conflict trend issue03 2011

Peacekeep i ng and Peacebu i l d i ng Nexus

ISSUE 3 , 2011

conflict trends I 1conflict trends I 1

EDITORIAL 2 byVasuGounden

3 ContextualisingthePeacekeepingandPeacebuildingNexus

byGustavodeCarvalhoandDorcasEttang

13 NavigatingHybridPoliticalOrders:BalancingPeacebuildinginChad

byDianaFelixdaCostaandJohnKarlsrud

22 ViolenceinLiberia:FallingbetweenPeacebuildingandPeacekeeping

byJenniferM.Hazen

29 TheUNMissionandLocalChurchesinSouthSudan:OpportunitiesforPartnershipsinLocalPeacebuilding

byIngridMarieBreidlidandAndreasØienStensland

37 PeacekeepingtoPeacebuildingfromaGenderPerspective:TheUNMILCase

byKristenA.Cordell

45 Civil-MilitaryCoordinationandTransitionManagement:TheUNMILExperience

byChristopherHolshek

53 Practitioners‘PerspectivesonthePeacekeeping-PeacebuildingNexus

byGustavodeCarvalhoandDorcasEttang

FEATURES

contentsct3|2011

InTERvIEw

2 I conflict trends2 I conflict trends

ByVaSUGOUNdEN

editorial

VasuGoundenistheFounderandExecutivedirectorofaCCORd.

Whilst theAfricancontinent issignificantlyafflicted

and affected by armed and violent conflict, it has also

providedaseriesofinnovativeresponsestoresolvesuch

conflicts. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives

haveevolved,transformedandadaptedtonewrealities,

withtheaimofprovidingmoreeffectiveandsustainable

responses to armed conflicts and the processes that

followtheaftermathoftheseconflicts.Thisevolutionis

visibleinvariousforms.Ontheonehand,peacekeepers

havebeenprovidingawiderrangeofresponses,moving

away fromthesimplemonitoringofpeaceagreements

only to providing stronger support for longer-term

peacebuildingpriorities–includingelectoralassistance,

institutional support to governments, confidence-

building,securitysectorreform,andsoon.Ontheother

hand, largerpeacebuildingprocessesareseennotonly

aspracticesthatbeginwiththedrawdownofmissions,

butareactuallyinitiatedconcomitantlytothedeployment

of peacekeeping operations. Such transformations

in peacekeeping operations indicate the increased

complementarity–andevenacertainlevelofoverlap–

betweenpeacekeepingandpeacebuilding.

An important and current debate in the conflict

resolutionfieldisthedistinctionbetweenpeacekeeping

andpeacebuilding,especiallyinsituationswherethishas

becomelessclearandwherethereisnowmoreoverlap

intasks.Thisdebateisoflessconcernattheconceptual

or theoretical level,butmorevalidatapractical level.

It isat thecoreofdesigningstrategiesfordealingwith

armed and violent conflicts, of allocating appropriate

and efficient efforts and resources for implementing

larger peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes,

and of defining clear strategies that can meaningfully

supportpost-conflictsocieties in theirquest for lasting

peace.Thisimportantdebateis,therefore,atthecenter

ofconsiderationsanddecision-makingonhowtomake

responses to conflict more meaningful, effective and

sustainableforthesocietiesbeingassisted.

However,whilst thisongoingdebate isessential for

a better understanding of the nature of peacekeeping

and peacebuilding processes, many questions are

yet to be answered. There is an important need for

increasing understanding on whether, when and how

peacekeeping operations should be involved in early

peacebuildingtasks.Also,determininghowto improve

coordinationbetweenpeacekeepingoperationsandother

peacebuildingactorson theground is key,particularly

as peacebuilding processes should be undertaken as

nationalresponsibilitiesandnotbeledsolelybyexternal

actors. In addition, as each conflict context – whether

it is Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo

or South Sudan – presents different characteristics,

dynamics,challengesandopportunitiesforapplyingand

understanding the relationship between peacekeeping

and peacebuilding better, these questions need to

be understood and applied in the context specific to

particularcountries,regionsandscenarios.Thesearebut

a fewexamplesof themanyquestionsand issues that

needtobeaddressedwhenattemptingtostrengthenthe

capacityofpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingprocessesin

theprovisionandsupportofsustainablepeace.

The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution

of Disputes (ACCORD) is one of the main actors at

the forefront of shaping and supporting both the

peacekeeping and peacebuilding fields. It has assisted

countries in developing peacebuilding strategies, and

has supported the strengthening of peacekeeping

missions throughoutAfrica.Through itsongoingwork

andprojects,ACCORDremainscommittedtothegoalof

strengthening theunderstandingof thenexusbetween

peacekeepingandpeacebuilding.Tothisend,thisspecial

Issue of Conflict Trends unpacks and provides clarity

onsomeof thekeyquestionsand issuesrelated to the

peacekeeping-peacebuildingnexus,andhowit impacts

peacekeepingoperationsandthelargercontextsinwhich

theyoperate.

conflict trends I 3

Once upon a time, peacekeeping operations tended to be calm and consensual. … Today’s peacekeeping may take an

entirely different form. There is less clarity about peace, the conflict might even be ongoing, with no clear views on who

the parties to it actually are. … Not taking sides may be difficult. … The ‘international community’ is called upon to help

in diverse situations of tragedy and emergency. … In essence, instead of keeping the peace, the international community

is invited to participate in the building of peace.1

conflict trends I 3

Theabovequote, though largelyasimplificationof

peacekeeping,presentsinaverydirectwaytheevolution

of the field over the past 20 years. Peacekeeping has

evolvedfrommainly traditionalceasefireoperationsto

focusonmorecomplexconflict scenarioswherewider

responses are required, including early peacebuilding

initiativesandprogrammes.Inthiscontext,andaccording

to the September 2010 Department of Peacekeeping

Operations(DPKO)–DepartmentofFieldSupport(DFS)

Paper on Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, 10 of the

current16UnitedNations(UN)peacekeepingoperations

Contextualising the PeaCekeePing and PeaCebuilding nexusByGUSTaVOdECaRVaLHOANDdORCaSETTaNG

above:darfurdramaactorsperformatElSrief (Northdarfur),aspartofadisarmament,demobilisationandreintegration(ddR)outreachactivity,organisedbytheafrican Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation indarfur(UNaMId)andsupportedbytheUnitedNationsdevelopmentProgramme,theUnitedNationsChildren’sFund,theNorthSudanddRCommissionandthelocalnon-governmental organsiation, Friends of Peace anddevelopmentOrganization(July2011).Suchcoordinationamongvariousorganisationsandinstitutionsatalllevelsincreasestheeffectivenessandreachofpeacebuildingactivitiesandprogrammes.

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4 I conflict trends

aliTreki,the2010UNGeneralassemblypresident,notedthattheUNneededabroaderandholisticstrategyinbridgingpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingeffortstobuildsustainablepeaceincomplexandfragilesituations.

aremultidimensionalinnature,andhavemandatesfrom

the UN Security Council to perform a broad range of

peacebuildingactivities.2

This evolution in the peacekeeping field emanated

f rom changes in the internat ional system and

the nature of conflicts in which the UN and other

international organisations are directly involved. As

such, the institution and practice of peacekeeping has

faced constant pressure for adaptation and increased

effectiveness.Tothisend,peacebuildinghas,therefore,

been identified by some as the “overall framework in

which external assistance to post-conflict countries

should be included encompassing peacekeeping,

humanitarianassistanceanddevelopment”.3

Currently, it is clear that institutions involved in

peacekeepingare trying to findaway tobecomemore

meaningful and maximise their impact. Thus, while

peacekeeping is still largely seen as a tool to provide

securityandstabilityintheaftermathofaconflict,there

isalsoanincreasedbeliefthattodosorequiresashift

towards more sustainable and long-term post-conflict

processes.This shiftbecomesparticularly relevant for

the civilian capacities within a peacekeeping mission

that have focused frequently on peacebuilding and

statebuilding components in their functions and the

initiativesinwhichtheyareinvolved.

The 2010 UN General Assembly president, Ali

Treki,noted that theUNneededabroaderandholistic

strategy in bridging peacekeeping and peacebuilding

effortstobuildsustainablepeaceincomplexandfragile

situations and tackle the interlinked issues of security

and development in a comprehensive manner.4 This

highlightstheneednotonlytostrengthenpeacekeeping

andmakeitrelevanttocurrentconflictcontexts,butalso

tosolidifyitscontributiontopeacebuildingprocesses.It

portraysalargercommitmentbytheUNtocontinueits

focusonpeacebuildingwithinitsinstitutions.

Many of the changes that peacekeeping has faced

are due to the fact that, in an immediate post-conflict

context,thepriorityisnotonlytokeepthepeaceandhalt

violence,butalsotoensurethatissuesofgrosshuman

rights violations, weak infrastructure, unemployment,

poverty,traumaandweakstateauthorityareaddressed.

This, therefore, requires that peacekeepers – who are

usuallythefirstgroupontheground–taketheseissues

intoaccount.Suchissueshaveimplicationsforclarifying

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conflict trends I 5

and establishing how the mandates of peacekeeping

missionsaredesignedandimplemented.

Thisarticle firstpresentswhypeacekeepingshould

bepartofawiderpeacebuildingprocess,andthatboth

processes must be linked in complex situations where

suchfunctionsareneeded.Ithighlightshowpeacekeepers

areincreasinglyperformingearlypeacebuildingfunctions

at the policy and practical level. Second, the article

discusses some of the implications of the relationship

betweenpeacekeepingandpeacebuilding,andhowitcan

beclarifiedandstrengthenedfurther.

PolicyandPracticeConsiderations

Since the1990s,variouspeacekeepingoperations–

suchas theUnitedNationsMission inSudan (UNMIS)

ortheUnitedNationsMissioninCôted’Ivoire(UNOCI)–

weremandated inawiderscopeofactions.Therefore,

while peacekeeping still remains largely focused on

providing stability and security in a post-agreement

environment, var ious new funct ions have been

incorporated.Thesefunctions,whicharegroupedunder

the peacebuilding umbrella, are now often undertaken

by contemporary peacekeeping operations – and

include electoral support; supporting the restoration

and extension of state authority; the strengthening

of civil society; and supporting the disarmament,

demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants.

Peacekeepers are indeed providing peacebuilding

support – both in terms of directly supporting critical

peacebuildingtasksandthroughenablinglocalactorsin

developing and implementing peacebuilding priorities

andstrategies.

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Contemporarypeacekeepingoperationsnowincludepeacebuildingfunctions,suchaselectoralsupport.Here,theUnitedNationsMissioninSudan(UNMIS)providedtechnicalandlogisticalsupporttoSudan’sNationalElectionsCommission:UNhelicoptersdeliveredballotsandpollingmaterialsforthenationalelections,toremoteareas insouthernSudan(april2010).

PEACEKEEPING HAS EVOLVED FROM

MAINLy TRADITIONAL CEASEFIRE

OPERATIONS TO FOCUS ON MORE

COMPLEx CONFLICT SCENARIOS WHERE

WIDER RESPONSES ARE REqUIRED,

INCLUDING EARLy PEACEBUILDING

INITIATIVESANDPROGRAMMES

6 I conflict trends

TheUNGeneralassemblyholdsathematicdebateon“UnitedNationsPeacekeeping:LookingintotheFuture”(June2010).

Main Roles Performed by Peacekeepers in the

BroaderPeacebuildingEffort,accordingtotheUN

SecretaryGeneral

• “Peacekeepers articulate strategic priorities by

supportingconsensusamongnationalcounterparts

andthebroaderinternationalcommunity.

• “Peacekeepers enable peacebuilding by others,

by providing a security umbrella, monitoring

commitments by parties to the conflict, expanding

andpreservingpoliticalspace,facilitatingassistance

efforts, delivering administrative and logistical

enabling support, and coordinating or directly

managingvariousresourcestreams.

• “Peacekeepingoperationsdirectlyimplementcertain

peacebuilding tasks, including measures for short-

termstabilityandlayingthefoundationsforlong-term

capacity building and institutional development in

collaborationwithpartners.”5

Jennifer Hazen appropriately highl ights that

more frequently peacemaking, peacekeeping and

peacebuildinghavebeenconceptuallyidentifiedasthree

distinct activities in a post-conflict context and that,

if successful, peacekeeping would lay the foundation

for peacebuilding.6 Emily Munro points out that, in

integrating peacebuilding activities into peacekeeping

missions, challengesemerge –particularly concerning

the frequent ambiguous nature of most mission

mandates on peacebuilding responsibilities, and the

inconsistencies between mission tasks and budgets.7

Whilethesestatementsprovideimportantdistinctionsin

termsofthefocusofactivitiesthatneedtobeconducted,

theyalsohighlighttheconfusionthatoccurs–especially

in areas where they overlap in implementation. This

confusionwasseeninthechallengesthatpeacekeeping

operations have faced in transitioning to longer-term

peace consolidation and development in Chad, Côte

d’Ivoire,Darfur, theDemocraticRepublicof theCongo

(DRC),Haiti,LiberiaandTimor-Leste.8Thesechallenges

includestruggleswithdeliveringonmissionmandates

to protect civilians and, at the same time, respond to

threats; inadequatecapabilitiesandsupport structures

tocarryoutmandateseffectively;andthe lackofcrisis

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conflict trends I 7

planninganddecision-makingintimesofenvironmental

crisis(suchastheearthquakeinHaiti).

More recen t l y, the Spec ia l Commi t tee on

PeacekeepingOperationshascalledforbetterdefinitions

and identification of peacebuilding activities in the

mandates of peacekeeping operations. It is expected

that the DPKO and DFS will soon develop an “early

peacebuilding strategy for peacekeepers to guide the

prioritisationandsequencingofinitiativesintheareasof

civilaffairs,policing,justice,corrections,securitysector

reform,mineaction,disarmament,demobilizationand

reintegration”.9

The increased interaction between peacekeeping

and peacebuilding activities has had a direct impact

ondiscussionsatUNHeadquarters level.TheSecurity

Council is often in discussions about the matter, and

thetopichassubsequentlyreceivedincreasedattention.

BetweenFebruary2010andFebruary2011,fiveSecurity

CouncilPresidentialStatementson topics linked to the

peacekeepingandpeacebuildingnexuswerereleased.10

Furthermore,variouscriticaldocuments(seeTable1)that

highlightthisrelationshiphavebeenreleased.Attention

to the peacekeeping and peacebuilding nexus became

acentral issue indiscussionsand in thesedocuments,

within thecontextofhowtoenhanceUNresponses to

conflicts.

A common theme can be gleaned from the

aforementioned documents. On the one hand, they all

confirmtheideathatpeacekeepingshouldpavetheway

forlonger-termsustainablepeace,throughtheirsupport

ofcomprehensivepeaceagreementsandby laying the

foundation for legitimate governance.15 On the other

hand,thesekeydocumentsalsoacknowledgethatthere

areseveralchallengesinstrengtheningthepeacekeeping

and peacebuilding nexus, so that it contributes to the

overallefficiencyoftheUN.

ImplicationsoftheNexusonthePracticeof

Peacekeeping

Thereareanumberofimplicationsforpeacekeeping

operations when considering the nexus between

peacekeepingandpeacebuilding.

Local OwnershipLocal ownership is central to discussions on

the principle and pract ice of peacekeeping and

peacebuilding. Building local institutions and national

ownership is a long-term process that continues long

Table1:RelevantdocumentsHighlightingthePeacekeepingandPeacebuildingNexus

UNdocument ExamplesofSectionsinthedocumentHighlightingtheNexus

Secretary General Report on Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict

“The Security Council plays an essential role in signalling strong international attention

and support for a peace process and for the initiation of peacebuilding, calling on all

stakeholders for their constructive support and engagement and authorising a number of

potential steps, including peacekeeping operations.” 11

A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping

“UN Peacekeepers play a critical role in building peace after conflict, in establishing the

conditions for recovery and development activities and in carrying out some of the tasks

essential to stabilisation and early consolidation of peace.” 12

Independent Report of the Senior Advisory Group - Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict

“The separation of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and political affairs into separate boxes,

and the alignment of departments and funding modalities with these arbitrary divisions,

constrain the UN’s ability to deploy the right capacity at the right time and to adjust in

response to changing needs.” 13

2011 Substantive Session – UN General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (also referred to as C-34)

“The Special Committee stresses the importance of the explicit definition and clear

identification of peacebuilding activities in the mandates of peacekeeping operations,

whenever appropriate and of their helping to lay the foundations for longer-term

peacebuilding and sustainable peace and development.”14

8 I conflict trends8 I conflict trends8 I conflict trends

TheUnitedNationsIntegratedMissioninTimor-Leste(UNMIT)trainsandempowersthelocalpoliceforceindili(2008).Peacekeepingoperationsshouldensurethat localactorsand institutionsareenhancedfromtheonsetofpeace-keepingmissions.

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after missions have drawn down. In this context, it

is now widely acknowledged that, to provide lasting

results, the host country and local actors should be

widely engaged in the process of reconstructing their

society. One of the main challenges in increasing the

linkagesbetweenpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingisto

avoidthe‘dependency’syndrome,wherelocalactorsare

heavilyreliantonexternalactorstoleadandmanagethe

peacebuildingprocess.

However, wh i l s t i t s impor tance i s w ide ly

acknowledged, there are sti l l challenges in fully

implementing local ownership in practice. In the past,

many peacekeeping operations have performed as an

alternative to the state, which hindered sustainable

programmes. Hazen confirms this view by stating

that peacekeeping missions have tended to adopt a

short-termapproachbyadvisingandassistingnational

governments with post-confl ict processes and/or

performing tasks that the government is unable to

perform.16This short-termapproachcannot contribute

successfullytoaddressingtheunderlyingcausesofthe

conflictandtorebuildingthecountryinthelongterm.In

clarifyingthepeacekeepingandpeacebuildingnexus,the

focusmustremainonbuildingandenhancingnational

capacitiesandestablishingnational responsibilityand

commitmenttotheprocess.

Although current peacekeeping operations have

consciously focused on strengthening and targeting

national capacities through various peacebuilding

activities,moreconcreteeffortswouldensurethatthese

capacitiesarestrengthenedinanongoingandin-depth

manner, and that local actors and institutions are

A COMPREHENSIVE AND WELL THOUGHT-OUT STRATEGy ON HOW TO TRANSFER

INFORMATION,SKILLSANDExPERTISEFROMINTERNATIONALTOLOCALCAPACITIES

NEEDSTOBEDEVELOPED

conflict trends I 9

enhanced fromtheonsetof thepeacekeepingmission.

Theseeffortswouldincludethetrainingandbuildingof

localcapacitiesinconflictresolutionandpeacebuilding;

providing technical assistance to national institutions;

supportingthepolicydevelopmentandimplementation

process;andcreatingavenuesfordialogue,information

andknowledge-sharingbetweenvariouslocalinstitutions

and actors. Furthermore, national capacities must

be involved in the initial planning, coordination and

implementation of all activities. A comprehensive and

wellthought-outstrategyonhowtotransferinformation,

skillsandexpertisefrominternationaltolocalcapacities

needstobedeveloped.Thiswillcontributetobuildinga

thoroughandclearunderstandingofthepeacebuilding

process,andwillensurethatlocalactorsareenabledto

achieveasustainablepeace.

Provision of Peacebuilding Expertise Within Peacekeeping Operations

It is important thatpeacekeeperspossesssufficient

capacitiestoperformtheirpeacebuildingfunctionsfully.

Working in a peacebuilding context, these capacities

would require that peacekeepers are knowledgeable

on a wide range of thematic areas such as the rule of

law,genderissuesandsecuritysectorreform,andhave

skills in mediation, negotiation, analysis, persuasion

and communication. This knowledge will ensure that

theyareable to respond tochangingsituationson the

ground, meet the relevant needs on the ground, and

contribute to long-termpeacebuildingefforts.With the

objectiveof increasingtheUN’scapacity torespondto

post-conflictchallenges,theUNisundergoingaprocess

toreviewitsciviliancapacities.Thiswillensurethatthe

neededcapacitiesareavailabletocontributeadequately

to rebuilding post-conflict states. This process is still

underwayand,at thetimeofwriting,theUNSecretary

General’sreportonthereviewhasnotyetbeenreleased.

As such, it is difficult to assess how fundamental the

changesintheUNsystemwillbe,concerningthecivilian

capacity in theaftermathof conflict.However, there is

the expectation that the process can and will support

theUNtoutiliseciviliansmoreefficientlyinsupporting

post-conflict societies – particularly through increased

partnershipswithin theUNsystemandbeyond,better

StaffmembersoftheUnitedNationsIntegratedReferendumandElectoraldivision(UNIREd)provideassistanceduringathree-daytrainingworkshopconductedbytheCentralEquatoriaStateReferendumHighCommitteeinJuba,Sudan.Theworkshopwasdesignedtoprovideclassroomandpracticaltrainingtocounty-levelrepresentativesaheadofthereferendumheldinearly2011.

