CRITIQUE OF THE EMPIRICIST EXPLANATION

OF MORALITY

c.w. MARIS

CRITIQUE OF THE EMPIRICIST EXPLANATION OF MORALITY

IS THERE A NATURAL EQUIVALENT OF CATEGORICAL MORALITY?

Springer Science+ Business Media, B.V.

1981

(original title: Een Natuurlijk Equivalent van de Plicht?)

translated by Jane Fenoulhet University of London

ISBN 978-94-017-4432-4 ISBN 978-94-017-4430-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-4430-0

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Maris, C.W. Critique of the empiricist explanation of morality

Translation of: 'n natuurlijk equivalent van de plicht. Bibliography: p. includes index. 1. ethics. 2. empiricism. i. title.

bj41.m3713 171 '.2 81-12373

ISBN 978-94-017-4432-4 AACR2

© 1981 Springer Science+ Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Uitgeverij Kluwer B. v., The Netherlands in 1981

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other means without written permission from the publisher

I should like to thank for their help and support H. Dalitz, Jane Fenoulhet, G.A. den Hartogh, H.J.R. Kaptein, G.E. Lange­meijer, A. Johanna Maris, J.C. Maris. Marca Schasfoort and Ineke Vonk.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

In translating this book it has been my policy to render all quotations in En­glish. Where a published translation exists, this has been used, otherwise I have given my own translation from the original text. The italicized title then is the work to which the reader may refer. I have also used a number of abbrevia­tions of titles. The reader may find the list below useful. My thanks to Phebe Robinow, Michael Evans and Jeremy Walker for their in­valuable help.

CPP : Comte, Cours de Philosophie Positive, 1869 CPP+ : Comte, Cours de Philosophie Positive, 1968 Div. : Durkheim, Emile Durkheim on the Division of Labor in Society DN : Ross, Directives and Norms EH : Guyau, Education and Heredity EL : Stevenson, Ethics and Language Enq. : Hume, Enquiries FP : Spencer, First Principles FPPP : Comte, Fundamental Principles of Positive Philosophy FR : Hare, Freedom and Reason L : Hobbes, Leviathan LaF : Olivecrona, Law as Fact LM : Hare, The Language of Morals ME : Durkheim, Moral Education MS : Smith, Moral Sentiments OLaJ : Ross, On Law and Justice ProE : Spencer, The Principles of Ethics ProPs: Spencer, The Principles of Psychology ProS : Spencer, The Principles of Sociology

J.F.

SM : Guyau, A Sketch of Morality Independent of Obligation or Sanction S&P : Durkheim, Sociology and Philosophy Tr. : Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature TRJ : Ross, Towards a Realistic Jurisprudence VJJR : Durkheim, Value Judgements and Judgements of Reality

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CRITIQUE OF THE EMPIRICIST EXPLANATION OF MORALITY

Contents

INTRODUCTION:

a The problem of the empiricist explanation of morality. b Definition of 'empiricist'. c The relation between epistemology and ethics; the structure of this

work.

CHAPTER I: A TOPOGRAPHY OF THE EMPIRICIST THEORIES OF LAW 9

a The relation of law and morality; the problem of the empiricist ex­planation of the validity of the law.

b The empiricist explanation of Scandinavian Realism; the relation­ship of this school to the Doctrines of Natural Law and of Legal Positivism.

c Ross' arguments against the dualism of the Doctrine of Natural Law and the monism of Legal Positivism.

d The psycho-sociological explanation of legal consciousness: this ex­planation casts doubt on the status of the law's claims to validity.

CHAPTER II: HOBBES'S EMPIRICIST THEOR Y OF MORALITY 25

a Hobbes's empiricist doctrine; his nominalism. b Hobbes's nominalist view of moral concepts; the subjective charac­

ter of these concepts. c Hobbes's account of human nature: wolf-man; man's natural condi­

tion: a state of war; reason provides deliverance; a society ordered according to natural laws ruled by coercion; the social contract; the Leviathan.

d Natural laws are of an instrumental rather than an absolute nature. e Influence of Galileo: empiricism and the theory of motion; Gali­

leo's 'metodo resolutivo-compositivo' in the human sciences; Hob­bes's mechanistic image of man and society.

f The apparent idealism of Hobbes's natural law doctrine is an illusion. g The hypothetical, fictitious nature of natural law concepts in Hob­

bes's work. h A criticism of the empirical basis of Hobbes's theory.

