COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS

1. ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. MENDOZA GR NO. 176949 JUNE 27, 2012 (675

S 285)

Petitioner’s Arguments

- A charge or sales invoice is not an actionable document;

- thus, petitioner’s failure to deny under oath it genuineness and due execution does not constitute an

admission thereof.

- respondent was not able to prove her claim as the invoices offered as evidence were not properly

authenticated by her witnesses.

- CA erred in affirming the award if attorney’s fees as the RTC Decision failed to expressly state the basis for

the award thereof.

Respondent’s Arguments

- Respondent prays for the dismissal of the petition contending that the arguments raised by petitioner are a

mere rehash of those presented and already passed upon by the CA.

- charge invoices are actionable documents, and that these were properly identified and authenticated by

witness Tejero, who testified that upon delivery of the supplies and materials, the invoices were stamped

received by petitioner’s employee.

- award of attorney’s fees was justified as the basis for the award was clearly established during trial.

Actionable Documents; A document is actionable when an action or defense is grounded upon such written

instrument or document; These documents need not be attached to or stated in the complaint as these are

evidentiary in nature.

- in the instant case, THE CHARGE INVOICES ARE NOT ACTIONABLE DOCUMENTS PER SE AS THESE

“ONLY PROVIDE DETAILS ON THE ALLEGED TRANSACTIONS.”

- In fact, respondent’s cause of action is not based on these documents but on the contract of sale between the

parties.

Evidence; Preponderance of Evidence; In civil cases, only a preponderance of evidence or “greater weight of

evidence” is required.

- In this case, except for a bare denial, no other evidence was presented by petitioner to refute respondent’s

claim. Thus, we agree with the CA that the evidence preponderates in favor of respondent.

- In civil cases, the party with the most convincing evidence prevails.

Sales invoices are not actionable documents – an invoice is nothing more than a detailed statement of the nature,

quantity, and cost of the thing sold and has been considered not a bill of sale (Lazaro v. Brewmaster International, Inc.

628 S 574 [2010])

Basis for the award of Attorney’s fees must be stated in the decision. However, with respect to the award of

attorney’s fees to respondent, we are constrained to disallow the same as the rationale for the award was not stated

in the text of the RTC Decision but only in the dispositive portion (SCC Chemicals Corp. v. CA 405 P 514 [2001])

2. ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST VS. CA, G.R. NO. 121171 DECEMBER 29, 1998

FACTS:

By virtue of RA 1528, a MOA was drawn where RP thru the Surigao Mineral Reservation Board, granted MMIC the

exclusive right to explore, develop and exploit nickel, cobalt and other minerals in the Surigao mineral reservation.

MMIC is a domestic corporation engaged in mining with respondent Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr. as President and among

its original stockholders.

RP undertook to support the financing of MMIC by purchase of MMIC debenture bonds and extension of guarantees.

Further, the Philippine Government obtained a firm commitment from the DBP and PNB to subscribe in MMIC and

issue guarantee/s for foreign loans. On July 13, 1981, MMIC, PNB and DBP executed a Mortgage Trust Agreement

where MMIC, as mortgagor, agreed to constitute a mortgage in favor of PNB and DBP as mortgagees, over all

MMIC's assets; subject of real estate and chattel mortgage executed by the mortgagor. MMIC was having a difficult

time meeting its financial obligations. As the various loans and advances made by DBP and PNB to MMIC had

become overdue and since any restructuring program relative to the loans was no longer feasible, and in compliance

with the directive of Presidential Decree No. 385, DBP and PNB as mortgagees of MMIC assets, decided to exercise

their right to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgages in accordance with the Mortgage Trust Agreement.

Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr., together with the other stockholders of MMIC, filed a derivative suit against DBP and PNB

before the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, for Annulment of Foreclosures, Specific Performance and Damages. In the

course of the trial, private respondents and petitioner APT, as successor of the DBP and the PNB's interest in MMIC,

mutually agreed to submit the case to arbitration by entering into a "Compromise and Arbitration Agreement." This

agreement was presented for approval to the trial court. On October 14, 1992, the Makati RTC, Branch 61, issued an

order

1. Substituting PNB and DBP with the Asset Privatization Trust as party defendant.

2. Approving the Compromise and Arbitration Agreement dated October 6, 1997, attached as Annex "C" of

the Omnibus Motion.

3. Approving the Transformation of the reliefs prayed for [by] the plaintiffs in this case into pure money claims;

and

4. The Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

The Arbitration Committee rendered a majority decision in favor of MMIC ordering the defendant to pay private

respondents for damages. RTC approved and confirmed the arbitral award. Petitioner questioned the approval

and confirmation of the arbitral award on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON the lower court (Makati RTC Branch 62) had lost its jurisdiction over the case and could not validly

confirm and approve the arbitral award.

HELD: Yes, the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, had lost its jurisdiction over the case and could not validly confirm the

arbitral award.

The use of the term "dismissed" is not "a mere semantic imperfection". The dispositive portion of the Order of the trial

court dated October 14, 1992 stated in no uncertain terms: “4. The Complaint is hereby DISMISSED. “ The term

"dismiss" has a precise definition in law. "To dispose of an action, suit, or motion without trial on the issues

involved. Conclude, discontinue, terminate, quash."

xxx correct procedure was for the parties to go back to the court where the case was pending to have the award

confirmed by said court. However, Branch 62 made the fatal mistake of issuing a final order dismissing the

case. While Branch 62 should have merely suspended the case and not dismissed it, neither of the parties

questioned said dismissal. Thus, both parties as well as said court are bound by such error.

It is erroneous then to argue, as private respondents do, that petitioner APT was charged with the knowledge that the

"case was merely stayed until arbitration finished," as again, the order of Branch 62 in very clear terms stated that the

"complaint was dismissed." By its own action, Branch 62 had lost jurisdiction over the case. It could not have validly

reacquired jurisdiction over the said case on mere motion of one of the parties. The Rules of Court is specific

on how a new case may be initiated and such is not done by mere motion in a particular branch of the RTC.

Consequently, as there was no "pending action" to speak of, the petition to confirm the arbitral award should have

been filed as a new case and raffled accordingly to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court.

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Actions; Arbitration; Judgments; Dismissal of Actions; Words and Phrases; The term “dismiss” has a precise

definition in law – to dispose of an action, suit, or motion without trial on the issues involved, conclude,

discontinue, terminate, quash.

The use of the term “dismissed” is not “a mere semantic imperfection.” The dispositive portion of the Order of

the trial court dated October 14, 1992 stated in no certain terms: 4. The Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

The term “dismiss” has a precise definition in law. “To dispose of an action, suit, or motion without trial on the

issues involved. Conclude, discontinue, terminate, quash.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; A court makes a fatal mistake if it dismisses a case instead of merely suspending

it to await the outcome of arbitration proceedings. – Admittedly, the correct procedure was for the parties to go

back to the court where the court where the case was pending to have the award confirmed by said court. However,

Branch 62 made the fatal mistake of issuing a final order dismissing the case. While Branch 62 should have merely

suspended the case and not dismissed it, neither of the parties questioned said dismissal. Thus, both parties

as well as said court are bound by such error. It is erroneous then to argue, as private respondent do, that

petitioner APT was charged with the knowledge that the “case was merely stayed until arbitration finished,” as again,

the order of Branch 62 in very clear terms stated that the “complaint was dismissed.” By its own action, Branch 6 had

lost jurisdiction over the case. It could not have validly reacquired jurisdiction over the said case on mere motion of

one of the parties. The Rules of Court is specific on how a new case may be initiated and such is not done by mere

motion in a particular branch of the RTC. Consequently, as there was no “pending action” to speak of, the petition to

confirm the arbitral award should have been filed as a new case and raffled accordingly to one of the branches of the

Regional Trial Court.

3. DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES VS. PHILIPPINE SECURITY BANK G.R. NO. 176339, JANUARY 10, 2011

FACTS:

Dragon Lady Industries, Inc., owned by spouses Lim took out loans from respondent Security Bank Corporation that

totaled P92,454,776.45. Unable to pay the loans on time, the Lims assigned some of their real properties to the Bank

to secure the same including the said property in question.

The Bank offered to lease the property to the Lims through petitioner Do-All Metals Industries primarily for business

although the Lims were to use part of the property as their residence. DMI and the Bank executed a two-year lease

contract from October 1, 1998 to September 30, 2000 but the Bank retained the right to pre-terminate the lease. The

contract also provided that, should the Bank decide to sell the property, DMI shall have the right of first refusal.

However on December 3, 1999 respondent Bank gave notice to DMI that it was pre-terminating the lease on

December 31, 1999. Wanting to exercise its right of first refusal, DMI tried to negotiate with the Bank the terms of its

purchase. DMI offered to pay the Bank P8 million for the property but the latter rejected the offer, suggesting P15

million instead. DMI made a second offer of P10 million but the Bank declined the same.

Pending the negotiations, the bank posted security guards on the said establishment and herein petitioners claimed

that the guards prevented the Lims and the employees of DMI from entering the said establishment and because of

the said refusal, DMI was unable to close some of its contract and the Lims also was not able to retrieve some of the

furnitures and equipments left behind.

This prompted the petitioners to file and action against respondent bank for damages. When the Lims

eventually were allowed to enter the premises, they found out that some of the equipment were missing, hence they

filed a supplemental complaint which raised the claims for damages to 27million.

