Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay (G.R. No. L-25554)Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.

The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?

Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and the House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.

“In resume, the Court agrees with petitioners that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation for such increased compensation may not be disbursed until December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted, and the items of the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) purporting to authorize the disbursement of the increased compensation to members of the Senate and the House of Representatives even prior to December 30, 1969 are declared void, as violative of Article VI, section 14, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; and the respondents, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, are prohibited and enjoined from approving and passing in audit any disbursements of the increased compensation authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 for Senators and members of the House of Representatives, before December 30, 1969. No costs.”

COCOFED vs. Republic, GR Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012

FACTS:In 1971, Republic Act No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut

Investment Fund (CIF). The source of the CIF was a P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. The Philippine Coconut Administration was tasked to collect and administer the Fund. Out of the 0.55 levy, P0.02 was placed at the disposition of the COCOFED, the recognized national association of coconut producers declared by the PCA. Cocofund receipts were ought to be issued to every copra seller.

During the Martial Law regime, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued several Presidential Decrees purportedly for the improvement of the coconut industry. The most relevant among these is P.D. No. 755 which permitted the use of the Fund for the “acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of coconut farmers and the distribution of the shares of the stock of the bank it [PCA] acquired free to the coconut farmers” (Sec.2).

Thus, the PCA acquired the First United Bank, later renamed the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). The PCA bought the 72.2% of PUB’s outstanding capital stock or 137,866 shares at P200 per share (P27, 573,200.00) from Pedro Cojuangco in behalf of the coconut farmers.” The rest of the Fund was deposited to the UCPB interest free.

Farmers who had paid the CIF and registered their receipts with PCA were given their corresponding UCPB stock certificates. Only 16 million worth

of COCOFUND receipts were registered and a large number of the coconut farmers opted to sell all/part of their UCPB shares to private individuals.

Simply put, parts of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects and/or was converted into different assets or investments through the years.

After the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 1 which created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).

The PCGG aimed to assist the President in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses and their cronies. PCGG was empowered to file cases for sequestration in the Sandiganbayan.

Among the sequestered properties were the shares of stock in the UCPB registered in the name of “over a million coconut farmers” held in trust by the PCA. The Sandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary Judgment that the Coconut Levy Funds are prima facie public funds and that Section 1 and 2 of PD No. 755 (and some other PDs) were unconstitutional.

The COCOFED representing the “over a million coconut farmers” via Petition for review under Rule 45 sought the reversal of the ruling contending among others that the sequestration amounted to “taking of private property without just compensation and impairment of vested right of ownership.”

ISSUE: What is the NATURE of the Coconut Levy Fund?

RULING:The SC ruled in favor of the REPUBLIC.To begin with, the Coconut Levy was imposed in the exercise of the

State’s inherent power of taxation. Indeed, the Coconut Levy Funds partake the nature of TAXES. The Funds were generated by virtue of statutory enactments by the proper legislative authorities and for public purpose.

The Funds were collected to advance the government avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry. The SC took judicial notice of the fact that the coconut industry is one of the great economic pillars of our nation, and coconuts and their byproducts occupy a leading position among the countries’ export products. Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues to support the government, but also to provide means for the rehabilitation and the stabilization of a threatened industry, which is so affected with public interest.

“”THE COURT AFFIRMIS THE RESOLUTIONS ISSUED BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN ON JUNE 5, 2007 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 0033-A AND ON MAY 11, 2007 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 0033-F, THAT THERE IS NO MORE NECESSITY OF FURTHER TRIAL WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF (1) THE SEQUESTERED UCPB SHARES, (2) THE CHF BLOCK OF SMC SHARES AND (3) THE CIIF COMPANIES, AS THEY HAVE FINALLY BEEN ADJUDICATED IN THE

AFOREMIENTIONED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS DATED JULY 11, 2003 AND MAY 7, 2004.

SO ORDERED.

Costs against petitioners COCOFED, et al., in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and Danilo S. Ursua in G.R. No. 178193.

