containing a nuclear iran: difficult, costly, and...

Containing a Nuclear Iran: Difficult, Costly, and Dangerous

Ted R. Bromund and James Phillips

Abstract: Proponents of a containment policy toward Iranare ignoring the harsh realities inherent in seriously pursu-ing such a policy. First, the U.S. has been trying to containIran since the Iranian revolution in 1979, with little success.If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, it will become evenmore difficult to contain. A serious containment policy willrequire the U.S. to maintain a credible threat of forceagainst Iran. This will be even more difficult if Iran goesnuclear because the U.S. will have lost credibility. A con-tainment policy will also require the U.S. to support theundemocratic governments in the countries neighboringIran, which will pose many political dilemmas. Instead ofpursuing a policy of containment, which would be a policyin name only, the U.S. should keep the military option alive,defend itself and its allies, and seek both to weaken theregime’s economic base and to empower and encourage itsdomestic adversaries.

The Obama Administration’s engagement policytoward Iran is dead but not buried. Although this policyhas failed to halt Iran’s nuclear program or even to facil-itate substantive negotiations with Tehran, the Adminis-tration continues to adhere to its two-track diplomaticstrategy of engagement backed by sanctions. For its part,Iran’s defiant regime is willingly accepting the costs ofthe economic, political, and diplomatic sanctions inorder to realize its nuclear weapons ambitions.

While the Obama Administration maintains thatthe military option is on the table, it has done little toconvince Tehran that it is serious. If this trend contin-

No. 2517February 14, 2011

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• Containing a nuclear Iran will be difficult,costly, and dangerous and will pose a chal-lenge that the Obama Administration is illsuited to meet.

• At its best, “containment” summarizes a rangeof demanding policies across a wide range ofissues. At its worst, containment is a lullabyintended to lull the American people intoignoring their adversaries. Regrettably, that isthe role it is playing today.

• Iran’s nuclear program is not a reason toargue that the U.S. should seek to containIran, but a reason to be concerned about fur-ther weakening of the U.S. ability to containIran in the future.

• The U.S. should take the lead in identifyingthe Iranian regime as the problem and Iran’snuclear weapons program as the most trou-bling symptom of that problem. It shouldthen promote change in Iran and protectitself and its allies until that change occurs.

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ues, containment of a nuclear Iran will become thedefault option for the United States. Before this hap-pens, the Administration should carefully weigh thecosts, risks, benefits, and feasibility of such a policy.

Containing a nuclear Iran will be difficult, costly,and dangerous and will pose a challenge that theObama Administration is ill suited to meet.

• Containment will require deterring Iran with acredible threat of the use of force, but the Admin-istration’s credibility will be severely underminedif Tehran acquires the nuclear capability that thePresident has warned is unacceptable.

• Containment will require a firm American deter-mination to confront Iranian aggression withoverwhelming force, a determination theAdministration has not evinced.

• Containment will require reliable and capableallies, but the Administration has distanced itselffrom Israel, the only such ally the U.S. has in theMiddle East.

• Containment will require the U.S. to confrontIran’s terrorist surrogates, but the terrorists oper-ate in a murky realm and will be difficult to deterand contain.

In short, containment is a very demanding policyoption, and the Administration’s policies to datehave made it even more difficult to implement. TheUnited States should instead keep the militaryoption convincingly alive, adopt policies to pro-mote change in Iran, and protect itself and its alliesuntil that change occurs.

The Limits of ContainmentBy itself, “containment” is simply a word. The

argument that the U.S. can or should contain Iran inresponse to the Iranian nuclear program is oftenadvanced as though the word “containment” pos-sesses magic power. The word is used to wish awaythe problems that Iran poses for the U.S. by borrow-ing the prestige of the policy of containment, thepolicy that helped to produce the West’s victory in

the Cold War. Using the word implies that becausecontainment worked against the Soviet Union, itwill work against Iran. This supposedly renders itunnecessary to consider the issue further.

However, if U.S. policy is to contain Iran, U.S.actions toward Iran must—if the word “contain-ment” is to have any meaning—bear some similarityto the policies the U.S. employed to contain theSoviet Union. The history of the Cold War clearlyshows that containment is a demanding policy, notan easy option. It has serious implications for polit-ical, economic, diplomatic, and military power.Furthermore, containment of the Soviet Union wascontroversial and not always successful. Contain-ment sometimes failed precisely because it was sodemanding, and both the policy and its failureswere controversial.

Finally, as John Lewis Gaddis, a distinguishedhistorian of the Cold War, points out, while some ofthe principles behind containment may be transfer-able, it “cannot be expected to succeed…in circum-stances that differ significantly from those that gaverise to it, sustained it, and within which it eventu-ally prevailed.”1 The Obama Administration cannotsafely assume that the U.S. can contain a nuclearIran, because the current circumstances do differsignificantly from those during the Cold War inways that would make containing the Iranian threatdifficult, costly, and dangerous.

Containment as the Status QuoContainment of Iran would not be a new policy

for the United States. It has been American policysince the Iranian revolution of 1979 to contain theregime.2 Yet past U.S. efforts to contain Iran havenot succeeded in stemming the expansion ofTehran’s malevolent influence.

Although Iran’s Shia Islamist brand of revolutionhas limited appeal to most Sunni Muslims, whocomprise the majority sect in the Middle East, Iran’srevolutionary regime has cultivated ties with largeShiite communities in Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain

1. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War, rev. and expanded ed. (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 383.

