corporate lienency program

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Gujarat National Law University

LENIENCY PROGRAM: A REMEDY TO CARTELIZATION

(Comparative Study)

(Project submitted for partial fulfilment of Seminar Course in Competition Law)

Disha Arora

Registration No- 12LM06

Submitted to: Dr. Udhaykumara R


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sr. No PARTICULARS PAGE NO

1. Abstract 3

2. Acknowledgment 4

3. Abbreviations 5

5. Chapter 1 : Introduction 6

6. Chapter 2: Cartels 7-9

7. Chapter 3: 10-13

8. Chapter 4: 14-16

9. Chapter 5: Conclusion 17-18

10. Bibliography 19-20


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ABSTRACT

Cartels are considered as one of the most harmful anti competitive agreement across the globe

since their only aim is to undertake prohibited anti competitive activities. But because of the

leniency program, one member of the cartels blows the whistle on to the other, giving itself an

exemption from the penalties. This was one of the major accomplishments of US Anti Trust

Laws in some previous laws was the modification of the Corporate Leniency Program in 1993 by

Department of Justice (DOJ). It is strongly evident that Corporate Leniency Program helps

revealing information of the criminal behaviors and activities, in the manner that the agency

working gets the information about the cartel than as it was working in the absence of such

cartel. Because of such a program the prosecution and investigation cost has been seen to be

minimized. Leniency program policies give incentives to those cartel members who come ahead

and give details of the cartel activity by promising a chance to keep away from prosecution for

their own past activities.

Across the globe different jurisdictions have different laws to break the HCC. Similarly there

are diverse leniency regulations and policies implemented by those different jurisdictions. A

Corporate Leniency Program for HCC and other illegal cartel is interesting both from the

theoretical point of view and also from an empirical viewpoint and outlook. In theory, a

lessening in the fines forced, for the primary self-reporter participant of the cartel and sky-

scraping fines and penalties for all other team participants brings a motivation to be the one,

to be the first, who will come forward and take the advantage of the CLP. Three main

features of a market make it easier for the firms in this market to conspire. Markets such as

power, oil, cement, gas, steel, which have no available substitutes, provide better extent for

enormous earnings and gains by price rise, and therefore a chance for open conspiracy amid

the firms.

Second important characteristic is the point of competition in the relevant market. The more

is the competition and lesser the prices, in non existence of the cartel, the better are the

probable profit from setting up of a cartel.


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Any accomplishment requires the effort of many people and this is not different. I wish to

express my gratitude to those who have to do this work and whose patience support wasinstrumental in accomplishing this task. I acknowledge & thank my teacher, Dr. Udhaykumara

K. Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar, for providing me an opportunity to undertake

a Research project on CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM: A REMEDY TO

CARTELIZATION (A Comparative Study).

I must acknowledge them and say thanks. Their diligent efforts have made me learn so much.

They were helping hand to me and their meticulous efforts provided me the foundation for the

work done

LASTLY I would also like to thank the library staff of Gujarat National Law University,

Gandhinagar, for providing with every possible effort for the fulfilment of this project.


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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ ACRONYMS

1. Act: Indian Competition Act, 2002

2. AAEC: Appreciable Adverse Effect On Competition

3. CLP : Corporate Leniency Program

4. DOJ : Department of Justice

5. EU: European Union

6. HCC: Hard Core Cartels

7. ICN: International Competition Network

8. OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

9. RPM: Retail Price Management

10.S.C. : Supreme Court

11.U.S.: Unites States of America


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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The idea behind the present research paper is to bring the light on the fact that how the

corporate leniency program are helpful in bursting cartels.

The other important object of the present research paper is to make a comparative study of the

different corporate leniency programs governing Unites States of America, European Union, and

India.

RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY

CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM: A REMEDY TO CARTELIZATION

(Comparative Study) is a very relevant study as it helps us gain knowledge on the working of

Corporate Leniency Programs.

The present research paper will also help us to study the Leniency guidelines in a better way by

the comparative study

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. To understand the concept of Corporate Leniency Program

2. To understand the nature of Leniency Program, of how it is helpful in breaking the

Cartels.

RESEACRH METHODOLOGY

The present is done with the Doctrinal method of research.


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CHAPTER 2

CARTELS

2.1OVERVIEW

Cartels are born when given the opportunity and market conditions are right, while cartels

die because of internal collapse or they are caught and convicted by the antitrust authority.