No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let Entry of Judgment be made in due course.””

DEMETRIA V ALBA

Facts:Petitioners assail the constitutionality of first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977)—as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers—on the primary grounds that Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.

The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President…may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”

Issue:1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional

2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act

Held:1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by empowering the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the Executive Department to any program of any department included in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the

item. It not only disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to naught. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government has assumed to do as void, as part of its constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to say that the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.

FACTS

Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in theGeneral Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law,

thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.

“Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a provision of law which We have earlier mentioned to be constitutionally infirm. The general principle relied upon cannot therefore accord them the protection sought as they are not acting within their "sphere of responsibility" but without it.

The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the economic destitution brought about by the plundering of the Treasury by the deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision which allows even the slightest possibility of a repetition of this sad experience cannot remain written in our statute books.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional.”

Guingona v. CaragueG.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991

Gancayco, J.

Facts:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled “Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act),” by P.D. No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.

The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.

Issue:

                Is the appropriation of P86 billion in the P233 billion 1990 budget violative of Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution?

Held:

                No. There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be “made by law,” such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present.CASE DIGEST: Guingona, Jr. vs. CaragueG.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

“The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same.

There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of petitioners in filing this petition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail on the constitutional and legal issues raised. As to whether or not the country should honor its international debt, more especially the enormous amount that had been incurred by the past administration, which appears to be the ultimate objective of the petition, is not an issue that is presented or proposed to be addressed by the Court. Indeed, it is more of a political decision for Congress and the Executive to determine in the exercise of their wisdom and sound discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.”

DIGEST: Nazareth v.s. Villar G.R. 188635 (2013)

October 29, 2013Author:No comment yet

Facts:

1. On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the State to provide a program for human resources development in science and technology in order to achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and manpower that would sustain the drive for total science and technology mastery.3 Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional allowances and benefits (Magna Carta benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439.

2. The DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta benefits to the covered officials and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the absence of specific appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. Subsequently, following the post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas on April 23, 1999, October 28, 1999, June 20, 2000, February 27, 2001, June 27, 2001, October 10, 2001 and October 17, 2001, several NDs (Notice of Disallowance) were issued disapproving the payment of the Magna Carta benefits. The provision for the use of savings in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) was vetoed by the President; hence, there was no basis for the payment of the aforesaid allowances or benefits according to the State Auditor.

3. DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the President (OP) through his Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 (Request for Authority to Use Savings for the Payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439) for the authority to utilize the DOST’s savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.6 The salient portions of the Memorandum of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. explained the request in the following manner: x x x. However, the amount necessary for its full implementation had not been provided in the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since the Act’s effectivity, the Department had paid the 1998 MC benefits out of its current year’s savings as provided for in the Budget Issuances of the Department of Budget and Management while the 1999 MC benefits were likewise sourced from the year’s savings as authorized in the 1999 GAA. The 2000 GAA has no provision for the use of savings. The Department, therefore, cannot continue the

payment of the Magna Carta benefits from its 2000 savings. x x x. The DOST personnel are looking forward to His Excellency’s favorable consideration for the payment of said MC benefits, being part of the administration’s 10-point action program to quote “I will order immediate implementation of RA 8439 (the Magna Carta for Science and Technology Personnel in Government)” as published in the Manila Bulletin dated May 20, 1998.

4. Through the Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by authority of the President, approved the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr., ” With reference to your Memorandum dated April 03, 2000 requesting authority to use savings from the appropriations of that Department and its agencies for the payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439, please be informed that the said request is hereby approved”.

5. On July 28, 2003, the petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST Regional Director in Region IX, lodged an appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging the lifting of the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for the period covering CY 1998 to CY 2001 amounting to P4,363,997.47. She anchored her appeal on the April 12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora, and cited the provision in the GAA of 1998.

Issue: Is the act of the Executive Secretary falls under Article VI, Section 25 (5) which provides ” “(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the PRESIDENT, x x x may by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.””

