CRN REPORT

Focal Report 3

Risk AnalysisRisk Communication in the Public Sector

Zurich, September 2009

Crisis and Risk Network (CRN)Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich

Commissioned by the Federal Office for Civil Protection (FOCP)

Supported by ISNCRN

Authors: Jennifer Giroux, Jonas Hagmann, Myriam Dunn Cavelty© 2009 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich.

Contact:Center for Security StudiesSeilergraben 45-49ETH ZürichCH-8092 ZürichSwitzerlandTel.: +41-44-632 40 25

crn@sipo.gess.ethz.chwww.crn.ethz.ch

Contracting entity: Federal Office for Civil Protection (FOCP) Project lead FOCP: Stefan Brem, Head Risk Analysis and Research Coordination Contractor: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich Project supervision ETH-CSS: Myriam Dunn, Head New Risks Research Unit, Andreas Wenger, Director CSS; Victor Mauer, Deputy Director CSS

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this focal report do not necessarily represent the official po-sition of the Swiss Federal Office for Civil Protection, the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection, and Sport or any other governmental body. They represent the views and inter-pretations of the authors, unless otherwise stated.

Purpose: As part of a larger mandate, the Swiss Federal Office for Civil Protection (FOCP) has tasked the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich with compiling “focal reports” (Fo-kusberichte) on critical infrastructure protection and on risk analysis to promote discussion and provide information about new trends and insights.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 4

1 RISK COMMUNICATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR .........................................................51.1 DefiningRiskCommunication ......................................................................................................... 51.2 TheNeed,Evolution,andUsefulnessofPublicRiskCommunication ..............................61.3 RiskCommunicationCaveats ..........................................................................................................8

2 RISK COMMUNICATION IN ACTION............................................................................... 102.1 BestPracticeRiskCommunicationModel .................................................................................102.2 TheProcessofFormulationandDispersion .............................................................................. 112.2.1 InternalFormulation–orFindingaConsensus ...................................................................... 122.2.2 ExternalFormulation–orOvercomingDifferentPerceptions ...........................................132.2.3 Dispersion ............................................................................................................................................... 14

2.3 ToolsforCommunicatingRisk ........................................................................................................ 162.3.1 Traditional Channels ........................................................................................................................... 162.3.2 ModernInformationCommunicationTechnology(ICT) ......................................................17

3 IMPLICATIONS FOR SWITZERLAND .................................................................................18

4 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................204.1 AcademicLiterature .......................................................................................................................... 204.2 GovernmentandPolicyDocuments .......................................................................................... 244.3 Websites ................................................................................................................................................. 26

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CRN REPORT Focal Report 3 – Risk Analysis

INTRODUCTION

Thisfocalreportdrawsa)ontherelativelyrecentaca-demicliteratureonriskcommunicationtodefineanddifferentiatetheconceptandb)onofficialriskcom-municationstrategypapers (inparticularstrategiesdevelopedbythegovernmentsofCanada,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates)toexaminehowriskcommunication is conducted today and to identifypractical challenges andpossible solutions to over-comethesechallenges.Itisstructuredasfollows:

1. In the first part, risk communication is defined,andadistinction ismadebetweenriskcommu-nicationontheonehandandcrisiscommunica-tionontheotherhand.ThevariouspublicpolicyfunctionsofRCarediscussedandcaveatsofriskcommunicationareidentified.

2. In the second part, a best-practice RC model ispresented. Two important aspects are distin-guished: a) formulation (internal and externalconstruction)ofriskmessagesandb)dispersiontothetargetaudience.Attheendofthesection,contemporaryriskcommunicationinstruments–rangingfromprintmediatotelevisionandinter-netservices–arehighlightedtoillustratethedi-versityofpossibleriskcommunicationstrategies.

3. Inthethirdpart,implicationsforSwitzerland,andinparticularforthenationalhazardanalysis“RiskSwitzerland”(RisikenSchweiz)areidentified.

4. In the fourth part, an annotated bibliographysummarises central academic articles, govern-mentreports,policydocumentsandwebsitesre-latedtoriskcommunication.

Theanalysisandevaluationofrisksandthreatsrel-evanttothecivilprotectionsystemisamongthekeyresponsibilities of the Swiss Federal Office for CivilProtection (FOCP).Aspart of a largermandate, theFOCPhastaskedtheCenterforSecurityStudies(CSS)atETHZurichwithproducing‘focalreports’(Fokusb-erichte)onriskandvulnerabilityanalysis.

The focal reports are compiled using the followingmethod: First, a ‘scan’ of the environment is per-formedwiththeaimofsearchingactivelyfor infor-mationthathelpstoexpandanddeepentheknowl-edgeandunderstandingoftheissueunderscrutiny.Thisisacontinuousprocessthatusesthefollowingsources:

� Internet Monitoring: New and/or relevant publi-cationsanddocumentswithafocusonriskandvulnerabilityanalysisareidentifiedandcollected.

� Science Monitoring:Relevantjournalsandarticlesareidentified,screened,andevaluated.

� Government Monitoring: Policy documents withrelevance to Switzerland from various countriesandfrominternationalinter-andnongovernmen-talorganizationsareidentified.

Second, thematerial thus collected is filtered, ana-lyzed,andsummarizedinthefocalreports.1

This focal report looks at risk communication (RC),which is an essential part of the riskmanagementcycle: RC contributes to the transparency of intra-governmentalriskanalysisprocesses,informstargetgroupsandthewiderpopulationabouttheexistenceandpossible effects of risks, andpromotesbroaderintra-governmental and public understanding andacceptanceofriskmanagementdecisions.

1 PreviousfocalreportscanbedownloadedfromthewebsiteoftheCrisisandRiskNetworkCRNathttp://www.crn.ethz.ch.

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1 RISK COMMUNICATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

In a very general sense, therefore, risk communica-tion refers to the exchange of information aboutthe existence and nature of specific risks amongstdifferentinterlocutors.Existingnarrowerdefinitionsof RC either a) emphasise the different collabora-torsofRCframeworks(actorperspective),orb)focusmore closelyon thepractical informativeeffectsofRCuponthepublic(effectsperspective).AnexamplefortheactorperspectiveisthedefinitionproposedbyriskcommunicationexpertWiliamLeiss,whodepictsRCas ‘theflowof informationand risk evaluationsbackandforthbetweenacademicexperts,regulatorypractitioners,interestgroupsandthegeneralpublic’.3 TheUnitedStatesDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,bycontrast,givesmoreemphasistotheeffectsper-spective, defining RC as ‘the exchange of informa-tionwiththegoalof improvingriskunderstanding,affectingriskperceptionand/orequippingpeopleorgroupstoactappropriatelyinresponsetoanidenti-fiedrisk’.4Notwithstandingdifferentemphases,inapublicpolicyperspective,RCincludesavarietyofgov-ernmentalandnon-governmentalinterlocutorsandaudiences,justasitincludesavarietyofkindsofRCpurposes,rangingfromthesimplestatementthatarisk exists togivingpractical advice onappropriateindividualbehaviour.

It is also important todistinguish risk communica-tionfromcrisiscommunication.Whilecrisiscommu-nication is geared towards overcoming challengesposedtoacompany/publicagencybyaneventthatoccursratherunexpectedly, that isoutsideanorga-nization’scontrol,and thatusuallyalsohas thepo-

3 Leiss,W.1996.ChallengesinRiskAssessmentandRiskMan-agement.Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science545:p.86.

4 UnitedStatesDepartmentofHomelandSecurity2008.DHS Risk LexiconWashington,D.C.,p.26.Similarly:French,S.etal.2005.SoftModellinginRiskCommunicationandManage-ment:ExamplesinHandlingFoodRisk.The Journal of the Operational Research Society56(8):pp.879-888.

Thischapterdefinestheconceptofriskcommunica-tion(RC), lookingbothatthevarietyofparticipantsinriskcommunicationandthedifferentkindsofad-visoryfunctionsthatriskcommunicationmayfulfil.Itdifferentiatesriskcommunicationfromcrisiscom-municationandrecapitulates the inherentlyunpre-dictablenatureof itsobject:risks.Thechapter thenexplains why RC is warranted and what its publicpolicyfunctionsare.ItalsoidentifiespossiblepitfallsofRCthatpolicy-makersshouldbeawareof.

1.1 DefiningRiskCommunication

Riskcommunicationisanessentialpartofriskman-agement. Riskmanagement canbe seenas a four-step cycle involving the identification of risks, theassessment/measurement of their possible effects,the preparation for the practical handling of risks,and theevaluationof these tools’effectiveness.Forevery step, communication plays a crucial role (seeFigure1).Riskcommunicationaimstodiscussthesevarious management steps with different kinds ofpublicandprivateinterlocutors,andtomakeitsfind-ingsanddecisionsaccessibletothepublic.RCisthusdirectlysupportiveofriskmanagement.