The RTC set the pre-trial in the case for December 4, 2001. On that date, however, counsel for the Bank moved to

reset the proceeding. The court denied the motion and allowed DMI and the Lims to present their evidence ex parte.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and granted damages that were prayed for by the

petitioners. On appeal, respondent bank then raised the issue that the court did not acquire jurisdiction

because herein petitioners failed to pay the proper docket fees on their supplemental complaint. On appeal,

the CA found for the bank and upon motion by the petitioners, the CA dismissed the said motion, hence, this

petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction although docket fees for the supplemental complaint was not paid?

RULING:

What the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC

acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied

by the payment of the filing fees due on the same. The plaintiffs’ non-payment of the additional filing fees due

on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.

However, as to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their supplemental complaint, their stand is that the

RTC committed no error in admitting the complaint even if they had not paid the filing fees due on it since

such fees constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award. But this after-judgment lien, which implies that

payment depends on a successful execution of the judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were

incorrectly assessed or paid or where the court has discretion to fix the amount of the award. This is not

present in the case at bar.

Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought

against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners claim that they were willing

to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same. They merely

said that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it. But a supplemental

complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its

filing. The court is not required to make any special assessments as to supplemental complaints.

Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees they owed the court.

Consequently, the trial court should have treated their Supplemental Complaint as not filed. The court granted

the petition with modification, insofar as the moral and exemplary damages and deleted the actual damages prayed

for by the petitioners.

4. HEIRS OF LAZARO GALLARDO VS. PORFERIO SOLIMAN, VIVIAN VALETE AND ANTONIO SOLIMAN (CASE

DIGEST)

FACTS:

Lazaro and Prosperidad are the registered owners of a 4.3699-hectare parcel of land in Tarlac. The land was placed

under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27 and respondent Porferio Soliman was instituted as

a qualified farmer tenant-transferee thereof. In 1995, petitioners (heirs of Lazaro) filed a Complaint for collection of

land amortizations, dispossession, ejectment, and cancellation of Deed of Transfer and Emancipation Patent against

respondent before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD).

It appears that a Kasunduan in 1985 and a notarized Deed of Transfer were executed by Lazaro and Porferio. Under

said deeds, Porferio (as sole farmer-beneficiary and in consideration for the transfer of the whole of the land in his

favor), obliged himself to pay the petitioners 999 cavans of palay in 15 equal yearly amortizations under the Direct

Payment Scheme of PD 27. An advance payment of 66 cavans and 28 kilos, representing total lease payments made

by Porferio to Lazaro since 1973, shall be deducted from the 999 cavans, leaving an annual amortization to be made

by Porferio of 62 cavans or 16 cavans per hectare per year. But Porferio paid only 121.2 cavans or 480.9 cavans

short of the total amortizations due from 1986 to 1995, into the deed.

Porferio failed/refused to attend mediation with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) and pay

amortizations on the land. (The Tarlac PARO issued Emancipation Patents not only in favor of Porferio but also to his

children who were not legally instituted farmer tenant-transferees of the land under PD 27.) In their Answer, Porferio

and his children alleged the title of the subject land was already transferred registered accordingly to their names.

They argued that the PARAD has no jurisdiction over the case and no authority to cancel such titles as the same

pertain to the regular courts. They further contended that between them and the petitioners, there is no tenancy

relationship; and that they have exceeded payments for the land.

Ruling of the PARAD

PARAD ruled that:

o it had jurisdiction over the controversy which partakes of an agrarian dispute.

o Despite the Kasunduan and the Deed of Transfer were defective for non-compliance with certain

requirements of PD 27. said deeds were "within the context of PD 27"

o Porferio still owes petitioners 597.8 cavans of palay.

o the failure of Porferio, Vivian and Antonio to pay rentals/amortizations cannot be considered as deliberate

because they "labored under the honest belief that they are now vested with absolute ownership" of the

land

o respondents to pay petitioners the remaining 478.24 cavans of palay

Ruling of the DARAB

o upheld the validity of the Emancipation Patents following the ratiocination of the PARAD that they have been

regularly issued.

o Affirmed PARAD’s finding that respondents’ failure to pay the rentals/amortizations was not deliberate and

willful and that respondents to pay the remaining balance

Ruling of the CA

o the issuance of the Emancipation Patents in respondents’ name was irregular, and that Porferio’s deliberate

failure and refusal to pay the annual amortizations since 1986 despite demand should result in the

cancellation of his title.

o Resolution dismissing petitioners’ Petition for Review on the ground that the verification and

certification against forum shopping was signed by only four of the six petitioners. Petitioners Mario

Lazaro P. Gallardo and Lazaro P. Gallardo, Jr. did not sign, and no special power of attorney to sign in their

favor accompanied the Petition.

o that the certification against forum shopping must be executed and signed by all of the petitioners, or else it is

insufficient.

ISSUES

1. WON CA erred in holding that the signing of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping

by only 4 of the 6 petitioners is insufficient to meet the requirements of the rule

2. WON CA erred in outrightly dismissing the petition for review on purely technical ground:

RULING:

1. Yes; It was an error for the CA to have dismissed the Petition for Review.

despite 2 of the petitioners did not sign on the verification & certification, Petitioners are all heirs of the

deceased Lazaro. As such, they undoubtedly share a common interest in the land, as well as common claims and

defenses, as against respondents

Jurisprudence:

Heirs of Domingo Hernandez:

General Rule: the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the

signature of only one of them is insufficient

but the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of

justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and

legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents

of the certification.

the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping

merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its

requirements completely disregarded.

HLC Construction and Development Corporation v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association

the signature of only one of the petitioners in the certification against forum shopping substantially

complied with rules because all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of

action or defense.

Traveño v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose

The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;

otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable

circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a

common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against

forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.41

Medado Case

verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the assurance that

the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may simply order the correction of

unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. It is deemed

substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the

complaint or petition signs the verification; and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good

faith or are true and correct

2. Yes; CA should not have dismissed the petition on purely technical ground

CA to decide the case on the merits considering the vital issues presented in the Petition. There is a need for

the CA to resolve whether the Emancipation Patents issued in the name of Vivian and Antonio were valid,

considering that by the evidence presented, they were never instituted as tenants to the land.

CA should also settle the issue as to whether Porferio may be said to have deliberately refused to honor his

obligation to pay the amortizations on the land, per the Kasunduan and Deed of Transfer, considering that on

record, written demand has been served upon him, and despite such demand, Porferio failed to pay the

amortizations.

5. JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL. VS. FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., ET AL. MARCH 5,

2012

Facts:

Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana Complex I and

other neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint for damages, in its own

behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring

subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc.

JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary

injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping and intimidating them in their use of La Paz Road.

Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it

was improperly filed as a class suit. . They claim that the excavation of La Paz Road would not necessarily give rise to a

common right or cause of action for JCHA, et al. against them since each of them has a separate and distinct purpose and each

may be affected differently than the others.

With regard to the issuance of the WPI, the defendants averred that JCHA, et al. failed to show that they had a

clear and unmistakable right to the use of La Paz Road; and further claimed that La Paz Road was a torrens

registered private road and there was neither a voluntary nor legal easement constituted over it.

Issues: A)WON the complaint states a cause of action;

B)WON the complaint was properly filed as a class suit

C)WONor not a WPI is warranted

Held:

A) The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts

committed by the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting

the plaintiff’s cause of action.

The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not

admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said

complaint.

In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of

action. First, JCHA, et al.’s averments in the complaint show a demandable right over La Paz Road. These are:

(1) their right to use the road on the basis of their allegation that they had been using the road for more than

10 years; and

(2) an easement of a right of way has been constituted over the said roads

B) The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:

1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;

2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and

3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully

protect the interests of all concerned.

In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road.

“The individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to

join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint.”

C) A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to parties

before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The requisites for its issuance are:

(1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and

(2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

For the writ to issue, the right sought to be protected must be a present right, a legal right which must be shown to be clear and

positive. This means that the persons applying for the writ must show that they have an ostensible right to the final

relief prayed for in their complaint.

In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of violation of their right to justify the issuance of

a WPI. Their right to the use of La Paz Road is disputable since they have no clear legal right therein.

Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Fil-Estate Land, Inc. March 5, 2012

(Class Suit)

Main Issue: Whether or not the filing by JCHA as a "class suit" is proper.

o Elements of Class Suit:

i. Subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;

ii. Parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to the court; and

iii. Parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully

protect the interests of all concerned.

o This case or suit is clearly one that BENEFITS ALL COMMUTERS AND MOTORISTS WHO USE THE LA PAZ

ROAD.

o The subject matter of the instant case – the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road – is initially shown to be of

common or general interest to many persons.

6. MEDISERV, INC. VS CA & LANDHEIGHTS DEVELOPMENT, INC. (CASE DIGEST)

FACTS:

Petitioner Mediserv, Inc. executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Chinabank as security for a loan. The mortgage

was constituted on a 500-square meter lot with improvements. Mediserv defaulted on its obligation with Chinabank

and so the real estate mortgage was foreclosed. At the public auction sale, private respondent Landheights Dev’t

Corp. became the highest bidder for the subject property. Landheights filed an “Application for Possession of Real

Estate Property Purchased at an Auction Sale under Act No. 3135” before the RTC and subsequently, the title of the

property was consolidated in its favor and The Register of Deeds thereafter issued a TCT. To obtain possession of

the subject property, Landheights, filed a verified complaint for ejectment against Mediserv before the MTC. The trial

court then ruled in favor of Landheights and ordered Mediserve to vacate the premises. But on Mediserve’s appeal,

RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. Landheights filed for Petition for Review with CA but was dismissed in a

Resolution, stating that the authority of Dickson Tan to sign the verification and certification on non-forum shopping as

well as the copies of the complaint and answer were not attached in the petition. When Landheights filed for an MfR

and submitted a Secretary’s Certificate (stating that the BOD affirms the authority of Mr. Dickson Tan to file the

Petition for Review), CA eventually issued another Resolution giving the former 10 days to correct and rectify the

deficiencies in the petition. While Landheights filed its Manifestation of Compliance, Mediserve likewise filed a MfR to

set aside CA’s current’s resolution (on the mfr) and to reinstate it’s former resolution (the one which dismissed

Landheights’ petition). But with the subsequent compliance of Landheights. CA eventually considered its petition.

