consolidated cases (1-84)

8/12/2019 Consolidated Cases (1-84)

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEWDigested Cases

June 27, 2013

Submitted to:

Atty. Edilwasif Baddiri(Prof)

Submitted by:

LLB-4 C


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ARTICLE INATIONAL TERRITORY


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1. REAGAN VS. CIR

30 SCRA 968

Facts:

Petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American corporationproviding technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines.

He dispute the tax assessed on him by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue on anamount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the United States Marine Corps,the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga.

Reagan contended, that in legal contemplation the sale, was made outside Philippine territoryand therefore beyond our jurisdiction to tax.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippines has jurisdiction over the US bases here in the country.

Held:

The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over itsentire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees aresupreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies mustsubmit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily,likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.


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2. PEOPLE VS. GOZO

L 36409, OCTOBER 26, 1973

Facts:

Defendant-appellant Loreta Gozo brought a house located inside the United State Naval Basein Olongapo City. She demolished and built another house in it, without building permit from theCity Mayor of Olongapo City.

A building and lot inspector from the Engineers Office, Olongapo City apprehended thecarpenters of the house. After due investigation, Loreta Gozo was charge with violation of MunicipalOrdinance No. 14 Series of 1964. The City court of Olongapo City found her guilty of violating thesaid ordinance. This was affirmed by the Court of First Instance of Zambales.

She contended that the ordinance does not apply to her because the location of her dwelling iswithin the naval base.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippines has sovereignty over the American bases here in the country.

Held:

By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merelyconsents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purelyas a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of the Philippine territory ordivested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein." Under the terms of thetreaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of suchoffense. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdiction rights not granted, but also suchceded rights as the US Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of.


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3. MAGALLONA VS. ERMITA

GR No. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner, in their respective capacities as citizens, taxpayers or legislators assails theconstitutionality of RA 9522. According to them it reduces the Philippine Maritime territory.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 9522 reduces Philippine Maritime territory, and logically, the reach of thePhilippine states sovereign power.

Held:

Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-outspecific base points along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured,to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continentalshelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, theexclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguouszone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagicbaselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties todelimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this givesnotice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarineareas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereigntyover territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, andsanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-livingresources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all thewaters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippineswould still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw thebaselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries orother portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermostislands and drying reefs of the archipelago."

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, aspetitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire

(or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not byexecuting multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to complywith the treatys terms.


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Article II

Declaration of Principles and State Policies


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Legal Value of Article I

4. TONDO MEDICAL VS. CA

GR NO. 167324 JULY 17, 2007

Facts:

In 199, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda, a reform agendadeveloped by the HSRA Technical Working Group, it provided for five general areas of reform: (1) toprovide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure funding for priority public healthprograms; (3) promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance;(4) strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; and (5) expand the coverage of theNational Health Insurance Program.

Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy ofgovernment hospitals, particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the corporaterestructuring of government hospitals. In lieu thereof, according to petitioner, certain employees

allegedly suffered diminution of compensation, while others were supposedly assigned to positions forwhich they were neither qualified nor suited.

Issue:

Whether or not the provisions of the constitution are considered self-executing, and donot require future legislation for their enforcement.

Held:

As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do notrequire future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, themandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. [18] However,some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.

In Tanada v. Angara, [19] the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II ofthe 1987 Constitution as non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislativeenactments before they can be implemented:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies.x x x. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for

enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exerciseof its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.

In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, [20] this Court declared thatSections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, [21] the Courtreferred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentivesto legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay down a generalprinciple, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non self-executing and, therefore,cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceableconstitutional rights.


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6. In Re letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno

210 SCRA 588

Facts:

Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, member of the Court of Appeals, wrote a letter dated Nov.14, 1990 addressed to this court, seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court ofAppeals. He contends that the error was an Inadvertence.

The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a reorganization of theentire government, including the judiciary. To effect the reorganization of the Intermediate AppellateCourt and other lower courts, a screening committee was created. President Corazon C. Aquino,exercising legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, issued EO No. 33 to govern the saidreorganization of the judiciary.

The screening committee recommended and assigned petitioner in rank eleven (11), but wherethe appointments were signed by President Aquino, petitioners seniority ranking changed, however,from number eleven (11) to number twenty six (26).

The Supreme Court granted the plea of petitioner and ordered the correction, but a motionfor reconsideration was filed by Associate Justices Jose G. Campos, Jr. and Luis A. Javellana whowere affected by the order. They contended that the present court of appeals is a New Court and

that petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court; neither can he claim that he wasreturning from his former court.

Issue:

W/N the present Court of Appeals is a New Court such that it would negate any claim to

precedence in the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to EO No. 33.

Held:

The present Court of Appeals is a New Court, different and distinct from the Court ofAppeals or Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to EO No. 33 for it was created in the wake ofthe revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the aftermath of the People Power Revolution(EDSA) in 1986.