Figure 1: Integrated Risk Communication and Manage-ment Process2

2 BasedonUnitedKingdom.UK Resilience: Communicating Risk, p. 26.

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Whatthesehazardshaveincommonisthattheiref-fectsareoftendelayed,complex,and, therefore,dif-ficult topredict. Inmany cases, thesehazardshavefurthermore come to be recognised as products ofhumanindustrialactivityanddevelopment.6InSwit-zerland,too,thisawarenesswasfosteredbyaseriesofdomesticandinternationalevents.In1986,forin-stance, thecityofBaselonlyverynarrowlyescapedan industrial catastrophewhen a fire set chemicaldepotsablazeinSchweizerhalle.Inthe1990s,theap-pearanceofBovineSpongiformEncephalopathy(BSE,orcolloquialmad-cowdisease)togetherwiththein-creaseofCreutzfeldt–Jakobdiseaseandtheensuinguproaragainunderlinedhowfar-reaching,complex,but also difficult to forecast the effects ofmodernrisksare.Currently, themostprominentlydiscussedrisk is a global pandemic (in the form of avian orswineinfluenza–orahithertounknownvirus).

Today,thereisnotonlyawidespreadunderstandingthatchallengingcomplexrisksexist–thereisalsoabroad understanding that public authorities mustpreventively inform vulnerable groups about them,providing solutions and recommendations for ap-propriate risk-minimising individualbehaviour (‘riskliteracy’),ifpossible.Theriskliteracyconceptcanalsobeapplied toorganizations (includingpublic agen-cies) that need to handle internal or external risks.For example, schools, businesses, etc. develop theirowncontingencyplansfortheeventofaninfluenzapandemic. In the realmofpublic risks,anumberofgovernments,suchasthoseofCanadaortheUnitedKingdom,butalso internationalorganisations,suchastheWorldHealthOrganisation(WHO),havenowdeveloped comprehensive RC plans.7 Especially the

6 Beck, U. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity.London:Sage.

7 PublicHealthAgencyofCanada2006.The Strategic Risk Communication Framework.

tentialtocauseharmtotheagency’sreputation(incaseofmishandlingofthecrisis),RCdealswithlong-term, strategicmessages about possible threats orhazards and their likely adverse effects before theyoccur.Thus,theveryobjectofRCischaracterisedbyaspeciallogic:sincerisksarealwaysfuturepotentials,neither their exact occurrence nor their individualimpactsmaybeclearlyforecasted,eveninthecaseofriskswheretheprobabilityofoccurrencecanbeex-trapolatedstatisticallyfromtheirhistoricaltrackre-cords.Itisthedefiningcharacteristicofariskthatitisuncertainandrelativelyunpredictable.Inaddition,futurecoursesofactionstakenbypublicauthoritiesthemselvesmaydirectlyaffecttheexistence,occur-rence,andimpactofrisksaswell.5Seenthisway,RCisalwaysaboutthetransmissionofinformationabouthazardpotentialsthataredifficulttoassessorevenelusive. Consequently, risk communication ismuchvaguerandmoredifficulttojustifythancrisiscom-munication.Asamatteroffact,however,thecrucialtaskofgovernmentistodealwithrisks–beforetheybecomemanifest threats or hazards.The followingchapterswillshowthatthisfundamentalnatureofRC’sobjectposesparticular challenges to thewaysinwhichgovernmentalriskcommunicatorscan,may,and should inform the public, and towhat behav-iouralchangesRCmayeffectivelylead.

1.2 TheNeed,Evolution,andUsefulnessofPublicRiskCommunication

RCisarelativelyrecentgovernmentpractice.Itsad-vent largely reflects the popularisation of the riskconcept both in the social sciences and in publicpolicyinthelate1970s.Atthattime,theriskconceptemerged inparallel to an increasingpreoccupationwithhazardssuchashurricanes,industrialpollution,environmental degradation, or food contamination.

5 Luhmann,N.1991.Soziologie des Risikos.Berlin:deGruyter.

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Publicriskcommunicationhasavarietyoffunctions.TheUK government’s risk communication strategy,forexample, setsout theutilitiesofRC indetail. Inthisview,RChasfivebroaderfunctions:

� RChelpstopreventcrises(preventivefunction), � RCempowersthepublictomakebetterdecisionsaboutrisksindailylife(riskliteracyfunction),

� RC ensures smoother implementation of poli-ciesdesignedtotacklerisks(policylegitimisationfunction),

� RC reassures the public (panic reduction func-tion),and

� RCservestobuildtrust intheriskmanagementauthorities and the information they provide(trust-buildingfunction).10

Consideringthesefivefunctions,RCisahelpfultoolforthemitigationofthelikelyimpactofrisks.Byin-forming vulnerable groups about the existence ofrisks and aboutways to protect oneself, public au-thoritiesmayimprovethepopulation’slevelofsafe-ty. By transparently exposing the existence of risks,authorities can also use RC to address preventivelythoseanxietiesandfearsthatmayflareupintimesofactualcrisis.Thismaybothheightentherisklitera-cyandtheriskresilienceofsocietiesandimprovethespeedofreturntonormalityafteracrisis.Riskcom-munication, differently put, also serves awareness-buildingmoregenerally.

Sofar,riskcommunicationhasmainlybeenappliedin casesofnatural/environmentalor technicalhaz-ardsandnot incasesof “national security” (under-stoodhereas risks thatgobeyondday-to-daypoli-

tion: Theory and Practice.Oslo,DirectorateforCivilDefenceandEmergencyPlanning.

10 UnitedKingdom.UK Resilience: Communicating Risk, op. cit., p.7ff.

spread of avian influenza in 2005 stimulated thedevelopment of newnational and international RCstrategies.8

Compared to the 1970s, theways inwhich risk in-formation can or should be communicated to therespectiveaudienceshaveevolvedsignificantly.Backthen, RC primarily stressed the scientific expres-sionofriskestimates.Inotherwords,RCwaschieflyaboutconveyingtechnicalknowledgetothepublic,and thus about directing governmental regulatoryactionstowhat,fromascientificpointofview,werethemosturgent risks. In the 1980sandmid-1990s,however, recognising the limits of technical exper-tise transmission, the practice ofWestern govern-mentalriskcommunicationshiftedtoevaluationsofsuccessful communication. Subsequently, attentionturnedtothecredibilityandpersuasivenessofspeak-ers,broaderpublicriskperceptionproblems,andtheanalyticaltargetingof‘groupsatrisk’.Sincethemid-1990s,RChascometofocusevenmorestronglyonthesocio-culturalcontextsofaudiencegroups.Mov-ingawayfromthesimpletransmissionoftechnicalexpertknowledgeaboutrisks,theefficiencyofRCto-day isenhanced throughaback-and-forthdialoguewithmessage recipients. In thisway, contemporaryRCstrategiesacknowledgetheowninter-subjectiveinformationprocessingschemesoftheaudience.9

UnitedKingdom.UK Resilience: Communicating Risk, op.cit. Dora, Carlos 2006. Health, Hazards and Public Debate: Lessons

for Risk Communication from the BSE CJD Saga. World Health Organization.

8 Ottawa 2005. Global Pandemic Influenza Readiness: An International Meeting of Health Ministers.Communiqué.25October,p.2.

RAND. 2009. Risk Communication in the Early Stages of the H1N1 (Swine Flu) Alert: How Effective Were State and Local Public Health Departments? RAND Factsheet, p. 1.

9 Zimmerman,R.1984.AProcessFrameworkforRiskCommu-nication. Science, Technology, and Human Values12(3/4):pp.131-137.

Leiss 1996, op. cit., pp. 87-91. Drottz-Sjöberg,B.-M.2003.Current Trends in Risk Communica-

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� Providing the public or the media with highlytechnicalorcomplicatedmaterial.

� Ignoring the issues of greatest concern to thepublic.

� Appearingtohaveall theanswers inasituationofuncertainty.

However, there is another danger. In providing RC,publicauthoritiesmay‘overdo’it.Whenriskassess-ments are particularly uncertain, authorities havethetendencytowarntoooften,toolong,andontoohighalevel–accordingtothecredothatoneis‘bet-terpreparedthansorry’.Acaseinpointistheswineinfluenzaof2009(andtheavianflubeforethat).BySeptember2009thatinfluenzavirushadproliferatedbroadlybutitnotproventobeofhighestlethality.Yetthatviruscouldmutateatanypointintime,becom-ingtheoriginofanunseendeadlysuper-virus.Suchariskisdifficulttosharewiththebroaderpopulation,andassuch,someorganisations(suchastheWHO)havebeenquick,attimesalsobasedonpre-definedcriteria, to raise thealert to thehighest level. Foralongtime,asimilaroverreactionhadbeenobservedinthecaseofUSterrorismalerts,wherethenationalalertremainedalmostconstantlysetto‘levelorange’i.e. the secondhighestnationalalert level.Thiswillinvoluntarily lead to the “cry wolf” syndrome: be-cause of these (seemingly exaggerated) warnings,subsequentwarningswilllikelybequestionedbythepublicandmaynotbetakenseriouslyanymore.