Held:

NO. “Simply put, it means that only the President has the power to augment savings from one item to another in the budget of administrative agencies under his control and supervision. This is the very reason why the President vetoed the Special Provisions in the 1998 GAA that would authorize the department heads to use savings to augment other items of appropriations within the Executive Branch. Such power could well be extended to his Cabinet Secretaries as alter egos under the “doctrine of qualified political agency” enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154, where it was pronounced that the official acts of a Department Secretary are deemed acts of the President unless disapproved or reprobated by the latter. Thus, in the instant case, the authority granted to the DOST by the Executive Secretary, being one of the alter egos of the President, was legal and valid but in so far as the use of agency’s savings for the year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was reenacted in 2001, the authority granted on the use of savings did not necessarily extend to the succeeding year.”

[COMPREHENSIVE DIGEST] Belgica v. Executive SecretaryClick here for the shorter digest (substantive issues only).

Click here for the full text of the Decision.* FACTS: In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.

The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

Over the years, “pork” funds have increased tremendously. In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks. In 2004, several citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 General Appropriations Act for being unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – “JLN” standing for Janet Lim Napoles – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013,

the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use of legislators’ PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration.

As for the “Presidential Pork Barrel”, whistle-blowers alleged that “[a]t least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy [NGO].”

* ISSUES:A. Procedural Issues1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy

2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to judicial review

3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue

4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res judicata and stare decisisB. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on…

1.) …separation of powers

2.) …non-delegability of legislative power

3.) …checks and balances

4.) …accountability

5.) …political dynasties

6.) …local autonomy

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

WON the phrases:(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund,

are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power

* HELD AND RATIO:A. Procedural IssuesNo question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization - such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund - are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.

Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that “the ‘moot and academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case.” The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved: This is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved – the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system’s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court’s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government’s own recognition that reforms are needed “to address the reported abuses of the PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter.It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public: This is  applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality. There is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has

commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution).3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases. Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” As taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters “of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” The CoA Chairperson’s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves “not [merely] a systems failure” but a “complete breakdown of controls” amplifies the seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. This required identity is not attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel System”. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. Absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of powers problem,

specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel System” as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. Since the Court now benefits from hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA Report), it must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory.Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases, stare decisis would not apply.B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import.In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also

declared that informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law  a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical

materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency.”

4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.However, the Court  cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator’s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the former’s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.

5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

6.) YES.  The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under

the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.”However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains legally effective and subsisting.

Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.”The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 - it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.710 SCRA 1 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Local Government – Invalid

DelegationLegislative Department – Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);

b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.Presidential Pork BarrelThe president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the  Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.Pork Barrel Scam ControversyEver since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.ISSUES: I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.HELD: I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:a. Separation of PowersAs a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).

This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.b. Non-delegability of Legislative PowerAs a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.Exceptions to the rule are:(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.c. Principle of Checks and BalancesOne feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”d. Local AutonomyAs a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy.

It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

“On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘ access to official documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate petition.

The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible

criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.

This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.

SO ORDERED.”

Tolentino vs. Secretary of FinanceBy: Dennis D. San Diego

G.R. No. 115455235 SCRA 630 (1994)

FACTSRA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.Art. VI,  Section  26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.ISSUEWhether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.HELD

No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.

Tolentino v Sec. of FinanceFacts:

-          House of Rep. filed House Bill 11197 (An Act Restructuring the VAT System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance its Admin., Amending for these Purposes…)

-          Upon receipt of Senate, Senate filed another bill completely different from that of the House Bill

-          Senate finished debates on the bill and had the 2nd and 3rd reading of the Bill on the same day

-          Bill was deliberated upon in the Conference Committee and become enrolled bill which eventually became the EVAT law.