The Gist of the case:

The revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government inany country or state by those who were previously subject to it or as a sudden, radical andfundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence. In Kelsens

book, The General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which occurs whenever the legalorder of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order.a way not prescribed by the first

order itself.

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularlyknown as the People Power Revolution that the Filipino tore themselves away from an existing

regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino Government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an inherent

right of the people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their systemof government or institution by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methodof making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable. It hasbeen said that the locus of the positive law- making power lies with the people of the state and from

there is derived the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form ofgovernment without regard to the existing constitution.

7. Republic v. Sandiganbayan

407 SCRA 11

Facts:

On 3 March 1986, the constabulary raiding team served at Christine Dimaanos residence asearch warrant. Dimaano was not present during the raid, but her cousin witnessed it. The raiding


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team seized several rifles and pistols, and items not included in the search warrant. The search andseizure was conducted on March 3, 1986, or five (5) days after the successful EDSA revolution.Dimaano questioned the propriety of the search and seizure invoking exclusionary right guaranteedby the 1973 Constitution. Petitioner asserts that revolutionary government effectively withheld theoperation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed respondents exclusionary right.

Issue:

1. Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973Constitution during the Interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective takeover bythe revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to24 March 1986 (Immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution)

2. Whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civiland Political Rights Covenant and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights(Declaration) remained in effect during the Interregnum.

Held:

The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the Interregnum.During the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under the Bill of Rights.But the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during theinterregnum. Article 17 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that,No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Hence, according to the Supreme Court, the

seizure of the items was void.


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8. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh

75 PHIL 113 (1945)

Facts:

This petition for mandamusin which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lowercourt be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiatedunder the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese militaryoccupation of these Islands.

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said caseon the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur hadthe effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of thePhilippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippinesestablished during the Japanese military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no

jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of thedefunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. Andthe same respondent, in his answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the

government established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were no de factogovernment.

Issue:

Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth, which are the same as those existing priorto, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine Executive Commissionand by the so-called Republic of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings inactions pending in said courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by theAmerican and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth Government was restored.

Held:

That the present courts as the same courts which had been functioning during the Japaneseregime and, therefore, can continue the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the restorationof the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is confirmed by Executive Order No. 37 which we havealready quoted in support of our conclusion in connection with the second question. Said ExecutiveOrder provides"(1) that the Court of Appeals created and established under Commonwealth Act No. 3as amended, be abolished, as it is hereby abolished," and "(2) that all cases which have heretoforebeen duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for finaldecision. . . ." In so providing, the said Order considers that the Court of Appeals abolished was thesame that existed prior to, and continued after, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government;for, as we have stated in discussing the previous question, almost all, if not all, of the cases pending

therein, or which had theretofore (that is, up to March 10, 1945) been duly appealed to said court,must have been cases coming from the Courts of First Instance during the so-called Republic of thePhilippines. If the Court of Appeals abolished by the said Executive Order was not the same onewhich had been functioning during the Republic, but that which had existed up to the time of the

Japanese occupation, it would have provided that all the cases which had, prior to and up to thatoccupation on January 2, 1942, been dully appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall betransmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision.


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9. ACCFA V. CUGCO

30 SCRA 649

Facts:

Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA), a government agencycreated under RA 821, as amended was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural CreditAdministration (ACA) under RA 3844 or Land Reform Code. A collective Bargaining Agreement wasagreed upon between ACCFA and the labor unions ASA (ACCFA Supervisors Association) & AWA(ACCFA Workers Association which was supposed to be effective for one year beginning July 1, 1961.

Due to non-implementation of the CBA, the unions held a strike. Five days later, the unions with itsmother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporation and Offices (CUGCO) filed acomplaint against ACCFA before the CIR on the ground of alleged acts of unfair labor practices,violation of the CBA in order to discourage the members of unions in the exercise of their right to selforganization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotion and refusal to bargain.

ACCFA moved for reconsideration. But while the appeal was pending, RA 3844 was passedinto law and effectively changed ACCFA into ACA. ASA and AWA then petitioned that they obtained

sole bargaining rights with ACA. While the petition was not yet decided upon, EO 75 was also passedwhich placed ACA under Land Reform Project Administration. Notwithstanding the latest legislationpassed, Trial Court & Appellate Court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA. ACA challenged the jurisdictionof CIR to entertain the petition of the unions for certification elections on the ground that it isperforming a governmental function. The unions join the issue on this single point contending thatACA is performing a proprietary function.

Issue:

Whether or not ACA is a government entity.

