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Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics

Illusion in Theater: The Sign/Stimulus EquivalenceAuthor(s): Stratos E. ConstantinidisSource: Poetics Today, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1987), pp. 245-260Published by: Duke University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1773036 .

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ILLUSION IN THEATERThe Sign/Stimulus Equivalence

STRATOS E. CONSTANTINIDISOhio State

1. FOCUSMaurice Merleau-Ponty concludes his discussion of the "Higher Formsof Behavior: Pavlov's Reflexology and its Postulates" (1967:52-128) bysubmitting two major propositions: first, unlike lower responseswhich are functions of antecedent conditions unfolding in objectivetime and space, higher responses "do not depend on stimuli, takenmaterially, but rather on the meaning of the situation" (1967:125). Sec-ond, behavior consists of relations that are irreducible to their allegedparts-whether these "parts"are stimuli coming from outside or in-side. "The structure of behavior as it presents itself to perceptual experi-ence is neither thing nor consciousness" (1967:127). Is it, then, a sign?Ivan Pavlov,of course, looked into perceptual behavior as an extension ofhis theories on respondent conditioning. In theater studies, however,interdisciplinary research teams such as the late Tinchon/Dietrichteam at the Institute for Audience Research at the University of Viennaor the more recent Schoenmakers/Tan team at the Institute for Recep-tion Esthetics at the University of Amsterdam, seek to describe the au-diovisual signs of performance-texts and to explain the emo-tional/cognitive aspects of spectator response to these signs(Schoenmakers 1982, 11:146).The findings of such teams hopefully willhelp theater companies increase the affective quality (impact) that per-formance-texts have on spectators. Interestingly, Umberto Eco arguedpersuasively enough that "stimuli cannot be regarded as signs"(1979:19-20; 241-242). Without first disproving Eco, the above teamsproceeded to harness semiotics and psychological esthetics to a com-mon task. This paper aims at refuting Eco's point and at justifying aninterdisciplinary approach to theatrical phenomena.Wilfried Passow negotiated a way of lifting the barrier between thetwo disciplines by pairing three types of theatrical experience (visceral,emotional, and cognitive) to Charles Peirce's three kinds of interpre-tants (immediate, dynamic, and final). Passow suggested that these

Poetis Today,Vol. 8:2 (1987) 245-260

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246 STRATOS E. CONSTANTINIDISinterpretants have an energetic, emotional, and logical aspect respec-tively which can, in turn, elicit differentiated responses such as action,feeling, and thought (1982, 11:254). Passow's inspiring negotiations,however, failed on two counts: first, they did not establish an equiva-lence between signs and stimuli. Such an equivalence would allowsigns and stimuli to be used interchangeably as interdisciplinary in-vestigations move back and forth from the semlotic to the empiricaldomain. Second, Peirce's interpretant, which mediates the realizationof a sign (Peirce 1958:1.399; Greenlee 1973:34, 62-69), is not necessarilyan interpreter-i.e., a spectator. It is rather another sign explainingthe previous sign. Peirce's notion of unlimited semiosis-next to PietrBogatyrev's notion of theatrical semiosis which regards theatricalsigns as signs of other signs, not as signs of things-frees theatricalsignification from the bonds of a referent but also deprives reception es-thetics of an object and a subject for measurement studies.Ferdinand de Saussure's notion of a sign as a twofold psychologicalentity comprising a signifier and a signified, seems a more appropri-ate model for bridging the disciplines. Passow recognized this value ofthe Saussurean sign because the signified is defined as a mental activitywhen the listener/spectator preceives a signifier. This notion of a signallows researchers to match signifieds to signifiers and, thus recordmeaning variations to verbal, paraverbal, and nonverbal signifiers(1982, II:265). It is, indeed, in the context of the Saussurean sign that EdTan and Henry Schoenmakers see reception research and theatersemiotics as having each other's point of departure as their goal. The-ater semiotics analyzes performance-texts (i.e., signifiers) in terms ofgeneral characteristics which, in turn, determine reception processesand results. Reception research, on the other hand, analyzes the recep-tion process (i.e., signifieds) by isolating subprocesses arising in re-sponse to incoming stimuli (but not signs?) from a large variety of per-formance-texts (Tan 1982, I1:158).Such interdisciplinary approaches as the above promise to documentand explain the relationship between the sign-systems of performance-texts and the interpretive experiences of spectators. Clearly, unless weequate signs with stimuli, we cannot justify this interdisciplinary ap-proach to theatrical phenomena or carry on reliable scientific discus-sions. Eco is right when he observes that all stimuli do not elicit behav-ioral responses by convention or have completely predictable effects.Should this, however, deter us from equating stimuli with signs?2. PROBLEMSemiotic and empirical research in theater face an intriguing puzzleconcerning the interaction between literary (fictive) and non-literary(real) elements on stage. The more a spectator's extra-theatrical life ap-proximates the literary (fictive) dimension of a performance-text, themore it appears that he/she experiences real emotions which result