Procedural Issue:(1)    WoN RA 7716 originated exclusively from the House of Rep. in accordance

with sec 24, art 6 of Consti(2)    WoN the Senate bill violated the “three readings on separate days”

requirement of the Consti(3)    WoN RA 7716 violated sec 26(1), art 6 - one subject, one title rule.

NOTE: This case was filed by PAL because before the EVAT Law, they were exempt from taxes. After the passage of EVAT, they were already included. PAL contended that neither the House or Senate bill provided for the removal of the exemption from taxes of PAL  and that it was inly made after the meeting of the Conference Committee w/c was not expressed in the title of RA 7166

Held:(1)    YES! Court said that it is not the law which should originate from the

House of Rep, but the revenue bill   which was required to originate from the

House of Rep. The inititiative must ocme from the Lower House because they are elected in the district level – meaning they are expected to be more sensitive to the needs of the locality.Also, a bill originating from the Lower House may undergo extensive changes while in the Senate. Senate can introduce a separate and distinct bill other than the one the Lower House proposed.  The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the House bill, so long as action by Senate is withheld pending the receipt of the House bill.

(2)    NO. The Pres. certified that the Senate bill was urgent. Presidential certification dispensed the requirement not only of printing but also reading the bill in 3 separate days.  In fact, the Senate accepted the Pres. certification

(3)    No.  Court said that the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. It is also in the power of Congress to amend, alter, repeal grant of franchises for operation of public utility when the common good so requires.One subject rule is intended to prevent surprise upon Congress members and inform people of pending legislation. In the case of PAL, they did not know of their situation not because of any defect in title but because they might have not noticed its publication until some event calls attention to its existence.

235 SCRA 630 (1994) – 249 SCRA 635 (1995) – Political Law – Origination of Revenue Bills – EVAT – Amendmentby Substitution

Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s ironic however to note that  Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR.

What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

“We have carefully read the various arguments raised against the constitutional validity of R.A. No. 7716. We have in fact taken the extraordinary step of enjoining its enforcement pending resolution of these cases. We have now come to the conclusion that the law suffers from none of the infirmities attributed to it by petitioners and that its enactment by the other branches of the government does not constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Any question as to its necessity, desirability or expediency must be addressed to Congress as the body which is electorally responsible, remembering that, as Justice Holmes has said, "legislators are the ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as are the courts." (Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270, 48 L. Ed. 971, 973 (1904)). It is not right, as petitioner in G.R. No. 115543 does in arguing that we should enforce the public accountability of legislators, that those who took part in passing the law in question by voting for it in Congress should later thrust to the courts the burden of reviewing measures in the flush of enactment. This Court does not sit as a third branch of the legislature, much less exercise a veto power over legislation.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality and the temporary restraining order previously issued is hereby lifted.”

LUNG CENTER V QUEZON CITYFACTS:

The Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a parcel of land in Quezon City.  Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines.  The ground floor is being leased to a canteen, medical professionals whom use the same as their private clinics, as well as to other private parties.  The right portion of the lot is being leased for commercial purposes to the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.  The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government.

Petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from realty taxes amounting to about Php4.5 million, predicating its claim as a charitable institution. The city assessor denied the Claim.  When appealed to the QC-Local Board of Assessment, the same was dismissed.  The decision of the QC-LBAA was affirmed by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, despite the Petitioners claim that 60% of its hospital beds are used exclusively for charity.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to exemption from realty taxes notwithstanding the fact that it admits paying clients and leases out a portion of its property for commercial purposes.

HELD:

The Court held that the petitioner is indeed a charitable institution based on its charter and articles of incorporation.  As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution.

Despite this, the Court held that the portions of real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.  (strictissimi juris) Moreover, P.D. No. 1823 only speaks of tax exemptions as regards to:

        income and gift taxes for all donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and supplies to be imported by authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the Philippines for the actual use and benefit of the Lung Center; and

         taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment purchases (expression unius est exclusion alterius/expressium facit cessare tacitum).