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CHAPTER III: THE EMPIRICIST THEORIES OF DA VID HUME AND ADAM SMITH 41

A. GENERAL 41 a Hume's and Smith's empiricist doctrine of knowledge under the in­

fluence of Newton; Newton's theory of gravity applied to the hu-man sciences.

b A comparison of Hume, Smith and Hobbes; Hume and Smith reject Hobbes's egoistic view of man; Hobbes, Cudworth and Hutcheson; sympathy as the basis of moral feelings; reason as the slave of the passions; doctrine of the social contract untenable.

c Reason is ruled by human emotions, and therefore cannot form the seat of morality.

B. HUME a Hume's scepticism and empiricism. b His empiricist approach to morality. c The use of the virtues of justice and benevolence; through our

capacity for sympathy, this use gives us pleasure, even though we derive no direct advantage from it.

d All virtues are useful or pleasant, either for their possessors or for third parties.

e The objectivization of our sympathetic judgements; sympathy and the unbiased observer; self-judgement from the latter's point of view.

f The causes of the special authority of moral sentiments.

C. SMITH a Smith's refinement of the concept of sympathy; sympathy with

people's motives; self-judgement. b Sympathy with the neutral observer; internalization of the latter's

standpoint to produce an 'internal judge'; conscience; regret.

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D. THE PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS OF HUME AND SMITH 65 a The gulf between 'is' and 'ought'; theory detached from moral prac-

tice; Hume's persuasion to a moral stance on the grounds of the aesthetic value and social function of virtues; the 'interested obliga-tion' towards virtue.

b Smith's universal harmony; the individual's hedonistic urges are best served by a moral stance.

CHAPTER IV: COMTE AND POSITIVISM 73

A. POSITIVISM, SOCIOLOGY AND EVOLUTION 73 a The positivist theory of knowledge; purely inductive acquisition of

knowledge is impossible; the evolution of human thought accord-ing to the law of three stages; the hierarchy of sciences; sociology.

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b Biology focusses attention on the organic development of society. c The organic view of society: the individual as a subordinate part of

the social whole. d Comte's anti-individualism; rejection of psychology. e From a psychological point of view Comte's theory lacks subtlety;

altruism and morality.

B. SOCIOLOGY, EVOLUTION AND MORALITY 81 a Social statics and morality; social order and the individual; physio-

logy of the brain: the regions where egoism, altruism and reason are situated; social order on a social level and at the level of the family.

b Social dynamics and morality; evolution in the theological stage: development of a universal morality of a categorical nature.

c The metaphysical stage: abstract entities instead of anthropomor­phic conception; the rise of scientific thinking; a critical phase from the point of view of morality; emphasis on personal irllerests.

d The positive stage: further development of scientific thinking; so­ciology gives insight into man's social nature; final victory of altru­ism.

CHAPTER V: HERBERT SPENCER AND EVOLUTIONISM 93

A. EVOLUTION, SOCIOLOGY AND HEDONISM 93 a Differences and correspondences between the evolutionary theories

of Spencer and Comte. b Spencer's empiricist theory of knowledge. c The process of dissolution and evolution; the struggle for life; the

survival of the fittest; the notion of progress. d Spencer's emphasis on material development as opposed to Comte's

emphasis on spiritual evolution. e Spencer's individualism in contrast to Comte's collectivism; Spen­

cer's organic view of society; the differences between social and biological organisms; society in the service of the individual.

B. EVOLUTION AND ETHICS 103 a Moral relativism; good is what is pleasant. b Relativity brought about by the various demands of the evolutionary

phases; absolute ethics in the final phase of evolution; during the evolutionary process morality consists in compromises between egoism and altruism.

c The duality of human nature; the herd-instinct and the predatory instinct; evolution from the military to the industrial stage; evolu­tion from agressive egoism to altruism as survival functions; the genesis of a moral sense.

d The culmination of evolution: industrial society, total adaptation, general harmony and absolute ethics; absolute ethics is the ethics of the perfect human, being in perfect circumstances; their sub­stance can already be scientifically determined on the basis of the natural laws of evolution.