Consideringtheseexamples,RCresemblesabalanc-ing act:When there is no risk communication, thepopulationmight be unprepared for dangers, or itmightfailtosupportofficialresponsestothem.How-ever,when there are too intensive alerts anda riskfails tomaterialize,publicauthoritiesmaysubstan-tially losecredibilityand trustworthiness, renderingRCmoredifficultinthefuture.Thisproblematiqueis

ticsintermsofeffectsandresourcesneeded),wherethere is a focus on crisis communication.The chal-lengeinthecaseofsecurityrisksisthattheirnaturediverges in some respects from the kinds of publicrisks discussed before: Individuals have much lessinfluenceoverwhetherornot toengagewithase-curityrisk–suchasterrorismoraninternationaldip-lomaticcrisis–intheireverydaylife.Individualsmayavoidcrowdedplacesand‘dangerous’traveldestina-tions,buttheycannotactuallydecidewhethertheybecomethetargetofterrorismornot-whereastheycandecideas towhether theywant tobuildhous-esclose towater.Buteven if individual risk literacymaynotbeachievable in the realmof security, riskcommunication can contribute to security politicsnonetheless. RC canadvance societal resilience (forexample, incaseofaterrorattack),anditmayhelptoovercomecrisesfaster.Inaddition,RCcanensurethatactionsduringthecrisisarelegitimizedandfindgreater acceptance. In the absence of communica-tion, it ismore likely that thepublicwillnotacceptorunderstandpoliticaldecisions,orthattheywillbeperceivedasill-plannedpanicreactions.Thismakesitlikelythatpublicsupportwillbewithdrawnandthestrategic options of political actorswill be reducedsignificantly.

1.3 RiskCommunicationCaveats

There are numerous potential problems when en-gaging in RC. The UK Resilience: CommunicatingRisk-report identifies six (communication technical)pitfallsthatneedtobeavoided:11

� Causingconcern,alarm,orevenpanicthroughbe-ing(too)openandfrank.

� Givingover-categoricalassurances. � Leavinginformationgaps.

11 Idem, p. 61.

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allthemorechallenginggiventhattheeffectivenessofRCisdifficulttomeasureinactualcases.Towhatextent exactly RC serves to prepare the populationagainstdangers,andtowhatextentRCcanimprovethereturn tonormalcyonceariskhasmaterializedis difficult to assess. In a systemwith political ac-countability,however,opendialogueaboutthemostimportantcurrentrisksisindispensible.ConsideringthelimitsinherenttoRC,itisthusnecessaryforriskcommunicators toaddress the limitsof knowledgeand preparation directly.

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2 RISK COMMUNICATION IN ACTION

this model, there are three main actors – sources,transmitters, and receivers – all ofwhommaintaindifferent roles, yet increasingly interact with eachother(forexamplesforeachcategory,refertoTable1).Inatraditionalsense,sourcestypicallyalerttrans-mitters to risks through various publishing outlets(such as reports, press releases, books, or personalinteraction). In turn, transmitters relyonawidear-rayoftools(suchaswebsites,newspapers,brochures,billboards, television, and radio) to communicateidentifiedriskstothetargetedaudienceandbroaderpublicinthehopeofcreatingbehaviouralresponse.Today, interactionbetweentheroles ishighand in-creasinglydynamicinaworldthatisequippedwithmoreinformationexchangeopportunities.

Figure 2: Communication Model13

Interestingly,while thismodel has remainedpopu-lar amongst risk communicators, the practices ofriskcommunicationhavegonethrough3significantphases over the years.14 These phases represent nota-bleshiftsincommunicationstrategythathavetakenthe process from a one-way delivery pathway (i.e.,messagefromtransmittertoreceiver)toathree-wayexchange between the sources, transmitters, andtarget audience (also see Figure 2).During the late1970s, phase 1wasmainly preoccupiedwith trans-mittingprobabilisticscenariosandriskcomparisons

of Communication.Urbana:UniversityofIllinoisPress.

13 AdaptedfromRenn2008,p.209

14 Leiss 1996, op. cit.

This section will delve deeper into examining theprocessofriskcommunication,firstcallingattentiontoabest-practiceRCmodelbuiltonthebasisofthereviewed literature,whichwill informthefollowingdiscussiononformulation(internalandexternalcon-struction)ofriskmessagesanddispersion.Toolsusedinriskcommunicationarepresentedattheendofthesection.InreviewinggovernmenteffortsinthefieldofRC,significantattentionisplacedonconstructingriskcommunicationstrategiesthatpossessthreesig-nificant characteristics: Internal cohesion on termsandidentifiedrisks,engagementandexchangewithtarget audience, and information-sharing through-outtherelevantsectors.Aswillbehighlightedinthefollowing, in the government documents surveyed,Canada and theUnited States, notably, havemadevaryingeffortstodevelopaninternal(withingovern-mentdepartments)understandingofriskandreachaconsensusonthedefinitionofkeyterms(suchasrisk,riskcommunication,riskmanagement,etc.).

However, inorder tocreateanRCstrategy thatwillbeembracedandusefulforthetargetaudience,riskcommunicatorsneed toengage inandfacilitateanexchange with concerned individuals. Section 2.2.2delves more deeply into the necessity of this ex-changesothatcommunicatorsdeliverriskmessagesthataddressrealhazardsaswellasthoserisksthatareperceivedwithinthecommunity.

2.1 BestPracticeRiskCommunicationModel

Riskmanagerscontinuetorelyonabasiccommuni-cationmodel(seeFigure2),whichwasinitiallydevel-opedinthe1940sbyShannonandWeaver.12 Within

12 Renn, O. 2008. Risk Governance: Coping with Uncertainty in a Complex World.EarthscanPublicationsLtd,p.208.Thismodelcontinuestobethemostpopularframeworkthatriskman-agersuse.

Cf.Shannon,C.andWeaver,W.1949. The Mathematical Theory

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Anumberoffactorsmustbeconsideredwhendevel-oping a risk communication strategy.These factorsinclude:identifyingactorswithintheriskcommuni-cationprocess,formulatingriskmessages,communi-cating the saidmessages to the targetedaudienceand selecting the tools available to facilitate thatprocess.Inthenextchapter,wefocusontheprocessofformulationofmessagesandtheirdispersion.This

process isat theheartofeveryriskcommunicationstrategy.

2.2 TheProcessofFormulationandDispersion

Before risk messages can be communicated to abroaderaudience(“dispersed”),thespecificaudienc-esmustbeidentified.

Figure 3 identifies the three-step RC process to bediscussed in this section, while preceding Table 1suggests ideal-typical combinations of sources,transmittersandtargetaudiencesofRC.Withintheformulation phase, internal and external risk mes-sage construction involves facilitating informationexchange amongst risk professionals and then de-veloping the messages to be externally communi-cated. Ineachstep, riskcommunicatorsmust reachageneralconsensusontheriskstobeaddressedandcommunicated,whichcomeswithconsiderablechal-lenges,ashighlightedinthefollowing.

toatargetedcommunity.Thiswaslargelyunsuccess-ful, as “peoplewereunwilling to abstract from thecontext of risk-taking and the corresponding socialconditionsandtheyalsorejectedtherelianceonex-pectedvaluesastheonlybenchmarksforevaluatingrisk.”15Inotherwords,peoplewerenotabletorelatetoandembracethemessagesbeingcommunicatedtothem.

Table 1: Ideal-typical categories within the risk commu-nication model16

Phase2emerged in the late 1980sandwasknownasa strategyofpersuasion.Theanti-smokingcam-paign, forexample, sought to convince thebroaderpublic that smoking was ultimately poor for thehealthandnotsociallyacceptable.Bothphaseswerecharacterisedbytheone-waydeliverypathwaymen-tioned above. Unique to the current third phase isthatitencouragesanexchangebetweenthetrans-mitterofriskmessagesandthereceiver. It isrecog-nized that an open dialogue in order to achieve apublicconsensusonanacceptablelevelofriskisanessential component to effective dispersion of riskmessages and implementation of risk mitigationprotocol.Moreover, such all-actor risk identificationactivitiesreinforceefforts toraisepublicawarenessofrisksandtheirlocalimpacts.

15 Renn 2008, op. cit., p. 201.

16 Idem, p. 210.

Sources Transmitters ReceiversPublicAgencies PublicInstitutions TargetedAudienceScienceCommunities Media GeneralPublicThink Tanks Opinion Leaders GeneralPublicInterestGroups InterestGroups GroupMembersIndividuals(public) Individuals(public) Individuals(exposed)

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from a collectively agreed-upon set of definitions,understandings, and shared concepts within therisk domain. For example, Canada’s Public HealthAgencyandtheDHS,respectively,haveidentifiedkeydefinitionsof common, agreed-upon termsused inriskmanagementandriskcommunications.20How-ever, identifying and agreeing upon a set of terms,especiallyacrossmultipleagencies, canbedifficult.The DHS achieved this by creating a Risk LexiconWorkingGroup (RLWG) and followed the followingprocedure:21

1. Collection:TermswerecollectedfromacrossDHSandtheriskcommunity.

2. Taxonomy Development: Terms were organizedaccording to the concepts they represent, facili-tatingconsistentdefinitionsforrelatedterms.

3. Harmonization:Multiple,oftenconflicting,defini-tionswereharmonizedtoproduceasinglemean-ingforeachterm.

4. Validation, Review, and Normalization: Harmo-nizeddefinitionswerevalidatedagainstanum-berofnon-DHSsourcestoensurethatthedefini-tionsproducedforuseinDHSareconsistentwiththoseusedbythelargerriskcommunity.ProposeddefinitionswereprovidedtotheentireRLWGforcomment.Commentswereadjudicatedanddefi-nitionsstandardizedforgrammarandformat.

