crisis over south china sea

8/17/2019 Crisis Over South China Sea

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RISIS OVER SOUTH CHINA SEA


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Uploaded by ;

Amila Prasad Kariyawasam

Sri Lanka


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THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

• The South China Sea Islands consist of over 250 islands, atolls,cays, shoals, reefs, and sandbars in the south china sea, none

of which have indigenous people, few of which have anynatural water supply, many of which are naturally under waterat high tide and many of which are permanently submerged.

• The South China Sea comprises a stretch of roughly .! million

s"uare miles in the #aci$c %cean that encompasses an areafrom the Singapore and &alacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan,spanning west of the #hilippines, north of Indonesia, and eastof 'ietnam.

• The South China Sea islands number in the hundreds, althoughthe largest and most contentious(dispute territories include theSpratly Islands, #aracel Islands, #ratas Islands, &accles$eld)an*, and Scarborough Shoal, to which all of the si+ maorSoutheast -sian nations lay various claims.


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THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

•

The disputes arent limited to land, however/ each country hasan +clusive conomic 1one13, prescribed by the 426nited 7ations Convention on the 8aw of the Sea 67C8%S3,over which it has special rights to marine resources and energye+ploration and production.

• -n 1 spans outward 200 nautical miles from the coast of theeach states territorial sea, and may include the continentalshelf beyond the 2009mile limit.

•

The region is home to a wealth of natural resources, $sheries,trade routes, and military bases.


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THE SOUTH CHINA SEA


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THE TERRITORIES INVOLVED IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE


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CHINA

• China claims the largest share of territory in the South China Seas,

basing its assertions on historical grounds demarcated by a nine9dashline it drew in 4!;. It does not adhere to the international protocols setout by the 6nited 7ations Convention on the 8aw of the Sea 67C8%S3,and has clashed militarily with 'ietnam and the #hilippines over the#aracels and Spratly Islands.

•

It has also resisted attempts to resolve the disputes through 67C8%S orregional body -S-7, preferring to pursue coniaoyu(Sen*a*u Islands in theast China Sea, where it has clashed with ?apan. @ising nationalism inboth countries and a long wartime history have escalated tensions

despite highly interconnected economies.

• -S-7 countries have contested this boundary, but China has insistedon the historical legitimacy of the line based on survey e+peditions,$shing activities, and naval patrols dating as far bac* as the $fteenthcentury.


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MALAYSIA

• &alaysia claims some islets( small islands in the southern Spratlys,and has occupied $ve of them since 2004. In 44, it developed a

resort and built an airstrip on Swallow @eef to promote tourism,prompting fellow claimants, including the #hilippines, 'ietnam,)runei, and China to protest.

• It clari$ed its claims in 2004 with the oint 'ietnamese9 &alaysiansubmission to 67C8%S on the limits of the continental shelf, and

maintains a less confrontational relationship with China than otherclaimants.

VIETNAM

• 'ietnam has been one of the most vocal claimants in the South China

Sea dispute. It claims the Spratly and #aracel Islands based on its 1and continental shelf Aones, and oined &alaysia in &ay 2004 in a oint submission of territorial claims in the South China Sea to67C8%S.

• 'ietnam fought China in 4!; over the #aracels, which China

occupied, and again in 4 when China=s navy san* three'ietnamese vessels *illin sevent 9four 'ietnamese sailors on the


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PHILIPPINES

•

The #hilippines claims Spratly Islands based on its 1 andcontinental shelf Aones. Tensions reached an in


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BRUNEI

• hile )runei has not made any formal claims or engaged in

any confrontation with other claimants, it lays claim to the8ouisa @eef and @i


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JAPAN

• ?apan claims it anne+ed what it calls the Sen*a*u Islands in 45.It retained residual sovereignty over the islands after the Treaty of

San Erancisco in 45, and the 6nited States returned full controlof the territory to To*yo after the %*inawa @eversion Treaty in4;. ?apan views this reversion agreement as validation of itssovereignty over the islands.

PARACEL ISLANDS

• The paracels, which occupy roughly ;.;5 s"uare *ilometers !.s"uare miles3, are claimed by China and 'ietnam. China occupiedthe islands, building a military installation with an air$eld andharbor. The islands also boast $shing and natural resources.

SPRATLY ISLANDS

• The Spratly Islands are a cluster of more than one hundred smallislands and reefs that together measure less than $ve s"uare*ilometers B. s"uare miles3.

• The territory is host to rich $shing grounds and oil and gas

deposits, and is claimed by China, 'ietnam, &alaysia, and the#hilippines.


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PRATAS ISLANDS

• Taiwan and China both claim them, although China alsoclaims Sovereignty over Taiwan more generally. The islandsare home to Taiwanese military outpost and even a civilairport.