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TheUNSecurityCouncildiscussestransitionandexitstrategiesinpeacekeepingoperations(February2010).

national ownership, and increased flexibility in the

utilisationofresourcesanddeployment.17

Clarity on Strategies for Peacekeeping TransitionHow the relationship between peacekeeping and

peacebuildingplaysout inthecontextofmissionsthat

will potentially draw down and transition is relevant.

questionssuchashowtoensuresuccessfultransitions

frompeacekeepingmissionstootherformsofsupport,

andhowtoensurethatrolesandfunctionsarehanded

over to national partners so that they are able to lead

and guide the peacebuilding process, are important.

Inplanningatransitionfromafullyrobustpeacekeeping

mission to a smaller mission, important factors to

considerincludehoweffectivetheroleofpeacekeepers

have been in initiating sustainable peacebuilding

processes, and if local actors are equipped and

knowledgeable to take over these processes. These

considerationsareimportant,aspeacekeepersaremostly

internationalstaffandaredeployedforashortterm,and

the processes they initiate should ideally remain long

aftertheyhavedrawndown.

Many of the peacebuilding functions performed

by peacekeepers are evolving processes that are

increasingly part of a larger peacebuilding process

in thecountry.Oneclearexampleof thishasbeen the

role of civil affairs officers in performing certain early

peacebuildingtasks.18Inparticular,theexperiencefrom

theUnitedNationsMissioninLiberia(UNMIL)highlights

howcivilaffairsofficersgraduallybecamemuchmore

involved in peacebuilding tasks. In the early stages of

themission,civilaffairsofficersweremoreengagedin

thegatheringofinformationandinconflictmanagement.

As the mission (and the country’s situation) evolved,

civil affairs officers continued to be involved in those

initialengagements,butalsobecamemorefocusedon

IT IS IMPORTANTTHATAMISSIONTRANSITIONSORDRAWSDOWNATTHERIGHT

TIME,TOAVOID ‘OVERDEPENDENCy’ByTHEHOSTCOUNTRy,ONTHEONEHAND,

ANDTOENSURETHATITLEAVESTHECOUNTRyINASTABLESTATE,ONTHEOTHER


workingwithlocalactorsandinstitutionsinsupporting

andstrengtheningtheircapacities.

It is important that a mission transitions or draws

down at the right time, to avoid ‘overdependency’ by

the host country, on the one hand, and to ensure that

it leaves thecountry inastablestate,on theother.As

such, there is a need for increased understanding of

theinitialbenchmarksthataresettomeasurethegoals

and achievements of a mission, which are used to

determinethebesttimetoexitfromaparticularcountry.

Understanding these benchmarks within an ever-

changingsituationinacountrywillensurethatthereis

sufficientplanningwellinadvanceofdrawdown,andcan

helptogaugeadequatelywhenthelocalactorsareready

totakeovertheprocess.

Coordination between Various Actors Inanyefforttobranchintopeacebuildingactivitiesin

aclearandsystematicmanner,itisimportanttonotethat

awiderangeofactorsexistinthefield–andareplaying

similar roles. Ongoing efforts to build coherence and

coordinationamongthesevariousactorsandinstitutions

at all levels (including local actors and institutions)

alreadyexist.

There are challenges between the coordination

mechanisms of peacekeeping and peacebuilding

institutions. At the level of the UN Headquarters,

coordinat ion among the Secur i ty Counci l , the

Peacebui ld ing Commission, the DPKO and the

Peacebuilding Support Office remain inadequate,

especiallyinrelationtotheiractivities.Frequently,their

activities are not fully coordinated, and planning of

peacekeepingmissionsarenotyetfullyintegrated.The

role of the World Bank is important, and the need for

closecollaborationbetweenit,theUNandotherfinancial

anddevelopmentpartnersisnecessary.Muchmorecan

bedonetoachievethis.Thischallengeisalsofeltatthe

missionlevel,especiallybetweenthemissionandother

peacebuildingactorsontheground.

RecentdevelopmentswithintheUNsystemtobuild

coherence and coordination amongst its missions,

agenciesandcountryteamsatthepoliticalandstrategic

level will help to solidify the relationship between

peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Recognising that

thesebodieshaveworkedindependently,itwillrequire

concrete and well thought-out efforts to harmonise

theirapproaches.Whenachieved, thiswillensure that

the UN can respond to short-, mid- and longer-term

peacebuilding activities in a holistic manner. Through

this integrated and strategic approach, the UN can

providesupport tocorepeacebuildingprocesses,such

asprovidingsafetyandsecurityduringelections,aswell

as economic revitalisation. In the case of UNMIL, the

missionhasbeenactive in facilitating theengagement

of the Peacebuilding Commission in the country, and

has played equivocal roles in facilitating the overall

peacebuilding process. In spite of ongoing efforts to

improvecoordination,muchmorecanbedoneso that

sustainableresultsareachieved.

Conclusion

This ar t ic le has focused on contextual is ing

the peacekeeping and peacebuilding nexus within

current-day peacekeeping operations. It has also

a t tempted to draw out the l inkages between

peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the policy and

practice of contemporary peacekeeping operations.

Understandinghowthepeacekeepingfieldhasevolved

from purely military operations to more robust and

multidimensional operations will strengthen the UN’s

role on the global stage. Furthermore, the need for

strongerandconsistentjointeffortsbetweentheDPKO

andtheUN’speacebuildingstructuresinunderstanding

thenexusbetweenpeacekeepingandpeacebuilding is

important,especiallyinthedesignandimplementation

ofmandates.

Howfuturepeacekeepingmandateswillbedesigned

and implemented wil l have implications on how

local ownership is perceived and achieved and how

the capacities of peacekeepers are built to perform

peacebuilding functions effectively. This will provide

moreclarityonthetransitionofpeacekeepingmissions,

especiallyastheydrawdown.Itisacknowledgedbythe

Security Council that there is the need for enhancing

ALTHOUGHCURRENTPEACEKEEPINGOPERATIONSHAVECONSCIOUSLyFOCUSED

ONSTRENGTHENINGANDTARGETINGNATIONALCAPACITIESTHROUGHVARIOUS

PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITIES, MORE CONCRETE EFFORTS WOULD ENSURE THAT

THESECAPACITIESARESTRENGTHENED INANONGOINGAND IN-DEPTHMANNER,

ANDTHATLOCALACTORSANDINSTITUTIONSAREENHANCEDFROMTHEONSETOF

THEPEACEKEEPINGMISSION


peacebuildingactivitiesbyformulatingastrategybased

on the interdependence between sustainable peace,

security and development in its entire dimension.19

Dialogue between the General Assembly, Security

Council, theSecretariat, troop-andpolice-contributing

countries, and partners within and beyond the UN

system through both formal and informal channels,

highlight the ongoing efforts to understand and

clarify thepeacekeepingandpeacebuildingnexus. It is

important that these ongoing efforts and discussions

remainrelevantandintegraltothespecificcontextson

the ground in which the UN works – as it is here that

thechallenges inunderstanding thepeacekeepingand

peacebuildingnexusaremostvisible.

Gustavo de Carvalho is an analyst in aCCORd’sPeacekeeping Unit and Training for Peace (TfP)Programme.

dorcas Ettang is an analyst in aCCORd’sPeacebuildingUnit.

Endnotes

1 Ojanen,Hanna(ed.)(2006)‘Peacekeeping-Peacebuilding:PreparingfortheFuture’,Availableat:<http://www.upi-fiia.fi>.

2 UnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations,DepartmentofFieldSupport(2010)‘PeacekeepingandPeacebuilding:ClarifyingtheNexus’,Availableat:<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PKO%20Peacebuilding%20Peacekeeping%20Nexus.pdf>Accessedon:13July2011.

3 Cutillo,Alberto(2006)‘InternationalAssistancetoCountriesEmergingfromConflict:AReviewofFifteenyearsofInterventionsandtheFutureofPeacebuilding’,Availableat:<http://www.ipacademy.org/media/pdf/publications/cutillo_e_rpt.pdf>Accessedon8July2011.

4 UnitedNations(2010)‘GeneralAssemblyThematicDebate:UNPeacekeepingLookingIntotheFuture’,pressrelease,22June2010,Availableat:<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga10953.doc.htm>.

5 UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(2011)Report of the Secretary-General: Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations,A/650/680,4January2011.

6 Hazen,JenniferM.(2007)CanPeacekeepersBePeacebuilders?International Peacekeeping,14(3),p.324.

7 Cutillo,Alberto(2006)op.cit.

8 UnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations,DepartmentofFieldSupport(2010)The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 1.Newyork:DPKO–DFS.

9 UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(2011)op.cit.

10 UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(2011)Update Report: Interdependence Between Security and Development,9February,No.2,Availableat:www.securitycouncilreport.org.

11 UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyandSecurityCouncil(2009)Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the

Immediate Aftermath of Conflict,A/63/881–S/2009/304,11June2009.

12 UnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperationsandDepartmentofFieldSupport(2009)A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping. Newyork:DPKO–DFS.

13 UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyandSecurityCouncil(2011)Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict: Independent Report of the Senior Advisory Group, A/65/747-S/2011/85,22February2011.

14 UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(2011)op.cit.

15 UnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperationsandDepartmentofFieldSupport(2010)op.cit.

16 Hazen,JenniferM.(2007)op.cit., p.326.

17 Thereviewofciviliancapacitiesisaprocessthatwasinitiatedatthe2009UNSecretaryGeneralReportonPeacebuildingintheImmediateAftermathofConflict.ItsSeniorAdvisoryGroupreleasedareportinFebruary2011withrecommendationsfortheprocess.Therecommen-dationsaremostlybasedonenhancingciviliancapacitythrough(1)amorelocallyownedprocess;(2)utilisingappropriateandwiderrangeofpartners;(3)withtherightexpertise;and(4)inaflexiblemanner.

18 Civilaffairsisoneofthecivilianfunctionsofpeacekeeping.Itsmainroleistointeractwiththelocalcommunities,under-standthemandcreatestrategiesforsupportingconflictmanagementinitiativesandenhancinglocalgovernance,onadailybasis.

19 UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(2001)Presidential Statement,2001,No.5,PRST2001/5,20February.

conflict trends I 13

Introduction

There isan increasingunderstandingof theneedto

take intoaccount thehybridpoliticalordersexisting in

post-conflict environments where peacekeeping and

peacebuildingoperationsaredeployed.However,mostof

thisworkisstillattheconceptual level.Thisarticlewill

attempttoadvancethetheoreticalandpolicydebateson

therelationshipbetweenlocal-levelandnationalactors,

andthecomplexitieswithinthenotionoflocalownership,

by highlighting some of the inherent challenges for

local-level peacebuilding. It also highlights some of

the potential avenues for further development of local

peacebuilding approaches in hybrid political orders

through examples from Chad. The practices employed

in Chad have followed liberal peacebuilding patterns

with unpredictable challenges at times, but also some

successes. This article argues that a more bottom-up

orientedapproach topeacebuilding,whichstrengthens

local confidence in – and ownership of – formal and

traditional institutions, can improve the success of

peacekeepingoperations.

Peacebuilding efforts have come to a crossroads,1

withmountingcriticismforsupportingnationalelitesat

theexpenseof traditionalauthoritiesat theperiphery,2

UN

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navigating hybrid PolitiCal orders: balanCing PeaCebuilding in ChadBydIaNaFELIxdaCOSTaANDJOHNKaRLSRUd

above:MINURCaT’scivilaffairsofficersmeetandtalkwithlocal,displacedwomen.Itisimportanttogarnertheconfidenceandsupportofthelocalpopulationandtodeveloppeaceprocessesfromthegroundup.


withering consent of host states,3 a sharply contracted

economicenvironmentinthepost-financialcrisisperiod

andageneralcriticismagainsttheliberalpeacebuilding

agenda.4 The legitimacy of United Nations (UN)

peacekeeping missions suffers from long drawn-out

missions that often do not seem to be able to deliver

stability,improvedsecurityorjusticetohostpopulations.

The peacebuilding agenda is thus under considerable

stress.yet,while someof thecriticismseems toargue

forendingwhatisconsideredaneo-colonialenterprise,

othershavearguedthatmostofthecriticsstillconceive

ofpeacebuildingreformthatisbroadlywithintheliberal

agenda.5

This art ic le wil l focus on examples of local

peacebuildingundertakenbyUNpeacekeepingofficers

in Chad. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Fianga

MANDOUL

KoumraLOGONE OCC.

Massenya

Fada

IribaBahia

Arada

Abou Deïa

GozBeïda

Salal

Koro Toro

Mangalmé

OumHadjer

Guéréda

Ngouri

Gélengdeng

Djédaa

Melfi

Bokoro

Am Zoer

Farchana

Am Dam

Kyabé

Maro

Pala

Zouar

MoïssalaGoré

Massenya

Aozou

HarazéMangueigne

Kélo

NokouNguigmi

Maiduguri

Ngaoundéré

Séguédine

Bilma

Fianga

Bol

Bongor

Sarh

DobaMoundou

Mongo

Am Timan

Abéché

Biltine

Lai

Ati

Mao

Massakory

Faya

Koumra

Fada

Bardaï

N'Djamena

Moussoro

KANEM BAHR ELGAZEL

BATHA

SALAMATGUERA

WADI FIRA

MOYEN-CHARI

MANDOUL

TANDJILE

CHARI-BAGUIRMICHARI-BAGUIRMI

LOGONE OCC.MAYO - KEBBI

QUEST

OUADDAÏ

DAR SILA

BORKOU

TIBESTI

ENNEDI

LAC

LOGONEORIENTAL

HADJER-LAMIS

MAYO - KEBBI

EST

B o r k o u

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de B

i lma

S a r i r T i b a s t i

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u

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y

a

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e

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e

r

t

Massifde Guéra

Dépression du Mourdi

Massifde Marfa

Erg du Djourab

Kerkour N

oure

ne

Plateaudu Djado

Chari

Ouadi Hawach

Lac Fitri

Bahr Ergig

Lac Iro

LakeChad

Nga

dda Ye

dsera

m

MbakaouRes.

Vina

Wad

i Howar

Batha

Bahr AoukLogone

Gribingui

Bamingui

Bangoran

Bahr Salamat

N I G E R

CAMEROONCENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

NIGERIA

LIBYAN ARABJAMAHIRIYA

EGYPT

S U D A N

15° 20° 25°

20°

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10°

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The boundaries and names shown and the designations usedon this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptanceby the United Nations.

Map No. 3788 Rev. 8 United NationsMarch 2009 (Colour)

Department of Field SupportCartographic Section

CHAD

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Peacekeepersmustdevelopworkingrelationshipsandpartnershipswithlocalleadersandauthorities.

(DPKO)civilaffairsofficersandtheircolleaguesareoften

theonlyUNpresenceinthefield,andtheirtasksinclude

supporting the strengthening of state authority and

coordinating thesupportofotherUNand international

actors,amongotherthings.Theythusrepresentoneofthe

nodeswherepeacekeepingandpeacebuildingintersect.

While it iscrucial forpeaceprocessestoevolveata

national level and for international support to solidify

itssubsequentacceptanceandrecognition, it isequally

important to garner the confidence and support of the

populations living in rural areas, and todeveloppeace

dividendsfromthegroundup.Howcanthisbeachieved?

How can international actors work towards linking the

centre and the periphery when implementing peace

processes?Andhowcan internationalactorsundertake

thedifficultbalancingactbetweenrespectingthenational

governmentasthemaincounterpart,whileacknowledging

that,at the local level, thenationalcounterpartmaybe

oneofthepartiestotheconflict?Insuchcases,whatcan

bedonetobuildconfidenceamongthelocalpopulation?

This article will argue for a more multilayered

approachtopeacebuilding,wherelocalownershiptakes

intoaccountlocalactorsaswellasnationalcounterparts,

and where the support offered from the international

community is better tailored to local needs and takes

intoaccountthepowerdynamicsbetweenthecentreand

periphery. The legitimacy of peacebuilding ultimately

dependsonacarefulbalancingactbetweentherespect

for national sovereignty and the need to engage with

all stakeholders, local administration authorities, local

traditionalauthoritiesandothernon-stateactors.

aTriangularRelationship

Therelationshipbetweenlocalactorsandinternational

actorsisnotstraightforward.Thereisnoeasyfixtothis

conundrum: international peacekeepers are present in

thefieldatthemercyofthehoststatewhich,depending

on their relative bargaining power, can also ask the

peacekeepers to leave – as was seen in Chad in 2010.

According toClapham,peacekeepers“view themselves

bringingsolutions”,whilethehostpopulationsperceive

the international support “as contributing resources,

whichmaybecapturedandusedbyoneormoreofthe

internalpartiestotheconflict, inorderto improvetheir

positionwithintheconflictitself”.6

This relationship can be framed as a ‘triangular

relationship’ between traditional local authorities,

administrativestateauthoritiesand internationalactors


(largelyunderstoodbybothtraditionalandadministrative

stateauthoritiesasahomogenouscategory,despitethe

wide array of types of actors within the ‘international’

sphere). Internationalactors,workingwithin the liberal

peacebuilding paradigm, often overlook or neglect the

interplaybetweengovernmentadministrationauthorities

and traditional authorities at the local level, focusing

theirattentionontherelationshipwiththehoststateand

seeking to strengthen this at the local level, to extend

stateauthorityandservices.

Boege et al term the interplay between traditional

and administrative local actors as “hybrid political

orders”.7Localownershipshouldbediscussedinterms

oftheinteractionandrelationshipbetweenthese‘hybrid

political orders’ – the fusion or established relations

betweentraditionalandadministrativeauthorities–and

the thirdparty.AsarguedbyReich, thedebateof local

ownershipisnottobemeasuredinabsoluteterms;rather,

thefocusshouldbeonthecomplexrelationshipbetween

insidersandoutsiders, since it ishere thatpower isor

is not shared and negotiated, and that equality among

partnerscanbefulfilled.8

The followingsectionpresents fourgeneral lessons

fromChadonhowtodevelopapproachesthatconsider

existinglocal-leveldynamicswithinthenationalpolitical

context,andoutlineswaystobuildconfidenceamongall

stakeholders. It concludeswithasummaryon thevery

delicatebalancingactbetweenhybridpoliticalorders.

Supporting Multiple Layers of Governance Most post-conflict states contain multiple layers

of governance. As suggested by Boege et al, further

reflectionshouldbeplacedoncomprehendingthecontext

ofwhat trulyconstitutespoliticalorder insuchplaces.9

Forexample, ineasternChadat the regional and local

level, there are government and customary authorities

–suchasgovernorsandsultans,sub-prefectsandchefs

decanton–who togetherconstitutewhat iscommonly

knownas ‘localauthorities’. Ineffect, in regionswhere

formal central government representation and its

institutions are largely absent from rural areas, local

ownership depends on a working partnership between

traditionalauthorities(whoeffectivelyactasregulatorsof

sociallife)andadministrativestatelocalauthorities(who

representthecentralgovernment).

Peacebuilders must work towards a fine balance,

notonlybybeingawareofpotentialtensionsthatmight

exist – as often do – between these two categories

of local actors, but also to reflect on questions of

genuine legitimacyof stateactorsand their customary

counterparts,andsupporteachgroupaccordingly.Within

the IntercommunityDialogueStrategy (ICD),developed

andimplementedbythePoliticalandCivilAffairsSection

(POLCA)oftheUNMissiontotheCentralAfricanRepublic

and Chad (MINURCAT), as well as the wider mandate

ofCivilAffairs ingeneral,10greatemphasiswasplaced

on theextensionofstateauthority toareaswhere they

were previously absent. This was done as a means to

prevent intercommunity tensions and violence. While

this is laudable, there is some concern regarding the

heavy emphasis that international actors - such as UN

peacekeepingofficers,UNfundsandprogrammes-puton

extendingthepresenceofthestate.Particularlyincases

wherethestateisregardedbymanyashighlycorruptand

illegitimate,howrepresentativepeacekeepingofficersare

canbequestionable–particularlyifthestateiseffectively

oneoftheperpetratorsofviolence. Italsoraisesissues

ofcustomaryauthoritiesbeingsidelinedascommunity

representatives.

Contextual Awareness and Understanding the Local Political Environment

InsomeofitsofficesinChad,MINURCAT’sPOLCAhad

agoodunderstandingoftheregionitwasoperatingin,

builtonaconsistentrapportwithboththeadministrative

andcustomaryauthorities.11Throughcollaborationwith

MINURCAT’s Human Rights Section, information was

systematically collected and constant communication

maintained with other actors – including the UN High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its national

non-governmental organisation (NGO) counterpart,

alongside other NGOs involved in protection and

economic recovery. The POLCA office used up-to-date

information to inform its community peacebuilding

strategy. Staff invested in building relationships and

trust with local authorities and developing follow-up

mechanisms, including supporting reconcil iat ion

commissions and encouraging other more long-term

actorsineasternChadtoimplementeconomicrecovery

projectswithtangiblepeacedividends.Inotherlocations,

however, UN agencies and NGOs expressed confusion

over POLCA’s role in intercommunity dialogue. The

POLCAofficersshowedlessunderstandingofthecontext,

andfewinitiativeswereundertaken.Fieldofficesseemed

tolackawarenessofwhatwashappeninginareasbeyond

their area of operations, and information flow within

POLCAwasweak.