The likelihood that a cartel, once identified, is convicted depends inversely on the caseload of

the antitrust authority due to an implicit resource constraint. The authority also chooses an

enforcement policy in terms of the fraction of non-leniency cases that it prosecutes.1

Cartels are, in real meaning, agreements connecting competitors not to connect in

competition with one other. Cartel activity, usually involves market allocation, price fixing

and collusive tendering, is usually seen as the mainly serious of competition law

contraventions by competition authorities across the world2.

Competition law considers Cartels as one of the most damaging and harmful type of anti-

competitive agreements between enterprises, as their plan is classically to get involved in

prohibited activities like collusive tendering (bid-rigging), price fixing, and market division

which will lead to hiked prices and reduced efficiency. Normally, competition authoritys

clash to examine and investigate and prosecute enterprises and firms caught up in cartels

without the support of an insider, as cartels are by their natural world collusive and

mysterious. Leniency programs incentivize cartel enterprise members to come ahead and

account cartel activity by hopeful of an opportunity to keep away from prosecution for their

previous past behavior and actions.

2.2MEANING OF CARTEL

Cartel as defined by the European Commission for Competition is a group of similar,

independent companies which join together to fix prices, to limit production or to share

markets or customers between them. 3 The European commission (EU) includes only

independent companies under the purview of cartels.

The Indian Competition Act defines Cartelization as entering into the agreement or

arrangement or understanding between enterprises and instituting measures to control

competition. The Act defines cartel in section 2 as follows-

1http://ideas.repec.org/p/jhu/papers/548.html

2

http://www.bowman.co.za/ezines/Competition/Newsletters/CorporateLeniency.htm3Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/index_en.html


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Cartel includes an association of producers, sellers, distributors, traders, or service

providers who, by agreement amongst them, limit, control or attempt to control the

production, distribution sale or price of, or, trade in goods or provisions of services4

The definition is very wide and inclusive, covering both trade and competition. It is formal

association of manufacturers or suppliers to maintain prices at high level, and control

production, prices, marketing arrangements etc., and thereby limiting competition and

imposing restraints on trade. It, thus, imposes unreasonable restraint on free trade and

disorts competition. To give a wider impact, it includes all kinds of combinations which are

anti competitive. In Alkali Manufacturers Association of India v. Sinochem International Chemicals

Company Ltd.5It was stated as cartelization being an economic field, a greater latitude has to

be given to the word cartel to include all sorts of combinations, which are anti -

competitive.

In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation6SCdefines cartel as, therefore, is an

association of producers who by agreement among themselves attempt to control

production, sale and price of the product to obtain a monopoly in any particular commodity

or industry.

A cartel is formed, interalia,with a view that members of the cartel do not wage a price war

and they sell at an agreed price. There may also be cartel where members divide territories. A

cartel is a formal organization of the producers in an industry, to which the individual

member surrender their price making powers. The cartel agreements may be open or

decretive and are directed towards price, production and market control.7

The Office of Fair Trading defines cartels as an agreement between businesses not to

compete with each other. The agreement is usually secret, verbal and often informal.8

2.3 CARTEL: AN APPRECIABLE ADVERSE EFFECT ON COMPETITION

When we study cartel, an important question that comes to mind is why cartel harmful?

Cartel is assumed to have AAEC. In a very layman language, competition law seeks to

promote, maintain and sustain competition in market being beneficial to various

stakeholders in society. In case of Cartel, competitors agree not be compete on price,

product, customers etc. since in the case of a Cartel, direct competitors agree to forego

4Mitta l , D.P, Compet i t ion Law & Pract i c e (New Delhi: Taxmann Publications (P) Ltd. , 3 r d Ed.,

2011, pg 5.115 [1999] 98 Comp. Cas. 333(MRTPC)]

6 [1993] 3 SCC 499/AIR 1994 SC 9887Ibid 48 http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-cartels/cartels/what-cartel


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competition and opt for collusion, the consumers and business houses lose the benefits of

competition. Thus, cartels are inherently harmful. Further, competitors know that such an

agreement is unlawful and it compels them to keep such agreement secretive and resultantly

it is invariably not reduced to writing and it is often found to be in the form of arrangement

or understanding. Moreover, the best evidence against Cartel is usually in possession of the

charged parties, which are not likely to easily part with and make available to the investigator

or enquiring authority. These compulsions seem to have persuaded the law makers to

prescribe that Cartel is presumed to have AAEC.9

2.4 SOME OF THE LEADING CARTELS

Some famous worldwide cartel cases are The International Vitamins Cartel where all

important and major manufacturers of vitamins situated in Canada, France, Belgium, Japan,

Germany, the Netherlands, the United States and Switzerland which included Hoffmann-la

Roche AG and BASF of Germany, Rhone-Poulenc of France operated for over 10 years

from 1989 to 1999 and covered all major vitamins consumed the world over, Cement cartels

of Argentina, Pharmaceutical cartels, washing powder cartel of Unilever and

Procter&Gamble etc.