==================

G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 [Constitutional Law - Article VI: Legislative Department; Taxation ]

FACTS:Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks exemption from real property taxes when the City Assessor

issued Tax Declarations for the land and the hospital building. Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The request was denied, and a petition hereafter filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner alleged that as a charitable institution, is exempted from real property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition and the decision was likewise affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the CBAA.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160.

2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.

RULING:1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. The purpose for which it was created was to render medical services to the public in general including those who are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity. Under PD 1823, petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even if the gift or donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the government.

2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon.The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property taxes only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.

Tan v Del Rosario, Jr.Facts:This is a consolidated case involving the constitutionality of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation (SNIT) scheme.Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued implementation of the SNIT. In the 1st case, they contend that the House Bill which eventually became RA 7496 is a misnomer or deficient because it was

named as “Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession” while the actual title contains the said words with the additional phrase, “…Amending Section 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code”.In the 2nd case, they argue that respondents have exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships by issuing Revenue Regulation 2-93 to carry out the RA.

Issue:Whether or not general professional partnerships may be taxed under SNIT

Held:No. A general professional partnership is not itself an income taxpayer. Income tax is imposed not on the partnership (which is tax exempt), but on the partners themselves in their individual capacity computed on their distributive shares of partnership profits. There is no distinction in income tax liability between a person who practices his profession alone and one who does it through partnership with others in the exercise of a common profession.In the case, SNIT is not envisioned by the Congress to cover corporations or partnerships which are independently subject to the payment of income tax.***Notes:*2 KINDS OF PARTNERSHIPS UNDER TAX CODE1. Taxable Partnerships – no matter how it was created or organized, they are subject to income tax by law.2. Exempt Partnerships – the partners, not the partnership (although obligated to file an income tax return for administration and data) are liable for income tax in their individual capacity.John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. Lim [GR 119775, 24 October 2003] En Banc, Carpio-Morales (J): 9 concur, 2 took no partFacts: Republic Act 7227, entitled "An Act Accellerating the Convetsion of Military Reservations into other Productive uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for other purposes," otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," was enacted on 13 March 1992. The law set out the policy of the government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America Military Bases Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay) in the City of Baguio. RA 7227 created the Bases Conversion and Development Authority' (BCDA), vesting it with powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in accordance

with the declared government policy. RA 7227 likewise created the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes and bounds of which were to be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines; and granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses therein from local and national taxes, to other hall-narks of a liberalized financial and business climate. RA 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay. On 16 August 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with Tuntex (B.V.L) Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. 4 months later or on 16 December 16, 1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreements whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint venture company known as the Baguio International Development and Management Corporation which would lease areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning such places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as originally envisioned by the parties under their AZemorandmn of Agreement. The Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions in response to the actions taken by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. By Resolution of 29 September 1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City officially asked BCDA to exclude all the barangays partly or totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of any plan or program for its development. By a subsequent Resolution dated 19 January 1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots being occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding the military reservation. Still by another resolution passed on 21 February 1994, the sanggunian adopted and submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept for the development of Camp John Hay. The sanggunian's vision expressed, among other things, a kind of development that affords protection to the environment, the making of a family-oriented type of tourist destination, priority in employment opportunities for Baguio residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed participation of the city government in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously named nine barangays from the area for development, and liability for local taxes of businesses to be established within the camp." BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other proposals of the sanggunian." They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full development in accordance with the mandate of RA 7227. On 11 May 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution requesting the Mayor to order the determination of