Finally,withan internal communicationplanandasharedunderstandingofconceptsinplace,riskpro-fessionals should aim to further develop relation-shipswith those identifiedwithin the broader riskcommunitysoastoimprovetrustandpositivelyrein-forcerelationship-building.Forexample,increatingastrategy tocommunicate thepotentiallyunpredict-

20 PublicHealthAgencyofCanada2006,op. cit.,pp.18ff.;UnitedStatesDepartmentofHomelandSecurity2008,op. cit.

21 Idem,p.3.

Figure 3: 3-step RC process with feedback loops

2.2.1 Internal Formulation – or Finding a Consensus

In formulating an RC plan, risk professionals mustfirst identify all relevant stakeholders within theirown organisation (‘internal space’). In addition topolicy-makers and government officials, scientists,technical,andlegalstaff,thisincludesriskassessorsandmanagers.17Withintheseareas,communicationmust be able to flow to encourage the identifica-tionofriskandinternalconsistencyaroundtheriskmessagesthataretobecommunicatedtoabroader,external audience. In this regard, creating Informa-tion Sharing Plans (ISP) can aid in the process ofidentifyingstakeholdersanddevisingastrategicriskcommunication strategy. For example, the US De-partment of Homeland Security (DHS) establishedthe information-sharing network to enhance theprotectionofcriticalinfrastructureandkeyresources(CIKR).18Thiseffort isapartof theFederal Informa-tionSharingEnvironment(ISE),whichisdedicatedto“improvinginformationsharingbetweenandamongFederal,State,andlocalgovernmentandtheprivatesector”.19Thiseffortisgroundedinaplanthatiden-tifiedrelevantactorsandcreatedastrategyaroundcommunicatingrisksandsharinginformation.

Second, devising an internal RC plan can also en-courage the process of developing a common ‘risk’lexicon, so that internal stakeholders are operating

17 Idem, p. 202.

18 UnitedStatesDepartmentofHomelandSecurity.National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Information Sharing.

19 Idem, p. 1.

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Thisinteractionbetweenperceptionandactualhaz-ardsisnotonlyhighlightedintheacademicliteraturesurveyed for this report, but also found in govern-mentdocuments.Forexample,theUnitedKingdomEnvironmentAgencyRiskTeam’sguideonriskcom-munication notes that “[i]ndividuals can have verydifferentperspectivesonrisks,”whichcandifferfromthemessagesbeingdeliveredbytheriskcommuni-cator.25 Canada’s Strategic Risk CommunicationsFramework andHandbook also identifies the influ-ence that perception has on the riskmanagementmilieu.26Hence,whencraftingmessages,theyshouldnotonlybespecificallytailoredtothetargetedaudi-ence,butalsobetestedonasmallgroupinordertomeasurereceptivenessandeffectiveness.Forexam-ple,tolearnaboutindividualviews,Canadianhealthofficialsassessstakeholder(external)perceptionsofrisksbydrawinguponformalandinformalresearchmethods27thataimtodetermineneeds,issues,inter-ests, and priorities28 Inparticular, the following fac-torsaremeasured:

� Assumptionsandvaluesoftargetedcommunity. � Views about risks (people differ in terms of theriskstheyarewillingtoaccept).

� Levelofcommunitytrustwithriskcommunicator/sandsourcesofriskinformation.

Asthelastpointhighlights,trustplaysasignificantrole:Riskcommunicatorsmusthavethetrustofthe

25 UnitedKingdomEnvironmentAgencyRiskTeam.Understan-ding risk and risk Communication, p. 3.

26 Inthisdocument,‘riskperception’isdefinedas“People’sunderstandingoftherisksandbenefitsassociatedwithaneventoralternativecoursesofaction.Thismayincludetheirassessmentofthelimitsoftheirunderstandingoftherisksandbenefits.”PublicHealthAgencyofCanada2006,op. cit., p. 19.

27 Formalresearchmethodsinvolvefocusedinterviews,where-Formalresearchmethodsinvolvefocusedinterviews,where-asinformalmethodsaresemi-structuredconversations.

28 Ibidem,pp.12f.

ableeffectsofclimatechangetoasmallcommunity(such as flash flooding from heavy bouts of rain),riskmanagersandassessorscanrefertothesciencecommunity for informationon the issuewhilealsoworkingcloselywithinternalstaffandpolicy-makersto furtherarticulate the issue tobe transmitted toabroader audience.After the internal environmenthasreachedaconsensusontheidentifiedrisksandrespectiveroles,professionalscanthenturntostep2,whichconcernstheexternalenvironment.

2.2.2 External Formulation – or Overcoming Different Perceptions

Having established strong internal communica-tion and shared understanding, riskmanagers canbegin formulating an external risk communicationplan that identifiesmessages to be delivered. Thistask, however, brings with it significant challengesduetothedifferingriskperceptions.Riskperceptionis commonly regarded as a fusion between actualhazards and the individual and social perceptionsof risks,whichare influencedby “psychological, so-cial, institutional,andcultural”processesandexpe-riences.22 Peter Sandman further explains that theriskdynamicisactuallyacombinationofhazardandoutrage views, where “experts respond to hazardandthepublicrespondstooutrage”23.Sandmanusestheexampleofthepublic‘outrage’thatpeoplehadwhenCoca-Colachangeditsformulaorthecriticismthatemergedregardinggeneticallymodifiedfoods;noting thatwhilenobodywas indanger (i.e., therewasnoapparentimmediaterisk),publicandprivateagenciesstillneededtorespondtotheseconcerns.24

22 Renn 2008, op. cit.,pp.214f.

23 Reeves, C. 2007. Managing Outrage and Crises: Dealing with risk by understanding your audience.GuelphFoodTechnologyCentre(GFTC),p.49.

24 Ibidem.

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andindividualsmayplacegreatertrustintheirownexperience,or thatof friendsandneighbours, thaninofficialRCmessages.Publicauthoritieshaverecog-nisedthatratherthanbrushingsuchpublicconcernsasideas‘uninformed’,‘ideological’,‘irrational’,or‘un-scientific’, it is better to address the differentiatedsocio-cultural contextsuponwhichdifferent targetaudiences are actually basing their decisions.31 As theeffectivenessofRCdependsonitsechowithre-cipientsandnotonitsauthoritativeformalscientificcomponents,riskmessageshavetobedispersedac-cordingtoindividualtargetgroupsanddesignedac-cordingtotherationalityoftherespectivesocio-cul-turalmilieu.TheeffectivedispersionofRCmessagesis thusunderstoodtorelyonfoursub-components,namely the differentiation and stratification of RCtargetgroups,theanalysisoftargetgroupmeaningsandlogics,theselectionandseizureofcommunica-tion intermediaries,and theestablishmentanduseoffeedbackmechanisms.

First, the dispersion of risk messages relies on theclear differentiation and stratification of RC targetgroups.32 The United Kingdom government, for in-stance,proposesadistinctionbetween

� thosewhicharedirectlyexposedtoarisk; � thosetowhomvulnerablepeoplewillturnforad-vice(e.g.,medicalprofessionalsfollowingahealthscare);

� peoplewhoneedtobeinformedofissuesinad-vanceofwiderpublicity(e.g.,relativesofaccidentvictims);

31 Garland, D. 2003. The Rise of Risk.In:RiskandMorality.Ericson,R.andDoyle,A.Toronto:TorontoUniversityPress,pp.48-86.

32 Blake,E.1995.UnderstandingOutrage:HowScientistsCanHelpBridgetheRiskPerceptionGap.Environmental Health Perspectives103(6):pp.123ff.;CrisisandRiskNetwork(CRN)2003. Risk and Crisis Communication - CRN-Workshop Report Oslo, Norway, 2003.Zurich,CenterforSecurityStudies(CSS).

targetedcommunity inorder for theirmessages tobereceivedpositively.Globally,duetotheincreaseofconstant informationflows through the rise of 24-hourtelevision,amplificationofriskbythemedia,29 andthe internet, thepublic ispresentedwithmoredispersedinformationaboutrisksthatmayinfluenceperceptionsand,insomecases,contradictriskmes-sagesbeingcommunicatedbypublicagencies.Regu-latoryscandals,suchastheaforementionedUKandEuropeanBSEcrises,canalso taintpublic trustandinfluenceperception.Thus,riskcommunicatorsmustcarefully identify and assess the respective targetgroups,theymustcautiouslydesigninformativeandreassuringmessages, and theymustwisely choosedifferent channels and strategies for information-sharing.Atthesametime,giventhatRCisnotcrisiscommunication, risk communicators must neithercreate panic amongst their audiences, nor shouldtheycreateasenseoffatiguewithpublicwarningsaltogether.30Takingintoaccounttheaforementionedelementswillhelpofficialsdeterminethetypeofau-dience(e.g.,smallfarmingcommunity,suburb,etc.),levels of trust, andgeneral perceptions about risks,andultimatelyinformtheriskmessagestobecom-municatedfrombothagovernmentalandcommu-nity perspective.