9

Combating cartel in markets issues & challenges by G.R. Bhatia,www.competition-commission-india.nic.in, available at http://www.competition-commission

india.nic.in/speeches_articles_presentations/GR.BhatiaArticle.pdf viewed on 13th

March,2013
http://www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/http://www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/http://www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/http://www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/http://www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/http://www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/


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CHAPTER 3

CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM

3.1 OVERVIEW

In the present century the Corporate Leniency Programs are widely used as an important tool

of the competition act. Basically the Leniency program serves two purposes by its

implementation, firstly, in the short run application; it helps in the detection of the cartels and

helps to cut down the legal enforcement cost of the entire process of breaking the cartel.

Secondly, in the long run it creates a deterrent impact on the firms from committing antitrust

abuse.10 THE CLP is intended at eradicating and preventing cartel activity as it harms the

economy at large. The reason for adopting the CLP is to offer a cartel member the possibility

to disclose information on a cartel to the commission in return for immunity from prosecution

and fines11

3.2 DEFINTION

Leniency is used to mean total immunity and lenient treatment to mean less than full

immunity. A competition agencys decisions that could be considered lenient treatment include

agreeing to pursue a reduction in penalties or not to refer a matter for criminal prosecution.

The terms leniency, immunity and amnesty are used in many jurisdictions but the definitions of

these terms vary between jurisdictions. For example, under the U.S. program, corporate

amnesty andcorporate leniency are used interchangeably to mean complete immunity from

criminal conviction and from fines for the anticompetitive conduct. Some other jurisdictions,

such as the EU, us leniency to refer to any reduction in fines up to 100 percent. Leniency

policy describes the written collection of principles and conditions adopted by an agency that

govern the leniency process. A leniency policy is one component of a leniency program, which

also includes internal agency processes, for example on how the agency implements its leniency

policy, including processes for conferring leniency and/or lenient treatment.12

3.3 THE BENEFITS OF IMPLEMENTING A LENIENCY POLICY

Most of the jurisdictions have developed or developing programs and regulations which

propose leniency and/or lenient behavior because of the numerous payback that run from

10

Ibid 411Mihe Heinrich Gaomab II What is Corporate Leniency Program pg 512

Anti Cartel Enforcement Manual by www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org


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having them. Leniency programs give confidence to the violators to admit and associate their

co-conspirators, as long as first-hand, straight insider proof of conduct that the other parties

to the cartel want to hide. The programs and regulations also help to expose conspiracies that

would or else go unnoticed and undetected and can subvert existing cartels. They take action

as prevention with deterrent impact to those contemplating inflowing into cartel agreements

and arrangements. Evidence can be collected more quickly, at a lesser direct cost, in

comparison to different other methods of inquiry and investigation, mainly to timely and well-

organized decree of cases. To collect this information, the parties which supply it are promised

lesser fines, less restrictive orders, shorter prison sentences, or even complete immunity.

The benefits of implementing leniency programs can be clubbed jointly as:

Deterrence making cartel membership less attractive

Detection promoting the discovery of cartels

Desistence causing cartels to cease operation

Sanctioning making punishment of co-conspirators more likely

The overall objective of leniency programs is however, to improve the level of compliance

with antitrust and competition laws, through the increased detection of cartels. This benefits

the community through the increase in competition, leading to lower prices, better service,

more innovation and more efficient firms, an objective consistent with that of enforcement

agencies.

CLP comes as a useful tool for 'defectors' to lessen their probable punishments. Leniency

programs lessen fines for members of a cartel that gets the evidence to the concerned

authority. The punishments and penalties for companies that violate the competition law

rules are very strict. Illegal cartel members have a limited chance of either reducing this

punishment or avoiding it entirely. Different competition law commissions functions a

leniency program where companies that give information about a cartel of how they

participated might be given full or at least partial immunity from punishment and fines. It is

seen that the majority important input of current years to the global fight against cartel

arrangement and its sustainability is the wide recognition of leniency programmes by a large

number of national jurisdictions.