Held:

There can be no dispute as to the fact that Land Reform Program contemplated in the saidcode is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate to reality. It is purely agovernmental function no less than the establishment of public schools and hospitals. The growingcomplexities of modern society have rendered the classification of the governmental functionsunrealistic, if not obsolete. Ministrant and governmental function continue to lose their well definedboundaries and are absorbed within the activities that government must undertake in its sovereigncapacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times and move towards a greatersocialization of economic force.


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10.PHHC VS CIR

150 SCRA 296

Facts:

In 1967, through the agreement entered into between the Philippine Government & WorldFood Program, Peoples Homesite & Housing Corporation proposed a self help project to beundertaken for the families of squatters in Sapang Palay engaging them to work in the constructionof two earth dams. World Food Program has been asked to supply the food for basic ration of 500settlers participating in this scheme and their 2000 dependents for a period of 560 days. The foodration will supplement a cash incentive of 0.50 peso per participant per day. Although, participantswere assigned to work on canals & roads, the projects were never fully implemented. Complainingabout their work and compensation, the participant brought the matter to Dept. of Labor. Thereafter,PHHC suspended work. Participants then instituted an action with the CIR against PHHC praying forthe payment of difference between minimum wage and 0.50 paid to them, overtime andreinstatement. In its answer, PHHC claimed that it was exercising a governmental functions; that itdid not employ private respondents; CIR had no jurisdiction over PHHC and over the subject matterof action.

Issue:

WON CIR has jurisdiction over PHHC, a government owned and controlled corporation performinggovernmental function.

Held:

PHHC, as it was established as an instrumentality of the government to accomplishedgovernmental policies and objectives and extend essential services to the people, performs a

governmental and not proprietary function. It is thus comes under the jurisdiction of civil servicecommission and not DOLE. CIR has jurisdiction over labor disputes involving GOCC performingbasically proprietary function but not those performing governmental function.


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11. Sps. Jose Fontanilla and Virginia Fontanilla vs Hon. Maliaman

GR No. L-55963 February 27, 1991

Facts:

On December 1, 1989, the court rendered a decision declaring NIA, a government agencyperforming proprietary functions like an ordinary employer, NIA was held liable for the injuriesresulting in death of Francisco Fontanilla, son of the petitioners Sps. Fontanilla, caused by the faultand/or negligence of NIAs driver employee Hugo Garcia. NIA, however maintains that it does notperform solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency the government tasked withgovernment functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver who was not itsspecial agent.

Issue:

Whether or not NIA is a government agency with juridical personality separate and distinct from theGovernment.

Held:

Yes. NIA was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that NIA wasessentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare,such fact does not make NIA essentially and purely a government function corporation. NIA wascreated for the purpose of constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all irrigationsystem in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects. Certainly, the stateand the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but thefunctions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency which is the irrigation of lands.

NIA is a government agency, invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from thegovernment, thus is governed by the corporation law. It is not mere agency of the government but acorporate body performing proprietary function. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damagescaused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.


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12.PEOPLE VS. GOZO

53 SCRA 476

Facts:

Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which iswithin the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon advice of an Assistant in Mayors Office andsome neighbors, she demolished the house without acquiring the necessary permits and then lateron erected another house. She was charged by the City Engineers Office for violating Mun.Ordinance 14 series of 1964 which require her to secure permits for any demolition and/orconstruction within the city. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealedand countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot becauseit is within the naval base of foreign country.

Issue:

Is the municipal ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?

Held:

Yes. The Philippine government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part ofPhilippine Territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed withintherein. Under the terms of the Treaty, the US Government has prior or preferential but not only

jurisdictional rights but also all such ceded rights as to the US Military Authority for reason of theirown desire to make use of. Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the state through the City ofOlongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval base.


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SECTION 2. GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

13. AGUSTIN VS. EDU

88 SCRA 195

Facts:

This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of Letter ofInstruction No. 229 issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners,users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from avehicle when it is stalled or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of instruction, theCommissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1directing compliance with such Instruction. This petition alleges that such letter ofinstruction and subsequent administrative order are unlawful and unconstitutional as itviolates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation ofpolice power.

Issue:

Whether or not Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Orderissued are unconstitutional.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question

are deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power assuch were established to promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter ofinstruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting the generally acceptedprinciples of international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instructionmentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on RoadSigns and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations, and thatsuch Letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due tostalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways.


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14. J.B.L. Reyes vs Bagatsing

G.R. No. 65366 October 25, 1983

Facts:

Retired Justice Jose B. L. Reyes, in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought for apermit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983,starting from the Luneta Park to the gates of the United States embassy. The objective ofthe rally was to peacefully petition for the removal of all foreign military bases in thecountry and to present such a petition to a representative of the US Embassy so that itmay be delivered to the United States Ambassador. The coalition initially sought to compelthe mayor of the City of Manila to make a decision on the application for a permit but itwas discovered later that a denial of the application has already been sent through mail.