2. See James Phillips, “Containing Iran,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 980, March 9, 1994, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1994/03/Containing-Iran.

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as well as important Shiite minorities in Saudi Ara-bia, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and elsewhere in the Mid-dle East. Following Iran’s revolution, a Shiiteuprising was suppressed in Saudi Arabia in 1979,and an Iran-backed coup was quashed in Bahrain in1981. Iranian efforts to subvert and radicalize Iraq’sShiite majority prompted Iraqi dictator SaddamHussein to invade Iran in September 1980, startinga bloody eight-year war that inflicted more than 1million casualties.

While the Iran–Iraq war blunted Iran’s immediatethreat in the Persian Gulf, Iran successfully exportedits revolution to Lebanon, where it created, funded,armed, trained, and guided Hezbollah (“Party ofGod”), a revolutionary Lebanese Shiite organization.Tehran dispatched hundreds of RevolutionaryGuards to Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, where theyassisted and directed Hezbollah’s terrorist campaignagainst Western peacekeeping forces and Israeliforces in southern Lebanon, as well as bombings ofthe U.S. Marine barracks and U.S. embassy in Beirut.

Tehran also developed a strategic alliance withSyria and, to a lesser extent, with Sudan throughwhich it cultivated close ties to a wide array of rad-ical Sunni Arab terrorist groups, including Hamas,Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for theLiberation of Palestine–General Command, and theEgyptian Islamic Jihad, which later merged into al-Qaeda. Iran has used these and other terroristgroups as surrogates to strike at its avowed enemies,including the United States, Israel, France, SaudiArabia, Egypt, and Kuwait, and at other targets ofopportunity.

The 1991 Gulf War, which reversed Iraq’s inva-sion of Kuwait, and the U.N. sanctions imposed

after the regime violated the cease-fire greatly weak-ened Iraq, Iran’s strongest Arab neighbor. The Clin-ton Administration adopted its dual containmentstrategy to contain and deter both Iran and Iraq.

However, both regimes actively resisted contain-ment and continued to support terrorist attacksagainst various neighbors and the United States. InJune 1996, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards supported aterrorist bombing by the Saudi branch of Hezbollahthat killed 19 American servicemen stationed inSaudi Arabia. The massive truck bombing of theKhobar Towers housing complex in Dhahran tar-geted U.S. military personnel that were enforcingthe no-fly zone over southern Iraq.3 By launchingthe attack, Tehran drove up the costs to the U.S. ofthe dual containment policy and the costs to theSaudi government of cooperating with Washingtonin containing Iran.

In addition to supporting terrorist attacks againstAmericans in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, Iran hasordered its proxies to attack U.S. troops in Iraq andAfghanistan. In Iraq, Iran is pursuing a strategy sim-ilar to its strategy in Lebanon by working to radical-ize, arm, train, and direct Iraqi Shiite militias andusing them to attack U.S. troops and undermine theIraqi government.4

The manifest failure of U.S. efforts to contain Ira-nian influence and deter attacks on Americans inthe past 30 years should raise alarms about themuch greater difficulty inherent in containing anddeterring Tehran after it acquires nuclear weapons.To argue the merits of containment now that Iran ison the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons is toargue for a policy that has been tried for decades—a policy that is now close to an enormous defeatbecause of the progress of Iran’s nuclear program.

A nuclear-armed Iran will be far more difficult tocontain than one without nuclear weapons simplybecause credibly threatening a nuclear Iran will bemuch more difficult. The Iranian regime recognizesthis, and it is one reason Iran is seeking to develop

3. See James Phillips, “Maintain International Pressure and Sanctions on Iran,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1135, September 5, 1997, pp. 8–9, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1997/09/BG1135nbsp-Maintain-International-Pressure-and-Sanctions-on-Iran.

4. See James Phillips, “Iran’s Hostile Policies in Iraq,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2030, April 30, 2007, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/04/Irans-Hostile-Policies-in-Iraq.

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Containment of the Soviet Union sometimes failed precisely because it was a demanding policy, and both the policy and its failures were controversial.

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NewDelhi

Bishkek

Astana

Moscow

Kyiv

Ankara

Jerusalem

Riyadh

Baghdad

Kuwait City

SanaaKhartoum

Cairo

Ashgabat

Kabul

Islamabad

MinskWarsaw

Bucharest

Russia

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyztan

China

Uzbekistan

Turkmenistan

IRANAfghanistan

Pakistan

India

Oman

Yemen

Somalia

Saudi Arabia

Iraq

Turkey

Egypt

Sudan

Ethiopia

Chad

Libya

Ukraine

Belarus

Latvia

Poland

Romania

Bulgaria

MediterraneanSea

CasCaspianCasp

500 km

1,300 km

2,000 kmCapitals

Major cities(population: 1 million+)

Istanbul

Karachi

Mumbai

IRAN

2,000 km

heritage.orgMap 1 • B 2517

The Threat of IranIran’s most advanced missile has an estimated range of

2,000 kilometers (about 1,200 miles). It poses a threat to many U.S. allies in the Middle East, to several NATO allies, and to U.S. military facilities in the region. Iran is continuing to develop and buy improved missile technology. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, containing it will be difficult and dangerous in part because Iran can threaten many U.S. interests and allies.

Source: Heritage Foundation research.