Leniency policies have till now been successful across the globe in combating cartels by each

of the policies stages:

1) Prosecution, making conviction and penalization stricter and more frequent;

2) Detection, making discovery more probable;


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3) Desistance, making cartels less stable, seeding mistrust and suspicion among cartel

partners; and

4) Deterrence, making cartels less profitable.13

In year 2002, the European Union Commission has considerably revised its law related

enforcement against cartels. Particularly, the fresh policy follows the road of the CLP

enacted by the U.S. govt in 1993 and stresses the chances of fine deductions for self-

reporting cartel members. CLP in U.S is measured the most efficient leniency program till

present for a large number of reasons.

1993, August 10 the DOJ Division of U.S. announced a new CLP according to which a firm

can avoid criminal prosecution for anti-trust violations by accepting and confessing its

participation in the anti competitive activities, completely helping the Division, and following

the other specified conditions14.

13Combating cartel in markets issues & challenges by G.R. Bhatia,www.competition-commission-

india.nic.in, available at http://www.competition-commission

india.nic.in/speeches_articles_presentations/GR.BhatiaArticle.pdf viewed on 13

th

March,201314US Corporate and Individual Leniency Policy., www.justice.gov, Available at

http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lenind.html, visited on 12th March,2013
http://www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/http://www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/http://www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/http://www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lenind.htmlhttp://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lenind.htmlhttp://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lenind.htmlhttp://www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/http://www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/


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Chapter 4

COMPARISON OF LENIENCY PROGRAM: US, EU AND INDIA

4.1 OVERVIEW

Corporate Leniency Programs exists in the increasing number of jurisdictions where HCC

conduct is a criminal offence, as well as in jurisdictions, such as EU and many of its member

states, where HCC conduct is not subject to criminal sanctions. 15 As a result of the success

achieved with the existing policies in the U.S., Europe, and Canada, as well as the

International work on leniency pogrammes that has been taking place in the forums such as

OECD, ICN, and European Competition Network many other jurisdictions have redefined

their prior leniency programmes or introduced the new ones that attribute many of the

features of the best in class policies.16

4.2 COMPARISION

The highest rate of success in the leniency policy is gained by U.S and EU. But for their

success many important factors comes into play. The U.S. CLP was first drafted in the year

1978 and then it was later amended in the year 1993. Before 1993 the program did not

present immunity but rather "prosecutorial discretion" that was comparatively

unproductive.17 Scott Hammond, Director of Criminal Enforcement, stated "[prior to 1993]

comparatively few general pardon applications, in detail, no additional than one a year, and

also did not guide to the discovery and breaking of even a single international cartel." 18 For

this very reason that of, the DOJ altered its regulations and policy to the leniency policy of

present situation which defines leniency as

"not charging such an individual criminally for the activity being reported."19

The reorganization of the regulation prove to be very useful and is supported by Department

of Justice's statement,

15http://europe.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/authorities_with_leniency_program.pdf

16Vinod Dhall, Competition Law Today- Concepts, Issues, and the Laws in Practice, (Oxford University

press,2008) pg no 108-10917

Farhad Sorabjee, Reeti Choudhary,J. Sagar Associates, available athttp://www.jsalaw.com/Admin/uplodedfiles/PublicationFiles/Leniency%20Regimes%20-

%20Fourth%20edition%202012%20(India).PDFvisited on 15th

March,201318The European Commission's New Leniency Policy,www.crowell.com, available at

http://www.crowell.com/pdf/leniency.pdf , visited on 23rd March,201319Leniency Policy for Individual, www.usdoj.gov , available at

http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lenind.htm) visited on 23rd March,2013
http://www.jsalaw.com/Admin/uplodedfiles/PublicationFiles/Leniency%20Regimes%20-%20Fourth%20edition%202012%20(India).PDFhttp://www.jsalaw.com/Admin/uplodedfiles/PublicationFiles/Leniency%20Regimes%20-%20Fourth%20edition%202012%20(India).PDFhttp://www.jsalaw.com/Admin/uplodedfiles/PublicationFiles/Leniency%20Regimes%20-%20Fourth%20edition%202012%20(India).PDFhttp://www.jsalaw.com/Admin/uplodedfiles/PublicationFiles/Leniency%20Regimes%20-%20Fourth%20edition%202012%20(India).PDFhttp://www.jsalaw.com/Admin/uplodedfiles/PublicationFiles/Leniency%20Regimes%20-%20Fourth%20edition%202012%20(India).PDF


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"the Amnesty program has been responsible for detecting and prosecuting more antitrust violations than all of

our search warrants, consensual-monitored audio or video tapes, and cooperating informants combined. It is,

unquestionably, the single greatest investigative tool available to anti-cartel enforcers."20

After the achievement of U.S. CLP, the EU leniency policy was first introduced at EC level

in 1996 and was later revised twice, in Feb 2002 and more recently in December 2006. Not

likely the U.S. system of CLP which mainly focuses on criminal approach of antitrust law,

European Unions policy is basically used on civil suits, because the criminal prosecution of

EU anticompetitive law does not exist. EU's leniency policy is only accessible for companies

since only companies and not any individual can be liable for anticompetitive actions.

