Critical Problems in the History of Science: Proceedings of the Institute for the History ofScience at the University of Wisconsin, September 1-11, 1957 by Marshall ClagettReview by: M. A. HoskinIsis, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Jun., 1962), pp. 230-231Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/228034 .

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MARSHALL CLAGETT (Editor). Critical Problems in the History of Science: Proceedings of the Institute for the His- tory of Science at the University of Wis- consin, September 1-11, 1957. xiv - 555 pp., glossary. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959. $5.00.

For those who were privileged to take part, the ten-day Institute at Madi- son was far more than a succession of sixteen papers with commentaries. But the formal record alone, here published in an attractively-produced volume, would have more than justified the holding of the Institute.

The wealth and variety of the ma- terial presented rules out any possi- bility of adequate review. Some con- tributors, like Father Joseph T. Clark in his discussion of the significance of philosophy of science for the historian of science, raised fundamental ques- tions. Others reviewed major fields of the history of science and their papers have proved valuable reading for stu- dents in more than one university. Among these were E. J. Dijksterhuis's survey of the development of mechanics down to Newton; Marie Boas Hall's analysis of the impact of the mechani- cal philosophy on chemical theory in the 17th and 18th centuries; and (de- spite its references to " the hard-headed scientist" and other creatures of doubt- ful historical value) J. Walter Wilson's study of the simultaneous establishment of continuity in cells, organisms, and species. Others again, like Thomas S. Kuhn in his "Energy Conservation as an Example of Simultaneous Discovery." took limited topics as pegs on which to hang general questions. Another help- ful group of papers came to grips with the practical problems of running his- tory of science courses. The commen- tators, too, though much more varied in performance, made a number of valuable points. Altogether, this is a volume that deserves widespread and

careful reading and contains a quite depressing number of suggestions for further work.

In arranging the Institute the organ- isers were of course limited by the time allotted and by the interests of the available speakers. As Professor Clagett records in his Preface, the additional day to be devoted to history of biology and the proposed discussion of the his- tory of recent science both had to be abandoned for want of speakers. One notable omission, surprising in view of the frequency (in Britain at least) with which historians of science are recruited from mathematics and physics, was any consideration of the interaction be- tween pure mathematics on the one hand and mathematical physics on the other. To what extent has mathemati- cal physics been guided (or hampered) by the pure mathematics available, and to what extent has pure mathematics developed in response to the interests of the physicists?

The most frequently recurring theme, and the one that dominated the early meetings of the Institute, was the per- ennial problem of the influences at work in the scientific revolution. Read- ers of this volume will agree with Rupert Hall when he writes: "There is no straightforward answer to any question about the whole nature of the scientific revolution." Georgio de Santillana made a plea for the study in this connection of " the one art capable of receiving a high theoretical content, namely, architecture." Rupert Hall, before coming down firmly on the side of the conceptual developments as pre- eminently important, showed how dangerous can be the facile dichotomy into " scholars " and " craftsmen." The issues in astronomy and mechanics were discussed respectively by Derek J. de S. Price and E. J. Dijksterhuis, and a number of other speakers made refer- ence to them.

The discussion centered, however,

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BOOK REVIEWS BOOK REVIEWS

around A. C. Crombie's paper on " The Significance of Medieval Discussions of Scientific Method for the Scientific Rev- olution." Crombie gave rather more than half his space to an admirable review of the medieval achievements that he has detailed elsewhere. Al- though he is not correct when he says that Swineshead rejected dynamical ex- planations of motion, his emphasis on the "sophistication and mathematical skill" of the Mertonians is timely. In fact, in spite of the subsequent appear- ance of Claggett's Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, the extent of the Mertonians' sophistication has not yet been fully described. They may have worked with rules "rarely or never made to be deduced to the effect," as Buridan put it, but this is not to say that they were inadequate as mathe- maticians. Swineshead in applying Bradwardine's law of motion is often as unconcerned with practical reality as a 20th-century applied mathematician applying Newton's laws to the rolling of a sphere inside a conical surface. Techniques such as his were necessary to 17th-century mathematical physics but not sufficient.

In the latter part of his paper Crombie went on to contrast medieval interest in the logic and theory of ex- perimental science with "the compara- tive scarcity of actual experimental in- vestigations ": a state of affairs very different from " the restoration of full contact between science and scientific methodology" in the 17th century. Ernest Nagel, in commenting on Crombie's paper, urged that the poor medieval performance ought to make us suspicious of the significance of medieval texts, saying "if there is a persistent incongruity between a man's actual performance and his account of what he does, it is not unreasonable to ask whether the individual does have a clear grasp of what it is he is saying, or alternatively, whether the man's words mean what we suppose them to mean." I. E. Drabkin, on the other hand, in his commentary, tended to view the high standard of medieval discussions as a consequence of their insufficiently-appreciated performance.