Mediserve filed again a MfR but was dismissed and so it filed a petition for review under Rule 65.

Mediserve argued that from the beginning, CA found the petition to be defective and that there is no showing that

Landheights, through its BOD, authorized Mr. Dickson Tan to file the petition and to sign the verification and

certification against forum-shopping. Petitioner cited Rule 7, Sec. 5 of the ROC, which provides that failure to

comply with the requirements on certification against forum shopping shall not be curable by mere

amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for dismissal of the case.

ISSUE: WON CA gravely used its discretion when it allowed the respondent to correct/rectify its petition despite

deficiencies in the verification and certification on non-forum shopping and attachments.

RULING: No.

Par. 3, Sec. 3 of Rule 46 of the ROC states that:

petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true

and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. The party need not sign the verification.

A party’s representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the

pleading may sign the verification.

On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by the plaintiff or principal

party in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief or in a sworn certification annexed

thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any

claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,

no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete

statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or

claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his

aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

The requirement that a petitioner or principal party should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applies

even to corporations. A corporation, however, exercises its powers through its BOD and/or its duly

authorized officers and agents.

The Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not

jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with

which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an

assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a

matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the

pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending

circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of

justice may thereby be served.

On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission

thereof after the filing of the petition. Sec. 5, Rule 45 of RoC provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit

the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum

shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against

forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory

is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.

While the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements

must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of

forum-shopping. Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the

swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more

urgent ideal.

Unquestionably, there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to hold that Landheights has substantially complied

with the verification and certification requirements. We have held in a catena of cases with similar factual

circumstances that there is substantial compliance with the RoC when there is a belated submission or filing

of the secretary’s certificate through a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision

dismissing the petition for certiorari.

7. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP (RCA) OF SAN FERNANDO PAMPANGA (PETIONER) VS. SORIANO, JR., ET. AL

(RESPONDENTS) AND BENJAMIN GUINTO, JR. (PETITIONER) VS. RCA (RESPONDENT)

The Case

2 petitions combined: 1st Petition – Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45) filed by Roman Catholic Archbishop

(RCA) of San Fernando Pampanga, assailing CA Resolution. 2nd

Petition: Petition for Injunction (Rule 58), filed by

Benjamin Guinto, Jr. seeking to enjoin implementation of Writ of Execution issued by MCTC Macabebe-Masantol,

Pampanga.

Facts:

RCA claimed to own land alleged to be unlawfully occupied by defendants, and that it has title to said land, the OCT

having been issued in 1929. Ejectment case was filed before MCTC. Defendants countered that RCA has no

cause of action because the said title was spurious. They contended that the land belonged to the State and

they have acquired it by prescription, as they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous

possession for more than 30 years.

MCTC decided in favor of RCA. The court held that OCT in the name of the RCA remains valid and binding against

the whole world until it is declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, defendants were ordered to vacate

the premises and a Writ of Execution was issued.

Seeking to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and the notice to vacate, Guinto (one of the defendants)

filed the instant Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of TRO.

During the pendency of the ejectment case at the MCTC, some of the defendants, namely, Eduardo Soriano, Jr., et. al, filed

a case against the RCA for Quieting of Title and Declaration of Nullity of Title before the RTC of Macabebe, Pampanga.

They claimed that they are in actual possession of the land in the concept of owners and alleged that OCT in the name of

RCA is spurious and fake.

Before filing its Answer, the RCA moved to dismiss the case on grounds of noncompliance with a condition

precedent, laches, and for being a collateral attack on its title.

RTC denied the motion to dismiss finding that the plaintiffs had a cause of action and the issues can only be

determined by trial on the merits. RTC likewise denied MfR. The RCA filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with

prayer for preliminary injunction. CA dismissed petition for lack of merit. MfR denied by CA.

ISSUES WON the CA erred in not holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to

dismiss filed by the RCA.

HELD

CA ruling affirmed. Petition denied

On noncompliance of condition precedent:

CA did not find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. The appellate court was not convinced with the

RCA’s argument that plaintiffs failed to comply with the condition precedent provided in Article 477 of the Civil

Code because they allegedly did not have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property.

The CA explained that the requirement stated in Article 477 is not a condition precedent before one can file an

action for quieting of title. Rather, it is a requisite for an action to quiet title to prosper and the existence or

nonexistence of the requisite should be determined only after trial on the merits.

On laches:

The CA also agreed with the trial court in ruling that the RCA cannot raise in a motion to dismiss the ground that the

complaint is already barred by laches for it still remains to be established during trial how long the plaintiffs have slept

on their rights, if such be the case. Evidently, the CA is correct in finding that the denial by the RTC of the RCA’s

motion to dismiss is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

On misjoinder:

Next, the RCA submits that an action for quieting of title is a special civil action covered by Rule 63, while an

action for declaration of nullity of title is governed by ordinary rules. Thus, it contends that these cases

should have been dismissed for violation of the rule on joinder of actions under Section 5, Rule 2 (Rules of

Court), which requires that the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules. Such

contention, however, is utterly bereft of merit and insufficient to show that the CA erred in upholding the trial

court’s decision. Section 6 of Rule 2 explicitly provides that misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for

dismissal of an action.

On collateral attack:

The RCA likewise asserts that the case for quieting of title is a collateral attack on its title which is prohibited by

law. However, we agree with the CA in holding that the complaint against the RCA does not amount to a collateral

attack because the action for the declaration of nullity of OCT No. 17629 is a clear and direct attack on its title.

An action is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment

pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment,

or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different

relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.[32]

8. STEEL CASE INC., V. DESIGN INTERNATIONAL SELECTIONS G.R. NO. 171995

FACTS:

Petitioner Steelcase, Ibnc. (Steelcase) is a foreign corporation existing under the laws of Michigan, USA. Respondent

Design International Selections Inc. (DISI), a corporation existing under Philippine Laws and engaged in the furniture

business, including distribution. Steelcase and DISI orally entered into a dealership agreement whereby Steelcase

granted DISI the right to market, sell, distribute, install and service its products to end-user customers within the

Philippines.

Business relationship continued smoothly until terminated after 12 years due to breached with neither party admitting

any fault.

Steelcase filed a complaint for sum of money against DISI for the unpaid account of $600,000 and pay for damages.

DISI filed a counterclaim praying for issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Steelcase from

selling its products in the Philippines except to DISI, dismissal for lack of merit, and damages.

DISI alleged that the complaint has no cause of action for Steelcase lacks the capacity to sue in Philippine

courts as it was doing business in the country without license.

RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondent, thus this petition to SC.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Steelcase is doing business in the Philippines without license; and

(2) WON DISI is estopped from challenging the Steelcase’s legal capacity to sue.

RULING:

(1) Court favors the petitioner.

Steelcase is an unlicensed foreign corporation NOT doing business in the Philippines. Under RA 7042

(foreign investments act of 1991) expressly states that “doing business” excludes the appointment by a foreign

corporation of a local distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in its own name and for its

own account. Appointment of a distributor in the Philippines is not sufficient “doing business” unless it is under full

control of the foreign corporation. In the case at bench, DISI was an independent contractor, distributing various

products of Steelcase and of that of other companies, acting in its own name and account. As a result, Steelcase

cannot be considered to be doing business in the Philippines by its act of appointing a distributor as it falls under

the exemptions under RA No. 7042.

(2) Court favors petitioner.

DISI is estopped from challenging Steelcase’s capacity to sue. Entering into a dealership agreement with

Steelcase charged DISI with the knowledge that Steelcase was not licensed to engage in business activities in

the Philippines. DISI only raised the issue of the absence of a license with the Steelcase after it was informed that

it owed the latter $ 600,000 for the sale and delivery of its products under their special credit arrangement. By

acknowledging the corporate entity of Steelcase and entering into a dealership agreement with it and even

benefiting from it, DISI is estopped from questioning Steelcase’s existence and capacity to sue. A foreign

corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine courts although not authorized to do business

here against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited by said corporation. A party is

estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering

into a contact with it. The doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as

to domestic corporations.

Steelcase, Inc. v. Design International Selections, Inc. April 28, 2012

(Exception to the Rule that Unlicensed Foreign Corporations cannot Sue)

Issue: May a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, but without license, sue in the

Philippine court?

GENERAL RULE: Sec. 133, BP 68 (Corporation Code) – an unlicensed foreign corporation doing

business in the Philippines do not have the capacity to sue before the local courts.

EXCEPTION:

Said foreign corporation may still sue before Philippine courts against Filipino or a

Philippine entity that had derived some benefit from their contractual agreement because

the latter is considered to be estopped from challenging the personality of a foreign

corporation after it had acknowledged the said corporation by entering into a contract with

it.

