credit-based network management

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Credit-based Network Management 2009-01-06

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Credit-based Network Management2009-01-06

OutlineThe problem of Network ManagementThe Idea of Credit-based Network ManagementAn Implementation in Campus NetworkConclusions

Network management headachesWidespread security problemsDDoS attacksAddress spoofing, misconfigurationUnwanted trafficPoor QoSProblems brought up by new technologiesP2P, Wireless, mobility, IPv6

Physical vs behavioral problems

Behavioral problemsVery few real malicious guysA few youngsters try to be hackersMost problems caused by carelessness, exploited by other hackersLet’s consider a couple of common examples

DHCP SpoofingIn many networks, users get IP addresses from a DHCP serviceAn invalid DHCP server will cause problems to an entire LANE.g. some WLAN router enables DHCP service, which causes problem to the LAN it is connected to

DHCP RequestDHCP Request

10.1.1.1

Invalid DHCP ReplyInvalid DHCP Reply

aa-aa-aa-aa-aa-aa

10.1.1.3cc-cc-cc-cc-cc-cc dd-dd-dd-dd-dd-dd

XX

DHCP ReplyDHCP Reply

DHCP Server10.1.1.2bb-bb-bb-bb-bb-bb

ARP SpoofingIn an IP/Ethernet network, both hosts and routers use ARP protocol to map IP to physical addressesIt is easy for someone to spoof ARP replies, causing problems to some hosts or the entire LAN.

AIP:10.0.0.1

MAC:aa-aa-aa-aa-aa-aa

BIP:10.0.0.2

MAC:bb-bb-bb-bb-bb-bb

HackerIP:10.0.0.3

MAC:cc-cc-cc-cc-cc-cc

switch

IP MAC

10.0.0.2 bb-bb-bb-bb-bb-bb

ARP cache

IP MAC

10.0.0.1 aa-aa-aa-aa-aa-aa

ARP cache

Spoofed ARP replyIP:10.0.0.2

MAC:cc-cc-cc-cc-cc-ccS

poof

ed A

RP

repl

yIP

:10.

0.0.

2M

AC

:cc-

cc-c

c-cc

-cc-

cc

Spoofed ARP replyIP:10.0.0.2

MAC:cc-cc-cc-cc-cc-cc

AIP:10.0.0.1

MAC:aa-aa-aa-aa-aa-aa

BIP:10.0.0.2

MAC:bb-bb-bb-bb-bb-bb

HackerIP:10.0.0.3

MAC:cc-cc-cc-cc-cc-cc

switch

IP MAC

10.0.0.2 cc-cc-cc-cc-cc-cc

ARP cache

IP MAC

10.0.0.1 aa-aa-aa-aa-aa-aa

ARP cache

A’s cache is poisoned

AIP:10.0.0.1

MAC:aa-aa-aa-aa-aa-aa

BIP:10.0.0.2

MAC:bb-bb-bb-bb-bb-bb

HackerIP:10.0.0.3

MAC:cc-cc-cc-cc-cc-cc

switch

To: cc-cc-cc-cc-cc-ccSpoofed ARP reply

IP:1.2.3.4MAC:aa-aa-aa-aa-aa-aa

Spoo

fed

ARP

repl

yIP

:1.2

.3.4

MAC

:aa-

aa-a

a-aa

-aa-

aa

The switch will then think that aa-aa-aa-aa-aa-aa is

connected at this port

Rooted in network architectureOpen accessFavoring easy application developmentAllow/support anonymous access (privacy)Best-effort serviceDecentralized management for extensibilityManaged by many ISPsCooperate on “connectivity”Lack of cooperation on management

Current management practiceFocus is on infrastructure managementSetting up routers, access points, name service, email, web servers, routing policiesMonitoring network resources for reliabilitySetting up local security (e.g. user accounts) to protect usage of local resourcesResponding to security problems

Behavioral managementInternet is another human societyBehavioral problems can be dealt with using law enforcementToo heavy-weight for many scenariosCurrent practice is mostly passiveFilters, firewalls…Is there a middle ground – a light-weight approach to behavioral management?

What kind of mechanisms?Should be simple to implementShould have positive influence on user behavior, and effects should be cumulativeShould not negatively impact normal operationShould benefit both the ISPs as well as usersApply credit ratings to users and ISPs

Concrete examplesManaging a campus network:Allocate management resources according to user classificationAssign credit rating to users, and adjust service levels according to credit ratingsManaging peering relationshipsMonitor unwanted trafficMonitor QoS

Access network scenario

LocalNETUser

Internet

…… User …… User

ISP peering scenario

Peer PeerGain/lost evaluationOptimized Routes

Unwanted Traffic

General case – cascading effect

Backbone Access Net UserBehaviorassessment

ServiceassessmentSP

PeerBehaviorassessment

Thirdparty

Framework

Network behavioral measurementSPAM Virus DoSHijacking

Credit assessment and managementRecording Computing reportingAnalysis

Credit-based service differentiationServices Priority chargeSpeed limit

MethodologyCredit rating methods in financial scenariosUser classification methodologies based on machine learningNeed to consider structural/physical grouping, for ease of incentive applicationReputation and incentive mechanisms in social networks

Other considerationsReward good behaviorPunish bad behavior, but allow recoveringManual control (VIPs, over-rides)?Global cooperation, e.g. Sharing of credit informationStandardized credit ratings

Case study – a campus networkBehavioral problems increasing2006 and 2007 data on campus2006年处理案例分析图

20%

19%

2%55%

4%

Network Failure Connection Failure

System Failure User Problem

Other

2007年度处理案例分析图

13%

19%

2%63%

3%

Network Failure Connection Failure

System Failure User Problem

Other

Management difficultiesLarge user base (>50K), mobilityLimited manpower for network adminNew types of problems requirement more time and man powerCost for behavioral management is much higher than that of physical devices

Concentrated nature

Most problems tend to originate from a few classes of users

User classificationAfter classification using selected attributes:Male undergraduates (especially 1st yr, or 4th yr)Specific departmentsFocused monitoring saves management resources

Physical attributesPhysical groupingStudents can be grouped by dorm buildingThey belong to same subnetsSignificant concentration with such groupingEase of management based on physical groupingUpdate equipment to prevent ARP spoofing first applied to more “dangerous” networks

Personal credit ratingRepeat problematic users7.1% of problematic users are repeat usersThey cause 14.3% of problemsThe distribution of such users is randomNeed targeted treatment

Experimental credit rating systemCredit rating valuesMinimum is 0; maximum is 100; >50 acceptableInitialization of credit ratingGenerously initialize (almost) all to 60Rating adjustmentsFirst offense: deduct 10*wDeduction for more offense = past*0.5 +10*wIncrement credit rating by 1 each month

Experimental resultsOver span of 1.5 years, the fluctuation of problem users and credit adjustments:

ConclusionAn important aspect of network management is user behavioral managementCredit-based management:Focus management on problem usersApply incentive system to influence behaviorCascading effect (conjecture)Help improve entire Internet