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9

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Standing Group REGRADED NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Per Authority IMSM-431-99

By £0lCX).C.ft2ëf Date

Groupe Permanent

SGM-1198-51 27 July 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION BOARD AND THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC BOARD

SUBJECT: Acceleration of NATO Air Force Programs (Paris Plan)

1. An. examination has been made by the Chiefs of Air Staff of Canada, France, United Kingdom and the United States to deter­mine whether the air force requirements of the Medium Term Plan could be met by 1954.

2. This study is known as the PARIS PLAN, the main con­clusions of which, as they affect production, are given for information in the following paragraphs. It is emphasized that the PARIS PLAN has not been agreed by nations, SHAPE and the Standing Group* In addition the impact of this Plan on the Naval and Army requirements of the Medium Term Plan has yetto be studied.

3. Aircraft. Productionâ* By making certain assumptions on the quantity of war

reserve aircraft and by utilizing the available production capacity, it appears that most of the aircraft required for the front line force could be provided by December 1954.The production by December 1954 of the required aircraft will not be possible, however, unless the necessary aircraft engine, airframe, and component production programmes are determined, and firm orders, backed by the necessary funds,are placed on industry as a matter of the utmost urgency,

iand not later than 1 September 1951. This is parti true in the case of the basic and advanced trainer /

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■ ÏNa à 1 Vab* The lack of adequate detailed information at the

' 4 ■time of writing this report has prevented' an accurate overall analysis of the ability of useable aircraft production resources to meet the new front line requirements. However, there is no apparent reason to believe that from an aircraft production standpoint the gap in front line aircraft cannot be closed. The individual training aircraft shown in para­graph 6 Can be made available in time to permit accomplishment of the aircrew training required to close the gap. Details of the aircraft production position are shown at the Enclosure and Appendices,

£. It has been determined that:(1) The first essential is to ensure that

existing production programmes are achieved. Unless outstanding questions relating to the allocation of machine tools and materials are settled quickly,this will not happen and there will be a short-fall even on current contributions.

(2) Production programmes must be stepped up and accelerated whenever possible, and from a pre­liminary studyt it appears that this can, in fact, be done in certain countries so as tp provide the required front line aircraft by December 1954 provided that the necessary decisions are taken within the next few months.

(3) Each country should re-examine its production programmes to make certain that each is making or . planning to make the types that will be of most value to the common end.

(4) SACEUR should request that the Defense Produc­tion Board make a detailed study of the possibility of increasing the overall NATO production by an interchange of components and equipments on a greater scale than is at present contemplated.

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(5) Examinations have revealed that if funds are. made available and if all the potential for GFP is exploited, there is additional productive potential in Canada, U .S., France and U.K. from mid-1953 and through 1954. ■­

4. Provisioning. Based on the examination of the logistic aspects the following courses of action are deemed desirable,

â. Provisioning. (U.S. Procurement) There is need for urgent provisioning action in most ranges of supply and equipment. National staffs, in conjunction with SHAPE must extract detailed requirements and Initiate procurement action. The necessary information should then be forwarded to NATO Defense Production Board so that it can take early action to make good any deficiencies that have been revealed. A target date of not later than September 1951 is recommended for the initiation of procurement action.

In addition, each government should ensure that the necessary priority is accorded for the manufacture and supply of the "Paris Plan" requirements. Arrangements must also be made for the necessary overhaul and repair arising from attrition, particularly on the scale to be expected should war occur.

b. Telecommunications. Within the overall picture telecommunications requirements probably r-epresent the most critical single factor.

5. Communications.. - Electronicsâ. Unless prompt and effective measures are taken

there will be critical deficiencies in 1952 and 1953 in the following categories of communications-electronics equipments: (not in order of priority).

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Line of sight radio link stations Teletype equipment Cryptographic machines Mobile radio vehicles Early Warning Radar Identification Equipment (I.F.F.)Ground Control Interceptor Equipment (G.C.I.)Ultra High Frequency Ground Equipment Airborne Interception Sets

b. A lead time of 18 months ±3 required in the procurement of copimunications-electronics equipment.

£. A series of combined air force telecommunications conferences will be required to prepare the detailed tele­communications programme required to Implement the air build-up.

