ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTSE V A L U A T I O N O F U N D P C O N T R I B U T I O N CONGO

Evaluation Office, August 2008United Nations Development Programme

R E P U B L I C O F T H E

Copyright © UNDP 2008, all rights reserved.Manufactured in the United States of America

The analysis and recommendations of this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United NationsDevelopment Programme, its Executive Board or the United Nations Member States. This is an independent publication by UNDP and reflects the views of its authors.

This independent evaluation was carried by the evaluators from Abacus International Management L.L.C. (NY, USA)

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EVALUATION TEAM

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS: REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Team Leader Carrol Faubert, Abacus International Management L.L.C.

Team Members Abdenour Benbouali, Abacus International Management L.L.C.Hyacinthe Defoundoux-Fila, Abacus International Management L.L.C.

Task Manager Michael Reynolds, UNDP Evaluation Office

F O R E W O R D i

This is an independent country-level evaluation,conducted by the Evaluation Office of the UnitedNations Development Programme (UNDP) inthe Republic of the Congo. This Assessment ofDevelopment Results (ADR) examines therelevance and strategic positioning of UNDPsupport and its contributions to the country’sdevelopment from 2004 to 2007. It assessesUNDP interventions under the various thematicareas of the four-year country programme,with the aim of providing forward-lookingrecommendations meant to assist the UNDPcountry office and its partners in the formulationof programmes for the next cycle (2009–2013).

The report examines the context in whichUNDP operates in the Republic of the Congo,mainly with regard to economic and humandevelopment. In addition, it assesses therelevance of UNDP interventions to nationalpriorities, as well as the UNDP role within thenational development aid community.

Since 1991, the Republic of the Congo has beenengaged in a transition towards multipartydemocracy and a market economy. The transitionwas marred during the nineties by repeated civilconflicts between largely ethnic-based militiagroups. The country emerged from the civil warsonly in 2000, and has started a reconciliation andrebuilding process that is well advanced but stillnot completed.

Despite booming income derived from oil extractionand export, the socio-economic situation of the Republic of the Congo remains a seriousconcern. There is a disconnect between two maineconomies. One is modern, dynamic, export-oriented and based mainly on the oil and woodindustries, while the other is more traditional,based on subsistence agriculture, small businessesand services, and a large civil service sector.The result is a relatively good standing in per

capita GDP, combined with acute poverty and alow human development index, under which thecountry ranks 139th out of 177.

This evaluation report concludes that UNDPinterventions in the Republic of the Congocorrespond to expressed national priorities and to the broad corporate parameters of the organization. UNDP has made judiciousdecisions in selecting its areas of intervention, butit is now time to question the pertinence ofcontinuing post-conflict types of activitiesbeyond the current programme cycle. Theevaluation recommends that the next countryprogramme build upon the demonstratedcomparative advantages of UNDP in theRepublic of the Congo. These include UNDPsupport for good governance, its pro-poor andcommunity development approach, its regionalapproach to environmental issues and its strongadvocacy capability. UNDP should graduallyphase out activities directly related to the post-conflict period. Peace-building should becomethe underlying theme for most activities, particu-larly those fostering good governance andpoverty reduction, and become the central focusof the programme to ensure lasting stability andsustainable development.

A number of people contributed to the evaluation.I would especially like to thank the evaluationteam, composed of Carrol Faubert (Team Leader),Abdenour Benbouali and Hyacinthe Defoundoux-Fila. I would also like to offer my thanks to RajeevPillay, General Partner of Abacus InternationalManagement , the consulting company contractedto undertake the evaluation, who provided substan-tive guidance and support to the evaluation team.In the Evaluation Office, I would like to thankMichael Reynolds, the evaluation Task Manager,as well as Kutisha Ebron, Thuy Hang To andAnish Pradhan for their administrative support.

FOREWORD

F O R E W O R Di i

The research and preparation of the evaluationwere completed thanks to the collaboration and openness of the staff of the UNDP countryoffice in the Republic of the Congo, led by Resident Representative Aurelien Agbenonci,Violet Kakyomya, Deputy Resident Representative,and Emelyne Mahanda, who acted as the countryoffice focal point for the evaluation in its earlystages. I would also like to thank the UNDPRegional Bureau for Africa, particularly AdeMamonyane Lekoetje.

This report would not have been possiblewithout the commitment and support ofnumerous officials from the Government of theRepublic of the Congo. In particular, I would liketo thank Jean-Baptiste Ondaye, Director Generalfor Planning and Development, who has beenthe main UNDP counterpart and has provided

valuable insights for the evaluation. The team isalso indebted to representatives of civil societyand non-governmental organizations, donorcountries and the United Nations Country Team,including those from international financialinstitutions, who generously gave their time andfrank views.

I hope that the findings and recommendations ofthis report will assist UNDP in responding to thecountry’s challenges and provide broader lessonsthat may be of relevance to UNDP and itspartners internationally.

Saraswathi MenonDirector, Evaluation Office

Acronyms and abbreviations v

Executive summary vii

1. Introduction 1

1.1 Purpose and scope 11.2 Methodology 21.3 Organization of the report 4

2. National development context 5

2.1 Geographic and demographic background 52.2 Political context 52.3 Economic context 72.4 Human development context 82.5 Achieving progress on the Millennium Development Goals 102.6 UNDP in the development community 12

3. UNDP contribution to development results 15

3.1 Overall analysis of UNDP 2004–2007 Country Programme 153.2 Improving democratic governance 203.3 Poverty reduction 263.4 Conflict prevention and recovery 293.5 Energy and sustainable management of the environment 333.6 Cross-cutting themes 37

4. Conclusions and recommendations 39

4.1 Relevance of UNDP interventions 394.2 Effectiveness of UNDP interventions 404.3 Sustainability of results 404.4 UNDP strategic positioning 414.5 Recommendations 42

Annexes

Annex I. Terms of reference 45Annex II. Key documents reviewed 51Annex III. People consulted 55Annex IV. Information note 59

C O N T E N T S i i i

CONTENTS

C O N T E N T Si v

Tables

Table 1. Categories of non-UNDP persons interviewed for this ADR 2Table 2. Evolution of select indicators for the period 1998 and 2002–2005 8Table 3. Likelihood of achieving MDG targets (2004 estimates) 11Table 4. Governance programmes 2004–2007: components and activities 22Table 5. Projects related to poverty reduction and achieving the MDGs, 2004–2007 27Table 6. Projects related to conflict prevention and recovery, 2004–2007 29Table 7. Environment and energy programme 2004–2007: components and activities 34

Figures

Figure 1. Annual expenditure 2004–2007 by core and non-core resources 18

Boxes

Box 1. Strengthening Parliament 23Box 2. Promoting women in politics 24Box 3. Support to anti-fraud and anti-corruption initiatives 25Box 4. Support to socio-economic reintegration of underprivileged groups 28Box 5. Collecting Small Arms for Development (PCAD I and II) 32Box 6. Preparation of referential frameworks and capacity building 36

A C R O N Y M S A N D A B B R E V I A T I O N S v

ADB/ADF African Development Bank/African Development Fund

ADR Assessment of Development Results

CCA Common Country Assessment

CEDAP Centre for Project Execution and Support (Centre d’exécution et d’appui aux projets)

CIB Compagnie Industrielle du Bois (private-sector enterprise, wood industry)

CNR Council for National Resistance (Conseil national de la Résistance)

DEX Direct execution modality

GDP Gross domestic product

IMF International Monetary Fund

IPCP Interim Post-Conflict Programme

I-PRSP Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

MDG Millennium Development Goal

NEX National execution modality

NGO Non-governmental organization

NICT New information and communication technology

PCAD Collection of Small Arms for Development Project(Projet de Collecte des Armes pour le Développement)

PRAEBASE Basic Education Support Programme (Projet d’Appui à l’Education de Base)

PRESJAR Community Action Project for Community Recovery and Social Reintegration of Youth at Risk (Projet d’Action Communautaire pour le Relèvement des Communautés et la Réintégration Sociale des Jeunes à Risque)

PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

SARIS Société Agricole de Raffinement Industriel du Sucre (private-sector enterprise, sugar industry)

SEP/CNLS Permanent Executive Secretariat/National Council to Fight AIDS and STDs (Secrétariat Exécutif/Conseil National de Lutte contre le SIDA et les IST)

TRAC Target for resource assignment from the core

UNCT United Nations Country Team

UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDG United Nations Development Group

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UN DPA United Nations Department of Political Affairs

UNICONGO Inter-professional Union of the Congo (Union Inter-professionnelle du Congo)

UN OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y v i i

This report reviews the contribution of the UnitedNations Development Programme (UNDP) todevelopment results in the Republic of theCongo from 2004 to 2007. It examines theinterventions of UNDP under the various thematicareas of the four-year country programme, withthe aim of providing forward-looking recommen-dations meant to assist the UNDP country officeand its partners in the formulation of programmesfor the next programming cycle (2009–2013).This evaluation process, known as an Assessmentof Development Results, was carried out onbehalf of the UNDP Evaluation Office by threeindependent consultants working with AbacusInternational Management, L.L.C.

The report examines the context in whichUNDP operates in the Republic of the Congo,mainly with regard to economic and humandevelopment. In addition, the report assesses therelevance of UNDP interventions to nationalpriorities, as well as the role of UNDP within the national development aid community.UNDP programme components and themes arereviewed in terms of results achieved, effectiveness,sustainability and strategic positioning.

DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Since 1991, the Republic of the Congo has beenengaged in a long transition towards multipartydemocracy and a market economy. During thenineties, the transition was marked by repeatedcivil conflicts among largely ethnic-based militiagroups. The country emerged from the civil warsonly in 2000, when it started a reconciliation andrebuilding process.

While well advanced, this process has not beencompleted. Parts of the Pool Department, asouth-eastern region hard hit by the latestconflict, remain under the control of militias,although violence has subsided. Under the

constitution adopted in 2002, a second round ofelections started in 2007 with parliamentaryelections. It should be followed by local electionsin 2008 and a second presidential election thefollowing year.

Reconciliation and peace remain fragile. However,it is hoped that the second cycle of elections willmark the definitive end of the transition periodand indicate the strengthening of inclusivedemocracy and peace consolidation. This isconditioned on elections taking place withoutviolence, as well as on the electoral process beingperceived as fair and transparent.

The socio-economic situation of the Republic ofthe Congo remains grim, despite boomingincome derived from oil extraction and export.There is a disconnect between the two maineconomies. The first, comprising mainly the oiland wood industries, is modern, dynamic andexport-oriented. The second economy is moretraditional, based largely on subsistence agriculture,small businesses and services, and a large civilservice. The result is a relatively good standing inthe GDP per capita classification, under whichthe Republic of the Congo qualifies as a lowermiddle-income country, with an average incomeof US$1,262. The reality behind the statistic,however, is one of acute poverty and a low humandevelopment index: the Republic of the Congoranks 139th out of 177 countries.

The country is also highly indebted. In March2006, the Republic of the Congo became eligiblefor debt relief under the International MonetaryFund Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative.As part of related discussions, the governmentcommitted to a number of reforms, particularly withregard to improving governance in all spheres ofpublic life. Weaknesses in governance representone of the major obstacles to development,together with human-capacity deficiencies within

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Yv i i i

the public administration. Reforms will only be possible with a strong political will anddetermined action on the part of government, aswell as sustained international support.

There are major challenges facing the country inits furtherance of peace consolidation. On thesocio-economic side, these include attainingsustainable growth and equitable redistributionof wealth. On the socio-political side, thechallenge is to move beyond past conflicts andtensions by completing the transition towards aninclusive democratic system that protects therights of citizens and ensures human security.Meeting these challenges will require far-reachingreforms promoting responsible and transparentgovernance, coupled with strong and determinedpolitical will on the part of leaders at all levels of authority.

UNDP ROLE

During and immediately after the civil conflicts,UNDP operated on an ad hoc, project-by-projectbasis. In September 2003, the Executive Boardapproved a four-year programme for the period2004–2007. The programme was subsequentlyextended by one year for the purpose of harmoniz-ing programming cycles among several UnitedNations agencies operating in the country.

The programme adopted in 2003 addressed threemajor themes: good governance, poverty reduction,and environmental and natural-resource manage-ment. In addition, three cross-cutting areas wereidentified for inclusion in all activities: gender,HIV/AIDS, and new information and communi-cations technologies. The programme set out to:

n Increase the capacity of the principalgovernance institutions, mainly throughsupport that addresses the needs of parlia-mentary institutions, local authorities andcivil society;

n Strengthen capacity for reducing poverty andachieving the Millennium Development Goals(MDGs) on the part of the government andcivil society; and

n Strengthen the capacity of national andsectoral authorities to plan and implementintegrated approaches to environmentalmanagement and energy development thatmeet the needs of the poor.

RELEVANCE OF INTERVENTIONS

The evaluation team found that programmeswere generally relevant to the strategies andpolicies of the government and to UNDPcorporate objectives. The programmes addressedneeds that are important for sustaining thecountry’s efforts of pursuing and completing thetransition towards democracy, a free-marketeconomy and social justice.

Surprisingly, the approved country programmedid not address conflict prevention and recoveryas a separate category of support. Although anumber of activities fell under this programmingtheme, they were subsumed under the theme of poverty reduction. The programmes wouldhave been more coherent, had conflict preventionand recovery been addressed either directly orthrough an approach that emphasized peaceconsolidation in all areas of intervention, partic-ularly in governance.

In this respect, it should be noted that the UNDPcountry office adopted a new approach in aninternal restructuring at the beginning of 2007,when it entrusted a dedicated Governance and PeaceConsolidation Unit with management responsibilityfor governance and post-conflict projects.

In addition, the country office had limitedUNDP core resources at its disposal. This madeit more difficult to use such resources as seedmoney to attract contributions for important but under-funded activities, particularly theenvironment programme. In response, the officedeveloped an aggressive and successful fundmobilization strategy. However, some UNDPpartners—among the donors and within thegovernment—consider this emphasis on fundmobilization to be excessive.

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y i x

The government and aid-community partnersrecognized a number of UNDP interventions as particularly relevant. Projects and areas ofactivity that represent comparative advantagesand should be built upon in the next programmecycle include:

n Support to the formulation of key nationaldocuments related to poverty reduction. Thisincluded two National Human DevelopmentReports and, in close partnership with TheWorld Bank, the interim and final PovertyReduction Strategy Papers. UNDP alsoassisted the government in producing the2004 National MDG Report and the near-final national strategy for achieving them;

n Support to parliamentary institutions andthe effective advocacy it allowed UNDP tomount among parliamentarians on a numberof cross-cutting issues, such as gender, HIV/AIDS and the environment;

n Effective assistance in the development of legislation on political parties and the role of women in politics. On the legislative side, support was accompanied by concreteoperational programmes to train the cadre ofpolitical parties and to help establish networkspromoting the role of women in politics;

n Innovative environmental programme tosupport conservation, alternative sources ofenergy and sanitation in large urban areas;

n Judicious use of high-visibility initiativesand field offices, such as the public burningof collected weapons as instruments forsignalling a return to normalcy across thecountry (including in more troubled areas)and, despite several operational weaknesses,the continued presence of the UnitedNations alongside the population; and

n Effective advocacy campaign, which used themedia, civil society and key institutions, such asthe Parliament, to promote a pro-poor agenda.

OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

The UNDP country office has implemented a soundand balanced approach that combines upstream

and downstream interventions. The programmealso demonstrated a degree of operationalsynergy, particularly in support provided toparliamentary institutions, which, in turn,became powerful advocacy vehicles. Similarsynergies were also evident in several communitydevelopment projects and the small arms collec-tion programme, which were conducted inBrazzaville and the Pool Department.

Weaker points include:

n Mainstreaming cross-cutting issues intoprogramming. There was a deficiency in theinclusion of cross-cutting themes in theinitial design of certain projects, althoughcorrective action was generally taken at alater stage;

n Unfavourable local perception of UNDP.Despite important efforts towards improvingprogramme delivery, UNDP is viewed asslow to disburse funds, deficient in reportingquality and heavily bureaucratic in manage-ment style; and

n Lacking clarity of outcomes and indicators. Thedefinitions of outcomes and their indicatorsremained weak. Available financial and humanresources were not sufficient to undertake themonitoring needed for on-demand programmeadjustments or meaningful final evaluations.This weakened the capacity of the office to illustrate results and justify donor trust.

SUSTAINABILITY OF RESULTS

Programme sustainability remains the majorweakness of UNDP operations in the Republic ofthe Congo. Numerous projects achieved generallypositive results and produced pre-definedmaterial outputs; however, many such projectsalso failed to produce the intended outcomes orto develop mechanisms that ensure long-termresult viability.

With reference to achieving result sustainability,there is a need for a distinction between upstreamand downstream interventions.

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Yx

In many cases, upstream support provided byUNDP had been successful in putting in placethe strategy and policy frameworks or the plansof action required. Since the expected outcomeswill materialize over time, upstream projects andprogrammes are sometimes referred to as‘dormant successes’.

In contrast, the sustainability of downstreamprojects often depends on the availability ofdedicated national or local budgets, the capacityof managers and beneficiaries to developindependent sources of income, and the capacityto manage projects with the goal of maintaininginitial results. Most often, such resources andcapacities are absent. Consequently, a number ofprojects, particularly those dealing withinfrastructure rehabilitation, are destined forrapid deterioration due to lack of maintenance orthe collapse of local management committees.

UNDP needs to address sustainability through apersistent and structured effort at developing andmaintaining realistic and measurable means tofoster national ownership. Concrete measures areneeded to ensure that the country’s institutionsand community groups have both the willingnessand the capacity to take over long-term responsi-bility for programmes. In particular, new initia-tives are required to cultivate a higher level ofgovernment commitment through increasedgovernment cost sharing.

POSITIONING AND COORDINATION

UNDP has made judicious decisions in selectingprogramme interventions. Now that it is time tomove forward and adapt to the changing realityof the country, the continued relevance of post-conflict interventions should increasingly bequestioned. New interventions should focus onthe major challenges faced by the Republic of theCongo a decade after the end of active conflict.Peace consolidation, mainly through focusedgovernance and community development inter-ventions, represents a key requirement in orderfor the country to move beyond the post-conflictperiod and the current stabilization phase.

To accomplish this, UNDP needs to be moreforceful in building on its comparativeadvantages in the areas of community develop-ment and governance.

A major effort will be required to develop—and attimes, mend—relationships with certain membersof the development aid community. Currentcoordination mechanisms should be examinedwith a view towards improving efficiency andcomplementarity. This can take the form of aparticipative exercise among partners.

The accomplishments of the United Nations (UN)Country Team during the preparation of the nextUnited Nations Development Assistance Frame-work (UNDAF) can prove particularly meaningfulfor UNDP efforts to improve its performance indeveloping results-based programmes for the nextcycle. For monitoring and evaluation in particular,the UNDAF should provide opportunities for aclearer identification of measurable outcomesand indicators, as well as for joint programmeevaluations with UN partners.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Twelve recommendations are derived from theanalysis contained in this report. These are:

GENERAL AND STRATEGIC ISSUES

1. The next Republic of the Congo country programme should build upon demonstratedUNDP comparative advantages. These includeUNDP support for good governance, pro-poor and community development approaches,a regional approach to environmental issues andstrong advocacy capability. UNDP shouldgradually phase out post-conflict activities.

2. In order to ensure lasting stability andsustainable development, peace consolidationshould become the central focus andunderlying theme for most UNDP activities,particularly those in good governance andpoverty reduction.

3. UNDP should continue to emphasize thelinkages between upstream and downstream

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y x i

approaches, intervening at both political andoperational levels in all programmes.

4. Based on experience in other countries,UNDP should engage the government innegotiations aimed at increasing nationalcost-sharing contributions to at least equalthe resources allocated by UNDP.

5. Particular attention needs to be devoted tofostering national ownership and ensuringsustainability. This could include:

n Greater attention during the project designphase to incorporating a sustainable exitstrategy, based on identifying thenational mechanisms expected to takeover, defining conditions of an effectivemanagement transfer and establishingbenchmarks for monitoring relevantpreparations and the capacity of thechosen national entity;

n Intensified efforts in national capacity-building through establishing a compre-hensive and structured programme inclose coordination with the governmentand other development actors;

n Continued gradual and prudent approachto increasing the national executioncomponent of programmes; and

n A clear demonstration of the politicalwill of national authorities in addition to their commitment to assumingownership of programmes, in particularthrough increased cost-sharing asoutlined in recommendation four above.

6. In close consultation with all partners,UNDP should start to reflect on ways toimprove coordination among developmentactors. This is of particular importance forgood governance initiatives, in view of the UNDP intent to further develop itssupport to some financial oversight andadministrative institutions.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

7. The UNDP country office in the Republic ofthe Congo should vigorously pursue its effortsto improve programme delivery. In addition,measures of rewarding staff efficiency shouldbe established, and the new Centre forProject Execution and Support1 should beindependently evaluated in 2009, after twofull years of operation.