No. 2517 February 14, 2011

nuclear weapons. As Ayatollah Abdollah JavadiAmoli said, “Nuclear energy is just like armor whichprotects us from the enemy’s attack.”5 In short,Iran’s nuclear program is not a reason to argue thatthe U.S. should seek to contain Iran, but a reason tobe concerned about further weakening of the U.S.ability to contain Iran in the future.

This fact points out one of the fundamentalrequirements of any policy of containment: TheU.S. must be willing to threaten—and threatencredibly—the nation being contained with the useof force if it breaches containment. Thus, a contain-ment policy, which seeks to stop the expansion ofanother nation’s power or influence, requires simul-taneously pursuing a policy of deterrence to dis-suade that nation from challenging its containment.

For deterrence to work, the U.S. threat of forcemust be credible. Otherwise, the nation being con-tained will likely ignore it. Under several Adminis-trations, the U.S. has clearly stated that Iran’spossession of nuclear weapons would be “unac-ceptable,” but if Iran nevertheless succeeds inacquiring them, U.S. credibility will be severelydamaged.6 Again, Iran’s nuclear program is not areason to adopt a policy of containment, but a rea-son that will make the policy more difficult to pur-sue in the future.

The Obama Administration, which called onIran to “take its rightful place in the community ofnations,” has done little to build a credible belief

that it would respond forcefully to an Iranian chal-lenge of containment.7 During the Cold War, con-tainment was a necessary precondition to successfulnegotiations with the Soviet Union, which other-wise had little incentive to talk constructively. TheObama Administration has reversed this order ofpriorities by seeking to negotiate first and then tocontain when negotiations failed.

This approach was based on the Administration’snaive belief that Iran’s hostility would diminish ifthe U.S. behaved differently. In fact, hostility to theU.S. is part of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s found-ing ideology. Predictably, Iran took the Administra-tion’s extended hand as an indication that the U.S.was repenting of its past mistakes and would there-fore be an easy mark. The Administration has thusnot created the public image that it is willing torespond with overwhelming military force to an Ira-nian breach of containment, and this now furtherhandicaps it in dealing with Iran. In short, theAdministration’s actions have undermined contain-ment as a policy option.

Containment Requires AlliesDuring the Cold War, the U.S. did not contain

the Soviet Union alone. It worked closely with alliesaround the world, from the Western Europeannations in NATO to Australia, South Korea, andJapan in the Pacific. If Iran is to be contained, theU.S. will again need the support of reliable, willing,and capable allies—preferably democratic ones—that would resolutely oppose any expansion of Ira-nian influence. Yet the only U.S. ally in the MiddleEast that fulfills all of these criteria is Israel, fromwhich the Administration has sought to distanceitself.8 Iraq would also be an essential U.S. ally incontaining Iran, but the Administration has beeneager to reduce the size and scope of the U.S. pres-

5. Ali Alfoneh, “Iran News Roundup,” American Enterprise Institute, December 3, 2010, at http://www.irantracker.org/roundup/iran-news-roundup-december-3-2010 (January 24, 2011).

6. Agence France-Presse, “Iran’s Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons ‘Unacceptable’: Obama,” Google News, November 7, 2008, at http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jd7CNq_U-GYQVuGA_4u0z8BDymTw (November 16, 2010).

7. Thomas Erdbink and Glenn Kessler, “Obama’s Tone in Iran Message Differs Sharply from Bush’s,” The Washington Post, March 21, 2009, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/20/AR2009032000398.html (November 16, 2010).

8. James Phillips, “The Obama–Netanyahu Meeting: Closer Cooperation Needed,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 2949, July 2, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/The-Obama-Netanyahu-Meeting-Closer-Cooperation-Needed.

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A nuclear-armed Iran will be far more difficult to contain than one without nuclear weapons simply because credibly threatening a nuclear Iran will be much more difficult.

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ence in Iraq as rapidly as possible, even at the cost ofincreasing the dangers of Iranian infiltration.9

The situation in the Middle East as a whole is nomore encouraging. To fully contain Iran, the U.S.would need the support of all of Iran’s neighbors,just as it needed the support of the states surround-ing the Soviet Union to contain the Soviets duringthe Cold War. The states surrounding Iran includeIraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, theUnited Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turk-menistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey.

During the Cold War, the U.S. sought to breakthe relationships between the Soviet Union and itsclient states, such as Cuba, and worked openly andcovertly to defeat Communist parties around theworld. Similarly, the U.S. would need to break theclose relationship between Iran and Syria and endIran’s extensive influence in Lebanon, which gives itan outlet into the Mediterranean and a staging areafor attacks on Israel.

Finally, the U.S. would need to apply economicpressure to cut off or limit Iran’s trade, as the U.S.did to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Forthese purposes, the U.S. would need the backing ofthe major trading states in Europe and Asia.

These are extremely demanding requirements.Even breaking the Iranian–Syrian axis or expellingIranian influence from Lebanon would be a majorU.S. triumph. It is highly unlikely that all of thestates bordering Iran would resolutely help the U.S.in containing Iran. Some of them, preeminentlySaudi Arabia, are long-time Iranian rivals andwould likely side with the U.S., but others wouldfind it more convenient to play both sides of thefence. Still others are too weak domestically to playa substantial role.

In these cases, the U.S. would confront the unen-viable problem that it often faced during the Cold

War: the need to support a regional ally, usually anondemocratic ally, that could not stand on its own,such as South Vietnam. In such cases, the U.S. hada double burden: fighting off the external enemywhile seeking to build the domestic capabilities ofthe threatened state. The U.S. is facing this verychallenge in Afghanistan today. Liberals who arequeasy about the war there should think twicebefore advocating a policy that will involve the U.S.in some of the same dilemmas of state-buildingthroughout the Persian Gulf.