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e The modified altruism of absolute ethics. f Justice: altruism without self-sacrifice; decentralization. g Private benevolence - the weak must not be artificially kept alive;

the survival of the unfit is not desirable; profit in accordance with merits.

h Spencer's justification of the claims of absolute ethics; the superi­ority of the highest phases of evolution; a moral stance is also rec­ommendable from a hedonistic point of view; a hypothetical guide­line instead of a categorical one.

CHAPTER VI: GUYA U'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE 121

A. THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 121 a An equivalent of moral 'duty'; morality is based neither on a

metaphysical obligation nor on sanctions. b Philosophy of life; the union of egoism and altruism; evolutionism

as an explanation and justification of morality; rejection of opti­mistic ideas of progress; energistic view of life.

c Dominance of altruism; the moral fertility of life eliminates the contradiction between egoism and altruism.

B. ETHICS 126 a Kant's description of the sense of duty is correct, but his explana-

tion of it is incorrect; the impulses behind the sense of duty; he­redity and education.

b The coercive force of moral commands is caused by the intensity of moral impulses; life-energy gives rise to expansion and altruism; the permanent pressure exerted by moral, altruistic impulses; the altruistic 'obsession raisonnee' and 'idee-force' are the basis of the notion of duty.

c A hypothetical, empirical justification of morality; a moral stance is in agreement with man's deepest personal desire: life.

d An intense life certainly involves altruism, and possibly also total self-sacrifice as empirical 'equivalents of the notion of absolute duty'.

CHAPTER VII: DURKHEIM'S SOCIOLOGICAL ETHICS 137

A. SOCIAL STATICS AND COLLECTIVE EVOLUTION 137 a Durkheim and Guyau: rejection of the economic view of life; life

as energy-charged development; collective life-energy; restriction of the development of individual lives by the community.

b Durkheim and Comte: organicist view of society; society has an order of its own higher than that of the individual; Durkheim and the individualistic sociology of Tarde; the individual has no influ­ence on social events.

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c Durkheim's emphasis on social statics; rejection of the idea of progress; he pays no attention to social change.

d Social statics: the division of labour and the 'conscience collective' as principles of organization; homo duplex: homo lupus and zoon politikon; social values and anomie; sui generis development of the collective consciousness.

B. THE COMMUNITY AS SOURCE AND OBJECT OF MORALITY 145 a A sociological explanation of value judgements; ideals are social

facts; refutation of the metaphysical and naively empirical ex­planations; the combined subjective and objective character of value judgements has its origin in collective ideals; communal values are generated by social fermentation and take on a life of their own independent of their social usefulness; their collective origin gives them special intensity which sets them apart from everyday reality; the individual has partly internalized these communal values, but they also have an authority which rises above the personal level; this gives them their objective-subjective character.

b Moral norms have a partly obligatory and a partly pleasant charac­ter; synthesis of the deontological and teleological views of ethics; sociological explanation of this character.

c Sociological justification of moral imperatives; clarification of its impact: the community is the goal of morality; the individual should serve the community because it is superior and because he owes his higher cultural personality to it; the individual moreover owes his sense of meaningfulness and his life to it.

d Clarification of the commands of morality: the community is the goal of morality - individuals only in as much as they are members of that community; the content of collective values depends on chance developments; they must be accepted unconditionally how­ever imperfect the existing community may be.

CHAPTER VIII: STEVENSON'S AND HARE'S ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE 155

A. LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY 155 a Early linguistic philosophy and the criterion of meaningfulness. b Stevenson's and Hare's criterion of meaningfulness. c The non-cognitive meaning of normative language usage; Hume's

influence; rejection of metaphysical and 'naturalistic' interpreta­tions.

d The gulf between descriptive and evaluative judgements.

B. STEVENSON 164 a Descriptive meaning; emotive meaning as the expression of an at­

titude. b The emotive meaning of commands and moral statements; the mor­

al attitude. c The descriptive meaning of moral terms; the persuasive definition.

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d Rational and scientific argumentation in ethics; its limitations. e Rational argumentation. f Rational and scientific methods are not enough for obtaining a mor­

al consensus; a disagreement in attitude is the determining factor in a difference of opinion about morality.

g Persuasive methods. h Persuasive argumentation and propaganda.