8. The formulation of outcomes, indicators andmeans of verification should be improved. Inpossible collaboration with donor-partners,the UNDP country office must ensure thatsufficient financial and human resources aredevoted to monitoring outcomes as well asoutputs. In defining outcomes for the nextUNDAF, UNDP should build upon inter-agency work and encourage the developmentof a system-wide approach to outcomemonitoring and evaluation.

9. The country office should engage partners indiscussions geared towards improving theperformance and efficiency of Project ReviewCommittees and Steering Committees.

10. UNDP offices outside Brazzaville need todevelop their services for the benefit of bothUN agencies and non-governmental organi-zations. This should include creating openand inclusive coordination hubs at the locallevel, promoting cross-fertilization, and under-taking activities such as mapping developmentand humanitarian actors, which waspreviously done through the UN Office forthe Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

11. More attention should be given to themainstreaming of gender and HIV/AIDSconsiderations into the country programmeduring its initial design phase.

12. While direct environmental interventionsshould continue, particularly in subregionalcontexts, the country office’s intent to treat suchconcerns as cross-cutting should be encouraged.

1 Centre d’exécution et d’appui aux projets.

1C H A P T E R 1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N

With a 2005 GDP per capita of $1,262,2 theRepublic of the Congo is classified as a lowermiddle-income country. However, rampantpoverty is the reality behind this relative statisti-cal wealth. In an economy heavily dominated bythe extraction and export of crude oil, mosthuman development indicators remain low,although some have improved since the countryemerged from the three successive civil wars ofthe 1990s.

In the phase following the return to peace, theUnited Nations Development Programme(UNDP) concentrated on providing emergencyassistance to certain key sectors and was author-ized to function on an ad hoc, project-by-projectbasis until 2003. In September 2003, the UNDPExecutive Board approved a new four-yearcountry programme (2004–2007). In contrast tothe post-conflict recovery approach of theprevious phase, the new programme emphasizedthree central themes: good governance, povertyreduction, and environment and natural resourcemanagement. The period covered by the countryprogramme has now been extended to the end of2008 in order to respond to the objective ofharmonizing programming cycles among UnitedNations (UN) system agencies.

1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The Assessment of Development Results (ADR)is an independent evaluation tool used by theUNDP Evaluation Office to assess the UNDPcontribution to national development results.The overall goals of an ADR are to:

n Provide an independent assessment of

country-level development results in areascovered by UNDP interventions, assessingboth their relevance and effectiveness.UNDP activities are also assessed in light ofpartnerships with other development actors;

n Contribute to accountability and to learningfrom experience;

n Provide an analysis of how UNDPpositioned itself to add value in response tonational needs and priorities, and how itadapted to changes in the national develop-ment context; and

n Present key findings and lessons, and providea set of forward-looking recommendationsfor future UNDP programmes.

In broad terms, this ADR examines whetherUNDP did the right things in the Republic ofthe Congo and how well it did them. This reportaddresses:

n Relevance of UNDP programmes and activi-ties, and its capacity to respond to changes inthe national environment;

n UNDP effectiveness in achieving statedobjectives and intended results;

n Sustainability of the development results towhich UNDP contributed; and

n UNDP strategic positioning and compara-tive advantages.

This evaluation limits itself to the period of2004–2007. It also examines projects startedprior to 2004, when these are relevant tounderstanding ongoing activities.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

2 UNDP, Human Development Report 2007–2008, New York, 2007.

2

In addition, the evaluation team did not limititself to examining the project portfolio andoutcomes linked to project activities. It alsolooked at non-programmatic interventions, suchas advocacy, coordination, support for policydevelopment, communications and publicinformation, as well as civil-society relations.

The detailed Terms of Reference for this evaluation,prepared by the Evaluation Office, are attachedas Annex I.

1.2 METHODOLOGY

UNDP retained the services of Abacus InternationalManagement L.L.C. to carry out this evaluationexercise, with support from the UNDP EvaluationOffice and the country office in the Republic ofthe Congo. The independent evaluation teamconsisted of three members: two internationalconsultants and one national consultant.3

The methodology used was based on ADRguidelines4 and the broader UNDP evaluationpolicy.5 The preparatory phase involved anintensive initial review of documentation, as well as consultations with the UNDP EvaluationOffice, the Regional Bureau for Africa and keyUNDP departments. In New York, the twointernational consultants met with representativesof UN system bodies, including the Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA),the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and theUnited Nations Development Group (UNDG).The consultants also briefed the PermanentMission of the Republic of the Congo to theUnited Nations in New York on the ADR exercise.

The preparatory phase also included a one-weekscoping mission to Brazzaville, undertaken by the

team leader and the national consultant. Themission was used to refine the scope of the evalua-tion, to discuss the structure and rationale of thecountry programme with UNDP officers, and toidentify additional documentation to guide theteam. The mission enabled the team to select keyprojects and activities to be reviewed in moredepth based on the relative size of their budgetsand relevance to the programme themes. Themission was also used to map UNDP partners formore detailed interviews. All team membersfollowed this preparatory mission with a secondround of desk review of documentation.6 On thebasis of the desk review, notes and questions wereshared with the relevant units of the countryoffice in preparation for detailed workingsessions during the main mission.

The main two-week mission took place from 27 February to 12 March 2008. The evaluationteam had extensive discussions with UNDP seniormanagement, programme units responsible forthematic areas and project staff. The team alsomet a number of UNDP partners in the govern-ment, the UN system, multilateral and bilateralagencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)and civil society. The team made a point ofextending its civil-society contacts beyond the ambitof organizations already associated with UNDPand sought the views of members of associations,NGOs, academic institutions and women’s groups,as well as of political leaders from the majorityand the opposition. Individual interviews weresemi-structured, with each potential respondenthaving received an information note containing ageneral list of questions a week before the arrivalof the international consultants.7

In total, over 80 persons were interviewed duringthe course of this evaluation, mainly in individual

3 Carrol Faubert was the Senior Consultant and Team Leader. International team members included Abdenour Benbouali,Senior Consultant, and Hyacinthe Defoundoux-Fila, National Consultant.

4 UNDP, ‘Guidelines for an Assessment of Development Results’, Evaluation Office, New York, December 2007.5 UNDP, ‘The Evaluation Policy of UNDP’ (DP/2005/28), Evaluation Office, New York, May 2006.6 A list of major documents consulted appears as Annex II.7 See Annex III for a list of persons met and Annex IV for the information note.

C H A P T E R 1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N

C H A P T E R 1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N 3

meetings. Group meetings were organized forNGOs, in view of the large number of partici-pants. Non-UNDP persons interviewed belongedto one of the four categories identified in Table 1.

Field visits to project sites in Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire and Kinkala8 (Pool Department) supple-mented the desk review, interviews, and individ-ual and group meetings. Field visits were selectedby taking into account the logistical difficulties in the Republic of the Congo, as well as theopportunity to expose evaluation team membersto a variety of projects in key thematic areas inthe same location. This allowed the evaluationteam to visit two of four UNDP offices and

12 project sites, which represented of the majorthemes of the country programme. On eachoccasion, a specific effort was made to enter intodirect discussions with project beneficiaries,including primary school teachers, members oflocal community management committees,vocational trainers and their students, and formercombatants engaged in a small-scale vegetablegardening project.

This ADR was carried out under stringent timeconstraints, with a view to presenting a reportand recommendations in time to feed into theplanning of the 2009–2013 country programme.The duration of the entire process was reduced to

8 Kinkala was visited on 2 February 2008, during the scoping mission.

Government

Civil societyleaders,politicians,national NGOs

Multilateral andbilateral develop-ment partners,including UNagencies andinternationalfinancial institutions

Programmebeneficiaries

Respondents

Have UNDP interventions appropriately reflected national priorities? Has UNDPdemonstrated a capacity to adapt to changes in the national environment? How doyou see the role of UNDP as a contributor to national development? What were themost significant and successful UNDP interventions and why? Are there areas whereUNDP should intervene further or improve its performance? What arrangementshave been made to ensure the sustainability of results achieved with UNDPsupport? What are the existing coordination mechanisms, and how effective hasUNDP been in coordinating with others?

What are your views on progress towards human security and development? HasUNDP effectively contributed to improving the situation in the Republic of theCongo? What was the most significant UNDP contribution? What could have beendone better or differently to improve effectiveness and better respond to needsmore adequately? Do you participate in consultations organized with the support of UNDP for the development of major national strategy documents or for sectoralprogrammes? What has been the effectiveness of such consultations? Have youbenefited from UNDP-supported training or capacity building? What is the image of UNDP with the general public?

What are your views on progress towards human development in the Republic of the Congo? What are your views of the UNDP role and performance, includingeffectiveness, efficiency, relevance and strategic role? What are the major compara-tive advantages of UNDP in this country? What has been the major ‘value added’of UNDP? How could UNDP have been more effective? What coordinationmechanisms are in place, and what role does UNDP play in coordination?

Has your situation improved as a result of the UNDP intervention? Did UNDPsupport correspond to your needs? Was the support timely and well targeted? Whatdid UNDP do well? What did it do wrong? How do you see the future? Will you beable to continue your activities once direct UNDP support ceases?

Main evaluative questions

Table 1: Categories of non-UNDP persons interviewed for this ADR

C H A P T E R 1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N4

less than three months, approximately half of theaverage time normally allotted to an ADRexercise. This limitation precluded commissioningadditional surveys and research that could havehelped fill information gaps.

As the ADR concentrates mainly on intendedand unintended outcomes and results, theexistence of baseline data is crucial to assessingthe situation at the end of the programme. Theteam found that such data was unavailable formost projects. Although outcome indicators were generally identified in the initial projectdescriptions, the team noted confusion betweenoutcome indicators and project outputs, as well asthe absence of mechanisms to ensure the systematiccollection of data related to indicators during thecourse of a given project.

Where baseline data was not available, the teamsought to establish trends at the broader nationallevel over recent years. Where specific data hadnot been collected to enable the assessment oftrends and results, background questions aimedat determining actual results were posed toparties on different sides of the developmentpartnership. The analysis thus made use of thetriangulation method, which is based on:stakeholders’ perceptions; programme documen-tation, evaluation reports and other relevantwritten material; and existing surveys and data.

Finally, in a multiple-actor environment wherefactors affecting outcomes go far beyond thoseunder UNDP control, evaluating the directcorrelation between UNDP activities anddevelopment results is nearly impossible. Theteam endeavoured to establish credible linkagesbetween UNDP activities, programme outputsand national development results. This analysis,supported by documentary evidence wheneverpossible, was based on prevailing perceptions ofthe main UNDP contributions among keystakeholders in the Republic of the Congo.

1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

This report is organized into four chapters.Following the Executive Summary and thisintroduction, Chapter 2 examines the nationaldevelopment context and the UNDP role in the aid community. Chapter 3 assesses theUNDP contribution to development results inthe Republic of the Congo through bothprogramme activities and other interventions.Chapter 4 draws evaluation conclusions andmakes recommendations.

While analysis of the various programmeinterventions is based on an overview of the fullportfolio of projects under each major programmetheme, details of representative projects arepresented in boxes accompanying the text.

C H A P T E R 2 . N A T I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T C O N T E X T 5

This chapter provides an overview of theRepublic of the Congo’s recent history, itsgeographical and demographic situation, and itssocio-economic environment. The evolution ofhuman development and human security since2000 is briefly analysed. In addition, this chapterlooks at major UNDP partnerships and its role intheir coordination.

2.1 GEOGRAPHIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND

With a land area of 342,000 square kilometres,the Republic of the Congo borders the CentralAfrican Republic and Cameroon to the north,the Angolan enclave of Cabinda to the south, theDemocratic Republic of the Congo to the eastand the Republic of Gabon to the west. Thecoastline on the Atlantic Ocean accounts for 170kilometres. The climate is equatorial, and thevegetation is mainly savannah and forests, thelatter covering about 60 percent of the country.Only 2 percent of the total arable land is undercultivation. The country is rich in mineralresources. Its hydrographic network includes twomajor basins, the Congo and the Kouilou-Niari.

In 2006, the population of the Republic of theCongo was estimated to be 3.7 million inhabitants.People under 20 years old represented 55 percentof the population, and women represented 52percent. The urban population was estimated at60 percent, which is very high compared to the sub-Saharan Africa average of 35 percent.The demographic growth rate stood at just over

2 percent and the population density at 10 personsper square kilometre.9

2.2 POLITICAL CONTEXT

Recent history of the Republic of the Congo is characterized by a move from a Marxist one-party state system to liberal multiparty politics.Unfortunately, that transition resulted in threesuccessive civil wars between 1993 and the end of 1999.

2.2.1 SOCIALIST PERIOD

Following the overthrow of the first presidentelected after independence, the period from 1963to 1990 was characterized by a one-party statesystem. It had two phases. During the first phase,1963–1965, the dominating ideology was moresocialist than Marxist. Marxism dominated thesecond phase, 1968–1990. During the secondphase, development strategy focused on the stateas the major economic actor with a centralplanning system.

In 1991, in line with reforms initiated in theSoviet Union and following the fall of the BerlinWall, the government of President Sassou-Nguesso organized a national conference wherepolitical reforms were adopted. A democraticconstitution was voted in on 15 March 1992.Pascal Lissouba won the first democraticelection, though former allies who joined theopposition to constitute a new parliamentarymajority soon contested the results.

Chapter 2

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

9 Figures and statistics in this paragraph are drawn mainly from The World Bank Web site, Republic of the Congo – DataProfile, the Human Development Report 2007–2008 (UNDP 2007) and the 2005 Household Survey in the Republic ofthe Congo.

C H A P T E R 2 . N A T I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T C O N T E X T6

2.2.2 CIVIL WARS

This marked the beginning of what theCongolese have called the ‘democratic crisis’. TheCongo has endured three successive rounds ofcivil wars (1993, 1997 and 1998–1999).Brazzaville and the southern departments ofPool, Bouenza, Niari and Lékoumou bore thebrunt of fighting, violence and destruction. As inmost internal conflicts, the civilian populationwas targeted, most often on a purely ethnic basis.In addition to numerous deaths, the wars alsoresulted in close to 800,000 persons beinginternally displaced or becoming refugees outsidetheir country. The conflict cycle left a legacy ofincreased poverty, social and ethnic tensions,and economic decline. The chaos also gave rise toimpunity, aggravating bad governance, corruptionand fraud.

President Sassou-Nguesso returned to power in1997. After several rounds of negotiations,a cease-fire agreement was signed at the end of 1999. It called for the re-establishment ofpolitical parties and the demobilization of ex-militia fighters. Although the Council forNational Resistance (CNR)10 of ReverendNtoumi also signed the cease-fire agreement, his‘Ninja’ militia retained control of large parts ofthe Pool Department and fighting continued,producing additional population displacement.

2.2.3 IMMEDIATE POST-CONFLICT PERIOD:2000–2002

With the end of the conflict, the government andthe international community worked towardsrestoring national institutions, re-establishing therule of law, and reconstructing economic andadministrative structures through an InterimPost-Conflict Programme (IPCP). In parallel,the government pursued a policy of reconciliationbased on three pillars: negotiations with therebellion, political inclusion and decentralization.

A new constitution was adopted in January 2002.Presidential elections were held in March,followed by legislative elections in May and Juneof the same year. These improved the environ-ment for reconciliation and dialogue, despitecriticism of the fairness of the electoral process.In 2005, exiled leaders began returning to thecountry and reorganizing their political parties.

2.2.4 TRANSITION AND STABILIZATION:2003–2007

The first cycle of elections under the newConstitution marked the beginning of a period oftransition and stabilisation. In March 2003,another agreement was signed with the CNR ofReverend Ntoumi to define the conditions forthe disarmament, demobilization and reintegrationof about 5,000 militia fighters. Although thisagreement was not implemented, PresidentSassou-Nguesso appointed Reverend Ntoumi tothe position of Minister in Charge of thePromotion of Peace Values and Rehabilitation inthe Aftermath of War11 after further discussionsin 2007. By March 2008, Reverend Ntoumi hadnot yet taken up his new functions, and his returnto Brazzaville was still under discussion.

The legislative elections of 2007 marked thebeginning of the second electoral cycle. Partiessupporting the presidential majority won over 90percent of National Assembly seats, leaving theopposition holding only 11 seats. Several partiesof the majority and some independents laterjoined the President’s party to constitute a new Union for the Presidential Majority,12 inpreparation for a second presidential electionscheduled for 2009.

After years of conflict, distrust and suspicion, thecountry has made significant progress on thepath to reconciliation. The situation, however,remains fragile. Factors contributing to thisfragility include increasing impoverishment, high

10 Conseil National de la Résistance.11 Ministre Délégué Chargé de la promotion des valeurs de paix et de la réparation des séquelles de guerre.12 Rassemblement pour la Majorité Présidentielle.

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unemployment, disparities between the poor andthe affluent, and continuing political tensions.

2.3 ECONOMIC CONTEXT

The Congo experienced a GDP real growthaverage of 5.8 percent during 2004–2006, slightlyhigher than the sub-Saharan Africa average. Inan economy dominated by the oil industry,13 thecountry benefited from the global soaring of oilprices. The resulting increase in public incomeenabled the country to show primary-balancesurpluses14 every year, culminating in a projectedsurplus of some $1.5 billion in 2007. The govern-ment has set aside the surpluses resulting fromhigher fiscal income from oil in a stabilizationfund held at the Bank of Central African States.Observers estimate the value of that account atsome $3.56 billion.

According to widespread consensus, severalfactors drive economic growth in the Republic ofthe Congo. These include:

n Oil production. Coupled with increasing inter-national prices, there has been a continuingincrease of activities in this sector since 2000;

n Wood industry is the second main source ofincome and exports;

n Sugar production, although currently limited,has high economic potential and could generateimportant employment opportunities;

n Telecommunications is growing. Two mobiletelephone networks have expanded theircoverage throughout most of the country,investing some $10 million in 2004–2005; and

n Public investments have been made in largeinfrastructure projects, such as the Imbouloudam project representing an investment of

some $330 million over a six-year period(2003–2009).

After a decrease in both 2002 and 2003, non-oilincome started rising again, reflecting increasedeconomic activity. However, the increase isinsufficient. If calculated using only non-oilincome, the primary balance would equal anegative $702 million in 2007.

This situation is illustrative of one of the manycontradictions that characterize the Republic ofthe Congo. Two parallel economies exist. Thefirst comprises mainly the oil and woodindustries. It is modern, dynamic, competitiveand export-oriented. The second economy is moretraditional and is largely based on subsistenceagriculture, small and often informal businessesand a plethoric civil service. There is littleinterconnection between the two economies, andthe wealth of the first has little effect on theeconomic and human security of the majority ofthe population.

The Republic of the Congo is also highlyindebted.15 In March 2006, it qualified for debtrelief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countriesfacility of the International Monetary Fund(IMF). The government has yet to complete thereforms it committed to as pre-conditions fordebt relief in its discussions with IMF. Theagreement included three pillars to allow thecountry to move towards sustainable growth:

1. A sustainable medium-term fiscal strategythat takes into account the country’s limitedoil resources;

2. An improvement in the quality of publicspending, including an increase in pro-poorspending, and of the transparency andaccountability in the budgetary process; and

13 2006 figures from ADB/ADF show that the oil sector accounted for 64 percent of GDP, 85 percent of exports and 71percent of fiscal revenues. See ‘Country Strategy Document based on Results’, DSPAR 2008-2012 (ADB/ADF,December 2007).

14 The primary balance is defined as “revenue (excluding grants) minus non-interest current expenditure minus domesticallyfinanced capital expenditure and net lending”. See ‘Country Report no. 06/262’ (IMF, July 2006).

15 According to The World Bank’s Country Brief (see www.worldbank.org/cg), the external debt corresponds to 806 percentof budgetary income, 338 percent of exports and 235 percent of the GDP.

C H A P T E R 2 . N A T I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T C O N T E X T8

3. Measures to reduce the cost of doing business,including governance measures aimed attackling corruption.17

There is no doubt that the reforms envisagedwould go a long way in solving the country’sproblems and allowing citizens to benefit fromgrowth much more than they have so far.

2.4 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

As discussed in section 2.3, there is a contradictionbetween the wealth derived from oil extractionand the relatively poor performance of the countryin terms of human development. According tothe UNDP Human Development Report 2007–2008, the Republic of the Congo ranks 139th out of 177 countries. More than 50 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.18

Social security for the most vulnerable personsremains weak, and basic social infrastructure

and services destroyed by war have not been fully re-established.

Nevertheless, there has been marked progress,evident to the extent of reliability of official data.Table 2 illustrates this by showing the evolutionof select human development indicators from1998 through the end of the civil war cycle andthe years 2002 to 2005.

Currently, the situation in the health sector ischaracterized by the deterioration of services, theincrease of communicable diseases, and theexcessive concentration of health personnel andservices in urban areas.