Building the broader coalition necessary for theeconomic containment of Iran would be even morechallenging. The European Union—including theimportant NATO members Germany, Italy, andFrance—is Iran’s leading trading partner.10 Iran’snuclear power plant was built with technical assis-tance from Russia, which also supplies Iran withadvanced weaponry.11 Iran is a major exporter of oilto Japan, China, India, and South Korea, amongother states, and has a particularly close relationshipwith China as well as with regional nuisances Vene-zuela and Cuba.12

In the world today, there is simply no analogy tothe broad political, economic, diplomatic, and U.S.-led military alliance against the Soviet Union thatmade containment possible. NATO itself is reluc-tant to identify Iran as a potential threat, blocked byTurkey’s warming relations with Iran. An Iraniantest of a nuclear device might generate the politicalbasis for such an alliance, but a nuclear Iran would

9. Michael R. Gordon and Andrew W. Lehren, “Leaked Reports Detail Iran’s Aid for Iraqi Militias,” The New York Times, October 22, 2010, at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/world/middleeast/23iran.html (November 16, 2010).

10. European Commission, “Trade: Iran (Bilateral Relations),” September 3, 2010, at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/iran (November 15, 2010).

11. James Phillips, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: What Is Known and Unknown,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2393, March 26, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/03/iran-s-nuclear-program-what-is-known-and-unknown.

12. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Iran,” Country Analysis Brief, January 2010, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Iran/Oil.html (November 15, 2010).

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To fully contain Iran, the U.S. would need the support of all of Iran’s neighbors, just as it needed the support of the states surrounding the Soviet Union to contain the Soviets during the Cold War.

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also make a policy of containment far more difficultto carry out.

Containment Requires Firm and Vigilant Responses to Subversion

During the Cold War, the Soviet threat was par-tially military. It was at least conceivable that theSoviets would invade Western Europe, the oneregion that the forces of democracy could not affordto lose. In contrast, the Iranian threat is much morelikely to work through terrorist groups thanthrough direct military action, such as closing theStrait of Hormuz. Of course, this is not a new prob-lem. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union helpedto arm, train, and inspire guerrilla movementsaround the world. By so doing, the Soviet Unionposed three challenges for the United States.

First, it was not always clear whether or to whatextent these movements, or indeed entire nations,were acting under Soviet control or influence. Thus,there were always arguments that U.S. interestswere not genuinely engaged in a particular country.For example, it was not known until decades afterthe Korean War that Stalin had personally autho-rized the North Korean invasion of South Korea.13

In the case of Iran, this ambiguity would shroudevery political and military event in the Middle East.Iranian involvement would often become clear onlyafter many years had passed, if then. For example,Iran’s role in the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marinebarracks in Beirut and the 1996 bombing of theKhobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabiadid not become clear until much later. In theinterim, there would be legitimate disagreementabout the extent of Iranian involvement, whilestates, non-state actors, and individuals opposed toa policy of containment would exploit every uncer-tainty to undermine the policy.

Second, even when the Soviet Union was clearlyseeking to undermine a friendly government, theU.S. had trouble finding ways to impose costs onthe Soviet Union for its involvement. In the strategicbalance of terror between the two nuclear-armed

superpowers, trying to hold the Soviet Union fullyresponsible for its actions was believed to be toodangerous to contemplate. Therefore, during theCold War, the U.S. focused on opposing the mani-festations of perceived Soviet influence abroad bysupporting friendly governments politically, militar-ily, and economically. The same dilemma wouldconfront the U.S. in seeking to contain a nuclear-armed Iran. In practice, containment means dealingwith the symptoms, not the disease.

In the early 1970s, President Richard Nixon andHenry Kissinger tried to apply the policy of linkage,which sought Soviet and Communist Chineserestraint in promoting revolution in exchange forU.S. agreement in the nuclear and economicrealms.14 This policy appealed to supporters ofdétente in part because the U.S. was in a weak stra-tegic position after the Vietnam War. However, link-age did not accept that the Communist regimes weresystemically hostile to the West. It therefore tradedpermanent U.S. concessions for temporary Commu-nist concessions. As a result, it proved unsustainableboth internationally and domestically.

The U.S. would face—indeed, it is now facing—precisely the same dilemma in applying a policy oflinkage to Iran. A totalitarian state, such as theSoviet Union or Iran, can cheat on its public com-mitments more easily than the United States can.

Third, while containing and deterring a conven-tional state may be possible, it is much less clear thatreligious zealots or terrorist groups can be con-tained, especially if they are willing to commit sui-cide for their cause. In the post-9/11 context, thisdilemma has become particularly acute. This is onerealm in which the Cold War experience sheds lesslight on U.S. policy toward Iran.

During the Cold War, U.S. policymakers couldgenerally assume that the Soviet leaders were noteager to die for Communism. There is serious doubtthat all of Iran’s leaders share this sentiment aboutthe Shia faith, because their regime was founded onand is justified by a claim about religious truth. In

13. John Lewis Gaddis, We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 71.

14. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 317–318.

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contrast to the Soviet Union, which was imbuedwith an ideology that promised the inevitable vic-tory of Communism and prescribed constant evalu-ation of the correlation of forces before settingforeign policy, Iran’s hard-line regime espouses anideology that extols martyrdom and demandsimplacable resistance to the “satanic” power of theUnited States, which is viewed as the chief barrier toimplementing the will of God on Earth.