Thecore tasksof theUNDPKOCivilAffairsofficers

are tosupportstateauthorities, facilitate reconciliation

between population groups and liaison between the

centre and periphery, facilitating the local voice in

nationalpolicyprocesses.12Thesevarioustaskscall for

adeepunderstandingof the localpoliticalenvironment

and the operational context – balancing the role of

supporting local authorities and strengthening their

capacitywith theroleofbeinganexternal facilitator in

conflictresolutionprocesses.UNDPKOofficersandother

peacebuildersatthelocal levelareexpectedtodevelop

akeenunderstandingofthevariousformalandinformal

governance mechanisms at play. They should see


Insomeareas,MINURCaT’sPoliticalandCivilaffairsSection(POLCa)hadagoodunderstandingoftheregionitwasoperatinginandtheneedsofthelocalpeople.Here,locallyelectedwomenleadersofinternallydisplacedpersonsandrefugeesreceivesolar-poweredradiotransmittersdonatedunderaninitiativeledbyPOLCa.

themselvesasmorethanprovidersoflogisticalassistance,

support for capacity development and developing

infrastructure. They can negotiate the relationship

between formal and informal forms of governance at

the community level, and the relationship between the

localandcentral level.Theyare importantprovidersof

both political and economic resources, and can confer

legitimacy upon their interlocutors. The peacebuilders

themselvesareperhapsthemost importantresourceof

theexternalintervention,andtheirunderstandingofthe

world they inhabitcanhavevery realconsequenceson

theground.

The Perilous Assumption of a National and Local Commitment to Peace

Local peacebuilding, according to the l iberal

peacebuildingtemplate,involvesextendingtheauthority

of a state – regarded by many as highly corrupt or

illegitimate, or simply as an alien and largely external

force. This is often done at the cost of traditional

authorities, who are the de facto ‘leaders’ at the local

level. This approach can have the unintended and

unwelcome result of increasing instead of decreasing

tensionandviolence.

Thesituationatthelocallevelmayormaynotreflect

theengagement–or,perhapsmostaccurately, the lack

ofengagement–atthenationallevel.InChad,therecent

electionsinApril2011–consideredtobethecornerstone

oftheinternationalcommunity’sstrategyfora‘democratic

transition’inChad–offeredlittlehopetomanyChadians,

who are eager for peace and saw the elections as just

anotherwayof legitimising thestatusquo.The results

wereunsurprising:PresidentDébywonafourthtermin

power;nowreachingmorethan20yearsinoffice.13

Whileelectionsareproposedbymanyasasolutionfor

ademocratictransition,itisunlikelythattheywillleadto

sustainablepeacebeforeacomprehensiveandinclusive

nationaldialogue isheld. Indeed,averageChadiansare

tiredofviolenceandconflict.Whileanational inclusive

dialoguecouldbenefitgreatlyfromstrongerinternational

pressurefromactorssuchasFranceandtheUnitedStates

(US), local initiatives suchas the local intercommunity

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MINURCaTassisted localgovernorsandstateofficials toestablishwaterdrillingunits indryandremoteareas.Thishelped tostrengthen theconfidenceof the localpopulationandhumanitariancommunity in localofficialsandMINURCaT.

dialogue are partially thwarted by the lack of progress

in a genuine wider national engagement to a peace

process. Local administrative authorities – particularly

administrativestateauthorities–atthecommunitylevel

were quick to understand the benefits of collaborating

withMINURCAT,bothintermsofperceivedlegitimacyin

faceoftheinternationalcommunity,andofthematerial

andpolitical resources theycouldbenefit fromthrough

engagement.

The rebel groups, which mostly hail from the east,

onlyaccountforaminorpartofthepopulation,whilethe

majorpartofthepopulationlivesinthesouth.Similarto

Sudan,thereisanorth-southdivideinChad,andthesouth

controlledChaduntil1979.14Thesouthernpopulation–

andindeedthepopulationatlarge–isscarcelyinvolved

inthepoliticalandsecuritystructuresofthestate.Their

resilience relies on local patrimonial structures that

provide security, food and provision of services. They

survive as nomadic herdsmen or subsistence farmers,

andoftenhavean instrumental relationship tonational

authorities, as well as international humanitarian,

peacebuilding and development actors. However, this

israrelyaccountedfor in thestrategiesof international

actors, which assume that support to state authorities

atthelocal levelwill improvetheresilienceofthelocal

population.Instead,thissupportcanbetakenhostageby

nationalauthoritiestostrengthentheirpoweratthelocal

level,anddevolvetheauthorityoftraditionalleaders.

Managing Consent and Building Confidence – The Balancing Act between Formal and Traditional Authorities

Onehelpfulwaytolookattherelationshipandpower

negotiationsbetweenthevarioussetsofactorsistofocus

ontheinterplaybetweendifferentlocalactors–including

betweenadministrativeandcustomaryauthorities–and

of these with international actors. In addition, the UN

is also aware that its legitimacy as a mission partially

dependsonitbeingableto‘win’orguaranteethesupport

oftraditionalauthorities.

While it is crucial to strengthen central state

institutions, this must be done parallel to existing

customary structures. More focus should be placed on

supportingadialogueandpartnershipbetweencentral

government authorities and its few representatives at

the local level with traditional authority structures. In


the balancing act between national government, local

administration and traditional authorities, an analysis

mustbeundertakentomaptheinterestsofactorsatall

levels.Peacebuildersnavigateverycomplexanddifficult

watersinfragilestates,wheretheirstrategies,formedin

theliberalpeacebuildingmould,caninhibit theirability

toperceiveandunderstandtheinterestsofalltheparties:

Domestic combatants have a clearer and longer-

term view of what they are trying to achieve;

they are uncluttered – or uninhibited – by the

value system within which the peacekeepers are

operating;theyareoftenwellawareofthedomestic

and international constraints on the behaviour of

the peacekeepers, while suffering from few such

constraints themselves;and theyhavea farbetter

graspofthelocalpoliticalscene.15

In Chad, MINURCAT’s ability to implement the

intercommunity dialogue successfully rested in its

capacity to build confidence that the security situation

couldbe improvedbyengagingindialogueat the local

level.OneofthelessonsfromChadisthat,inthemidst

ofconflict,thereisspacetobuildlocalpocketsofpeace.

Manyconflictsareessentially local in theirnature,and

canberesolvedlocally.

However, national authorities may be wary of

engagementwithtraditionalauthorities.Whileespousing

a will for peace, national authorities may not be as

forthcoming in practice. In eastern Chad, the national

authoritieswereperceivedbymanyatthelocal levelto

beoneofthepartiestotheconflict–havingsupportedthe

zaghawatribe(fromwherePresidentDébyandmanyof

hisclosestallieshail)intheethnicviolencethatinlarge

partresultedinthedisplacementoflocalpopulations.The

sustainabilityofactivitiesandthelevelofconfidenceand

trustthatthelocalpopulationhasinnationalauthorities

dependsonanawarenessoftheseperceptions,andtaking

them into account when designing and implementing

projects.

At the local level, MINURCAT enjoyed a very good

relationshipwithgovernorsandotherstateofficials.As

an example, the mission supported them with a water

drillingunitwhich,incooperationwiththehumanitarian

community, was able to locate, drill for and establish

water sources in very dry and remote areas. The

water drilling unit was hugely popular and assisted in

strengthening the confidence of the local population

andhumanitariancommunityinlocalofficials.Duringa

high-levelvisitbyUNofficialsfromheadquartersinearly

2010,afterthepresidentofChadhadsentaletterasking

themissiontoleave,localofficialswhowereclosetothe

presidentunderscoredtheirwishforthemissiontostay–

mentioning the support to intercommunity dialogue,

securitypatrolsandthewaterdrillingunitas important

contributionsatthelocallevel.16

Whatemergedwasatensionbetweenthenationaland

locallevel,wherelocal-levelofficialsenjoyedtheeffects

ofmaterialsupportthroughtheincreasedconfidenceof

thepopulationandthelegitimacythisconferredonthem.

Ontheotherhand,nationalauthorities,havinganational

outlookanddifferentinterests,wantedtoendthemission

as they did not want to be perceived as a ‘fragile’ or

‘weak’state.Whenthemissioncouldnolongerprovide

any significant material resources, there was a strong

resistanceagainstinvolvementin‘internalaffairs’andthe

improvedrelationshipbetweenSudanandChadmadethe

needforanexternalsecurityproviderobsolete,fromthe

president’sperspective.

LiberalPeacebuildingNavigatingHybridPolitical

Orders:aBalancingact

Peacebuilding literaturehas focusedon theneed to

support‘fragile’,‘weak’or‘failed’statesinre-establishing

security,corestatefunctionsandtheprovisionofbasic

services to thepopulation.yet, as suggestedbyBoege

etal,speakingof ‘weak’statessuggeststhereareother

actorsthatarestronginrelationtothestate.Effectively,

itacknowledgesthat“thestateisonlyoneactoramong

othersand‘stateorder’isonlyoneofanumberoforders

claiming to provide security, frameworks for conflict

regulationandsocialservices”.17

Conflict resolution in eastern Chad, as in most

sub-Saharan countries, is based on legal pluralism.

Conflict management institutions and social practices

fromdifferentdomains–traditionalsociety,religionand

state, forexample–co-existand intermingle inconflict

mediation and resolution processes. Pawlitzky et al

highlighthow,ineasternChad,reconciliationprocesses

launched and led by mixed delegations (comprising

traditional, religious and state authorities) had higher

chancesofsuccessfullybringinglocalcommunityleaders

together in constructive dialogue, and generating a

reconciliationagreementandstrategy.18

To be able to adapt to new surroundings, time and

spaceareneededtoadjust,understandandlearnabout

the different context. International peacekeepers need

toreassess their rolewithin thepeacebuildingprocess.

As suggested by Pouligny: “Contrary to what they may

THE PEACEBUILDERS THEMSELVES

ARE PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT

RESOURCE OF THE ExTERNAL INTER-

VENTION, AND THEIR UNDERSTANDING

OF THE WORLD THEy INHABIT CAN

HAVE VERy REAL CONSEqUENCES ON

THEGROUND


be inclined to feel or believe they [international actors]

arenotthemainactors,butshouldthinkofthemselvesas

facilitatorsofaleverageprocess.”19Assuch,theyshould

actflexiblyandmodestly,andacceptthatwhattheyhave

tooffer isonlyuseful insofarasitbuildsuponnational

capacitiesandworkswithlocalactors.

Conclusion

The critiques offered by Richmond, Chandler, Paris

andotherscholarshasbeenjust,buthaslackedpractical

suggestions forhow itshouldbeoperationalised. In the

UN, the importanceof the roleof civilianpeacebuilders

has gained ground with the issuing of the Capstone

Doctrine in 2008, the Secretary General’s report on

peacebuilding released in 2009 and the Guéhenno

Reportonciviliancapacitiesreleasedthisyear.20Inthese

attemptsat reformingpeacekeeping– includingoffering

greateremphasistopeacebuildingwithinpeacekeeping–

the UN has shown intent to restructure and improve

its practices. However, in academic literature, little has

been offered in terms of functional examples on how

peacebuilding practices can be improved. This article

represents an attempt to bridge the divide between

academic critique and UN policymakers, by providing

examplesfromChadthathighlightsomeofthedilemmas

thatpeacebuildersareconfrontedwith,andpointatsome

potentialsolutions.

Multiple and competing layers of governance exist

in most fragile states. Even when good local context

analysis is carried out and the host state is responsive,

a lack of commitment from local actors will cause local

peacebuildinginitiativestofail.Themostpressingquestion

when assessing the UN’s role in local peacebuilding is

whether local actors actually want external assistance

in the first place. MINURCAT’s mandate problematically

assumedthatnationalandlocalauthoritiesinChadwere

committed to resolving local tensions and promoting

reconciliationeffortsandactivelyinterestedinchangingthe

statusquo.ThiswasaperilousassumptioninChad,where

thegovernmentoftenappearedtosupportspecificethnic

groups and had a long history of co-opting customary

authoritiesandoppositionmembers.

The aim of the international effort must first and

foremostbetohelpdeveloptheconfidenceandresilience

of the local population. With all-embracing mandates

incorporatingissuesrangingfromruleoflawandgender

tohumanrightsandsecuritysectorreform–tonamejust

afew– legitimatequestionscanberaisedastowhether

multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations have

sufficientexpertise,contextualknowledgeandstaminato

carryouteffective conflict resolutionandpeacebuilding

workatthelocallevel.Amissioncanbringaddedresources

and contribute positively to local level peacebuilding

efforts,butitisclearthatifpeacekeepingoperationstake

on this task, it must be done in close cooperation with

otherUNagencies,NGOsandlocalpartnerstoensurethat

engagementcontinuesafterthemissionhasleft.

UN civil ian peacekeepers facil itate local-level

peacebuilding such as the provision of basic services,

intercommunity dialogue and strengthening local

security, which may often consist of simple, low-cost

interventions.21Whendonewell, such interventionscan

provideaUNoperationwithkeyknowledgeandcontribute

tothebottom-uppeacebuildingthatiskeytothelong-term

success of any peace operation.22 However, engaging

inpeacebuildingat the local level requiresspecific local

knowledge,flexibilityandlong-term,sustainedcommitment

– a challenge for large, unwieldy and time-limited

peacekeeping operations. Together with the short-term,

project-basedculturesofsomedonororganisations, this

generatesconsiderablepressurefortherapidachievement

of concrete and measurable results. Success is thus

oftenmeasured in termsof tangibleoutcomes–suchas

thequantityof infrastructurerehabilitatedornumbersof

returnedinternallydisplacedpeople(IDPs)andrefugees–

ratherthanwhethertheunderlyingcausesofconflict(and

thepoliticaldynamics)havebeensustainablyaddressed.

Anyengagementhastobesustained,longtermandaimed

at building the capacity of local governance structures

andpartnershipswithnationalNGOsandotheractors, to

ensurecontinuityaftertheUNpullsout.

UNpeacekeepingoperationsmayprovetobe anassetin

facilitatingthespacerequiredforlocal-levelpeacebuilding

andinadvocatingforearlyrecoveryactivities,byfostering

structures that meet basic human needs and maximise

publicparticipation.However,thishastobedonealongside

nationalauthoritiesanddevelopingactorswithinarealistic

timeframe.Internationalpeacekeepersandpeacebuilders

represent a considerable supply of material and other

resources to all levels of governance in a fragile state,

which has instrumental value to all parties. Navigating

between a mandate directed at supporting a host state

and avoiding detrimental impact on existing traditional

structureswillremainaseriouschallengeforinternational

actors.However,examplesfromChadshowthat,whilethis

balancingactmayattimesfail,itcanbeachieved.

EVENWHENGOODLOCALCONTExTANALySIS ISCARRIEDOUTANDTHEHOSTSTATE

IS RESPONSIVE, A LACK OF COMMITMENT FROM LOCAL ACTORS WILL CAUSE LOCAL

PEACEBUILDINGINITIATIVESTOFAIL


dianaFelixdaCostaisanIndependentResearcherworking on issues related to local-level peace-buildingandcommunitydevelopment,andhybridpolitical orders in post-conflict states. Shehas conducted research in South Sudan, Chad,Mozambique,HaitiandTimor-Leste.

John Karlsrud is a Research Fellow at theNorwegianInstituteofInternationalaffairs(NUPI)andaPhdcandidateattheUniversityofWarwick.

Endnotes1 Inthisarticle,peacebuildingisunderstoodbroadlyasefforts

“toidentifyandsupportstructuresthatwilltendtostrengthenandsolidifypeaceinordertoavoidarelapseintoconflict”[Boutros-Ghali,Boutros(1992)An Agenda for Peace.UNdocu-mentA/47/277-S/24111(17June1992)].Itwillusetheterm‘peacebuilders’forthecivilianstaffthatworkinpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingoperations,withtasksintendedtoreducethefragilityofstatesravagedbyconflictandstrengthentheirresilienceagainstarelapseofconflict.

2 FelixdaCosta,D.andKarlsrud,J.(2010)ARoleforCivilAffairsinCommunityConflictResolution?MINURCAT’sIntercommunityDialogueStrategyinEasternChad.Humanitarian Exchange Magazine,48(October2010);HumanitarianPracticeNetwork,ODI,London;Autessere,S.(2010)The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding.Newyork:BarnardCollege,ColumbiaUniversity.

3 Karlsrud,J.andPiccolino,G.(forthcoming)WitheringConsent,butMutualDependency:UNPeaceOperationsandNewAfricanAssertiveness.Conflict, Security and Development, 11(4).

4 Thisarticlewillfocusonearlypeacebuildingactivitieswithinpeacekeepingoperations,asdefinedbytheSecretaryGeneralinhisopeningremarksoftheSecurityCouncildiscussiononpeacebuilding,13October2010,wherehestressedthatpeace-keepingmissionsshouldbeenabled“tohaveanimpactas‘earlypeacebuilders’”[UN(2010)‘AsSecurityCouncilWeighsMeasurestoStrengthenPeacebuilding,Secretary-GeneralStressesRapidDeploymentofTrainedStaff,PredictableFinancing,Women’sInput’,pressrelease,Availableat:<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sgsm13181.doc.htm>Accessedon:28October2010].See,forexample,Paris,R.(2004)At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress;Richmond,OliverP.(2006)TheProblemofPeace:Understandingthe‘LiberalPeace’.Conflict, Security and Development, 6(3),pp.291–314;andChandler,David(2006)Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building.London,AnnArbor:PlutoPress.

5 Paris,R.(2010)SavingLiberalPeacebuilding.Review of International Studies,36(2),pp.337–365.

6 Clapham,C.(1996)BeingPeacekept.InFurley,O.andMay,R.(eds)Peacekeeping in Africa.Surrey:Ashgate,pp.303–319(p.306).

7 Boege,V.,Brown,A.,Clements,K.andNolan,A.(2008)On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of ‘Fragility’. Berlin:BerghofResearchCenter,Availableat:<http://www.berghofhandbook.net/uploads/download/boege_etal_handbook.pdf>.

8 Reich,H.(2006)‘Local Ownership’ in Conflict Transformation Projects – Partnership, Participation or Patronage? BerghofOccasionalArticleNo.27(September2006),BerghofResearch

CenterforConstructiveConflictManagement,Availableat:<http://www.berghof-center.org/uploads/download/boc27e.pdf>.

9 Boege,V.etal.(2008)op.cit.,p.6.

10 SeeUnitedNationsDPKO(2008)Policy Directive: Civil Affairs.DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperationsandDepartmentofFieldSupport(April2008),Availableat:<http://www.undg.org/docs/8915/Civil-Affairs-Policy.pdf;UnitedNations(2008)United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (The Capstone Doctrine)>.DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations,Newyork:UnitedNations,Availableat:<http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdfandMINURCAT’sICDStrategy>.

11 TheassessmentsinthissectionarebasedonfieldresearchundertakenbyDianaFelixdaCostainAugust2009,aswellasJohnKarlsrud’sworkinChadwithMINURCATasaSpecialAssistanttotheSRSGbetweenAugust2008andJanuary2010,andstrategicplannerfromJuly2009toFebruary2010.

12 UnitedNationsDPKO(2008)op.cit.

13 BBC(2011)‘Chad’sPresidentIdrissDebyRe-electedAmidBoycott’,10May2011,Availableat:<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13342664.

14 PowershiftedfromsouthtonorthinthelateseventiesafterPresidentTombalbayewaskilledinacoupin1975.Subsequently,ChadwasledbyamilitaryjuntaunderthecommandofthesouthernGeneralFélixMalloumuntil1979,whenNigeriaandtheOrganizationofAfricanUnitybrokeredtheLagosAccordthatestablishedanewnorthern-dominatedgovernment.Sincethen,powerhasshiftedhandsseveraltimes,buthasremainedamongthetribesfromthenorth.

15 Clapham,C.(1996)op.cit.,p.308.

16 Oneoftheauthors,JohnKarlsrud,waspartofthemission,wheretheSRSGandhisteamvisitedAmleyuna,Gaga,Farchana,HadjerHadidandAbecheineasternChadon12and13January2010.

17 Boege,V.etal(2008)op.cit.,p.6.

18 Pawlitzky,C.,Jánszky,B.,Behrends,A.andReyna,S.(2008)‘Sources of Violence, Conflict Mediation and Reconciliation: A Socio-anthropological Study on Dar Sila’, July2008,Availableat:<http://minurcat.unmissions.org/Portals/MINURCAT/English_final_revised.pdf>.