realty taxes which may otherwise be collected from real properties of Camp John Hay. The resolution was intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian in determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ, the sanggunian being of the view that such declaration would exempt the camp's property and the economic activity therein from local or national taxation. More than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed Resolution 255, (Series of 1994)," seeking and supporting, subject to its concurrence, the issuance by then President Ramos of a presidential proclamation declaring an area of 285.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the provisions of RA 7227. Together with this resolution was submitted a draft of the proposed proclamation for consideration by the President. On 5 July 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation 420 (series of 1994), "creating and designating a portion of the area covered by the former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic Zone pursuant to Republic Act 7227." The John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, et. al. filed the petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction on 25 April 1995 challenging, in the main, the constitutionality or validity of Proclamation 420 as well as the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between the BCDA, and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.Issue: Whether the petitioners have legal standing in filing the case questioning the validity of Presidential Proclamation 420.Held: It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case." RA 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in the country.'" The grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence on the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation 420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged." Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an interest in the question involved or an incidental interest," for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proclamation 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City. Moreover, Petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governance of Baguio City and whose duties included deciding

for and on behalf of their constituents the question of whether to concur with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against" the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) supporting the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation 420, have legal standing to bring the present petition.

John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. Lim [GR 119775, 24 October 2003] En Banc, Carpio-Morales (J): 9 concur, 2 took no part

Facts: Republic Act 7227, entitled "An Act Accellerating the Convetsion of Military Reservations into other Productive uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for other purposes," otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," was enacted on 13 March 1992. The law set out the policy of the government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America Military Bases Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay) in the City of Baguio. RA 7227 created the Bases Conversion and Development Authority' (BCDA), vesting it with powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in accordance with the declared government policy. RA 7227 likewise created the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes and bounds of which were to be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines; and granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses therein from local and national taxes, to other hall-narks of a liberalized financial and business climate. RA 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay. On 16 August 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with Tuntex (B.V.L) Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. 4 months later or on 16 December 16, 1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreements whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint venture company known as the Baguio International Development and Management Corporation which would lease areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning such places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as originally

envisioned by the parties under their AZemorandmn of Agreement. The Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions in response to the actions taken by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. By Resolution of 29 September 1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City officially asked BCDA to exclude all the barangays partly or totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of any plan or program for its development. By a subsequent Resolution dated 19 January 1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots being occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding the military reservation. Still by another resolution passed on 21 February 1994, the sanggunian adopted and submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept for the development of Camp John Hay. The sanggunian's vision expressed, among other things, a kind of development that affords protection to the environment, the making of a family-oriented type of tourist destination, priority in employment opportunities for Baguio residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed participation of the city government in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously named nine barangays from the area for development, and liability for local taxes of businesses to be established within the camp." BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other proposals of the sanggunian." They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full development in accordance with the mandate of RA 7227. On 11 May 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution requesting the Mayor to order the determination of realty taxes which may otherwise be collected from real properties of Camp John Hay. The resolution was intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian in determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ, the sanggunian being of the view that such declaration would exempt the camp's property and the economic activity therein from local or national taxation. More than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed Resolution 255, (Series of 1994)," seeking and supporting, subject to its concurrence, the issuance by then President Ramos of a presidential proclamation declaring an area of 285.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the provisions of RA 7227. Together with this resolution was submitted a draft of the proposed proclamation for consideration by the President. On 5 July 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation 420 (series of 1994), "creating and designating a portion of the area covered by the former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic Zone pursuant to Republic Act 7227." The John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, et. al. filed the petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction on 25 April 1995 challenging, in the main, the constitutionality or validity of Proclamation 420 as well as the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between the BCDA, and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.

Issue: Whether the petitioners have legal standing in filing the case questioning the validity of Presidential Proclamation 420.

Held: It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case." RA 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in the country.'" The grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence on the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation 420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged." Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an interest in the question involved or an incidental interest," for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proclamation 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City. Moreover, Petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governance of Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents the question of whether to concur with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against" the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) supporting the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation 420, have legal standing to bring the present petition.

