Roksana GabidullinaMarch 21, 2014Professor Stanger

The Evolution of Containment and its Strategies in Today’s World

Is containment still viable in 2014? We have to ask the question of who or what is the

enemy of the United States. During the Cold War, the enemy was an ideology supported by

several states. Communism(s) had faces and borders. The ideologies were adopted and

legitimized by states. One of them, the Soviet Union, was a global superpower and the object of

containment. Containment was born during this time. It was aimed largely at states, such as the

Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. Transnational actors only played a role, such as the international

communist party, when trying to advance communism worldwide. The parties themselves were

not the central focus. In today’s world, terrorism is a worldwide security concern. In this essay, I

argue that due to the growth of transnational actor’s influence, containment as traditionally

understood is not a viable strategy in 2014. The containment strategies have to be tailored to the

contemporary world as they have been throughout the Cold War.

Each strategy has its own context and that is true of containment as well. It arose during

at a time after destructive wars with the psychology of people averse to such violence and “more

favorable…climate…for developing ‘measures short of war’ (Gaddis 382). All the state actors

had “societies to defend” and “a state to preserve” (Gaddis 382). Furthermore, during the Cold

War, the Soviet leaders did not have a timetable and thus could be persuaded or shown that their

ideologies were wrong over time (Gaddis 382). Thus, this climate made containment possible.

Containment, as was understood by Kennan, was

restoration of the balance of power through the encouragement of self-confidence in nations threatened by Soviet expansionism; reduction, by exploiting tension between Moscow and the international communist movement, of the Soviet Union’s ability to project influence beyond its borders; and modification, over time, of the Soviet concept

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of international relations, with a view to bringing about a negotiated settlement of outstanding differences (35-6).

Kennan’s containment focused on the Soviet Union, a state, and he thought only the

industrial-military power could bring change in world politics. Additionally, he advocated for the

asymmetrical response through economic means (Gaddis 212).

While two of Kennan’s recommendations were adopted by the Truman administration,

such as abandoning universalism and continuing the balance of power (Gaddis 63), it did not find

resources as limited as Kennan did and thought there was no need for distinction between vital

and peripheral interests (Gaddis 92). The NSC-68 also suggested that balance of power

dependent not only on capabilities but also on perceptions, thus effectively increasing the variety

of interests deemed relevant for national security. This strategy’s repercussions, such as

increased defense expenditures and prolonged, inconclusive wars, changed the next

administration’s views on the strategies of containment.

Eisenhower’s New Look continued certain strategies but implemented the strategy of

deterrence and liberation. The communist world’s victories, such as China, negatively affected

the American psyche, thus the Eisenhower administration drew the lines in the periphery of the

communist world, implied the threat of nuclear weapon use, and attempted to role back existing

Soviet influences (Gaddis 143-5). To continue drawing support for the American Foreign Policy,

the enemy had to be established, and, in this administration the communist “world” was viewed

and treated as a monolithic system (Gaddis 139, 143). The assumption of this administration was

also the communist ideology determined the Soviet policy. By its nature, it was hostile to

capitalism, so the Soviet Union would be belligerent towards the United States and its allies. But

this administration could not clearly communicate its strategy, which resulted in “confus[ing] the

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public, alarm[ing] the allies, and bewilder[ing] the adversaries,” with the last being deliberate so

as to keep the enemy confused and, thus, much make careful decisions (Gaddis 159-160).

Kennedy’s new generation was tired with the old and wanted to put a distance between

them. The Kennedy and Johnson’s administrations attempted to “intervene on behalf of

diversity” to keep concentration of power in the hands of those hostile to the U.S. (Gaddis 202).

These administrations moved to symmetric responses, which they believed expanded their

options unlike the restrictive nuclear option of the previous administration (Gaddis 213-4). They

continued to expand the missile gap and elevated the use of non-military actions to “mitigate or

remove conditions that made communism attractive in the first place” (Gaddis 222). But the

symmetry and the calibration failed, especially in the case of Vietnam, in which the conflict only

escalated and became one of the most unpopular wars (Gaddis 247). This strategy lacked a clear

deterrence target, left initiative open to the enemies, and in the case of the Vietnam war, failed to

use the weapons discriminately (Gaddis 247-250).

Nixon and Kissinger’s strategy of containment was different than that of the previous

administrations. The power concentrated in the white house (Gaddis 273), the administration was

unwilling to assume the sole responsibility of securing global equilibrium (Gaddis 276), and it

gave up on changing the internal nature of other societies (Gaddis 277). Furthermore, this

administration was much more open to cooperation, even to states with antithetical ideologies

(Gaddis 283). Nixon and Kissinger stressed to the Soviet Union that it should cooperate for its

own interests rather than force it to change, which was done through linkage and exploitation of

Sino-Soviet relations (Gaddis 290, 292). This administration also thought that unpredictability

enhanced “credibility (Gaddis 297-8). This administration was charged with amorality in its

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foreign policy with regards to human rights, which was not their primary focus, and betrayal of

its ideals, such as self-determination and choice (Gaddis 335, 339).