The education sector has been severely affectedby the civil wars and resulting populationdisplacement. Gross primary school enrolmentdropped almost by half, to 57 percent in 1999,before beginning to rise again in 2002. It reached92 percent in 2004 and an almost pre-war level of

Source : UNDP Human Development Reports 2000 and 2004–2007

Indicator / year 1998 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average sub-Saharan Africa (2005)

Human Development Index 0.507 0.494 0.512 0.520 0.548 0.493

Life expectancy at birth 48.9 48.3 52 52.3 54.0 49.6

Adult literacy rate (%) 78.4 82.8 82.8 83 84.7 60.3

Children underweight for age (%) 17 25 14 14 15 n/a

Population with access to safe water (%) 34 49 46 58 58 55

Gender-related Development Index 0.499 0.488 0.507 0.519 0.540 n/a

Women in Parliament (% of seats)16 n/a 12 12 12 12 n/a

GDP per capita (purchasing power parity US$) 995 980 965 978 1.262 1.998

16 The parliamentary elections held in 2007 actually resulted in fewer women holding seats.17 IMF, ‘Country Report no. 07/206’, June 2007.18 A figure of 50.1 percent is given in the 2005 nationwide household survey. See National Centre for Statistics and

Economic Surveys, ‘Enquête Congolaise auprès des Ménages pour l’Evaluation de la Pauvreté (ECOM 2005)’,Brazzaville, April 2006.

Table 2. Evolution of select indicators for the period 1998 and 2002–2005

C H A P T E R 2 . N A T I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T C O N T E X T 9

111 percent in 2005.19 As in the health sector,there is undue concentration of personnel andservices in urban areas. The six grades of a rural primary school are often covered by onlytwo teachers.

Gender equality is enshrined in the 2002Constitution, and existing legislation for employ-ment, education or politics does not contradictthat principle. However, powerful social andtraditional forces contribute to negating genderequality. Women represent less then 14 percentof the Council of Ministers. They also hold 15percent of Senate seats, 9 percent of the NationalAssembly and less than 9 percent of localcouncils. The situation is better in the NationalEconomic Council, were women represent 33 percent.Women also have 30 percent of the seatson the National Commission on Human Rights.

Two major factors hamper the efforts of theCongo to ensure that its relative wealth translatesinto significant improvements of humandevelopment indicators: the continued effects ofthe social tensions, disruptions and destructioncaused by the civil wars, and generally weakgovernance. These points represent importantchallenges for the future of the country.

2.4.1 MOVING BEYOND THE POST-CONFLICT PERIOD

The wars of 1993, 1997 and 1998–1999 resultednot only in immense human suffering, but also inthe destruction of the economic and socialinfrastructure in the Congolese departmentsaffected by violence. In the most affected areas,the wars led to the destruction of 50 percent ofthe food production capacity and 90 percent ofthe livestock. Schooling was interrupted in fourregions and in Brazzaville, and 50 percent ofnational medical facilities were destroyed orlooted. The damage inflicted will take years to

repair, and full rehabilitation will depend oncomplete reconciliation and a more efficient useof national resources.

At the end of the civil wars, there were between15,000 and 25,000 militia fighters in theRepublic of the Congo, and there were anestimated 41,000 serviceable small arms and lightweapons.20 The social fabric of the country wasalso affected, as the militias were largely createdalong ethnic lines.

In a post-war 12-point platform called ‘NewHope’,21 President Sassou-Nguesso stated hisdetermination to build a lasting peace, toorganize political life in a stable institutionalenvironment, to promote a dynamic and prosper-ous economy and to ensure that each Congolesebenefits from security, welfare and social justice.

Significant progress has been achieved in theprocess of reconciliation and reconstruction.Following the adoption of a new constitution in2002, presidential elections were held, followedby parliamentary elections. A law on politicalparties has been adopted, and a second round ofparliamentary elections was organized in 2007.These elections should be followed by local electionsin 2008 and a second presidential election in2009. Despite claims of irregularities, electionshave taken place without violence. Oppositionparties—although with only 11 members—arerepresented in the Parliament. Journalists areallowed some leeway for criticism, and the activi-ties of human rights NGOs are tolerated.

Despite such progress, political reconciliation is notyet complete, as areas of the Pool Departmentremain under NRC control.

The vast majority of the persons displaced by warhave now returned or settled in a new—generallyurban—environment. Most of the militias have

19 The value of gross enrolment ratios can vary from less than 10 percent to more than 100 percent, reaching 130 percentin some countries when there are sizeable under-aged and/or over-aged enrolment.

20 Small Arms Survey, ‘Small Arms Availability, Trade and Impacts in the Republic of Congo’, Special Report, April 2002.21 ‘Nouvelle Espérance’, issued for the presidential election of 2002 by President Sassou-Nguesso.

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disbanded, although large quantities of weaponsare still held by the remaining active militia or by civilians.22

After a transition period, beginning immediatelyfollowing the end of hostilities and ending in2002, the country entered a phase of stabilization,reconciliation, and re-establishment of institutionsand rule of law. For many observers of the Congoleseenvironment, the second cycle of elections nowunder way should mark the end of the post-conflict phase, provided that such elections are fair,transparent and violence-free. Most emergency-oriented international NGOs have now left thecountry, as the UN OCHA did in May 2007.The International Committee of the Red Crosshas already closed two offices in the PoolDepartment and will have withdrawn from thelast one by the end of March 2008. It will continueto operate from Brazzaville and is confident thatthe Congolese Red Cross can effectively takeover most of its Kinkala-based activities.

2.4.2 IMPROVING GOVERNANCE

Through the Interim Poverty Reduction StrategyPaper (I-PRSP) of 2004, the governmentacknowledged a number of problems and issuesrelated to governance. These included:

n The crisis of administration, state authorityand control;

n Erroneous and inadequate allocation of availablehuman, material and financial resources;

n Worsening corruption and fraud;

n Lack of coordination among the variousadministrations involved in economicmanagement; and

n Inappropriate contract awarding procedures.23

This meant that the pro-poor expendituresplanned in successive national budgets were often

not used or were simply siphoned away for other purposes. The only budgets that showimportant overspending have been the politicaland security allocations.

In an assessment at the end of 2007, the AfricanDevelopment Bank/African Development Fund(ADB/ADF)24 noted some progress towardsgood governance, particularly concerningtransparency in the oil sector. Such observationsincluded the creation of a national commission tofight corruption and fraud, as well as a separateobservatory on corruption, the latter with theparticipation of members of the civil society. Thereport also noted that although the principle ofdecentralization had been accepted, the transferof resources to local administrations had nottaken place, except for an ad hoc flat transfer of some $2.3 million to each department.Remaining high priorities include furtherimprovements in governance, capacity buildingwithin the civil service, and fostering a strongerpolitical will to reform.

2.5 ACHIEVING PROGRESS ON THEMILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The scarcity of data renders monitoring indicatorsfor the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)difficult. The tracking of indicators made by TheWorld Bank25 indicates that by 2005, most of theindicators related to social and communityservices had barely reached their pre-war levels of1990, a sad illustration of the consequences ofrepeated conflicts of the nineties.

Published in 2004, the latest National MDGReport estimated that the achievement of MDGtargets was unlikely for the elimination of genderdisparity in secondary education, reversal of theincidence of malaria and other diseases, andsignificant improvement of the lives of slum

22 Survey undertaken in 2007 by the NGO Small Arms Survey.23 Republic of the Congo. ‘Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) for the Congo’, 27 September 2004.24 ADB/ADF. ‘Country Strategy Document Based on Results’ (DSPAR 2008-2012), December 2007.25 As posted on The World Bank Web site; see http://go.worldbank.org/JE0BPHWUT0.

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dwellers. Only two targets were considered likelyto be achieved: achieving universal primaryeducation and dealing comprehensively with thedebt problem. Table 3 represents a governmentalassessment of the likelihood of reaching, by 2015, the goals presented in the 2004 NationalMDG Report.

Progress towards attaining the MDGs remains atthe heart of the government’s strategy forreducing poverty. With support from UNDP, thegovernment is finalizing a national strategy for

the attainment of the MDGs.26 The authors ofthe latest draft have identified the necessaryconditions of success, including the promotion ofgood governance, a diversification of the nationaleconomy, a dynamic policy of employment andtraining, the allocation of resources to pro-pooractivities and their actual disbursement, an equitablerepartition of national wealth and, lastly, a strongpolitical will to respect commitments.

Two important features of this draft MDGstrategy are that its activities are budgeted and

Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hungerTarget 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income isless than $1 a day Target 2:Halve,between 1990 and 2015,the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary educationTarget 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be ableto complete a full course of primary schooling

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower womenTarget 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferablyby 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015

Goal 4: Reduce child mortalityTarget 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate

Goal 5: Improve maternal healthTarget 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio

Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseasesTarget 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria andother major diseases

Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainabilityTarget 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policiesand programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access tosafe drinking water and basic sanitation Target 11: Have achieved by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of slum dwellers

Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for developmentTarget 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countriesthrough national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable inthe long term

Potentially

Potentially

Likely

Unlikely

Potentially

Potentially

PotentiallyUnlikely

Potentially

Potentially

Unlikely

Likely

Goals / Targets Likelihood ofachieving

Table 3. Likelihood of achieving MDG targets (2004 estimates)

Source: Government of the Republic of the Congo, National MDG Report, 2004.

26 Republic of the Congo. ‘National Plan for attaining MDGs in the Congo’ (sixth draft), December 2007.

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that it includes a realistic mechanism for themonitoring and evaluation of the national plan.The monitoring plan is based on recent surveysconstituting a baseline, although incomplete, and ona programme to strengthen the national statisticaland monitoring and evaluation capacity.

2.6 UNDP IN THE DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

The Ministry of Planning,27 the principalnational partner of UNDP in the Republic of theCongo, plays a central role in discussions withdifferent members of the international aidcommunity. The Ministry of Planning approvesthe major agreements and strategy documentsgoverning the activities of UNDP. UNDPcooperates closely with the ministry and providesfinancial and technical support in order tostrengthen ministerial capacity and assist in theelaboration of national strategy documents. UNDPalso works closely with several line ministries,particularly the Ministry of Health and SocialServices. Close links have been developed withthe National Assembly and the Senate and witha number of other national institutions.

The major international development actors presentin the Republic of the Congo are the BrettonWoods Institutions, France and the EuropeanUnion. China has also become an increasinglyprominent partner of the country. Major donorsto UNDP programmes in 2006 and 2007 includeThe World Bank ($4.2 million),28 Japan ($2.2 million), the European Union ($2 million),Sweden ($1 million) and ADB ($0.1 million).The Government of the Republic of the Congohas contributed $0.4 million from nationalresources under a cost-sharing formula duringthe same two-year period.

Unlike many other countries, the Republic of theCongo does not have an elaborate and compre-

hensive coordination mechanism, which istypically composed of thematic groups and anoverseeing body. The likely explanation is thatthe number of resident bilateral and multilateralagencies is limited, with many countries coveringthe Congo from another base in the region, andseveral UN organizations not being represented ona permanent basis. Coordination therefore remainslargely ad hoc and linked to punctual requirements.

Temporary coordination or consultation mechanismshave been put in place for exercises such as the preparation of the I-PRSP, the PovertyReduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the NationalHuman Development Report and the NationalPlan for the MDGs, as well as for preparationsfor particular events or meetings. Recently, theEuropean Union and the French Embassy havebeen jointly convening coordination meetings inpreparation for a forthcoming meeting in Accraunder the framework of the Paris Declaration onAid Effectiveness. In the absence of other initia-tives to structure coordination among donors,that particular group is considering pursuing theeffort beyond the immediate objective of theAccra meeting.

Relations between UNDP and internationaldonors are often characterized as a collaborationof equal partners in the global development effortand the unequal partnership between a donor andUNDP as fundraiser. Occasionally, temporarytensions resulted from such situations. Forexample, long and difficult talks with The WorldBank took place to re-negotiate an overheadpercentage under a school rehabilitation project.Similarly, the European Union was critical ofimplementation delays and financial reportingfor two projects it financed.

Coordination within the UN system is naturallygreater than with other partners.The UN CountryTeam (UNCT) meets regularly and cooperates inthe formulation of common assessments and

27 Ministère du Plan et de l’Aménagement du Territoire.28 Funds contributed to the Government of the Republic of the Congo but managed by UNDP under agreement with

The World Bank.

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strategy documents.Two types of regular meetingsexist. The first concerns general substantivecoordination among UNCT members and addressescommon concerns, such as administrative andmanagement issues, programme strategies andpolicies or common communication strategies.The meetings are convened on what appears tobe an ad hoc basis, and some participants haveexpressed the wish to have them at fixedintervals. These substantive meetings are supple-mented by thematic groups and as well as‘Communities of Practices’ that deal withprogramme sectors and themes. In addition toUNCT members, national counterparts anddonors often participate. The second type ofUNCT meetings deal with security issues and areused to advise the UN Resident Coordinator inhis capacity as designated official responsible forUN security.

The UNCT in the Republic of the Congoconsists of eleven members, including the nineUN agencies and programmes with local offices,the IMF and The World Bank. All UNCTmeetings are chaired by the UNDP ResidentRepresentative, acting in his capacity as UNResident Coordinator. In his absence, a represen-tative of one of the participating agencies acts aschair. The Deputy Resident Representative sitsfor UNDP in these meetings. As UNDPoperations in the Republic of the Congo are toosmall to justify the creation of the post of CountryDirector, as is now done in some other situations,the roles and responsibilities of UN ResidentCoordinator and UNDP Resident Representativeare often confused.The UN coordination effort nowbenefits from the presence of full-time, dedicatedstaff to assist the UN Resident Coordinator.

UNCT is now engaged in the preparation of aUnited Nations Development AssistanceFramework (UNDAF) for the period of2009–2013. Following two UN plans for theperiod of 2000–2002 and annual ConsolidatedHumanitarian Appeals through 2006, this will bethe first comprehensive UNDAF processdeveloped for the Republic of the Congo since2000. The last Common Country Assessment

(CCA) prepared by UNCT dates back to 2005.For the ongoing UNDAF process, it was decidedto forego the preparation of another CCA, as therecent PRSP, supplemented by complementaryanalysis, was judged to have provided a soundbasis for developing the UN framework.

A review of activities in the immediate post-conflict period resulted in the recommendationfor UNDP to strengthen relations with civilsociety, NGOs and the private sector. Thecountry office has established some successfulprivate-sector partnerships through a project tosupport the development of strategies foraddressing HIV/AIDS in some 30 largemanufacturing and business firms. UNDP alsosigned a framework agreement for a partnershipwith Total, the largest oil company operating inthe Republic of the Congo. The agreement opensthe way for partnerships in a number of areas,including HIV/AIDS, the environment, povertyreduction, micro-finance programmes as well asnew information and communication technology(NICT). Representatives of the manufacturingand business communities are regularly invited toparticipate in consultations organized by UNDP.

Relations with NGOs and members of the civilsociety, on the other hand, were less intense thanduring the preceding period. During the immediatepost-conflict period, UNDP developedoperational relationships with several NGOs andlocal associations for the implementation ofemergency recovery projects. In the newprogramming cycle, more emphasis was graduallyput on execution through national institutions,and direct operational relationship with NGOsbecame an exception to the rule. Nevertheless,UNDP continued to consult with civil society,including some national NGOs, as part of itssupport for the elaboration of major reports andstrategy documents.

Until May 2007, when OCHA withdrew itspresence, there existed a humanitarian coordina-tion hub. The hub, located in the premises ofUNDP, enabled members of the UN system,donors, NGOs and relevant national institutions

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to share information on their respective activities.This avoided unnecessary duplication of effortand allowed newcomers to build upon the experienceand knowledge of other organizations. Thesecoordination meetings were highly appreciated,and a number of participants felt they shouldhave been continued after the departure ofOCHA. UNDP lost an opportunity to capitalizeon that success in 2007 by failing to take over the

coordination meetings (albeit with a differentdevelopment emphasis).

Among the general public, the UNDP image isrelatively positive, benefiting from high-visibilityreconciliation and peace-building operations,such as the collection and public burning ofweapons. UNDP activities are well covered in thenational media.

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This chapter briefly reviews the relevance ofUNDP activities with regard to major nationaland international objectives, as well as theorganization’s capacity to adapt to changes incontext and the environment. It provides anoverall analysis of operational efficiency, followedby a more in-depth review of the four largerthematic areas in which UNDP is active.

3.1 OVERALL ANALYSIS OF UNDP2004–2007 COUNTRY PROGRAMME

The UNDP country programme is structuredaround three major themes: good governance,poverty reduction, and environmental and natural-resource management. There are three additionalcross-cutting themes, which include gender,HIV/AIDS and NICT. The intent was to buildstrong synergies between UNDP programmecomponents and components of programmes byother members of the aid community.

In broad terms, the expected results were to:

n Increase the capacity of the principalgovernance institutions, mainly throughsupport that addresses the needs of parlia-mentary institutions, local authorities andcivil society;

n Improve responsible reporting in publicadministration;

n Strengthen capacity for reducing poverty andachieving the MDGs on the part of thegovernment and civil society; and

n Strengthen the capacity of national andsectoral authorities to plan and implementintegrated approaches to environmentalmanagement and energy development thatmeet the needs of the poor.

The approved country programme was used as aframework to guide country-office activities.The programme was modified as necessary toavoid duplication with non-UNDP initiativesand respond to funding opportunities or govern-ment requests.

It is worth noting that crisis prevention andrecovery activities were not presented under aseparate theme, but were instead—and surpris-ingly—included under the theme of povertyreduction. The evaluation team was told that thegovernment wished to clearly mark a passagefrom a post-conflict situation to a developmentphase and preferred not to emphasize post-conflict activities. Nevertheless, such activitiescontinued to represent an important part ofUNDP work and a large share of its resources.For its own analysis, the evaluation team opted topresent post-conflict activities separately.

The initial budget estimates for the four-yearprogramme stood at $11,035,000. Of this,$2,535,000 (23 percent) was expected to comefrom UNDP regular resources. Actual expendi-tures were more than double that amount,reaching $22,706,934, of which 20 percent wasallocated from regular target for resource assign-ment from the core (TRAC) 1 resources.

3.1.1 PROGRAMME RELEVANCE

UNDP interventions are decided upon in consul-tation with the government and correspond tonational priorities as contained in major nationalstrategy and policy documents. Such documentsinclude the 2002 presidential platform of ‘NewHope’, the I-PRSP and, in some cases, nationalsectoral plans, such as the one for the environment.The programme also respects the priorities

Chapter 3

UNDP CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S1 6

defined by the New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment, as well as the global and regionalobjectives of UNDP.

The consensus among respondents from thegovernment, the aid community and civil societyis that UNDP activities correspond to genuineneeds in the country. However, not all areas ofactivity are recognized as being areas ofexcellence, where the comparative advantages ofUNDP are evident. In general, recognized areasof expertise include UNDP interventions in thefields of governance, support to communitygroups, support to the preparation of nationalstrategy documents and reports, and advocacy forthe environment, HIV/AIDS and gender issues.

Some activities are seen as less successful and notentirely relevant to the UNDP mandate andexpertise. In particular, this relates to highlyoperational downstream projects for the rehabili-tation of infrastructure damaged by wars. Forexample, between 2002 and 2004 the rehabilitationof rural tracks was undertaken with deficienttechnical backstopping by the United NationsOffice for Project Services.

As noted in section 3.1, a structural anomaly inthe country programme resulted from thedecision to present conflict prevention andrecovery activities under the theme of povertyreduction. The programme would have benefitedfrom a clearer presentation that emphasizedconflict prevention and recovery as an independentprogramme component.

3.1.2 IMPLEMENTING LESSONS LEARNEDFROM THE PREVIOUS CYCLE

The Country Programme document approved bythe UNDP Executive Board in September 2003noted some lessons learned from past operationsin the Republic of the Congo and madecorresponding recommendations.

1. Adopting a programme approach enhancingcoherence and synergies. Although a pro-gramme approach was adopted in the planningphase, the realities of implementation have

forced the country office to proceed with projectsrather than fully integrated programmes. Thenecessity to divide the programme intoprojects corresponding to donor fundingmechanisms has meant that the programmesbecame de facto umbrella programmes, eachcovering a portfolio of projects.

The country office considered that theCountry Programme Document constituteda framework that had to be responsive tochanged circumstances and priorities duringimplementation. Thus, UNDP had to foregosome of the planned activities when fundingthem proved difficult or when others hadpreviously engaged in the same field. Thiswas the case for planned activities related tomarine and coastal environments and forfollow-up on the UNDP-supported surveyon corruption and fraud. On the other hand,certain activities were incorporated into theprogramme without being planned from theoutset. These included, for example, therehabilitation of primary schools, undertakenin consideration of the UNDP comparativeadvantages in community action and at therequest of both the government and TheWorld Bank.