Adding to the giving way immunity to the companies which provide information on hidden

cartel or the one which provides the evidence to establish the cartel infringement, as of its

civil nature, EU guidelines also recognized a "sliding window" scheme for corporations that

do not qualify for absolute immunity. The civil nature of European Union's

anticompetitive law helped to make it probable to compute punishment exclusively on

monetary damages; as a result it is possible to start a system where companies who can give

evidence that is measured to be of "significant added value" for Commission investigation

are to be approved reduction in the fines.21

The "sliding window" policy in EU's leniency program reflects the view on violation of

antitrust been a civil subject not been a criminal matter. Since the absence of the

infringement holding moral weight, it is acceptable that penalties are reduced, for companies

to put in for the investigation not in favor of itself. Not likely the EU legal society, a few

unpleasant or even minimal violation of any antitrust law in U.S. brings a disgrace and so

fractional exemption cannot be very easily intended and it becomes not as much of

meaningful for companies to assist inquiry and investigation not in favor of itself. By means

of the help of violators, EU Commission can further successfully decide cases, and spotlight

their restricted resource on investigation and prosecution of other anticompetitive

violations.22

20Hammond, "When Calculating the Costs and Benefits of Applying for Corporate Amnesty, How Do You Put a

Price Tag on an Individual's Freedom?", the Fifteenth Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime 2 (Mar. 8,2001) (available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/7647.htm)21

Einer Elhauge, Damein Geradin Global Competition Law and Economics (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2nd

edi)22

How the Punishment of the European Union Competition Law and United States Antitrust Law ReflectRespective View on Competition., www.voices.yahoo.com, available athttp://voices.yahoo.com/how-punishment-european-union-competition-4523875.html?cat=17visited on 23rd March,2013
http://voices.yahoo.com/how-punishment-european-union-competition-4523875.html?cat=17http://voices.yahoo.com/how-punishment-european-union-competition-4523875.html?cat=17http://voices.yahoo.com/how-punishment-european-union-competition-4523875.html?cat=17http://voices.yahoo.com/how-punishment-european-union-competition-4523875.html?cat=17http://voices.yahoo.com/how-punishment-european-union-competition-4523875.html?cat=17http://voices.yahoo.com/how-punishment-european-union-competition-4523875.html?cat=17


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In spite of the record high fines posed to 8 vitamins companies which included Hoffman-

La Roche (800 million) for agreeing to charge a higher price for the product illegally, in

most of the cases of cartel they do not have fines thereby making the policy a money-making

profitable choice for companies. The EU leniency policy is considered as unbeaten following

it had undergone 2 amendments and knowledge of around 16 years.

The Competition Commission of India (Lesser Penalty) Regulations was 1st introduced in the year

2009. With barely three years this leniency policy came into picture, it will certainly take more

time to extend in the Indian markets and increase additional experience from other

Commissions. Though the finest provisions of different leniency policies from across the

world, diverse jurisdictions have been incorporated in the Indias lesser punishment

regulations and rules, there are still some of the few factors which makes the U.S. and EU

leniency policies enhanced than Indias CLP.

4.3 LENIENCY POLICY: SIMILARITY BETWEEN EU AND U.S.

4.3.1 REDUCED PENALTY: It is relevant to understand that at present in both the EU

and U.S.; all or any willingly helpful cartel member who might have missed the competition

for complete and full resistance from prosecution may still get a less penalty. That makes it

clear that in both the EU and U.S., two evenly culpable participants of the same cartel be

able to be given greatly different penalties relied on their near the beginning taking of liability

and the appropriateness and worth of their cooperation.23 With this situation, India also

stands on the same position as the Lesser Penalty Regulation in its section 4(b) which

states that

The applicantswho are subsequent to the first applicant may also be granted benefit of reduction in penalty

on making a disclosure by submitting evidence, which in the opinion of the Commission, may provide

significant added value to the evidence already in possession of the Commission or the Director General, as the

case may be, to establish the existence of the cartel, which is alleged to have violated section 3 of the Act.