19 Pouligny,B.(2004)CivilSocietyandPost-conflictPeacebuilding:AmbiguitiesofInternationalProgrammesAimedatBuilding‘New’Societies.PaperpresentedattheconferencePost-conflictPeacebuilding:HowtoGainSustainablePeace?LessonsLearntandFutureChallenges, GraduateInstituteofInternationalStudiesGeneva,11–14October2004,Availableat:<http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/cherlist/pouligny/111004.pdf,p.12>.

20 UN(2008)The Capstone Doctrine;UN(2009)Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, UNdocument(A/63/881-S/2009/304,Newyork:UnitedNations;andGuéhenno,J.M.etal.(2011)‘Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict: Independent Report of the Senior Advisory Group’,Availableat:<http://civcapreview.org>,Accessedon26August2011.

21 FelixdaCosta,D.andKarlsrud,J.(2010)op.cit.

22 Kalyvas,S.N.(2006)The Logic of Violence in Civil War.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.


violenCe in liberia: Falling between PeaCebuilding and PeaCekeePingByJENNIFERM.HazEN

The peacekeeping burden has grown substantially

overthepastdecade.ThebudgetforUnitedNations(UN)

peacekeepingin2010–2011stoodatUS$7.83billion.1The

expansion of peacekeeping has resulted from both an

increaseinthenumberofcivilwarsthathaveended(and

thereforethenumberofpeacekeepingmissionsdeployed),

andtheexpandingnatureofpeacekeepingmandates.The

shift from traditional peacekeeping, aimed at providing

a buffer between warring factions, to multidimensional

peacekeeping,whichnowencompassesmanyadditional

tasks, has stretched the capacity of peacekeepers to

respond to the challengesofpost-conflict environments.

It has also raised important questions about the role of

peacekeepersinpeacebuildingactivities.AlthoughtheUN

isstill in theprocessof clearlydelineating the tasksand

responsibilities of peacekeeping versus peacebuilding,

there is growing consensus that peacekeepers, although

ill-equippedtobelong-termpeacebuilders,cancontribute

toearlypeacebuilding.2This contribution largelycentres

on providing a secure environment in which others can

implementpeacebuildingtasks.

Whencivilwarsend throughnegotiated settlements,

attention often shifts to how best to prevent a return to

conflict.Peacekeepingprovidesasecurityumbrellaunder

whichpartiescanimplementpeaceagreementsandwhere

peacebuildingcan takeplace.This isnecessary, aspost-

conflictcountriesoftenlackthecapacitytocarryoutbasic

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above:Peacekeepingprovidesasecurityumbrellaunderwhich parties can implement peace agreements andwherepeacebuildingcantakeplace.


governance functions, such as providing law and order,

crimepreventionandbasic security.AUNpeacekeeping

presenceprovidesthebasisforpeacebuildingbydeterring

the largest threats to the peace – often through a focus

on the belligerent parties – and providing security more

generally. Peacebuilding, by contrast, “entails a range

of activities aimed at making peace self-sustaining and

reducing the risk of relapse into conflict”, and always

continues beyond the departure of the peacekeeping

mission.3Thetwoprocessesareimportantforthetransition

ofapost-conflictcountryfromfragiletostable.However,

theyareinsufficientwithoutathirdprocess:statebuilding.4

Statebuilding is “an endogenous process to enhance

capacity,institutions,andlegitimacyofthestate”toenable

theemergenceofa“capable,accountable,andresponsive

state”.5Whilebuildinginstitutionalcapacityandlegitimacy

aretheresponsibilityofastateanditspopulation,andnot

somethingthatcanbeimposedbyexternalactors,thisdoes

notprecludearoleforinternationalactors.

Liberia exemplifies the challenge of ensuring

statebuilding is not forgotten. Reports from the UN

Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) over the past

severalyearsindicatethesituationinLiberiais“generally

stable” with no evidence of a return to war at hand.

Peacekeepinghasbeensuccessfulinprovidinganenabling

environmentforthenationalpeaceprocess.However,nearly

eightyearsafter theendof thewar, thecountry remains

“fragile”.UNMILhasyettohandoverfullresponsibilityfor

securitytonationalauthorities.Widespreadreportsofarmed

robbery, rape and mob violence continue to undermine

public perceptions of security. A 2009 special report on

Liberia’sprogressonachievingspecificbenchmarksstated:

“Liberiaisfarfromattaininga‘steadystateofsecurity’.”6

Concerns about a growing regional drug trade, poorly

reintegrated ex-combatants, widespread corruption and

limitedeconomicopportunitiessuggestthat,whileUNMIL

providesadeterrenttoareturntowar,thepervasivenature

of localisedviolenceandcrimemaydomoredamage to

prospectsforsecurityanddevelopmentinLiberiainthelong

run.Preventingthisfromhappeningisachallengeforboth

peacekeepingandpeacebuilding,butcanonlybeaddressed

throughstatebuilding.

Widespreadreportsofarmedrobbery,rapeandmobviolencecontinuetounderminepublicperceptionsofsecurityinLiberia.

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InMonrovia,mostresidentsfeelunsafeintheirneighbourhoodsandhavefearsthatsomeoneintheirhouseholdswillbecomeavictimofcrime.

Understanding the situation inLiberia today requiresacknowledging the starting point of post-conflict efforts.Afternearly14yearsofcivilwar:

LiberiawasacompletelyfailedState,withthreewarringfactionscontrollingdifferentpartsofMonroviaandtheinterior.Thealreadylimitedinfrastructurelayinruins,athirdofthecountry’spopulationhadbeendisplaced,andthepublicsectorhadcompletelycollapsed.Thenationalarmy and the police had disintegrated into variousfactions,andwhatremainedofthesecuritysectorwasdominated by a proliferation of agencies created bysuccessive regimes to persecute political opponents;the justice system had completely broken down;and criminal economic exchange, dominated by theillegalexploitationofnaturalresources,wasthriving.7

LiberianpresidentEllenJohnsonSirleafcalledthisstartingpoint“theabyss”andemphasisedtheenormouschallengesfacing thecountry– the“landofa thousandpriorities”.8Everything–fromsecurityforcestogovernmentinstitutionsand economic activities to social relations – had to berebuilt from a limited foundation. However, while mostinstitutionsdidnotfunctioninlate2003,neitherwasthereablankslateuponwhichtobuild.Liberiafacedahistoryofconflict,grievances,ethnicdivisions,discriminatorypolicies

andinstitutionallegacies,whichwereexacerbatedbyboththewarandthepeaceprocess.Thus, itwasnotamatterofrebuildingadilapidatedstatebut, infact,creatingnewstate institutions thataddressed this legacyandavoidedreifyingtheconditionsthatledtowarinthefirstplace.Thishighlightsanimportant intersectionofpeacebuildingandstatebuildingefforts:statebuildingaimstocreateeffectivegoverninginstitutions,whilepeacebuildingaimstoensurethoseinstitutionsdonotre-createpastcleavagesorincreasethelikelihoodoffutureconflict.

‘No security without development, no development

withoutsecurity’isaphrasecommonlyheard.Butwarisnot

theonlythreattodevelopment.Oftentimes,violencedoes

notendwiththesignaturesonapeaceagreement.Instead,

violenceofvaryingtypes–criminal,political,communal–

continues in thepost-conflictperiod.Thisviolence isnot

theresultofareturntowar.Instead,itiscommoncriminal

andinterpersonalviolenceenabledbylimitedstatecapacity

toensure lawandorder.Theendofwar isnoguarantee

of either security or development. In fact, the two are

often linked. Weak state institutions and poor economic

opportunitiesprovideanenvironmentconducivetocrime

and violence. At the same time, violence and crime can

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Ex-combatantsandthelargepopulationofunemployedyouthareoftenblamedforthewidespreadcrimeinLiberia.

deterinvestment,reduceeconomicopportunities,weaken

governanceandreducepopularconfidenceingovernment,

therebyhindering–orevendelaying–development.Crime

and interpersonalviolencetaketheir tolloncommunities

andonrecoveringeconomies, impedingprogressinboth

securityanddevelopment.TheWorldDevelopmentReport

2011 identifies insecurity as “a primary development

challenge”.9Animportantprimarysteptostatebuildingis

“securingphysical controlovera territory”10 –while the

UNhasestablishedabroadsecurityblanketagainstlarge

threats,theLiberiangovernmenthasnotyetachievedthe

most basic of state functions: providing security to the

population. This suggests that addressing post-conflict

violence requires linkingpeacekeepingandstatebuilding

moreclosely.Peacekeepingcanprovidetemporarysecurity,

butonlystatebuildingcanproducelong-termsecurity.

Theprimaryroleofpeacekeepingistoprovideasecure

environment. As such, peacekeeping efforts have come

to entail certain expected elements, such as providing

a deterrent force to renewed war, supporting national

authorities to provide basic security, supporting the

disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of

ex-combatants,andsupportingthereformofstatesecurity

forces(SSR)–suchasthepoliceandthemilitary–toenable

them to takeon the responsibility forprovidingnational

securityindependentofexternalsupport.11Intheirsecurity

role,peacekeepers tend to focuson themostvisibleand

most obvious threats to peace: the belligerent factions.

While it is important to focus on the most dangerous

threats–thosewhoaremostlikelytospoilthepeaceand

renewthewar–thiscanoftenleavelow-levelbutperhaps

moreinsidiousviolenceunchecked.Althoughthisviolence

rarelythreatenstheoverallpeaceprocess,itdoesthreaten

the prospects for human security and development, and

handicaps peacebuilding efforts. Large security threats

remainthepurviewofpeacekeepers,butcommoncrimeis

oftenlefttoanationalpoliceforcewithlimitedcapacityand

resourcestorespond.

Liberia’s situation illustrates the challengewell.Over

the past few years, every UN Secretary General’s report

onLiberiahas listed thekeysecurity concernsasarmed

robbery,rapeandmobviolence.Thereportsalsohighlight

theinabilityoftheLiberianpolicetorespondtorisingcrime

ratesandemphasisethatpeaceandstabilityrestmainlyon

thesecurityprovidedbyUNpeacekeepers(bothmilitaryand

police),andthatanydrawdownoftheforcelevelsshould

becarefullyconsideredinlightofthepersistentdeficiencies

withintheLiberiansecuritysector.12Onechallengeissimply


to understand the dynamics of violence and crime on

theground.

AlthoughUNreportscommonlyciteahigh incidence

ofcrime,thedataavailableoncrimeandviolenceremains

inadequate to provide solid evidence of rates of specific

crimes, or even whether the general trend is improving.

UNMILoriginallycollectedthisdataintheearlyyearsofthe

peacekeepingmission,becausetheLiberianpolice lacked

the capacity todoso.However, thequalityof thedata –

andeventhenumberofcategoriesofcrimes–variedover

time,largelydependingonthosetaskedwithcollectingthe

inputs.Thishasmade itdifficult tocomparedataacross

years.13TheLiberianNationalPolice(LNP)havenowputin

placeasystemtocollectcrimestatistics.Allpolicestations

aresupposedtoreportcrimesonaregularbasisusinga

standardform,toensurethecomparabilityofdataacross

regionsofthecountry.Currentreportingvaries–and,given

thedifficultyofdeployingpolice forcesoutsideofmajor

towns,itisunlikelythatthedataiscomplete.However,ifthe

LNPstatisticsonviolentcrimereportedin2009and2010are

takenasindicative,themainviolentcrimesincludedrobbery

(armedandunarmed),assault(aggravatedandsimple)and

rape,andthegeneraltrendhasbeenanincreaseinthese

andotherviolentcrimes.14Thishelpstoexplainwhyboth

theUNand theLNPcontinue toexpress concernsabout

violenceandcrime.

Bycontrast, thepopulation is increasingly concerned

aboutdevelopmentissues.15In2010,whenaskedabouttheir

mostseriousconcerns,respondentsfocusedoncleanwater,

healthcare,education, transportation,sanitation,housing

and electricity, while very few mentioned the security

situation.Roughlytwo-thirdsoftherespondentsreported

feelingsaferin2010thanin2009(12monthsprior).Thisisa

significantchangefroma2008assessment,whichfoundthat

“mostLiberiansfelttheirsecuritywasmoreprecariousthan

atanytimesincethewarended”.16However,the2010survey

resultssuggestastarkcontrastbetweenMonroviaandthe

counties.InMonrovia,lessthanhalfoftherespondentsfelt

safeintheirneighbourhoods,comparedto83%feelingsafe

orverysafe in their communities in thecounties.Nearly

two-thirdsofrespondentsinMonroviaexpressedfearthat

someoneintheirhouseholdwouldbecomeavictimofcrime,

whereasonlyone-thirdexpressedthisfearinthecounties.

Themostcommonlycitedconcernsmirroredthosereported

bytheUNandLNP:robbery,assaultandviolenceagainst

women.Althoughatpresentthepopulationismostvocal

about development needs, feelings of insecurity clearly

lingerwithinthepopulation.

Concerns also persist about ex-combatants and the

largepopulationofunemployedyouth.Intheearlyyearsof

peacebuilding,‘ex-combatants’servedaseasyscapegoats

foranythingthatwentwrong.Thelabel,althoughlessused

now,iscommonlyheardalongside‘criminal’and‘youth’to

describeperpetrators.Ex-combatantsremainthefocusof

discussionsoftheillegaloccupationofrubberplantations

and the prevalence of motorcycle taxi unions, whereas

unemployedyouthareoftenblamedforwidespreadcrime.

Thesolutiontoconcernsaboutcrimeandviolenceiswidely

expected to come from economic improvement through

development, with attention focused on the presumed

underlyingcauseofcrime:lackofeconomicopportunities.17

yetjobsareunlikelytocomeavailablequicklyorinsufficient

numbers,leavingthepotentialforcrimetofester,criminal

organisations to develop firmer roots in the economy,

and the past criminal war economy to transform into a

criminalised peace economy. This suggests that waiting

for thesituation togetbetteron itsownas theeconomy

growsandinstitutionsdevelopisnotthebestsolution,but

thatmoreneedstobedoneonthesecuritysidetoenhance

policecapacity,bothtodetercrimeandpunishcrimesthat

dotakeplace.

Shouldapeacekeepingforceberesponsiblefortaming

non-conflictpost-conflictviolence?UNpeacekeepershave

been tasked with protecting civilians under imminent

threatofphysicalviolence,supportingnationalefforts to

establishasecureenvironmentforphysicalsafetyandthe

protectionofrights,andtakingdeterrentactiontodecrease

levelsofviolenceandcrime.18Giventhis,itisnotastretch

to argue that more attention should be paid to reducing

levelsofviolenceandcrime,andthatsucheffortsfallwithin

apeacekeepingmandate.Unfortunately, thereexists little

agreementonwhatprotectionmeans,anditisnotalways

cleartoUNtroopsandpolicewhatisexpectedfromthem.19

UNMIL,throughformedpoliceunits,backstopstheLNPand

aUnitedNationspoliceofficerofUNMILtrainsaLiberianNationalPolicerecruitonarrestprocedure.

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respondstoincidentsthepoliceproveunabletohandle.This

isimportant,andhasaidedinimprovingpopularconfidence

in the security forces. However, responding to major

episodesofunrestisnotthesameasrespondingtosystemic

andfrequentincidentsofcriminalviolence.Mostofthese

incidentsoccurinLiberiawithoutresponse,investigation,or

oftentimesevenreporting.

The2003peaceagreementprovidedforthedisbanding

of the Liberian police and the complete reconstruction

of the force. UNMIL is mandated to assist the Liberian

government inmonitoring, trainingandrestructuring the

policeforce.Thishasprovenadifficulttask.Giventhatthe

startingpointwaszero,UNMILfocusedinitiallyonsimply

increasingthenumbersintheranks.However,thisapproach

didnottranslateintoensuringaqualitypoliceforce.20Initial

monetarysupportforUNMIL’sroleintrainingthepolicewas

limited,leavingUNMILhavingto“begforessentialfacilities

andequipment”neededtoimplementitsmandate.21Funding

forpolice reform improved,but remaineduncoordinated

andpiecemeal.The result isnotsurprising.AJune2009

UNreviewoftheLNPprovided“asoberingassessment…

characterizingtheforceasineffectual”.22Whilemanyfactors

havecontributedtothepoorqualityoftheLNP,thereport

highlightedthe“shortcomingsinthetrainingandmentoring

thatUNMILpoliceadvisersareproviding”andthelackof

donorsupport.23Lawandorderclearlystandoutaspriorities

for2011.

Criminal violence is not a problem that either

peacekeepersorpeacebuildersalonecansolve.Improving

securityrequiresmorethanjustgoodpolicing.Addressing

widespread crime and violence requires a competent

nationalpolice force,modern laws,aneffective judiciary

systemandpropercorrectionalfacilities.Theseareprimarily

statebuildingtasks.Improvingpolicecapacitytoinvestigate

crimes and arrest perpetrators does little to provide a

deterrentorimprovepopularconfidenceinthegovernment

whenthosesameperpetratorsareoftenreleasedduetothe

dysfunctionofthejudicialsystem,orsimplyescapefrom

prison.Improvingsecuritywillalsorequireaddressingthe

underlyingfactorsthatenable,andevenencourage,crime

andviolence–includingunemployment,poverty,corruption

andeconomicincentivesforviolence.

Peacekeeping addresses large security challenges.

Peacebuildingaddresses the root causesof conflict, and

TheLiberiangovernmentneedstoassumeresponsibilityforthesecurityofthecountrybyreformingtheLiberianNationalPoliceandimprovingtheircapacitytoprovidelawandorder.

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aimstoimproveconflictmanagementwithingovernment

andsociety.Bothsetsofactivities focusonpreventinga

returntowar.Butneitherfocusesdirectlyonstatebuilding.

Peacekeepers have mandates to assist and support

statebuildingefforts,justaspeacebuildersstrivetoensure

statebuilding efforts are conflict-sensitive; but what is

neededto fill thegap isactualstatebuilding.These tasks

havebeenlefttowar-torngovernmentswithlimitedcapacity

andmeanstoachievethem.Inpart,thishasresultedfrom

national concerns about sovereignty – and, at times, at

thebehestofnationalgovernmentswantingtopavetheir

futuresthemselves,ratherthansimplyrespondtodictates

fromtheinternationaldonorcommunity.Italsostemsfrom

agrowingrecognitionamongdonorsthatstatebuildingisa

nationaltask–onethatcanbesupportedbutnotimposed

from outside. Both are admirable notions, but neither

ensuressecurityinapost-conflictcountry.

The most fundamental building block – a necessary

condition for both peacebuilding and statebuilding – is

security. The UN can provide security, especially early

in the lifeof apeacekeepingmission,whengovernment

capacity toensure lawandorder is limited.However, the

bluesecurityblanketofUNpeacekeepingisnoreplacement

forimprovinganationalgovernment’scapacitytoaddress

securitychallenges. Inmid-2009,PresidentEllenJohnson

Sirleaf admitted that police reform was off track.24

Reportingin2011suggeststhatsignificantimprovements

haveyettobemade.IftheLiberiangovernmentistotake

responsibilityforthesecurityofthecountryfollowingthe

October2011elections,thensignificantprogressneedsto

bemade inbuilding institutionalcapacity,andreforming

thepoliceandimprovingtheircapacitytoprovidelawand

order.Thiswillrequirebettertraining–somethingtheUN

admitshasnotbeenadequatethroughUNMIL25–andbetter

funding–somethingthatdonorswillneedtoputforward.

Ultimately,reducinginsecurityrequiresabettercoordination

ofpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingandamoreproactive

approachtowardsstatebuilding.

Criminalandinterpersonalviolenceremainawidespread

probleminLiberia–onetheLNParenotyetabletohandle,

and one the UN has proven unwilling to address more

directly.Certainlythechallengeisanationalone,but the

internationalcommunitycandomoretoaidthegovernment

in pushing statebuilding efforts forward. Leaving these

problems to the government, and therefore deferring

addressingthemuntilpoliceinstitutionsarestrongerand

governmentcapacityisrebuilt–aprocessPresidentSirleaf

hasstatedwilltakeatleast20years–providestimeforcrime

andviolencetogrow.This,inturn,hamperseffortstoward

encouragingdevelopmentandimprovingsecurity.Passing

thebucknowonlycreateslargerproblemsdowntheroad.

dr Jennifer M. Hazen is a Research Fellow andLecturerattheLydonB.JohnsonSchoolofPublicaffairsattheUniversityofTexasataustin,USa.

Endnotes

1 UnitedNationswebsite,Availableat:<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml>Accessedon:22June2011.

2 Hazen,JenniferM.(2007)CanPeacekeepersBePeacebuilders?International Peacekeeping,14(13),pp.1–16.TheUNstatedasimilarargumentin2009–seeUNGeneralAssembly(2009)Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations,UNdocumentA/64/573(22December2009),pp.7–8.