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ILLUSIONIN TI-EATER 247from the "slice of life" on stage. Even when the representation is asstylized as in Greek tragedy, the correlation holds. Greek dramatistPhrynichus was fined because his play The Captureof Miletus (493 B.C.)harrowed the Athenian audience to tears, since most of them had lostrelatives during the actual siege (Herodotus 6.21.2). Similarly, themore an actor's performing situation approximates the literary (fictive)dimension of performance (such as in Konstantin Stanislavski'smethod of acting), the more it seems that the actor is experiencing realemotions that result from the "as if" circumstances of the characterhe/she impersonates (Gunkle 1975:44).3. JUSTIFICATIONAlthough the puzzle refers to the experience of both spectators and ac-tors, a solution should address both facets. Presently, empirical andtheoretical studies in psychological esthetics operate on the premisethat an "esthetic"response or experience of a fictive situation is yet qual-itatively different from a real-life response (Clynes 1977). Two domi-nant models in the field are available to investigate the puzzle, thepsychodynamic and the psychobiological models (Child 1972; Kreitlerand Kreitler 1972; Berlyne 1971; Valentine 1962; Pratt 1961). Neither,however, explains in what ways "esthetic" responses are similar toreal-life responses or, if they are dissimilar, why they can be consid-ered as identical for methodological purposes.The psychodynamic model embraces approaches of Freudian andJungian orientation which-generally speaking-examine the influ-ence of "lower" drives on esthetic content (Grimaud 1976; Holland1968). If reduced to account for theatrical phenomena, the model holdsthat the "lower"drives of actors and spectators are gratified temporar-ily-in the obscure way of catharsis, whether Aristotelian orFreudian-through exposure to or participation in the performance.The model focuses on linguistic (cognitive) behavior as a function offour factors: stimulus, psycho-profile, drive, and defense. Its theory haschanged radically over the years, depending on the degree of empha-sis placed upon each of the above four factors in the making (poetic func-tion) and interpreting (hermeneutic function) of play-texts or perfor-mance-texts. The model is limited to merely describing the result(catharsis) of an esthetic experience rather than addressing the processor the causes that trigger itThe psychobiological model, on the other hand, has grown out of re-search that suggests the existence of a psychobiological basis for such"higher" drives as curiosity, boredom, and need for royalty (Lindauer1974). It encompasses two subparadigms: one with a focus on psycholog-ical variables such as expectation (Schoenmakers 1982; Peckman 1965);and the other with an emphasis on physiological variables, such asarousal, which are elicited by three property types in the work of art:signal values, psychophysical properties, and collative properties



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248 STRATOSE.CONSTANTINIDIS(Berlyne 1971). Both subparadigms view perception as the assimilationof stimuli to pre-existing internal categories (Sokolov 1963). The psy-chobiological model illustrates the arousal and "channeling" of actorand spectator "higher" drives, but it does not adequately answer how"higher" drives are gratified/frustrated during a performance. It failsto differentiate the conditioned expectations of spectators or actors be-tween watching or acting in a theatrical performance and eating achocolate bar during intermission.In sum, neither model explains how the real elements of a perfor-mance-text (unconditioned stimuli) turn into "fictive" elements(conditioned stimuli) and vice versa. This gap in our knowledge justi-fies this pilot study that I undertake here.4. PURPOSEMy purpose is twofold: First, I will try to demonstrate that conditionedstimuli can be regarded as signs. Second, I will investigate what causesreferents (i.e., non-literary elements in performance such as actors) tobecome identical with the signifiers (i.e., literary elements such ascharacters) in the performer's or the spectator's mind, thus producingthe effect of illusion.5.PROCEDUREI will follow three steps. First, I will attempt to equate Umberto Eco'sconcept of sign systems with Ivan Pavlov's concept of signal systems.Russian and Czech formalist (Shklovsky 1919; Mukafovslk 1940), recentRussian and European semiotics (Lotman 1977; Elam 1980), and post-war research in the field of Russian respondent conditioning as wellas the American learning theory (mediation), all offer avenuesjustifying this step. Conditioned stimuli share all five requirementswhich Eco designated as necessary for signs. It will therefore be pos-sible to study actor and spectator conditioned responses (signifieds)from an interdisciplinary approach as a next step.Second, I will investigate the nature of theatrical illusion as it re-lates to the spectator's experience. From Walter Gropius' totalthcater,designed for Erwin Piscator (1927) in order to draw spectators into thefictive world, to the new Ottawa Arts Center, designed by Fred Leben-sold so that it surrounds spectators with sound, light, and action evenbelow their feet, theatrical illusion remains a common denominator.