The same letter also provided that should the rally be held somewhere else, permit may beissued. The respondent mayor alleged that holding the rally in front of the US Embassy is aviolation of the resolutions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in1961 and of which the Philippines is a signatory. In the doctrine of incorporation, thePhilippines has to comply with such generally accepted principles of international law aspart of the law of the land. The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the denial ofthe permit is a violation of the constitutional right of the freedom of speech and expression.

Issue:

Whether or not the Anti-Bases Coalition should be allowed to hold a peaceful protest rallyin front of the US Embassy.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled to allow the rally in front of the US Embassy to protectthe exercise of the rights to free speech and of peaceful assembly and on the ground thatthere was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evilthat could justify the denial of the permit. These rights are not only assured by ourconstitution but also provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Betweenthe two generally accepted principles of diplomatic relations and human rights, the lattertakes higher ground. The exercise of the right of freedom of expression and of peacefulassembly is highly ranked in the scheme of constitutional values.


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15.Tanada v. Angara

272 SCRA 18 (1997)

Facts:

On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of

Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to itsrespective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek approvalfor such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratifythe WTO Agreement.

This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II,providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10and 12, Article XII, providing for the Filipino first policy.

Issue:

Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitutionmandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, itrecognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality andreciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and tradepractices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalistpolicy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economydoes not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplatesneither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.

The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement therebymaking it a part of the law of the land. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal departmentin government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing

proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreementlimits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation butcreates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid internationalobligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure thefulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
http://ulandi-digest.blogspot.com/2012/04/tanada-v-angara.htmlhttp://ulandi-digest.blogspot.com/2012/04/tanada-v-angara.html


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16. Bayan vs Zamora

GR 138570, October 10, 2000

Facts:

The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others,

the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series ofconferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter,President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by SecretarySiazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, thesenate approved it by (2/3) votes.

Cause of Action:

Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution isapplicable and not Section 21, Article VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under the provision cited, the foreign militarybases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions aresufficiently met:a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a nationalreferendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, andc) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable sothat, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by atleast two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

Issue:

Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of theConstitution?

Held:

Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreignmilitary bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent andin a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicabilitywith regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votesrequired to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.

The Constitution makes no distinction between transient and permanent. Wefind nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to bestationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executiveagreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as atreaty.


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17. ARTHUR D. LIM vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002

FACTS:

This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petition-in intervention,praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and thatafter due notice and hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injunctionand/or prohibition against the deployment of U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegaland in violation of the Constitution.

Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States ofAmerica started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in"Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training operationsinvolving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuverspursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippinesand the United States in 1951.

The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the internationalanti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events thatoccurred on September 11, 2001.

On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition forcertiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joinedsubsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist organizations, whofiled a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002.

Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide mutualmilitary assistance in accordance with the constitutional processes of each country only in the caseof an armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country, against one of them. Theyfurther argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an external aggressorto warrant US military assistance in accordance with MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the

VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippineterritory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Balikatan 02-1 activities are covered by the VFA.

HELD:

Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an impermanentbasis, in activities, the exact meaning of which is left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed onits definition is couched in the negative, in that the US personnel must abstain from any activity

inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only

logical to assume that Balikatan 02-1 a mutual anti terrorism advising assisting and trainingexercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement.Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion thatcombat-related activities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instantpetition, are indeed authorized.

The Court held that no doubt that the US forces are prohibited / from engaging in anoffensive war on Philippine territory. Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops activelyengaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistanceexercise? The Court cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring down south, as reportedfrom the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, it does not take cognizance of newspaper or

electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but forthe simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. It cannotaccept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners' allegation that the Arroyo government is engagedin "doublespeak" in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troopson native soil. The petitions invite the Court to speculate on what is really happening in Mindanao.Wherefore, the petition and the petition-in-intervention were dismissed.


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18. PRISCILLA C. MIJARES vs. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA

GR 139325, April 12, 2005

Facts:

Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al., all of whom suffered human rightsviolations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the

late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages fortortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment wasaffirmed by the US Court of Appeals.

As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement ofthe Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, 7(b) where the valueof the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed aMotion to dismiss alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed theComplaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a

judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing forthe easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M,which Petitioners had not paid.

Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matterof the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum ofmoney or recovery of damages.

For the CHR, the Makati RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution of a foreignjudgment as a new case, in violation of the principle that once a case has been decided between thesame parties in one country on the same issue with finality, it can no longer be litigated again inanother country. The CHR likewise invokes the principle of comity and of vested rights.

Petitioners complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based o n ajudgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. The provision does not make any distinctionbetween a local judgment and a foreign judgment, and where the law does not distinguish, we shallnot distinguish.

Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error.

To resolve this question, a proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of aforeign judgment in this jurisdiction.

Issue:

Is the preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment a generally accepted principle ofInternational Law.