Even more worrisome is that President MahmoudAhmadinejad and some members of his regime pro-fess to believe in the imminent return of the HiddenImam.15 According to Shia eschatology, the HiddenImam will return one day as the Mahdi (“The GuidedOne”) to lead the forces of righteousness against theforces of evil in one final apocalyptic battle. As a lead-ing expert on Iran’s Shiite ideology has written,“Ahmadinejad advocates a new version of apocalypti-cism, which states that human action is necessary toprepare for the Hidden Imam’s return, if not to accel-erate it.”16 The danger is that Ahmadinejad or otherswho share his beliefs might seek to provoke conflictand turmoil to hasten the return of the Mahdi.

In any event, the high value placed on martyr-dom may skew the perceptions of Iran’s regimetoward deterrence. As Middle East scholar BernardLewis has noted:

[W]ith these people in Iran, mutuallyassured destruction is not a deterrent factor,but rather an inducement. They feel thatthey can hasten the final messianic process.

This is an extremely dangerous situation ofwhich it is important to be aware.17

Finally, even if the leaders of Iran are rational inthe Western sense of the term and if their beliefsabout the Mahdi play no role in their policymaking,there is no guarantee that their terrorist proxiesshare this rationality or that Iran will always havethem under tight control. In short, the applicabilityof deterrence to regimes like Iran is highly question-able, especially given Iran’s longstanding supportfor suicide terrorism.18

Containment Requires Problematic Political Relationships

During the Cold War, the U.S. sometimesneeded to work on the basis that an enemy of theSoviet Union was a friend of the United States, evenif the state in question was nondemocratic or evenCommunist. Thus, in the 1970s, the U.S. opened arelationship with China because of their shared hos-tility to the Soviet Union. This particular step wasunpopular with many conservatives, but the alli-ances that containment required were often evenmore controversial on the left. Indeed, throughoutthe Cold War, the left regularly criticized contain-ment because it required the U.S. to tolerate or evencooperate with bad regimes for the sake of stoppingthe worse evil of the Soviet Union.

As an abstract moral point, this criticism has somevalidity. However, as a matter of practical geopolitics,the U.S. could not and cannot work only with decent,stable democracies. There are not enough of them inthe world, especially in the Middle East, for that to bea viable option. The left’s enthusiasm for the contain-ment of Iran, in light of its criticism of containmentduring the Cold War, is revealing in that it implies thatthe left is advocating containment of Iran as anattempt to avoid the issue and preclude any militaryoptions, not as a serious policy.

15. See Mohebat Ahdiyyih, “Ahmadinejad and the Mahdi,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Fall 2008), pp. 27–36, at http://www.meforum.org/1985/ahmadinejad-and-the-mahdi (January 25, 2011).

16. Mehdi Khalaji, “Apocalyptic Politics: On the Rationality of Iranian Policy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy Policy Focus No. 79, January 2008, p. 32, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus79Final.pdf (January 25, 2011).

17. “Scholar: MAD Doctrine Does Not Apply to Iran,” World Tribune, February 25, 2008, at http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2008/me_iran_02_25.asp (January 25, 2011).


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While containing and deterring a conventional state may be possible, it is much less clear that religious zealots or terrorist groups can be contained, especially if they are willing to commit suicide for their cause.

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Nonetheless, the broader point that contain-ment requires the U.S. to support its allies is cor-rect. During the Cold War, this meant both directmilitary support and broader political backing.Thus, NATO was founded in part as a military alli-ance to deter and, if necessary, to defeat a Sovietinvasion of Western Europe. But more important,NATO was a political alliance intended to reassurethe then-fragile democracies in Western Europethat the United States would not abandon themand would give them the necessary political sup-port to reject Communism and other forms ofpolitical extremism and to move decisively towardcapitalist democracy.19

In postwar Western Europe, which was seekingto restore the democratic systems that had collapsedduring the interwar years, this policy was not mor-ally or politically problematic, although it requiredcourage and leadership. Nor did U.S. support for ademocratic Japan raise fundamental issues. How-ever, in the Middle East there are no democracies forthe U.S. to support, except for Israel, Turkey, andpossibly Iraq. While Iran might choose to launch anuclear attack, it would more likely use a nucleararsenal to threaten and intimidate its neighbors,much as the Soviet Union’s massive conventionalsuperiority would have intimidated WesternEurope if the U.S. had not formed NATO.

A policy of containment of Iran would thus com-mit the U.S. to providing political support to theregion’s autocracies and dictatorships, includingsome that are dominated by ruthless clans, tribes, orreligious minorities. Even when the religious major-ity is in power, it will still mean supporting theexisting undemocratic regime. While this may benecessary, it is far from ideal, and the costs of such apolicy—which are illustrated by the current turmoilin Egypt, a long-time American ally—must beassessed honestly.

First, this policy poses an undeniable moraldilemma that cannot be resolved or evaded.

Second, while the U.S. must work in the world asit is, American policymakers who seek to containIran through a policy of regional alliances will regu-larly be described, especially by the left, as thefriends and enablers of the oppressors.

Third, because it will be committed to the domes-tic stability of the region’s regimes, the U.S. will findit difficult to encourage those regimes to make evensmall reforms. As soon as the U.S. raises a voice, theautocrat in question will immediately protest thatany reforms will undermine the regime’s standagainst Iran.