6* Trailâ. The additional requirements of training aircraft

for the PARIS PLAN over and above those planned and known mutual aid are estimated as follows:1439 (U.E.) Basic training aircraft (T-6, T-28, Morane 475 Types) 825 (U.E.) Jet aircraft (T-33, Meteor 7, etc.)540 (U.E.) Jet fighter types 40 (U.E.) Tow aircraft21 (U.E.) Navigation trainers (l4 place type)

b. The basic and navigation trainer aircraft must be made available over the period Jan 1952 to Jan 1953. Jet trainers and fighters must be made- available over the period Jan 1953 to July I953.

FOR THE STANDING GROUP:

C.. H.. DONNELLY Colonel, USA Senior Secretary

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ENCLOSURE A I R C R A F T

AVAILABILITÏ vergue REQUIREMENTS

No, Role Nation

PROGRAM TOTAL TO MEET PARIS PLAliProposedAddn’lProduc­tionEffort

BalanceFinal

PositionIndigenousProduction

Foreign Aid

Including PS»52 PlanFirm

Add’lEffort

a , "b , o , d e >le/d/e)f g . 1 1 r iFighter Belgium 496 496 7*203Bomber Denmark 194 194 / 96France 823 823 1-119Italy 341 34l / 37Netherlands 325 325 £.30Norway 296 296 /198U.K. 909 909 /Mo ' /985U.S. 1157 1157TOTAL 2066 2475 4541 *

Day Belgium 231 231 ^ 7 19Fighter Canada 300 800 1810 /2110Denmark 10 10 -174France l4l0 520 1930Italy 4l0 4l0 A - 77Netherlands 519 519 N /332Norway 3 3 A -280U.K. 1129 1129 L -305TOTAL 4499 520 13 5032 Y /1667

Fighter Belgium 12 12 S - 59All Wx. Denmark 20 20 I - 28France S -310Italy 4 4 - 90Netherlands 9 9 N - 53Norway 0 - 48U.K. 662 662 T / 39TOTAL ' 662 45 707 -624Tactical Belgium 42 42 0 J 18Recce, Denmark 3 8 0 - 4

France (F) 151 151 IS / 35« (LB) p - 56Italy I -146Netherlands 49 49 E t 29Norway 16 16 T / 8U.K. 187 187 E / 66 (F)/35U.S. 204 204 (LBJ-85TOTAL 391 266 657Light U.S. ’ 277 277 rwi .1-- - --- -- BEBomber France -273Italy - 65U.K. 932 932 5 /220

Canada 514 514TOTAL 1209 5l4 1723 5 -118Medium U.K. 236 164 4ooBomberTrans­ Belgium 37 37 - 2port Denmark - 39Fiance 65 21 86 / 21Italy 43 43 - 22Norway 13 13U.K. 48 37 85 - 2

u .s , 118 118TOTAL 231 151 382 - 44 - 44GRAND TOTALS 9294 1034 311-4 13442 {j -

PARIS PLANSQÎKL198-51 - 5 _

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APPENDIX "A"EXCESS BASIC TRAINER REQUIREMENTS

vsEXCESS AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION CAPACITY

U.S» AND CANADIAN PRODUCTIONonly

2000

EXC.EXCE

ESS BASI IS AIRCR

| TRAINE.vs

FT PRODl| REQUIR ACTION C

iMENTS.PACITY

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Schedi lizatio] of know| Commit

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à be ent /

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1200 /

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1000.........

800 I

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/ / 1, : I ....... -ß . . j ! 4 - JL-1952 1953

tm 6 *f*SGM-1I98-51

PARIS PLAN Appendix HA"

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APPENDIX »B1*

EXCESS PRODUCTION CAPACITY TO MEET ADDITIONAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, T ~ ^ a/c

$ A, Vi^

U»S, AND CANADIAN PRODUCTION ONLY

2OOO

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Froi i the po: nt of v: ew of traAning ahe eçtiiiated T>rQ( notion nan mèqt tfra -Ttra: ning ret ulremen1 ;s (Tri ining Si ib-*Commi ;tee )

1954 PARIS PLAN Appendix "B"

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