Held:

The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a foreignjudgment were originally contained in Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing,while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right asbetween the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. However, in both cases,the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of

jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact.

The complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniaryestimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus

placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. We find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3),involving as it does, other actions not involving property.

The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign judgment hasbeen recognized in this jurisdiction. This defense allows for the application of local standards inreviewing the foreign judgment, especially when such judgment creates only a presumptive right, asit does in cases wherein the judgment is against a person. The public policy defense can safeguardagainst possible abuses to the easy resort to offshore litigation if it can be demonstrated that theoriginal claim is noxious to our constitutional values.


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There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines torecognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generallyaccepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.

While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreignjudgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty that suchan undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international law. There is a

widespread practice among states accepting in principle the need for such recognition andenforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying degrees. The fact that there is no bindinguniversal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a widespread rejection of the principle, butonly a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for recognition andenforcement.

Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that thereis a general right recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seekrecognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against suchenforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, orclear mistake of law or fact.

The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country merely due

to an exorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally accepted practices and principles ininternational law.

In this particular circumstance, given that the complaint is lodged against an estate and isbased on the US District Courts Final Judgment, this foreign judgment may, for purposes of

classification under the governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) ofRule 141, i.e., within the class of all other actions not involving property. Thus, only the blanketfiling fee of minimal amount is required..

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE,and a new order REINSTATING Civil Case No. 97-1052 is hereby issued. No costs.


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19. Shangri-La International Hotel Management Ltd. v Developers Group of Companies, Inc.

GR No. 159928, March 31, 2006

Facts:

DGCI claimed ownership of the trade marks based on prior use on its restaurant businesswithin the Philippines since 1982, and on that basis was granted a certificate of trade mark

registration on May 31, 1983. SLIHM started using the mark in the Philippines only in 1987 when itput up two hotels, the EDSA Shangri-La Hotel and the Makati Shangri-La. However, use of thetrademarks went back as far as 1962 when the Kuok family, owners of SLIHM, adopted the nameShangri-La in all of their hotels and hotel related establishments around the world.

On June 21, 1988, the Shangri-La International Hotel Management, Ltd. and Kuok PhilippineProperties, Inc., filed with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) apetition praying for the cancellation of the registration of the Shangri-La mark and S logo issued tothe Developers Group of Companies Inc., on the ground that the same was illegally and fraudulentlyobtained and appropriated for the latters restaurant business. In this regard, theypoint to the ParisConvention for the Protection of Industrial Property as affording security and protection to SLIHMs

exclusive right to said mark and logo.

The Shangri-La Group alleged that it has been using the said mark and logo for its corporateaffairs and business since March 1962 and caused the same to be specially designed for theirinternational hotels in 1975, much earlier than the alleged first use by the Developers Group in 1982.DGCIs lone witness even admitted in court that he travelled around Asia prior to 1962 and knew theShangri-La Hotel in Hong Kong and even stayed in that hotel.

The Developers Group instituted a complaint for infringement and damages with prayer forinjunction. When the Shangri-La Group moved for the suspension of the proceedings, the trial courtdenied such.

The Shangri-La Group filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but it was dismissed rulingthat Kuok Group does not have proof of actual use in commerce in the Philippines in accordance withSection 2 of R.A. No. 166, it cannot claim ownership of the mark and logo. While the ParisConvention protects internationally known marks, R.A. No. 166 still requires use in commerce in the

Philippines. Accordingly, and on the premise that international agreements, such as ParisConvention, must yield to a municipal law, the question on the exclusive right over the mark and logowould still depend on actual use in commerce in the Philippines. Respondent has a right to the markand logo by virtue of its prior use in the Philippines and the issuance of Certificate of Registration.Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not international agreements, such as Paris Convention, must yield to a municipal law(RA No. 166).

Held:

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CA and the Trial Court which found SLIHMguilty of trademark infringement. SC is in favor of SLIHM.

The new Intellectual Property Code (IPC), Republic Act No. 8293, undoubtedly shows the firmresolve of the Philippines to observe and follow the Paris Convention by incorporating the relevantportions of the Convention such that persons who may question a mark (that is, oppose registration,petition for the cancellation thereof, sue for unfair competition) include persons whose internationallywell-known mark, whether or not registered, is identical with or confusingly similar to orconstitutes a translation of a mark that is sought to be registered or is actually registered. However,while the Philippines was already a signatory to the Paris Convention, the IPC only took effect on

January 1, 1988, and in the absence of a retroactivity clause, R.A. No. 166 still applies.

The Paris Convention mandates that protection should be afforded to internationally knownmarks as signatory to the Paris Convention, without regard as to whether the foreign corporation isregistered, licensed or doing business in the Philippines. It goes without saying that the same runsafoul to Republic Act No. 166, which requires the actual use in commerce in the Philippines of thesubject mark or devise.