"Commodum ex injuria sua non habere debet" – no person ought to derive any advantage of

his own wrong.

"Doctrine of Estoppel to Deny Corporate Existence" – Merril Lynch case

While it is essential to uphold the sound public policy behind the rule that denies unlicensed foreign

corporation doing business in the Philippines access to our own courts, it must never be used to frustrate

the ends of justice by becoming an all-encompassing shield to protect the unscrupulous domestic

enterprises from foreign corporation entities seeking redress in our country.

[Minor Issue] Appointment of distributor in the Philippines is not sufficient to constitute "doing business"

unless it is under the full control of the foreign corporation.

9. TIJAM VS. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)

FACTS:

Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibonghanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila

Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the

defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ

but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.

CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed mtd on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view

of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original

exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set

aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the

jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.

ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.

HELD: YES. SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen

years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time

- A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we

speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. LACHES, IN A

GENERAL SENSE IS FAILURE OR NEGLECT, FOR AN UNREASONABLE AND UNEXPLAINED LENGTH OF

TIME, TO DO THAT WHICH, BY EXERCISING DUE DILIGENCE, COULD OR SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE

EARLIER - Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse

decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable

practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it

for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

Notes:

The essential elements of laches are:

1) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or on one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation on

which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy

2) Delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the

defendants conduct and having afforded an opportunity to institute a suit

3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the

complainant, or the suit is not held barred

Kinds of estoppels:

1) Estoppel in pais

2) Estoppel by deed or by record

3) Estoppel by laches

Nature of Laches:

– Laches, in general sense is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,

to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or

omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it

either has abandoned it or declined to assert it ( doctrine of “ stale of demands”)

Basis: public policy which requires, for the peace of the society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike

statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequality or unfairness of

permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted

Judiciary Act; Jurisdiction of courts; exception to the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter may be

raised at any stage of the proceedings; Laches – The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is

conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of

the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and

the circumstances of the present case, a party may be barred by laches from invoking this plea for the first

time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active participation of

said party invoking the plea

Jurisdiction; A party cannot invoke jurisdiction and then deny it to escape a penalty- it is not right for a

party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief,

to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty. A party cannot submit his case for decision and

accepts the judgement only if favourable, and attacks it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.

Bond – made to secure payment to the plaintiff or any judgement he may recover in the action

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy April 15, 1968 (Laches in Raising Issues of Jurisdiction)

Jurisdiction of Courts; Exception to the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised

at any stage of the proceeding: "… objection [to jurisdiction] may be raised at any stage of the

proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, a party may be

barred by LACHES from invoking this plea for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling

everything done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea."

Laches: "In a general sense, it is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,

to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or

omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to

assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."

A party cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction and then deny it to escape a penalty. This court frowns from

the "undesirable practice" of submitting case for decision, and then accepting the judgment, only if

favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

10. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPIN ES VS. BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST INC. GR NO.

171905,JUNE 20, 2012

Facts:

Petitioner UCCP is a religious corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine law. Respondent BUCCI is

also a religious corporation with a separate and distinct personality and was formerly a member of UCCP.

On April 1990, during a general assembly attempted to settle a dispute, an unfavorable decision triggered a series of

events which prompted herein respondents, BUCCI, to disaffiliate from UCCP which was ratified by the by the

members of the BUCCI.

UCCP then filed before the SEC a complaint for rejection of the amended articles of incorporation of BUCCI and

prayed for the disallowance of the continued use of the corporate name BUCCI. An amended complaint was then filed

by UCCP and argued that under the constitution and bylaws of UCCP, the separate incorporation and registration of

BUCCI is not allowed and enjoined herein respondents from using the name BUCCI.

On January 2004, the SEC en banc dismissed UCCP’s petition and defended the right of BUCCI to disassociate itself

from UCCP in its recognition of the constitutional freedom to associate and disassociate. Furthermore, SEC pointed

out that petitioner used the fact of BUCCI’s disaffiliation as a ground for the complaint of unlawful detainer. Finally,

SEC found out that UCCP is not the real party in interest.

UCCP then filed an appeal with the CA and on appeal pointed out that the said disaffiliation of BUCCI is purely an

ecclesiastical and only UCCP has the sole power and authority to declare or decide whether BUCCI can disaffiliate

from UCCP. Subsequently the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the SEC, hence this petition for

review was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the said disaffiliation of herein respondents from the petitioner is purely ecclesiastical?

Ruling:

The court ruled that the issue is not purely an ecclesiastical affair. An ecclesiastical affair is one that

concerns doctrine, creed or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a

religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership and power

excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership.

In corporation law, the SEC shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations.

Even with their religious nature, the SEC may exercise jurisdiction over them in matters that are legal and

corporate.

Furthermore, basic is the rule that a party cannot be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure

affirmative relief and latter renounce or repudiate the same after it fails to obtain such relief. Finally, the

Supreme Court cannot countenance this practice of shifting to a new theory on appeal in the hope of obtaining a

favorable result.

United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. v. Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc., et.al. June 20,

2012

(No Jurisdiction over Ecclesiastical Affairs)

Main Issue: Do courts have jurisdiction over ecclesiastical affairs?

Jurisdiction: "Basic is the rule that a party cannot be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure

affirmative relief and later on renounce or repudiate the same after it fails to obtain such relief."

Appeals: "Fair play, justice and due process require that as a rule, new matters cannot be raised

for the first time before an appellate tribunal. Failure to assert issues and arguments "within a

reasonable time" warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned

or declined to assert it.

Ecclesiastical Affairs: "… one that concerns doctrine, creed or form of worship of the church, or the

adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the

government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed

unworthy of membership."

decisions that may have religious color and are therefore ecclesiastical affairs, THE COURT

MUST RESPECT AND CANNOT REVIEW.

but SEC shall have absolute jurisdiction over ALL corporations pertaining only to LEGAL

MATTERS.

11. MEROFE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN VS. CATALAN-LEE G.R. NO. 183622, FEBRUARY 8, 2012

FACTS: Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United

States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner. When Orlando died, Merofe

filed intestate case praying that she be appointed administratrix. The case was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 228.

While . Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first

marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of

Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate

was already pending.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner is not considered party in interest because she was charged

with bigamy by Felicitas as Merope married to Eusebio before she married Orlando. RTC ruled that Merope was not

married to Eusebio but since divorce is not recognized in the Philippines, the marriage between Orlando and the

petitioner was not valid. The petitioner, not being married to Orlando, therefore, is not a real party in interest.

Petitioner’s case for letters of administration was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the

rightful party to be issued the letters of administration.

HELD: Yes, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party

to be issued the letters of administration.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are

covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy

and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they

are valid according to their national law.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,

they must be alleged and proved. U.S. marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know

by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable

doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

It appears that the trial court did not require petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the

United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the

proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.

------------------------------------------------

(Same; same; same; same; same)

Remedial Law; Evidence; Divorce; Documentary Evidence; A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the

divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be

a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. –

The fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio, to wit: Respondent is

getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document

must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce

decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.

The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or

official record of a foreign country by either

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not

kept in the Philippines, such copy must be

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the

Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an

Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on

evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18,

1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact

that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was

admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by

the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a

written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52)

of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he

acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him

with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of

their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed

his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

12. OTERO V. TAN AUGUST 15, 2012

(Effect of Default; Remedies Thereof)

FACTS:

Tan filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages in the MTCC Cagayan de Oro City against Otero,

for the latter's failure to pay his obligations arising from purchased on credit petroleum products from Tan's Petron

outlet. Despite receipts of summons which was served to Otero's wife, no answer was filed. This prompted Tan to

file a motion to declare him in default. Otero opposed on the ground that he never received the summons. Hence, a

hearing on the motion was set. However, Otero failed to appear on the day of the hearing. The Court, thus, declared

him in default. Tan then allowed to present his evidence ex parte. In due time, MTCC ruled in favor of Tan, ordering

Otero to pay Tan a sum of money. The decision was affirmed by the RTC and CA. Hence this, instant petition.

Otero's contention: The statements of account presented by Tan as pieces of evidence were not

authenticated. Hence, inadmissible before the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Otero, having been declared in default by the MTCC, may, in the appellate proceedings, still

raise the failure of Tan to authenticate the statements of account which was adduced in evidence.

HELD:

YES he may raise that issue, but it would not modify the ruling of declaring him liable to Tan.

Loss of standing in court, the forfeiture of one's right as a party litigant, contestant or legal adversary, is the

consequence of an order of default. A party in default loses his right to present his defense, control the

proceedings, and examine or cross-examine witnesses. He has no right to expect that his pleadings would be

acted upon by the court nor may be object to or refute evidence or motions filed against him.

A defendant who has been declared in default is precluded from raising any other ground in his

appeal from the judgment by default, since otherwise, he would then be allowed to adduce evidence

in his defense, which right he had lost after he was declared in default. Indeed, he is proscribed in the

appellate tribunal from adducing any evidence to bolster his defense against the plaintiff's claim.

Remedies to a party who has been declared in default:

1. The defendant in default, may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion

under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud,

mistake, accident, or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defense;

2. If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the

same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial (Rule 37);

3. If defendant has discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may

file a petition for relief (Rule 38); or

4. He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or the law,

even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him.

- [Otero availed of the 4th remedy. True indeed, it was erroneous for the lower courts to rely on the statements of

account, as they were inadmissible in evidence. The statements of account presented by Tan, which are private

documents, were merely hearsay as the genuineness and due execution of the same were not established.