SCARBOROUGH SHOAL

• This island is particularly rich $shing area is much closer to

the #hilippines than it is to China. That did not stop )eiingfrom starting a maor confrontation over Scarborough in -pril202.

MACCLESFIELD BANK

• The &accles$eld )an*, disputed between the #eoples

@epublic of China, the @epublic of China, the #hilippines, and'ietnam, with no land above sea9level.

DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS

• Composed of $ve uninhabited islets and three roc*s, the>iaovu(Sen*a*us are the center of an escalating territorial

dispute between China and ?apan. The region contains rich$shing grounds and potential oil and gas deposits.


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WHY SOUTH CHINA SEA IS SIGNIFICANTABUNDANCE OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE REGION

• There are minerals, natural gas and oil deposits on the islands and

under their nearby sea


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ABUNDANCE OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE REGION

• In >ecember 202, Chinas 7ational nergy -dministration namedthe disputed waters as the main oFshore i$e "or %#$*r#l +#

,ro-*)$io%, and a maor Chinese energy company has alreadybegun drilling in deep water oF the southern coast.

• Competitive tensions escalated when Indias state9run %il and7atural Gas Corp announced it had partnered with petrovietnam for

developing oil in the disputed waters.

• In ?une 20, 'ietnam accused a Chinese $shing boat of cutting

cables from an oil e+ploration vessel inside its 1. Hostilitiesresurfaced in &ay 20!, when Chinese vessels $red water cannons

at a 'ietnamese


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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

• The strategic importance the South China Sea has been

rising in recent years. The main factors boosting thestrategic value of this maritime area have been

a. -ccess to oceanic energy resources.

b. Territorial con


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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

• The following issues are as those most important from a securityperspective in the -sia9#aci$c region, especially the South China

Sea, both today and into the future.

a. -lthough China and -S-7 are wor*ing toward realiAing aJcode of conductK for the South China Sea that is legallybinding and that creates a structure for con$dence building

measures, this does not appear li*ely to have much eFect on themost fundamental problems in the South China Sea, namelyterritorial issues, $shing rights and access to natural resources,and naval buildup.

b. #roblems in the South China Sea are diLcult to resolve

either legally or politically. Met there is no eFective mechanismfor resolving con


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STANCE/ACTIONS

• China is the main player in the South China Sea. China does not

have large sea area and also china as emerging supper power/ it

doesn=t respect the law of sea 2 Dm territorial sea3. China

needs economic development rather than capturing of othercountries therefore they need South China Sea to be free from

disturbances for their economic activities. However, China=s

recent activity in the South China has been ta*ing belligerent(

hostile actions in the sea.

•

China $rst made its claim over the islands after orld ar IIwhich went uncontested until the 4;0s. China is in dispute over

maritime boundaries with ! -S-7 members, 'ietnam,

&alaysia, )runei and the #hilippines. @ising tensions between

)eiing and &anila has resulted in both sides accusing the other

of violating prior agreements and maritime boundaries.• China=s claim to the Spratly islands is based on the historical

evidence. In the eyes of the Chinese authorities, their version of

history trumps international law.

• )y moderniAing the Chinese navy and strengthening its ability

to enforce naval law, China has strengthened its assertions ofle al urisdiction and its resence in the sea.


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STANCE/ACTIONS

• >ue to relatively calm relations between China and Taiwan in recent

years, China has become able to get particularly involved with

South China Sea issues.

• China=s territorial claims in the South China Sea are represented by the

Jnine9dotted lineK that envelops about 0N of the sea=s area in a 6

shape.

• In order to broadly strengthen its presence and heighten its ability to

enforce naval law within the 69shaped line, China has been mobiliAing

not only the #eople=s 8iberation -rmy 7avy, but also paramilitary andcivilian naval bodies.

• China has ta*en some contradictory actions in the past few years. Eirst,

while strengthening its military it has simultaneously been developing

more active diplomatic relations.

• The Chinese population is conservative regarding issues of territory and

sovereignty, and it is therefore diLcult for the Chinese leadership to

ta*e a ue to domestic political

conditions, Chinese policyma*ers have few options available on the

South China Sea problem, ma*ing


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STANCE/ACTIONS

• ell on the path to becoming a superpower with a permanent seat

at the 67 Security council, China is abusing its powers by pushing

its unwilling neighbors into negotiating on its own terms.

• The priority on all sides should be to avoid military con


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LARGE NUMBER OF TRADE / SEA ROUTES CROSSING THE SOUTHCHINA SEA

• -s much as 50 percent of global oil tan*er shipments pass through

the South China Sea, which sees three times more tan*er traLc than

the SueA Canal and more than $ve times that of the #anama Canal,ma*ing the waters one of the worlds busiest international sea lanes.

