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Corruption, Democratization andState-Buildingin the Balkans

Assoc.Prof. Gul M. KurtogluEskisarDokuzEylul University, Department of International Relations

Assoc.Prof. AysegulKomsuogluIstanbul University, Department of International Relations

This is a work in progress. Please do not cite without permission.

Abstract

Is there a link between corruption, and foreign assistance for democratization in the

Balkans? The widespread existence of corruption in the regionhas been subject to numerous

studies so far, many of which underline its cultural underpinnings.While valuable, these

observations do not explain why the region hasgenerally failed to eradicate such activities

despite receiving significant amounts external assistance for democratization in recent years.

We therefore explore the possibility that corruption in the Balkans may well be linked to

foreign assistance for democratization. Although further research is necessary to draw firm

conclusions, we suggest that there are at least two ways in which foreign assistance can be

related to corruption and its measurement in the region. First, foreign financial assistance in

polities where judicial control is weak or nonexistent may lead to predatory behavior by the

elites, who treat them as spoils that are readily available and expendable for their own gains.

Second, foreign assistance to combat corruption may elevate publicexpectations and alter

their perceptions, and thus make it difficult to rely on global surveys and indices that measure

corruption levels. These arguments can help to rule out the null hypothesis that external

assistance for democratization efforts and corruption are irrelevant, and can further promote

future research dedicated to explore the nature of their relationship.

Keywords: Corruption, democratization, state-building, Balkans, EU

Corresponding Author. E-mail: gul dot kurtoglu at deu dot edu dot tr

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Introduction:

While the negative impact of corruption on economic development is widely covered

in recent years, the linkage (or possibly triangle) between corruption, democratization and

foreign assistanceis less well understood. In the Balkans, corruption is portrayed as a major

roadblock to building strong states with robust democracies. (Yusufi 2005: 73; Andreas 2004;

Irrera 2006, Ristei 2010)According to a recent special report conducted by the European

Commission (2012: 32), 88% of Greek, 82% of Slovenian, 82% Romanian and 79% of

Bulgarian respondents express that “corruption is part of the business culture” in their

particular country.1 The October 2013 UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime)

report on Western Balkans similarly ranks corruption as “the third biggest obstacle to doing

business in the region.”2 Such activities are assumed to have particularly deleterious effects

on the reconstruction of war torn countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (Le

Billon 2008; Phillips 2010:93).

Past studies on corruption worldwide also draw a bleak picture of its effects on

democratization and development. Stapenhurst, Ulrich and Strohal (2006:1) report that the

Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC) regard it as the most

significant detrimental factor that leads to the decline of the basic principles and institutions

that form and support democracies. Johnston similarly explains the negative impact of

corruption as pervasive, and argues that it affects several fronts in state building process in

countries with weak institutions (Johnston 2005: 1)3The tenacity of global poverty and

underdevelopment is often attributed to the salience of corruption networks in a setting.4

Some critics go further, and claim that“the main cause of poverty, anywhere and everywhere,

is official corruption, which breeds economic policies that enrich the ruling elite and

1Figures not available for other Balkan countries in the report.2 The UNODC “Business, Corruption and Crime in the Western Balkans: The impact of bribery and other crime on private enterprise,” UNODC Report, 2013, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Western_balkans_business_corruption_web.pdf, accessed on 21 November 2013.3 For a more detailed discussion on the negative effects of corruption, see Ateljevic and Budak (2010: 377-378).4 The literature on corruption is too wide and nuanced to give justice here. For a review of the subject, see Ateljevic and Budak (2010).

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exacerbate income and wealth disparities” (Batra 2007:2). In short, corruption has a bleak

reputation in both Balkan studies and social sciences literature.

Meanwhile, recent research on international assistance (aid) and democratization

(regime transition) suggest that they may be closely linked. Alexander (2008: 948) reflects

that foreign direct investment is positively linked to democratization, particularly if a country

is initially “set on a democratic path of institutional reform.” In a research based of 150

countries, Sandholtz and Gray (2003) found that greater levels of international integration

lessen corruption levels in a country: more exposure to international society raises both

economic and moral costs of defection—i.e., not effectively dealing with corruption for a

state. Kono and Montinola (2009: 705) similarly reflect that foreign assistance can increase

the odds for regime endurance in general.

In this study we question the validity and usefulness of treating corruption as a

“technical”problem; an approachoften adopted by international organizations that track and

measure such activities, and by external actors who seek to eliminate it. The technical outlook

regards corruption as a phenomenon that is uniformly perceivable by all citizens in a given

polity, and subsequently seeks to measure and remediate it with universal policy

prescriptions.Through examples drawn from different Balkan states, we argue that this

approach frequently leads external actors to inadvertently end up reinforcing corrupt networks

in what we broadly refer to as “states in transition.”5

Transition periods that involve dramatic political or economic changes can exacerbate

the effect of the existing corruption networks, or even encourage the emergence of new ones,

especially when supported by external actors. External support in this framework may be

offered by inter governmental organizations/regional organizations, such as the UN or the EU.