After people’s disillusionment with Nixon and their tiredness of the Cold War, Reagan

entered and invigorated the American people through his rhetoric and speeches, confident in the

American power (Gaddis 351). He stopped focusing on American weaknesses but rather

exploited the Soviet’s flaws, such as their inability to outspend the United States. He wanted to

push “the old Soviet system to the breaking point,” paving the way for a new, more moderate

Soviet leader, i.e. Gorbachev (Gaddis 354). The Reagan administration presented the U.S. as the

better alternative to the Soviet Union, especially because of the latter’s lack of freedom and

economic development; Reagan capitalized on human rights (Gaddis 353). He also rejected

détente, mutually assured destruction, use of nuclear weapons, and wholeheartedly supported the

dissidents and the fighters against the communists (Gaddis 352-3). Then, the Soviet Union

unraveled due to internal and external factors and pressures.

In the contemporary world, the United States is the world’s only superpower. It is an

economic powerhouse with the strongest military. China is growing in strength and influence but

it will take several more years before it reaches United States’ levels. The containment for the

states will just be the balance of power, with the United States attempting to remain the single

superpower. The United States will—psychologically and multilaterally, economically and

politically—contain states that pose a security threat, such as Iran, North Korea, and balance

China. It had already attempted to balance Iran by bolstering Iraq (Haass 47).

One of the main security concerns is terrorism and its transnational nature. Terrorists do

not have legitimate governments that represent them. They do not control governments.

Containment was designed to contain the influences of the Soviet Union and balance of power,

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which was part of strategy, required state actors since they were the main players in the

international arena. Yet, transnational movements are quite strong today, they influence the

state’s decisions and, in case of terrorist attacks, can change the state policies, for example

withdrawing troops from Lebanon or declaring War on Terrorism. Transnational movements are

also elusive because they can move around, unlike the immobility of states. They are also rather

small groups and harder to find and target. How can they be contained? Some terrorist

organizations are state-sponsored or, in the case of Taliban, sympathized with and given haven.

Containment may still target the states; especially those who give them haven, fund them, or

allow their land for training. The terrorists also try to expand their ideology throughout the

world; the result is homegrown terrorism. Their reach can also be contained and constrained,

although, with the advent of the Internet, new strategies dealing with the cyberspace will have to

be invented.

The perceptions of power were important to several administrations during the Cold War,

such Kennedy and Nixon’s. The United States will have to control the damage it has brought on

its image around the world. Anti-Americanism is expressed around the globe and many are

pointing out the hypocrisies of the “defender of democracy,” such as American support of

dictators, monarchs, and other authoritarians. The American credibility, which was negatively

impacted by its actions during the Cold War, will have to be restored if it wants to offer the

world something better. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the communist ideology was

something worse than the American one and in today’s world, the terrorists’ violent ideology

might replace the “something worse.” Many terrorists and other anti-Americans cite its support

for dictators, Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, among others, to garner support from their

surroundings.

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People looked to communism as an alternative to the systems they saw before them. The

ideology advanced by the Islamic terrorists is an alternative to the secular states, capitalism, and

communism. It is based more on religious grounds. During the Cold War, Kennan and others,

attempted to shape the psychology and people’s awareness of capitalism. By showing people that

capitalism allowed for a better life than communism, they garnered support that way. The

terrorists do not have majority support anywhere; they are usually minorities with some

sympathizers. If one wants to minimize the number of sympathizers, then there must a policy for

improving their lives. As the United States was sending aid to Europe and other areas to improve

their conditions, so in today’s world, the U.S. will have to do the same things to undermine the

support for the terrorists (Piazza 350).

In the post-Cold War world, the U.S. is the superpower and the terrorists, a transnational

group with no fixed borders, are the threats to its security. While the context is very different

than that of the bipolar Cold War world, containment can still apply to the situation. As

containment policies shifted with each presidency to reflect the realities of their situations,

today’s containment will also have to change according to the context. The containment of

terrorism as compared to containment of China and preservation of balance of power will also

involve different strategies. But they will have to be comprehensive in nature, including the

military, economy, and the international regimes.

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Bibliography

Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Haaas, Richard H. War of Necessity, War of Choice. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009.

Piazza. "Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism." Journal of Peace Research (2011): 339-353.

I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid on this assignment.

Roksana Gabidullina

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