Nevertheless, Otero's obligation to pay was still proven by a preponderance of evidence, through the direct

testimonies of Tan's employees. Hence, judgment affirmed.]

13. KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION VS. JUDGE JANOLO

FACTS:

Private Respondent Ong filed a petition for the amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation of the entry on citizenship in his Certificate of Birth under Rule 108 and was raffled to RTC presided by herein respondent Judge Janolo. But before the hearing, petitioners filed a motion for voluntary inhibition which RTC denied. Motion for reconsideration of such denial was filed but the Judge still proceeded to hear Ong’s petition. Meanwhile, RTC declared petitioners in default. A motion to vacate said order in default was filed but was denied. Eventually, RTC granted Ong’s petition and recognized him as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Janolo erred and committed grave abuse of discretion:

1.) in not voluntarily inhibiting himself from presiding the case;

2.) declaring herein petitioners as having defaulted; and

3.) granting the petition of Ong.

[On their comment, Ong and OSG claim that petitioners availed themselves of an improper remedy and disregarded the hierarchy of courts. Furthermore, the defective verification of their petition for certiorari renders it as unsigned pleading, and the lack of service thereof on all adverse parties violates the basic rules.]

HELD:

A party declared in default may alternatively file a petition for certiorari assailing BOTH the order of default and the judgment of default. On the choice of remedy, SC finds petitioner’s recourse procedurally allowable.

But on the issue of hierarchy of courts, SC says although the rule on hierarchy of courts is not absolute and the court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly to it, a direct invocation of SC’s original jurisdiction may be allowed only where there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In this case, the petition is bereft of even a single allegation of exceptional and compelling circumstance.

On the issue of no verification, SC ruled that the petition carries a defective verification since it was verified without stating the basis thereof. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records, and a pleading required to be verified which lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. Moreover, SC observes that the affiant failed to present competent evidence of his identity before the

notary public. The court cannot assume that affiant, being a public figure, is personally known to the notary public, for the jurat does not contain a statement to that effect.

On the more substantial issue of voluntary inhibition, SC said that such issue is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test, the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. In this case, petitioners alleged that the law school ties between Judge Janolo and Ong, they having graduated from San Beda College of Law, spell partiality. SC said inhibition is not allowed in every instance that a schoolmate or classmate appears before the judge as counsel for one of the parties. In one case, SC ruled that organizational affiliation per se is not a ground for inhibition.

On the complain that Judge Janolo proceeded to hear the case and declared them in default without first resolving their pending motions for reconsideration and postponement. SC said that the trial court narrated what transpired on the hearing as confirmed by the entry of the nunc pro tunc order making on record the denial of the omnibus motion. The issuance of a nunc pro tunc (“now for then”) order is recognized where an order actually rendered by a court at a former time had not been entered of record as rendered. The purpose of which is to make a present record of an order that the court made in a previous term, but which was not then recorded. It can only be made when the thing ordered has previously been made, but, by inadvertence, has not been entered. In this case, petitioners did not seriously contest the veracity of the transcript used as basis for such order nor claim any unwarranted prejudice from the fact if its resolution during their non-appearance in the scheduled hearing.

In considering the motions, two things must be borne in mind:

1.) the reason for postponement and

2.) the merits of the case of the movant.

In this case, the requested postponement was premised on the pendency of the MR which was, however, “submitted ex parte and without further arguments from oppositors” drawing Judge Janolo to promptly resolve it by denying it. No trace of bias can be found as long as opinions formed during the proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct observed by the Judge.

On the issue of declaring petitioners in default, SC held that for a motion to lift an order of default to prosper, the following requisites must concur:

1. It must be made by motion under oath by one who has knowledge of the facts 2. It must be shown that the failure to file answer was due to FAME 3. There must be a proper showing of the existence of meritorious defense.

In this case, these were not followed. No oath, no FAME, nor meritorious defense.

No abuse of discretion, hence, petition was dismissed.

14. METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT V. MACTAN ROCK INDUSTRIES, INC. JULY 4, 2012

FACTS:

In 1997,MCWD entered into a Water Supply Contract with MRII wherein it was agreed that the latter would supply MCWD

with potable water. In 2004, MRII filed a Complaint against MCWD with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission

(CIAC). MRII sought the reformation of Clause 17 of the Contract, or the Price Escalation/De-Escalation Clause. MCWD

filed its Answer which included a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the CIAC had no jurisdiction over the

case, as the Contract was not one for construction or infrastructure. CIAC thereafter issued an order denying MCWD’s

motion to dismiss. MCWD, thus, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, questioning the jurisdiction of the

CIAC and ruled in favor of MRII. Aggrieved by the CIAC Decision, MCWD filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the

CA but was dismissed stating that issue on jurisdiction has already been resolved. MCWD did not appeal from the denial

of the motion. It, thus, became final and executory. MCWD filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence,

this petition.

ISSUE: W/N CIAC has jurisdiction over the dispute and whether such final and executory decision is binding such that

courts are generally precluded from passing judgment on the issue of jurisdiction in the present petition.

RULING: (from SCRA’s syllabus/same.same)

The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) was created in 1985 under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1008

(Creating an Arbitration Machinery for the Philippine Construction Industry), in recognition of the need to establish an

arbitral machinery that would expeditiously settle construction industry disputes. The prompt resolution of

problems arising from, or connected to, the construction industry was considered necessary and vital for the fulfillment of

national development goals, as the construction industry provided employment to a large segment of the national labor

force, and was a leading contributor to the gross national product.

The jurisdiction of the CIAC as a quasi-judicial body is confined to construction disputes, that is, those arising

from, or connected to, contracts involving “all on-site works on buildings or altering structures from land

clearance through completion including excavation, erection and assembly and installation of components and

equipment.” The CIAC has jurisdiction over all such disputes whether the dispute arises before or after the

completion of the contract.

This Court has held time and again that a final and executory judgment, no matter how erroneous, cannot be

changed, even by this Court. Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby

becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if such modification is meant to

correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is

attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.

This Court has held that the CIAC has jurisdiction over a dispute arising from a construction contract even though

only one of the parties requested for arbitration. In fact, in Philrock, Inc. v. Construction Industry Arbitration

Commission, the Court held that the CIAC retained jurisdiction even if both parties had withdrawn their consent to

arbitrate.

(Jurisdiction of Construction Industry Arbitration Commission or CIAC)

Main Issue: Whether or not CIAC has jurisdiction over the dispute arising from the "water supply contract"

between the parties.

CIAC Jurisdiction, Construction Dispute: "The jurisdiction of CIAC as a quasi-judicial body is confined to

construction disputes, that is, those arising from, or connected to, contracts involving "all on-site works on

building or altering structures from land clearance through completion including excavation, erection, and

assembly and installation of components and equipment."

whether the dispute arises BEFORE OR AFTER the completion of contracts.

even if both parties HAD WITHDRAWN their consent to arbitrate.

ADR Act: "All incidents and matters relating to construction contracts are deemed to be within the

jurisdiction of CIAC, except only those arising from employer-employee disputes."

Query: Are disputes arising from "water supply contract" construction dispute?

Answer: YES! The undertaking contemplated by the parties is one of infrastructure and works, rather than

one of supply or mere services.

RA 9284 (Government Procurement Reform Act) described "infrastructure project" as including "water

supply."

15. TUNA PROCESSING, INC. V. PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC. FEBRUARY 29, 2012

(Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award by Foreign Corporation)

Main Issue: Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, but which collects royalties from

entities in the Philippines, sue here to enforce foreign arbitral award?

Sec. 45 of RA 9285 (ADR Law) provides that the opposing party in an application for recognition and

enforcement of the arbitral award may raise only those grounds that were enumerated under Art. V of the

New York Convention.

NOT ONE OF THOSE GROUNDS TOUCHED ON THE CAPACITY TO SUE of the party seeking the recognition

and enforcement of the award.

Sec 45 erased any conflict of law question.

When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and in fact submits itself to

arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration,

conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into contract, participate in the arbitration and

cause the implementation of the result. (ESTOPPEL) – Merryl Lynch case

BP 68 (Corporation Code), which provides that only foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines

may sue in the courts of justice here is a GENERAL LAW.

RA 9285, which provides that foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may sue here (for

an isolated transaction, enforcement of arbitral award, doctrine of estoppel), is a SPECIAL LAW.

Applying Statutory Construction, as between a general and a special law, the latter shall prevail.

Hierarchy of Courts: "A strict application of the rule on hierarchy of courts may be excused when the reason

behind the rule is not present in a case where the issues are not factual but purely legal."

16. REPUBLIC V. SAGUN FEBRUARY 15, 2012 G.R. NO. 187567

(Exception to Observance of Hierarchy of Courts)

APPEALS: "A direct recourse to the Supreme Court from the decisions, final resolution and orders of the

RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved."

QUESTION OF LAW – when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,

which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-

litigants.

QUESTION OF FACT – when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

Syllabus: Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; A direct recourse to the Supreme Court from the

decisions, final resolutions and orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) may be taken where only questions

of law are raised or involved. – At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the

decisions, final resolutions and orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved.

There is a question of of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts, which

does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other

hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or

not, is a question of law.

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, seeking

the reversal of the April 3, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case

No. 17-R which granted the petition filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun entitled “In re: Judicial Declaration of Election of

Filipino Citizenship, Nora Fe Sagun v. The Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.”