CAMP JOHN HAY VS LIM G.R. No. 119775 MARCH 29, 2005

FACTS: Petitioners filed their Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief assailing (1) the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420 and (2) the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement previously entered into between public respondent BCDA and

private respondents. Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 was declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly declared of no legal force and effect.Intervener CJHDC filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene alleging that it, together with its consortium partners, entered into a Lease Agreement dated October 19, 1996 with respondent BCDA for the development of the John Hay SEZ; and that it "stands to be most affected" by this Court's Decision "invalidating the grant of tax exemption and other financial incentives" in the John Hay SEZ since "[i]ts financial obligations and development and investment commitments under the Lease Agreement were entered into upon the premise that these incentives are valid and subsisting."CJHDC, proffering grounds parallel to those of public respondents, prays that: (1) it be granted leave to intervene in this case; (2) its attached Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention be admitted; and (3) this Court's Decision of October 24, 2003 be reconsidered and petitioners' petition dismissed.

CJHDC's Motion for leave to Intervene was granted and noted its Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention.

ISSUE: Whether the tax exemptions and other financial incentives granted to the Subic SEZ under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), are applicable to the John Hay SEZ.RULING: CJHDC's argument that the President's "power to create Special Economic Zones carries with it the power to provide for tax and financial incentives," does not lie. It is the legislative branch which has the inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions. Paragraph 4, Section 28 of Article VI of the Constitution is crystal clear: "[n]o law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress."Hence, it is only the legislature, as limited by the provisions of the Constitution, which has full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation. The Constitution itself may provide for specific tax exemptions or local governments may pass ordinances providing for exemption from local taxes, but, otherwise, it is only the legislative branch which has the power to grant tax exemptions, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax.There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7227 which can be considered a grant of tax exemption in favor of public respondent BCDA. Rather, the beneficiaries of the tax exemptions and other incentives in Section 12 (the only provision in R.A. No. 7227 which expressly grants tax exemptions) are clearly the business enterprises located within the Subic SEZ.Contrary to public respondents' interpretation, the Decision of October 24, 2003 does not "tie the hands" of executive or administrative agencies from

implementing any present or future legislation which affords tax or other financial incentives to qualified persons doing business in the John Hay SEZ or elsewhere. The second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 was declared null and void only insofar as it purported to grant tax exemptions and other financial incentives to business enterprises located in John Hay SEZ. However, where there is statutory basis for exemptions or incentives, there is nothing to prevent qualified persons from applying for and availing thereof.

“The unconstitutionality of the grant of tax immunity and financial incentives as contained in the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 notwithstanding, the entire assailed proclamation cannot be declared unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant to law or the Constitution.  The delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ was well within the powers of the President to do so by means of a proclamation.[51] The requisite prior concurrence by the Baguio City government to such proclamation appears to have been given in the form of a duly enacted resolution by the sanggunian.  The other provisions of the proclamation had been proven to be consistent with R.A. No. 7227.

Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.[52] This Court finds that the other provisions in Proclamation No. 420 converting a delineated portion of Camp John Hay into the John Hay SEZ are separable from the invalid second sentence of Section 3 thereof, hence they stand.

WHEREFORE, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly declared of no legal force and effect.  Public respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the aforesaid void provision.

Proclamation No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and effective.”

Abbas vs Senate Electoral Tribunal - A case digestFIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

Facts:

This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter

filed.

Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were being asked to inhibit themselves in hearing SET Case No. 002-87 as they are considered interested parties, therefore leaving the Senate Electoral Tribunal senateless, and all remaining members coming from the judiciary.

Issue:

WON the SET can function without the Senator members.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.Abbas v SETOn 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24)—- requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature—- is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.ISSUE:Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due weight. HELD:The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list systemrepresented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”  It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate,the Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty andauthority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

“Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.”

Bondoc v PinedaFACTS:

-    Pineda, member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc, member of Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for Representative for 4TH district of Pampanga.  Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest at the House of Rep Electoral Tribunal (HRET)

-         After review, HRET decided that Bondoc won by 107 votes.

-         Cong. Camasura revealed to Cong. Cojuangco (LDP Sec. Gen) that he voted for Bondoc because he was ‘consistent with truth, justice and self-respect’ and that they would abide by the results of the recounted votes where Bondoc was leading.