3 DPKO/DFS(2010)Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Clarifying the Nexus,workingpaper.

4 SeeParis,RolandandSisk,TimothyD.(2009)Introduction:UnderstandingtheContradictionsofPostwarStatebuilding.InParis,RolandandSisk,TimothyD.(eds)The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations.Newyork:Routledge,pp.1–20.

5 OECD(2011)Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance.Paris:OECDPublishing,pp.20–22.

6 UNSecurityCouncil(2009)SpecialReportoftheSecretary-GeneralontheUnitedNationsMissioninLiberia,UNdocumentS/2009/299(10June2009),pp.8,10.

7 Ibid.,p.2.

8 JohnsonSirleaf,Ellen(2011)‘Liberia:TheChallengesofPost-warReconstruction–TheLiberianExperience’.SpeechdeliveredattheRoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs(ChathamHouse),13June.

9 TheWorldBank(2011)World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development.Washington,DC:TheWorldBank,p.1.

10 OECD(2011)op.cit.,p.42.

11 UNDocumentA/64/573,p.7.

12 SeeUNDocumentS/2009/299,p.3.

13 AuthorviewedtheUNMILcrimestatisticsdatafor2004–2007.

14 StatisticsarereportedinSmallArmsSurvey(forthcoming2011)Crime and Victimization in Liberia.LiberiaArmedViolenceAssessment,IssueBrief2.Geneva:SmallArmsSurvey.

15 ThisparagraphisbasedondatafromtheSmallArmsSurvey(availableat:<www.smallarmssurvey.org>)collectedduringanationwidesurveyofpublicperceptionsaboutsecurityinLiberiainearly2010.Theresultsofthestudywillbereleasedinaseriesofbriefingpapers.IssueBrief1,Perceptions of Security in Post-war Liberia,andIssueBrief2,Crime and Victimization in Liberia,shouldbeavailableinAugust2011.

16 InternationalCrisisGroup(2009)Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform.Brussels:ICG,AfricaReportno.148,p.19.

17 TheLiberianPovertyReductionStrategylinkselevatedratesofcrimeto“highunemploymentamongex-combatantsandex-servicemen”.RepublicofLiberia(2008)Poverty Reduction Strategy.Monrovia:GovernmentofLiberia,April2008,p.53.

18 UNDocumentA/64/573,p.5.

19 Williams,PaulD.(2010)Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa,ACSSResearchPaperNo.1.Washington,DC:NationalDefenseUniversityPress,pp.14–15.

20 SeeMalan,Mark(2008)Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings.Carlisle,PA:USArmyWarCollege,StrategicStudiesInstitute,pp.46–66.

21 Ibid.,p.66.

22 UNDocumentS/2009/299,p.7.

23 Ibid.,p.7.

24 Ibid,p.8.

25 Ibid,pp.7,13,17.


On9July2011,SouthSudandeclareditsindepend-

ence from Sudan, marking the formal end of the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). While many

disputedissuesbetweenthepartiesremainunresolved,

oneofthemainchallengesfacingthenewUnitedNations

Mission in theRepublicofSouthSudan (UNMISS)will

be the prevalence of South-South conflicts. Some of

theseconflictsaredirectlylinkedtotheconflictbetween

theNorthand theSouth,butmostarerooted in tribal,

ethnicandpoliticaldifferenceswithintheSouth.These

conflictsarelikelytoincreaseinthepost-CPAperiodasa

resultofpoliticalpowerstruggles,resourcecompetition,

armed insurgencies, redrawing of internal borders,

resurfacing of ethno-political tensions, cattle rustling,

armsproliferation,lackofpeacedividendsandthereturn

ofrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs).

UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations,

commonlydescribedasearlypeacebuilders,playakey

role inpost-conflictpeacebuilding. In thisprocess, the

integration of peacebuilding at the macro (national)

and micro (local) levels is increasingly recognised as

adeterminantofsuccess.1Thus, inviewof theconflict

dynamics in South Sudan, local peacebuilding has

the un Mission and loCal ChurChes in south sudan: oPPortunities For PartnershiPs in loCal PeaCebuildingByINGRIdMaRIEBREIdLIdANDaNdREaSØIENSTENSLaNd

above:On9July2011,SouthSudandeclared its in-dependence from Sudan, marking the formal end oftheComprehensivePeaceagreement.OneofthemainchallengesfacingthenewUNMISSwillbetheprevalenceofSouth-Southconflicts.

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emerged as a vital task for the United Nations (UN)

peacekeepingmission2.However,therecent UNMission

in Sudan (UNMIS) and partners have a mixed record

whenitcomestolocalpeacebuilding.

In recent years, scholars and practitioners have

expressedincreasinginterestinthepotentialofreligious

actorsinpeacemaking.3SouthSudanesechurchesplayed

an important role in peace processes during the civil

war,andwere instrumental inbridging intercommunal

differences and uniting different ethnic and political

groupsintheSouth.Whiletheroleofthechurchesinlocal

peacebuilding has diminished, they still have many of

thefeaturesthatcontributedtotheirhistoricalsuccess–

including their presence in rural areas, indigenous

knowledgeandlocallegitimacy.

ThispaperthereforearguesthatthenewUNmission

would benefit from partnering with local churches to

improve the impact of local peacebuilding initiatives

in South Sudan. To this end, it

explores the approaches to local

peacebuilding applied by UNMIS

and the loca l churches . The

overall objective is to identify the

comparative advantages of both

actors,anddiscusschallengesand

opportunitiesforsynergiesinlocal

peacebuilding.4

UNMIS’sRoleinPeacebuilding

andConflictManagement

UNMIS was authorised under

UN Security Council Resolution

(UNSCR) 1590 to support the

signatoryparties, theGovernment

of Sudan and the Sudan People’s

Liberation Movement (SPLM) in

implementing the CPA5. Similar

to the new mission, UNMIS was

a m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l m i s s i o n

comprising civil ian, police and

m i l i t a r y c o m p o n e n t s u n d e r

the leadership of the Special

Representative of the Secretary

General. The mission, with its

headquarters in Khartoum and

Juba (regional),waspresent inall

10 states of South Sudan. In the

capacity of being an integrated

miss ion , UNMIS was fur ther

expectedtocoordinateandengage

in joint planning with the UN

CountryTeamtoconsolidatepeace.

Whi le the overa l l pol i t ica l

mandateandpriorityofthemission

wastosupportCPAimplementation

– sometimes at the cost of local conflict management

init iat ives – the mission leadership increasingly

acknowledged the importance of integrating national

andlocal-levelpeacebuilding.Theescalationofviolent

conflictsontheground,althoughnotnecessarilylinked

to any of the CPA parties, further resulted in calls for

enhanced efforts to prevent and resolve local-level

conflicts.

The Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of UNMIS was

directly mandated to support the authorities and local

communities in areas related to local peacebuilding –

including conflict management and reconciliation,

political analysis, and support to political space and

governance structures at the sub-national level.6 This

entailedsupporttopeaceandreconciliationinitiativesat

the local level, incoordinationwiththeGovernmentof

SouthSudan(GoSS),stateandlocal-levelauthoritiesand

traditionalleaders.

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SUDANSOUTH

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Strengths of the Mission in Local Peacebuilding and

Conflict Management

UNMIS had several features and capacities that

made it a key player in local-level peacebuilding and

conflictmanagement inSouthSudan.Throughregular

patrolling and interactions with local communities,

the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and local

police, the UN mission was well-placed to develop

soundconflictanalysisandearlywarningmechanisms.

ThepresenceofCADofficersinallofthemission’sfield

officesfacilitatedaccesstogovernment,traditionaland

community leaders,andofferedanopportunity for the

missiontoobtainlocallyinformeddata.CAD’scontextual

knowledge and analysis of the political, security and

conflictdynamicsonthegroundwascommonlyusedto

informandrecommendcoursesofactiontothemission

leadership in efforts to prevent and mitigate conflicts.

This had the potential of making UNMIS a valuable

advisor to the parties and other stakeholders in local

conflicts.

The UN mission also had a strong position and

leverage vis-à-vis GoSS because of its consent-based

presenceandsupporttothepeaceprocess.Particularly

at the top level, theUNwasandstill isperceivedasa

legitimateactor.ThispositionwasvaluablewhentheUN

missioncontributedwithsupport tomediationand the

managementoflocalconflictsthatrequiredinvolvement

from the top level. While UNMIS did not have funds

to implement local peace- and conflict management

projects,7 the mission could make use of its broad

international network, including partnerships with UN

andnon-UNimplementingorganisations,tosupportand

securefundingforlocalpeaceinitiatives.

The mission also had access to valuable logistical

assets,includinghelicoptersandairplanes.Inthecontext

ofSouthSudan,wherethepoorinfrastructureprevents

both government officials and humanitarian agencies

ChristianityisanintegralpartofSouthSudaneseidentity.WomenholdcrossesastheymarchduringtheIndependencedayceremonyinJuba(July2011).

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Localchurchesareoftentheonlyindigenousnon-governmentalactorspresentinmanylocalitiesandtheythereforehaveanimportantroletoplayinpeacebuilding.

fromreachingouttocommunities,theseassetsproved

invaluable to the mission’s engagement in conflict

management, and to transport participants to peace

conferencesandcommunityconsultations.

In addit ion to these functions, UNMIS had a

comparativeadvantageoverotheractorsduetoitsability

todeterviolence through thepre-emptivedeployment

oftroops.Whiletheeffectwasshort-lived,theset-upof

temporaryoperationalbasesinJongleiStatein2009is

illustrativeofhowthemerepresenceofUNMIStroops

avertedfurtherclashesbetweentherivaltribes.

Weaknesses of the Mission in Local Peacebuilding and Conflict Management

ThemainconflictmanagementtoolutilisedbyUNMIS

at the local levelwas thesupport toand facilitationof

so-called ‘grassroots’ peace conferences. While these

conferencessought to involveabroadspectrumof the

local community – including chiefs, elders and youth,

aswellaskeypoliticiansandgovernmentauthorities–

the impact of a majority of these initiatives has been

limited. This needs to be seen in relation to the lack

of implementation and follow-up by the relevant

stakeholders.Mostofthesepeaceconferencestendedto

beone-offevents–withtop-downresolutionsimposed

by the government – instead of long-term processes.8

Lackofownershipandcommitmentamong theparties

andlocalstakeholdersresultedinsub-optimalfollow-up–

and,insomecases,allowedactorsatthelocal,stateand

nationalleveltomanipulateandunderminetheprocess.

Lack of presence in and – outreach to – remote

locations further contributed to hamper the mission’s

abilitytopreventandmanagelocalconflictseffectively.

Even though UNMIS had access to helicopters, and

its military component carried out air patrols on a

regularbasis, thetimeonthegroundwaslimited.This

preventedthemissionfrombuildingtrustanddeveloping

networks inremoteareas. Insomecases, thisalsohad

negative implications for the UN mission’s ability to

identifyandinvolverelevantlocalstakeholdersinpeace

initiatives, particularly women with limited access to

these arenas. Instead, UNMIS became too dependent

onthegovernmentauthorities,whonotonlylackedthe


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necessarylegitimacyontheground,butsometimesalso

hadtheirownvestedinterestsintheconflict.

Indigenous knowledge, or deep insights into the

values and beliefs of the local community, is critical

to identify complex causes and solutions to conflicts.

While local staffmembersarean invaluable sourceof

suchinsights,theytendtobeinshortsupply.Moreover,

theUN,similar tothegovernment, isstillperceivedas

an ‘outsider’andmaystill lack theneeded indigenous

knowledgeandlegitimacyamongthelocalcommunities.

Becauseof itsnon-implementingmandate,theCAD

was totally reliant on UN and non-UN implementing

partners – such as the UN Development Programme

(UNDP)–tosupportsubstantiallyandimplementpeace

initiatives. However, cooperation with these actors

had been weak and ad hoc for a number of reasons –

includingbureaucraticconstraints,divergingmandates

andpriorities,andlimitedflexibility.Hence,muchofthe

conflictmanagementworkof theCADwas reduced to

reporting,advising, logistical supportandmonitoring.

Instead of focusing on measures and initiatives to

prevent conflicts, themission tended tobe reactive in

responsetomass-scaleviolenceorCPAviolations.

ChurchInvolvementinConflictResolutionduring

theCivilWar9

The South Sudanese churches, under the auspices

oftheNewSudanCouncilofChurches(NSCC),cameto

playasignificantrole inpeacebuildingduringthecivil

war,bothatthenationalandlocallevel.10Aspartofthe

NSCC’sPeopletoPeople(P2P)Peacemakingprogramme,

thepeace conferences inAkobo in1994andWunlit in

1999reconciledrivallingtribesandpoliticalfactionsafter

yearsof internecineconflict.TheNSCCalsomobilised

external fundingandsupport through its international

networks.

Followingthesigningof theCPA, thechurches lost

much of their significance in local peacebuilding, due

to both internal and external causes. The problematic

mergeroftheNSCCandtheSudanCouncilofChurches

(SCC)ledstaffmemberstoseekjobsinGoSS,theUNand

non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Additionally,

financialmismanagementintheSCCandthenewfocus

onCPAimplementationspurreddonorstoredirecttheir

fundstothenewlegitimategovernmentintheSouth.

Added Value of Churches in Local Peacebuilding Churchesareeagertoengageinlocalpeacebuilding.

Theysee itasoneof theirmainpurposes,andseek to

promotepeacefulcoexistencethroughtheirownlimited

financialmeans.Severalfeaturesoflocalchurchesmake

them well-suited to play an active role in grassroots

peacebuilding.

Christianity is an integral part of South Sudanese

identity, and the legitimacy of the local churches is

strong.During thecivilwar, thechurchesgrewrapidly

as a result of the emergence of local leaders and lay

evangelists, making Christianity accessible to local

notionsofspirituality.Overtime,Christianitybecamea

symboloftheresistanceagainsttheArabIslamistregime


Womenarealreadyactivemembersintheircongregationsandchurchesprovide animportantarenaforstrengtheningthepositionofwomeninlocalpeacebuilding.

in Khartoum. This was, no doubt, augmented by the

factthatlocalchurcheswereamongthefewactorsthat

stayedandsufferedwiththelocalpopulationsduringthe

civilwar.Asaresult,politiciansatthefederal,stateand

locallevelwereattentivetocriticismandpraisefromthe

church.ThiswasseenduringtheKajikoIIconferencein

October2010,wheretheSCCunitedthechurchleaders

in support of the referendum, and held politicians

accountableforlackofservicedelivery.Illustratively,this

wasalsowherePresidentSalvaKiirchosetoannounce

hisamnestytobreakawaySPLAcommandersandmilitia

leaders.

Local churches are often the only indigenous

non-governmental actors present in many localities.

Becausepastorsandchurchleadersliveandworkinrural

townsandvillagesyear-round,theyhavewell-established

networks in local societies. They can disseminate

informationandmessagesofpeaceandreconciliationto

theircongregations.Duringthewar,churchesalsoplayed

an early warning function, relaying information about

conflicts to the international community. Inter-church

committees(ICCs)–localecumenicalforums–serveas

coordinating mechanisms across denominations, and

are a natural entry point for external actors wishing

to engage the local churches. Additionally, presence

in rural areas has given the local churches invaluable

indigenous knowledge – a key factor in the success of

theP2Pconferences.Thefacilitatorsacknowledgedthe

importance of people with various forms of authority

andplacedthemattheheartoftheprocess–including

chiefs, spiritual leaders, women, youth, government

administrators and the military. The use of traditional

practices, combined with Christian rituals, proved a

powerfulcovenant‘binding’thesignatories.

CHURCH REPRESENTATIVES ALSO PLAy A CENTRAL ROLE IN SO-CALLED PEACE

COMMITTEESORPEACECOUNCILS,CREATEDATTHECONFERENCESAND INTENDED

TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE, DEVELOP MEDIATION SKILLS, AND DISSEMINATE AND

IMPLEMENTRESOLUTIONS

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The ICCs and the i r member churches were

importantpartnersfortheNSCCinfacilitatingtheP2P

peacemaking conferences. The churches consulted

and mobilised local communities and contributed to

thepeacebuilding initiativesbeingongoingprocesses

ratherthanonce-offevents.Becausethechurcheshave

apermanentpresenceinmostcommunities,theyhave

incentivestofollowupresolutionslongafterthepeace

conferencesareover.Churchrepresentativesalsoplay

a central role in so-calledpeace committeesorpeace

councils, created at the conferences and intended

to promote dialogue, develop mediation skills, and

disseminateandimplementresolutions.

Although the local churches have few women in

leadershippositions,womenarecentralmembersoftheir

congregationsandparticipateinarangeofactivities–

includingdomesticconflictresolution,communitywork,

and so on. As women are already active members in

their congregations, churches provide an important

arenaforstrengtheningthepositionofwomeninlocal

peacebuilding.

Limitations of Local ChurchesThe churches are not immune to the weaknesses

thataffectSouthSudanesesocietyatlarge.Corruption

and nepotism are also found within the church

organisations.Further,becausedenominationalborders

oftenfollowethnicandpoliticalcleavages,churchescan

alsobeinvolvedinethnicpolitics.

Following the CPA, church organisations became

f ragmented and s ta r ted focus ing on in te rna l

organisation-specific interests, rather thanecumenical

c o o p e r a t i o n . T h i s w e a k e n e d c o h e s i o n a c r o s s

denominations,andhencetheirability tocooperate in

supportofpeacebuildingactivities.

The brain-drain phenomenon continues to weaken

the capacity of many local churches. Their failure to

meetthecriteriaofdonorshindersaccesstofunding–

and hence their ability to engage effectively in local

peacebuilding.Withoutfunding,theyarealsounableto

providesorelyrequiredtrainingfortheirstaffmembers,

thus perpetuating the low levels of capacity. Several

local churches have given up external fund-raising

altogether. Without increased skills in financial and

projectmanagement,localchurcheswillnotbeableto

escapethisvicious‘capacity-funding’cycle.

ConclusionandRecommendations

UNSCR1996 (2011),mandating thenewmission in

South Sudan (UNMISS), recognises “the importance

of supportingpeacebuildingefforts inorder to lay the

foundationforsustainabledevelopment”and“sustained

cooperationanddialoguewithcivilsocietyinthecontext

of stabilizing the security situation and ensuring the

protection of civilians”. UNMISS envisions a more

decentralised approach, with a focus on reaching the

most vulnerable areas and populations and engaging

local communities in a bottom-up manner. To achieve

these objectives, the mission needs to partner with

local actors already present on the ground. Some

recommendations on how a strengthened partnership

with local churches can contribute to the mission’s

peacebuildingeffortsfollow.

• First,whiletheUNmissionhasastrongposition

vis-á-visthegovernment,itneedstostrengthen

itslegitimacyandoutreachontheground.Tothis

end,localchurchescanfunctionasaninterface

betweenthesecular,modernUNmissionandthe

traditional, spiritually oriented communities in

ruralareas.

• Second, while the UN mission has proven its

ability in developing sound conflict analyses,

these can be strengthened further by tapping

into the indigenous knowledge of the local

churches.Thiswillimprovethemission’sconflict

managementinitiatives,includingearlywarning

mechanisms.

• Third,capacitybuildingof localchurchesisnot

onlyatrade-off– it isalsoanecessaryelement

for the UN mission to succeed in sustainable

local peacebuilding. In addition to its support

to the judiciary, army and local police, the UN

mission and partners could provide capacity

building and the training of local churches in

conflict management and mediation skills as

wellasfund-raisingandfinancialmanagement.

This is imperative ifchurchesaretoescapethe

‘capacity-funding’ cycle.At thesame time,any

WHILE THE ROLE OF THE CHURCHES IN LOCAL PEACEBUILDING HAS DIMINISHED,

THEySTILLHAVEMANyOFTHEFEATURESTHATCONTRIBUTEDTOTHEIRHISTORICAL

SUCCESS–INCLUDINGTHEIRPRESENCEINRURALAREAS,INDIGENOUSKNOWLEDGE

ANDLOCALLEGITIMACy


intervention at the local level in the form of

fundingwillrequiretactandcarefulfollow-upto

avoidcorruptionandrivalryamongthechurches.

• Fourth, the UN mission’s lack of presence

in remote areas – as well as its rather short

attention span, due to numerous mandated

tasks – hampers the mission’s ability to follow

uppeace initiatives thoroughly.Localchurches

makevaluablepartnersduetotheircontinuous

presenceandwell-establishednetworkson the

ground.Whenactingthroughecumenicalforums,

theyalsohavethepotentialtotranscendethnic

identities.

• Fifth,thecrucialroleofwomeninpeacebuilding

is well-recognised in UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR

1820. However, UNMIS was not able to utilise

this potential sufficiently. The reasons for this

arecomplex,andarerelatedtowomen’soverall

marginalisation in South Sudanese society.