Finally, I will examine the nature of theatrical illusion as it seesawsbetween signifier and referent in the actor's experience. For example,emotional memory stirs the actor to physical action by intensifying"inner and outer stimuli" (Stanislavski 1936:132-136). Like Pavlov,Stanislavski explored the "second nature," that is, the artificial spon-taneity acquired by habit. The actor rehearses his actions until hisemotions appear to be spontaneous (psychophysical events) in the Pavlo-vian sense of acquired automatisms.



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ILLUSIONN THEATER 249I hope that, by equating theatrical signs with conditioned stimuli, Imay offer a model of theatrical illusion which can explain a great vari-

ety of performances-from psychophysical events to ideological acts-ina simple and comprehensive way.6. EQUATIONFor Eco, semiotics studies everything that can be taken as a sign; a signis everything that can be taken as significantly substituting for some-thing else; this something else does not necessarily have to exist or ac-tually be somewhere when a sign stands for it. Eco concludes that semi-otics, in principle, studies anything that can be used to tell a lie(1979:7). So, Eco argues, stimuli cannot be regarded as signs because, inPavlov's experiment, (1) the code does not inform the dog that salivates;instead, it informs the scientist "who knows that to every ring mustcorrespond a salivation" (1979:20), and (2) the bell-sound provokes sali-vation without any other mediation.Eco's point that the bell-sound is a stimulus for the dog independentof any social codes, is overstated. Eco fails to distinguish between un-conditioned and conditioned stimuli; disregards the rules of first andsecond signaling system activity; and discards the dog's rule as an ad-dressee because he wants to keep sign-function within the confines ofcultural anthropology. Don't dogs learn anything while social scien-tists are "conditioning" themselves? I argue that a sign-function repre-sents the correlation of two functives. Such functives are not by naturesemiotic, indeed, outside their correlation. However, insofar as theyare correlated, they acquire a semiotic nature-i.e., they can be used totell a lie. Semioticians know that potential signs become signs onlywhen addressees respond according to-or in avoidance of-senderintentions. Potential signs, therefore, become registered signs (i.e., acode) only if their repeated emotions evoke similar responses. Conse-quently, the intention/response correlation between social scientistsand dogs can be rewritten as a case of expectancy for scientists and a caseof conditioning for dogs.Eco's next point that the bell-sound provokes salivation without anyother mediation, is also debatable. By mediation,Eco cannot mean infer-encebecause he relates inference to symptoms, not to signs. He mostlikely means a referentwhich mediates between a signifier and itssignified. For example, a waiter removes the menu (signifier) beforehe serves food (referent). At the absence of referents and signifiers,waiters and customers preserve "images" of food (signifieds) in theirmemories. A concrete referent in the plate mediates between its signi-fier in the menu and its signified in the mind by reinforcing theirabstract correlation. Similarly, traditional Pavlovian respondent con-ditioning correlates a conditioned stimulus (bell-sound) to anunconditioned stimulus (food-powder) blown by an air-puff into a dog'smouth to create an expectation in its brain (salivation). Gradually, a