2.2.3 Dispersion

It isconventionalwisdomtoday thatgovernmentalRC does not automatically transform popular riskperception:Subjectiveimpressionscanbestrong,au-thoritativeclaimsmayberegardedwithscepticism,

29 Giddens, A. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity.Cambridge:Polity Press.

30 Freedman,Lawrence2005.ThePoliticsofWarning:TerrorismandRiskCommunication.Intelligence and National Security 20(3):pp.379-418;Handmer,J.andJames,P.2007.TrustUsandBeScared:TheChangingNatureofContemporaryRisk.Global Society21(1):pp.119-130.

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media landscape (local/national, print/radio/televi-sion, weeklies/dailies, etc.) itself and its respectivebusinesslogicsandformats(boulevard/mainstreammedia, etc.).The last aspect in particularmay alterthe public receptiveness to risk communication, asthevarioustypesofmediaoutletsmayaddanotherimportant layerof informationfilters to theRCdis-persion process.35

The fourthcomponentof theRCdispersionprocessincludes feedback loops such as public meetings,telephonehotlines,orinternetchat-rooms.Feedbackloopsservethreebroaderpurposes:1)Theyservetoprovide the public with communication channelsthroughwhichtovoicetheirconcerns;2)theyallowriskcommunicatorsbettertounderstandthecontex-tualconcernsofrespectivetargetgroups;and3)theyhelptoassesstheactualeffectivenessoftheoriginalRCmessages.36Withthis,RCitselfcanbemonitoredandifnecessaryadapted.

During thedispersionstage, tools thatcanbeusedtocommunicateriskmessagesshouldbeidentified.Asurveyofgovernmenteffortsondispersionactivi-ties reveals that current RC efforts are dominatedbyinitiativestoprovideriskguidelinesforstateandnon-stateactors(individuals,businesses,etc.).Somestatesandorganizationsareusingmoreinteractive,moderntechnologytoolstoengagewithstakehold-ers,butataminimum,mosthaveproducedwrittenmaterials37 and/or constructed topical websites.38

35 Renn 2008, op. cit., pp. 205-222.

36 Idem, pp. 242-271.

37 E.g.Italy:DipartimentoDellaProtezioneCivile.2008.The Civil Protection Handbook for Families;Germany:BundesamtfürBevölkerungsschutzundKatastrophenhilfe.2007.Für den Notfall vorgesorgt – Vorsorge und Eigenhilfe in Notsituationen.

38 E.g.Austria:http://www.sicherheitsinformationszentrum.at;Canada:http://www.getprepared.gc.ca;France:http://www.prim.net;UK:http://www.preparingforemergencies.gov.uk.

� thosewhoarenotdirectlyinvolved,butmightbedeeplyaffected(e.g.,touristorganisationsduringthefootandmouthcrisisintheUnitedKingdom);

� thestaffinallorganisationsaffected; � themedia,whomaybevitalalliesindisseminat-inginformationquickly.33

Second,effectiveRCdispersionisgroundedindetailedanalysesof targetgroupmilieumeaningsand log-ics.GovernmentalRCmessagesshould‘makesense’to each targetgroup individually. In order todo so,messagesshouldnotonlybedesignedtoprovidethekindofinformationrequiredbyeachtargetgroupassuch–theyshouldalsobebroughtintunewiththeirrespectiveculturalbeliefs,folkwisdoms,andorgani-sational logics.34 Such adaptation notwithstanding,messagesmustalwaysbekeptcoherent.

Third,RCdispersionusuallyalsoreliesoncommuni-cationintermediaries.Sinceriskcommunicatorsareoftenunabletoreachtargetgroupsthemselves,theymustmakeuseof ‘transmitters’ to leverage the in-formationdispersionprocess.Tobeeffectiveindoingso, thechoiceof transmitters shouldcorrespond tothe target groups’ socio-cultural preferences.Threeaspects have to be recognised in this selection: 1)risk communicators have to respect the differenti-atedreceptivenessoftargetgroupingstothediver-sityofavailablecommunicationchannels;2)inorderto avoid alarming thebroaderpublic audience, riskcommunicators should carefully mix active withpassive forms of communication; 3) whenworkingthrough communication intermediaries, risk com-municatorsmustrecogniseboththediversityofthe

33 UnitedKingdom.UKResilience:CommunicatingRisk,op. cit., p. 48.

34 Drottz-Sjöberg2003,op. cit.;Baker,F.1990.RiskCommunica-tionaboutEnvironmentalHazards.Journal of Public Health Policy11(3):pp.353.

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of information,butalso theexchangebetween thecommunicatorandtheaudience.

2.3.1 Traditional Channels

Radio,television(TV),publicevents,andwrittenmate-rialconstitutethetraditionalchannelsthatriskcom-municatorscanusetoreachoutreceivers.Toaddressthe H1N1 influenza, for example, the Swiss FederalHealth Office (BAG) created the “Together AgainsttheFlu”informationcampaign,whichincludedtele-visionadsfeaturingcomedianandpopularnationalfigureBeatSchlatter.40IntheTVsegments,Mr.Schlat-tercallsonthepublictowashtheirhandsandstayathomewhenexperiencingafeverorotherflusymp-toms.Thiswasonlyoneelementinamulti-faceted,multi-lingual risk communication strategy to com-bat influenza infection, whose effects were at thetimestillawaitedtomaterialiseinSwitzerland.

Figure 4: Beat Schlatter in TV commercial for “Together Against the Flu” campaign

Public meetings and lectures are another way ofbringingpeopletogethertobecomemoreinformed,discuss, and raise questions to risk communica-tors. Such gatherings can also be an effective wayforofficialstomeasurecommunityresponsetoriskmessagesaswellasgetasenseofother risks thatthe community perceives to be significant. At suchevents, officials can distributewritten communica-

40 Kampf gegen die Schweinegrippe: Bund schickt Komiker Schlat-ter vor. Tages-Anzeiger, 27.07.2009.

Austria,France,Germany, Italy, theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates,forinstance,havealloutlinedpossible emergencies and specific preparation andresponsemeasures for stakeholders to follow. Thismovetoshare,andincreasinglyexchange,riskinfor-mationultimatelyestablishesa long-termstrategicrisk communication process that encourages pub-lic discourse on risks and their consequences. Suchpublic outreach can also positively feed into com-munityempowermentandresilience-building.Asanexample, international organizations like theWorldHealthOrganization (WHO) areutilizing innovativedispersiontechniques,manyofwhichencouragetheinteractionbetween the threeRCplayers identifiedinTable 1.TheGlobalOutbreakAlert and ResponseNetwork(GOARN),forinstance,gathersinformationonpotentialhealthemergenciesfromformalsources(publichealthagencies, scientists, etc.),butalso re-liesonfeedbackfrominformalsources(individuals)whoaretypicallythereceiversofriskmessages.39 The followingsectionprobesmoredeeplyintothetoolsthatcanbeusedtocommunicaterisk.

2.3ToolsforCommunicatingRisk

Toolsforcommunicatingrisk togglebetweentradi-tional andmoremodern forms; both of which areeffective and when used together create a morecomprehensive approach. More traditional toolsavailabletoriskcommunicatorsinclude:radio,print(newspapers and magazines), television, and com-munitymeetingswhereattendeescanreceivefliers,brochures,andotherinformationmaterials.Moderntoolsrefertotheadvancesmadeininformationcom-municationtechnology(ICT),wheretheinternetandthe interactive tools available within this domainofferanewspaceinwhichtoreachpeople.Further-more, these tools encourage not only the delivery

39 http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en

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andmicro-blogs(e.g.Twitter),andonlinephoto(e.g.Flickr) and video-sharing (e.g. YouTube) sites. Net-working sites such as Facebook andMySpace havebecome increasinglypopularas theyallowusers toswitch between the role of audience and contentproviders.

TheReutersAlertNet41 service isanexcellentexam-ple of how the internet can be used to communi-cateemergingrisks in thehealth,food,andconflictdomains.Whileitstargetaudienceconsistsofreliefprofessionals, the site isopen to thepublicandat-tractsmorethanthreemillionvisitorsayear,manyofwhomsubscribetoaweeklye-mailnewsletter.Gov-ernment-sponsoredwebsitesdesignedtocommuni-cateriskshavebecomeincreasinglypopular.The“To-getherAgainsttheFlu”42website,forinstance,offersinformationonsymptomsandprevention.Similarly,the“UKResilience”websitefeatureshealthinforma-tion, in addition to other risks and provides visitors useful resources. During the United States-based2008/09 outbreak of salmonella in peanut butter,theHealthandHumanServicesDepartmentandtheCenterforDiseaseControl(CDC)usedICT,withem-phasisonsocialmedia,towarnthepublicaboutin-fection.Authoritiescreditthebroadcommunicationandoutreachstrategywiththefactthatthenumberofinfectionswaslimitedto500people.43

Figure 6: Online tools with interactive functions.

41 http://www.alertnet.org

42 http://www.pandemia.ch

43 Nagesh,G.2009.Agencies used social media to manage sal-monella outbreak.Nextgov.9February.

tionintheformoffliers,brochures,andothersimilaritems.Whilein-persondispersionisoneoption,writ-tenmaterials canbedelivered tohomes, circulatedduringameetingorpostedinpopularvenues,suchas the local foodmarket.Billboardsarealsoa formofwrittencommunicationthatcancallattentiontoarisk.Forexample,thecampaigntoraiseawarenessoftheadverseeffectsofsmokingcigarettesandul-timatelydecrease thenumberof cigarette smokershasresultedinnumerousbillboards(bothfixedandmobile) being featured in highly frequented areas(seeFigure5).