Importantly,women’sdomestic responsibilities

inhibit them from participating in training

and workshops taking place outside their

own communities. Through more conscious

mobilisationandprogramming,UNMISSandits

partners canencourageandaid local churches

to facilitate peacebuilding initiatives at the

grassroots level, where churches are already

presentandwomenaremorelikelytoparticipate.

This art ic le has explored the strengths and

weaknesses of UNMIS and local churches in local

peacebuilding inSouthSudan.Ouranalysis illustrates

thelimitationsofbothactorsinthisprocess.ForUNMIS,

this included insufficient presence in remote areas,

lackof indigenousknowledge,andlimitedfollow-upof

peacebuildinginitiatives.Localchurches’demonstrated

abilitytoactasagentsofchangehas,ontheotherhand,

been constrained by their weak capacity and lack of

fundingtoimplementmorecomprehensiveprogrammes.

While there is no quick fix to solve South Sudan’s

conflicts, many of these challenges can be mitigated

throughincreasedcooperationbetweentheUNmission

and local churches. As both actors have comparative

advantages in local peacebuilding, a strengthened

partnershipcancreatesynergiesandenhancetheimpact

oflocal-levelpeacebuildinginSouthSudan.

Ingrid Marie Breidlid is an advisor at theNorwegianInstituteofInternationalaffairs(NUPI),and is currently working on issues related topeacekeepingandpeacebuildinginafrica.

andreasØienStenslandisaResearchassistantatNUPI, and iscurrentlyworkingon issues relatedto the protection of civilians, peacekeeping andpeacebuildinginafrica.

Endnotes1 Auteserre,Séverine(2010)The Trouble with the Congo: Local

Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding. Newyork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

2 Foranoverviewofrecentscholarshiponreligionandpeace-makingandatypologyofreligiousbrokers,seeHarpviken,KristianB.andRøislien,HanneE.(2008)FaithfulBrokers?PotentialsandPitfallsofReligioninPeacemaking.Conflict Resolution Quarterly,25(3).SeealsoSmock,David(2006)ReligiousContributionstoPeacemaking:WhenReligionBringsPeace,NotWar.Peaceworks,55, Washington: UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace.

3 ThestudyisbasedonfieldresearchbytheauthorsinJuba,JongleiandEasternEquatoriainOctober–November2010,inrelationtoresearchprojectsontheprotectionofcivil-iansundertheauspicesoftheTrainingforPeaceinAfricaprogramme.

4 UNMIS’smandateexpiredon9July2011,andwasreplacedbytheUnitedNationsMissionintheRepublicofSouthSudan(UNMISS).ThenewmissionisauthorisedunderUNSecurityCouncilResolution1996(2011).

5 UNMIS(2011)‘CivilAffairsDivisionFactSheet’,Availableat:<http://unmis.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=p4xSixFqSB8%3d&tabid=2157>Accessedon:20July2011.

6 Withtheexceptionofminorgrantsthroughthequickimpactprojects.

7 ACCORD(2010)The Conflict Management Work of the Civil Affairs Division of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).Durban:ACCORD.

8 ThissectionispartiallybasedonBradbury,Mark;JohnRyle,John;Medley,MichaelandSansculotte-Greenidge,Kwesi(2006)Local Peace Processes in Sudan: A Baseline Study.RiftValleyInstitute;InternationalCrisisGroup(2002)God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan.InternationalCrisisGroup,report39(28January2002);Kayanga,SamuelE.andWheeler,Andrew(1999)But God is Not Defeated! Celebrating the Centenary of the Episcopal Church of the Sudan, 1899–1999. Nairobi:PaulinesPublicationsAfrica;andSchomerus,MareikeandAllen,Tim(2011)Southern Sudan at Odds with Itself: Dynamics of Conflict and Predicaments of Peace. London:DESTIN.

9 TheSCCmembersincludetheAfricaInlandChurchSudan,theEpiscopalChurchoftheSudan,thePresbyterianChurchoftheSudan,theCatholicChurchofSudan,theCopticOrthodoxChurch,theEthiopianOrthodoxChurch,theGreekCatholicChurch,theGreekOrthodoxChurch(PatriarchateAlexandria),theSudanEvangelicalPresbyterianChurch,theSudanInteriorChurch,theSudanPentecostalChurchandtheSudaneseChurchofChrist.

10 UNSC,6576thmeeting.Resolution1996.OfficialRecord.Newyork,8July2011.p.1–2.


PeaCekeePing to PeaCebuilding FroM a gender PersPeCtive: the unMil CaseByKRISTENa.CORdELL

Introduction

In a post-conflict environment, keeping the peace

through the provision of kinetic or physical security

rapidly transitions to addressing the wider needs of

the population through peacebuilding tasks. Under

theumbrellaofpeacekeeperprotection,peacebuilding

efforts work to ensure the basic safety and protection

of civilians, establish credible political processes and

systems, ensure access to basic services (including

foodandwater),andnormaliseeconomicactivity.The

transition between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is

overlapping,fluidanddiverse–and,forthepurposeof

thisarticle,isdescribedasanexus.

Gender mainstreaming is a core part of both

peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, as it ensures

thattheservicesandbenefitsestablishedwillreachboth

above: UNMIL launches the "16 days of activism"campaignwithmessagesonthousandsofwoodenstarstostrengthentherightsofwomenandtostopgender-basedviolence(2008).

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men and women within the community. In the least,

thismeansensuringthatwomenwillbeprotectedinan

ongoing conflict through peacekeeping. More broadly

defined, itmeans thatwomenwillbeactiveplayers in

an evolving equitable society through peacebuilding.

However, it israrelysosimple.Betweentheconclusion

ofarmedconflictand the introductionofdevelopment

opportunities lies a wide spectrum of gender equality

issues. How international peacekeeping operations

canengageand involvewomenacross thedivide from

peacekeeping topeacebuilding, specifically replicating

the success of the United Nations Mission in Liberia

(UNMIL),istheprimaryfocusofthisarticle.

Background

Forwomen,wardoesnotendwith thecessationof

conflict. In the post-conflict environment, women are

continually plagued by political exclusion, economic

marginalisation, sexual violence and constraints on

human rights. This has dramatic limitations for any

country’s development and long-term stability.1 To

successfullynavigate thenexusbetweenpeacekeeping

and peacebui ld ing , re levant ac tors must take

integrated action on a variety of social, economic,

political and security platforms in a gender-relevant

manner. Wider than simply the provision of physical

security, an inclusive approach has proven to be an

operationalimperative–notjustagoalofwell-meaning

peacebuilders.

Acorepartofthisinclusivityiswomen’sparticipation

in post-conflict transitions as a means for ensuring

state stability. The links between the two are now

more clear than ever. In 2009, the RAND-sponsored

study,Women and Nation Building,foundthatstronger

emphasis on gender equality and women’s inclusion

early in peacekeeping activities was likely to improve

theoutcomesofstatestability(theoverarchinggoalof

thepeacekeepingcommunitywrit large).2This finding,

built on World Bank-sponsored research, indicated

that societies which remained stratified by gender

showed a continued proclivity towards violence and

oppression in the long term. The author concluded

that:“Genderequality isnotmerelyamatterof social

justice but of international security in predicting state

aggressiveness internationally.”3 In other words, there

is a positive correlation between domestic gender

inequality and external aggression. Thus, those in the

peacekeepingcommunitywhopushfor the installation

WomenreadelectioninstructionalmaterialprovidedbyUNMILpeacekeepersduringasensitisationtour,inParloma,Liberia(2005).

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LaymahGbowee,ExecutivedirectorofWomeninPeacebuildingNetworkafrica(WIPNET)ofLiberia,speaksontheroleofwomeninpeacebuildinginafrica,atajointpressconferenceheldbywomen’sorganisationsfromaroundtheworld,attheUNheadquartersinNewYork(2006).

ofnewinstitutionsandgovernancemechanisms,butare

cautiousonwomen’s inclusion,mayhavethings inthe

wrongorder–especiallyiflong-termstabilityisthegoal.

Peacebuilding (in all its various forms) is focused

on self-sustaining peace and a reduction of the risk

of conflict relapse, with gender equality as an inherit

goal.4 There are hundreds of resources available on

the integration of women in peacekeeping. However,

the implementation of such policy – especially in the

murky post-conflict context – remains unclear. How

can peacekeepers include women in the most fragile,

early transitions without jeopardising a fragile peace?

In addition, how can the same multilateral operations

enforce gender mainstreaming across the life of the

missionandbeyond?

Mandate

As a tool for examining the components of gender

equality in effective peacekeeping-to-peacebuilding

transitions, this article presents the case of UNMIL.

Theresearchwasconductedaspartofacomprehensive

draw-down best practice exercise hosted by UNMIL

in2010.5

UNMILprovidesanexcellenttemplateforthestudy

ofthenexusbetweenpeacekeepingandpeacebuilding,

because it postured itself to address gender equality

within its various activit ies from the start. As a

multidimensionalpeacekeepingoperation,UNMIL’swork

ongendermainstreamingcameundertheleadershipof

theOfficeoftheGenderAdvisor(OGA).Thisofficeisthe

responsiblepartyforcoordinatingtheeffortandaligning

thegoals for the integrationofgender throughout the

mission.Despitelimitedresources(and, inmanyways,

duetolimitedresources),theofficerealisedearlyonthat

fullmainstreamingthroughoutthemission’svariousunits

wouldbetheonlywaytocarryoutitsmandateoverthe

transitionprocess.Thisapproachiscrucialinthe“space”

between conflict and peace, where “effective support

requires integrated action across the peacekeeping,

development,humanrightsandhumanitarianpillarsof

thesystem.”6

“Foramissiontobesuccessful, thenexusbetween

peacekeeping and peacebuilding must be coordinated

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byanoverallstrategysothatsetsof tasksdonotexist

in a vacuum, but are part of a larger vision of what it

willtaketoreachasustainablepeace.”7Across-cutting

andstrategicapproachtomainstreaminggenderwasnot

just best practice, but the only feasible practice at the

time.Giventhelimitsoftime,staffingandresourcesof

theOGA, itwasessential tobuild the internalcapacity

ofvariousunitswithin themission to integrategender

independently (or with as little oversight as possible).

The OGA took a strategic approach in helping units

acrossthemissiontoidentifygender-relevantgoalsand

relevantstakeholdersforeachtask,andcoordinatewith

localandnationallevelprocesses.

One example of this approach is the work the

OGA undertook early on with the Civil Affairs Unit, in

preparation for a national presidential election. The

OGA encouraged the Civil Affairs staff to identify the

importanceofwomen in theupcomingelection,create

messages around voting that were gender-specific,

andwork tobuild thecapacityof theNationalElection

Committeeongender.Theresultwasnotonlyagender-

relevantelection,butalsoaCivilAffairsstaff that fully

understood the relevance of gender throughout their

work.Thiscross-cuttingapproachintroduceda‘common

vision’ for gender mainstreaming in the mission from

thestart.

BestPracticeStrategies

In 2003, UNMIL’s founding mandate – UN Security

CouncilResolution(UNSCR)1509–specificallyaddressed

the“importanceofagenderperspectiveinpeacekeeping

operationsandpost-conflictpeacebuildinginaccordance

with resolution 1325”,8 and gave special attention to

addressingviolenceagainstwomenandgirlsasatoolof

warfare.Theresolutionalsocalledfortheestablishment

of administrative structures, the restructuring and

supportofthepolice,andtheconsolidationofthejustice

sector – interventions essential for addressing and

respondingtogender issues inacross-cuttingmanner.

It effectively laid the framework forUNMIL, aswell as

emerging Liberian institutions, to address actively the

needsofwomenandgirlsinemergingstatestability.9

Effectivetransitionsarereliantonpeaceagreements

that are treated as living documents, with flexibility

JudgesoftheartsforadolescentsandWomen’sRightsPaintinganddrawingCompetitiondiscusstherankingsofthefinalists.TheeventisorganisedbyUNMILandtheUnionofLiberianartists(July2011).

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and long- term open-endedness . 10 The L iber ian

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was also a

productofthewillandattentionoflocalwomentomove

thepeaceprocess forward.TheCPAcalledfor“gender

balanceinapportioningresponsibilitiesforprogramme

implementation”, across “programming for national

rehabilitation, reconstructionanddevelopment, for the

moral, social and physical reconstruction of Liberia in

the post-conflict period”. 11 The document set gender

quotas for members of the Transitional Legislature

Assembly to include representatives from women’s

groups, and ensured a gender balance in elective and

non-electiveposts.Theresultwasahighlygender-aware

transitionalframework,includingaTransitionalCabinet

with three women out of 21 members, a Transitional

NationalAssemblywithfourwomenoutof76members,

a National Elections Commission with three women

out of seven members, and representation for women

on the newly formed Liberian National Committee

on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and

Rehabilitation(NCDDRR).

Intheearliestofoperations,UNMILsupportedUNSCR

1509andtheCPA.Oneofthefirstexampleswasthepush

for the inclusion of Women Associated with Fighting

Forces (WAFF) in the country’s ongoing disarmament,

demobilisation,reintegrationandrehabilitation(DDRR)

activities. Not only did inclusion give the process

credibilityandawiderbeneficiaryframework,butwomen

wererecognisedasactorswhowouldbeimportanttothe

country’srebuildingprocess.Toaccomplishthis,UNMIL/

EllenJohnson-Sirleaf,PresidentofLiberia,addressesthepaneldiscussion,“WomenasaCriticalForceindemocraticGovernance”,jointlyorganisedbytheCouncilofWomenLeadersandCommunitiesofdemocracy(September2010).

THEOGAENCOURAGEDTHECIVILAFFAIRSSTAFFTO IDENTIFyTHE IMPORTANCEOF

WOMEN IN THE UPCOMING ELECTION, CREATE MESSAGES AROUND VOTING THAT

WERE GENDER-SPECIFIC, AND WORK TO BUILD THE CAPACITy OF THE NATIONAL

ELECTIONCOMMITTEEONGENDER

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OGA advocated for early policy mandates on DDRR in

LiberiatoincluderesourcesforWAFF.

UNMILworkedtoreachwomenthroughcentralised

informationoperationsanddecentralisednetworks for

an inclusive outreach process. It empowered national

women’s civil society organisations to sensitise and

disseminate information to women in the country. A

centralisedcampaigndemystifyingtheDDRRprocessfor

women was facilitated through the Public Information

Office(PIO).Thefull integrationofwomenintheDDRR

process ensured that they would be beneficiaries of

development and economic support programmes. By

supporting women combatants in the demobilisation

processinthecountry,UNMILcreatedtheconditionsfor

effectiveDDRRthatwouldfullyreintegratewomenwho

hadparticipatedintheconflict.

As peacekeeping missions evolve to peacebuilding

efforts,militaryforcesdrawdown,effectivelyto“allow

thecountry theroomandfreedomtogrowandto take

responsibilityforthoseaspectsofsecurityandlogisticsit

can”.12Asthemilitarypresenceshrinks,afullyfunctional

nationalsecuritysectorshouldprovidesafetyandensure

stability over time (this is especially relevant in areas

where conflict is fluidand regional).Withan inclusive

DDRRprocesssettingthetoneforwidespreadinclusion

of women, the OGA was able to turn its attention to

capitalisingonthe inclusionofwomenin thecountry’s

emergingsecuritysector.

In2006,UNMIL’sPoliceUnit(UNPOL)establishedthe

Liberian National Police (LNP) Committee for National

RecruitmentofWomen.Within thiscommittee,UNPOL

workedwithpartnerstorecruitandretainwomenwithin

UNMIL’sPoliceUnitworkedwithpartnerstorecruitandretainmorewomenintheLiberianNationalPolice.

WOMENBETWEENTHEAGESOF18AND35,WHOCOMPLETEDATLEASTNINTHGRADE,

WEREELIGIBLETOPARTICIPATEINATHREE-MONTHSHORTACADEMICPROGRAMME,TOBE

FOLLOWEDByTHREEMONTHSOFPOLICETRAININGATTHENATIONALPOLICEACADEMy

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the LNP better. They created the Educational Support

Programme(ESP)–acondensedversionofahighschool

diploma that women could complete as a prerequisite

forentering thenationalpolice force.Womenbetween

the ages of 18 and 35, who completed at least ninth

grade,wereeligibletoparticipateinathree-monthshort

academicprogramme,tobefollowedbythreemonthsof

policetrainingattheNationalPoliceAcademy.TheESP

dramaticallyincreasedthenumberofwomenintheLNP–

apositivechangeforwomeninthecountry.

Withinthetransitionfromconflicttopeace,theHead

ofMission,ortheSpecialRepresentativetotheSecretary

General(SRSG),isacrucialactorwhohasthepotential

to “generate and sustain the international political

supportthatiscriticaltokeepingthepartiesontrack”.13

Throughout its life cycle, UNMIL’s SRSG supported a

visionthatwouldnottradewomen’sinclusionforother

politicalpriorities.14TheSRSGpassedthisvisiondown

through the ranks, advancing a common goal for all

missionstaffandsettingthetoneforallactivities.Within

themission,strongleadershipadvancedtheOGA’sability

toaddresscross-cuttingissuesandpresentedagender

awarenessthat“workeditswaydown”tootherunitsand

partnersinthemissionandtheUN.Thishassimplified

theneedfortheOGAto“makethecaseforgender”,and

allowed theoffice tospend timeprovidingsubstantive

andtechnicalexpertiseforthemission.15

TheOGAalsoestablishedastrongrelationshipwith

theUNCountryTeam(UNCT),asatoolformanagingthe

transitiontopeace.Theclearestexampleisinrelationto

addressingsexualandgender-basedviolence(SGBV)in

thecountry. In2009, the fieldofactorsaddressing this

topic was growing – as were the monetary resources.

UNMIL’s OGA helped set up the Gender Theme Group

(UNGTG)andtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistance

Framework(UNDAF)toprovidestrategiccoordinationfor

partnerswithintheUNCT.Astheco-chairoftheUNGTG,

the OGA worked alongside the UN Fund for Women

(now UN Women) to support the government and UN

gendermainstreaminginitiatives.Together,thesebodies

coordinated a range of programmes and projects on

SGBV,ensuringbotha responsibleuseof resources in

the immediate term and a platform for developmental

organisations to take over this important work in the

longterm.

Atthenationallevel,theOGAintroducedarangeof

participatoryprocessestoengagewomen’scivilsociety

in emerging national frameworks. This illustrated a

highrecognitionof localpoliticalwill forgenderissues

in the country. The office worked to support local

capacitythroughfacilitatingparticipatoryprocessesthat

would leave organisations more stable for a peaceful

transition.This iskey,giventhat thepeacekeepingand

peacebuilding relationship must extend “beyond the

UN, [through] close collaboration with key partners,

suchas international financial institutionsandregional

organizations”.16 The OGA supported government

authorities by providing training programmes and

capacity building, technical expertise and long-term

supportfortheMinistryofGender–thekeygovernment

body for mainstreaming gender in Liberia. Examples

includeinputonthepreparationofapovertyreduction

strategy (PRS), the Liberian National Action Plan on

1325 (LNAP), theNationalGenderPolicyand theTruth

andReconciliationReport(PRSP).Ineachcase,women’s

networks(withthesupportoftheOGA)facilitatedalarge

number of county-level consultations across Liberia,

resulting in the mobilisation of women to participate,

and policy documents that reflect their needs and

preferences. The final product – full gender-inclusive

national documentation – will guide the transition to

developmentinthecountry.

Conclusion:GenderandtheRoadtodevelopment

Today, Liberia is at a crucial stage in the transition

from conflict to peace. The recovery process is well

underway. However, recovering from armed conflict

will require inclusivepeacethroughlong-termchanges

insocial infrastructureandreform.Throughtheir long-

standing civic participation and dedication to peace

and prosperity, women have solidified a place in the

publicsphere,butstillfacelimitsinsecurity,accessand

equality.Perhapsnowhereisthismoreclearthaninthe

lead-uptothecountry’s2011election17where,despitea

strongshowing(ascandidatesandvoters) in2005,few

womenhavesignedupascandidates.18

Retainingthemomentumofgenderequalityoverthe

changingactorsandnationalsystemswhilepromoting

sustainabilityofeffortisasignificantchallenge.National

actors and institutions must take over the tasks of

UNMILPROVIDESANExCELLENTTEMPLATEFORTHESTUDyOFTHENExUSBETWEEN

PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING, BECAUSE IT POSTURED ITSELF TO ADDRESS

GENDEREqUALITyWITHINITSVARIOUSACTIVITIESFROMTHESTART


the international community. Economic recovery and

infrastructuresustainabilityarereplacingtheprovision

ofsecurityaspriorities.Itiscriticalthatpolicywhichis

created with the express goal of empowering women

not be left on the shelf, but instead be implemented

effectively and efficiently by relevant actors. UNMIL –

specifically the OGA – has systematically capitalised

on theabilitiesandcapacitiesof the country’swomen

to build a stable and equitable society. The networks

and mechanisms established by this office must be

maintained and expanded with increased national

ownership.