This dilemma has stalemated U.S. policy in theMiddle East for several generations. Except forPresident George W. Bush, no American leader hasbeen willing to challenge the belief that America’sfundamental interest rests in maintaining the exist-ing order.

Yet by pursuing stability, the U.S. will help tobreed instability over the long term by backingdictatorships, some of which tolerate, abet, and useterrorist organizations for their own purposes. Morebroadly, in this modern age, pursuing stability isparadoxically very demanding simply because itoften means opposing political change and the socialand economic forces that lead to it. A policy of Iraniancontainment would thus not create a new dilemma,but would sharpen an existing one, complicatingU.S. efforts to address issues such as Saudi promo-tion of religious extremism, which in the long termalso pose a serious threat to the U.S. and its alliesaround the world.

A close embrace of the United States and thepresence of U.S. troops could also create politicalproblems for the Middle East governments helpingto contain Iran. By welcoming foreign troops, alliedgovernments risk making themselves vulnerable tocriticism by Islamist, nationalist, and xenophobicopposition forces, some of which would likelyreceive Iranian support. This could exacerbateinternal political instability and attract unwantedattention from terrorist groups, particularly those

19. Ibid., pp. 71–72.

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A policy of containment of Iran would thus commit the U.S. to providing political support to the region’s autocracies and dictatorships.

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backed by Tehran. The prospective costs and risksof cooperating with Washington to contain Iranwould complicate relations between the U.S. and itslocal allies while hindering efforts to contain Iran.

Containment Requires Military AlliancesWhile NATO was created largely to provide

political reassurance to Western Europe, it was alsoa military alliance with a military purpose. Nor didNATO stand alone. During the Cold War, the U.S.built a worldwide network of military alliances anddefense commitments. The most serious of thesecommitments was the extension of the U.S. nuclearumbrella to its allies. This meant that the U.S. basednuclear weapons on the territory of those allies andthat the U.S. stated that it would regard a Sovietattack on those allies as an attack on the U.S. itself.

This was a necessary part of deterrence and con-tainment. If the U.S. had disassociated itself fromthe security of its allies, the Soviet Union could haveused its massive conventional superiority withoutfear of U.S. retaliation. In the Middle East, a policyof containment of Iran implies that the U.S. mightneed to extend the U.S. nuclear umbrella to itsregional allies. This would be a revolutionary step—one that the Obama Administration, with its unwiseenthusiasm for worldwide nuclear disarmament, isparticularly ill suited to take.

Even an Administration not committed tonuclear disarmament might believe that extendingthe U.S. nuclear umbrella would be a step too far,but the U.S. would certainly need to extend its com-mitment to the conventional defense of the statesbordering Iran. In July 2009, Secretary of StateHillary Clinton explicitly admitted this:

We want Iran to calculate what I think is afair assessment that if the United Statesextends a defense umbrella over the region,if we do even more to support the militarycapacity of those in the Gulf, it’s unlikely thatIran will be any stronger or safer because

they won’t be able to intimidate and domi-nate as they apparently believe they can oncethey have a nuclear weapon.20

A policy of containment thus implies that the U.S.will expand its military presence in the Persian Gulf.This could mean many things. It might imply guar-antees of conventional U.S. support. It might implyexpanded U.S. bases in the region or more visiblepatrols. It certainly implies substantial U.S. armssales, such as the $60 billion sale of advanced aircraftand other weapons to Saudi Arabia that wasannounced in late October 2010. This sale, the larg-est in U.S. history, was justified as a contribution to“the regional balance of power in the Middle East”—in other words, a contribution to the containment ofIran.21 The sale immediately drew criticism fromcongressional Democrats and from the left.

Supporters of containment should recognize thatpursuing a containment policy will require manymore arms sales and spark much more criticism.Moreover, arms sold to Arab allies could help themresist Iran but could also threaten Israel. Worse, if acoup or revolution suddenly replaced a friendlyArab regime with a hostile regime, the U.S.-sup-plied arms could be turned against U.S. interests,just as Iran used U.S. arms originally provided tothe Shah to threaten U.S. interests in the Gulf.

Regrettably, the proliferation of missile technol-ogy means that the Iranian threat is not limited tothe states in Iran’s immediate vicinity. Iran hasalready orbited a satellite. Today, Iran’s missiles canreach portions of Europe, and Iran continues todevelop more advanced systems. Unless the regimechanges course fundamentally—and there is nosign of this—it will develop missiles that can reachall of Europe and eventually the United States.

Thus, to shield itself and its allies and to pre-vent itself from being blackmailed into breachesof containment, the U.S. needs to pursue missiledefense systems to protect the U.S. homeland, notjust theater or regional missile defense systems.

20. James Rosen, “Clinton: U.S. Will Extend ‘Defense Umbrella’ over Gulf if Iran Obtains Nuclear Weapons,” Fox News, July 22, 2009, at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/07/22/clinton-extend-defense-umbrella-gulf-iran-obtains-nuclear-weapons (November 15, 2010).

21. Dana Hedgpeth, “Pentagon Plans $60 Billion Weapons Sale to Saudi Arabia,” The Washington Post, October 21, 2010, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/20/AR2010102006518.html (November 15, 2010).

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Regrettably, the Obama Administration hassought to limit or cancel precisely these types ofsystems.22 In this realm, too, the Administrationhas undermined its ability to implement a policyof containment successfully.