• &ore than half of the worlds top ten shipping ports are also located

in and around the South China Sea, according to the International

-ssociation of #orts and Harbors. -s intra9-S-7 trade has mar*edlyincreasedPfrom 24 percent of total -S-7 trade in 40 to !

percent in 2004Pmaintaining freedom of navigation has become of

paramount importance for the region.

• This is a very important issue, and has become the main concern of

?apan, the 6nited States and even right now the uropean 6nion.

However, China is unli*ely to instigate an interruption in traLc

because its business, e+ploration, and importation rely entirely on

freedom of navigation as well.


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MILITARI0ATION IN THE REGION

• The region has also seen increased militariAation in response to

Chinas burgeoning power, ma*ing disputes more diLcult to resolve.

•'ietnam and &alaysia have led regional military buildups andincreased arms trade with countries li*e @ussia and India, while the

#hilippines doubled its defense budget in 20 and pledged $ve9year

oint military e+ercises with the 6nited States.

•

The #hilippines also embar*ed on a moderniAation program costingroughly Q billion that will rely heavily on 6.S. sales of cutters small

fast ships3 and potentially $ghter ets.

• Ships are commonly involved in naval disputes, as e+hibited in the

Scarborough Shoal incident when the #hilippines said its largestwarshipPac"uired from the 6nited StatesPhad a standoF with

Chinese surveillance vessels after the ship attempted to arrest

Chinese $shermen but was bloc*ed by the surveillance craft.


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MILITARI0ATION IN THE REGION

• China is building arti$cial islands to e+ert military in


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US INFLUENCE OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

China=s rigid attitude toward the South China Sea problem in recent yearshas given the 6nited States a chance to once again enhance its presencein -sia.

-t the ?uly 200 -S-7 @egional Eorum -@E3, 6S Secretary of StateHillary Clinton indicated that the national interest of the 6nited Statesincludes free transit through the region, freedom of access to -sian oceancommons, and strict observance of international law regarding the SouthChina Sea problem.

The -merican strategic approach to the -sia #aci$c region and adacentwaters is composed of the following three components

a. mphasiAing and strengthening relations with treaty allies in the-sia #aci$c while also strengthening contributions to multilateral

organiAations in the region.

b. &aintaining a strong military presence in the region in order tomaintain access to the ocean and freedom of actions that adhere tointernational law.

c. positioning -merican naval power as the main actor promoting an9


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• #resident )arac* %bama=s Jpivot to -siaK security strategy says

that the 6nited States, as an -sia #aci$c country, aspires for an

international order in the region that provides a foundation forpeace and prosperity, in which all countries have rights and

responsibilities, and in which free trade and free transit are not

infringed upon.

• -merican policy toward South China Sea sovereignty has been

fairly consistent since the late 440s. -lthough Secretary of State

Clinton said at the ?uly 200 -@E that the 6nited States would not

get involved in any territorial disputes, it has maintained a clear

position on the establishment of maritime borders.

• The 6nited States is well aware that although members of -S-7

e+pect it to ta*e a role in strengthening security in the South China

Sea, those countries are also not hoping for increased Sino9


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• The recent pivot to the region by the 6S is seen as a step in balancing China=s

naval e+pansion. The 6S has said that it will remain neutral in the matter and

has urged -S-7 to act as mediator and settle the dispute through peaceful

negotiations.

• The 6S appears to be reluctant to ta*e sides for fear of incurring China=s

angry. It would seem that the pivot was to not settle the dispute and calm

China but to protect its own interests and in


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• Control over strategic shipping lanes and freedom of navigation

are increasingly contested, especially between the 6nited States

and China.

• The 6S will hesitate to militarily defend -S-7 countries

against China. The Chinese and -merican economy are tooclosely intertwined and the 6S has too much to lose from its

bene$cial relationship with China, much more than with any of

its other allies in the region.

• 6S presence in ?apan, South Dorea,RR


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US PRESENCE IN THE REGION

THE ASEAN RESPONSE


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THE ASEAN RESPONSE

• - 2002 >eclaration of Conduct between China and -S-7 was

intended to freeAe the situation as a means of managing the con


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THE ASEAN RESPONSE

• The #hilippine government announced its intention to ta*e China to

an international arbitration tribunal based on claims that China

violated the 67 Convention on the 8aw of the Sea.

• China, Taiwan, 'ietnam, &alaysia, )runei, and the #hilippines have

competing territorial and urisdictional claims to the South China Sea,

particularly over rights to e+ploit its potentially vast oil and gas

reserves.

crisis over south china sea

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