Through a mult idimensional , straightforward

approach, UNMIL advanced a series of best practices

for gender mainstreaming in a challenging post-

conflict transition.The lessonsof thisapproachshould

influencemissionplanningacrosstheUNDepartmentof

PeacekeepingOperationsandtheworld.

Kristena.CordellhasservedtheUNinmissionstothedemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,LiberiaandLebanon,whereshehasadvisedonissuesrelatedto sexual and gender-based violence, securitysector reform, policy interventions for improvednational capacities and empowerment strategiesforwomeninpost-conflictcontexts.ShecurrentlysupportsRefugee International’sworkongenderandpeacekeepingintheMiddleEastandafrica.

Endnotes1 Caprioli,Mary(2003),GenderEqualityandStateAggression:

TheImpactofDomesticGenderEqualityonStateFirstUseofForce.International Interactions,29,pp.195–214.Alsosee:Benard,CherylandCordell,Kristen(2007)WomenandHumanSecurity:TheCaseofPostConflictAfghanistan.Georgetown University: WIIS Words Journal,Winter2007;andCarment,David;Prest,Stewart;Gazo,John;ElAchkar,Souleima;Samy,yiaqadeesenandBell,Terry(2006)FailedandFragileStates2006.Country Indicators for Foreign Policy,November2006.

2 Benard,Cheryl;Jones,Seth;Oliker,Olga;Thurston,Cathryn;Stearns,BrookeandCordell,Kristen(2008)Women and Nation Building.SantaMonica,CA:TheRANDCorporation.

3 Carment,Davidetal.(2006)op.cit.,p.209.Alsosee:Caprioli,Mary(2003)op.cit.,p.196.

4 UnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations(UNDPKO)(2010)‘PeacekeepingandPeacebuilding:ClarifyingtheNexus’,UNDepartmentofFieldSupport,Availableat:<http://www.effectivepeacekeeping.org/reports/peacekeeping-and-peacebuilidng-clarifying-nexus>.

5 Thefindingsaretheresultofover80interviewsand10focusgroupsthroughoutthecountry,examiningtheperiodbetween2001and2010.Thisarticleisbasedlargelyontheoutputofthatresearch–Cordell,Kristen.Best Practices in Gender Mainstreaming.StudyforUNDPKO,facilitatedandsupportedbytheOGA/UNMIL.CordellwouldliketothanktheOGAandCaroleDoucetandherstaffatUNMIL,whofacili-tatedthereportbyprovidingaccessandsupport.

6 UNDPKO(2010)op.cit.

7 ColumbiaUniversitySchoolofInternationalandPublicAffairs(SIPA)andUNDepartmentofFieldSupport(2011)VoicesfromtheField:AnAnalysisonBestPracticeReporting.AjointprojectoftheUNStudyProgram,SIPAandthePeacekeepingBestPracticesService.

8 UNSecurityCouncil(2003)SecurityCouncilResolution1509ontheEstablishmentoftheUNMissioninLiberia(UNMIL),19September2003,S/RES/1509(2003),Availableat:<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f8d304d4.html>Accessedon:15July2011.

9 SubsequentUNMILresolutions(developedduringvariousphasesofthemission)havereaffirmedtheoriginalcommit-mentofresolution1509,includingonissuesofgender-basedviolence,protectionandsexualexploitationandabuse.TheseresolutionshavemadeUNMILthecentralbodyfortherestorationofstateauthority,enhancinghumansecurityandprovidingprotection–allcrucialelementsinrestoringthesecurityofthenation’swomen.

10 TheCenterforInternationalCooperation(2011)Global Peace Ops Review 2011.NewyorkUniversity.

11 ComprehensivePeaceAgreementBetweentheGovernmentofLiberiaandtheLiberiansUnitedforReconciliationandDemocracy(LURD)andtheMovementforDemocracyinLiberia(MODEL)andPoliticalParties,Accra,18August2003.

12 UNSecurityCouncil(2008)SecurityCouncilResolution1836ontheExtensionoftheMandateoftheUNMissioninLiberia(UNMIL),29September2008,S/RES/1836(2008),Availableat:<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48e47cda8.html>Accessedon:15July2011.


14 Doucet,Carole(2009)Women in Peacekeeping: The Power to Empower.Remarksfortheseminar‘TheImportanceofIncludingWomeninPeacekeepingMissions’,UniversityofLiberia.

15 Authorinterviews,UNMILstaff,2009,asnotedin:Cordell,Kristen(2010)Best Practices for Gender Mainstreaming at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from 2003 to 2008.UnitedNationsBestPracticesUnit.


17 Atthetimeofwriting,thedateoftheelectionisunclear.WhileitiscurrentlyscheduledforOctober,anationalrefer-endumislikelytopushitbacktoNovember2011.

18 Authorunknown(2011)‘Analysis:DoLiberiansKnowWhatThey’reVotingfor?’IntegratedRegionalInformationNetworks,8August2011.Availableat:<http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=93431>.


Civil-Military Coordination and transition ManageMent: the unMil exPerienCeByCHRISTOPHERHOLSHEK

Ithas longbeenwidely recognised that“cooperation

andcoordinationbetween themilitaryandhumanitarian

componentsarecriticalinmultidimensionalpeacekeeping

operations”.1 While the stress on issues of civil-military

coordination (CIMIC) has largely been regarding

peacekeeping and humanitarian organisations, less

attentionhasgoneto theroleof themilitary in fostering

peacebuilding; moreover, the role of CIMIC across the

spectrum of peace support operations and enabling

the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. The

conceptputatworkintheUnitedNations(UN)Missionin

Liberia(UNMIL),whichdirectlyaddressesthechallengeof

connectingsecurityanddevelopment,hasprovenacase

studyofinteresttothelargerpeaceandstabilityoperations

community, with implications for general civil-military

approachesformilitaryandcivilianprofessionalsalike.

Background

In January 2008, UNMIL began to slowly draw

down its forces parallel to the Government of Liberia’s

above: The Liberian project manager of a youthagriculturaltrainingfarmexplainsthepilotprojecttotheUNMILChiefofCIMICandstaffofficersoftheresidentBangladeshpeacekeepingbattalion.

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anarmedForcesofLiberia(aFL)soldierassistsUNpeacekeeperswithscreeningpatientsatamedicaloutreachcentreinSinoeCounty(2008).

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implementationof itsPovertyReductionStrategy (PRS).2

The international community supported the PRS using

the United Nations Development Assistance Framework

(UNDAF)andotherplansdesignedtohelpbuildthecapacity

of theGovernmentofLiberia–particularlyat thecounty

level–todeliveressentialpublicservices.Theseservices

includedsecurity,governance,theruleoflaw,andeconomic

andsocialdevelopment.Theintentoftheseframeworksis

toreachfulfillmentoftheseservices,articulatedinaseries

of benchmarks, by the time of the next general election

inNovember2011.Thiswillmark theendof the second

(ordrawdown)phaseand thebeginningof the thirdand

final phase of withdrawal, characterised by civilian-led

peacebuildingfocusedondevelopmenttosupplantsecurity-

intensive,military-basedpeacekeepingoperations.3

Inrecognitionofitsroleinunderpinningthisstabilisation

process,withtheonsetoftheseframeworksthatendedthe

peacekeepingconsolidationphaseandstartedthedrawdown

phase(transitioningtopeacebuilding)inJanuary2008,the

UNMIL Force approach to CIMIC changed substantially,

basedontheconstantconcerninForceCommandreports

on“theincreasingdependenceoftheGovernmentofLiberia

ontheassetsoftheForce…”4Sincethen,thegreatestrisk

for security and stability in Liberia has been persistent

dependency on the mission in general and the military

in particular as Force capability diminishes, bringing on

potentiallydestabilisingeffectsthatrisktheinvestmentand

sacrificesofmanytobringlastingpeacethere.

Forthedrawdownphase,bothrisksandopportunities

abounded. Under enormous international pressure,

accelerated drawdown intensified these civil-military

concerns. Further, military reductions paralleled a

humanitarian assistance drawdown, requiring more

efficientandeffectivecoordination in the transition from

relief to recovery. The real and perceived effectiveness

of countygovernments, inparticular, todeliveressential

publicservices–amongthemsecurityandtheruleoflaw–

hasbeenthevitalcentreofgravitytothefulfilmentofthe

mandate and the mission’s exit strategy. Additionally,

largeconcentrationsof idleandunemployedyouthhave

presented the most dangerous threat to long-term civil

stability.Thisisparticularlytrueamongyoungmeninurban

areas,whoare idealrecruits for illicitactivitiesasLiberia

struggleseconomically,furtherfeedingthegeneralproblem

ofacorruptsociety.

However,therehavealsobeenopportunitiestofacilitate

the transition from military-intensive peacekeeping to

civilian-led, self-sustained peacebuilding, per the PRS.


Oneopportunityhasbeentherelativelypeacefulandstable

situationenduringfromthepeacekeepingeffort.Another

hasbeenthesubstantialdevelopmentassistancepresence

stillresidinginLiberia–amongthis,strongbilateraldonor

nation supportof Liberiaaswell as coordinationamong

thosenations,themission,andtheGovernmentofLiberia

insupportofawell-developed,home-growntransitionplan

(thatis,thePRS).Therehasalsobeentheessentiallypositive

environment forCIMICunder strongmission leadership,

emphasisingintegratedmissioncoordinationunderthe‘one

UN–deliveringasone’concept,andviewingCIMICasone

amonganumberofmissioncoordinationmanagementtools.

Lastbutnotleast,theLiberiangovernmentandpopulation

havethoughtpositivelyoftheinternationalpresence–due

innosmallparttoaneffectivepublicinformationcampaign.

With the linkagesbetweencapacitydevelopmentand

securitythusclearlyestablished,theracewasontofacilitate

the transitionprocess,build local capacity,andwork the

Forceoutofmany jobsdeemedessential tostabilitybut

ultimatelytheresponsibilityoftheGovernmentofLiberia–

allbeforetheForceitselfreducestoalevelofineffectiveness

toinfluencethetransitionprocess.

TheUNMILCIMICConcept:“It’sNotaboutUs;It’s

aboutThem”

As introduced in 2008, the UNMIL CIMIC concept is

firmly nested in the UN integrated mission concept and

“…motivated by the need to maximize coordination and

coherencebetweenthemilitarycomponentandthecivilian

componentsofthesameintegratedmission,betweenthe

militarycomponentofaUNpeacekeepingoperationandthe

restoftheUNsystem,andbetweenthemilitarycomponent

ofthemissionandotherexternalandinternalcivilianactors

in the same mission area”.5 The UNMIL CIMIC concept

helpedformthebasisofwhatisnowarticulatedinthenew

‘UN–CIMIC’policyforallUNpeacekeepingforces–namely,

that civil-military coordination, writ large, has two core

functions:first,tosupportmanagementofthe“interaction

betweencivilianandmilitaryactors”;andsecond,tofostera

“creatingandenablingenvironmentfortheimplementation

of the mission mandate by maximizing the comparative

advantage of all actors operating in the mission area”.6

Especiallywithrespecttothe latter, theForceengages in

CIMICwiththeaimofleveragingcivilianpartnerstoreduce

itsownrole.

The concept of CIMIC in Liberia is well articulated in

theUNMILForceCIMICDirective,auniqueUNplaybook

thathasbeensourcedattheDepartmentofPeacekeeping

Operations (DPKO)andsharedwithother fieldmissions.

Lessconcernedwith ‘winningheartsandminds’ through

thedirectuseofmilitaryforcesforhumanitarianassistance

ordevelopmentprojectsthatservetoreinforceratherthan

reducedependency–andoftencreatesfrictionwithcivilian

partnerorganisations,theCIMICintentinLiberiahasbeen

tousethecapabilitiesoftheForceto“…enableandmultiply

civilianinitiatives,andconductedincoordinationwiththe

UNMILcivilcomponent(jointly)andUNagenciesaswell

asNGOsandtheGovernmentofLiberia(collaboratively)”.7

Thisentailsamoreindirectroleformilitaryassets–more

clearlyinsupportofcivilianagenciesandleadinglessfrom

thefrontandmorefrombehindtheUNMILcivilcomponent,

UNagenciesandtheGovernmentofLiberia,alignedwith

themand their frameworksandbenchmarks, topromote

localownershipofciviladministrationandessentialpublic

services responsibilities,and tohelpbuildcivilauthority

andpublicconfidence.Tode-emphasise‘winningheartsand

minds’,thesloganforUNMILCIMICbecame:“It’snotabout

us;it’saboutthem.”8

Figure 1 depicts the conceptual intent of UNMIL

CIMIC: of leading more from behind than the front. The

idea is to bring the Force from the front to the rear of

assistanceeffortsthroughadeliberateprocessoftransition

management.First,themilitaryshiftstheuseofitsassets

away from direct assistance to the population and more

to enabling efforts led by UN agencies. These work in

tandem with non-governmental organisations (NGOs),

whilegraduallyintegratingCIMICeffortswiththoseledby


Figure1:depictionofCIMICConceptEmployedatUNMIL


LiberianMinistryofPublicWorkspersonnelreceiveon-the-jobtraininginculvertrestorationfromBangladeshiengineers.

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theseagencies (that is, to ‘civilianise’militaryassistance

efforts).Simultaneously,itlookstoimprovepartnerefforts

tobuild thecapacityofGovernmentofLiberiaentities to

performciviladministrationfunctions(thatis,to‘localise’

ownershipofthepeacebuildingprocesstoaddressthelocal

civilsituationandallitschallenges).Inthisdoubletransition,

theaimiscreatetheproperalignmentofassistanceefforts

tofacilitatetheconditionsdesiredbyallthreestakeholder

groups.

Themilitary itself is the real ‘forcemultiplier’.At the

sametime,theassumptionofamoreindirectandsupporting

rolehasmadeiteasierfortheForcetodiminishitspresence

and operations, while mitigating or reducing potential

destabilisingdrawdown-relatedgapsandrisksassociated

withover-dependencyastheForcepreparesforwithdrawal–

verymuchinitsownsecurity interests. Inotherwords: it

worksitselfoutofajob.

Agoodexampleoftheapplicationofthiscivil-military

transition concept is the CIMIC approach to project

management. To facilitate transition, ownership and

sustainability,UNMILCIMICdirectsthatitsprojectsshould

involveGovernmentofLiberiaofficialsthroughouttheentire

reliefordevelopmentprojectlifecycle–thatis,assessment,

planning, coordination and execution – to ‘front-load’

ownershipandsimultaneouslyenhanceprojectmanagement

skilldevelopment,which isaclearcapacitydevelopment

outcome. In addition, it should demonstrably support

specificPRSobjectives.Understandingthat ‘civilsuccess

is Force success’ gradually makes the Force a minority

stakeholder in the provision of essential public services,

and thus facilitates theCIMICendstate.The indicatorof

thisisthesuccessfulexecutionofForcedrawdownwithno

debilitatingcivil-militaryimpactsand100%civilianleadinall

civil-militaryinitiatives.

Similarly, UNMIL’s approach to its military-assisted

quick Impact Project (qIP) programme has, accordingly,

de-emphasised ‘hearts and minds’ and focused more on

helpingtobuildcapacityandconfidence–specifically,inthe

renovationorconstructionoflocalrule-of-lawinfrastructure,

including dozens of police stations, courthouses and

detentionfacilities.WhileForceengineerslargelydidthis

earlieron, local contractorswere increasinglyemployed,


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wheretheygainedexperience,withtheadditionalimpactof

creatinglocalemploymentandtrainedlabour.Thistransition

management combination of CIMIC and qIP is a model

waytheUNingeneralcanmaximisebothCIMICandqIP’s

stability-orienteddevelopmentdollars.

The key linkages of this concept are UNMIL CIMIC’s

linesofcoordination,whicharepointedlyindirectascivilian

partnersareplacedbetweentheForceandlocalentitiesat

all levelsofcoordination.Atthetactical (orcounty) level,

CIMICsupporttothecountyordistrictgovernmentoccurs

throughtheUNMILJointCountyOffices.Attheoperational

(or national) level, CIMIC coordination occurs through

theOfficesof theSpecialRepresentativeof theSecretary

General (SRSG)andDeputySRSGs,whoheaduptheUN

CountryTeam.TheChiefCIMICOfficerprovidesoperational

level‘reachback’fortacticalCIMICintheformofplanning

guidanceandidentificationofresourcesbeyondthoselocally

available.Theruleissimple:allrequestsorproposalsfor

militarysupporttociviladministrationfirstcomesthrough

theappropriateUNMILcivilianmissioncoordinationoffice

andlevelofcommand.

There are two other essential characteristics of the

UNMIL CIMIC concept. First, because peace support

operationsareinanoperatingenvironmentthatislargely

psychological rather than physical, UNMIL CIMIC forges

a close relationship between CIMIC and information

operations,which iscritical toachievedesiredoutcomes.

Regardless of measurable development progress, if the

common perception remains that the country’s future is

fragileandthatthedepartureofUNMILwouldprecipitate

renewedmassviolence–theunderlyingsecurityconcern

ThedeputyCommissioneroftheLiberianNationalPolicecutstheribbononanewsecuritydepotindolo’sTown,MargibiCounty,Liberia(July2011).ThedepotisoneofUNMIL’sQuickImpactProjects,whichinvolvesrefurbishingorconstructingcourthouses,policestations,andpolicebarrackstostrengthentheruleoflawinLiberia.

WHILE THE UN PEACEBUILDING

SUPPORT OFFICE, FOR ExAMPLE,

ACKNOWLEDGES THE LINKAGE

BETWEEN PEACEKEEPING AND

PEACEBUILDING AND ADVOCATES

GREATER ‘COORDINATION’ OF THE

PROCESS, IT MAKES NO MENTION OF

THE MILITARy’S OBVIOUSLy CRITICAL

ROLEINENHANCINGTHISTRANSITION


inLiberia– thecountrymay indeeddestabilise following

drawdownandwithdrawal.Thiskeylinkagebetweensecurity

anddevelopmentisthuslargelyperceptual.Second,UNMIL

CIMICemphasisesbuildingbothcapacityandconfidencein

waysthatgobeyondsimplepublicinformation.Itdirectsthat

Liberiansbevisiblyintheleadofcapacity-buildingefforts

or events such as medical outreach, even if most of the

effortisfromtheForce.Inclearsupportofgovernanceand

securitysectorreform,whenfeasible,italsolookstoinvolve

localpoliceandthemilitaryinCIMICprojectstobuildtheir

capacityand,moreimportantly,promotepublicconfidence

inthegovernmentbytransferringthepsychologicalcapital

ofpublictrustgainedbytheUNMILtotheGovernmentof

Liberia.

InadditiontothemorefamiliaruseofCIMICactivities

as sources of ‘good news stories’, CIMIC itself has been

supportive of public information through ‘key leader

engagement’ of indigenous public opinion makers and

international civilian relief and reconstruction managers.

Thisencouragesgreatersensitivitytolocalcultureandthe

useofnon-mediapubliccommunication. Incountries like

Liberia,traditionalcommunicationpracticesinruralareas

beyondthereachofmediaareoftenprimary.Inthiscontext,

forexample,awell-synchronisedCIMICinformationeffort

can also educate locals on issues such as public health,

gender-basedviolenceandotherdriversofconflictimportant

tobothcivilianandmilitarystakeholders.

AmajorUNMILCIMICchallengehashadtodowiththe

capability of the Force to implement a concept of CIMIC

thatgoesbeyondthewidelyheldbeliefthatCIMICissome

kindofpublicrelationsactivity.AswithmostAfricanpeace

support operations, a critical vulnerability has been the

relatively lowunderstandingof thismorecomprehensive

ideaofCIMICamongbothmilitaryandcivilianplayers in

themission,alongwithashortageoftrainedmilitaryCIMIC

officers–even thoughcivil-militaryoperationsareat the

coreofpeaceandstabilityoperations.

To mitigate this, UNMIL instituted a multisourced

education and training strategy to improve overall

understanding of CIMIC, build CIMIC capability and thus

enhancemissioncoordination.ThisincludesaCIMICcourse

thathastrainedForceofficersbutincludedtheGovernment

ofLiberia,NGOsandUNpolice,aswellasmembersofthe

Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the Liberian National

Police (LNP) – thus further contributing to both capacity

building and security sector reform. The introductory

CIMIC course concentrates on two important CIMIC

operations skills: assessments and project management.

Additionally, UNMIL CIMIC officers are required to build

furthersubjectmatterexpertise throughvirtualaccess to

ThearmedForcesofLiberia(aFL’s)firstBaileybridgelaunchindecember2008.Theauthorispictured(centre-left)withaFLengineers,officers,contractmentors,internationaldevelopers,MinistryofPublicWorksmenandwomen,andfemaleaFLmembers.