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250 STRATOSE.CONSTANTINIDISstimulus substitution occurs: bell-sound (CS) stands for food-powder (US)evoking the same response (salivation). Initially, however, salivationwas an unconditioned response because it was related to the food-pow-der (US), not to the bell-sound (CS). We know that the dog is condi-tioned when it experiences unnaturally-caused salivation (CR) to bell-sounds.The unconditioned stimulus (US) in conditioning theory coincideswith the referent in semiotic theory: it evokes a response that resultsfrom its natural properties and can be absent when the conditionedstimulus (CS) is present. Normally, a bell-sound may induce earache,but not salivation. If it induces salivation, it becomes a conditionedstimulus and, thus, capable of lying. It acquires so-to-speak a "magic"power that transforms reality, eliciting a subject's natural responses to"deceitful" stimuli. The conditioned stimulus, on the other hand,meets Eco's five requirements which constitute the attributes of a sign:intentionality, substitution, arbitrariness, convention, and spurious-ness. These attributes that are evident during the conditioning process,become even more apparent during extinction. The dog progressivelystops salivating to the bell-sound when, after many trials with bell-sounds alone, it receives no food-powder (reinforcement). Obviously,the conditioned stimulus does not share the properties of the uncondi-tioned stimulus, otherwise extinction could not take place. The correla-tion between conditioned stimuli (signifiers) and conditioned re-sponses (signifieds) is therefore reinforced by the occasional presenceof unconditioned stimuli (referents).In sum, I can equate signs with conditioned stimuli, in theory, sothat I can facilitate an interdisciplinary discussion of theatrical phe-nomena. Pavlov's signaling systems and Eco's sign systems agree thatthe making or breaking of stimulus and sign connections respectivelyis an arbitrary, but fundamental, mental activity. Indeed, conditionedstimuli (signifiers) induce responses (signifieds) resembling those ofunconditioned stimuli (referents) after they are presented to subjects inan appropriate time and intensity relationship in the controlled envi-ronments of laboratories. Can I also safely argue that the spectators intheaters behave like conditioned dogs or hungry gourmets who-at theabsence of the "real thing"-salivate at bell-sounds or feel their mouthwatering at menu-reading?7. ILLUSIONUnder normal conditions dogs do not confuse bell-sounds with food-powder, and people can easily distinguish between signifiers andtheir referents-if any. In this way, people can maintain a mental bal-ance between mental images (signifieds) and percepts of reality, real-ized in referents and signifiers. The major concern of semiotic andconditioning theory has been to understand the nature of the connec-



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ILLUSION IN THEATER 251tions in the referent-signifier-signified triangle and in the US-CS-CRtriangle respectively. Both theories try to describe the mechanics andboundaries of the semioticaction (Peirce 1958, 5:484) and of the signalingprocess-i.e., the substitution of one sign for another and of one stimulusfor another. For example, how flexible or unrestricted is the chain ofsigns or stimuli that can substitute for one another?Pavlov divided brain activity into two systems: our perceptions of thesurrounding world are primary (concrete) signals of reality. Words,on the other hand, are secondary (abstract) signals of reality, permit-ting generalization (1955:590). Freud argued a similar case: the con-scious idea comprises a concrete idea plus a verbal idea that correspondsto it An unconscious idea, on the other hand, is that of the thing alone(1956, 4:134). For Piaget, too, the gradual differentiation between sig-nifiers, referents, and signifieds observed in child development,marks the dawn of intelligence (1951:32). What we experience dailyduring social interaction results, for the most part, from an interpreta-tion of codes such as language, traffic signs, penal codes, etc. The socialinteraction of other intelligent species such as dogs, chimpanzees, dol-phins, bees, etc., observe their own systems of codes, and some of themare capable of elementary secondary signalling system activity. In sec-ondary-respondent-conditioning experiments, Pavlov substituted bell-sounds (primary conditioned stimuli) for white cards (secondary con-ditioned stimuli), and he found that the white cards elicited salivationwithout ever having been connected with food-powder (US). Can I alsoassume that a theatrical experience is a similar case of higher levelassociation which substitutes real-life codes for fictive codes? Sincetheater-goers are not subject to secondary respondent conditioning inthe theater, such an assumption is unwarranted. However, childrenand adult audiences alike do occasionally fail to differentiate betweenreality and fiction, experiencing real emotions to unreal stage situa-tions even though they know performances to be faked reality. What,then, impedes them from differentiating between literary and non-literary elements-i.e., between signifiers and referents? In otherwords, how willing is a spectator's willing suspension of disbelief intheater?I cannot extrapolate the findings of experiments on animals and ap-ply them to people unless the same methods produce similar responsesin both species. Experiments with hallucinogenic drugs in the 1950s,by inducing disturbed states of consciousness to both animals and peo-ple, helped bridge the gap and draw reliable analogies. When ani-mals received a shock (US), they howled (UR). When a bell-sound (CS)substituted for a shock, they lifted a paw (CR). Under the influence ofmescaline, surprisingly, they did not lift a paw (CR) at the bell-sound(CS), but they howled (UR) although no shock (US) was applied(Bridger 1956:352; Courvoisier 1956:25). Obviously, hallucinogenic