Respondent is the legitimate child of a Chinese national father and a Filipino citizen mother. She was born on August 8,

1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. At the age of 33 and after

getting married, she executed a duly notarized Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine which but was not

recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.

When respondent applied for a Philippine passport, her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and

there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a

judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be

ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate.

After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered a decision granting the petition and declaring respondent a Filipino

citizen.

Contending that the lower court erred in so ruling, petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant recourse via a

petition for review on certiorari before us. Petitioner raises the following issues:

I. Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally

permissible; and

II. Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after reaching the age of majority, is

considered to have been made “within a reasonable time” as interpreted by jurisprudence.

ISSUE: WON the OSG is correct in directly filing the instant recourse via a petition for review on certiorari before the

Supreme Court.

RULING:

Yes, the OSG is correct in directly filing the instant recourse via a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to SC from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of

the RTC may be taken where only QUESTIONS OF LAW are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the

doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for an examination of the

probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the

doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact,

the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law.

In the present case, petitioner assails the propriety of the decision of the trial court declaring respondent a

Filipino citizen after finding that respondent was able to substantiate her election of Filipino citizenship.

Petitioner contends that respondent’s petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is

procedurally and jurisdictionally impermissible. Verily, petitioner has raised questions of law as the resolution of these

issues rest solely on what the law provides given the attendant circumstances.

For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial

declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial

proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. This was our ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic citing

the early case of Tan v. Republic of the Philippines, where we clearly stated:

Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an

individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable

and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of

right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and

make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. x x x

Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondent’s Filipino citizenship as

such pronouncement was not within the court’s competence.

17. RE: REQUEST OF THE HEIRS OF THE PASSENGERS OF DONA PAZ MARCH 3, 1988

(Class Suit; Exemption from Legal Fees as "Pauper Litigant")

Main Issues:

1) May the heirs of the victims of "the worst sea disaster in history" file a class suit for damages?

2) May plaintiffs be exempt from payment of docket and other legal fees as pauper litigant on the ground that the

subject matter involves that of "national importance?"

Ruling:

1. In class suit, there is only ONE SINGLE RIGHT OF ACTION pertaining to numerous persons, NOT

MULTIPLE RIGHTS belonging separately to several, distinct persons.

If there are many persons who have DISTINCT, SEPARATE RIGHTS AGAINST THE SAME

PARTY/PARTIES, BUT THOSE RIGHTS ARISE FROM THE SAME TRANSACTIONS OR SERIES OF

TRANSACTIONS AND THERE ARE COMMON QUESTIONS OF FACT OR LAW resulting therefrom, the

former may join as plaintiffs in one action against the same defendant under the "JOINDER-OF-PARTIES

RULE." (Permissive Joinder)

Plaintiffs each have a material interest only in the damages properly due to him, not in those that may be

payable to others, although their rights thereto arise from the same transactions.

2. To seek exemption, one must establish, not simply allege, his lack of means. Where there is multiplicity of such

parties, EACH must show lack as it were.

The particular circumstance or possible consequence of a suit as to so impinge upon the wider interests of

the people at large as to assume as aspect of "national interest" DOES NOT UNDER ANY EXISTING LAW

OR RULE JUSTIFY SUCH PARTIES FROM PAYING THE REQUIRED JUDICIAL FEES OR COSTS.

Sympathy or commiseration, however well-deserved, are not considerations that would justifiably argue for

bending or dispensing with the observance of the rules which prescribe how such vindication may be obtained

in the courts of law.

18. CALIMLIM V. JUDGE RAMIREZ NOVEMBER 19, 1982

(Res Judicata; Analysis of the "Sibonghanoy" doctrine)

ISSUE: May a party, who previously filed in CFI (sitting as a cadastral court) for cancellation of TCT but was subsequently

dismissed, file a civil complaint for cancellation of conveyance and sale involving the same property in the same CFI?

Res Judicata: "There is no res judicata or bar by prior judgment where a CFI, acting as a court of limited

jurisdiction as a land registration court, resolved a highly controversial matter – ownership of titled

property and cancellation of torrens title – which was beyond its judicial competence to pass upon."

One element of res judicata is that the PRIOR JUDGMENT MUST HAVE BEEN RENDERED BY A COURT

WITH PROPER JURISIDCTION. The judgment cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy if there is

lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter (in view of the court's limited jurisdiction as such).

The ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is to be considered as a mere exception rather than the general rule.

"The exceptional circumstances involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept

of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored, and instead a blanket doctrine has been upheld

that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as an exception but rather the general rule, virtually

overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by

estoppel." (Thus, Respondent Judge's reliance on Sibonghanoy was misplaced!)

"The filing of the petition or complaint in court DOES NOT RESULT IN WAIVER on lack of court's

jurisdiction, as the determination of the correct jurisdiction is not a simple matter, and court itself which

takes cognizance over a case it has no jurisdiction over should be faulted for the resultant situation."

19. SWEET LINES, INC. V. JUDGE TEVES, ET.AL. MAY 19, 1978

(Limiting Venue via Adhesion Contract is Subject to Public Policy)

Issue: Is the provision at the back of a passenger's ticket, limiting the filing of any action in one venue, valid?

There is a valid contract of transportation here, but with respect to the 14 conditions printed at the back of the

tickets, they are commonly known as "contracts of adhesion," the validity and/or enforceability of which

will have to be determined by the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and the nature of the

conditions or terms sought to be enforced.

Condition No. 14 should be held as VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE for the following reasons:

a. Under circumstances obtaining in the inter-island shipping industry, it is not just and fair to bind

passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the back of the passage ticket. It was

prepared solely at petitioner's instance without participation of respondents.

b. Condition no. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of proceedings of this nature,

since the same will prejudice the rights and interests of innumerable passengers in different parts

of the country who, under condition no. 14 will have to file suits against petitioners only in the

City of Cebu.

c. (Public policy is "that principle of law which holds that no citizen or subject can lawfully do that

which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.")

20. COSCO PHILIPPINE SHIPPING, INC. V. KEMPER INSURANCE COMPANY APRIL 23, 2012

(Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping be Signed by "Authorized Person")

Issue: May a counsel of the corporation, who was not "properly authorized" thereto, sign in behalf of the corporation a

certificate of non-forum shopping?

Certificate of non-forum shopping MUST be signed BY THE PRINCIPAL PARTY. If for any reason, the

principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf MUST have been DULY

AUTHORIZED.

PAL v. FASAP, 479 SCRA 605 (2006) – "Only individual vested with authority by a valid board resolution may

sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf of the corporation. A proof of such authority must be

presented. The petition is subject to dismissal if a certificate was unaccompanied by a proof of the signatory's

authority.

not curable by mere amendment.

dismissal WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Tamondong v. CA, 444 SCRA 509 (2004) – "If a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is not

authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any

legal effect. Hence, it is dismissible on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff."

21. KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO. , LTD. V. JUDGE LERMA AND PACIFIC GENERAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORP.

JANUARY 7, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioner KOGIES and respondent PGSMC executed a Contract whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder

Manufacturing Plant for respondent. Respondent unilaterally cancelled the contract on the ground that petitioner had

altered the quantity and lowered the quality of the machineries and equipment it delivered. Petitioner opposed informing

the latter that PGSMC could not unilaterally rescind their contract nor dismantle and transfer the machineries and

equipment on mere imagined violations by petitioner. Petitioner then filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against

respondent before the RTC. Respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim asserting that it had the full right

to dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment because it had paid for them in full as stipulated in the contract.

KOGIES filed a motion to dismiss respondent’s counterclaims arguing that when PGSMC filed the counterclaims,

it should have paid docket fees and filed a certificate of non-forum shopping, and that its failure to do so was a

fatal defect. The RTC dismissed the petitioner’s motion to dismiss respondent’s counterclaims as these

counterclaims fell within the requisites of compulsory counterclaims.

ISSUE: WON payment of docket fees and certificate of non-forum shopping were required in the respondent’s Answer

with counterclaim?

HELD: NO. The counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in

accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the

Answer with Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, “A compulsory counterclaim

or a cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained therein.” As to the

failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping, PGSMC’s Answer is not an initiatory pleading which requires a

certification against forum shopping under Sec. 524 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a

responsive pleading, hence, the courts a quo did not commit reversible error in denying KOGIES’ motion to dismiss

PGSMC’s compulsory counterclaims. At the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against

KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress,

however, that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees

are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.

Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Judge Lerma and Pacific General Steel Manufacturing Corp. January 7, 2008

(Jurisdiction of RTC in Relation to Arbitration)

Main Issues:

1. Can RTC acquire jurisdiction over dispute, despite of an arbitration clause agreed by the parties?

2. Can RTC exercise its power of judicial review over foreign arbitral award (FAA)?

3. Can RTC grant provisional relief during pendency of an arbitration proceeding?

Ruling: RA 9285 (ADR Law) is a procedural law which has a retroactive effect.

1. Sec. 24 thereof – RTC does NOT have jurisdiction over disputes that are properly the subject of

arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause, and mandates the referral to arbitration in such cases.

2. FAA is subject to judicial review. Even if FAA is mutually stipulated by the parties in the

arbitration clause to be final and binding, the same are NOT immediately enforceable or cannot be

implemented immediately – they must still be confirmed by the RTC.

When confirmed, it is not deemed judgment of a foreign court; instead, it has the same effect as a JUDGMENT OR AWARD OF QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES (like NLRC).

RTC may set aside, reject, or vacate it.