Figure 5: From Left to Right: Cigarette package with warning; mobile billboard; H1N1 flier; CDC H1N1 poster.

2.3.2 Modern Information Communication Technology (ICT)

ICT refers to technology that can record,broadcast,and communicate information. Traditional ICTs in-cludetelevisionandradio,whilemodernICTsconsistofmobilephonesandcomputers,whichhaveopenedthe gateway to the internet and e-mail. All thesetoolscanbeusedinRCactivitiesand,infact,expandthe opportunities for exchange and dialogue; thegoalbeingtospreadinformationbeforeariskmani-festsitselfasacrisis.

Websites,forinstance,offeraplatformtoprovidevis-itorswith,typically,staticinformation,whereasmoredynamicsocialmediatools,commonlyreferredtoasWeb2.0features,enhancetheopportunityforinter-actionbetweensources, transmitters,andreceivers.Socialmediaincludethefollowing:blogs(weblogs)

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3 IMPLICATIONS FOR SWITZERLAND

thestageofofficialdispersion,giventhatitisstillintheinternalformulationstage.

InorderfortheFOCPtobesuccessfulintheseendea-vours,thefollowingpointsshouldbeconsidered:

First, Risiken Schweiz looksatagreatvarietyofverydifferent risks, ranging from technical to environ-mental tonationalsecurityrisks.AnoverarchingRCstrategy would have to take into account that RCaimsdifferdependingonthetypeofriskthatiscom-municated: variance in audience, type of risk, goalsandcommunicationchannelsshouldbefactoredin.

Second,existingRCactivities inSwitzerlandarenotcentralized,butfragmentedandcompartmentalizedthroughoutthecantonalandfederaladministration.Amongother things, this isdue to thenecessityofmanagingrisksatthemostappropriateand,prefera-bly,atthelowestpossiblelevelofauthority.Theques-tioniswhethertheseRCactivitiescanandshouldbecentralizedtosomedegreethroughRisiken Schweiz, becauseclearresponsibilitiesaswellasgenerallyac-ceptedRCstrategieshelpintheRCprocess.Thean-swer to thisquestiondepends toa largedegreeonthefinal product ofRisiken Schweiz (a national riskand vulnerability analysis). Such an analysis shoulddefinitelybe an elementof anational security andsafetydialogue.Inkeepingitscoordinatingrole,theFOCPcouldissueguidelinesandgeneralrecommen-dationstothosewhotakepartinRisiken Schweiz and arealreadyengagedinRC.Furthermore,itcouldpro-videeducationalmeasuresfor those interestedandengage in the preparation of specific RC exerciseswith thehelpofexternalexpertsorotherpartnerswithinthefederaladministration.Itcouldalsofosterresearch into various underexplored aspects of RC.Finally, it couldalsoensure thatotheragenciescanlearnfromthoseeffortsintheareaofriskdialogue

Risk communication is among the aims of the na-tional hazard analysis “Risk Switzerland” (RisikenSchweiz)coordinatedbytheFOCP:Apartfromdocu-mentingtheriskstothepopulationandthusempow-ering sectoral risk management strategies, Risiken Schweizalsoaimstoa)promotedialogueaboutriskbetweenpublic authorities,many ofwhich engageinriskmanagementactivitiesthemselvesandb)in-formand sensitize the population.These two aimsarepromotedbyseveraloftheaspectsdiscussedinthisfocalreport.

� Promote dialogue about risk between public au-thorities: Ultimately, the goal is to establish abroad practice of information exchange in theframework of an expert network and to fosterconsistentunderstandingsofrisks,whichinitselfserves as basis for further public planning andpreparation activities. This is partly congruentwith what was discussed above in Section 2.2.1on Internal Formulation. However, there is alsoadispersionaspectinvolvedinthis:risksmaybecommunicatedtopublicagenciesnotdirectlyin-volved in themanagementof risks –orRCmaybenecessarytofamiliarizepublicauthoritieswithriskstheydonotnormallydealwith.Risiken Sch-weizhasbeenengagedin‘internalformation’forawhile now,mainly through itsworking group.With the Forum Risiken Schweiz where repre-sentativesfromCantons,privatesectorandaca-demiameet theFOCPhascreatedaplatformtoalsoengageinexternalRC.

� Inform and sensitize the population:Effortsinthisarea are directed towards sponsoring of discus-sionsabout‘acceptablerisks’,orratherwhatlevelofsafetycanbereachedatwhatprice.Thismostcloselyfitswhatwasdiscussedundertheheadingof‘dispersion’.Risiken Schweiz has not yet reached

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thatarealreadyunderway–suchasPLANAT(Nation-alPlatformforNaturalHazards)44andPandemia.ch.

Third, within the federal and cantonal administra-tion,thereismuchmoreawarenessofcrisiscommu-nication,whichisalsoreflectedinthemanpowerorresourcesallocated,aswellasinthenumberofexer-cisesortrainingsconducted.Asmentioned,RCisfarmoredifficult to justify than crisis communication.Inconnectionwiththenationalriskandvulnerabilityanalysis,theFOCPcouldbecomeanadvocateoftheneedformoreandbetterRCthroughoutthefederaladministration – and could strengthen the preven-tiveaspectofRC,complementarytoalreadyexistingcrisismanagementstructuresinthecantons,aswell.

44 http://www.planat.ch

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4 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

ingrolesofclassandgenderinanewworkenviron-ment;andthepolitics(bothpersonalandpublic)ofthe risk society.

Blake, Elinor R. (1995). “Understanding Outrage: How Scien-tists Can Help Bridge the Risk Perception Gap.” Environmen-tal Health Perspectives 103(6): 123ff.

The popular press often portrays environmentalhealthrisksasbeingmorealarmingthanmostscien-tistswouldportraythem–ittendstopresenttheserisks from the general public’s perspective.This ar-ticledescribeshowtheviewsofscientistsandthoseofthepublicdiffer,givinganexampleofhowthegapbetweentheseviewscanbebridged.

Crisis and Risk Network (CRN) (2003). Risk and Crisis Com-munication - CRN Workshop Report, Oslo 2003. Zurich, Cen-ter for Security Studies (CSS).

One of the main intentions in holding this expertworkshop was to focus on the many challengeswhen itcomes toactiveuseof riskcommunicationandcrisiscommunication.Goodandwell-developedcommunicationskillsarenecessarytodeliverames-sage that will be noticed and understood. For thesenderof informationabouta riskoracrisis situa-tion,thechallengeliesincommunicatinganimage,whichhopefullytherecipientoftheinformationwillalso‘see’andperceiveinthesamewayasthesender.ThisCRNReportcollectsthestatementsandpresen-tationsmadebyworkshopparticipantsontheseriskcommunicationchallenges.

This annotated bibliography contains a number ofacademicarticles, government reports, policydocu-ments,andrelatedwebsitesfromthescandescribedintheintroductiontothisfocalreport.

4.1 AcademicLiterature

Baker, F. (1990). “Risk Communication about Environmental Hazards.” Journal of Public Health Policy 11(3): 341-359.

Thisarticlebrieflydescribesthedevelopmentofthenew field of risk communication of environmentalhazards, defining the term ‘risk communication’.Subsequently, eight basic steps in risk communica-tion are discussed, including: 1) risk assessments;2) the settingofgoals; 3) theassessmentof targetaudiences;4)theassessmentofrespectivesocio-cul-turalcontexts;5)theselectionofcommunicationap-proaches;6)theconstructionofcommunicationsassuch;7)theimplementationofriskprograms;and8)theevaluationofriskcommunicationeffects. Inde-scribingeachstep,therelevantliteratureconcerningriskcommunicationisreviewed.

Beck, Ulrich (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London Sage.

Arguingthatsocietiesarefacinganewkindofmo-dernity typified by reflexivity, Beck provides a co-herentanddetailedpictureof currentdirectionsofglobal social change. Underpinning the analysis isthenotionofthe‘risksociety’.Thechangingnatureof society’s relation to production and distribution,it isargued, is related to theenvironmental impactasatotalizing,globalizingeconomybasedonscien-tificandtechnicalknowledgebecomesmorecentraltosocialorganizationandsocialconflict.Withinthisframework,Beckdevelopsanoverviewofother keyelementsofcurrentsocialdevelopment;thecentral-ityofthepoliticaleconomyofknowledge;thechang-

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French, Simon, A.J. Maule, and Gabe Mythen (2005). Soft Modeling in Risk Communication and Management: Exam-ples in Handling Food Risk. The Journal of the Operational Research Society 56(8): 879-888.