UNDP successfully developed synergiesbetween different projects and activities. Thiswas particularly visible in the PoolDepartment, where a project for youth at riskwas used to support disarmament of formercombatants and primary-school rehabilitationactivities. Another example of synergies, thistime at the upstream level, concerned UNDPsupport to parliamentary institutions. In thiscase, the access and goodwill generated bythe project allowed UNDP to conduct moreeffective advocacy and enlist the active supportof parliament on a number of issues, includinggender, HIV/AIDS and the environment.

2. Strengthening and deepening partnershipswith NGOs and associations. A secondlesson called for further development ofrelationships with NGOs and associations asa proven mechanism of delivering assistance

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in areas that remained insecure. As mentionedin section 2.6, relations with NGOs andassociations have been less intense during thecurrent programming cycle than in theimmediate post-war period, when nationalimplementation capacity was particularlyweak. In the new cycle, UNDP has correctlyplaced more—and continues to graduallyincrease—emphasis on national execution.

3. Improving national ownership, ensuringsustainability of the outcomes of projectsand actions, and fostering nationalcapacity-building in the area of economicmanagement. Unfortunately, full nationalownership and the resulting sustainability ofresults remain the weak points of severalUNDP activities carried out under theprogramme. In many cases of both upstreamand downstream interventions, the plannedoutputs were delivered, yet anticipated resultscould not be achieved due to the national orlocal authorities’ failure to devote the humanand financial resources necessary to sustainsuch results. This important issue is furtherdiscussed, and concrete examples are providedin the thematic sections of this ADR.

4. Deepening and broadening partnershipswith the private sector, particularly in thecontext of fighting poverty and HIV/AIDS,as well as environmental and natural-resource preservation and management. Asdiscussed in section 2.6, this recommenda-tion has largely been implemented.

3.1.3 FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAMME

The UNDP country office has succeeded inredressing its rate of delivery,29 which was partic-ularly low at the beginning of the period underreview. For 2004 and 2005, the delivery ratestood at only 66 and 65 percent, respectively.Following stricter controls introduced by thecountry office management and an increasedreliance on an office-based service centre responsible

for procuring goods and services, the rate ofdelivery increased to 78 percent in 2006 and 87 percent in 2007. According to the 2007performance ranking by the UNDP RegionalBureau for Africa, the Republic of the Congo’scountry office achieved second place among 44 countries, due in part to the improvement inprogramme delivery.

Programme funding demonstrates a heavyreliance on non-core resources and, therefore, areliance on additional fundraising on the part ofthe UNDP country office. Figure 1 indicates therespective proportions of core and non-coreresources expended for each of the four yearsunder review. There are two notable observations.First, UNDP has been increasingly successful inmobilizing and using additional non-coreresources, though often at the expense of othermanagement duties. Second, UNDP coreresource allocations remained relatively lowduring the programme period. This phenomenonis due to the methodology applied in allocatingTRAC resources to different country programmes.

Two factors constitute the principal basis forallocations: the classification of a country on thebasis of the gross national income per capita andthe size of its population. Oil revenues place theRepublic of the Congo in the lower middle-incomegroup. It also does not fall into the category ofleast developed countries, and its population isrelatively small. No special consideration appearsto have been given to the structural problems ofthe country’s economy and its poor human-development ranking. This combination offactors has resulted in core (TRAC 1) resourcesexpenditure representing a yearly average of$1,141,000, which equals only some 20 percentof total UNDP programme expenditure.

This has proven to be limiting in many ways.First, UNDP was restrained in using coreresources as seed money to launch new activities

29 Expenditure as a percentage of approved budgets. Source: UNDP country office in Brazzaville based on the UNDPATLAS accounting system.

C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S1 8

and attract additional funding. Second, thecountry office had to develop an aggressivefundraising strategy that, at times, souredrelations with donors. Some of them felt UNDPengaged in activities simply because of fundingopportunities; others thought that by engagingwith some parts of the government, UNDP wascompeting for funding.

The current programme cycle marked thebeginning of a shift in project execution modalities,in line with a gradual passage from a post-conflict situation into a stabilization period. Theprevious period had been characterized bycooperation with some international and localNGOs for the implementation of projects, aswell as by the extensive use of the directexecution modality (DEX). Progress in movingtowards the national execution modality (NEX)has been modest, with less than 30 percent ofexpenditures occurring under NEX during2004–2007.

In 2006, the country office commissioned anevaluation of the NEX through both governmentinstitutions and national NGOs. The evaluation

concluded that a comprehensive programme forstrengthening national capacity was essential forachieving the objective of moving towardsincreased national execution. In June 2006, thegovernment also requested that UNDP manageon its behalf some of the funds provided underNEX. This request concerned mainly procurementactivities and was made in order to improve therate of delivery for NEX projects, which hadpreviously been alarmingly low. Under someprojects, a hybrid NEX/DEX formula emerged;it now needs to be accompanied by a strongcapacity-building approach and concrete govern-mental measures in order to streamline itsdisbursement mechanisms and render them moretransparent. In the meantime, the passage to a pure NEX modality must remain gradual and prudent.

3.1.4 CONSULTATION MECHANISMS

A number of mechanisms have been put in placeto ensure the widest possible participation in theformulation and management of programmesand projects. Local project review committeesassess and approve UNDP interventions prior totheir inception. During the course of implemen-

Year

2004 2005 2006 2007

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

Res

ou

rces

n Core resources n Other resources

Figure 1. Annual expenditure 2004–2007 by core and non-core resources

C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S 1 9

tation, programmes and projects have also beenmonitored and overseen by steering committeesthat were expected to meet regularly. Both typesof committees enjoy large participation thatincludes not only the immediate government anddonor partners, but also civil society organiza-tions and individual experts.

Some committee members felt that their consul-tations were merely symbolic, as meetingsoccurred at the end of the planning process,mostly after the project design had beenapproved by a donor. With few exceptions,such as the governance programme, steeringcommittees met irregularly, and some had notmet at all. It would appear that difficulty arosefrom the designation of chairs at the ministeriallevel, which placed additional demands on theschedules of people who are already extremelybusy. One minister mentioned to the evaluationteam that she had asked a senior civil servant tochair steering committees and report to her. Thismight provide the formula to increase theeffectiveness of such committees.

3.1.5 INTERNAL MANAGEMENT ISSUES

The country office implemented two initiativesto improve programme management. The firstconcerned the establishment of outlying officesin four parts of the Republic of the Congooutside Brazzaville. The offices in Kinkala, PoolDepartment, and in Pointe-Noire, KouilouDepartment, have been designated as UN offices.In fact, they are staffed and maintained byUNDP alone and provide ad hoc services tovisiting personnel from other agencies. The othertwo offices, Dolisie in Niari Department andOwando in the Cuvette Department houseUNDP project staff. The location of the fouroffices demonstrates the balanced UNDPapproach to addressing the needs of people in allparts of the country.

UNDP made a bold gesture by opening theKinkala office in the troubled Pool Department.

It constituted a powerful signal of the return topeace, normalcy and reconciliation. This positivepublic-relations effect could have been amplified, had senior office personnel beenpresent on a more regular basis or had otherUNDP staff been more mobile in the wholeDepartment. However, UN security rulescontinue to limit access to a number of districtsin the Pool Department, though such rules areconsidered excessively prudent among somelocally active non-UN organizations. Theyshould also be allowed to benefit from theservices of UNDP field offices, which shouldendeavour to play an increased role in providinga forum for coordination among developmentand humanitarian actors in their regions.

As part of the 2007 restructuring, country officesenior management decided to create a Centrefor Project Execution and Support (CEDAP).30

It was launched in September 2007, followingthe finalization of a business plan and the recruit-ment of a manager and an assistant. CEDAP is amerger of two former entities: the DEX Unit andthe Service Centre. Its main objective was toboost the delivery of UNDP programmes. Itsservices included support to UNDP projects byprocuring goods and services, support to govern-ment partners requesting services within CEDAPcapabilities, and management and assumption offull responsibility for procurement-only UNDPprojects executed under DEX.

The Centre is experiencing increasing demandamong government institutions wishing tooutsource their procurement activities, even incases where such activities are not financedthrough UNDP. This interesting developmentunderscores the unit’s excellent performance.However, it would be prudent not to overstrainthe capacity of CEDAP. While this service hasalready demonstrated its capacity to accelerateprocurement and reduce costs, a full evaluation ofits activities should take place in late 2009, aftertwo full years of operation.

30 Centre d’exécution et d’appui aux projets.

C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S2 0

Despite a significant improvement in the rate ofprogramme delivery in 2006–2007, the efficiencyof UNDP financial management continues tosuffer from negative perceptions among itspartners, particularly with regard to disbursementspeed. One partner complained about the lack ofquality and delayed delivery of financial reportson the use of contributions to UNDP. Thisshould send a clear signal that UNDP needs toenergetically pursue efforts to streamlineprocedures, avoid over-centralization and betterreward superior staff performance.

3.1.6 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

During the period of 2004–2007, the UNDPcountry office undertook four formal evaluations:evaluation of the community action project,evaluation of the HIV/AIDS prevention project,a mid-term evaluation of the youth at riskproject, and an unfinished final evaluation of thefirst phase of the weapons collection project.31

As previously mentioned, an evaluation of NEXwas conducted in 2006 and, in the beginning of2008, an outcome evaluation of the environmentand energy programme was underway and closeto completion. In total, this effort fell onlyslightly short of the objectives of the originalevaluation plan.

The evaluation team found that outcomes ofprogrammes and projects were often merelyoutputs. In addition, outcome indicators were attimes defined in a purely qualitative way, makingmonitoring and assessment more subjective thanfactual. No human or financial resources wereallocated to the systematic production of baselinedata or to monitoring indicators throughout thelife of each project. This proved to be anotherweakness, which rendered the evaluation ofoutcomes extremely difficult. According toinformation given to the evaluation team, thiscan be explained by the fact that many donors didnot wish to accommodate costs that, in theirview, are administrative in nature. However, the

importance of being able to properly illustrate theresults of programme interventions, UNDPshould insist that donors accept and coverrealistic monitoring costs—or, alternatively, use itsown allocated regular resources for the purpose.

The draft UNDAF document for 2009–2013goes a long way to defining measurable outcomeindicators for each of the programmecomponents, as well as potential sources ofinformation to monitor these indicators. Indesigning its next country programme for theRepublic of the Congo, UNDP should drawextensively on this excellent inter-agency workand align its own outcomes and indicators on thoseof the UNDAF. It would then be conceivable to go a step further in inter-agency cooperationand undertake joint multi-agency programmeevaluations. Such evaluations should be external,independent and could be funded through thefunds for coordination at the disposal of theResident Coordinator.

3.2 IMPROVING DEMOCRATICGOVERNANCE

Table 4 details the major components of thedemocratic governance programme and theunderlying areas of activity. The intendedoutcomes of the programme, as defined in thecountry programme document of 2003, were:

n Increased efficiency and representativeness ofParliament in discharging its legislative andgovernmental oversight duties;

n Ratification, implementation and monitoringof the Convention on the Elimination of AllForms of Discrimination against Women;

n Involvement of local authorities and communitymembers in planning and managing develop-ment and public service activities; and

n Enhanced efficiency, responsibility andtransparency in public administration.

31 The country office rejected the draft report on the weapons collection project, on the grounds that it did not fully respectthe Terms of Reference and was generally biased.

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The overall objective of the programme was tostrengthen the democratic process and the rule oflaw for sustainable human development.

Good governance is at the centre of the strategyformulated by the government, with strong

encouragement and support of the internationalcommunity, for achieving sustainable growthwhile improving the livelihood of populations. Itis also a pre-condition for successfully complet-ing the political, economic and social transitionstarted in 1991. Almost all members of the

Strengthening Parliamentary Institutions

Support to the new democratic institutions

Strengthening Civil Society Organizations andpromotion of human rights

Strengthening the capacity of political parties andsupport for their legal framework

Support fight against corruption and strengthencapacity in transparency and ethics

Improvement of public administration performance

Strengthening consultation and coordination at the ministerial level

Support to the decentralization process

Support to local development

Strengthening national capacities in financial andeconomic management

Support to private sector development

Component / activity

NEX32

NEX

NEX

DEX/NEX

AGEX (shifted to DEX)

NEX

DEX

NEX

NEX

Execution

2001-2006

2004-2007

2004-2007

2005-2007

2003-2007

Starting in 2008

Ongoing

Ongoing

Ongoing butlimited

Duration

300,000

3.7 million33

Budget US$

Table 4: Governance Programme 2004-2007: components and activities

Component 1: Democratic Governance

Component 2: Administrative Governance

Component 4: Economic Governance

Not started

Left to The World Bank, IMFand ADB

Component 3: Local Governance

Component 5: Support preparation of national framework for good governance Not started

Source: UNDP Republic of the Congo country office.

32 Shifted to NEX/DEX.33 A single umbrella project has been created to cover most of the activities related to governance.

the Inter-Parliamentary Union conducted a jointevaluation of the effectiveness of support toparliamentary institutions.

3.2.1 REVIEW OF RESULTS

Strengthening democratic governanceA number of activities were undertaken to fosterdemocratic governance. Two activities selected asrepresentative of interventions under thisprogramme component are analyzed in moredetail in boxes one and two.

Human rights were another area of significantactivity. With the involvement of governmentrepresentatives, CSOs, minority groups (Pygmies)and UN system representatives, UNDPconducted public awareness campaigns, trainedpolice officers on the rights of citizens andorganized the celebration of the InternationalDay for Human Rights. UNDP also supportedNGOs in establishing several legal clinics inresponse to the acute need of a populationwithout easy or free access to justice. However, asthese clinics rely largely on volunteer services, theabsence of regular and independent public orprivate income for operating costs and essentialpermanent staff renders their long-term sustain-ability questionable.

Another meaningful UNDP contribution wasthe support given to formulating legislation onpolitical parties, as it provided a much-neededlegal framework for multiparty democracy.UNDP combined such support with a programmefor training political parties, which included trainingfor opposition parties. Training took place mainlyin a South-South framework. The project helpedestablish a consultative framework, as well asbehavioural norms for interactions amongparties, associations and the government.

The planned support to new democratic institu-tions, such as the Human Rights Commissionand the Higher Council for Freedom inCommunications, could not be implemented dueto lack of funding.

international aid community are involved inhelping the government improve governance, andUNDP is part of a common effort that couldbenefit from increased coordination.

No significant changes were required to theinitial programme, as governance remained anoverwhelming priority throughout the periodand is still one today. The only changes occurredwhen planned UNDP interventions weresuperseded by programmes of internationalfinancial institutions as part of wider discussionson economic and administrative governance.This concerned support to private-sectordevelopment and the follow-up to the survey onfraud and corruption. During the course ofimplementation, additional intended outcomeswere identified, corresponding to new operationalopportunities, particularly regarding support forlegislation on political parties and the role ofwomen in politics.

Although some activities had to be initiated priorto the 2005 launch of the larger umbrella project,particular efforts were made in this area ofintervention to ensure that a comprehensive andcoherent programme was developed. Theprogramme was divided into different projectsfor execution and financing purposes. Someactivities, such as support to parliamentaryinstitutions and support to the cooperationframework and NEX, were continued from theprevious phase and received additional resourcesunder the new programme cycle.

The projects were submitted to a local projectreview committee.34 In the case of thegovernance programme, oversight by the steeringcommittee was quite satisfactory. The actingdirector of the national management unitprepared a progress report for the period of2005–2006. Ad hoc progress reports were alsoprepared for some sub-components, such as theinitiative for the organization of DepartmentParliamentary Conferences or for the promotionof women in politics. The French Parliament and

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34 Comités Locaux D’évaluation des Projets.

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Strengthening administrative governanceUnder this component, UNDP intended to supportthe fight against corruption and fraud, contribute toimproving public administration performance andsupport enhanced consultation and coordination atthe ministerial level. Only the first activity could bestarted during the 2004–2007 period. The plannedactivity of improving public administrationperformance was delayed until 2008 due to lackof funding, and more recently, due to a misunder-standing in which the counterpart ministry wasexpecting only the provision of equipment, whileUNDP was considering institutional, rather thanonly material, support. In addition to the anti-fraudproject (see Box 3), UNDP provided institutionalsupport to the Official Journal, which electroni-cally records all official documents.

Strengthening local governanceUNDP backed governmental decentralizationefforts, mainly through institutional support tothe technical committee for the evaluation ofdecentralization, which included representativesfrom all ministries. A training programme basedon a needs assessment of locally elected officialswas being finalized in March 2008. The positiverole played by UNDP in the organization ofDepartmental Parliamentarian Conferences (seeBox 1) led to the decision of the Ministry incharge of decentralization to request the office’sassistance in that sector. The Conferences alsoconvinced the government to allocate resourcesto local authorities. In 2008, support to localdevelopment programmes will start in tworegions on a pilot basis.

The programme organized work-shops and study tours for the staffsupporting the secretariats of boththe National Assembly and theSenate, as well as for parliamentar-ians. Training for parliamentarianswas aimed at improving theirknowledge on organization,processes, parliamentary diplomacyand budgetary issues.

The programme helped create the Centre of Information andLegislative Research of theParliament by providingequipment, computers anddocumentation. Unfortunately,access to the Internet nevermaterialized, as the ParliamentSecretariat failed to earmarkresources to finance the service.

Computers were also provided to the Finance Committee and the Brazzaville office of the Central African Network of WomenParliamentarians. The programmesupported some initiatives toopen the dialogue between theParliament and civil society and to improve the image of theRepublic of the Congo in theinternational parliamentary arena.

Major results of the programme included:

n Successful advocacy leading to policy formulation.UNDP made extensive use ofthe parliamentarian platform to advocate and raise awarenessof a number of cross-cuttingissues, such as HIV/AIDS, theenvironment, climate change,poverty alleviation, gender andnew information technologies.The Parliament adopted official statements on most of these subjects.

n Promoting decentralizationthrough organizingDepartmental Parliamen-tarian Conferences. Thesegatherings aimed to initiate adialogue, outside the capitalcity, between locally electedrepresentatives and nationalparliamentarians, in order todiscuss global issues, identifylocal needs and pave the wayfor decentralizing the politicaland administrative systems.Six conferences were organizedfrom 2003 to 2006, but nonewere held in 2007 due to a lackof funds. The Parliament did nottake over this initiative thoughits own financial resources.

n Successful introduction of gender considerations in programme execution.UNDP provided training to

women parliamentarians andsupported the formation of the Central African Network ofWomen Parliamentarians.

The numerous achievements ofthis programme highlight it asone area of excellence for UNDP in the Republic of the Congo. Theprogramme delivered the plannedoutputs; however, the anticipatedresults did not fully materialize.For constitutional and politicalconsiderations outside the pro-gramme’s influence, parliamentarycapacity to submit legislationproposals and exercise its legislativeand governmental oversightfunctions remained weak.National ownership exists, but the sustainability of results is most often not guaranteed in theabsence of budgetary allocationsto pursue activities.

The strengthening of parliamen-tary institutions is not limited to building technical and adminis-trative capacity. The process alsorequires strong national politicalwill and support. The results of the programme should beexamine from a longer-termperspective, and UNDP shouldcontinue its support, whileinsisting on concrete measures to ensure national ownership.

Box 1. Strengthening Parliament

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Strengthening economic governanceUNDP has only just begun activities related toeconomic governance. These remain limited totraining initiatives for members of the Economicand Finances Commission of the NationalAssembly and the Senate.

3.2.2 MAJOR PARTNERSHIPS, COORDINATIONAND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

UNDP participates in consultations and coordi-nation on governance issues through a ThematicGroup and a National Community on BestPractices. For the preparation of the I-PRSP, thefinal PRSP and its supplementary documents, aswell as for the ongoing preparation of theUNDAF, coordination with donors and the UNsystem was strong. The European Union, Franceand The World Bank are involved in support tomany oversight and control institutions,including the General Inspectorate, the localequivalent of a general accounts office,35

Economic and Financial Commissions and theNational Commission against Corruption andFraud. UNDP is or plans to be involved in

programmes with some of the same institutionsand would also benefit from increased coordina-tion with other actors.

Donor interest in strengthening parliamentaryinstitutions facilitated the mobilization ofresources. For other programmes, the UNDPcountry office used some of its regular resourcesand appealed for additional UNDP resourcesfrom the Democratic Governance ThematicTrust Fund. Major donor partners in the area ofgovernance included Italy, Sweden, theNetherlands through the Association ofEuropean Parliamentarians for Africa, theAfrican Capacity Building Initiative and theADB. UNDP also worked with internationalNGOs, such as the National DemocraticInstitute for International Affairs and theKonrad Adenauer Foundation.

UNDP succeeded in raising awareness andenlisting the active support of the Parliament ona number of issues. UNDP was also able toprovide advice through the use of South-South

The Centre for the Promotion of Women in Politics, an NGOreceiving technical and financialsupport from UNDP, trainedwomen on various topics. Theseincluded advocacy for politicalchange, leadership and manage-ment, entry of young women in politics, access to decision-making institutions, women anddemocracy, and best practices in governance. These trainingsessions targeted individualsand representatives of associa-tions. Most were held outsidethe major cities of Brazzavilleand Pointe-Noire.