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ILLUSIONIN THEATER 253decorticated animals show that any condition producing neocorticalinhibition shifts the level of thinking from secondary to primary sig-naling system activity, while any condition that excites hippocampalactivity causes great difficulty for subjects to distinguish between condi-tioned and unconditioned stimuli (Wing and Smith 1942; Zeleny andKadykov 1938; Marquis and Hilgard 1937). In short, a person's ability todifferentiate signifiers (CS) from referents (US) increases or decreasesdepending on how high or low that person feels an experience ischarged emotionally.Can a spectator's response be compared to a dog's response harnessedon a seat in a sound-shielded room? I can argue that some portions ofperformance-texts produce such strong emotional experiences to targetaudiences that keep some spectators "glued" to their seats in relativelysound-shielded playhouses. Can I, then, also argue that the Athenianspectators who watched The Capture of Miletus wept because their over-flowing emotions prevented them from distinguishing theatricalsigns from reality? Aren't there any other explanations? What if theplay reminded them of a personal or a family tragedy as, indeed, thiswas the case? If I accept the premise that performance-texts work on theemotions of spectators by association, can I subsequently sort out primaryand secondary signaling system experiences on as rough a basis aslife/theater? To what extent the principles of stimulus generalizationof animal conditioning can explain theatrical illusion remains to beseen through empirical research in theater. I, here, propose a modelwhich may assist interdisciplinary teams to formulate relevant studies.I point out that the US/CS substitutions or associations observed in pri-mary signaling system activity are generalizations by association due to(1) physical similarity (iconic signs), (2) spatial and temporal contigu-ity (indexical signs), and (3) identity of effect or function.

Although the connection between signifiers (CS) and referents (US)is an arbitrary one, my notion of a sign or signal and its replicabilityin labs, societies, or theaters, depends on postulating that such a recog-nition is possible. Semiotic studies generally accept any recognitionrules based on perception as a given. Such studies divide signs into asensory facet (i.e., signifier or referent) and a mental facet (i.e., signi-fied of a signifier or of a referent). If signifiers and referents exist togive access to signifieds, signifiers and referents seem subordinated tothe meanings they communicate. Consequently, I cannot account forsignifying performance-texts unless I describe the system that makesthem possible. In other words, an utterance-be it speech or bell-sound-does not "mean" by any inherent properties of its own; itrather "means" through rules of association established between actorand spectators, Pavlov and his dogs. In the jargon of speech-act theory,the illocutionary force of utterances depends on context rather than ongrammatical structure (Austin 1962:8, 26, 52, 119). By "framing" ameaningless speech-act or a bell-sound, I can make it signify and, thus,



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254 STRATOSE. CONSTANTINIDISI can alter its function. Pavlov's secondary and tertiary respondent con-ditioning experiments, as well as experiments with theatricalsymbolism, indicate that meaning is context bound, but context is rela-tively boundless. Ludwig Wittgenstein's claim that I cannot say"bububu" and mean "if it doesn't rain I shall go for a walk" (1953:18e)has made it possible to say so and mean so by association.Clearly, Saussure's notion of a sign and Pavlov's notion of a signalallow us to see performance-texts as a nexus of arbitrary audiovisualsigns or conditioned stimuli which "mean" by the differences orsimilarities that distinguish them from, or associate them with, othersigns or conditioned stimuli. Intensity of emotional response, how-ever, registers the signifieds of referents (UR) and the signifieds ofsignifiers (CR) at the subcortical level where both UR and CR "feel orlook" alike, causing a temporary confusion between reality and make-believe. So, the suspension of disbelief in theater seems related to theintensity of affect: the more affect a spectator experiences in a situation,the more likely he/she will shift from secondary to primary signal-ing system activity-i.e., from secondary to primary process thinking.In this state of emotional imbalance, theoretically speaking, the signi-fieds of signifiers (i.e., the literary elements on stage, such as charac-ters) and the signifiers of referents (i.e., the non-literary elements onstage, such as actors) "feel or look" alike at the subcortical level. Illu-sion, then, is in the mind of an emotionally affected spectator ashe/she witnesses "hot" situations such as cases of love/rape, mar-riage/divorce, success/defeat, suicide/murder, etc., and associatesthem with his or her personal case history. Such real-life experi-ences-especially if they are recent in memory-may amuse or distressspectators depending on individual disposition and on the theatricaltechniques used for manipulating audience response.Actors, on the other hand, induce in themselves a state of mindwhich temporarily makes them behave as the character they imper-sonate. Next to the recognized theories of Denis Diderot, G.H. Lewes,Theodule Ribot, Williams James and Lange, Stanislavski's psy-chophysical method of acting was also influenced in the 1930s by IvanSechenov's and Ivan Pavlov's neurophysiological research, whichplaced cerebral reflexes at the center of human behavior (Great SovietEncyclopedia1980, 24:465). Stanislavski's method accepts an indivisiblebond between body and mind, allowing for psychological and physio-logical acts to influence each other (1936:132-136). According toStanislavski, if thoughts, emotions, and actions arise reflexively bystimulating the senses, actors can self-induce thoughts and emotions byplacing themselves in the appropriate physical context (1936:72, 121,168). External behavior stimulates reciprocal emotions and thoughts,while emotions and thoughts stimulate reciprocal physical behavior(1949:47). The range of expressive behavior, however, results from theinherited natural and social reflexes of our species. To help an actor