C. HARE a The 'evaluative' or 'prescriptive' meaning of value judgements. b Moral discussion is different from propaganda; greater degree of

rationality in moral argumentation than Stevenson thinks; Hare's work not so far removed from Stevenson's as he himself thinks.

c Universal nature of value judgements; value judgements point to a universal standard; this gives them their descriptive meaning which makes logic possible in ethics.

d Universal standards: generally accepted principles or personal deci­sions.

e rreedom and reason; principles of universalizability and prescrip­tivity as logical criteria for moral judgements; the falsifying effect of Hare's universal prescriptivism.

f The psychological conditions of this effect; the amoralist and fanatic are outside the range of Hare's criteria; as is a clash between two ideals; but in general, Hare's psychological conditions will be met, he believes.

CHAPTER IX: SCANDINA VIAN REALISM

A. NON-COGNITIVISM a Non-cognitivism in jurisprudence. b Like commands, normative judgements are characterized by their

suggestive quality; Petrazycki's special and general impulses; uncon­ditioned and conditioned reflexes; the direct and disinterested char­acter of moral impulses; internalization during childhood of the moral attitude; the social ego.

c An explanation of the apparently objective, universally valid charac­ter of moral judgements and the way they command respect, and their metaphysical 'rationalizations'.

d Olivecrona's and Ross' linguistic analysis: the 'constative fallacy' in normative judgements; representative and expressive meaning; in­formative and directive meaning.

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B. THE LAW 203 a The magical origin of legal norms explains their non-cognitive char-

acter; the operation of legal norms depends on social conditioning; magic and 'performatory imperatives'.

b Law and morality; the law as a social order; the partly empirical, heteronomous and heterocratic character of the law.

c Social instinct or self-preservation.

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C. CONCLUSIONS 212 a Olivecrona's foundation of the claims of the law on the need to

control anarchy; true judgements and correct judgements; internal and external standpoints.

b Ross' ethology; the pragmatic value of moral norms; jurisprudence and practical law.

c The emptiness of the idea of justice; jurisprudence and the politics oflaw.

d The politics of law and persuasion. e The sceptical attitude towards the normative consciousness; moral

impulses do have some pragmatic value from the viewpoint of social relevance.

f Normative logic according to Ross; rejection of his earlier emo­tivism

CHAPTER X: SCEPTICISM OR EMPIRICISM?

a The scepticism of Sextus Empiricus in the explanation of morality and metaethics?

b A synthesis of empiricist explanations.

CHAPTER XI: THE PROBLEM OF THE EMPIRICIST EXPLANATION OF NORMATIVITY: IS THERE A

227

NATURAL EQUIVALENT OF 'DUTY'? 241

a The empiricist explanation impairs the claim of moral and legal norms to purely ideal normative validity and to the precedence of the behaviour they command over other modes of behaviour: the empiricists have reduced normativity to facts, and according to them, norms cannot be derived from facts; this insight could ad­versely affect practical moral life.

b The empiricists themselves expect their theories to have quite dif­ferent consequences; a natural equivalent of 'duty' is possible (Guyau).

c They believe that theory does not influence spontaneous moral sen­timents.

d Theory only affects human behaviour, according to them, in as much as it coincides with human striving or natural development; some believe that their theories agree with human striving to such an extent that they can only promote moral life.

e Only Guyau and the Scandinavian Realists consider a theory capable of destroying spontaneous feelings; 'the mind in opposition to the soul'; because an empiricist theory implies that moral and egoistic impulses are equally natural, it can destroy the moral attitude.

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CHAPTER XII: THE EMPIRICIST JUSTIFICA TION OF THE CLAIMS OF MORALITY 255

A. THE EMPIRICIST JUSTIFICATION AND THE GULF BETWEEN IS AND OUGHT 255

a The empiricist justification despite the normlessness of empirical phenomena.

b Disharmony in reality can lead to contradictory moral systems; Kropotkin and the social Darwinists: co-operation or conflict as a natural principle.

c Hypothetical justification on the basis of the presupposition of the human will to live; the empiricist justification cannot be invalidated on the grounds that it ignores the gulf between is and ought: Moore's 'open question argument' is also inapplicable.

B. THE TENABILITY OF THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE WILL TO LIVE 262 a Not everyone finds an appeal to the will to live convincing; the life

instinct is not empirically necessary; desire for elevation of the self by becoming one with nature; dissolving tendencies in human na-ture; the death instinct according to Freud.

b Disintegration alongside the evolutionary tendency (Popper, Elias); evolution is not empirically necessary; because nature displays con­trary tendencies, the choice of evolution and life is an arbitrary one.

c The postulate of the will to live is based on a normative choice. d The unbiased poet and the virtuous philosopher; the philosophical

pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann; the alternative of death.