This project also developed amanual for women consideringrunning for public office andhelped women develop a

subregional network toexchange experiences inaccessing political positions.

The Centre is recognized as asuccessful institution for itsintellectual capacity and itsactive advocacy programme forpromoting women in politics.

Such efforts, combined withstrong advocacy with theParliament, led to the revision ofthe electoral law to introduce aquota of 15 percent womencandidates for parliamentaryelections and 20 percent forlocal elections. The number ofwomen parliamentarians,unfortunately, did not increasewith 2007 elections (of a total of137 seats, 12 seats in 2002 and

only nine in 2007). In anticipa-tion of upcoming local elections,the electoral law is underrevision to avoid positioningwomen only in unfavourableplaces on electoral lists.

In all political parties, there is still resistance to women’s entryinto politics, under the pretextthat there are not enoughqualified women.

This programme illustrates whatone could term a ‘dormantsuccess’. Despite the absence of immediate results in therepresentation of women,conditions for a real success inthe future exist. The programmeis on the right track and requiressustained UNDP attention.

Box 2. Promoting women in politics

35 Cour des Comptes.

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expertise, national and international NGOs andeminent personalities.

3.2.3 MAIN FINDINGS

The UNDP democratic governance programmewas relevant in the context of a country intent oncompleting its transition to a multipartydemocracy after widespread internal conflicts.The programme was comprehensive and touchedupon several aspects of governance. It wasconceived to address highly sensitive issues, whilealso looking downstream to address social needsat the same time. The selection of DEX or NEXmodalities was appropriate and reflected thecomparative advantage of having UNDP directlyinvolved in critical and sensitive areas, such assurveys on corruption and support to politicalparties. The change in the programme largelyreflected the transfer of some interventions to theBretton Woods Institutions or project cancella-tions for a lack of funds.

The programme was designed to balanceupstream and downstream activities for almost allinterventions. This was particularly useful forgaining goodwill through a combination of

support at the level of strategic and policydevelopment, combined with concrete materialassistance in the same sector. For example,UNDP support to formulating legislation on theparticipation of women in politics was accompa-nied by support to an NGO actively promotingthat goal.

The most effective interventions were in the areaof support to parliamentary institutions, politicalparties and the promotion of women in politics.The organization of decentralized DepartmentParliamentary Conferences constituted a particu-larly innovative approach that should beevaluated further. Most of the achievements,however, must be seen as dormant successes inthe absence of the necessary national politicalwill to follow-up such initiatives by devotinghuman and financial resources.

Such political will, combined with the allocationof national resources, is often absent ingovernance programmes, as well as other areas ofintervention, resulting in the abandonment ofpromising initiatives. This was the case ofDepartmental Parliamentarian Conferences,

The programme began in 2003 with a survey thatproduced a comprehensive andclear picture of the extent offraud and corruption in thecountry. As a result, a NationalPlan against fraud and corruptionwas prepared and approved by the government in 2004.This was supplemented by anoperational plan, and a NationalCommission against fraud,misappropriation and corruptionwas also established in 2004.In addition, the Republic of theCongo ratified the UN andAfrican Union Conventionsagainst corruption in 2005 and 2006, respectively.

The IMF and The World Bank tookover this area of interventionfrom UNDP, as it related to oneof the major conditions for theeligibility of the Republic of theCongo under the Heavily IndebtedPoor Countries initiative. A newNational Council and a NationalObservatory against corruptionhave been established. Thediscussions related to theHeavily Indebted Poor Countriesinitiative also meant that a newsurvey on corruption and fraudhad to be undertaken and theNational Plan of Action revised.

The results of UNDP interven-tions have been limited,although the findings of theUNDP-sponsored survey have

been used as important inputsand statistical base for therecently launched NationalHuman Development Report onthe theme of governance.

Similar to the strengthening of parliamentary institutions,combating fraud and corruptionis not only a technical andadministrative operation. Itshould also be accompaniedby strong national political willand support. UNDP opened the door to others, and itsinvolvement in this area remainsvalid for the future—particularlyfor the provision of training tomembers of the new NationalCouncil and Observatory.

Box 3. Support to anti-fraud and anti-corruption initiatives

C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S2 6

discontinued in 2007, and the still-lackingInternet connectivity in the documentationcentre created for parliamentarians. In contrast,the Centre for the Promotion Women in Politicsis likely to become a self-sustained NGOthrough direct support from its members andelected women. UNDP will need to provideadditional support to some of these activities inorder to consolidate achievements, but should doit on the basis of government partners making anunambiguous and concrete commitment toassume full national ownership going forward.

For each of the activities falling under a broadercomponent, outcomes with indicators wereformulated, and outputs and annual targets wereidentified. Linkages between activities, outputsand outcomes were clear. Unfortunately, indica-tors and related baseline data were most oftendefined in a qualitative way, making measure-ment difficult and subjective.

3.3 POVERTY REDUCTION

The country programme approved in 2003defined the goal of UNDP poverty reductionactivities as “furthering governmental efforts inthe formulation and implementation of thepoverty reduction strategy.” The intendedoutcome was a “strengthened capacity for povertyreduction and achievement of the MDGs on thepart of the government and civil society.”

As previously mentioned, the initial programmemerged activities related to conflict preventionand recovery into the poverty reduction area.Most of these programmes are now consideredpart of a peace consolidation approach and areunder the management of the UNDP localGovernance Unit. For the purpose of this review,activities conducted under different themes arepresented separately. Table 5 details povertyreduction activities.

The PRSP and the MDG strategy are importantgovernmental priorities, both as part of the

country’s development policy and ongoingdiscussions with international financial institu-tions regarding economic restructuring and debt-relief programmes. Similarly, and despiteoperational difficulties encountered, the twocommunity development programmes have beentimely interventions in the aftermath of disrup-tive internal conflicts. These programmes were inline with two major thematic areas of the I-PRSP: the consolidation of peace and security,and rural development.

Except for the Support to PRSP and MDGStrategy programme, which focused on elaborat-ing poverty reduction strategy documents, allactivities were financed under the DEX modality.The Community Action project and theEmergency Programme for Rehabilitation andSupport to Communities36 were initiated soonafter the end of the civil wars, and, in view of thesevere disruptions caused by armed conflict, theprevailing opinion was that NEX would havebeen premature and unrealistic. In addition, thetwo projects heavily relied on implementationthrough NGOs, local associations andcommunity groups.

3.3.1 REVIEW OF RESULTS

The main UNDP poverty reduction effort at thenational level has been in supporting the preparationof the PRSP and the National MDG Strategy.UNDP provided financial support, equipmentand technical assistance. The country officefinanced some of the thematic studies required toprepare the final documents and providedsupport for the distribution of the InformationBulletin of the National Committee on theReduction of Poverty. UNDP was also instru-mental in organizing consultations in all regionsof the country, ensuring that strategy documentsbenefited from the widest possible participation.

UNDP supported the preparation of the 2004National MDG Report and is currently helpingfinalize a National MDG Strategy. The second

36 Projet d’Urgence de Relance et d’Appui aux Communautés.

C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S 2 7

National Human Development Report, launchedin March 2008, also benefited from UNDPsupport and inputs. Through the support fromUNDP and other actors, the government is nowequipped with tools needed to guide theimplementation of poverty reductionprogrammes. The actual results of these actionswill take time to assess and will largely depend onthe sustained political will of the government toimplement strategies and policies, as well as thegovernment’s continued cooperation with theinternational community to put in place thereforms needed to support the strategies.

The Community Action project, started in 2000,addressed the needs of communities’ victims ofthe civil wars in the four worst hit rural depart-ments of Pool, Niari, Bouenza and Lékoumou, aswell as four neighbouring departments. It wasconceived as part of the UN humanitarian andreconstruction effort in the aftermath of civilwars, and it was more akin to an emergencyresponse than a development programme. Theproject set out to repair dispensaries and classrooms,rehabilitate wells and other social infrastructure,and work towards the reintegration of formercombatants and war-affected communities. Localpartner NGOs and associations were chosenhastily, and their performance was often sub-standard. Security restrictions and logisticaldifficulties made monitoring erratic at times.

Nevertheless, the project shows positive results,mainly on two accounts. First, the number of

indirect beneficiaries of rehabilitated socialinfrastructure is estimated at approximately800,000. Close to 180,000 persons benefitedfrom improved health faculties, and nearly30,000 children benefited from rehabilitatedschools. In addition, UNDP conducted rigorousinformation and training campaigns on peace,reconciliation and human rights. Second, theproject emphasized a community-basedapproach with local project selection committeesto review and approve proposals for rehabilitationand community participation in the implementa-tion of activities. That community approachhelped reduce local tensions and contributed toreconciliation and the consolidation of peace.

The Emergency Recovery and CommunitySupport project was a component of a muchlarger programme, financed under a $41 millioncredit and a grant from The WorldBank/International Development Agency. Thecomponent entrusted to UNDP aimed to (i)strengthen the capacity of local NGOs andassociations for the formulation of developmentprojects and their monitoring and evaluation; (ii)promote partnerships at the local level betweenauthorities and the population through thecreation of consultative mechanisms on localdevelopment; and (iii) create employment throughthe implementation of small projects. Partners inthe programme, in addition to the InternationalBank for Reconstruction and Development/International Development Agency, were theMinistry of Finance and the Agency for

Community Action

Emergency Programme for Rehabilitation and Support to Communities

Support for the Reintegration of Vulnerable Groups

Support to Poverty Reduction (PRSP and MDG strategy)

Project

DEX

DEX

DEX

NEX

Execution

2000-2007

2003-2007

2007-2011

2005-2007

Duration

2.4 million

4.6 million

153,632 (2007)

0.8 million

Budget (US$)

Table 5. Projects related to poverty reduction and achieving the MDGs, 2004–2007

Source: UNDP Republic of the Congo country office.

C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S2 8

Technical Cooperation and Development, anNGO responsible for the implementation ofmost of the approved projects. The Governmentof Italy and two members of the private sectoralso contributed to the UNDP-managedcomponent. The Government of the Republic ofthe Congo participated with a contribution of$200,000.

The programme covered all regions of thecountry, except the cities of Brazzaville andPointe-Noire. It contributed to improving socio-economic infrastructure through 37 separateprojects. The agricultural production and fisherysectors implemented 153 projects, and 190 localdevelopment committees were put in place.There are no evaluations available of the impactof the programme.

3.3.2 ADVOCACY AND COORDINATION

UNDP support to the development of nationalstrategic documents allowed the country office todevelop consultative groups on various themes.Such groups were useful instruments for anadvocacy role on a number of issues related togood governance, the role of women, and the

need to mainstream HIV/AIDS or environmen-tal considerations into all sectors.

The usefulness of UNDP support in this field isbroadly recognized within the aid communityand in the civil society. According to a prominentmember of a large industrial union, the consulta-tions organized under the auspices of UNDPprovided unique opportunities for people fromdifferent horizons to exchange views andestablish useful contacts, going far beyond theimmediate purpose of the meeting. It should benoted that UNDP and The World Bank workedvery closely on preparing the PRSP, co-chairingthe donor consultative group in the process.

3.3.3 EFFICIENCY AND SUSTAINABILITY

The poverty reduction programme, developed by theUNDP country office to support the formulationof major strategic documents while also engagingin activities such as community development, isan illustration of the sensible approach ofcombining up- and downstream interventions.

However, for the two projects related tocommunity development, too little attention was

The recently started Support tothe Socio-economic Reintegrationof Underprivileged Groupsproject illustrates the servicesnow offered by UNDP throughthe CEDAP service centre.

In July 2006, the Ministry ofSocial Services, Solidarity,Humanitarian Affairs and Family*

turned to UNDP for managementassistance for a programmefinanced through a $22.1 milliongrant from the African Develop-ment Fund, a contribution of$6.6 million by the Governmentof the Republic of the Congoand $100,000 by UNDP. Underthe partnership agreementbetween the Ministry and UNDP,the country office is designatedas responsible for procuring allgoods and services under the

programme. During 2007, thefirst year of operation, UNDPprocured $153,632 in goods and services.

Established in 2007, the CEDAP has already shownpositive results in acceleratingdelivery and reducing costs ofUNDP-managed projects. Thepartnership agreement for thereintegration project is illustra-tive of a new area of interven-tion for the CEDAP. It is the first time that such a large andexclusively-procurement govern-ment programme was entrustedto the unit. At the beginning of2008, discussions were uderwaywith other ministries that werepotentially interested in usingthe same services.

The advantages for ministriesinclude speed and lower cost of procurement, compared to a heavier and less reliablegovernmental procurement and disbursement mechanism.There is, however, a twofold risk.First, should demand exceedcapacity, the CEDAP couldbecome over-extended, therebylosing some of its comparativeadvantages. Second, theapproach needs to be balancedby stronger national capacitydevelopment and support toprocedural and managementreforms, so that CEDAP is notperceived as a simple substitutefor management deficiencies in the civil service.

* Maintenant, Ministère de la santé et des services sociaux.

Box 4. Support the socio-economic reintegration of underprivileged groups

C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S 2 9

paid to sustainability during the design andimplementation phases. For reasons related tosecurity and transport difficulties, monitoring hasbeen generally insufficient. Furthermore, nomechanisms appear to have existed to monitorthe continued sustainability over the mediumterm, either for the maintenance of rehabilitatedinfrastructure or the continued viability of smallincome-generating projects for individuals or groups.

Throughout the implementation of the moreoperational projects, UNDP has developedpartnerships with several local NGOs andcommittees. However, there is no evidence thatUNDP has capitalized on this advantage bypursuing cooperation in the framework of otheractivities and programmes. Finally, the projectswere planned and implemented during theimmediate post-conflict phase under a sense ofemergency. While quite appropriate at the time,the projects’ structures were not completely inline with a development approach.

3.4 CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RECOVERY

As mentioned elsewhere in this report, severalactivities from 2004–2007 were inherited fromthe previous period. UNDP continued to assist

ex-combatants and victims of violent conflict andaddressed the rehabilitation of infrastructuredamaged by war. Given the specificity of suchprojects and the relative size of their budgets, theevaluation team chose to present them separatelyin this report (see Table 6).

Of all interventions, the only activity specificallymentioned in the approved 2004–2007 countryprogramme is Collection of Small Arms forDevelopment (PCAD),37 with an outcomeindicator of “improved public security.” Outcomeswere defined under the individual projects, buttoo often in terms of what are really outputs.

The main characteristics of the UNDP post-conflict portfolio include:

n Projects are implemented under the directexecution modality (with the exception of theproject to assist the integrated managementof natural disasters);

n Projects are highly operational and demand ahigher level of field presence than is normalfor UNDP interventions;

n The total project value exceeds $18 million,with a much larger average per-projectallocation than in other country programmethemes; and

Collection of Small Arms for Development (PCAD I)

Collection of Small Arms for Development (PCAD II)

Rehabilitation of Rural Tracks

Community Action for the Rehabilitation of Communitiesand Reintegration of Youth at Risk (PRESJAR)

Rehabilitation of Primary Schools (PRAEBASE)

Integrated Management of Natural Disasters and Risk

Project

DEX

DEX

DEX/AGEX

NEX

DEX

NEX

Execution

2004-2007

2007-2008

2002-2004

2005-2007

2005-2008

2006-2007

Duration

2.7

2.1

3.1

3.8

8.7

0.5

Budget (US$ millions)

Table 6. Projects related to conflict prevention and recovery, 2004–2007

Source: UNDP Republic of the Congo country office.

37 Projet de Collecte des Armes pour le Développement.

C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S3 0

n Significant synergies have been developedbetween different projects, particularly amongPCAD I, the Basic Education SupportProgramme (PRAEBASE),38 and theCommunity Action Project for CommunityRecovery and Social Reintegration of Youthat Risk (PRESJAR).39

Two projects are closely related to largerprogrammes financed by The World Bank.PCAD I, financed entirely by the European Union,is the UNDP-run disarmament programme. It is complementary to the government-leddemobilization and reintegration programmefinanced by The World Bank-operated regionalMulti-Donor Trust Fund for Demobilizationand Reintegration. For its part, PRAEBASE isone of four components in a $20 million WorldBank programme for support to primaryeducation. All other components of PRAEBASEare implemented through the relevant Congoleseline ministry.

Using the DEX modality for the portions ofthese programmes under UNDP responsibilityhas resulted in minor tensions, as some membersof national institutions felt strongly that fundsshould have been channelled through them. Onesenior civil servant even expressed surprise thatUNDP appeared to be competing with thegovernment for resources.

Most of the projects that belong to this categoryhave been planned and are being executed in an‘emergency mood’, characteristic of post-conflictsituations. Insufficient attention has beendevoted to technical backstopping and to theinitial mainstreaming of cross-cutting themesduring planning. Important gender andHIV/AIDS considerations were introduced onlylater, during the course of implementation. As an example, the manual for PRAEBASEimplementation had to be revised to ensure that

schools would be equipped with separate latrinesfor girls and boys.

In these projects, there is often confusionbetween outcomes and outputs. In PRAEBASE,for example, the outcome is defined as rehabili-tated schools and the formation and training of anumber of local community managementcommittees. It is only at the level of The WorldBank-sponsored programme that genuine,measurable outcomes are formulated. TheUNDP project could have adopted the generaloutcomes, but could also have defined new ones,particularly in terms of the sustainability of thecommunity management committees.

3.4.1 REVIEW OF RESULTS

Although conflict prevention projects did notform a part of an integrated programme, theyhave certain anticipated results in common.

The first is the restoration of a secure environ-ment, particularly as related to Collection ofSmall Arms for Development. The generalsecurity situation in the country has vastlyimproved since 2000, to the extent that thegovernment is now present and active in all butone small part of the country. The continuedpresence of illegal weapons,40 not only withformer members of the militia but also with othercivilians, still poses a threat to security andstability. Some government officials think thatthe issue is now that of general public orderrather than that of acute post-conflict emergency.This may be an indication that future emphasisof UNDP interventions should be moreupstream. For instance, assisting the authoritiesin the development of legislation on arms posses-sion and improving the management of nationalarms depots are two activities envisaged byUNDP for the next programme cycle.

38 Projet d’Appui à l’Education de Base.39 Projet d’Action Communautaire pour le Relèvement des Communautés et la Réintégration Sociale des Jeunes à Risque.40 The NGO Small Arms Survey, in a survey dated December 2007, estimated the number of small arms in circulation at

some 34,000. Most of these arms are no longer possessed by the remaining militia groups.

C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S 3 1

The second expected result is the restoration of afavourable economic environment in areasdevastated by war. Despite difficulties and theincreasing gap between the poor and the rich,there are signs that economic activity is pickingup in many areas of the Republic of the Congo.Unfortunately, this affects mostly urban areas,while the benefits of increased economicopportunities are substantially less in regions thatremain under the control of militias. However,steps are being taken to improve access into andfrom certain areas. The rehabilitation of NationalRoad One between Brazzaville and Kinkala isalready changing prospects in the Pool Department.

It is difficult to assess the extent to which UNDPinterventions influenced these achievements. Toomany actors and factors are at play to isolate oneparticular initiative as dispositive. It appears thatthe major contribution of UNDP in restoringsecurity and economic activity is more one ofimpact on mindframes and attitudes than actualmeasurable results.

There is no doubt that some successes wereachieved. Arms have been collected, although thenumbers collected were much fewer thanplanned. Some former combatants succeeded inestablishing viable income-generating ventures.Schools have been rebuilt, and children are backin the classrooms, despite the continuing difficul-ties facing the primary education system. Whenasked to identify the single most significantUNDP contribution to the Republic of theCongo in recent years, a group of NGOsconcluded that the much-publicized publicceremonies of burning collected weapons had themost profound effect on the minds of people andconstituted a strong signal of return to normalcy.

However, many projects were plagued by seriousoperational flaws. The rural tracks rehabilitationproject, operated by the United Nations Officefor Project Services, is an almost textbook-likeexample of a failure. The project rehabilitatedtwo of three roads, but fell short of completingthe third by three kilometres, making it totallyunserviceable. Furthermore, the two rehabilitated

roads, along with most of the national network,have not been maintained and have since falleninto disrepair. Two years after the formal end of the project, the donor and UNDP are still in disagreement regarding eligible expendituresand reporting.

The support given to building national capacityfor the management of natural disasters is theonly programme implemented under the NEXmodality. While successful in establishing anational structure, the programme needs to berevisited in order to ensure that the results have notbeen affected by a recent change in ministerialresponsibility for that portfolio.

The PRESJAR project, started in 2004, movedaway from addressing only the needs of ex-combatants to also include youth at risk. Itremains, however, very much linked to theconflict, as the rationale for inclusion of otheryoung people is to prevent them from taking uparms. The aim of the project was to reinforce theintegration of displaced rural communities,particularly youth and women. A mid-termevaluation highlighted high levels of participa-tion by the local authorities and population, aswell as the positive synergies developed betweenPRESJAR and other projects. It also noted,however, that the free distribution of materials,equipment and start-up funds could reduce thesense of ownership on the part of beneficiaries,consequently reducing the project’s sustainability.