External support can unwillingly exacerbate the existing corrupt networks, or play a role in

the formation of new ones for several reasons. The financial aid or political reform packages

often attract the existing local players who are involved with corruption to enrich themselves

with the illicit spoils unwillingly offered by the donors. Fulfillment of rigid bureaucratic rules

or regulations required by donors in return for assistance can encourage local actors to

implement superficial measures that lack longevity.

5 Throughout this study we assume states to be in transition if they are involved in the general process of establishing or consolidating formal institutions in charge of undertaking functions commonly associated with statehood and governance.

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We further argue that the “technical” approachadopted by international organizations

devoted to tracking corruption or international donors misses the input of two important

elements concerning corruption: i) perception of citizensin detecting and assessing its scale

and ii) the agency of local politiciansin dealing with the issue.To begin with, we concur with

the general arguments that stress the role of perception as an independent variable in grasping

the roots and consequences of corruption. Although various measurements of corruption by

international organizations assume that individuals have a uniform and universal perception of

corruption, this is not a verified condition, and has received criticism. (Tverdova 2011: 1-2;

Ivanov 2007: 32-34).Furthermore, while the public or individuals may be good at detecting a

rise in corruption, due to distorting signals from other sources, such as news media, “the

perception may exaggerate the scale of the increase.” (Holmes 2003: 194)

Second, by ignoring the input of the very societies to address the issue in favor of

dictating detailed rules and regulations, external actors in favor of anticorruption reforms not

only risk getting embroiled in a moral conundrum, but also pave the path for impractical and

suboptimal outcomes (Bukovansky 2006: 184). As Sioussiouras and Vavouras (2012: 98)

point out, the inflexible anticorruption campaigns led by international organizations, such as

the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development often result in diminishing payments and downspiralling

employment figures, they may be inadvertently contributing to the persistence of such

practices in the Balkans.6 Ultimately, in a region riddled by past conflicts, “[b]y promoting a

policy of zero-tolerance for corruption, the international community may in fact undermine

frail states by eliminating the only political mechanism that stands between politics-as-

bargaining and politics-as-war” (Hislope 2006:2).Moreover, the donors themselves can turn

out to be poor examples of propriety in condoning such acts and networks within their borders

(Holmes 2003: 202-203).

Although we do not claim to offer an all-encompassing theory of corruption in the

Balkans, webelieve that our study contributes to the existing bodies of literature on corruption

and democratization through the following points. First, our arguments concur withthe more

general studies in the literature on foreign aid and democratization. (e.g. Knack 2004; Kono

and Montinola 2009) On a regional basis, similar concerns have also been raised in other

studies on the EU’s effect on Central-East Europe (Grigorescu 2006). Second, they also

dovetail with other works that study the linkage between foreign aid and democratization in

6 See also Grødeland (2010: 176-177), and Smilov (2007: 19-20).

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the region, particularly Alexander (2008: 934), who argues that while international aid can

augment democratization efforts, it may also boost existing authoritarian regimes, “if

assistance is (often misguidedly) provided to elites that obstruct democratization.”

While selecting our examples, our focus has been intentionally regional. We believe

that several reasons make that region particularly attractive for discussing the possible causes

and effects of corruption within the context of international assistance. First, despite their

varying historical backgrounds, almost all countries in this region are united by their regime

transitions—from various forms of nondemocratic regimes to democracy—following the

collapse of the Soviet Union. Second, it is one of the few regions in the world where both

IGOs and non-neighboring states have been consistently and directly involved in its political,

economic and security affairs since the end of the Cold War. Both helped by the intensive

efforts of external actors and the dedication of its people, mostBalkan countries have thus

experienced one of the most complex transitions in the world in recent years. Whilst in search

of becoming functional democracies with a liberal market economy, however, their journey

has attracted little interest outside area study experts and EU bureaucrats. (Džihić and Segert

2012: 241).