-         Cong. Camasura was then expelled from his party (LDP) because it was a complete betrayal to his party when he decided for Bondoc.

-         HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and rescind his nomination from the tribunal.

-         Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to HRET from its resolution.

      ISSUE:    

W/N THE HOUSE OF REP. EMPOWERED TO INTERFERE WITH THE DISPOSITION OF AN ELECTION CONTEST IN THE HRET BY REORGANIZING THE REPRESENTATION IN THE TRIBUNAL OF THE MAJORITY PARTY?

W/N HRET RESOLUTION TO ORDER CAMASURA TO WITHDRAW AND RESCIND HIS NOMINATION IS VALID

HELD:  

NO! COURT SAID THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY POLITICAL PARTY TO CONTROL VOTING IN THE TRIBUNAL . THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AS JUDGE TO CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEMS OF THE HOUSE OF REP.

HRET RESOLUTION IS NULL AND VOID.  ACTION OF HRET IS VIOLATIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE BECAUSE:

1.     IT IS A CLEAR IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE OF THE HRET TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE ELECTION CONTEST BET. PINEDA AND BONDOC. TO SANCTION INTERFERENCE BY THE HOUSE OF REP. WOULD REDUCE TRIBUNAL AS TOOL FOR THE AGGRANDIZEMENT OF THE PARTY IN POWER (LDP)

2.     MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL MUST BE NON-PARTISAN. CAMASURA WAS DISCHARGING HIS FUNCTIONS WITH COMPLETE DETACHMENT, IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE. DISLOYALTY TO PARTY AND BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE -> NOT VALID GROUND FOR EXPULSION OF MEMBER OF THE TRIBUNAL

3.     IT VIOLATES CAMASURA’S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERS OF HRET ARE ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERSHIP MAY NOT BE TERMINATED W/O UNDUE CAUSE SUCH AS: EXPIRATION OF TERM OF OFFICE, DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, RESIGNATION FROM POLITICAL PARTY, FORMAL AFFILIATION WITH ANOTHER PARTY. DISLOYALTY IS NOT A VALID CAUSE!

Bondoc v. PinedaG.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991

Griño-Aquino, J.

Issue:

                Is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of “reorganizing” the representation in the tribunal of the majority party?

Held:

                No. The use of the word “sole” in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.

The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It must be a non-political body. To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.

Issue:

                whether the proposed amendment to the Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24)—requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions is repugnant to Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution

Held:

                No. On the contrary, proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.Bondoc vs. Pineda Digested

Bondoc vs. Pineda 201 SCRA 792

FACTS:

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative

for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein.

RULING:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

“”WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.

SO ORDERED.””

Codilla vs. de VeneciaG.R. no. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002

If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification case, the proclamation of the candidatecannot divest Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to review its validity

Ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office to the winning candidate

FACTS:

Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition for disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used theequipment and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so Codilla’s name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered disqualified.

Codilla’s votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of Locsin’s proclamation.

ISSUES: 

Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a Representative

Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the legally elected Representative

RULING:

First. The validity of the respondent’s   proclamation   was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.

xxxSince the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending hisproclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant case.

xxx

(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was

still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the “doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and acandidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves.” This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.

(b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.

xxxA petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.

Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but nevertheless unproclaimed   candidate

Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for mandamus “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or

station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered theproclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.G.R. No. 150605           December 10, 2002EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vsHON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official

capacities as Speaker and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively, and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN

Facts:

Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.

Issues:1.     Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.2.     Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.3.     Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.

HELD:1.     The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case against

petitioner had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorate’s choice.

2.      Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to

review resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondent’s eligibility was not the issue.

3.     The facts had been settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter, that petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its (Comelec’s) Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. Such duty is ministerial. Petitioner had the right to the office which merits recognition regardless of personal judgment or opinion.

“In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter.  The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land.  There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of office.  This decision shall be immediately executory.””