3.4.2 MAJOR PARTNERSHIPS, COORDINATIONAND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

The projects benefited from generally activesteering committees and a well-structuredcommunity approach. Coordination aspects wereof crucial importance for the primary educationproject that forms part of a larger programme,and for the small arms collection that runsparallel to a larger project supporting the nationaldemobilization and reintegration programme forformer combatants.

With regard to the primary school project,coordination has been efficient. However, it was

C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S3 2

markedly less successful for PCAD I. Despite theco-location of PCAD project management withthe High Commissioner for ex-Combatants, thecommonality of purpose and the synergiesbetween the two related activities could havebeen improved.

For some of the activities reviewed, the countryoffice benefited from allocations from the UNDPcentral Conflict Prevention and Recovery TrustFund. Most of the resources, however, have been mobilized through the efforts of the countryoffice. UNDP benefited from its previous experience in the Republic of the Congo and

elsewhere in the areas of disarmament, reintegra-tion and community development approaches.However, operational and managerial issues havegenerated occasional tensions with twoimportant partners and donors, The World Bankand the European Union. At issue with theformer was the increase, during the course of the project, in the overhead percentage chargedby UNDP against The World Bank contributionunder PRAEBASE. The latter friction concernedserious misunderstandings between the EuropeanUnion and UNDP regarding the management ofthe projects for the rehabilitation of rural tracksand PCAD I.

The PCAD programme is afollow-up to a joint UNDP/International Organization forMigrations project conductedduring 2000–2002.

Under the PCAD I project(2004–2007), UNDP defined thefollowing objectives:n The collection of 10,000 small

arms voluntarily surrenderedin exchange for a kit chosenby the beneficiary from amenu of options;

n A component aimed atpromoting economic anddevelopment activities as analternative to a livelihoodbased on violence; and

n A component aimed atreinforcing the capacity of theHigh Commissioner for theReintegration of FormerCombatants, the nationalinstitution in charge ofimplementing the nationalplan for demobilisation,disarmament and reintegration.

The second and third objectiveswere never implemented,essentially due to the absence offinancing. As a result, the projectconcentrated its activities onlyon the collection of weaponsand the provision of goods incompensation.

The intention was for the office ofthe national High Commissionerto give priority to ex-combatantshaving surrendered theirweapons for the benefits ofreintegration assistance.Unfortunately, disarmamentoccurred before most of suchassistance was available,resulting in a high degree offrustration for the formercombatants. Similarly, the smallarms collection went aheadwithout the counterpart goodsbeing available in UNDP stores,thus generating further frustra-tions. UNDP partly compensatedby using the resources of thePRESJAR project to providereintegration assistance to somebeneficiaries and establish itspresence in the Pool Department.

The geographical coverage of the project was graduallyreduced to only two areas.Furthermore, due to politicalconsiderations that preventedthe development of operationsin the Pool Department duringnegotiations between thegovernment and the CNR,collections took place only in Brazzaville.

By the end of the project, theactivities in Brazzaville hadresulted in the collection of:

n 1,308 weapons, falling farshort of the target but partlycompensated by;

n 626,533 bullets and otherammunition; and

n 2,383 grenades and otherexplosives.

The project fell short of expecta-tions regarding the number ofweapons collected and sufferedfrom operational malfunctioning.Nevertheless, it had a significantimpact on the people by givinga clear signal of a return tonormalcy, and by contributing to re-establishing a peace andreconciliation climate.

UNDP has used some of thelessons learned through thePCAD I project in planning andimplementing its successor,PCAD II. The synchronizationbetween weapon collection and the distribution of materialcompensation is now assured,at least for the first 1,200 benefi-ciaries. The project had startedits first collection campaign atthe beginning of 2008 in someneighbourhoods of Brazzaville.By March 2008, approximately10 small arms were collectedevery day.

Box 5. Collecting small arms for development (PCAD I and II)

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3.4.3 MAIN FINDINGS

UNDP interventions corresponded to expressednational priorities, the broad corporate parame-ters of the organization, and genuine needs feltby the Congolese population at large. Education,livelihoods and the restoration of a secureenvironment remain high priorities for allCongolese people. However, questions remain asto whether or not UNDP should engage inactivities such as the rehabilitation of roads or therebuilding of schools where the experience of the organization and its comparative advantagesare limited. On the other hand, UNDP has a recognized expertise in the area of smallweapons and disarmament, but usually linksthose activities more forcefully with reintegrationand community development.

An additional and related question is the long-term prudence of continuing programmesdirectly linked to the conflict. The wars thatravaged large parts of the country have now beenover for nearly 10 years. Relative security hasreturned to most previously troubled areas,leaving only parts of the Pool Department underthe control of a faction that has not yet acceptedparticipation in the emerging democratic process.Most observers recognize that the situation inthe Republic of the Congo is no longer one ofpost-conflict, typically characterized by the needto engage in emergency programmes mainlybenefiting former combatants and their victims.Still, the majority also recognizes that the state of affairs remains fragile, and that upcoming local and presidential elections of 2008 and 2009, respectively, will be critical benchmarks inthe return to normalcy. UNDP should developclear exit strategies from the remaining activitiesof a post-conflict nature early in the nextprogramming cycle.

Most conflict recovery projects only partly reliedon a government structure for long-term sustain-ability. Small arms collection and accompanyingintegration activities, school rehabilitation andfuture maintenance, and group integrationmeasures promoted under PRESJAR all relymainly on committees arising from their owncommunities or on individual entrepreneurs.

The means to verify the long-term viability ofsmall businesses or individual income-generatingactivities are almost non-existent. The vastmajority of local management committees, put inplace for primary-school development andmaintenance under PRAEBASE, have notsucceeded in securing independent sources ofincome that would enable them to effectivelyhelp their primary school. As such, the absence ofa realistic exit and sustainability strategy creates astrong risk of jeopardizing the benefits ofprogrammes. Such considerations should becomean important feature in future planning.

Despite numerous operational problems, linkedmainly to the technical nature of some projectsand the difficulties of operating in areas whereaccess was limited for security or logisticalreasons, UNDP projects have contributed to the return of security and to the fostering ofreconciliation. These interventions havebenefited from the recognized competence ofUNDP in disarmament programmes linked tocommunity development and from the expertisegained by the organization through integratedcommunity programmes. However, many activi-ties suffered from poor technical backstopping,weak management and a light field presence.There are encouraging signs that UNDP hasbeen addressing these weaknesses since thebeginning of 2007.

3.5 ENERGY AND SUSTAINABLEMANAGEMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The larger umbrella project for environment andenergy was approved in 2005. With a budget ofnearly $7.7 million, it constitutes a comprehen-sive picture of activities undertaken by UNDP inthis area, as it incorporates all projects startedearlier, as well as pipeline projects. Various projectcomponents and activities are detailed in Table 7.

Although the specific outcome identified in theinitial 2004–2007 country programme mentionedboth environment and energy, activities listed in the initial programme omitted energy. In its

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comprehensive programme of 2005, the countryoffice corrected the omission and introduced anenergy component. This also corresponded to anemerging government priority for the develop-

ment of renewable energy. In contrast, theplanned environmental education and awarenessactivity was dropped from the 2005 programmeand remains a pending proposal.

Support for the preparation of government communication onclimate change

Support for the preparation of national strategy and action plan onbiodiversity and capacity building

Support for the preparation of national strategy and action plan forprotection of soils

Support to national self-evaluation of environmental capacity

Control of refrigerants

Agro-forestry community development programme

Conservation of cross-boundary biodiversity (Cameroon, Gabon, Congo)

Establishment of an observatory and network on climate change

Distribution of improved cooking stoves

Building of micro-dams

Production of renewable energy through solar kits

Measurement of impact of pollution on resources and health

Study of water ecosystems biodiversity

Establishment of a map database

Preparation of a long-term policy and strategy to protect marine and coastal ecosystems

Evaluation of urban pollution

Capacity-building for urban waste management

Support to eliminate river pollution and land erosion

Activity

NEX

NEX

NEX

NEX

NEX

DEX or AGEX

DEX

DEX

DEX

DEX

DEX

DEX

DEX

DEX

DEX

NEX

NEX

NEX

Executionmodality

Approved 2006;ongoing

Approved 2004;completed

Approved

Approved 2004;started 2006

Approved 2006;ongoing

Pipeline

Project approved and just started

Pipeline

Pipeline

First phase completed;second phase

being finalized

Cancelled

Pipeline

Pipeline

Pipeline

Pipeline

Ended in 2007

Progress

$420,000

$188,600

$10,000

$230,000

$118,070

($44 millionapproved)

(Second phase,$21 million under

discussion)

$5 million

$90,000

Budget (US$)

Table 7. Environment and energy programme 2004–2007: components and activities

Component 1: Preparation of referential framework and capacity building

Component 2: Protection of forest ecosystem / observatory on climate change

Component 4: Reduction of marine and coastal pollution risks

Component 3: Promotion and production of renewable energy

Component 5: Urban environment and living standards

Source: UNDP Republic of the Congo country office.

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The anticipated outcome of the environment andenergy programme was defined as “a strength-ened capacity of national and sectoral authoritiesto plan and implement integrated approaches toenvironmental management and energy develop-ment that meet the needs of the poor.”

The programme developed by UNDP correspondsto national priorities as defined in:

n I-PRSP and the final PRSP;

n 1994 National Action Plan for Environment;

n 1995 National Action Plan for Forests;

n Relevant international conventions, sub-regional agreements and the New Partnershipfor Africa’s Development; and

n UN strategies as contained in the UNCTCCA, the draft UNDAF and UNDPcorporate and regional strategies.

It should also be noted that the Congolesepopulation at large is becoming increasinglyconcerned about environmental issues and theneed for alternative sources of energy. Togetherwith the Amazonian region, the 200 millionhectares of forests in central Africa constitute the ‘lung of the world’ and its biodiversity needsto be protected.

The programme was strengthened throughsystematic advocacy efforts. Advocacy throughparliamentarians and public awareness-raising wereparticularly successful. The UNDP programmemanager effectively provided advice to theMinistry of Tourism and Environment andhelped prepare official position papers.

The original programme document had definedclear outcomes with qualitative indicators for eachcomponent and sub-component. A qualitativebaseline, a list of outputs and annual targets werealso included. Due to the qualitative nature ofoutcomes and indicators, measuring results istime-consuming and subjective.

The linkages among activities, outputs andoutcomes were clear. Activities and outputs weremonitored through annual reports. Theprogramme was initially conceived of as an

integrated undertaking. However, due to theneed for fundraising in the absence of sufficientUNDP regular resources, it became de factodivided into several projects. The projects onbiodiversity and climate change were audited in2005, and all other projects were audited in July2007, as part of the country office audit. It shouldbe noted that in 2008, the environmentprogramme launched an outcome evaluation byexternal consultants.

The steering committee established to oversee theprogramme never met. The minister designatedas chairperson had other responsibilities, and wasunable to organize, attend or chair the committee’ssessions. A special counterpart unit, envisaged toprovide the structured national support to theprogramme, was never staffed: the NationalDirector was left alone to oversee activities withassistance, expertise and funding only from theexternal UNDP/Global Environment Facility.Despite its formal commitment to theprogramme, the government provided cost-sharing funds only for the micro-dams project.

3.5.1 REVIEW OF RESULTSAs Table 7 demonstrates, many of the activitiesplanned under the environment and energyprogramme are still in the planning stage,awaiting funding and final approval. Component 1,preparation of referential framework and capacitybuilding, has already started and is reviewed inmore detail in Box 6.

Most of the activities under component 5, urbanenvironment and living standards, have beencompleted, except for the waste managementprogramme where, despite a successful pilotphase and good prospects for financing, the localauthorities of Brazzaville were reluctant to acceptthe plan for unknown reasons.

The pilot phase of the waste managementprogramme was successful in training youngunemployed people, providing them withequipment and organizing them in groups tocollect garbage and improve the drainage systemin some critical neighbourhoods of Brazzaville.The execution of the programme was delayed bylack of funds, but the delivery rate was high.

Sites for the micro-dams initiative have nowbeen selected, and the African DevelopmentBank is expected to decide on final approval ofthe programme soon.

3.5.2 MAJOR PARTNERSHIPS, COORDINATIONAND RESOURCES MOBILIZATION

Some donors and parts of the private sector arehesitant to fund environmental activities. In theiropinions, the country has sufficient financialresources and should show its commitment to theenvironment more concretely. However, somemembers of the private sector now appear moreopen to funding projects. UNDP has signed aframework cooperation agreement with Total,the largest oil sector operator in the country, andis in discussions with other large firms.

With limited human resources to manage theenvironment and energy portfolio, UNDP hashad to emphasize resource mobilization over

coordination. However, initiatives such as thecreation of a community of practices on environ-ment should be commended.

UNDP successfully mobilized importantfinancial resources, mostly from the GlobalEnvironment Facility. This in turn increased theinterest of the African Development Bank forfunding large projects, and allowed UNDP toprepare the ground for exploring financingpartnerships with private sector enterprises suchas Total, CIB41 and SARIS.42 UNDP alsobalanced its interventions between up- anddownstream initiatives, a strategy that proveduseful for resource mobilization.

3.5.3 MAIN FINDINGS

The programme was relevant to national goals,international conventions and UN objectives. Itwas also well focussed on minimizing potentialnegative impacts on the environment from the

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Under this programmecomponent, UNDP providedsupport for the achievement of the following results:

n The production of a firstreport on climate change thatwas submitted to the partiesof the UN FrameworkConvention on ClimateChange. A second report iscurrently being prepared;

n A national strategy and actionplan for biodiversity, to bereviewed by the Council ofMinisters and Parliament forfinal approval;

n A national strategy and actionplan for the protection of soils.The follow-up pilot project is nowfrozen due to political consid-erations in the selection of thetwo proposed sites,which in turnhas complicated the mobiliza-tion of external resources;

n A comparative assessment ofcarbon dioxide emissions inBrazzaville and Pointe-Noire,which highlighted the respon-sibility of the energy andtransport sectors in urbanpollution; and

n A project for the recuperationand recycling of refrigerantsimplemented in bothBrazzaville and Pointe-Noire.

The reports and national plansunder this programme wereprepared through a participa-tory approach involving nationalrepresentatives and consultants.UNDP also promoted theestablishment of a ‘communityof practices’ on environment and energy, which helpedincrease awareness and developseveral other environmentalstudy reports.

The expected outcome ofnational institutions having the capacity to formulate andimplement policies and strate-gies related to the environmentwas not fully achieved. Nationalstrategies have been developed,as well as plans of action, butthere is not yet a fully dedicatednational agency in charge ofenvironment. The Ministry ofTourism and Environmentcurrently covers the environ-mental theme, but it lacks thehuman and financial resourcesnecessary for the task andsuffers from a high turnover rateat senior level. The Governmentis sensitive to environmentalissues, but not committed to the point of transforming thisawareness into appropriatehuman and financial resourcesand the establishment of adedicated national structure.

Box 6. Preparation of referential frameworks and capacity building

41 Compagnie Industrielle du Bois, wood industry.42 Société Agricole de Raffinage Industriel du Sucre, sugar industry.

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exploitation of forestry and the extraction of oil.It was important to re-introduce energy concernsin the programme, including the promotion ofrenewable energies. The programme is internallycoherent, but because it was managed as a portfolioof projects in order to mobilize funds fromdifferent donors, it did not fully align with thetypical UNDP integrated programming approach.

Capacity-building through networking andconsultative processes was the salient point of theprogramme and can be considered an effectiveway of ensuring a measure of sustainability.However, due to weak financial governmentsupport and high turnover of senior officials inthe field of environment, sustainability of thenational management capacity and the strength-ening of the ministry in charge of environmentinitiatives were not ensured.

Mobilizing NGOs in support of environmentalprojects, raising awareness among parliamentari-ans, the private sector and local communities, andinvolving national researchers and academicsstrengthened national ownership.

The mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues, suchas gender, was envisaged mainly through aplanned project for improved cooking stoves.Unfortunately, that activity had to be abandonedfor lack of funding. The combination of up- anddownstream interventions provided two levels ofentry that were useful in building a positiveimage of UNDP with the population, govern-ment counterparts and parliamentarians.

By their nature, interventions in the fields ofenvironment and energy have important regionaland subregional linkages. The programme haseffectively integrated a subregional approach andhas built bridges with initiatives requiringcoordination among countries from thesubregion. The technical and financial supportfrom the Regional Centre in Dakar was highly

effective. The country office also intends topromote the streamlining of environmentalconcerns in all development interventions.

The lack of UNDP core funds resulted instretching already-limited UNDP capacity indifferent directions: resource mobilization,partner consultation, and advisory and advocacyservices. Consequently, there was little time forUNDP to coordinate with donors.

3.6 CROSS-CUTTING THEMES

The country programme adopted three cross-cutting themes: gender, HIV/AIDS and NICT.All UNDP programme activities were intendedto reflect and include these themes.

Although the mainstreaming of cross-cuttingthemes was initially weak in some projects,efforts were made to re-introduce gender andHIV/AIDS considerations during the course ofimplementation. In addition, the country officedeveloped a strong advocacy strategy on both issues.

For the theme of HIV/AIDS, UNDP providedsupport to the formulation of a NationalStrategic Framework. It also conducted a numberof capacity-building and support activities infavour of the Permanent Executive Secretariat/National Council to Fight AIDS and STDs(SEP/CNLS),43 in addition to providing trainingto teachers and religious leaders. In cooperationwith UNICONGO,44 UNDP helped some 30private-sector operators develop a strategy toaddress HIV/AIDS on work sites. The GlobalFund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malariaprovided a large grant to SEP/CNLS, mainly dueto the support provided by UNDP country office.

UNDP interventions related to gender took theform of advocacy and support to women inpolitics described in Box 2 in section 3.2,covering good governance programmes.

43 Secrétariat Exécutif Permanent/Conseil National de Lutte contre le SIDA et les IST.44 UNICONGO is the private sector Inter-professional Union of the Congo, grouping manufacturers and national and

international industrial firms operating in the country.

Two major activities were undertaken relating toNICT. The first consisted of support given to theformulation of a national strategy on NICT. Thesecond represented direct interventions to help twonational institutions, the Parliament and the Ministryof Finance. UNDP helped create an information andresearch centre for parliamentarians. Unfortunately,the centre is not yet operational due to lack of

funding for an Internet connection. UNDP alsoassisted the Ministry of Finance with the creationof a Web site designed to facilitate citizen accessto information on government projects andprogrammes. Despite the Web site’s creation, theMinistry did not activate the service. In the absenceof national follow-up, the two interventions havefailed to produce the expected results.

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C H A P T E R 4 . C O N C L U S I O N S A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S 3 9

This chapter reviews the main conclusions of thisevaluation, addressing the relevance of UNDPinterventions during 2004–2007, their effectivenessin contributing to development results, the sustain-ability of these results and the strategic positioningof the UNDP country office. It also providesrecommendations on possible future directions.

4.1 THE RELEVANCE OF UNDPINTERVENTIONS

The areas of interventions in which UNDPengaged correspond to expressed national priorities,the broad corporate parameters of the organization,and to the genuine needs felt by the Congolesepopulation at large. UNDP interventions addressproblems perceived by the Congolese as crucial totheir well-being and development. Most of theseinterventions are aligned with areas whereUNDP has recognized competence and expertise,including promotion of good governance, develop-ment of pro-poor strategies, support to nationalenvironmental policies and plans, and disarmamentthrough community action. However, some activi-ties, such as infrastructure-rehabilitation projects,are less in line with UNDP competencies.

The country programme continued to feature anumber of activities that were either a continuationof the previous cycle’s post-conflict projects orwere targeted to beneficiaries defined in relationto a conflict that ended almost 10 years ago. Thegeneralized poverty affecting the whole populationand the difficult economic conditions, particularly

in rural areas, justifies an approach that moves fromtargeting ex-combatants to a more generalized,pro-poor and community-based approach.

However, the programme should continue toaddress issues related to peace consolidation45

through more upstream interventions aimed atimproving governance, developing povertyreduction actions that address whole communities,and fostering public security. The latter wouldbenefit from a focus on developing legislation onfirearms and the management of national armsdepots. In the phase that should follow thesecond cycle of elections, UNDP should concen-trate on peace consolidation initiatives in areas ofrecognized UNDP competence.

The regular resources allocated by UNDP to theRepublic of the Congo are relatively meagre whencompared to the vast needs of the population, themajority of which lives below the poverty line.This has forced the country office to develop anaggressive fundraising strategy that diverted staffaway from important tasks and, at times, createdmisunderstanding and annoyance with partners.It has also reduced the capacity of the office to useregular resources as seed money for larger projects,with a view towards attracting both donorfunding and national cost-sharing contributions.