The EU is hardly the only external actor considered to inadvertently contribute to the

diffusion and tenacity of corruption in the Balkans. The deleterious effect of weak institutions

on state-building caused by international actors involved in statebuilding in Bosnia and

Herzegovina is already discussed elsewhere (Chandler 2010; Divjak and Pugh 2008: 374-

384). This study nonetheless focuses on the EU for several reasons. First, since the end of the

Cold War, it has remained as “the most significant single donor and agent of external

governance across the region” (Fagan 2010: 23). The EU capacity for homogenizing

otherwise a widely diverse set of states in Eastern Europe has been compared to the Soviet

Union in previous decades (Fagan 2010: 18). While the active involvement of other external

actors, such as USA in the region played a crucial role in ending wars in places like Bosnia-

Herzegovina, once peace was restored, “the European Union took the initiative away from the

United States for economic development and integration of the region” (Alexander 2008:

944). Moreover, the EU ranks among the highest trusted institutions in the region (Gallup

Balkan Monitor 2009).7 As a result, assessing the idea that external involvement is crucial to

eradicate corruption in light of the role of EU in the region can be useful (Balfour and

Stratulat 2011: 23).

7 Gallup Balkan Monitor: Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans, June 2009.

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On the one hand, for many observers,the EU has become the main contributor to the

rapid democratization of the region (Alexander 2008: 950).The EU strategy towards the

Balkans follows a double pronged approach, comprised of a sound legal structure supporting

transparency, and an actual roadmap consisting of deadlines and clear execution plans on how

to proceed (Balfour and Stratulat 2011: 23).The EU has indeed demanded extensive legal

reforms in former EU candidates like Romania and Bulgaria prior to their accession. In

Romania, in addition to offering a set of guidelines including numerous bilateral agreements,

reports and remarks of EU authorities that would act as a road map for requested changes, the

EU has also carefully supervised the actual process (Mendelski 2012: 28).

On the other hand, unlike in Eastern Europe, where such reforms took place

earlier,after a considerable amount of foot dragging and delays, requested changes finally

took place in Bulgaria and Romania, thus enabling both candidates to become members. Put

differently, the EU insistence on following indicated guidelines has not produced the results

predicted earlier in the Balkans. While discussing the effects of EU membership in a

comparative study of Bulgarian and Romanian politics, Ganev (2013: 40) reflects that the

“EU pressures did not metamorphose local politicians into true democrats, wise rulers, or

responsible decision makers. But it did motivate them to pursue their interest in a particular

manner.” Similarly, despite significant external pressures by the EU in Romania, independent

actors like the World Bank has argued that the country’s overall quality of legal framework

has not necessarily improved (Mendelski 2012: 23-24).

Another factor that the EU bureaucrats and supporters may have overlooked or

dismissed in the process is the agency of national actors.In times of regime transition, the

input of national politicians is vital, as “[l]eaders can be expected to build up elements of the

state apparatus that further their interests and promote their intended institutional reforms”

(Alexander 2008: 933).Indeed, the EU accession approach has received an increasing amount

of criticism in recent years for obsessing with technical details and ignoring the need to

establish a genuinely reformed judicial system, which has effectively created a new group of

elites after eradicating another (Mendelski 2012: 25-26). Since political elites can exert a

significant amount of influence on the rules of political participation and ultimately affect the

quality of institutions that are most commonly associated with democratic regimes, this

criticism requires some reflection. Although regular elections and power transitions have

become routine practices throughout the region, various manipulations of political elites

challenge their level of institutionalization (Džihić and Segert 2012: 241).

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The outline for the rest of this study runs as follows. First, we explain what we mean

by ‘international aid/assistance’ and ‘corruption,’ and offer an overview of their coverage in

literature. The following section then draws upon survey results conducted by international

organizations, including Transparency International and World Values Survey for a sketch on

the perceptions of the Balkan people on corruption. The third section then overviews the EU

involvement in the region with a critical outlook. The fourth section concludes.

“International Assistance/Aid” and‘Corruption’:Contrasting Definitions, Changing

Perceptions

Prior to discussing the linkage between corruption and international assistance,an

overview of some of the outstanding debates concerning their definition and study in the

existing worksis appropriate. A quick research on corruption reveals a plethora of definitions

in the literature. This diversity stems from the complex nature of identifying of such activities

in the first place; thus making its study difficult (Harrison 2007). As Kunicová (2006: 141)

points out, a “corrupt” activity in politics can range from “bribery, kickbacks and the

embezzlement of public funds, through special-interest legislation and illegal campaign

finance, to vote-buying and electoral fraud.” In this study, we adopt the following definition

of political corruption:

“Corruption involves the abuse of a trust, generally one involving public power, for private benefit which often, but by no means always, comes in the form of money. Implicit in that notion is the idea that while wealth and power have accepted sources and uses, limits also apply” (Johnston 2005: 11).

We use the terms international assistance and international aid interchangeably here to

refer to a broad spectrum of foreign involvement in a country for a smooth and stable political

and/or economic transition. International assistance can be either in the form of pecuniary or

technical –know how—aid, and sometimes it involves both forms at the same time. While

offering financial aid to combat corruption, international actors usually ask for the fulfillment

of a number of preconditions, which involve meeting certain rules and regulations earlier

framed by the donor.