Nor can the U.S. rely on espionage and covertaction to contain Iran. The origins of the Stuxnet com-puter virus that has attacked Iran’s nuclear programremain unclear, but the virus has analogies in the U.S.effort under President Ronald Reagan to covertly crip-ple the Western technology on which the SovietUnion relied. Such actions are important and valu-able, and the U.S. should certainly pursue them, butthey are ultimately only part of a much broader arse-nal of policies that encompass the conventional,nuclear, moral, diplomatic, and economic realms.

Containment Is Not an Easy AnswerIn short, containment’s requirements are demand-

ing. That is why containment did not always workduring the Cold War. Despite U.S. efforts, Commu-nism—sometimes aided by the Soviet Union andCommunist China—spread to several countries inthe Western Hemisphere and more widely in Africaand Asia. Containment was unpopular on the left,frequently controversial among conservatives, andcriticized even by George Kennan, the U.S. diplo-mat most closely associated with it.

The history of the Cold War clearly shows thatcontainment was neither politically easy nor invari-ably popular domestically. That is partly becausecontainment, if taken seriously, will regularlyinvolve the U.S. in wars and crises. Essentially, con-tainment means that the U.S. must be willing tofight if the nation being contained crosses either aphysical or metaphorical border.

The fundamental logic of containment is that theU.S., as a democratic and capitalist society, is stron-ger than its enemies and that their weaknesses willbecome apparent over time and ultimately destroythem.23 That is true, but it is no reason to believe

that containment is therefore politically, economi-cally, or morally easy. On the contrary, it is a long-term policy that requires a profound and enduringnational commitment.

Calling for such a commitment is easy, but keep-ing it is difficult. Democracies are capable of mani-festing such commitment, as the U.S. and its alliesproved during the Cold War, but the Soviet Unionposed an existential threat that concentrated theminds of many policymakers. Iran’s nuclear pro-gram and the regime’s hostility to the West havenot produced an equivalent concentration amongpolicymakers around the world, even among U.S.policymakers.

It is true that Iran is not the Soviet Union. TheSoviet Union was a formidable military power thatmade and could deliver advanced weapons, includ-ing a devastating nuclear arsenal. It controlled a vastempire and influenced many other societies. Itseconomy faltered and ultimately collapsed, but fordecades it could mobilize substantial resources inpursuit of its aims, and it appeared to have no greatneed to become part of the free economic order.Above all, it had an ideology that—no matter howbizarre or inhumane—appealed to many around theworld who sought to justify their pursuit of power.

By comparison, Iran’s most significant militaryachievements apart from its nuclear and ballisticmissile programs are its mobilization of suicideterrorists and its use of IEDs.24 Its direct influenceis regional, its economy is in shambles and reliesheavily on oil exports, and its ideology appeals pri-marily to Shia who are embroiled in conflicts withnon-Shia and have not had the misfortune to expe-rience Iran’s misgovernment directly.

22. Baker Spring, “The Obama Administration’s Ballistic Missile Defense Program: Treading Water in Shark-Infested Seas,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2396, April 8, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/04/The-Obama-Administrations-Ballistic-Missile-Defense-Program-Treading-Water-in-Shark-Infested-Seas.


24. Improvised explosive devices, which have frequently been used against Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Regrettably, the proliferation of missile technol-ogy means that the Iranian threat is not limited to the states in Iran’s immediate vicinity.

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Yet the differences between Iran and the SovietUnion cut both ways. The magnitude of the Sovietthreat enabled the West to summon the political willto contain it. Iran, precisely because it is not asuperpower, cannot inspire such unified politicalwill, even though it poses a clear threat. During theCold War, the policy of containment was far from

glorious, but it was necessary. The alternative tooutlasting the Soviet Union was a war that no onewould have won. Concluding that the only way todeal with Iran is to treat it like a new superpowergives Iran far too much credit. The Iranian regimemay rhetorically aspire to become a superpower,but that aspiration is laughable.

By treating Iran like a new Soviet Union, theU.S. gives the Iranian regime a level of respect thatits power does not merit. By emphasizing the con-tainment of Iran, the U.S. would also slight themore positive and creative elements of its Cold Wargrand strategy, especially President Reagan’s policyof placing the Soviet Union under as much eco-nomic, diplomatic, and moral pressure as possible.The U.S. could and should similarly pressure Iran.However, as long as containment remains a mereanalogy, devoid of policies reasonably comparableto those that the U.S. undertook during the ColdWar, the U.S. will fail to build a comprehensivegrand strategy to counter and ultimately end theIranian menace.

Containment Requires a Commitment to Freedom at Home

Containment requires one more thing. As AaronFriedberg has pointed out, U.S. grand strategy in

the Cold War emphasized avoiding “the garrisonstate.”25 In other words, the U.S. was fighting tokeep the world safe for democracy and capitalism. Itwas therefore vital to ensure that the U.S. preservedemocracy and capitalism at home, both for moralreasons and for the practical reason that America’sfree society gave it an advantage against the SovietUnion over the long term. Thus, leading supportersof containment, such as President Dwight D. Eisen-hower, also supported limited government at homeso that the U.S. would retain its political and eco-nomic vibrancy.

The Obama Administration has overseen unprece-dented peacetime growth in the size of the federalgovernment.26 Over time, this will reduce Ameri-can economic growth and, ultimately, America’sability to outlast its adversaries. This is a fundamen-tal break with the Cold War containment policy.Because it affects every area of American life andpolicy, this break is more important than any of theAdministration’s foreign policy initiatives.