The special circumstances of the Republic of theCongo, specifically its low human developmentindex despite the technical classification as alower middle-income country, should prompt the

Chapter 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

45 The three areas of peace consolidation as used in this report reflect the conclusions of the Tokyo International Conferenceon African Development meeting in Addis Ababa on 16–17 February 2006.

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country office, with support from UNDPheadquarters, to develop new funding strategies.During the process of finalizing this report,the evaluation team was informed that UNDPhad already negotiated increased cost-sharingagreements with countries facing similarsituations.46 The formula could be explored forthe Republic of the Congo. At a minimum, thiswould require that the government, throughcost-sharing from national resources, matchesUNDP inputs from regular resources.

4.2 EFFECTIVENESS OF UNDP INTERVENTIONS

UNDP programmes in the Republic of the Congohave combined up- and downstream activities.Upstream, UNDP has been instrumental indeveloping a number of national strategydocuments and plans of action, as well as legislationon a number of issues crucial for the promotionof democratic institutions, improvement ofgovernance, protection of the environment,gender equity, HIV/AIDS, pro-poor policyformulation and the attainment of the MDGs.This has been accompanied by a very visible andeffective advocacy effort, which has been one ofthe main strengths of UNDP in the Republic ofthe Congo.

Downstream interventions have been essentialfor UNDP to gain the credibility and accessneeded to effectively engage in advocacy onseveral politically sensitive issues. This combina-tion of two levels of entry has been commendableand productive.

UNDP has also succeeded in developing importantsynergies between some projects and activities,particularly in its support of former combatantsand its advocacy with parliamentary institutions.

One of the important aspects of UNDP action inthe country has been the development of a fieldpresence outside the capital. The choice of

locations has been sensible and the intention ofmaking at least some of these offices UN hubs waslaudable. Unfortunately, the reality fell short ofexpectations as, in terms of management andorganization, the offices remained more UNDPthan UN offices. The offices did provide usefulservices to visiting members of the UN team, butneglected the necessary linkages with otherorganizations, including NGOs. Despite somemanagement weaknesses and a too-sporadic presenceof senior staff, the office in Kinkala, in thedepartment of Pool, became an important symbolof return to normalcy in that troubled region.

Cross-cutting themes of gender and HIV/AIDSwere not always taken into account at the initialplanning phase, but were re-introduced duringthe course of implementation. Additionalattention will be needed during the projectdesign phase in order to ensure more systematicmainstreaming. The intention of the countryoffice to more systematically include the environ-ment as an underlying concern in the design ofdevelopment projects should be encouraged.

In general, the definition of outcomes and theirindicators remains weak. More importantly,however, even when valid indicators exist, thecountry office and project management staff donot have the human or financial resources neededto ensure proper monitoring.This makes proactiveprogramme management more difficult in theabsence of measurable indicators of progress andeffect. It similarly complicates the final evaluationof programmes. Commendable work has beendone for the development of outcomes, indica-tors and means of verification in preparation forthe UNDAF of 2009–2013. This represents anopportunity for UNDP to improve its ownperformance and develop a joint UN approach tosome monitoring and evaluation functions.

4.3 SUSTAINABILITY OF RESULTS

The sustainability of results achieved with UNDPsupport remains problematic. For upstream

46 The examples of Botswana and Gabon were cited.

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interventions where the output was defined asthe development of a national strategy orworkplan, it often happened that the outputswere successfully produced but did not yield theanticipated effects. This evaluation has used thephrase ‘dormant success’ to describe this gapbetween successful outputs and the absence ofeffective results. It is hoped that the expectedresults will materialize, if future authoritiesexercise the necessary political will and allocateappropriate human and financial resources.

Such an end result is often the same for down-stream projects, in which sustainability dependsupon local communities and their managementcommittees pursuing these activities with theirown resources after the UNDP-supported initialphase. The situation is considered a little betterfor income-generating assistance to individualsor small groups, although the longer termmonitoring of initial successes is weak or absent.

The consequences of lacking sustainabilityinclude a gradual loss of the benefits of the project,lack of subsequent implementation of thedeveloped strategies and sectoral policies, and thecomplete abandonment of management structuresand instruments. It also means that effectiveUNDP exit strategies cannot be implemented.

The primary condition for sustainability remainsthe presence of the political will of authorities toaddress structural and procedural issues related tothe efficient allocation and utilization of publicresources. In the programme design phase,UNDP could have given more attention todeveloping a more comprehensive exit strategy.Such a strategy could include designating anentity to take over the activity, the conditions tomake this transition effective, and benchmarks tomonitor the commitment and capacity necessaryto assume full ownership of the programmes bynational and local institutions or by relevantcommunity organizations.

Despite having the resources at their disposal,local authorities appear to have been hesitant tofinancially participate in projects on a cost-sharing

basis. UNDP would need to initiate discussionson this important issue with the government,possibly on the basis of the formula mentioned insection 4.1. A cost-sharing approach shouldbecome the rule rather than the exception.

Human resource weaknesses within the civilservice remain a factor impeding both efficientnational participation in programme activities andfull national ownership. A number of capacity-building initiatives have been implementedunder various projects. The effort, however, couldhave been more systematic and structured. Itwould be useful for UNDP to link to existinginitiatives, so as to promote a concerted andcoordinated capacity-building effort betweendonors and the government.

4.4 UNDP STRATEGIC POSITIONING

UNDP has made judicious decisions in theselection of its intervention areas. At thisjuncture, it is appropriate to question thecontinued pertinence of continuing post-conflictactivities beyond the current programme cycle.UNDP should now build on its comparativeadvantages in the areas of good governance, thedevelopment of pro-poor strategies, communitydevelopment programmes, the regional approachfor environment and its strong advocacy services.

UNDP has developed good relations with somecivil society organizations and private sectoractors. A more structured partnership withNGOs is needed. A number of consultativemechanisms with wide participation exist, butthey can be rendered more effective andmeaningful. Coordination, on the other hand, isrelatively weak and initiatives are required toreflect on the issue with donors, the UN system,larger NGOs and the government.

The relations between UNDP and the multilateraland bilateral development community have beenexcessively based on financial partnerships. UNDPneeds to reassert its intellectual leadership inareas of its competence by capitalizing on itsgood work organizing thematic and consultativegroups for the preparation of major strategy papers.

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UNDP participation in UN inter-agency coordi-nation has been effective, despite the remaining—and unavoidable—ambiguity resulting from thedual roles of UN Resident Coordinator andUNDP Resident Representative.

Overall, UNDP enjoys a favourable image in theRepublic of the Congo and has developed excellentrelations with its government counterparts. Themedia coverage of UNDP activities is intense and productive.

4.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

Twelve recommendations are derived from theanalysis contained in this report. These are:

GENERAL AND STRATEGIC ISSUES

1. The next Republic of the Congo country programme should build upon demonstratedUNDP comparative advantages. These includeUNDP support for good governance, pro-poor and community development approaches,a regional approach to environmental issues andstrong advocacy capability. UNDP shouldgradually phase out post-conflict activities.

2. In order to ensure lasting stability andsustainable development, peace consolidationshould become the central focus andunderlying theme for most UNDP activities,particularly those in good governance andpoverty reduction.

3. UNDP should continue to emphasize thelinkages between upstream and downstreamapproaches, intervening at both political andoperational levels in all programmes.

4. Based on experience in other countries,UNDP should engage the government innegotiations aimed at increasing nationalcost-sharing contributions to at least equalthe resources allocated by UNDP.

5. Particular attention needs to be devoted tofostering national ownership and ensuringsustainability. This could include:

n Greater attention during the project designphase to incorporating a sustainable exitstrategy, based on identifying thenational mechanisms expected to takeover, defining conditions of an effectivemanagement transfer and establishingbenchmarks for monitoring relevantpreparations and the capacity of thechosen national entity;

n Intensified efforts in national capacity-building through establishing a compre-hensive and structured programme inclose coordination with the governmentand other development actors;

n Continued gradual and prudent approachto increasing the national executioncomponent of programmes; and

n A clear demonstration of the politicalwill of national authorities in addition to their commitment to assumingownership of programmes, in particularthrough increased cost-sharing asoutlined in recommendation four above.

6. In close consultation with all partners,UNDP should start to reflect on ways toimprove coordination among developmentactors. This is of particular importance forgood governance initiatives, in view of the UNDP intent to further develop itssupport to some financial oversight andadministrative institutions.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

7. The UNDP country office in the Republic ofthe Congo should vigorously pursue its effortsto improve programme delivery. In addition,measures of rewarding staff efficiency shouldbe established, and the new CEDAP shouldbe independently evaluated in 2009, aftertwo full years of operation.

8. The formulation of outcomes, indicators andmeans of verification should be improved. Inpossible collaboration with donor-partners,the UNDP country office must ensure thatsufficient financial and human resources are

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devoted to monitoring outcomes as well asoutputs. In defining outcomes for the nextUNDAF, UNDP should build upon inter-agency work and encourage the developmentof a system-wide approach to outcomemonitoring and evaluation.

9. The country office should engage partners indiscussions geared towards improving theperformance and efficiency of Project ReviewCommittees and Steering Committees.

10. UNDP offices outside Brazzaville need todevelop their services for the benefit of bothUN agencies and non-governmental organi-zations. This should include creating open

and inclusive coordination hubs at the locallevel, promoting cross-fertilization, and under-taking activities such as mapping developmentand humanitarian actors, which waspreviously done through the UN Office forthe Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

11. More attention should be given to themainstreaming of gender and HIV/AIDSconsiderations into the country programmeduring its initial design phase.

12. While direct environmental interventionsshould continue, particularly in subregionalcontexts, the country office’s intent to treat suchconcerns as cross-cutting should be encouraged.

A N N E X I . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E 4 5

1. BACKGROUND

The Evaluation Office of the United NationsDevelopment Program (UNDP) regularlyconducts a number of country evaluations,referred to as Assessments of DevelopmentResults (ADRs), in order to capture anddemonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDPcontributions to development results at thecountry level. Conducted in selected countries,ADRs focus on outcomes, critically examineachievements and constraints in the UNDPthematic areas of focus, draw lessons learned andprovide recommendations for the future. TheADRs also provide considered analysis forenhancing performance and strategicallypositioning UNDP support within nationaldevelopment priorities and UNDP corporatepolicy directions.

The overall goals of the ADR are to:

n Provide substantive support to theAdministrator’s accountability function inreporting to the Executive Board;

n Serve as a means of quality assurance forUNDP interventions at the country level;

n Generate lessons from experience in order toinform current and future programming atthe country and corporate levels; and

n Provide stakeholders in the programmecountry with an objective assessment of theresults (specific outcomes) achieved throughUNDP support and partnerships with otherkey actors during a given multi-year period.

An ADR is planned for the Republic of theCongo between the end of 2007 and thebeginning of 2008. It will cover the period from2004–2007, as well as some previous years.

2. OBJECTIVES OF THE ASSESSMENT

The purposes of the evaluation are to assessUNDP contributions to development results andits strategic positioning in the Republic of theCongo, draw lessons learned and outline optionsfor improvements. The ADR will:

n Provide an independent country-level assess-ment of the relevance and effectiveness of thedevelopment results achieved throughUNDP support and in partnership withother development actors during the last fiveto seven years, with particular emphasis onthe UNDP country programme;

n Contribute to accountability and to learningfrom experience, taking into account self-evaluations (project and outcome evalua-tions) and the role of development partners;

n Provide an analysis of how UNDP haspositioned itself to add value in response tonational needs and changes in the nationaldevelopment context; and

n Present key findings, draw key lessons, andprovide a set of clear and forward-lookingoptions for management to make adjust-ments in the current strategy and the nextcountry programme.

3. RATIONALE FOR THE EVALUATION

The UNDP programme in the Republic of theCongo has been selected for an ADR. Therewere numerous reasons for selection. Thecompletion of the 2004–2007 CountryCooperation Framework (CCF) presents anopportunity to evaluate the achievements andresults over the past programme cycle and before.The findings will be used as inputs to the

Annex I

TERMS OF REFERENCEASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS:REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

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2008–2011 country programme within thecontext of the new United Nations DevelopmentAssistance Framework. The challenges that theRepublic of the Congo faced during the yearsunder the CCF can be summarized as the processof re-establishing political, economic andenvironmental security. Assessing UNDP contri-bution to the process can yield lessons for theorganization. In addition, the country officeacknowledged the need for and the timeliness ofthe evaluation.

4. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The ADR will review the UNDP experience inthe Republic of the Congo and its contributionto overcoming social, economic and politicalchallenges. The thematic focus of the evaluationwill be the UNDP Country CooperationFramework (2004–2007), as well as some of theprevious UNDP assistance organized on an adhoc basis. In the latter category, various UNDPprojects focused on gradually re-establishingsecurity, restoring basic social services, the recoveryand/or creation of income-generating activities,and other activities in the areas of human rights,democratic governance and public affairs.

The 2004–2007 CCF was formulated based onthe Interim PRSP and the government developmentstrategy, Nouvelle Esperance (New Hope). Itincorporates concerns related to the achievementof the Millennium Development Goals and ofthe New Partnership for Africa’s Development.

The priorities stressed in the country programmerefer to:

n Governance, which included building parlia-mentary capacity, support for anti-fraud andcorruption measures, support for localgovernance by building the capacities of localcommunities,and support for the elaborationof governmental development strategies;

n Poverty reduction, such as UNDP assistancetargeted at the promotion of youth employmentand the reintegration of ex-combatants;

n Environmental and natural-resource manage-

ment, which included information, educationand awareness-raising; fighting marine coastalpollution; urban environment and improve-ment of living standards; protecting theforest eco-system; and international waters,climate change and biodiversity; and

n Cross-cutting themes, such as HIV/AIDS,gender and development of new informationand communications technologies.

The evaluation will undertake a comprehensivereview of the UNDP programme portfolio andactivities during the specified period. The processwill assess key results, specifically outcomes—anticipated and unanticipated, positive andnegative—and will cover UNDP assistancefunded by both core and non-core resources.Specifically, the ADR will address the:

a) Relevance of UNDP programmes: Howrelevant are UNDP programmes to thecountry needs in the context of post-conflictrecovery? Did changes in the UNDPapproach reflect key national priorities? Insum, did UNDP apply the right develop-ment strategy within the specific political,economic and social context of the Republicof the Congo?

b) Effectiveness: Did the UNDP programmeaccomplish its intended objectives andplanned results? What are the strengths andweaknesses of the programme? Whatunexpected results did it yield? Should itcontinue in the same direction, or should itsmain tenets be reviewed for the new cycle?

c) Sustainability: Are development results,achieved through UNDP contribution,sustainable? Do they ensure sustainabilitywith a focus on national ownership, anenabling policy environment, capacitydevelopment, gender equality, human rightsor other key drivers that UNDP considers inassessing development effectiveness?

In addition, the evaluation will analyse thestrategic positioning of UNDP, in order to:

A N N E X I . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E 4 7

n Ascertain the relationship of UNDP supportto national needs, development goals andpriorities, including its relevance and linkagesto the goal of poverty reduction and attainingother Millennium Development Goals;

n Assess how UNDP anticipated and respondedto significant changes in the nationaldevelopment context, particularly thoseaffecting poverty reduction and governancereform for sustainable development;

n Review the synergies and alignment ofUNDP support with other initiatives andpartners—including the United NationsDevelopment Assistance Framework, theGlobal Cooperation Framework and theRegional Cooperation Framework—and assesshow effectively UNDP has coordinated itswork with other development partners; and

n Consider the influence of systemic issues,such as the policy and administrativeconstraints affecting the programme, on boththe donor and the programme county sides,as well as how the development resultsachieved and the partnerships establishedhave contributed to ensure the UNDPrelevance and strategic position.

5. METHODOLOGY

The assessment will use a multiple methodapproach that includes desk reviews, workshops andmeetings, and group and individual interviews atheadquarter and field levels. The appropriatemethodology will be refined during the scopingmission and after further discussions between theteam of evaluators and various stakeholders.

The evaluation team will examine, whenappropriate, overall programming frameworks—e.g., United Nations Development AssistanceFramework, Common Country Assessment,Country Cooperation Framework—to providean overall picture of the country context. Theteam will also consider select project andprogramme support documents, as well as anycountry-level monitoring and evaluation reports.

Statistical data will be assessed where useful. Theevaluation team will validate its findings usingtriangulation of perceptions, documents and data.

The Evaluation Office envisages a strong partici-patory approach involving concerned stakeholders.The identification of the stakeholders, includinggovernment representatives of ministries, agencies,civil society organizations, private sector represen-tatives, United Nations agencies, multilateralorganizations, bilateral donors, and beneficiarieswill take place. The team will visit significantproject and field sites as required.

The ADR will follow the guidelines developedby the Evaluation Office in 2006. According tothese guidelines, the process can be divided inthree multi-step phases.

PHASE 1: PREPARATORY PHASE

n Desk review: Carried out by the EvaluationOffice in close consultation with the evaluationTeam Leader, the country office and theRegional Bureau for Africa (RBA), thereview will be based on the key questions forthe evaluation, developed by the evaluation TaskManager and Team Leader in consultationwith RBA.

n Scoping mission: The evaluation team willconduct a brief mission to the country to definescope, identify stakeholders, collect additionaldata and complete the evaluability assessment.

n Inception report: The report will include thefinal evaluation design and plan, backgroundof the evaluation, key evaluation questions,detailed methodology, information sourcesand instruments, the plan for data collection,the design for data analysis, and the formatfor reporting.

PHASE 2: CONDUCTING THE ADR AND DRAFTING EVALUATION REPORT

n ADR mission of data collection and validation:The main mission of two weeks will beconducted by the independent evaluationteam, led by the Team Leader.

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n Analysis and reporting: The informationcollected will be analysed in the draft ADRreport by the evaluation team within threeweeks of the team departing from thecountry. The draft will be subject to factualcorrections by key clients and to a technicalreview by the Evaluation Office. The TeamLeader, in close cooperation with the TaskManager, shall finalize the ADR reportbased on these final reviews.

PHASE 3: FOLLOW-UP

n Stakeholder meeting: A meeting with thekey national stakeholders will be organizedto present the results of the evaluation.Comments will be incorporated into the finalevaluation report by the Team Leader.

n Management response: The preparation ofthe management response and the trackingof its implementation will be undertakeninternally by UNDP.

n Learning events: The dissemination of thereport’s findings shall serve the purpose of organizational learning, as part of theoverall Evaluation Office dissemination andoutreach strategy.

6. EXPECTED OUTPUTS

The expected outputs are:

n An inception report (maximum 20 pages); and

n A comprehensive final ADR report on theRepublic of the Congo (maximum 50 pagesplus annexes).

The final report of the ADR to be produced bythe evaluation team should contain, at theminimum:

n Executive summary of conclusions andrecommendations;

n Background, with analysis of country context;

n Assessment of strategic positioning andprogramme relevance;

n Review of programme performance;

n Lessons learned and good practices;

n Findings and recommendations; and

n Annexes (e.g., Terms of Reference, personsmet, documentation reviewed, statistics).

7. EVALUATION TEAM

An international consultancy firm will undertakethe assessment and will designate an evaluationteam. The team will comprise three consultants,one of whom will be the team leader, a teamspecialist with specific skills in topical areasrelevant to the evaluation, and a national consultantwith extensive knowledge of the country situation.The team leader must have a demonstratedcapacity in strategic thinking and policy adviceand in the evaluation of complex programmes in the field. The team members should have in-depth knowledge of developments in Africaand preferably be fluent in French.

The composition of the evaluation team shall reflectthe independence and the substantive results-focusof the evaluation. The Evaluation Office willselect the international evaluation consultancy firm.

8. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

EO will manage the evaluation, ensure coordina-tion and liaison with RBA and other concernedunits at headquarter level. The Task Manager will manage the evaluation process, in closeconsultation with RBA and the UNDPBrazzaville office management.

The country office will take a lead role inorganizing dialogue and stakeholder meetings onthe findings and recommendations. The officewill act as a liaison between key local partnersand the evaluation team, ensure the team’s accessto all available materials and provide support tologistics and planning.

The Evaluation Office will meet all costs directlyrelated to the conduct of the ADR. These will

A N N E X I . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E 4 9

include costs related to participation of the TeamLeader, international and national consultants, aswell as the preliminary research and the issuanceof the final ADR report. The country willcontribute in-kind support. The EvaluationOffice will also cover costs of any stakeholderworkshops as part of the evaluation.

The timeframe and responsibilities for theevaluation process are as follows:

n Desk review and analysis of documentation:January 2008

n Inception meetings in New York:21–25 January 2008

n Scoping mission to the Republic of theCongo: 28 January – 4 February 2008

n Main ADR mission to the Republic of theCongo: 28 February – 12 March 2008

n Submission of final draft report:25 March 2008

n Submission of final report:22 April 2008

A N N E X I I . K E Y D O C U M E N T S R E V I E W E D 5 1

Adote, Mougani, and Oschauldes, Ibata, ‘Rapportprovisoire d’évaluation, projet ActionCommunautaire pour le rétablissementpost-conflit’ [‘Evaluation of CommunityAction Project’], February 2006.