Reminiscent of the debates on its definition, the underlying causes of corruption are

equally complex. Numerous studies treat it as a cultural or endogenous factor that is at least

partially explicable through history. In a cross-sectional study on the causes of corruption, for

instance, Treisman (2000) identifiesat least sixfactors that can contribute to corrupt dealings

across the globe, that range from a Protestant heritage to the level of economic development.

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The link between historical factors and the emergence and prevalence of corruption networks,

however, is not universally supported (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2008).8

Regime type and economic structure of a polity are also assumed to affect the

existence and level of corruption. Since democratic regimes can increase citizen control over

procedures by voting, they can also induce low levels of corruption in a polity (Nur-tegin

2012: 52; Kolstad and Wiig 2011; Sioussiouras and Vavouras 2012: 95-96; Drury,

Krieckhaus and Lusztig 2006). The business world similarly assumes such a relationship to

exist in countries with longer established democracies and open markets (Treisman 2007:

241). Meanwhile, Mungiu-Pippidi (2013: 101) claims that countries regarded as democracies

may well be more corrupt than those where such practices are absent.

Other studies argue that while corruption is observable in all parts of the world

regardless of economic income, it particularly prevails in countries undergoing transition,

whether economic and/or political (Sioussiouras and Vavouras 2012: 97).Corruption in such

settings both “act as an arbitrary tax,” as well as a form of “tax evasion” (Ateljevic and Budak

2010: 377-378).A World Bank report (2000, p. xix) explains this effect with the unstable

institutional conditions that prevail in transition countries: “The simultaneous transition

processes of building new political and economic institutions in the midst of a massive

redistribution of state assets have created fertile ground for state capture and administrative

corruption”.

On the exposure to the negative effects of corruption, Bolongaita (2005: 2) warns that

regions with a recent past of violent conflict, such as the Balkans are under increased risk.

Such settings, the argument goes, offer fertile grounds to conduct corrupt activities in the

absence of effective control mechanisms. Significant amounts of foreign aid available by

external actors in the area further exacerbate the temptations to get involved in corrupt

practices. At its worst, corruption in such places is predicted as capable of gradually eroding

the post-conflict peace efforts (Bolongaita 2005: 3). Johnston (2005:1) similarly implies that

corruption in political settings lacking strong institutions can lead to violence. Political

instability, exacerbated by weak judicial institutions that are incapable of effectively

enforcing the existing legal framework eventually encourages the expansion of corruption in

such settings (Damania et al 2004).

Nonetheless, the role of corruption in transitioning societies may be more complex than

often acknowledged. Scholars like Khan (2004) explain the tendency to attribute negative

8 See also Sioussiouras and Vavouras (2012: 90).

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characteristics to corruption in the literature with the “good governance” bias. Khan argues

that the “good governance” approach attempts to measure up the developing countries with an

idealized notion of a democratic state with a fully developed liberal free market economy.

Any measurable discrepancies between the ideal and the existing conditions are then taken as

evidence of underdevelopment, or failing/weak economy. The problem with this argument,

Khan argues, is that it contrasts with factual evidence from the past (Khan 2004: 16). In fact,

recent data from developing countries seem to indicate that different corruption practices can

lead to different effects, not all of them negative (Khan 2006).9

The Perception and Measurement of Corruption in the Balkans:

To assess the impact of international assistance on corruption and understanding how

the Balkan people perceive the institutions and practices regularly associated with democracy

is also important. While not always an accurate gauge of actual corruption levels in a given

setting, perceptions of corruption matter: they play a crucial role in the development of

numerous international corruption measurement indices, which, in turn, can affect decisions

of foreign assistance (Grigorescu 2006: 522). Several surveys carried out in the Balkans

suggest that corruption, while not approved, is not universally condemned either (World Bank

2000: 16; Irrera 2006: 9; Hislope 2006: 10). While discussing the link between economic

conditions and corruption, Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga (2013: 1191) suggest that

people’s perceptions and economic conditions play a key role in their assessment of and

reaction to corruption in a country.

Perceptions particularly matter in democracies, since voters who are unhappy can cost

governments their reelection (Džihić and Segert 2012: 240). The EU candidacy may increase

optimism in public about the possibility of making significant political changes in their

respective setting. It certainly raises hopes for well established institutions that would

represent democracy and the rule of law. As an example, in Croatia a Gallup survey in 2009

found out that a significant portion of the correspondents considered the level of corruption to

get better after the EU membership (See Chart 4).