Difference between final foreign arbitral award (FFAA) and final domestic arbitral award (FDAA):

FFAA – grounds for setting aside, rejecting or vacating the award by RTC are found under Art. 34 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law.

FDAA – grounds are found under Sec. 25 of RA 876 (Arbitration Law).

3. The pendency of an arbitral proceeding does NOT foreclose resort to the courts for provisional reliefs – the RTC has authority and jurisdiction to grant interim measures of protection.

Both RA 876 and RA 9285 recognize the parties' rights to be conserved and protected through provisional reliefs.

22. MANOTOC V. CA AUGUST 16, 2006

(Substituted Service of Summons)

REQUIREMENTS OF SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS (Sec. 8, Rule 14):

1. Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service;

2. Specific Details in the Return;

3. A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion (if delivered in the residence);

4. A Competent Person in Charge (if delivered in the office or place of business).

Reasonable Time: "The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be

served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. "Reasonable time" is defined as so much time as is

necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do conveniently, what

the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if

any, to the other party."

To the plaintiff, it means no more than 7 days, since an expeditious processing of the complaint is what the party

want.

To the sheriff, it means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk to

require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service.

THUS, ONE MONTH FROM THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUMMONS can be considered "reasonable time" with

regard to personal service on the defendant.

Several Attempts: "For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by

the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a "reasonable period." "Several attempts" means AT

LEAST THREE TRIES, preferably on AT LEAST TWO DIFFERENT DATES.

The efforts made "through direct means" and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in

detail in the Return of Summons.

Suitable Age; Discretion: "If substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence, it should

be left with persons of

[1] suitable age and discretion,

[2] then residing therein.

A person of "suitable age" and discretion is one who has ATTAINED THE AGE OF FULL LEGAL CAPACITY (18

YEARS OLD) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of summons.

To be of "sufficient discretion," such person MUST KNOW HOW TO READ AND UNDERSTAND ENGLISH to

comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the

defendant at the earliest possible time to the person to take appropriate action.

Thus, a person MUST HAVE THE "RELATION OF CONFIDENCE" TO THE DEFENDANT, ensuring that the

latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons.

Presumption of Regularity of Official Functions: "For the presumption of the regularity in the performance of

official duty by a sheriff, the Sheriff's Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally

serve the summons and that said efforts failed. The doctrine is not applicable where it is patent that the Sheriff's

Return is defective."

IN SUM, invalid substituted service in the case at bar.

23. ESTEL VS. DIEGO G.R. NO. 174082; JANUARY 16, 2012

Syllabus:

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; Estoppel; One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate the lower court’s decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one’s opponent or after failing to obtain such relief.—Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate the lower court’s decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one’s opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Forcible Entry; Unlawful Detainer; Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691, as well as Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.—Since the Complaint is clearly and admittedly one for forcible entry, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is, thus, upon the MTCC of Gingoog City. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, as well as Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Hence, as the MTCC has

jurisdiction over the action, the question whether or not the suit was brought in the place where the land in dispute is located was no more than a matter of venue and the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the case, could determine whether venue was properly or improperly laid. There having been no objection on the part of petitioner and it having been shown by evidence presented by both parties that the subject lot was indeed located in Gingoog City, and that it was only through mere inadvertence or oversight that such information was omitted in the Complaint, petitioner’s objection became a pure technicality.

Same; Civil Procedure; Verification; Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.—

Same; Same; Certification of Non-Forum Shopping; The requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.—It is settled that with respect to the contents of the certification against forum shopping, the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances, as the Court finds in the instant case.

Facts:

Petitioner contends that since respondents failed to allege the location of the disputed parcel of land in their complaint, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the said complaint. Petitioner also avers that the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for failure of respondents to specifically allege facts constitutive of forcible entry. On the bases of these two grounds, petitioner argues that the MTCC should have dismissed the complaint (for Forcible Entry, Damages and Injunction with Application for Temporary Restraining Order) motu proprio. However, a review of the records shows that petitioner did not raise the issue of jurisdiction or venue in her Answer filed with the MTCC.

Held:

CA correctly held that even if the geographical location of the subject property was not alleged in the Complaint, petitioner failed to seasonably object to the same in her Affirmative Defense, and even actively participated in the proceedings before the MTCC. In fact, petitioner did not even raise this issue in her appeal filed with the RTC. Thus, she is already estopped from raising the said issue in the CA or before this Court. Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate the lower court's decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief.

The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case

for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.

As to respondents' supposed failure to allege facts constitutive of forcible entry, it is settled that in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction. First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, namely, force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.

In the present case, it is clear that respondents sufficiently alleged in their Complaint the material facts constituting forcible entry as they explicitly claimed that they had prior physical possession of the subject property since its purchase from petitioner, who voluntarily delivered the same to them. They also particularly described in their complaint how petitioner, together with her two sons and five other persons, encroached upon the subject property and dispossessed them of the same. Respondents' complaint contains the allegations that petitioner, abetting and conspiring with other persons, without respondents' knowledge and consent and through the use of force and intimidation, entered a portion of their land and, thereafter, uprooted and destroyed the fence surrounding the subject lot, as well as cut the trees and nipa palms planted thereon. Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force and this is all that is necessary. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. No other proof is necessary. In the instant case, it is, thus, irrefutable that respondents sufficiently alleged that the possession of the subject property was wrested from them through violence and force.

24. DE GUZMAN VS. TUMOLVA GR. NO 188072 , OCTOBER 19, 2011

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the February 24, 2009 Decision

1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its May 26, 2009 Resolution

2 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 104945 entitled "Antonio M.

Tumolva v. Emerita M. De Guzman.

Facts:

On September 6, 2004, petitioner Emerita M. De Guzman , represented by her attorneys-in-fact, Lourdes Rivera and Dhonna Chan, and respondent Antonio Tumolva, doing business under the name and style A.M. Tumolva Engineering Works (the Contractor), entered into a Construction Agreement for the construction of an orphanage. Incorporated in the Agreement was the plan and specifications of the perimeter fence. The Contractor, however, made deviations from the agreed plan with respect to the perimeter fence of the orphanage. On September 6, 2005, after the completion of the project, De Guzman issued a Certificate of Acceptance. For his part, the Contractor issued a quitclaim acknowledging the termination of the contract and the full compliance therewith by De Guzman.

In November 2006, during typhoon "Milenyo," a portion of the perimeter fence collapsed and other portions tilted. De Guzman, through counsel, demanded the repair of the fence in accordance with the plan. In response, the Contractor claimed that the destruction of the fence was an act of God and expressed willingness to discuss the matter to avoid unnecessary litigation. De Guzman, however, reiterated her demand for the restoration of the wall without additional cost on her part, or in the alternative, for the Contractor to make an offer of a certain amount by way of compensation for the damages she sustained. Her demand was not heeded.

On February 14, 2008, De Guzman filed a Request for Arbitration of the dispute before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). She alleged that the Contractor deliberately defrauded her in the construction of the perimeter fence. She prayed for an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, and for the inspection and technical assessment of the construction project and the rectification of any defect.

After due proceedings, the CIAC issued the Award in favor of De Guzman to pay actual, exemplary moral damages and attoryneys fees.

Aggrieved, the Contractor filed before the CA a Petition for Review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, challenging the CIAC’s award of damages in favor of De Guzman.

On February 24, 2009, the CA modified the Award rendered by CIAC.The CA held that although the Contractor deviated from the plan, CIAC’s award of actual damages was not proper inasmuch as De Guzman failed to establish its extent with reasonable certainty. The CA, however, found it appropriate to award temperate damages considering that De Guzman suffered pecuniary loss as a result of the collapse of the perimeter fence due to the Contractor’s negligence and violation of his undertakings in the Agreement. It further ruled that there was no basis for awarding moral damages reasoning out that De Guzman’s worry for the safety of the children in the orphanage was insufficient to justify the award. Likewise, it could not sustain the award of exemplary damages as there was no showing that the Contractor acted in wanton, reckless, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

De Guzman filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, De Guzman interposed the present petition before this Court anchored on the following issue.

Issue:

1. THAT THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH THE AMOUNT OF ACTUAL DAMAGES THAT PETITIONER DE GUZMAN CAN RECOVER FROM THE RESPONDENT.

2. THAT THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER DE GUZMAN IS NOT ENTITLED TO AWARDS OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

RULING:

There is no doubt that De Guzman incurred damages as a result of the collapse of the perimeter fence. The Contractor is clearly guilty of negligence and, therefore, liable for the damages caused. As correctly found by the CA.

CIAC’s award of actual damages, however, is indeed not proper under the circumstances as there is no concrete evidence to support the plea. In determining actual damages, one cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding specific facts that could afford some basis for measuring compensatory or actual damages.

12 Article 2199 of the New Civil Code

defines actual or compensatory damages as follows:

Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

Unfortunately, De Guzman failed to adduce evidence to satisfactorily prove the amount of actual damage incurred. Contrary to her assertion, the handwritten calculation of reconstruction costs made by Engineer Santos and attached to his affidavit cannot be given any probative value because he never took the witness stand to affirm the veracity of his allegations in his affidavit and be cross-examined on them. In this regard, it is well to quote the ruling of the Court in the case of Tating v. Marcella,

13 to wit:

There is no issue on the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.

Neither is there any evidence presented to substantiate Engineer Santos’ computation of the reconstruction costs. For such computation to be considered, there must be some other relevant evidence to corroborate the same.