African Development Bank/AfricanDevelopment Fund, ‘République du Congo:Document de stratégie par pays axée sur lesrésultats – DSPAR 2008–2012’ [‘Results-based strategy document 2008–2011’].

African Ministerial Conference onEnvironment, ‘Action Plan of theEnvironmental Initiative of NEPAD’,adopted in Maputo, June 2003.

Ahounmènou, E.B., ‘Rapport de mission: Appuià la mise en place du CEDAP’ [‘MissionReport: Support to the Setting up of theCEDAP’], 20 August – 8 September 2007.

Centre for International Cooperation,University of Bradford, ‘Assessing andreviewing the impact of small armsavailability and poverty: a case study of the Republic of Congo UNDP/IOM ex-combatants Reintegration and smallarms collection project’, May 2004.

Defoundoux-Fila, Hyacinthe, ‘Rapport d’exécution technique et financier:Séminaires ateliers sur le renforcement descapacités des ONG en matière de luttecontre la corruption’ [‘Report on Seminarsand Workshops for the Strengthening ofNGO Capacity in the Fight AgainstCorruption’], Brazzaville, 2007.

Economic Intelligence Unit, ‘Country Profile,Congo (Brazzaville)’, September 2007.

International Monetary Fund, ‘Country Reportno 06/206’, July 2006.

International Monetary Fund, ‘Country Reportno 07/206’, June 2007.

International Monetary Fund, ‘Republic of Congo – Chairman’s Summing up, President’s Memorandum andRecommendation and Decision PointDocument under the Enhanced HeavilyIndebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative’,24 February 2006.

International Monetary Fund, ‘Oil and Growthin the Republic of Congo’, IMF WorkingPaper, August 2006.

International Monetary Fund, ‘Republic ofCongo: Selected Issues Paper’, 9 April 2007.

Makita-Mbama, Albert, ‘Rapport de l’étuded’analyse du projet Action communautairepour le relèvement des communautés et la réintégration sociale des jeunes à risque (PRESJAR)’, mid-term review,Brazzaville, undated.

Parliament of the Republic of the Congo,Statement of Congolese Parliamentarianson a healthy and sustainable environment,Brazzaville, 3 December 2004.

Parliament of the Republic of the Congo,Statement of Commitment ofParliamentarians to the Fight againstHIV/AIDS, Dolisie, 1 December 2002.

Parliament of the Republic of the Congo,Statement of Parliamentarians on the Fightagainst Poverty: Identification of RootCauses and the Role of Parliamentarians,Brazzaville, 8 March 2002.

Republic of France, ‘Framework partnershipdocument, France-Congo (2007–2011)’,available online at: www.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

Republic of the Congo, ‘Projet de Constitution’[draft Constitution], Brazzaville, 29November 2001.

Republic of the Congo, ‘Enquête congolaiseauprès des ménages pour l’évaluation de lapauvreté (ECOM 2005)’ [‘CongoleseHousehold Survey for the Evaluation ofPoverty’], April 2006.

Annex II

KEY DOCUMENTS REVIEWED*

* Project documents, reports and financial tables, as well as numerous briefing notes provided by the UNDP country office,are not listed.

A N N E X I I . K E Y D O C U M E N T S R E V I E W E D5 2

Republic of the Congo, draft Poverty ReductionStrategy Paper, January 2007.

Republic of the Congo, ‘Interim PovertyReduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) of theCongo’, 27 September 2004.

Republic of the Congo, ‘La nouvelle espérance :projet de société du Président de laRépublique du Congo, son ExcellenceMonsieur Denis Sassou Nguesso’ [NewHope: Social Platform of H.E. PresidentDenis Sassou Nguesso], 2002.

Republic of the Congo, Law on Political Parties, 2006.

Republic of the Congo, Ministry of Planning,Draft National Plan for Reaching theMDGs in the Congo, 6th draft,December 2007.

Republic of the Congo, ‘Plan national de lutte contre la corruption’ [‘National Anti-corruption Plan’], adopted by theGovernment on 4 June 2004.

Republic of the Congo, ‘Rapport national sur ledéveloppement humain 2002: Guerres, etaprès?’ [‘National Human DevelopmentReport 2002: Wars, and After?’], 2002.

Republic of the Congo, ‘Rapport national sur le développement humain: Gouvernance,cohésion sociale et développement humaindurable en République du Congo’[‘National Human Development Report:Governance, Social Cohesion andSustainable Development in the Republic of the Congo’], 2007.

Republic of the Congo, ‘Rapport National sur les Objectifs du Millénaire pour leDéveloppement’ [‘National MDG Report’],Brazzaville, August 2004.

Republic of the Congo, The World Bank andEuropean Commission, ‘La République duCongo: Evaluation intégrée de la gestiondes finances publiques et de la passation desmarchés’ [‘Country Integrated FiduciaryAssessment – CIFA’], June 2006.

Small Arms Survey, ‘Small Arms Availability,Trade and Impacts in the Republic of theCongo’, study prepared for the InternationalOrganization for Migration and UNDP,April 2002.

Small Arms Survey, ‘Quoi de neuf sur le frontCongolais? Evaluation de base sur lacirculation d’armes légères et de petit calibre en République du Congo’ [‘Survey of Small Arms Circulation in the Republicof the Congo’], December 2007.

UNDP, ‘Draft Country Programme Documentfor the Republic of the Congo (2004-2007)’, Executive Board documentDP/DCP/PRC/1, 28 July 2003.

UNDP, ‘Evaluation finale: Action communau-taire pour le rétablissement post-conflit enRépublique du Congo’ [‘Final Evaluation:Community Action for Post-conflictRehabilitation’], undated.

UNDP, ‘Evaluation Report: Support toParliamentarian Institutions’, Brazzaville,17–23 June 2003.

UNDP, ‘Evaluation of Results-BasedManagement at UNDP’, Evaluation Office,New York, 2007.

UNDP, ‘Information on TRAC-2 Allocationand Methodology and Criteria forEstablishing Fixed Lines in theProgramming Arrangements’, ExecutiveBoard document DP/2008/14,14 December 2007.

UNDP, ‘Proposals on ProgrammingArrangements for the Period 2008–2011’Executive Board document DP/2007/44,3 August 2007.

UNDP, ‘Measuring Democratic Governance,A Framework for Selecting Pro-poor andGender-sensitive Indicators’, May 2006.

UNDP, ‘Mission d’évaluation des modalitésd’exécution nationale (NEX) et exécution ONG des programmes/projets de développement mis en œuvre avec l’appui du PNUD au Congo’[‘Evaluation Mission on NEX/NGOImplementation Mechanisms’],Brazzaville, 11 October 2006.

UNDP, ‘Programming Arrangements for thePeriod 2004–2007: Information Note to theExecutive Board”, 10–14 September 2007.

UNDP, ‘Protocole d’accord entre le PNUD et la société TOTAL’, [‘Agreement betweenUNDP and TOTAL in the Republic of the Congo’], 2007.

UNDP, ‘Rapport d’évaluation du projetPrévention du SIDA dans les écoles duCongo’ [‘Evaluation Report on the Projectfor the Prevention of AIDS in Schools inthe Congo’], Brazzaville, April 2006.

UNDP, ‘Regional Programme Document forAfrica, 2008–2011’.

A N N E X I I . K E Y D O C U M E N T S R E V I E W E D 5 3

UNDP, ‘Second Regional CooperationFramework for Africa – 2002–2006’.

UNDP, ‘Second Multi-year FundingFramework, 2004–2007’, Executive Boarddocument DP/2003/32, 13 August 2003.

UNDP, ‘UNDP Strategic Plan, 2008-2011,Accelerating Global Progress on HumanDevelopment’, Executive Board documentDP/2007/43, 18 July 2007.

Union Interparlementaire et AssembléeNationale française and French NationalAssembly, ‘Rapport de la mission d’évaluation et de proposition auprès duParlement de la République du Congo’[‘Joint Interparliamentary Union andFrench National Assembly Evaluation ofthe Programme of Support to ParliamentaryInstitutions’], 21–27 April 2006.

Union for Study and Research on Populationand Development and the Republic of theCongo, ‘La corruption et la fraude enRépublique du Congo’ [‘Corruption andFraud in the Republic of the Congo’],November 2003.

United Nations Country Team in the Republicof the Congo, ‘UN Plan Republic of theCongo– 2001–2002’, undated.

United Nations Country Team in the Republicof the Congo, ‘UN Plan 2002: Together…’,Brazzaville, 2002.

United Nations Country Team in the Republicof the Congo, ‘Bilan commun de pays(CCA), Congo’ [‘Common CountryAssessment, Republic of the Congo],Brazzaville, February 2005.

United Nations Country Team in the Republicof the Congo, ‘Draft UNDAF – 2009–2013’.

United Nations, ‘Consideration of ReportsSubmitted by State Parties under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination againstWomen; Initial, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report of State Parties: Congo’, UN documentCEDAW/C/COG/1-5, 8 April 2002.

United States of America, Bureau ofDemocracy, Human Rights and Labor,‘Country Reports on Human RightsPractices: Republic of Congo’,6 March 2006.

The World Bank, ‘Country Profile, Republic of the Congo’.

The World Bank, ‘République du Congo:Projet d’Appui à l’Education de Base(PRAEBASE), Mission de Supervision’,Brazzaville, 1–12 October 2007.

The World Bank, ‘Note Analytique sur lesMarchés Publics (Country ProcurementIssues Paper – CPIP: République duCongo)’, 10 February 2006.

A N N E X I I I . P E O P L E C O N S U L T E D 5 5

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Germain Bemba-Bantsimba, Inspector of Municipal Services, Township of Pointe-Noire

Benjamin Boumakany, General Secretary of the Government

Jean Marie Bossina, Third Secretary, PermanentMission of the Republic of the Congo tothe United Nations, New York

Chantal Maryse Itoua-Apoyolo, FirstCounsellor, Permanent Mission of theRepublic of the Congo to the UnitedNations, New York

Jocelyne Milandou, Vice President, Cour desComptes et de Discipline Budgétaire (equiv. General Accountant Office)

Pierre Ngollo, First Secretary, Bureau of theNational Assembly

Alphonse Nzoungou, President,National Commission of the Fight against Corruption

Jean-Christoffe Okandza, Chief of Staff,Ministry of Planning

Emmanuel Okandze, Administrative Counsellor,Bureau of the National Assembly

Luc Joseph Okio, Minister Counsellor,Permanent Mission of the Republic of theCongo to the United Nations, New York

M. Oko-Olingoba, Chief of Staff, Bureau of the National Assembly

Mwaziby Olingoba, Commissioner for theEconomic Reintegration of FormerCombatants, HCREC

Jean-Baptiste Ondaye, Director General,Ministry of Planning

Gilbert Pana, Director, Government Publicationand Documentation

Emilienne Raoul, Minister of Health, SocialAffairs and Family

Col. Michel Sangha, Prefect, Pool DepartmentEtari Wa Dzon, Planning and Development

Department, Ministry of Planning

CIVIL SOCIETY

Lilian Barros, Coordinator, Comptoir JuridiqueJunior (legal aid NGO)

Yvonne Bantsimba, Manager, Kinsoudi PrimarySchool, Brazzaville

M. Bitsangou, Deputy-Treasurer, LocalCommunity Management Group, KinsoudiPrimary School, Brazzaville

El Hadj Djibril Bopaka, Union Nationale desOpérateurs Economiques Congolais(Employers Union)

Serge Bouiti-Viaudio, Coordinator, HumanDevelopment Programme, TOTAL-Congo

Scholastique Dianzinga, Centre de Promotionde la Femme en Politique (NGO for thepromotion of women in politics)

Father Christian de la Breteche, President,Forum of Junior Enterprises (NGO)

Hervé Diata, Dean, Faculty of EconomicSciences, Marien Ngouabi University

Georgette Ingani, Regional Director,Centre Régional pour l’Eau Potable etl’Assainissement (water and sanitation NGO)

Florent Kihoulou, General Secretary,Fondation Niosi

Marie-Françoise Kimbadi, Director (Group B),Kinsoudi Primary School, Brazzaville

Tsaty Mabiala, General Secretary, Union Pan-Afracaine pour le Développement Social(political party)

Célestine Matsima, Director (Group A)Kinsoudi Primary School, Brazzaville

Florent Mboungou, Executive Director,Association Congolaise du Bien-EtreFamilial (family welfare NGO)

Annex III

PEOPLE CONSULTED

A N N E X I I I . P E O P L E C O N S U L T E D5 6

Loamba Moke, General Secretary, Associationpour la Défense des Droits Humains et de l’Univers Carcéral (human rights and prisons NGO)

Jules Arsène Myningou, Chief, EnvironmentDepartment, TOTAL-Congo

Octave Gildas Ndalla-Bikoumou,Micro-finance Expert, Forum of Junior Enterprises (NGO)

Jeannin Ndamba, Environment Expert,Free University of the Congo

Roch Euloge Nzobo, Programme Officer,Observatoire Congolais des Droits del’Homme (human rights NGO)

Jean-François Obembé, General Secretary,Mouvement pour la Solidarité et leDéveloppement (political party)

J.J. Samba, General Secretary, Union Patronaleet Inetr-Professionnelle du CongoUNICONGO (employers union)

DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

Wilfred Banmbuh, Representative,World Food Programme

Aliénor Bernhard, Deputy Representative,International Committee of the Red Cross

Arnaud Borchard, Chargé d’Affaires,European Commission

Rose-Belle Da Silva-Rodrigues, Attachée deCoopération et d’Action Culturelle,French Embassy

Anicet G. Dologuélé, President, Banque de Développement des Etats d’AfriqueCentrale (Regional Development Bank of Central African States)

Rizzi Domenico, Italian EmbassyLouani Mahamat Goadi, Senior Expert in

Human Development, The World BankSerge Mbongolo, Communication Officer,

International Committee of the Red CrossBienvenu Monthe Biyoudi, Economist in charge

of Operations, The World BankAriane Tombet, Representative, International

Committee of the Red CrossKoen Vanormelingen, Representative, UNICEF

OFFICE OF THE RESIDENTCOORDINATOR

Lydia Kassa, Coordination Advisor

UNDP COUNTRY OFFICE

Aurélien Agbénonci, Resident RepresentativeAderemi Aibiou, Head of United Nations

office, KinkalaNormand Alouna, Finance OfficerEmelyne Bayanda, Adviser, Governance and

Peace Consolidation UnitIsidore Dianzinga, Chief Technical Adviser,

Project on Climate ChangeLuisa Dologuélé, Manager, CEDAPMax M. Fira, Governance UnitJoseph Ikoubou, CEDAPJean-Félix Issang, Officer in Charge of

Environment ProgrammesViolet Kakyomya, Deputy

Resident RepresentativeChristelle Kotolo, Head of UNDP Office in

Pointe-NoireEloi Kouadio IV, CEDAPDaniel Mikayoulou, Advisor, Poverty and

Environment UnitJoseph Ntsiefe, in charge of CFC projectRimteta Ranguébaye, EconomistNadège Zoula, Poverty Unit and Gender

Focal Point

UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK

David Bongwele, Political Affairs Officer,Department of Political Affairs

Sammy Kum Buo, Director, Africa II Division,Department of Political Affairs

Inyang Ebong-Harstrup, UNDG OfficeAida Mengistu, Associate Humanitarian

Officer, UN OCHAStephen O’Malley, Chief, Africa I Section,

UN OCHAMicheline Ravololonarisoa, Chief, Africa

Section, United Nations Development Fund for Women

A N N E X I I I . P E O P L E C O N S U L T E D 5 7

UNDP NEW YORK

EVALUATION OFFICE

Nurul Alam, Deputy DirectorOscar Garcia, Evaluation AdviserSergio Lenci, Evaluation AdviserSaraswati Menon, DirectorHoward Stewart, Evaluation AdviserJuha Uitto, Evaluation Adviser

BUREAU FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Selim Jahan, Director, Poverty PracticeTerence D. Jones, Democratic

Governance GroupJeffrey O’Lalley, Director, HIV/AIDS GroupBharati Silawal-Giri, Gender and

Development Adviser

REGIONAL BUREAU FOR AFRICA

René C. Giraud, Country Programme AdviserAde M. Lekoetje, Country Programme Adviser

BUREAU FOR CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY

Laurent Rudasingwa, Programme Specialist andRegional Focal Point for Africa

UNDP ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY GROUP,REGIONAL COORDINATION UNIT FOR WESTAND CENTRAL AFRICA

Abdoulaye Ndiaye, Regional Team Leader andRegional Technical Adviser Biodiversity andInternational Waters

A N N E X I V . I N F O R M A T I O N N O T E 5 9

The Evaluation Office of the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) has requestedthat Abacus International Management L.L.C.provide a team of independent consultants toevaluate the contribution of UNDP to develop-ment results in the Republic of the Congo. Thisexercise will primarily concern the period of 2004to 2007. It will endeavour to analyse the projectsand activities of UNDP and to compare the resultsof these actions to those that were anticipated whenthe currently ending programme cycle was adopted.The evaluation will take place between Januaryand April 2008. The evaluation team is entirelyindependent from UNDP. It is composed ofAbdenour Benbouali, Hyacinthe Defoundoux-Filaand Carrol Faubert, who will act as Team Leader.

For its research work, the evaluation team will visitthe Republic of the Congo between 24 Februaryand 10 March. It will meet, individually or ingroups, with the principal partners of UNDP in thegovernment, as well as with donors, internationalagencies and organizations, international financialinstitutions, non-governmental organizationsand civil society representatives. The evaluationteam will also meet persons and groups who are notdirectly engaged in a partnership with UNDP,but who can contribute to the understanding ofactions in favour of development, reconciliationand reconstruction.

The evaluation will analyse the major themes ofthe 2004–2007 programme, which support:

n Good governance;

n Poverty reduction;

n The preservation of the environment and themanagement of natural resources;

n Prevention and reconstruction in a post-conflict situation; and

n The cross-cutting themes of gender, HIV/AIDS and new information and communi-cations technologies.

The team will also be concerned with non-budgetary activities and those implemented withsmall budgets, including advocacy, the develop-ment of partnerships, the development ofnational capacities, etc.

With regard to activities and programmes, theanalysis carried out by the evaluation will addressthe relevance of strategic and programmaticchoices of UNDP, the efficiency of intervention,the sustainability of results achieved, the nationalownership, the strategic positioning of UNDPand its comparative advantages.

The following list represents some of theprincipal questions, to which the evaluation teamwill try to find answers. These questions willconstitute the thread of discussion the team willhave with you and other persons consulted.

1. What have been the main UNDP contribu-tions to development in the Republic of theCongo? What could it have done differentlyto improve these contributions? Has UNDPmade the right strategic choices?

2. Has UNDP been able to correctly analyse anevolving situation and to anticipate and adaptits interventions, programmes and projects tothe environment in which it operates?

3. Have UNDP programmes correctly reflectednational priorities? Do programmes fit in

Annex IV

INFORMATION NOTE*

* Unofficial translation from an original in French.

A N N E X I V . I N F O R M A T I O N N O T E6 0

harmoniously with the efforts of othercomponents of the international communityin the Republic of the Congo?

4. Have the results achieved, positive ornegative, in the areas of UNDP interventionbeen due to the efforts and activities ofUNDP or to external factors?

5. Are these results of a permanent nature? Canthey be sustained?

6. Do you see UNDP as a reliable and usefulpartner? How could it improve its relationswith you and, generally, its image as anefficient partner for the development of theRepublic of the Congo?

7. According to you, what determines thestrategic and programmatic choices ofUNDP? What are the external factorsinfluencing UNDP choices?

8. Is UNDP perceived as an important agent ofchange in the areas of governance, povertyreduction, environment protection, reconcili-ation and reconstruction, the promotion ofgender equality and the fight againstHIV/AIDS?

9. Does the entire UNDP programme and itsvarious projects, particularly in the areas ofgovernance and poverty reduction, convinc-ingly incorporate the stated priority of thepromotion of women?

10. Does UNDP play an important part in thecoordination between the different actorssupporting development in the Congo?According to you, what is the UNDP “valueadded” in the development aid set up in theRepublic of the Congo?

11. What do you think of UNDP interventionsin advocacy activities, coordination, thedevelopment of partnerships and capacitybuilding? Do you think that the actions andinterventions of UNDP have an effect onsectoral and national policies?

12. Do the UNDP interventions contributeefficiently to supporting national efforts forthe attainment of the MillenniumDevelopment Goals?

Should you wish to send the evaluation teamwritten comments prior to its arrival, you may doso by sending an e-mail directly to the TeamLeader, or to the officer responsible for thisevaluation in the UNDP Evaluation Office inNew York. We would also be grateful if you couldidentify any documentation that could be usefulto the evaluation team and, if the documents existin electronic form, send them to the addressesabove or provide a copy at the time of meetingwith the team. The evaluation team will needdocuments, statistics and precise facts.

The evaluation team,Brazzaville, February 2008