9 Between these types exists yet another type, which Khan refers to as “quasi-legal rent-seeking,” exemplified by patronage and/or clientelist networks (Khan 2004: 20-21). See also Kaufmann and Vicente (2005) for a discussion on “legal corruption.”

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A recent Eurobarometer research on corruption in EU member countries reports that

“[a]lmost all respondents (at least nine out of ten) in Greece . . . Romania, Bulgaria, [and]

Slovenia . . . agree that corruption is a major problem in their country. Indeed in Greece and

Slovenia almost eight out of ten respondents (78%) ‘totally agree’ that it is a major national

problem.” (Special Eurobarometer 374 [2012: 12]). According to the same report that 80% of

Greek, 78% of Romanian, 75% of Bulgarian and 50% of Slovenian respondents consider their

respective country to be more corrupt than other EU member states (the EU27 response to this

question is much lower at 36%) (Special Eurobarometer 374 [2012: 25]).10

At a first glance, earlier research on the region’s political culture underlines its generally

bleak view towards both democratic institutions and corruption (Giatzidis 2007: 341; Divjak

and Pugh 2008; Mungiu-Pippidi 2006: 653). When asked about their views about law and its

execution in their respective country, at least 90 percent of the respondents countries like

Bulgaria, Macedonia and Serbia answered that they consider politicians as unbound by laws

(Mungiu-Pippidi 2006: 654). A similar survey conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the

World Bank reflects that about forty percent of the respondents do not trust their government,

and consider politicians to be involved in corrupt activities (World Bank 2000:15). Parallel to

these findings, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2011) reports that

notwithstanding the remarkable variations between countries, on average, one in six citizens

of the western Balkan regions has either direct or indirect exposure to an act of bribery with a

public official on a yearly basis.

10Figures not available for other Balkan countries in the study.

Strongly improve22%

Mostly improve54%

Mostly deteriorate

15%

Strongly deteriorate2% DK/NA

7%

Gallup Balkan Monitor 2009 (Croatia):The expected level of corruption after EU membership

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Table 4 in this study summarizes the World Values Survey (WVS) data for the Balkan

countries on political corruption. In tandem with the findings by Mungiu-Pippidi and the

World Bank, the WVS results suggest that 42.9 percent of all correspondents considered

“most” public officials to be involved in political corruption, followed by 26 percent of them

regarding “almost all” to be involved, respectively. The perception levels for corruption,

however, vary for each country. For instance, while those people who believe that almost all

public officials to be involved in political corruption constitute as high as 54.2 percent of the

respondents in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, it is much lower at 12.4 percent

among the Slovenian respondents. Despite certain converging practices on various levels, the

variety of responses that appear in Table 4 reaffirms the diverse and complex nature of

corrupt activities in the region. These findings also question the usefulness of attributing a

uniform political culture to the region that is assumed to generate such practices in the first

place.

Nonetheless, Balkan countries do not have an impressive record on the corruption

ranking lists published by nongovernmental organizations that globally monitor such

activities. One of these NGOs is Transparency International, which annually publishes the

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) that ranks countries and territories based on the perceived

level of corruption in their public sector. Table 2 and Table 3 in this study provide the ranking

and scores of Balkan countries listed by the CPI for years 2012 and 2011. Both tables suggest

that corruption is a nearly ubiquitous phenomenon in the region. However, some countries

seem to be doing “better” (or worse) than others.

A way of explaining the changing levels of perception of corruption is by dividing

corrupt activities into separate groups. Some scholars argue that distinguishing between

different types of corruption can be an important factor when assessing their impact in a

polity. This is a sensible assumption for the Balkans, too, as similar to many other parts of the

world, corruption patterns in that region are highly heterogeneous (Ateljevic and Budak 2004:

384). While discussing corruption in post-communist geographies, Zagainova (2007: 142)

introduces a typology, where numerous Balkan countries come under different forms.

According to Zagainova, while Albania and Romania suffer from “bureaucratic corruption,”

“political corruption prevails in Bulgaria and Croatia, whereas Slovenia is listed under

“virtuous countries.” In response to the claims that trying to eradicate corruption exacerbates

populism, Crombois (2008) also reflects that corruption and populism may be symbiotic in

Bulgaria.

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External actors and corruption in the Balkans:

The most significant external actor in the Balkans concerning the monitoring and

eradication of corruption is probably the European Union (EU). Following the breakup of

Yugoslavia and the establishment of new states in the Balkans, the EU has gradually ascended

to the leading role in the democratization of the region, particularly by offering the prospect

of EU membership(Alexander 2008: 929).To assess the magnitude of the EU political and

financial assistance to the Balkans, Kosovo constitutes a good example. Aside from two

billion Euros provided by the EU, Fagan (2010: 2) asserts that the EULEX “[European Union

Rule of Law Mission to Kosovo] once fully operational, will confirm the Commission’s status

as the main development agency in the Western Balkan region and represents the most

ambitious and costly foreign policy adventure in the EU’s 50-year history.”