C. EVOLUTION OR DISSOLUTION? 275 a Nature presents the possibility of many contrary evaluations; inte­

grating and disintegrating tendencies in nature; justification of the moral attitude in the light of the tendency towards life and evolu-tion; justification of the moral attitude in the light of the tendency towards dissolution.

b The justification of sadism in the light of the tendency towards dissolution.

c The choice of life and evolution is arbitrary.

CHAPTER XIII: THE HIERARCHY ARGUMENT AS A JUSTIFICATION OF MORALITY 285

A. THE NATURAL SUPERIORITY OF THE MORAL ATTITUDE 285 a According to empiricists morality is one of many empirical phe­

nomena; they discern an opposition in moral phenomena between egoistic inclinations and moral inclinations; they recognize that these two natural phenomena are in themselves equal; some never­theless attempt to justify the precedence of moral sentiments; two methods of justification: the congruency argument and the hierarchy

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argument; according to the congruency argument the moral stance is congruent with egoism since this yields the most personal advan­tage; according to the hierarchy argument moral (social) inclinations are of a qualitatively higher order than other inclinations.

b Qualitatively different levels are distinguished in natural reality with the aid of the evolutionary ladder; the four forms of the hierarchy argument: society represents a higher rung on the ladder than the individual; the cultural/social part of the individual personality is higher than the 'animal'/instinctive part; the later phases of cultural development are superior to the earlier stages; a fully developed in­dividuallife is worth more than the normal way of life.

B. IS THE COMMUNITY SUPERIOR TO THE INDIVIDUAL? a The superiority of the community to the individual (Comte, Durk-

heim); communal values are therefore of a higher order than in-dividual efforts; the social organism is more than the sum of its constituent parts (individuals); similar ideas in structuralism and functionalism; but Durkheim is confusing a methodological ap-proach with an ontological one; whether a body can be explained by the attributes of the parts can depend on the· state of science; moreover, the proposition that the whole is more than the sum of its parts has nothing to do with moral superiority.

b The individual can indeed exert influence on communal processes. c Durkheim overlooks this because there is no room for change in

his static view of society. d Durkheim's proposition that the community is both the source and

the object of morality is based on a circular argument. e It is also possible to assign a psychological source to morality

(Freud); furthermore, the community does not always present us with an equally elevated picture; the supposition that the com-munity is of a superior quality is based on a personal evaluation.

C. IS THE SOCIO-CULTURAL PART OF THE PERSONALITY SUPERIOR TO THE 'ANIMAL' PART?

a Durkheim's 'homo duplex'; Durkheim confuses 'animal' with 'ag-gressive' and social orientation with human civilization.

b Animals can also be social creatures, and according to some, human civilization is the cause of human aggression.

c The culturally determined part of mankind is not always held in high esteem; Durkheim's positive evaluation is based on a normative choice.

d Comte bases the superiority of man's social (altruistic and intellec-tual) qualities on a hierarchy of the layers of the brain; the develop-ment of the capacity for abstraction is evaluated negatively, too; Comte's argument also rests on a normative choice.

D. IS AN INTENSE LIFE SUPERIOR TO A PEACEFUL EXISTENCE? a According to Guyau, an intense, expansive, altruistic existence is

the superior way of life; however, this, too, is based on a normative

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selection of natural phenomena; nature also contains decadent phe­nomena; as does human nature; man may, moreover, show prefer­ence for a passive existence.

b Guyau's notion of a life fully developed in every area is an ideal which does not correspond to empirical reality; full development in one area often means underdevelopment in others.

c Maslow's hierarchy of needs, a modern version of Guyau's ideal, also lacks an empirical foundation.

d Guyau's appeal to the connection between evolutionary develop­ment and altruism does not correspond to reality: the superiority of the more complex levels of evolution is based on a value judge­ment.

E. ARE THE LATER PHASES OF CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPERIOR TO ITS EARLIER PHASES? 324

a Guyau, Spencer and Comte consider the later phases of cultural development higher than the previous stages; since these later phases are characterized by an increase in altruism, the superior way of life is orientated towards other people

b Many anthropologists, however, raise objections to the notion of a single cultural development; present-day 'primitives' are no lower than 'cultivated' Europeans; an appeal to cultural evolution alone therefore cannot demonstrate the superiority of moral (altruistic) inclinations.

F. THE METAPHYSICAL AND THEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND TO THE HIERARCHY ARGUMENT 330

a All four forms of the hierarchy argument are based not on natural qualitative differences, but on personal evaluations.

b The theological idea of the 'scala naturae' lies behind the notion of an evolutionary hierarchy; Comte's 'natural laws' are in fact meta­physical laws of finality; Durkheim's reverence for society has a religious background.

c Guyau's doctrine is permeated by Neo-Platonic metaphysics.

CHAPTER XIV: THE CONGRUENCY ARGUMENT 337

A. EGOISM AND ALTRUISM; HEDONISM 337 a There is no hierarchical difference between selfish and moral in-

clinations; yet a number of empiricists maintain that the moral at­titude is (hypothetically) imperative, for according to the 'con­gruency argument', the two tendencies are congruent: i.e. the moral attitude is imperative from a selfish point of view; Guyau, Hobbes, Hume, Smith, Spencer, Durkheim and Olivecrona have recourse to this argument; the congruency argument and hedonism; the conflict model of society and the harmony model as bases of congruency; Guyau's individualistic congruency argument.

b Objections to the hedonistic view of man; the alternatives of egoism

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and altruism do not account for all types of human behaviour; the congruency argument is therefore not convincing for everyone.

c The good and the pleasant do not coincide as Spencer maintains (Kant, E. von Hartmann); virtue results in a specific kind of plea­sure (Hume).

B. THE CONGRUENCY ARGUMENT IN THE WORK OF GUY AU a According to Guyau altruism coincides with the deepest human

desire: life; life-energy leads to intensity, expansion and altruism; however, life is not always desired; nor is an intense life; living in-tensively does not imply an expansive life.

b Nietzsche versus Guyau: an expansive life is not necessarily altru-istic.

c Neither in physical matters (Adler), nor in volitive life (Carlyle); nor in emotional life (Burton, Simmel); nor in intellectual life, nor in the love of risk-taking in both actions and thoughts; Guyau's con-gruency argument is therefore unsuccessful.

C. THE FUNCTIONALIST CONGRUENCY ARGUMENT ACCORDING TO HOBBES'S CONFLICT MODEL

a Hobbes: an expansive way of life leads to a war of everyone against everyone; egoism calls for a normative attitude in order to guarantee social order and with it survival; functionalist congruency argument based on a conflict model of society.

b This form of the congruency argument is only tenable on the basis of a radical-aggressive image of mankind; Hobbes's model of man has no empirical foundation.

c Man's possession of some social sense gives him scope for satisfying other needs besides that of safety.

d This is so even when social conflicts are inevitable (Dahrendorf); Hobbes's congruency argument is therefore unsuccessful.

D. THE FUNCTIONALIST CONGRUENCY ARGUMENT AND THE HARMONY MODEL

a Smith's harmonious view of society is untenable. b Spencer's expectation of future harmony in industrial society lacks

empirical foundation. c Hume does not succeed in demonstrating an 'interested obligation'

in virtue (Machiavelli, Thrasymachus); the functionalist congruency argument based on the harmony model fails.

d Hume falls back on a personal evaluation; sympathy, the 'noble source of morality', is also the source of immorality (Vestdijk).

E. THE FUNCTIONALIST CONGRUENCY ARGUMENT IN THE WORK OF DURKHEIM

a Durkheim's view of the problem of order is in partial agreement with that of Hobbes; necessity of the community for individual sur-vival; need for respect for communal values - the spiritual binding force on the community.

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b Communal values are not necessary for social cohesion (Homans, Malinowski).

c This is evident in pluriform and plural societies (Elias, Benedict, Carlsson, Crowley).

d The one-sided emphasis Durkheim and functionalism lay on social order and harmony distorts the image of the need for universally ac­cepted communal values; Durkheim's 'normal' society does not cor­respond to empirical social reality.

e Social change is normal (Gillin, Moore, Elliott and Merrill, Elias vs. Parsons).

f Social change renders Durkheim's guideline that collective values should be unconditionally respected unrealizable.

g Social conflicts are normal, harmonious societies abnormal in Euro-pean history since classical antiquity. .