Containment is not a policy. At its best, “contain-ment” summarizes a range of demanding policies—including limiting the size of government and pro-moting economic freedom at home—across a widerange of issues that are necessary to contain foreignadversaries, including Iran. At its worst, contain-ment is a lullaby intended to lull the American peo-ple into ignoring their adversaries. Regrettably, it isplaying that role today.

What the U.S. Should DoThe Obama Administration’s actions have inhib-

ited efforts to contain Iran, which the United Stateshas attempted to do with uneven and often disap-pointing results since 1979. Containment willbecome even more difficult if Iran produces nuclearweapons.

Containment requires a firm American determi-nation to confront Iran when Iran pursues hostilepolicies. While containment often is trumpeted as analternative to the use of force, it is unlikely to pro-

25. Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). See also Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 389.

26. Brian Riedl, “Federal Spending by the Numbers 2010,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 78, June 1, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/federal-spending-by-the-numbers-2010.

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At its best, “containment” summarizes a range of demanding policies—including limiting the size of government and promoting economic free-dom at home—across a wide range of issues that are necessary to contain foreign adversaries, including Iran.

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duce a stable balance of power. Rather, it will likelyrequire the use of force in a future crisis. In such acrisis, the United States and its allies, if they tacitlyacquiesce in Iran’s nuclear program, would be com-pelled to go to war against a nuclear-armed Iran.

The United States cannot afford to reduce its pol-icy options to containment that fades into acquies-cence or war against a nuclear-armed Iran. That isbecause acquiescence will fuel Iranian ambitions ina way that might lead to the nuclear war the U.S.seeks to avoid.

The U.S. therefore cannot rule out militaryaction to stop the development of Iran’s nuclear pro-gram. If the U.S. fails to present a convincing threatof military action and thus effectively acquiesces inthe Iranian program, it will encourage the Iranianregime to believe that it can continue to advancewithout fear. The consequences of military actionunder any conditions would be serious, but militaryaction forced on the U.S. or Israel by the success ofIran’s nuclear weapons and missile programs wouldbe undertaken in conditions that would makeachieving success difficult and costly.27

The U.S. should not grow complacent in thebelief that containment will work against Iranbecause it worked against the Soviet Union. Such anapproach ignores the experience, successes, andfailures of containment during the Cold War. More-over, containment is in essence a negative policy, apolicy of playing for time. The United States canand should do more.

The fundamental problem that the U.S. and itsallies face in Iran is the repressive, hostile Iranianregime. The U.S. should take the lead in identifyingthe Iranian regime as the problem and Iran’s nuclearweapons program as the most troubling symptomof that problem. It should then take concrete stepsto promote change in Iran and to protect itself andits allies until that change occurs.28 These stepsshould include:

• Weakening the Iranian regime’s economicbase. Containment is based on the belief thattotalitarian economies and governments areweaker than capitalist and democratic ones inthe long term. This belief is correct. The U.S.should act on this belief by imposing and enforc-ing the strongest sanctions and by pressing alliesto impose sanctions to restrict investment, trade,and technology transfer to Iran’s oil and gas sec-tor, which provides the bulk of the regime’sincome. Supporters of containment shouldaccept and welcome such measures, which areinherent in the logic of their preferred policy. TheU.S. should not tighten and loosen sanctions inresponse to perceived progress in negotiationswith Iran. That only encourages the regime tobelieve that the U.S. can be manipulated.

• Empowering and encouraging the regime’sadversaries. Containment acknowledges thatthe regime being contained is hostile, dangerous,and tyrannical. Such regimes make enemies oftheir own people. The United States shouldexpose the regime’s human rights abuses, helpdissidents communicate securely with eachother, aid opposition groups, and use covertactions to discredit the regime. Such measureswould increase the internal and external pres-sure on Iran and make it clear to the regime thatits nuclear ambitions and its domestic repressioncarry enormous costs. Again, supporters of con-tainment should welcome such measures.

• Restricting and reducing the regime’s abilityto threaten others. Containment requires thatthe regime in question be confronted with theprospect of an effective U.S. military response ifit breaches containment. It must also not be ableto blackmail the U.S. and its allies. To that end,the U.S. should expose and restrict Iran’s med-dling in Iraq and Afghanistan, modernize theU.S. nuclear arsenal, expand U.S. expeditionarycapabilities, and deploy a robust and compre-

27. James Phillips, “An Israeli Preventive Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Sites: Implications for the U.S.,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2361, January 15, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/01/an-israeli-preventive-attack-on-iran-nuclear-sites-implications-for-the-us.

28. James Phillips, Helle C. Dale, and Janice A. Smith, “Ten Practical Steps to Liberty in Iran,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 2832, March 11, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/Ten-Practical-Steps-to-Liberty-in-Iran.

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hensive missile defense system. Such measureswould fulfill part of the logic of containment.

ConclusionTogether, these measures would not merely con-

tain Iran. They would follow the tradition of Presi-dent Reagan by refusing to accept that the U.S. hasno option but to yield to totalitarian regimes orgo to war with them. Together, these options offer aricher, more optimistic vision of policy toward Iran

than the repetitious, content-free, and ill-informedmantra of containment.

—Ted R. Bromund, Ph.D., is Senior ResearchFellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, adivision of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom DavisInstitute for International Studies, at The HeritageFoundation. James Phillips is Senior Research Fellowfor Middle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and SarahAllison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division ofthe Davis Institute, at The Heritage Foundation.

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