The aim of this paper is to explore the use of softmodellinginanintegratedriskcommunicationandmanagement process for managing uncertaintiesand‘scares’inthepublicdomain,particularlyintheareaoffoodriskandsafety.Muchhasbeenwritteninthepast20yearsontheissuesrelatingtotheman-agementandcommunicationoffoodrisksandsafe-tyissuestothepublic.Mostofthisresearchhasbeenbased upon post hoc studies ofwhatwentwrong– or, occasionally, right. In this article, the authorssurvey thosefindingsbrieflyanddraw them intoageneral framework for riskmanagement and com-munication.By integratingthesefindingsintoaco-herentcommonframework, theauthorsarguethatpublicauthorities, foodproducers, and the industrymaydevelopmoreeffectivestrategiesformanagingandcommunicatingriskswhich,inturn,willenablethepublictomakemoreinformeddecisionsontheirdiet.

Garland, D. (2003). The Rise of Risk. In: Risk and Morality. R. Ericson, and Aaron Doyle. Toronto, Toronto University Press: 48-86.

Thisworkexamineshowdecisionsaboutriskandun-certaintyrelate tomoralprinciplesandethicalcon-duct.The 15 papers collected in this edited volumeanalyse the broader social, political, economic, andculturaldimensionsofriskandmorality.Thecontrib-utors’respectiveresearchprojectsonriskandmorali-tyinpolitics,business,legalregulation,crimepreven-tion, insurance, extreme sports, and biotechnologyprovide original empirical evidence to substantiatetheirtheoriesandaddresstheideologicalandpolicy

Drottz-Sjöberg, Britt-Marie. (2003). Current Trends in Risk Communication: Theory and Practice. Oslo, Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning

This comprehensive report highlights theoreticalperspectivesandimplicationsofriskcommunicationstudiesandrelatesthefindingstothedifferentlevelsofactionorinfluence,e.g.,local,national,andglobal.Itdistinguishesbetweena)manifestaccidentsandcatastrophes, b) eventswith potentially harmful orcatastrophiceffects,c)harmfuleffectsthatbelongtotheareaof ‘normalaccidents’,d)harmfulandcata-strophiceventsduetointendedharm,ande)devel-opmentsunderminingorerasingthepositivevalua-tionofsafetyandsafetystandards.

Freedman, Lawrence (2005). The Politics of Warning: Terror-ism and Risk Communication. Intelligence and National Se-curity 20(3): 379-418.

This article examines the problem of risk commu-nication in thecontextof imperfect intelligencere-garding a prospective, rather than actual, terroristattack inorder toassess recommendations forpre-ciseguidanceforthepublic.Particularproblemsdis-cussedincludetheiterativequalityofriskcommuni-cationsaboutterrorism,astheyallowtheterroriststo change theirbehaviour; thedifficultyofofferingtactical warning without a prior strategic analysis;and the tendency to focuson thevulnerabilitiesofasocietyratherthanontheintentof theterrorists.TheseissuesareassessedthroughacasestudyoftheBali attacksof 2002, followedbyananalysisof theexperienceintheUnitedStatesfollowingtheattacksof11September2001.Intheauthor’sview,thisexpe-rienceconfirmsthedifficultiesofattemptingtocon-veyriskstothepublicbychangingpublicalertlevels.

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emphasizedrisk:Inamodemindustrialeconomy,wemusthavethecapacitytomanagerisksineveryofitsdetails.PhaseIIstressescommunication:Statementsabout risk situations are best regarded as acts ofpersuasivecommunication, that is, asmessages in-tendedtopersuadealistenerofthecorrectnessofapointofview.Currently,inPhaseIII,publicandprivatesectorinstitutionsincreasinglyarerecognizingtheirresponsibility to deal adequatelywith both dimen-sionsandtocarryoutsoundriskcommunicationasamatterofgoodbusinesspractice.

Plough, Alonzo and Sheldon Krimsky (1987). The Emergence of Risk Communication Studies: Social and Political Context. Science, Technology, and Human Values 12(3/4): 4-10.

Whyhastheconceptofriskcommunicationsudden-lybecomeawidelydiscussed framework forpublicpolicy in theenvironmentalandhealthareas?Priorto1986,onlyafewessaysinthescholarlyandpolicyliteraturedealtexplicitlywith ‘riskcommunication’.Sincethatyear,however,scoresoftitlesincludingthetermhaveappearedalongwithconferences,specialsessions in scientific meetings, agency-sponsoredworkshops,andgrants.Theemergenceof riskcom-munication as a research topic cannot be fully ap-preciated or accounted for without understandingits linktoasetof issuesthatsymbolizethediscordbetween scientific experts and the public when itcomestotheissueofrisk.Thesetensionsareplayedoutindisputesbetweendifferentresearchtraditionsonfundamentalquestionsregardingtheperceptionof riskand theessentialnatureofhuman rational-ity.Thisclassicessayanalysestheemergenceofriskcommunication as a significant new organizingthemeforasetofdiverse,butconceptually relatedproblems concerning the political management ofpublic risk perceptions and individual behaviouralresponses to risks. It concludeswith the argument

relevanceof theirwork.Collectively, theauthorsex-plainwhyriskhasbecomeakeyconcepttoWesternsocieties,demonstratinghowthisnewconceptualre-gimehastransformedsocialintegration,value-basedreasoning,andmorality.Theyillustratehowthisnewregimedoesnotnecessarilyfostermoreresponsibleconductorgreateraccountabilityininstitutions.

Handmer, John and Paul James (2007). Trust Us and Be Scared: The Changing Nature of Contemporary Risk. Global Society 21(1): 119-130.

The twoauthorsargue thata fundamental shift inthecommunicationofriskhasemerged,particularlyinthecontextofrecenteffortstocombatpoliticalvi-olence.Contrarytoearlierpractices,governmentsintheUnitedStates,theUnitedKingdom,Australia,andelsewherestressthenoveltyandradicalemergenceof terrorism-as-risk, in part by ignoringhistory andconcentratingon thesymptomstomaintainacon-tinuingsenseofdanger.Inthesametime,theearlieremphasisonexpertsandexpertsystemsforgenerat-ingriskassessmentisbeingactivelyunderminedbyideologues.These changes represent a problematicshiftfromthedominanceoftheEnlightenmentideaoftrustinginscienceandknowledgetoacceptingapost-Enlightenmentideathatauthorityandideologyareallthatcaneverunderpintheassessmentofab-stract risk.

Leiss, William (1996). Challenges in Risk Assessment and Risk Management. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 545: 85-94.

Effective communication between interested par-tiesiswidelyheldtobeavitalelementinhealthandenvironmental risk management decision making.There have been three phases in the evolution ofriskcommunicationduringthelast20years.PhaseI

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Renn, Ortwin. (2008). Risk Governance: Coping with Uncer-tainty in a Complex World. Earthscan Publications Ltd.

ThiscollectionofessaysbyOrtwinRennbeginswithadiscussionofriskhandlingandcoversthecoretop-ics of assessment, evaluation, perception, manage-ment,andcommunication,culminating ina lookatthe transition fromriskmanagement to riskgover-nanceandaglimpseatanewunderstandingofriskin(post-)modernsocieties.Thefocusisonsystemicrisks, such as genetically modified organisms, thatare high on complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguityandhavemajorrepercussionsonfinancial,economic,and social issuesbeyond thephysicalworld.This isessentialreadingforall researchers,academics,andprofessionalsacross the social sciences, thenaturalsciences,andthemedical,engineering,andfinancialsectors.

Ringel, Jeanne S., Elizabeth Trentacost, and Nicole Lurie. (2009). How Well Did Health Departments Communicate About Risk at the Start of the Swine Flu Epidemic in 2009? Health Affairs, 28,(4): w743–w750.

OnSunday,26April2009,thesecretaryoftheUSDe-partmentofHealthandHumanServicesdeclaredapublichealthemergencyinresponsetotheoutbreakofH1N1influenza(knownasswineflu)intheUnitedStates.Throughananalysisofstateandlocalhealthdepartment websites, the authors determinedwhether departments were able to provide onlineinformation to their constituents within 24 hoursof the announcement. The overwhelmingmajorityofstatehealthdepartments,andmorethanhalfofhealthdepartmentsparticipatingintheCitiesReadi-ness Initiative –butonly aquarterof smaller, localhealthdepartments–weresuccessfulindoingso.

thattheresearchactivitiescentredonriskcommuni-cationhaveprecipitatednewdebatesovertechnicalandculturalmeaningsofrationality.

Renn, Ortwin (1998). “Three Decades of Risk Research: Ac-complishments and New Challenges.” Journal of Risk Re-search 1(1): 49-71.

Risk research over the last three decades has beenfocusedonthedevelopmentofmethodsofandpro-cedures for risk analysis and risk management. Asa consequence of this research, risk managementagencieshavebeentryingtomakeriskassessmentsa routine operation for evaluating different haz-ards,chemicalagents,or technologies.Theproblemwiththeworldwideadoptionoftheriskassessmentmethodology is, however, that formal analysismayobscuretheconceptualfoundationsandlimitationsofthismethodandmayinduceafalsedegreeofcer-taintywhendealingwith thepotential side-effectsofhumanactionsandinterventions.Oneofthemaintasksoftheriskcommunityshouldbetoemphasizethenecessityof integratedriskassessmentandthedevelopmentofinnovativeriskmanagementstrate-giesthatbuildupontheinsightsofthenatural,tech-nical,andsocialsciences.Inordertointegrateriskas-sessmentandriskperception,thearticleanalysesthestrengthsandweaknessesofeachapproach to riskanalysis and highlights the potential contributionsthat the technical sciences and the social sciences canoffertoriskmanagement.Technicalassessmentsprovide the best estimate for judging the averageprobability of an adverse effect linked to an objectoractivity.Publicperceptionshouldgoverntheselec-tionofcriteriaonwhichacceptabilityor tolerabilityaretobejudged.Inaddition,publicinputisneededtodeterminethetrade-offsbetweencriteria.Finally,public preferences are needed to design resilientstrategiesforcopingwithremaininguncertainties.