4.4 LENIENCY POLICY: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EU AND U.S.

4.4.1 MOMENTUM: In the United States., near the beginning cooperators not only supply

evidence that can be valuable to the Division, but can be used in opposition to remaining

23Nathan H Miller, Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcementwww.jstor.orgavailable on

http://www.jstor.org/stable/25592481, visited on 15th

March,2013
http://www.jstor.org/http://www.jstor.org/http://www.jstor.org/http://www.jstor.org/stable/25592481http://www.jstor.org/stable/25592481http://www.jstor.org/stable/25592481http://www.jstor.org/


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members of the cartel, and also just the once their request agreements are filed on the public

evidence they over and over again give a tough drive that fastens the Division's investigation

procedure and prosecution of remaining members and also, in an Amnesty-Plus situation,

further cartels. Plea negotiations are secret and private, but just the once agreements are gets

reached, the plea agreement is presented before the court and made public. 24 Other cartel

members can then make out that further participating companies which have acknowledged

their liability and promised to help and cooperate with the authority, and so they frequently

rapidly line up to beg guilty.

24Ibid 18


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CONCLUSION

Cartels have been suspected and confirmed in different sectors, namely, such as steel, cement,

trucking, tyres, etc. Like other countries across the globe, India is too alleged to be a sufferer of

overseas cartel in bulk vitamins, soda ash, petrol etc. With all these it tends to lift the price or

decrease the option of choice of consumers. The corporate houses are affected the most by such

cartels as the cost of collecting and assembling inputs is improved or the choice is constrained

leading it to be uncompetitive, not viable or be fulfilled with a smaller amount profits.

It is because of these draw backs that Cartels are well thought-out as mainly grave

competition law infringements and absolute evil of antitrust laws. Cartels are the most

dangerous violations and infringement of competition law.

Moreover, developing countries are mainly affected more because either due to lack of

competition administration or because of not enough capacity to discover, prosecute or detectdomestic and also the overseas cartel. The battle in opposition to Cartel is lawfully and basically a

difficult and hard task.

Cartels are conspiracies and to strike at the foundations of them, Competition Authority desires

to deeply and seriouslybank upon Leniency Programme or to support and inspire to stimulate

the whistleblowers. An growing number of Competition Authorities, may therefore, set up

special HCC branches and the inspiration to do so is to expand centers of brilliance with high

opinion to knowledge and skilled authority, requisite in organizing raids, search and seizure,

interviewing witnesses, concealed surveillance alongside victorious execution of the leniency

programmes.

The system is designed, bearing in mind inducing participant of a Cartel to defect/subvert from

the cartel arrangement or agreement. The party making revelation will, though, be subject matter

to other instructions of the Commission as per provisions.

The Act does not offer for any encouragement or incentive to the whistleblower, which may

possibly be well thought-out after adequate and skill and knowledge in the application anf

enforcement of law is gained by the Authority. Certainty and justice are dangerous to make

leniency programme efficient and for this reason the Commission can take appropriate actions

and measures including formulation of Guidelines etc

The accessibility of explicit definition of the Cartel, integration of a leniency programme for a

participant of a cartel to defect/break, the control to impose restraint penalty connected with

profits or revenue on each member, clear provisions to put into effect jurisdiction in deference

of overseas acts having AAEC in India joined with requirements to go into cooperation

agreement with current global competition agencies all along with pains and hard works toconstruct strong competition civilization which includes encouragement to public to put forward


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information by ensuring privacy, synchronization with Government Departments & sect oral

regulators and by stressing the call for well-built sanctions in sight of unalterable harms caused,

the Competition Commission will be capable to successfully fight domestic as well as cross

border cartels.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

1. Bishop, Simon and Mike Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law(Sweet&Maxwell, 3 r d Edition)

2. Dhall, Vinod, Competit ion Law Today: Concepts , Issues and the Law in Pract ice (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008)

3. Elhange, Einer and Damien Geradin, Global Competit ion Law & Economics(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2 nd Ed., 2011)

4. Joelson, Mark R., An Intern ational Antitru st Primer (Hague: K.L.International, 2n d Ed., 2001)

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11.Leniency Policy for Individual, www.usdoj.gov , available at

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and Portland, Oregon, 2nd edi)

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http://www.jstor.org/stable/25592481, visited on 15th March,2013
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