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theUNPeaceOperationsTraining InstituteCIMICcourse

andthefirstpartoftheUNOfficefortheCoordinationof

HumanitarianActivities(OCHA)Civil-MilitaryCoordination

(CMCoord)course.

‘TheirGamePlanisOurGamePlan’

ThefinalgoalofintegrationofUNMILCIMICwithcivilian

effortsiscoinedinacatchphrasetopromoteitstransitional

thrust:‘Theirgameplanisourgameplan.’CIMICactivitiesin

Liberiaarewithinthesamefour-pillarstructureasthePRS.

Acloser lookat therangeofactivities ineachofthefour

pillarareashelpsillustratethebreadthanddepthofCIMIC

activitiesinLiberia:

• Inthesecuritypillar,theForcehasprovidedtraining

and capacity-building assistance to the AFL to

enhancecommunity-basedapproachesandinstilan

organisationalethosofpublicserviceandsensitivity

tocivilsociety.ForceencouragementoftheAFLledto

itsfirstmilitarycivilactionprojectinDecember2008,

with the launchofaBaileybridgealongastrategic

supplyroute intosouth-eastLiberia.TheForcealso

assistedwithmanagementconsultationtotheCenter

forCivil-MilitaryRelations,acivilsocietyorganisation

attheUniversityofLiberia,co-sponsoringanumberof

eventsdesignedtopromotecivildialogueonsecurity-

related issues. It also assisted AFL/LNP outreach

andgendermainstreamingthroughtrain-the-trainer

workshops,participationinleadershipseminarsand

jointcommunitysensitisationactivities.

• In economic revitalisation, the Force has provided

vocationalskillstrainingforover8000ex-combatants

and youth on generator, vehicle and building

maintenance;carpentry;masonry;welding;tailoring

anddesigning;animalhusbandry;computers;andfirst

aidandbasicmedicalcare.UNMIL,togetherwithlocal

governmentand internationaland localNGOs,also

ranagricultural trainingmodel farmsfor thousands

moreyouthandex-combatants,aswellasinsupport

ofcommunity-basedvillagecapacitydevelopment,in

Bong,NimbaandLofacounties.

• In governance and rule of law, the Force helped

to build local physical capacity in the execution of

numerousspeciallyselectedrule-of-lawqIPs.Italso

indirectly shared informationanddatacollectedby

militaryobserverteamsonthecivilsituation–inorder

tobuildciviladministrative informationcapacity,as

wellasassistwithlocalassessments,earlywarningof

civilunrest,andmonitoringofdevelopmentprogress.

• In infrastructure and basic social services, major

projectareashaveincludedmedicaloutreachfeaturing

‘on-the-job’trainingofLiberianmedicalstaff;support

to Ministry of Public Works synchronised road

UNMIL peacekeepers teach young Liberians, in Tubmanburg, to lay bricks as part of a job training programme(May2010).

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rehabilitation projects involving multiple partners;

execution of World Bank and UNDP-funded civil

engineeringprojects formore than600kmofmajor

roadmaintenance,withsecurityandgovernanceas

well as commercial implications;and logistical and

best-practice support and sharing to NGOs, NGO

collaboration and coordination, and information-

sharing. UNMIL CIMIC also assisted in public

education, includingtherehabilitationofmore than

three dozen schools, and providing and mentoring

dozensofschoolteacherstofillcapacitygaps.

Critiques

Thiscriticaldearthinunderstandingpointstoanother

majorweakness:thefailuretograspthecomprehensiveness

and importance of the transition process itself. As the

generalelectionnears,andwithitthebeginningofUNMIL

withdrawal,keytransitiontasks,particularlyinthesecurity

sector,haveonlybeenidentifiedandagreedupon,butnot

yetput intoplace inanyserious,concertedway.Security

sectorreforminLiberiaisstillbeing‘coordinated’.Thisis

verylateinthegame,reflectingastillrelativelywidespread

failure to appreciate fully the importance of building

confidenceandnotjustcapacityintransitionmanagement–

thepsychologicalaspectofwhichisthemostcriticalandyet

requiresgreaterpatienceandriskmanagement.

Conclusion

UNMILCIMIChasbeendistinctiveinUNpeacesupport

operations. It goes beyond ‘CMCoord’ and it is more

comprehensive,withgreateremphasisonindirectsupport

to capacity development rather than just humanitarian

assistance,involvesmanagingtransitionsfrompeacekeeping

topeacebuilding, ismore collaborative, andclearly links

security with development within a human security

context.Consistentwithcomplexandinterconnectedpeace

operations environments and the UN integrated mission

approach, it establishes the role of the military as the

enablerof the civilian-ledpeaceprocess,duplicating the

civil-military relationshipdesired indemocraticsocieties,

andmarkinganunambiguouspathtothe‘endstate’ofall

peace operations: self-sustained peace and civil society.

This transitionmanagementaspect,which isat theheart

of CIMIC, should be of interest to military and civilian

peacekeepers and peacebuilders alike during the steady

stateofmissionplanningandpreparationpriortoacrisis,

andcertainlynotasdrawdownbegins.Withthechallenges,

risksandopportunities in internationalconflictmitigation

andbuildingpeacegrowingincomplexityandintensity,as

the linkagesbetweensecurityanddevelopmentcontinue

togrow,andespeciallyinthefaceofdiminishingfinancial

resources,allcontributorsmust findaway toworkmore

effectivelytotransitiontoself-sustainablepeace–orface

failure–together.

Col.ChristopherHolshekisaretiredUnitedStatesarmy Civil affairs Officer who served as UNMILChiefofCIMICfromJanuary2008toJuly2009.

Endnotes1 Lloyd,Gary,VanDyk,GieleA.J.andDeKock,Francois(2009)The

PsychologicalSelectionProfileforCivil-MilitaryCoordinationOfficersinPeaceSupportOperations:TheResultsofFieldResearchintheSudan.African Journal of Conflict Resolution,9(3),p.54.

2 ThePRS,launchedinApril2008,istheGovernmentofLiberia’sdonor-fundedpost-conflictplantoreducethedriversofconflictandbringLiberiatoabaselineofself-sustaineddevelopmentalongfourmajorpillars(I–ConsolidatingPeaceandSecurity;II–RevitalizingtheEconomy;III–StrengtheningGovernanceandtheRuleofLaw;andIV–RehabilitatingInfrastructureandDeliveringBasicServices).Acopyofthedocumentisavailableat:<http://www.emansion.gov.lr/content.php?sub=Final%20PRS&related=PRS>.

3 ForanexcellentdiscussionandcritiqueofUNMIL’sapproachtopeacekeeping-peacebuilding,seeGray-Johnson,Wilfred(2009)AssessingtheUnitedNationsApproachtoPost-conflictPeacebuildinginAfrica:TheMissioninLiberia.Conflict Trends,3,pp.11–18.

4 UNMILForceHqConceptofOperationsfortheConductofOperationsbytheUNMILForceforthePeriod1January2008–31December2008,p.3.

5 DeConing,Cedric(2010)Civil-MilitaryRelationsandUNPeacekeepingOperations.World Politics Review,19May2010,4.

6 UN-CIMIC,Civil-MilitaryCoordinationinUNIntegratedPeacekeepingMissions,Ref.2010.2,UnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations,DepartmentofFieldSupport,October2010,5.

7 UNMILForceHqCIMICForceDirectivefortheConductofCIMICbytheUNMILForcefortheDrawdownPhase,Version2,15June2009,6.

8 Momudu,Sulaiman(2008)It’sNotAboutUs…UNMIL Focus,September–November,30.

9 UnitedNations(2010)Peacebuilding Review.Newyork:UnitedNationsPeacebuildingSupportOffice,October2010,esp.pp.9–14.


SouthSudan is thenewestnation in theworld,with

independencegainedon9July2011.Thenewcountry

isnowfacedwithenormouschallengesthatneedto

beaddressedbyacomprehensivepeacebuildingprocess.The

SouthSudancontextalsopresentsanarrayofopportunities

fortheUnitedNations(UN)peacekeepingmissiontoenhance

itssupport to theSouthSudanesepeacebuildingprocess,

particularly throughengagementwithcivilsociety.Moses

John,ExecutiveDirectoroftheSudaneseOrganisationfor

NonviolenceandDevelopment(SONAD),sharedhisviews

ontheSouthSudanesepeacebuildingprocessandtherole

thattheUNMissioninSouthSudan(UNMISS)canplayin

thisregard.

Conflict Trends: How do you see the role that peacekeepers

are playing currently in South Sudan?

John:SouthSudan isnownearlyonemonthasanation

andhasverylittleexperienceoftheroleofpeacekeepersin

consolidatingpeace. Ibelieve thatUNpeacekeepershave

played a mostly positive role in peacebuilding in South

Sudan.UNpeacekeeperswereabletofollowthewithdrawal

of forces between South and North Sudan in accordance

withtheComprehensivePeaceAgreement(CPA)timelines.It

establishedmediaforpeace,suchasRadioMirayaFM,which

isawidelytrustedradiothatprovidesreliableinformationand

haswiderconnectionswiththecommunitiesintheremote

villagesofSouthSudan.Thepeacekeepersalsoprovided

logistical support in termsof flights, carsandsometimes

othermeansof transport topeacestakeholders, including

interVieW

Practitioners‘ PersPectiVes on the PeacekeePing-Peacebuilding nexus1

The relat ionship between peacekeeping and

peacebuilding has gained increasing attention by those

who want to understand post-conflict environments

and international interventions better. Opportunities

to understand the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus

are most often presented to practitioners who directly

implement mechanisms to deal with conflict and post-

conflict environments. As such, it is important to learn

how practitioners understand the peacekeeping and

peacebuildingrelationship–particularlyconcerningroles,

responsibilitiesandopportunities.Thus,theAfricanCentre

for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)

interviewed three representatives from different sectors

whoaredirectlyinvolvedwithpracticalissuesthatpertain

tothepeacekeeping-peacebuildingnexus.Theinterviewees

includearepresentativefromaSouthSudanesecivilsociety

organisation,arepresentativefromtheDemocraticRepublic

of theCongo (DRC)government,anda representativeof

international non-governmental organisations (NGOs)

workingonpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingpolicyissues.

MosesJohnExecutivedirector,SudaneseOrganisation

forNonviolenceanddevelopment

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themilitaryandmembersofthepoliticalparties,fordialogue

meetingswithinSouthSudanandbetweenSouthSudanand

NorthSudan.It’sworthnotingthatpeacekeeperswereable

todocumenthumanrightsviolationsthatoccurredinSouth

Sudan,althoughverylittlechangehappenedasaresultof

UNreports.Theyalsoprovidedsecurityandlogisticalsupport

before,duringandaftertheApril2010generalelectionand

thereferendumheldinJanuary2011.

DespitethepositiverolesplayedbypeacekeepersinSouth

Sudan, therearealsosomenegativeaspects.Thegeneral

populationperceivesthemaspassiveforces,astheycando

verylittle–especiallyduringintercommunalconflicts,where

hundredsofliveswerelostinSouthSudan.Someofthese

killingsoccurredright in frontofUNpeacekeepingforces,

yettheywereunabletodoanythingastheydidnothavethe

mandatetointervene.Somepeacekeeperswerealsoaccused

ofsexualexploitationandrelatedhumanrightsviolations.

WiththeappointmentofHildeJohnsonastheUNChief

in theRepublicofSouthSudan,wewillseepeacekeepers

playamuchgreaterrolethanbefore,fortwomainreasons.

First,themandategivenisclear:tosupportandstrengthen

thecapacityofthegovernmentofSouthSudantodevelop

andmaintainpoliticaldiversity,respectfordemocraticand

humanrightsprinciplesandtoconsolidatepeacefollowing

the CPA. Second, Johnson has earned the confidence of

thepeopleandgovernmentofSouthSudanforplayingan

activeroleduringtheCPAnegotiationsinNaivasha,Kenya,

andhasspearheadedthedonorconferencetosupportSudan

followingtheCPA.

Conflict Trends: How can peacekeepers better support longer-

term peacebuilding processes in South Sudan?

John:Iwanttostressoneaspectonly:workinpartnership

with the local peace actors! This includes youth groups,

women’s groups, traditional leaders or chiefs, religious

bodies, political parties and the local government.

Peacekeepersshouldallowthelocalpopulationtoownthe

workifitistobesustained.Otherwise,theworkhaltsbythe

timethepeacekeepers’mandateends.Peacekeepersmust

bereadytolearnthelocalconflictdynamicsfromthelocal

people,notjustfrominformationtheyreadontheInternet.

MostinformationontheInternetabouttheconflictinSouth

SudaniswrittenbypeopleintheSudanesediaspora–and

on theground.Strengthening thecapacityof localactors

isalong-terminvestmentforpeace.Also,respectforlocal

resources,culturesandtraditionsisimportant.

Conflict Trends: How can local capacities be more involved in

the peacebuilding tasks that the UN mission is implementing?

John: There should be clear policy in terms of the work

thatthelocalandinternationalorganisationsshouldfollow,

includingtheUN.TheUNpeacebuildingtasksshouldsearch

forappropriatepartnerstoworkwith, includingministries

thatarefocusedonpeaceanddefenceissues.Thereshould

beaconsortiumof localandinternationalNGOsinvolved.

Internationalorganisationsshould implementactivities in

partnershipwithlocalorganisations.

Conflict Trends: In the eventual drawdown of the mission,

what are the main priority areas that need to be addressed by

the mission?

John: Ensure sustainability of the work of the mission

throughempoweredlocalactors.Withdrawalshouldbedone

inphases,not justwhen themission’smandatecomes to

anend.

The DRC case provides a real example of a very

complexpeacebuildingprocessinAfrica.Célestin

CibalonzaByaterana,Directorof theOfficeof the

Minister of Interior and Safety in the DRC, shared his

views about the country and his perspectives on what

roletheUNstabilisationmissionintheDRCcanplayin

theCongolesepeacebuildingprocess,particularlywith

regardtotheinvolvementoflocalactors.

Confl ict Trends: How do you see the role that

peacekeepers are playing currently in the DRC?

Byaterana: IntheDRC,theBlueHelmetsoftheUnited

Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the DRC

(MONUSCO) play a peacekeeping role in maintaining

peace with their interventions to handle hostilities on

theground.Thisrole isusually toprotectciviliansand

restoresecurityintheprovinces.

Conflict Trends: How can peacekeepers better support

longer-term peacebuilding processes in the DRC?

Byaterana: The DRC government has set up a

structure called the Framework for the Stabilisation

and Reconstruction of Post-conflict zones in Eastern

Congo (STAREC), in partnership with MONUSCO.

CélestinCibalonzaByaterana

directoroftheOfficeoftheMinisterofInteriorandSafetyinthedRC

This structure has been set up to faci l i tate the

population’s reintegration by creating better living

conditionsinpost-conflictareas(buildingroads,houses,

andsoon).Through this initiativeand thesubsequent

partnership,MONUSCOcancontinuetosupportlonger-

termpeacebuildingprocessesinthecountry.

Conflict Trends: How can local capacities be more

involved in the peacebuilding tasks that the UN mission is

implementing?

Byaterana:Forlocalcapacitiestobeinvolvedinrestoring

peace, they have to be directly associated with the

peacebuildingprocess.Theymustbeinvolvedinidentifying

problemsand inproposingsolutions to theseproblems.

Civilsocietysupportsthegovernmentinthepopularisation

ofpeacebuildingprocessesandassiststhepopulationto

understand and grasp these efforts. They also support

MONUSCOinitsmandatetosecurepost-conflictregions

andassistwiththeprovisionofinformationtofacilitatethe

mission’swork.

Conflict Trends: In the eventual drawdown of the

mission, what are the main priority areas that need to be

addressed by the mission?

Byaterana:Themainpriorityareasincludestrengthening

the state’s authority, peacebuilding, improving living

conditions for the population and creating an ongoing

dialogue on issues that affect the population in all

sectors (including security, employment, the economy

andculture).


CedricdeConingResearchFellow,aCCORdandtheNorwegian

InstituteofInternationalaffairs(NUPI)

The relationship between peacekeeping and

peacebuilding is particularly important at the

level of policy development. Cedric de Coning,

Research Fellow at ACCORD and NUPI, shared his

views on the relationship between peacekeeping and

peacebuilding,particularlytheevolutionoftheseconcepts

and therelationshipand the impact theywillhave in the

developmentofmechanisms fordealingmoreefficiently

withconflictsandpost-conflictenvironments.

Conflict Trends: How do you see the role of peacekeeping

operations in supporting longer-term peacebuilding

processes?

deConing:Peacekeepingoperationsthataremandatedto

supporttheimplementationofpeaceagreementstypically

support the first threecrucial stagesofapeaceprocess,

namely the stabilisation, transition and consolidation

phases.Theyhelptoensureasecureenvironmentwithin

whichthetransitioncanunfold.Theyfacilitatethetransition

process during which new political and governance

arrangementsarenegotiatedandimplemented.Andonce

thenewpost-conflictarrangementsareinplaceandtherisk

ofrelapseisatacceptablelevels,peacekeepingoperations

drawdown,handovertheirresponsibilitiesandwithdraw.

The peace consolidation process, and various forms of

internationalsupport, continues after the withdrawal of

the peacekeeping mission. The core point is, thus, that

peacebuildingdoesnot comeafterpeacekeeping; rather,

peacekeeping is a tool that the international community

should use during the first phases of a peacebuilding

process.

Thepeacekeepingperiod typically represents, invery

genericterms,one-quartertoone-thirdofthelonger-term

peacebuildingprocess;thatis,averyroughruleofthumb

couldbethatifapeacekeepingoperationwasdeployedfor

eightyears, theoverallpeacebuildingprocess is likely to

continueforanother24to32years.

Conflict Trends: How can current peacekeeping operations

be strengthened further within a peacebuilding process?

deConing:Peacekeepingoperationscanbestrengthened

bydevelopingassessment,analysis,planning,management

and evaluation approaches, mechanisms and tools that

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56 I conflict trends56 I conflict trends conflict trends I 56

CONFLICT TRENDS

Editor-In-Chief

VasuGounden

ManagingEditor

VenashriPillay

LanguageEditor

HaleyHarvey

design&Layout

ImminsNaudé

Contributors

IngridMarieBreidlid

KristenA.Cordell

DianaFelixdaCosta

GustavodeCarvalho

DorcasEttang

JenniferM.Hazen

ChristopherHolshek

JohnKarlsrud

AndreasØienStensland

aCCORd’sPeacekeepingandPeacebuildingUnits’teamsareacknowledgedfortheirassistanceinplanningthisIssue.

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are able to cope with the complex social

change processes they are meant to

influence. This implies processes that

can monitor, adapt and co-evolve with

the highly dynamic, non-linear and

complex systems we are dealing with.

Too often, we are narrowly applying

borrowedcausaltheoriesofchange,andare

blindtotheireffects,includingthenegative

andunintendedsideeffectsthatundermine

the very goals and objectives that these

missionshavebeenmandatedtoachieve.

Conflict Trends: As external actors,

peacekeeping operations face challenges

between short- and long-term measures

in their work. In this context, two of these

challenges include: determining the

departure of the peacekeeping missions,

and the benchmarks that they need to reach

before they can depart. How do you see

these apparent contradictions and challenges

faced by peacekeeping operations?

de Coning: A peacekeeping operation

should be evaluated against the extent

to which it contributes to long-term self-

sustainable peace consolidation. Pursuing

shorter-termgoalsthatgenerateinstitutions

which merely mirror internat ional

benchmarksareperverse.Peacekeeping is

not an end in itself. Peacekeeping is only

an initial security guarantee and change

catalyst. Its role is limited to providing

externalstimulustowhathastobealocal

change process. It should only intervene,

as a last resort, to avoid a relapse into

violentconflict.Theprimaryprinciple that

shouldinformpeacekeepingdesignisthus

the recognition that, for peacebuilding to

achieveself-sustainablepeaceconsolidation,

ithastobeanindigenousprocess.

Robustsocialsystemsthatareresilient

enough to cope with major political and

socialchange,withoutrelapsingintoviolent

conflict, cannot develop in a few short

years. Societies need time to generate,

absorb,adaptandrefinenewsocialnorms,

andtointegratetheseintonewinstitutions

grounded in, and interlinked with, the

network of indigenous systems. It thus

follows that, for such transitions to be

sustainable, these change processes have

to be at a pace that can be meaningfully

absorbedbythelocalsociety.

Endnotes1 Interviewswereconductedon7–12August

2011byGustavodeCarvalhoandDorcas

EttangofACCORD.

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conflict trend issue03 2011

Documents

conflict trends2

d i ng nexusissue

howpeacekeeping operations

butmorevalidatapractical

violent conflicts

stronger support

important need forincreasing

theunmilcase bykristena