Our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippinesmust subordinate an international agreement. Withal, the fact that international law has been made


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part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law overnational law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in mostcountries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislativeenactments

Consequently, the petitioners cannot claim protection under the Paris Convention.Nevertheless, with the double infirmity of lack of two-month prior use, as well as bad faith in therespondent's registration of the mark, it is evident that the petitioners cannot be guilty of

infringement. It would be a great injustice to adjudge the petitioners guilty of infringing a mark whenthey are actually the originator and creator thereof.

Under the former trademark law, R.A. No. 166, as amended, which was in effect up toDecember 31, 1997, hence, the law in force at the time of respondent's application for registration oftrademark, the root of ownership of a trademark is actual use in commerce. Section 2 of said lawrequires that before a trademark can be registered, it must have been actually used in commerce andservice for not less than two months in the Philippines prior to the filing of an application for itsregistration.

Registration, without more, does not confer upon the registrant an absolute right to theregistered mark. Evidence of prior and continuous use of the mark or trade name by another canovercome the presumptive ownership of the registrant and may very well entitle the former to be

declared owner in an appropriate case.

As between actual use of a mark without registration, and registration of the mark withoutactual use thereof, the former prevails over the latter.

While the present law on trademarks has dispensed with the requirement of prior actual useat the time of registration, the law in force at the time of registration must be applied, and thereunderit was held that as a condition precedent to registration of trademark, trade name or service mark,the same must have been in actual use in the Philippines before the filing of the application forregistration.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of theCourt of Appeals and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are hereby SET ASIDE.

The complaint for infringement in Civil Case No. Q-91-8476 is ordered DISMISSED.


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20. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque

GR No. 173034, October 09,2007

Facts:

Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries

of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded asa co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of saidexecutive agency. Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino onOctober 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the FreedomConstitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effectto Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breast milk Substitutes (ICMBS), a codeadopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted severalResolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, itshould be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breast milk substitutes. In1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 ofsaid instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant andchild mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informedof the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which

was to take effect on July 7, 2006. Part of the prohibitions contained in the IRR is the total ban onadvertising and promotion of breast milk substitutes. Petitioner challenged said order and contendsthat the provisions of the IRR are unconstitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed toimplement. It also contends that respondent acted in grave abuse of discretion in issuing the saidIRR. Respondents aver that the IIRR seeks not only to implement the Milk Code but also variousinternational instruments which are deemed part of the law of the land.

Issue:

Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued bythe Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional.

Held:Yes. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members, in

the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 comeinto force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:

Article 23.

The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respectto any matter within the competence of the Organizationfor an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule isbeing followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules.

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of the domestic

law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that aninternational law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such associal legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions intodomestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of theland that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by thelegislature.


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21. IBP vs. Zamora

338 SCRA 81 (2000)

FACTS:

At bar is a special civil action for certiorariand prohibition with prayer for issuance of atemporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of PresidentJoseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the PhilippineNational Police in visibility patrols around the metropolis. This is in view of the alarming increase inviolent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in averbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose ofcrime prevention and suppression.

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed the instant petition to annulLOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void andunconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Wether or not the deployment of Phil. Marines with PNP in Metro Manila constitutes a breachof civilian supremacy.

HELD:

No.

The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacyclause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets forcivilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols isappropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions ofthe LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines authority.


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22. ARTHUR D. LIM vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002

FACTS:

This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petition-in intervention,praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and thatafter due notice and hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injunctionand/or prohibition against the deployment of U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegaland in violation of the Constitution.

Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States ofAmerica started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in"Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training operationsinvolving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuverspursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippinesand the United States in 1951.

The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the internationalanti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events thatoccurred on September 11, 2001.

On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition forcertiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joinedsubsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist organizations, whofiled a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002.

Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide mutualmilitary assistance in accordance with the constitutional processes of each country only in the caseof an armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country, against one of them. Theyfurther argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an external aggressorto warrant US military assistance in accordance with MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the

VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippineterritory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Balikatan 02-1 activities are covered by the VFA.

HELD:

Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an impermanentbasis, in activities, the exact meaning of which is left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed onits definition is couched in the negative, in that the US personnel must abstain from any activity

inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only

logical to assume that Balikatan 02-1 a mutual anti terrorism advising assisting and trainingexercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement.Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion thatcombat-related activities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instantpetition, are indeed authorized.

The Court held that no doubt that the US forces are prohibited / from engaging in anoffensive war on Philippine territory. Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops activelyengaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistanceexercise? The Court cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring down south, as reportedfrom the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, it does not take cognizance of newspaper or

electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but forthe simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. It cannotaccept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners' allegation that the Arroyo government is engagedin "doublespeak" in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troopson native soil. The petitions invite the Court to speculate on what is really happening in Mindanao.Wherefore, the petition and the petition-in-intervention were dismissed.