Other than the rising global trends, the EU interest and active involvement in the

promotion of anti-corruption policies in its neighboring countries, regions and candidate

countries has evolved from the need to stabilize and effectively monitor its surroundings in

the post Cold War era. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia and the establishment of new

states, the EU began to promote the Stabilisation and Association process (SAp) in the region

with the successor states of Yugoslavia, with the aim to prepare and steer them toward EU

membership in the long run (Fagan 2010: 2).

The EU has diverse political, economic and security reasons to eradicate corruption in

the Balkans. The political interest of the EU mainly raises from the inability of the

Copenhagen criteria to monitor and address corruption effectively in the EU candidates, or

countries seeking candidacy (Grubiša 2010: 74). In addition to political factors, economic

concerns also play a significant role: The major economic investors in the region are also EU

members, which can explain the overall EU concern in ensuring the general stability in the

region(Sioussiouras and Vavouras 2012: 98). Finally, given the widespread perception of

corruption as a security threat, it makes sense that the EU has sought to find permanent

solutions to what is seen as a tenacious problem at its doorstep.

In view of these considerations, it is not surprising to see corruption as a focal subject

that is persistently brought up in nearly all enlargement reports of the EU. In these documents,

the EU repeatedly underlines the importance of combating corruption in most enlargement

countries, since it “undermines the rule of law, impacts negatively on the business

environment and national budgets and affects citizens’ everyday life in areas such as

healthcare and education.” (“Communication from the Commission to the European

Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges” 2012-2013,

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European Commission Report, Brussels, 10.10.2012:5) The EU further reports that “the

pervasiveness of corruption enables infiltration of organized crime groups into the public and

private sector” (ibid).

As a remedy for corruption, the EU recommends the Balkan countries seeking

membership to achieve a higher level of transparency in their public realm, particularly in the

expenditures regarding public funds. It also pinpoints to the existing legal structure of these

countries as a field that requires major improvement to fight corruption. Furthermore, the EU

requests a tighter rein over the following issues while fighting corruption: “the financing of

political parties and election campaigns, the management of conflicts of interest, transparency

in public procurement, access to information and the seizure and confiscation of assets”

(“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council,

Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges,” 2012-2013, European Commission Report,

Brussels, 10.10.2012:5).

On the one hand, the warnings and recommendations of the EU have found a response

in most Balkan countries. In fact, most observers acknowledge the pivotal role of the EU as

an external monitor over anti-corruption measures in places like Romania, Albania, and

Croatia(Irrera 2006; Ristei 2010; Grubiša 2010). Balkan countries that are already EU

members, such as Romania and Bulgaria has had to undertake significant steps in order to

deal with the widespread corruption networks there with roots in almost all public offices,

including the judiciary and the police. In the case of Romania, Ristei (2010) argues that, the

presence of the EU as a propeller and supporter of the anti-corruption campaign has led that

country’s statesmen to take risk and introduce reforms which might otherwise been costly for

them.

On the other hand, observers note that while respective governments in Central and

East Europe willingly undertook the requested changes in most cases throughout 1990s;

western Balkans have generally failed to show such keen enthusiasm (Fagan 2010: 22). To a

certain degree, it is possible to explain this difference with the strong presence of other

international organizations like the UN and various NGOs in the region (Fagan 2010:22-23).

Despite the ongoing efforts, the EU also seems aware of this lack of enthusiasm about the

measures to combat corruption in the region. For several countries, such as Macedonia, the

main issue for the EU officials remains the gap between the newly passed legislations to

combat corruption and their implementation (e.g. Communication from the Commission to

the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-

2013, European Commission Report, Brussels, 10.10.2012, p.37) Similar comments also

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appear in the same EU report for Serbia (ibid, p.44). For Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia,

the report further remarks that “[a] legal framework is in place but the political will to tackle

the issue and to improve institutional capacity remains weak.” (“Communication from the

commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main

Challenges 2012-2013”, European Commission Report, Brussels, 10.10.2012 :59) While the

EU progress report on Montenegro depicts better conditions than many other enlargement

countries, it still points out to the similar concerns raised for the rest of the Balkan states

(Montenegro 2012 Progress Report, Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels,

10.10.2012 :46).11 However, the same document also stresses that more work is needed for

tangible outcomes (ibid:50).