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ILLUSIONNTHEATER 255seize control over the unconscious reflexes which lie beyond his directcontrol, Stanislavski's method of acting lures the involuntary impulsesof the subconscious to express themselves by creating spontaneous, adap-tive behavior on stage or "motor adjustments" (1936:224). "There is nodirect approach to our unconscious," said Stanislavski, "therefore wemake use of various stimuli that induce a process of living the part"(1936:225). Appropriate physical actions, such as those of an actordrinking wine out of an empty bottle by swallowing his saliva, act onthe subconscious to create the inner truth of feeling (1936:132).Sechenov had observed that physical action stirred muscular mem-ory with a speed and accuracy unmatchable by conscious thought.Stanislavski came to believe that neuromuscular agility, optimizedthrough gymnastics, would allow actors to respond accurately to theElectrical Conductor for Plays. ECP was a metronome-like device withtwo blinking lights attached to the prompter box, dictating an actingrhythm to actors (1949:212). ECP devices allegedly would stimulateappropriate inner feelings in well-trained actors since rhythm andmovement constitute a "mechanical stimulus to emotion memory"(1949:236). Pavlov's substitution of an unconditioned response with aconditioned one became Stanislavski's principle of emotional mem-ory. To Pavlov, conditioned responses were an "improved" adaptivemechanism, connecting inner function to the environment throughthe senses. Likewise, Stanislavski saw that human behavior is condi-tioned by repetition which reinforces associations that reinstatepsychological responses at physical cues. This artificial spontaneityofPavlovian dogs and Stanislavskian actors, which is acquired by repeti-tion, is a process of acquired automatisms. Subsequently, Stanislavskiinvestigated the associative process of automatization by progressivelyfusing an actor's induced mental images (signifieds) and their on-stage physical manifestations as character behavior (signifiers) on theactor's real-life corporal behavior (referents). Under the principle ofphysical actions, Method actors on stage induce on themselves a sec-ondary behavior (role) which is more controllable than their primarybehavior in real life.Rehearsals allow Method actors to build a character by consciouslyconstructing a sequence of automatisms which progressively form a psy-chophysical sequence of behavior on stage (role). "Life on stage, as wellas off it," said Stanislavski, "consists of an uninterrupted series of objec-tives and their attainment. They are signals set all along the way of anactor's creative aspirations" (1961:51). However, an actor's stage be-havior becomes a conditioned response to the demands of the characterhe impersonates. When a Method actor fixes the sequence throughmany repetitions "spontaneity" returns. "The more often he repeatedthis sequence of so-called physical actions-or, to be more exact, the in-ner stimuli to action," Stanislavski observed, "the more his involuntarymotions increased" (1961:229). So, repetition in rehearsals makes a