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4.2 GovernmentandPolicyDocuments

Dora, Carlos (2006). Health, Hazards and Public Debate: Les-sons for Risk Communication from the BSE/CJD Saga. World Health Organization.

Communicating about health hazards is a centralfunction of every public health institution.TheBSE(Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or mad-cowdisease)crisishighlightedtheproblemsthatemergewhencommunicationistreatedasaone-waystreet:In this type of situation, information about healthrisks is channelled to thepublic after critical policydecisionshavealreadybeenmade.Thisbook is theproductofresearchintoriskcommunicationaspectsof theBSEsaga. Itoffersnewinsights intohowac-tors in policy, science, and mass media communi-catedaboutBSEandCJD(CreutzfeldtJakobDisease)between1985and2000intheUnitedKingdom,Ger-many,Italy,andFinland,andattheleveloftheEuro-peanUnionauthorities.Thebookpresentsaframe-work for integrating risk communication into allstagesofpolicymaking,servingasatooltosupporteffectivecommunicationstrategiesthattakepublicopinionintoaccount.

Meredith, Lisa S. et al. (2008). Analysis of Risk Communica-tion Strategies and Approaches with At-Risk Populations to Enhance Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. RAND Corporation Working Paper.

Communication is a critical component of helpingindividualspreparefor,respondto,andrecoverfromemergencies. However, there is limited knowledgeabout how to best communicatewith populationsatrisk inemergencies.Toinformthisgap,RANDre-searchers,under contractby theUSDepartmentofHealthandHumanServicesOfficeof theAssistantSecretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) (Task

Zimmerman, Rae (1984). A Process Framework for Risk Com-munication. Science, Technology, and Human Values 12(3/4): 131-137.

Amajorfunctionofariskcommunicationprocessistoprovideinformationonrisksandtheiruncertain-tiesandwaysofbalancingcompetinginterestswithregardtothedistributionofthoserisks.Societyplacesahighvalueonthecommunicationofhealth,safety,andenvironmentalriskstothelaypublic,asreflectedinthewidevarietyofriskcommunicationprograms.Despite the apparent unanimity of interest in andhighvalueplacedon riskcommunication, consider-able disagreement occurswith respect to its goalsorpurposes.Agoal-orientedframeworkisthereforenot the most fruitful approach for evaluating andimprovingriskcommunication.Afocusonprocessisabettermeansof evaluatingand identifyingprob-lemsinriskcommunication.Theprocessinquestionencompassesboth the risk communicationprocessitselfandotheragencyprocesses(suchasregulation,standardsetting,andplanning) thatprovide inputstoriskcommunicationprograms.Viewingcommuni-cationfromaprocessperspective,one immediatelyrecognizes a polarization in theperceptionsof twogroupswithrespecttothevalue,relevance,andplaceofboththeriskcommunicationprocessandgovern-mentaldecisionprocessesingeneral.Thefirstgroup,thelaypublic,seesitselfasnotbeingrule-orprocess-boundinthenegotiationofsettlementsandinfactisscepticalofsuchprocesses.Thesecondgroup,whichconsistsofregulators,projectsponsorsoradvocates,andexpertsfromthescientificcommunity,tendstobe rule- or process-bound in its perceptions of riskcommunicationanddecision-makingprocesses.Thediscrepanciesbetweentheseperceptionsofprocessareat theheartofmanyof theproblemswith riskcommunicationtoday.Anumberofpromisingdirec-tionsaresuggestedtoovercometheseproblems.

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United Kingdom. Understanding Risk and Risk Communica-tion. Environment Agency Risk Team.

Similar to the “UKResilience:CommunicatingRisk”document,thisguideexplainssomebasicprinciplesabout risksand theway that thepublicandmediareacttothem.Italsogivesgeneraladviceonhowtounderstandwhatthepublicandmediaareinterest-ed in andhow readers cangetmessages across tothemeffectively.

United States Department of Homeland Security (2008). DHS Risk Lexicon. Washington, D.C.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) RiskSteering Committee (RSC), chaired by the UnderSecretary of the National Protection and ProgramsDirectorate and administered by the Office of RiskManagementandAnalysis,hasproducedaDHSRiskLexiconwithdefinitionsfor73termsthatarefunda-mentaltothepracticeofhomelandsecurityriskman-agement. The RSC is the risk governance structurefor theDHS,withmembership fromacross theDe-partment,formedtoleveragetheriskmanagementcapabilitiesoftheDHSComponentsandtoadvancetheIntegratedRiskManagementFramework(IRMF)for theDHS.TheDHS Risk Lexiconmakes availablea common, unambiguous set of official terms anddefinitionstoeaseandimprovethecommunicationofrisk-relatedissuesfortheDHSanditspartners.Itfacilitates theclearexchangeofstructuredandun-structureddatathatisessentialtotheexchangeofideasandinformationamongstriskpractitionersbyfosteringconsistencyanduniformityintheusageofrisk-relatedterminologyfortheDepartment.

Order 07EASPE000074), sought to understand thecommunicationneedsandtoidentifystrategieswiththepotentialforimprovingriskcommunicationwithat-riskpopulations.Thisone-yearstudypresentstheresultsofanassessmentthatinvolvedareviewoftheliteratureonemergencypreparednessriskcommuni-cation and public healthmessaging strategies; thecompilation of educational and outreachmaterialsfor emergency preparedness communication withat-riskpopulations;andsitevisitsinthreestatesandtheWashington,D.C.areatoidentifygapsintheprac-ticeofriskcommunicationwithat-riskpopulations.

Public Health Agency of Canada (2006). The Strategic Risk Communication Framework. Ottawa, Canada.

HealthCanadadevelopedtheStrategicRiskCommu-nicationsFramework to support theworkofpublichealthprofessionalswhoareresponsibleforformu-latingand implementingeffective riskcommunica-tions. The Framework emphasizes a strategic, sys-tematicapproachtoformulatingandimplementingeffectiveriskcommunications.ItcomprisesfiveGuid-ingPrinciplesaswellasGuidelinesforImplementa-tionandadetailedprocessforstrategicriskcommu-nications.

United Kingdom. UK Resilience: Communicating Risk.

This is a user-friendly guide that aims to providereaderswithabackgroundbriefingonunderstand-ingrisk,theimportanceofcommunication,andhowthepublicand themedia view risk. Its sectionsaredesignedasa toolkit tohelp individualsandsmallbusinesseswithplanninganddesigningacommu-nicationstrategy.

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Venette, Stephen J. (2007). Best Practices in Risk and Crisis Communication: Advice for Food Scientists and Technolo-gists. IUFoST Scientific Information Bulletin.

Thisdocumentprovidesalistofbestpracticesinriskandcrisiscommunicationsfortheareasoffoodandtechnology. These include: plan pre-event; collabo-rateandcoordinatewithcrediblesources;acceptun-certaintyandambiguity;formpartnershipswiththepublic;listentopublicconcernsandunderstandtheaudience; be open and honest; meet the needs ofthemediaandremainaccessible;communicatewithcompassion, concern, and empathy; provide mes-sagesofself-efficacy;andcontinuouslyevaluateandupdateplans.

4.3 Websites

Center for Risk Communication: http://www.centerforriskcommunication.com/

TheCenter forRiskCommunication is anorganiza-tionthatoffersresources,information,andexpertiseintheareaofriskcommunication.Thewebsitepro-videsaccesstopublicationsandotherresourcespro-ducedbythecenter.

Crisisnavigator (Krisennavigator): http://www.crisisnavigator.org/(http://www.krisennavigator.de/)

This international internet guide to crisismanage-ment, crisis communications, issues management,riskmanagement, and disastermanagement is anopenplatformforresearchers,executives,journalists,and other people searching for information aboutthese topics.

The Peter Sandman Risk Communication Web Site: http://www.psandman.com/

Dr.PeterM.SandmanisariskcommunicationexpertandthiswebsiteprovidesRCinformationandaccesstohisarticlesandtheworkhehasdoneonthe“Haz-ard+Outrage”formulaforriskcommunication.

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich specializes in research, teaching, and infor-mation services in the fields of international relations and security policy. The CSS also acts as a consultant to various political bodies and the general public. The Center is engaged in research projects with a number of Swiss and international partners, focusing on new risks, European and transatlantic security, strategy and doctrine, state failure and state building, and Swiss foreign and security policy.

The Crisis and Risk Network (CRN) is an Internet and workshop initiative for international dialog on national-level security risks and vulnerabilities, critical infrastructure protection (CIP) and emer-gency preparedness.As a complementary service to the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), the CRN is coordinated and developed by the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich, Switzerland. (www.crn.ethz.ch)

ETH ZurichCSS