Numerous anecdotes from Balkan countries further challenge the view that

liberalization is the panacea to corruption. Ateljevic and Budak (2010: 385) point out at the

decentralization efforts that emerged as a result of the democratization and economic

liberalization steps in western Balkans as the major culprit behind the increased corruption

levels. Instead of eradicating or reducing corruption, they argue that such policies have

instead encouraged the spread of its mutant forms, which that have proven even more resistant

to interference (ibid).

In Croatia, for instance, although privatization did take place, its opacity has ended up

benefiting the supporters of the political actors in power, and ultimately generated the belief

that acquiring political power can be a way of accumulating wealth for self (Grubiša

2010:77). In Bulgaria, Krastev (2002: 120) argues that weak state institutions following the

transition to democracy

“have created an environment in which corruption has become a main source of wealth and new social status . . . Moreover, the impotence of the post-communist state has created conditions in which organized crime has ‘privatized’ the policing role of the state, with various shady conglomerates forcing private business to pay ‘protection money.’”

It is possible that while corruption has remained prevalent in both pre and post

membership stages for countries like Bulgaria and Romania, its nature may have changed.

Ganev (2013) argues that after their accession as full members, the electoral system in

Bulgaria and the legal framework in Romania underwent significant changes that left them

vulnerable to undemocratic influences. For Bulgaria, Ganev (2013: 32) argues that the EU

membership has inadvertently generated the rise of a new form of corruption, with far more

11For the full report please see: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/mn_rapport_2012_en.pdf.

15

predatory and deleterious tendencies than previous practices. According to Ganev (2013: 30),

while corruption networks have always existed in Bulgaria, the forms that prevailed pre-EU

accession nonetheless generated some growth, if only to serve the interests of the parties

involved (Ganev 2013: 30). Meanwhile, in neighboring Romania, the aftermath of the EU

requested legal reforms have produced a condition the same author describes as “deliberate

dysfunctionality” (Ganev 2013: 30). Meanwhile, one of the foremost Bulgarian politicians has

openly admitted during 2009 elections that he uses the EU funds to boost his patronage

network (Ganev 2013: 35).

Numerous idiosyncratic or local factors notwithstanding, foreign assistance given by

external actors like the EU may have already caused the phenomenon to gain resistance to

intrusion. While discussing the impact of foreign aid on combating corruption in Albania, for

instance, Irrera (2006:21) argues that “external aids seem to be ineffective and only help the

criminal structure by providing more public money for their activities, through corrupt

channels.” Similarly, in the case of Bulgaria, Crombois (2008) explains the surges of

populism in the country with the EU monitored state attempts to deal with corruption at public

offices.

Although the EU seems to have taken up the issue of fighting corruption in the

Balkans as a good cause, it may have overlooked certain other, possibly more important

problems. Even though corruption claims can destabilize democratic regimes, solely

undertaking anti-corruption campaigns instead of focusing on the firm establishment of

institutions that form the backbone of democracies in transitioning regions is misled (Smilov

2007: 1-2).

However, the ongoing liberalization efforts promoted by both domestic and external

actors throughout the regiondo not guarantee to end corrupt activities in a polity (Roberts

2008: 548; Ateljevic and Budak 2010: 379). Morever, counter to their initial purpose; such

measures may not always lead to the strengthening of democratic institutions either. Instead

of supporting democratization and statebuilding efforts, foreign assistance in many instances

have encouraged the adoption ofad hoc solutions by the receiving parties that may stall or

prolong reaching a more permanent solution against corruption. While undertaking rapid

reforms in an effort to secure or maintain the aid flow is common, the longevity or depth of

such sweeping changes remains questionable.

A similar risk also exists during international assistance following a conflict for

peacebuilding purposes, which may have the unexpected effect of monopolizing and even

institutionalizing corruption networks to ensure “economic and political stability.” Practices

16

that are loosely related with corruption, such as “nepotism, fraud, over-invoicing, lack of

transparency and accountability, and tax avoidance” during post-conflict foreign assistance

based on liberal principles further challenge the validity and usefulness of such efforts (Le

Billion 2008: 345).

Conclusion:

Corruption as an independent variable affecting the possibility and/or quality of

regime transitions and economic liberalization is widely covered in the literature. In this study

we argue that external actors like the EU that aim to diminish or eradicate such practices may

inadvertently support them in the long run. Numerous examples from the Balkans suggest that

rigid or unrealistic expectations from donors or external factors that fail to address the

existing political or economic ties in societies undergoing major transitions can lead to dual

pronged settings where despite undertaking required legal/administrative changes of donors

corrupt networks remain salient, or get stronger.

We also suggest that increased levels of foreign involvement in the form of financial

aid and technical assistance to combat corruption can shift its meaning and focus in the

societies where such relations prevail. Put differently, we argue that the perception of

corruption can have a significant effect on evaluating its existence and intensity.