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23.BAYAN VS. ZAMORA

GR 138570 October 10, 2000

Facts:

The Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement, amongothers, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. Tofurther strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the United Statesentered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed torespond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.

In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, thePhilippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement.On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship,Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases inthe Philippines.

Issue:

Wether or not the VFA violates the prohibition against nuclear weapons under Article IISection 8 of the constitution.

Held:

Military bases established within the territory of another state is no longer viable because ofthe alternatives offered by new means and weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guidedmissiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years withoutreturning to their home country. These military warships are actually used as substitutes for a land-

home base not only of military aircraft but also of military personnel and facilities. Besides, vesselsare mobile as compared to a land-based military headquarters.


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24. ROE VS. WADE

410 US 113 (1973)

Facts.

Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when medicallyadvised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratoryjudgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to preventdefendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she wasunmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physicianbecause her life was not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable toafford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of herselfand all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague andabridged her right of personal privacy.

Issue.

Does the Texas abortion law violated womens constitutional right to have an abortion?

Held:

The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualifiedand must be considered against important state interests in regulation.A woman, with her doctor, could choose abortion during the first six months without restrictions andwith restrictions during the last three months, based on the rights to privacy.

The court deemed abortion a fundamental right under the United States Constitution, therebysubjecting all laws attempting to restrict it to the standard of strict scrutiny.


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25.MEYER VS. NEBRASKA

262 US 30 (1932)

Facts:

Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the district court for Hamilton county, Nebraska,under an information which charged that on May 25, 1920, while an instructor in Zion ParochialSchool he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in the German language to Raymond Parpart, achild of 10 years, who had not attained and successfully passed the eighth grade. The information isbased upon 'An act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the state of Nebraska, that noperson, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, denominational, parochial or public school,teach any subject to any person in any language than the English language. That languages, otherthan the English language, may be taught as languages only after a pupil shall have attained andsuccessfully passed the eighth grade.

Issue:

Whether or not a statute prohibiting the teaching of German language to students up to acertain age is valid.

Held:

No. A statute prohibiting the teaching of a German language to students up to a certain age isinvalid. It is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station inlife; and nearly all the states, including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by compulsory laws. Thatthe state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to imporve the quality of its citizens, physically,mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must berespected. T

he protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as tothose born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had readyunderstanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with theConstitution-a desirable and cannot be promoted by prohibited means.


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26. PIERCE VS SOCIETY OF SISTERS OF THE HOLY NAMES OF JESUS AND MARY

268 U.S. 510 JUNE 1, 1925

Facts:

The appellate lawyers argued that the state had an overriding intent to oversee and controlthe providers of education to the children of Oregon. In 1922, the Oregon school system took part ina decision to Americanize their schools which requires all students between ages 8-16 to attendpublic schools, excluding those who were physically unable, those who lived more than 3 miles fromthe nearest road and those who were already completed the 8 thgrades. To enforce this law, parentswho did not send their children to public schools were subjected to 100 dollar fine and up to 30 daysin jail. This system seem highly unreasonable to the Society of Sisters and go against the 14 thAmendment, which provides equal protection and equal opportunity.

The Sisters sued Pierce along with Isaac Van Winkle and Stanley Myers alleging that theenactment conflicts with the right of parents to choose schools where their children will receiveappropriate mental and religious training and the right of the schools and teachers therein to engagein a useful business of profession.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion on the states power by

implementing the Oregon law.

Held:

The court unanimously upheld the lower courts decision, the injunction against the amendedact, thus in favour of parents in this case.

The court ruled that Oregon could not constitutionally compel all school students to attendpublic schools because in doing so would cause irreparable harm to the primary schools operated byreligious organizations. A state law that require all children in the first eight grades to attend publicschool rather than private or parochial schools violate the 14thAmendment due process guaranteeof personal liberty. Implicit to this libertyis the right of the parents to choose the kind of education they want for their children.


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27. GINSBERG VS NEW YORK

390 US 629 (1968)

Facts:

Under New York law it is illegal to wilfully sell to minors under 17 of age any picture whichdepicts nudity and any magazine which taken as a whole is harmful to minors. Ginsberg and his wifesold a girlie magazine to two 16 year old boys which they were prosecuted and found guilty.

Issue:

Whether or not the state of New York deprived minors of their liberty

Held:

The court found that it was well within the states power to protect minors and that justbecause the material is not classified as obscene to adults it may still be regulated with minors.


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28. JUAN ANTONINO, ANNA ROSARIO, AND JOSE ALFONSO ALL SURNAMED OPOSA,petitionersVSTHE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S- FACTURAN, respondent.