around A. C. Crombie's paper on " The Significance of Medieval Discussions of Scientific Method for the Scientific Rev- olution." Crombie gave rather more than half his space to an admirable review of the medieval achievements that he has detailed elsewhere. Al- though he is not correct when he says that Swineshead rejected dynamical ex- planations of motion, his emphasis on the "sophistication and mathematical skill" of the Mertonians is timely. In fact, in spite of the subsequent appear- ance of Claggett's Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, the extent of the Mertonians' sophistication has not yet been fully described. They may have worked with rules "rarely or never made to be deduced to the effect," as Buridan put it, but this is not to say that they were inadequate as mathe- maticians. Swineshead in applying Bradwardine's law of motion is often as unconcerned with practical reality as a 20th-century applied mathematician applying Newton's laws to the rolling of a sphere inside a conical surface. Techniques such as his were necessary to 17th-century mathematical physics but not sufficient.

In the latter part of his paper Crombie went on to contrast medieval interest in the logic and theory of ex- perimental science with "the compara- tive scarcity of actual experimental in- vestigations ": a state of affairs very different from " the restoration of full contact between science and scientific methodology" in the 17th century. Ernest Nagel, in commenting on Crombie's paper, urged that the poor medieval performance ought to make us suspicious of the significance of medieval texts, saying "if there is a persistent incongruity between a man's actual performance and his account of what he does, it is not unreasonable to ask whether the individual does have a clear grasp of what it is he is saying, or alternatively, whether the man's words mean what we suppose them to mean." I. E. Drabkin, on the other hand, in his commentary, tended to view the high standard of medieval discussions as a consequence of their insufficiently-appreciated performance.

He was "inclined to think that this interest in the substantive problems of science was more significant for the future development than were purely methodological concerns." Crombie's paper, emphasizing as it did medieval shortcomings as well as triumphs, had seemed likely to procure a large measure of agreement. But it is clear that important differences of interpre- tation remain.

M. A. HOSKIN Cambridge University, England.

J. BRONOWSKI and BRUCE MAZLISH. The Western Intellectual Tradition: From Leonardo to Hegel. xviii + 522 pp. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. $5.50.

Is juxtaposition equivalent to syn- thesis? The present volume reveals how deceptively easy it is to attain the former and how unattainable the latter may still remain. Its authors offer as one of its original features (not quite fairly, as the comparison with J. H. Randall, Jr.'s Making of the Modern Mind of 1926 shows) the fact that " we are interested in the whole spectrum of the human mind." Accordingly they devote chapters to such diverse subjects as Thomas More, The Royal Society, Adam Smith, The French Revolution, and Kant and Hegel. Now no one will doubt that religion, science, economics and politics are each of them intel- lectual occupations, nor that presum- ably compatible views on each of these topics may be held by one individual at one time; but it is a much harder thing to demonstrate that the develop- ment of these different branches of thought has been interdependent and mutually consistent. Would the French Revolution have been prevented if Cal- vin had not written the Institutes? Was the Principia an essential precursor of the Wealth of Nations? Unless the his- torian is content to make post hoc a substitute for propter hoc he must create a synthesis both to answer such questions and to justify his belief in the unity of the intellectual tradition in Europe. Otherwise he will, in at-

He was "inclined to think that this interest in the substantive problems of science was more significant for the future development than were purely methodological concerns." Crombie's paper, emphasizing as it did medieval shortcomings as well as triumphs, had seemed likely to procure a large measure of agreement. But it is clear that important differences of interpre- tation remain.

M. A. HOSKIN Cambridge University, England.

J. BRONOWSKI and BRUCE MAZLISH. The Western Intellectual Tradition: From Leonardo to Hegel. xviii + 522 pp. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. $5.50.

Is juxtaposition equivalent to syn- thesis? The present volume reveals how deceptively easy it is to attain the former and how unattainable the latter may still remain. Its authors offer as one of its original features (not quite fairly, as the comparison with J. H. Randall, Jr.'s Making of the Modern Mind of 1926 shows) the fact that " we are interested in the whole spectrum of the human mind." Accordingly they devote chapters to such diverse subjects as Thomas More, The Royal Society, Adam Smith, The French Revolution, and Kant and Hegel. Now no one will doubt that religion, science, economics and politics are each of them intel- lectual occupations, nor that presum- ably compatible views on each of these topics may be held by one individual at one time; but it is a much harder thing to demonstrate that the develop- ment of these different branches of thought has been interdependent and mutually consistent. Would the French Revolution have been prevented if Cal- vin had not written the Institutes? Was the Principia an essential precursor of the Wealth of Nations? Unless the his- torian is content to make post hoc a substitute for propter hoc he must create a synthesis both to answer such questions and to justify his belief in the unity of the intellectual tradition in Europe. Otherwise he will, in at-

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