h Social conflict is inevitable (Tarde, Simmel, Weber, Gouldner, Dah­rendorf, Engels). Conflicts of values also, therefore (Mannheim, Weber, Marx, Engels).

j The threat to life posed by collective values (C.W. Mills, Van den Muizenberg, Den Hollander, Merton); collective values can threaten the life of other communities.

k Durkheim's model of society as a harmonious order with communal values is an ideal; but 'open society' with its heterogeneous values can also be evaluated positively (Popper). The communal values cannot fulfil the role ascribed to them by Durkheim; the autonomous moral attitude, independent of social values, is also evaluated positively (Piaget, Freud); Durkheim does not succeed in demonstrating that from a selfish point of view, un­conditional respect for the collective values is imperative; his con­gruency argument therefore fails.

F. ROSS' CRITERION OF UTILITY 397 a Ross' appeal to the criterion of social usefulness of ineffective un-

less a social aim has first been chosen; in his later work Ross no longer adheres to his rejection of value judgements.

CHAPTER XV: THE MORAL GAME 399

A. THE RULES OF PLAY 399 a The linguistic philosophers and the Scandinavian Realists simply

establish that moral discussion is one of many human activities; 'rules of play' can be drawn up for this activity; they do not try to justify the claims this 'moral game' makes to universal validity and superiority.

b Stevenson and Ross (1958) want to introduce the rules of rhetoric into moral discussion; however, persuasion is not the same as moral argumentation.

c Perelman's rhetorical model is indeed moral in character; his juridi­cal model in ethics; objections to the juridical model; Perelman's rhetoric does not provide a solution.

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d The strictly logical rules of Hare and Ross (1968); Hare's relevancy criterion is in conflict with the tendency of these rules towards moral agreement.

e Hare's logical analysis is possibly not neutral. f Nor the rules of play for Universal-Prescriptivism. g They are inclined to exclude what for many is an essential part of

morality. h And to imply a utilitarian normative ethic.

Hare's requirement of rationality is already a non-neutral postulate. It is also possible to defend irrationalism.

B. THE STATUS OF THE MORAL GAME a The status of the 'moral game' after Hare's empiricist explanation;

a language game has solely logical consequences; it does not imply an 'ought', contrary to what Searle maintains.

b The special position of morality is of a non-logical, i.e. psychologi­cal nature according to Hare; this means that this position cannot be theoretically justified; this is important for Hare's doctrine in as much as it is not restricted to moral logic.

c Hare's denial that an objectivist or a subjectivist moral view makes any difference is untenable.

d According to Hare's non-cognitivist view, morality can only affect those who happen to have a satisfactory moral disposition.

e On the one hand, the majority of Western people (even non-cog­nitivists) do possess some moral disposition; on the other hand, morality in Hare's view is dependent on changeable psychological and sociological factualities instead of eternal, unchanging truths. Therefore the empiricist explanation can affect the psychological experience of authority, thus influencing practical moral life.

f Many people's 'moral disposition' already seems to be very unstable; it is even regarded as a peculiarity of Western culture.

CHAPTER XVI: CONCLUSION

a The empiricist explanation appears to affect the status of morality; the empiricists' justification is unsuccessful.

b All that remains is that people perform a moral activity according to certain 'rules of play'; this 'moral game' cannot maintain its claim to superiority and general authority over other empirical phe­nomena; a condition for its effectiveness is that man must have al­ready adopted a moral attitude; this conditional character is the Achilles' heel of the empiricist justification; in view of the change­able and contradictory nature of natural phenomena, this condition is fulfilled by chance in reality; from natural phenomena, one can derive many conflicting guidelines, and the choice between them is dependent on a personal evaluation which is not the same for every­one; the descriptive value of the empiricist theory increases in in­verse proportion to the possibility of basing guidelines (even condi-

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tional ones) on it; the fulfilment of the condition that a moral dis­position must already be present is likewise dependent on changing cultural and psychological factors; it is possible that the empiricist explanation of morality will itself be the cause of this condition be­ing satisfied less in the future.

c The question 'Why should I adopt a moral position?' cannot be an­swered positively for morality if morality is of an empirical nature.

d The fact that empiricists want to answer this question in a way favourable to morality (not unfavourable, at any rate) is due to those same impulses whose claims they have failed to justify; in fact, all they are trying to do is support illusory desires with argu­ments.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX OF NAMES

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