GR NO 101083 JULY 30, 1993

Facts:

Minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents and the Philippine EcologicalNetwork Inc filed a class suit petition against the Secretary of Department of Environment andNatural Resources in the person of Hon. Fulgencio Facturan Jr. The petitioners prayed to cancel allexisting Timber license agreements in the country and cease from receiving, accepting, processing,renewing or approving the new TLA, and further reinstated the adverse effect of continueddeforestation in the country.

Facturan filed a motion to dismiss the complaints on the grounds that the issue raised is apolitical question which properly pertains to the legislative and executive branches of thegovernment. The motion to dismiss was granted. The court ruled that the prayer of plaintiff willresult to the impairment of contracts which has prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file a case.

Held:

Yes. Base on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balancedand healthful ecology is concerned, such right is considered rhythm and harmony of nature. Suchpolitical question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial poweror the impenetrable shield that protects the executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry.

The petitioner may therefore amend their complaint.


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29. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitionerVSCOURT OF APPEALS

GR NO 110120 MARCH 16, 1994

Facts:

The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with the Court of Laguna LakeDevelopment Authority against the City of Government of Caloocan, et al. in a decision promulgatedby Court of Appeals on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue,cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Brgy. Camarin, Tala Estate, CaloocanCity. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not LLDA have the power and authority to issue, cease, and desist order under RA No4850 and its amending laws.

Held:

Yes. The cease and desist order issued by LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan tostop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done inviolation of RA No.4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, cannot be stamped as anauthorized execise by the LLDA of injunctive power.


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ARTICLE II, SEC. 16

30. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals

G.R.No. 120865-71December 7, 1995

Facts:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order toexecute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to acceleratethe development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces andtowns.

PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that thelake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same.EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated thetowns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay Region.

Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalitiesassumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waterssince Sec.149 thereof provides: Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fisheryprivileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore

Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to theconsternation of the LLDA.

The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and theindiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake withfishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of LagunaLake.

The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culturestructures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declaredillegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and IllegalFishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-Aof RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.

A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structuresotherwise demolition shall be effected.

Issues:

1.Which agency of the governmentthe LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the issuance ofpermits for fishery privileges is concerned?

2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?

Held:

1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EONo.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for theuse of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand,RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges onmunicipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDAand granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevailsince it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be


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taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contraryconclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to allenactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequentgeneral law by mere implication.

The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the otherhand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture

structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bayregion and for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is themost pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including the power oftaxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power shouldprevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution caseswith authority to issue a cease and desist order andon matters affecting the construction of illegalfishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.

Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, asamended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fisheryprivileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to

exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.


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31. MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008

Facts:

On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before theRegional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, for the cleanup,rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowablestandards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine EnvironmentCode.

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners inabating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:

(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);(8) Executive Order No. 192;(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and(12) International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bayand submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

Issues:

a) Whether or not pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaningof specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.

b) Whether or not the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled bymandamus.

Held:

Regional Trial Courts Order to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. Finding merit in thecomplaint, the Court ordered defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up andrehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation.

To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six(6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated,coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.

In particular:

Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilitiesin strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.

Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operatesewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.

Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate andmaintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.


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Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but alsoof other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.

Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfilland/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systemsuch as re-use or recycling of wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life inManila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.

Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning upand rehabilitation of Manila Bay.

Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flowof waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up inManila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to activelyparticipate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradablegarbage in the bay.

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies andrequire them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewagecoming from septic tanks.

Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education theimportance of preserving and protecting the environment.

Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the ManilaBay from all forms of illegal fishing.

The Court of Appeals Sustained the RTCs Decision

The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals(CA) individual Notices of Appeal. On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works andHighways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard(PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments andagencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45.

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extremenecessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and dischargetheir respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need toset timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them bylaw and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmarkcannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its formersplendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasksahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help andcooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take

responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservationand protection of the Manila Bay.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthfulecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and politicalrights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue oftranscendental importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of acategorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men andwomen representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep thewaters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayalof the trust reposed in them.

By a Decision of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of

the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outsideof their usual basic functions under existing laws.


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32. Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)191 SCRA 288November 1990

FACTS:

Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by agroup of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the products naphtacracker and naphta to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began itsproduction in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred fromBataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others,the BOI granted private respondent BPCs application, stating that the investors have the final choiceas to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of theinvestors without considering the national interest

HELD:

The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, andordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta asfeedstock maintained.

The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Courts judicial power to settle actualcontroversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote thereasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justifythe BOIs action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government,could have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, towit: .. he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient toforeign dictation.

Justice Grio Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken becausethe 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well as anydecision of the BOI regarding the amended application. She stated that the fact that petitionerdisagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner should haveappealed to the President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the1987 Investment Code.

Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does not vest inthe Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.


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33. TAADA VS ANGARA

G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

Facts:

Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the

Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement establishing the WorldTrade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled byFilipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipinolabor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further, they contended that the nationaltreatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of membercountries o

consolidated cases (1-84)

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