The ongoing debates on the causes and effects of corruption are unlikely to end

anytime soon. Aside from its theoretical implications, such a state of affairs is also significant

news for regions that are reported to harbor such activities. As numerous examples from the

Balkan countries suggest, treating corruption as a cultural phenomenon or a technical problem

with uniform characteristics is likely to miss its diverse functions under different settings.

While a certain amount of generalization is useful for displaying certain repetitive patterns

across countries and regions are useful to draw the general framework of the debate,

accounting for the nuances can help understand its persistence and pervasiveness in the

Balkans.

For a nuanced understanding of the factors lead to corruption in Balkan politics and

society, we suggest reviewing its sources and perception in the region. Aside from the

obvious theoretical implications, a shift in focus as suggested here can be a step in promoting

peaceful relations, democratization and better governance in the region.

17

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Appendix:

Table 1: Perceptions of Bribe Taking in the Balkans—Croatia vs. Turkey12

Country/region

Total Croatia Turkey

Compatriots do: accepting a

bribe

Almost all 13.7 % 4.1 % 20.8 %

Many 52.1 % 38.5 % 62.1 %

Some 29.5 % 48.4 % 15.5 %

Almost

none 4.7 % 9.0 % 1.6 %

Total 2020

(100%)

859

(100%)

1161

(100%)

Table 2: Corruption Perception Index Results for Balkans (2000-2011)

12 Table constructed from data from the World Values Survey collected from the following Balkan countries in indicated years: Croatia [1996], Croatia [1999], Turkey [1990], Turkey [1996], Turkey [2001], Turkey [2001]. Since the WVS is not limited to Balkan countries, but global in scale, only available Balkan countries are selected for the purposes of this study. For potential shortcomings of data collected in different waves of the WVS please see the explanations on their website (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org).

00.5

11.5

22.5

33.5

44.5

55.5

66.5

77.5

88.5

99.510

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Corr

uptio

n Sc

ore

Bulgaria

Romania

Croatia

Slovenia

Greece

Turkey

Montenegro*

Serbia*

FYR Macedonia

Albania

Kosovo**

Bosnia and Herzegovina

23

Table 2: Ranking and Scores of the Balkan countries in the Corruption Perceptions

Index, 2012-201313

13Data taken from Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 and 2013, published by Transparency International. Although data are available for 174 countries (as of 2012), only Balkan countries are selected here for the scope and purposes of this study. The Corruption Perceptions Index scores range from 0 (lowest—most corrupt) to 100 (highest—very clean). For more information, see Transparency International’s website at http://www.transparency.org.

05

101520253035404550556065707580859095

100

2012

2013

24

Table 4: Perceived Level of Corruption in the Balkans14

Country/region

Total Albania

Bosnia and

Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Romania Slovenia Turkey

FYR

Macedonia

Serbia and

Montenegro

Extent of

political

corruption

Almost no public

officials engaged

in it 4.4 % 0.7 % 1.9 % 1.6 % 1.1 % 21.5 % 2.5 % 4.7 % 1.6 % 1.9 %

A few are 26.6 % 35.6 % 25.0 % 13.9 % 22.1 % 12.9 % 55.0 % 27.7 % 11.8 % 33.7 %

Most are 42.9 % 50.9 % 53.3 % 50.3 % 61.2 % 38.3 % 30.1 % 33.6 % 32.4 % 43.0 %

Almost all public

officials are

engaged in it 26.0 % 12.8 % 19.8 % 34.2 % 15.6 % 27.2 % 12.4 % 33.9 % 54.2 % 21.3 %

Total 9743

(100%)

846

(100%)

1006

(100%)

792

(100%)

1027

(100%)

1101

(100%)

893

(100%)

1770

(100%)

900

(100%)

1408

(100%)

14 Table based on data from the Values Survey Databank, which comprises data collected from the following Balkan countries in indicated years: Albania [1998], Albania [2002], Bosnia and Herzegovina [1998], Bosnia and Herzegovina [2001], Bulgaria [1990], Bulgaria [1997], Bulgaria [1999], Croatia [1996], Croatia [1999], Greece [1999], Macedonia [1998], Macedonia [2001], Montenegro [1996], Montenegro [2001], Romania [1993], Romania [1998], Romania [1999], Serbia [1996], Serbia [2001], Slovenia [1992], Slovenia [1995], Slovenia [1999], Turkey [1990], Turkey [1996], Turkey [2001], Turkey [2001]. Since the WVS is not limited to Balkan countries, but global in scale, only available Balkan countries are selected for the purposes of this study. For potential shortcomings of data collected in different waves of the WVS please see the explanations on their website (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org).