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256 STRATOSE.CONSTANTINIDISrole habitual to actors. Habit establishes patterns of thought, emotion,and action, transforming a difficult task into an easy one; and, ofcourse, any task that becomes easy, feels comfortable. "Habit creates sec-ond nature, which is a second reality" (1961:62). Generally, Methodactors who grow comfortable with their established sequence, cannotconceive of approaching a role otherwise. Consequently, they behavelike robots who respond to an inner program and experience an illu-sion of reflexive vitality.8. CONCLUSIONI have demonstrated that conditioned stimuli can be regarded as signsbecause they share all five requirements which constitute the attributesof a sign: intentionality, substitution, arbitrariness, convention, andspuriousness. An interdisciplinary approach to theatrical phenomena,therefore, seems to be justified. I also investigated what causes referentsto become identical with the signifiers in a spectator's or an actor'smind, thus producing the effect of illusion. I argued that a person'sability to differentiate signifiers (CS) from referents (US) increases ordecreases depending on how high or low that person feels an experi-ence is charged emotionally. Intensity of affect in a theatrical experi-ence registers the signifieds of referents (UR) and the signifieds ofsignifiers (CR) at the subcortical level where both UR and CR feel orlook alike, causing a temporary confusion between reality and make-believe to spectators. Actors, on the other hand, who practiceStanislavski's method of acting, induce in themselves a conditionedbehavior (role) as they build a character by consciously constructing asequence of automatisms which progressively form a psychophysical se-quence of stage behavior. The artificial spontaneity of Stanislavskian ac-tors, which is acquired by repetition, is a process of acquired au-tomatisms that make actors respond to a "second reality."9. DISCUSSIONOf course, one can argue that spectators may cry during a theatrical per-formance, not because they fail to distinguish fiction from reality, butbecause other factors are also at play. For example, some spectators mayfeel more inclined to cry at a tragic event in the theater rather than inlife because tragic events in the real world are rarely as clearly framedas in a fictive world (Langer 1953:310). For this argument, the issue isnot the actor/spectator interaction, but the nature of the "theatricalframe." Ervin Goffman loosely defines the theatrical frame as some-thing less than a benign construction and something more than asimple keying for actors and spectators alike. It is the role of the per-formance-pure, mixed, or impure-that determines the "role" of theactors and the "role"of the spectators.Pure performances, such as theatrical performances, require that theactors have an audience to entertain. Mixed performances, on the other



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ILLUSIONNTIEATER 257hand, such as boxing matches or football games, require that thecontestants act as if something were at stake beyond the entertainmentof their audience; and finally, impure performances, such as surgicalor military operations, require that the surgeons or the soldiers in ac-tion show no regard for the dramatic elements of their labor. "On-the-spot TV news coverage," writes Goffman, "now offers up the world, in-cluding its battles, as work performances" (1974:126). In a similar way,the spectator's role depends on the type of performance that he is watch-ing. The theater-goer invariably is cast in an "audience role," accord-ing to Goffman (1974:124). Since the term "role"can describe both the-atrical and social activities, Goffman explains that the "audience role"gives theater-goers the license to watch and collaborate in the"unreality" of a theatrical performance. Based on a "syntax of re-sponse," the spectator "sympathetically and vicariously participates inthe unreal world generated by the dramatic interplay of the scriptedcharacters" (1974:130).For example, the actor playing Othello acts as if he does not knowwhat the villain will do. Similarly, the actor playing Iago acts as if hecan hide his intent from the hero. Naturally, both actors share a fullknowledge of Shakespeare's play and of the distribution of this knowl-edge. But the "actor's role" makes them act as if they are ignorant ofeach other's motives and of the outcome of the play. The "audiencerole," in turn, obliges the theater-goer to act as if his own knowledge aswell as that of some of the characters, is partial and uninformed on theresolution of the conflict. Goffman, however, does not proceed to ex-plain whyactors and spectators alike induce in themselves this frame ofmind. Neither does Elizabeth Burns. In ordinary life," Burns ob-serves, "the spectator selects the persons and events to which he will payattention. But for the theater audience, the selection is of course madeby dramatist, producer and performers. The spectator responds to theirsign language and accepts their version of reality" (1972:228). Goffmanagrees with Burns that the components of a fictive world are pre-se-lected "as what the audience must select out." All audience membershave access to the same amount of information provided by the perfor-mance and they assume that all essential information is brought totheir attention (1974:149). In the "audience role," Goffman reiterates,"we willingly seek out the circumstances in which we can be tem-porarily deceived or at least kept in the dark, in brief, transformed intocollaborators in unreality" (1974:136). And again:

It is perfectlyobvious to everyoneon and off the stage that the charactersand their actions are unreal, but it is also true that the audience holdsthis understanding to one side and in the capacity of onlookers allowsits interest and sympathyto respect the apparent ignorance of the char-acters as to what will come of them and to wait in felt suspense to seehow matters will unfold (1974:137).In sum, Goffman and Burns describe the symptoms but not the causes



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258 STRATOS E. CONSTANTINIDISthat make spectator response susceptible to the "unreality" or the"version of reality" of theatrical performances. They do not explain suf-ficiently why, or even how, the theatrical frame (of mind) transformsspectators into "collaborators in unreality." Goffman, of course, de-scribes eight transcription practices that render interaction amongcharacters (actors) on stage systematically different from interactionamong people in the real world. Goffman details the eight transcrip-tion practices or conventions as follows: the stage space arbitrarily sepa-rates the fictive world from the real world; the elimination of thefourth wall injects the spectators into the fictive world; the verbal inter-action among characters (actors) is designed to help spectators see intothe encounter; the characters (actors) take turns in becoming the focusof the interaction; characters (actors) generally respect turns at talkingand wait for the audience response (e.g., laughter) to cease before theyspeak their next line; the character interactions sustain a "disclosivecompensation" for the spectators; characters (actors) speak longer andmore grandiloquent sentences than real-world people because, in part,actors must project voice and feelings to the audience; and finally, thefictive world, unlike the real world, includes nothing that isunportentous or insignificant.Behind these conventions, according to Goffman, lurks the"multiple-channel effect": the spectator's senses process the informa-tion and, presumably, the spectator's brain judges the incoming stim-uli to be fictive or real. "It is the seeing of the course of these stimuli thatallows for a quick identification and definition-a quick framing-ofwhat has occurred" (1974:146). Goffman looks no further into this"quick framing" and closes the issue by finding the spectators' capacityto engross themselves in a transcription that departs radically and sys-tematically from the real-world interaction, "very remarkable." To hiscredit, however, Goffman does not simply suggest how interaction inthe theater differs from interaction in real life. He also introducesterms which provide what is needed in order to question the divisionbetween real world (s) and fictive worlds. He does not fail to observe thatillusion is at work behind this "very remarkable" capacity of the specta-tors. "An automatic and systematic correction is involved," he writes,"and it seems to be made without its makers' consciously appreciating thetransformation conventions they have employed" (1974:145). Nonethe-less, Goffman fails to explain why they are not consciously aware of this au-tomatic adjustment. Earlier in this paper, I have proposed the beginningof a possible explanation.REFERENCESAustin,John, 1962 How toDo ThingswithWords Cambridge: Harvard UP).Berlyne, D.E, 1971. Aatsstcs and Psychoioloty (New York:Appleton-Century-Crofts).Bridger, William, 1960. "Signal Systems and the Development of Cognitive Functions,"in: Mary Brazier, ed., CmntraNrvous Systm and Bhavior (New York:Josiah Macy

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ILLUSIONIN THEATER 259Bridger, Wagner and W. Horsley Grant, 1956. "The Effect of Mescaline on Differenti-ated Conditioned Reflexes," AmeicanJournalofPsychiatr 113:352-360.Burns, Elizabeth, 1972. Theatricaity:A Study of Convention n the Theatr and in Social Life

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260 STRATOS E. CONSTANTINIDISPeckham, Morse, 1965. Man's Rag for Chaors: ioog, Bdavio, and thaAris (Philadelphia:Chilton Books).1978 "Perceptual and Semiotic Discontinuity in Art,' Poetis 7:217-230.Piaget,Jean, 1967. Languageand Thoughtof th Child 3rd ed. (New York: Humanities Press).Pratt, C, 1961. "Aesthetics,"Annual Rviw ofPsycholog 12:71-92.Purpura, Dominick, 1956. 'Electrophysiological Analysis of Psychotogenic Drug Action,"Archivs ofNurolog and Psychiaby75:122-145.Roach, Joseph, 1985. ThePlay's Passion.Studies n theSdnce ofActing (Newark: University ofDelaware Press).Schoenmakers, Henry, 1982. The Tacit Majority in the Theatre," in: Ernest Hess-Lut-tich, ed., Theatr Semiotics, olume II of MuLtiedial Communication(Tubingen: Narr),108-155.Shklovsky, V., 1965. 'Art as Technique," in: Lee Lemon and Marian Reis, eds., RussianFormahit Critidsm FourEssays(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), -24.Sokolov, Evgenii, 1963. Percption and the ConditionedReJe trans. Stefan Waydenfeld (NewYork: Pergamon Press).Stanislavski, Konstantin, 1936. An ActorPrepare, trans. Elizabeth Hapgood (New York:Theater Art Books).1949 Buildinga Charactsr,rans. Elizabeth Hapgood (New York: Theater Arts Books).1961 Creatinga Ros, trans. Elizabeth Hapgood (New York:Theater Arts Books).1980 "Stanislavski Method," in: A Prokhorov, ed., Gret Soviet Encyclopedia.A Trans-lation of the Third Edition of Bol'shaia SovetskaiaEntsikloediia, Vol. 24 (New York:MacMillan, 1973-83), 464-465.Valentine, Charles, 1962. TheExperimentalPsychologyf Beauty(London: Methuen).Wing, Kempton and Karl Smith, 1942. The Role of the Optic Cortex in the Dog in the

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