14Thus, the CA

was correct in disregarding the affidavit of Engineer Santos for being hearsay and in not giving probative weight to it. There being no tangible document or concrete evidence to support the award of actual damages, the same cannot be sustained.

Nevertheless, De Guzman is indeed entitled to temperate damages as provided under Article 2224 of the Civil Code for the loss she suffered. When pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty, temperate damages may be recovered. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss.

15

As to the CIAC’s award of P 100,000.00 as moral damages, this Court is one with the CA that De Guzman is not entitled to such an award. The record is bereft of any proof that she actually suffered moral damages as contemplated in Article 2217 of the Code, which provides:

Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.

Certainly, the award of moral damages must be anchored on a clear showing that she actually experienced mental anguish, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights, wounded feelings, or similar injury. There could not have been a better witness to this experience than De Guzman herself.

16 Her testimony, however, did not provide specific

details of the suffering she allegedly went through after the fence collapsed while she was miles away in the United States. As the CA aptly observed, "the testimony of the OWNER as to her worry for the safety of the children in the orphanage is insufficient to establish entitlement thereto."

17 Since an award of moral damages is predicated on a

categorical showing by the claimant that she actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings, it must be disallowed absent any evidence thereon.

De Guzman cannot be awarded exemplary damages either, in the absence of any evidence showing that the Contractor acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner as provided in Article 2232 of the Civil Code. The ruling in the case of Nakpil and Sons v. Court of Appeals,

21 relied upon by De Guzman, where it

was emphasized that the wanton negligence in effecting the plans, designs, specifications, and construction of a building is equivalent to bad faith in the performance of the assigned task, finds no application in the case at bench. As already pointed out, there is negligence on the part of Contractor, but it is neither wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, nor malevolent.

The award of exemplary damages cannot be made merely on the allegation of De Guzman that the Contractor’s deviations from the plans and specifications without her written consent was deplorable and condemnable. The Court regards the deviations as excusable due to the unavailability of the approved construction materials. Besides, these were made known to De Guzman’s project manager who was present all the time during the construction. Indeed, no deliberate intent on the part of the Contractor to defraud the orphanage’s benefactors was ever shown, much less proved. As may be gleaned from his testimony:

25. TRAVEÑO V BOBONGON BANANA GROWERS, GR 164205 SEPTEMBER 03, 2009

SYLLABUS:

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Guidelines respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission

of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping—Respecting the appellate court’s dismissal of

petitioners’ appeal due to the failure of some of them to sign the therein accompanying verification and certification

against forum-shopping, the Court’s guidelines for the bench and bar in Altres v. Empleo (573 SCRA 583 [2008]), which

were culled “from jurisprudential pronouncements,” are instructive: For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court

restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the

requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:

a. A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of

defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective

certification against forum shopping.

b. As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the

pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the

attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that

the ends of justice may be served thereby.

c. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear

to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters

alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

d. As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in

verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless

there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of “substantial compliance” or presence of

“special circumstances or compelling reasons.”

e. The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a

case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable

or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common

interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the

certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

f. Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his

counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he

must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

FACTS:

As alleged by petitioner Oldarico Traveño and his 16 co-petitioners, in 1992, respondent Timog Agricultural Corporation

(TACOR) and respondent Diamond Farms, Inc. (DFI) hired them to work at a banana plantation at Bobongon, Santo

Tomas, Davao Del Norte.

Petitioners asseverated that while they worked under the direct control of supervisors assigned by TACOR and DFI, these

companies used different schemes to make it appear that petitioners were hired through independent contractors,

including individuals, unregistered associations, and cooperatives; and that under the last scheme adopted by these

companies, the nominal individual contractors were required to, as they did, join a cooperative and thus became members

of respondent Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-purpose Cooperative (the Cooperative).

Sometime in 2000, above-named respondents began utilizing harassment tactics to ease them out of their jobs. Without

first seeking the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), they changed their compensation

package from being based on a daily rate to a pakyawan rate that depended on the combined productivity of the “gangs”

they had been grouped into. Soon thereafter, they stopped paying their salaries, prompting them to stop working.

Three separate complaints for illegal dismissal were filed by petitioners, individually and collectively, with the National

Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against said respondents

DFI answered for itself and TACOR, which it claimed had been merged with it and ceased to exist as a corporation

The Labor Arbiter, found respondent Cooperative guilty of illegal dismissal. It dropped the complaints against DFI,

TACOR and Dole Asia Philippines.

On partial appeal to the NLRC, petitioners questioned the Labor Arbiter’s denial of their money claims and the dropping of

their complaints against TACOR, DFI, and Dole Asia Philippines.

NLRC sustained the Labor Arbiter’s ruling that the employer of petitioners is the Cooperative, and ordered the

Cooperative to pay them their unpaid wages, wage differentials, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay.

On appeal with CA, petitioners posit that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC disregarded evidence on record showing that

while the Cooperative was their employer on paper, the other respondents exercised control and supervision over them;

that the Cooperative was a labor-only contractor; and that the Orders of the DOLE Secretary relied upon by the Labor

Arbiter and the NLRC are not applicable to them as the same pertained to a certification election case involving different

parties and issues.

CA dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari on the ground that the accompanying verification and

certification against forum shopping was defective, it having been signed by only 19 of the 22 therein named

petitioners.

RULING:

See the syllabus above.

The court deemed it more practical to decide the substantive issue raised in this petition so as not to further delay the

disposition of this case. And it thus resolved to deviate as well from the general rule that factual questions are not

entertained in petitions for review on certiorari of the appellate court’s decisions in order to write finis to this protracted

litigation.

26. LUCAS VS LUCAS G.R. NO. 190710 JUNE 6, 2011

- Actions; pleading, practice and procedure; An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which

neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the

case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot

be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of

jurisdiction and not on errors of judgement. In number of cases, the court has granted the EXTRAORDINARY

REMEDY of CERTIORARI on the denial of the motion to dismiss but only when it has been tainted with grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the present case, no grave abuse of discretion on the part

of the trail court in denying the motion to dismiss was made.

- Jurisdiction:

o Action in personam – lodged against a person based on the personal liability. In an action in personam,

jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case.

o Action in rem – is directed against the thing itself instead of the person.

- a petition directed against the thing itself or the res which concerns the status of a

person, like a petition for adoption annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate.

-In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a

prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided the latter has jurisdiction over the res.

Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either:

i. by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of

law, or

ii. as result of the institution of the legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is

recognized and made effective.

o Action Quasi in rem – names a person as a defendant, but its object is to subject that person’s interest in a

property to a corresponding lien or obligation.

- A proceeding is adversial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to other party and afforded

the latter an opportunity to contest it. In this petition – classified as action in rem – the notice requirement for an

adversial proceeding was likewise satisfied by the publication of the petition and the giving of notice to the

Solitor General, as directed by the trial court.

- Due Process: A petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem – by the filing of the petition to

establish illegitimate filiation before the regional trial court, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Service of summons or notices made to the defendant is not for the purpose of vesting the court with the

jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.

- Pleading, Practice and Procedure; Cause of Action; Elements; A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken our without

leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.

Elements of Cause of Action:

1) legal right of the plaintiff;

2) correlative obligation of the defendant and

3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the said legal right.

27. PP OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JOVEN DE GRANO, ET AL G.R. NO. 167710

FACTS:

An information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando), and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo), who were at-large.

Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded “not guilty” to the crime as charged; while their co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large. Respondents filed a motion for bail but deferred by the trial court and allowed prosecution to present evidence. Finding that the evidence of guilt was not strong, the motion for bail was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was likewise, denied.

The prosecution filed a Petition for Certiorari but was denied. They sought recourse before the SC in G.R. No. 129604 and the RTC was ordered to immediately issue a warrant of arrest. As a result, Estanislao was re-arrested, but Joven and Armando were not.

1

After finding their respective evidence, the RTC found the accused guilty. The accused jointly moved for reconsideration which the prosecution objected by stating that, having opted to become fugitives and be beyond the judicial ambit, they lost their right to file such motion for reconsideration and to ask for whatever relief from the court.

Acting on the motion, the RTC modified its decision by acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading the conviction of Domingo and Estanislao from murder to homicide. Estanislao filed a Notice of Appeal, while the prosecution sought reconsideration of the Order. The RTC issued an Order denying the motion and giving due course to Estanislao’s notice of appeal.The petition for certiorari filed in CA by the prosecution was likewise denied.

ISSUES:

As to the technical objection:

1) W/N, OSG has the authority to sign the verification against forum shopping in behalf of the private complainant;

As to the substantive objection:

2) W/N, the prosecution was correct to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on its appeal to CA for the modification of decision by the RTC;

3) W/N, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment.

RULING:

1) YES.

As regards the issue of the signatory of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, a liberal application of the Rules should be applied to the present case.

The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective.Truly, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. Hence, it was sufficient that the private prosecutor signed the verification.

With respect to the certification of non-forum shopping, it has been held that the certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.

2However, this Court has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the

rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. Not being jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance.

Thus, petitioners need only show that there was reasonable cause for the failure to sign the certification against forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice

2) YES. Petitioner contends that its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA was the proper remedy, since the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it entertained the Joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Armando and Joven despite the fact that they had not regained their standing in court.

Petitioner’s recourse to the CA was correct.

A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

3[53] An act of a court or tribunal may be

considered as grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.

By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.

4 In which event, the

accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy — the revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice for the same offense.

3) It depends. The accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice.