113036072 political law case digests
TRANSCRIPT
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Esmeña, Kimberly Marie F.
DE LLANA vs. ALBA
Facts:
This case pertains to the question of constitutionality of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Thereof
and for Other Purposes.". That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding,
erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition
considered by this Court as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin
respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission onAudit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners sought to bolster their claim by imputing
lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation
of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and
allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the
determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed
completed.
Issue:
Whether or not the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the
security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges Under Article X,
Section 7 of the Constitution
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that there has not been shown
unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The Batasang Pambansa is
expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the
process toabolish existing ones. The termination of office of their occupants, as a
necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the
practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in the Supreme
Court. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with
an occupant whowould thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure
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does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the
effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal
and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He
ceases to be a member of the judiciary.
In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far
as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, the Supreme Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need
be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle
that the Supreme Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law isinvolved. If such were the case, certainly the Supreme Court could not have its
say prior tothe action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it
could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put
in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created bythe reorganization. That remains in the hands of the
Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the
tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achievedby this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in
the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the
power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded.
The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with
distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic
principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and
another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. There is
an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and
forms part of every act to avoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality.
Further, it is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is
precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence.
That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have
adopted that the Supreme Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task
of reconciliation. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it
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is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is
instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either
expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their own
benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the languageof ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." That is more than a moral
adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain
rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill
hisresponsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of
tenure provision to assure judicial independence.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.
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MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. PASAY TRANSPORTATION CO.
Facts:
A petition before the court requesting the members of the Supreme Courtsitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain transportation
companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the MERALCO.
MERALCO submits the petition before the court by virtue of Act No. 1446, section
11 which states: ―Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other
person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines
and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or
corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to thegrantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed
by the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators, the
decision of a majority of whom shall be final.‖
The parties to an arbitration may not oust the courts of jurisdiction of the
matters submitted to arbitration. It has been held that a clause in a contract,
providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred toarbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the
courts of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the members of the SC can sit as arbitrators and fix the
terms and compensation as is asked of them in this case
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in negative. The question in the instant petition is
not one of whether or not there has been a delegation of legislative authority to
a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of
whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.
The issue would not fall within the jurisdiction granted in the SC if it does, it
would mean that the courts would be ousted of jurisdiction and render the
award a nullity. If this is the proper construction, we would then have the
anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
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of arbitrators, taken wherefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the
Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its
members acting as arbitrators, members of the Supreme Court sitting as
arbitrators, exercising administrative or quasi judicial functions.
The members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be
considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the
performance of duties which the members of the Supreme Court could not
lawfully take it upon themselves to perform.
It is a judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by theSupreme Court. Supreme Court being the guardian of constitutional rights,
should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government. Its
power should be confined strictly within that granted by the Organic Act.
Exercise of jurisdiction by the SC cannot mean exercise of jurisdiction by the
members of the SC sitting as board of arbitrators.
The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgmentpassed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense
of the term, without it. Without such an award the judgment would be
inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It
would be merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter, and without
any operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congress should at some
future time sanctions it, and passes a law authorizing the court to carry its
opinion into effect.
This is not the judicial power confided to the SC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the Organic Act
and it would be illegal for the members of the SC to sit as arbitrators, the
decision of a majority to be final, to act on the petition of MERALCO.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.
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DAZA vs. SINGSON
Facts:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House ofRepresentatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission
on Appointments among the several political parties represented in that
chamber. On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was
reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives.
Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and
joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing
their former party to only 17 members. On the basis of this development, theHouse of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving
this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a
new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the
petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional
member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to court contending he cannot be removed from the
Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under
the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan. 5 His claim is that the reorganization
of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent
political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and
has not yet attained political stability.
Respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in
nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has
been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of
Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in
the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled
to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has a jurisdiction over the matter
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Whether or not change resulting from a political realignment validly
changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments
Ruling:On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative for it has the
competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is
not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be
reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the
legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner
from the Commission on Appointments.
Tañada vs. Cuenco defined the term political question connotes, in legal
parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In
other words, it refers "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended
inter alia that the subject of the petition was an internal matter that only the
Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this argument, holding that what was
involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the
legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the Constitution. The
petitioners were questioning the manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion
of the Senate in doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a
political question.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present
case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-member and spokesman of the
party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-behalf of its Committee
on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination ... of the party
having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate and hence, is null and
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void. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is
subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in
nature. It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department topass upon the validity of the proceeding in connection therewith.
It is, therefore, the court‘s opinion that they have not only jurisdiction but
also the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties
herein." Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in
Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise involved the manner or legality of the organization
of the Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom or discretion of the Housein the choice of its representatives.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court in the negative. As provided in
the constitution, ―there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of
twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected
by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation‖ of the
political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house ofCongress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it
may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the
Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed.
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GARCIA vs BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
Facts:
This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board ofInvestments (BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the transfer
of the site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and
the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned
corporation, located at Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output ofnaphtha. Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a new
domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as the
plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of the project was the
use of ―naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its
petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture with
PNOC. However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far EastCorporation, the major investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade Secretary
Jose Concepcion a letter dated January25, 1989 advising him of BPC's desire to
amend the original registration certification of its project by changing the job
site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced for the transfer was
the insurgency and unstable labor situation, and the presence in Batangas of a
huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by the Philippine Shell
Corporation.
Issues:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may take cognizance the instant case
Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in
approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to
Batangas
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled the first issue as a justiciable controversy
because first, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to
which the BPC agreed. That is why it organized itself into a corporation bearing
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the name Bataan. There is available 576 hectares of public land precisely
reserved as the petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan under P.D. No.1803. There
is no need to buy expensive real estate for the site unlike in the proposed
transfer to Batangas. The site is the result of careful study long before anycovetous interests intruded into the choice. The site is ideal. It is not unduly
constricted and allows for expansion. The respondents have not shown nor
reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or unstable
labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to Batangas. Certainly, these
were taken into account when the firm named itself Bataan Petrochemical
Corporation.
In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant‘s remaining in
Bataan, practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a
near-absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely choose the
site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain murky to
say the least. And this brings us to a prime consideration which the Court cannot
rightly ignore. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution provides that: Xxx "The
State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on soundagricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full
and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices."The Court,
therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in
approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and
authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG
for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to
the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the government has
been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy of
the government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own
affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.
On the second issue, the court holds and finds that the BOI committed a
grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant
from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from
naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in
the investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent
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advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. This is a
repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in
numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems best
for the national interest.
One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in part
said he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one
subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is not even a foreign government
but an ordinary investor whom the BOI allows to dictate what we shall do with
our heritage.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted.
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PACU vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
Facts:
This is a petition by the Colleges and Universities requesting that Act No.
2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be
declared unconstitutional, for they deprive owners of schools and colleges as
well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law,
they deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic
efficiency; and that their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education
unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute anunlawful delegation of legislative power.
Respondents on their answer submitted a mimeographed memorandum
contending that, the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting
unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional questions; petitioners are in
estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts; and the Acts are
constitutionally valid.
In support of their first proposition petitioners contend that the right of a
citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any
law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person
could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice
abhorent to our system of law and government. The Solicitor General on the
other hand points out that none of the petitioners has cause to present this issue,
because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by
virtue of their permits. And they do not assert that the respondent Secretary of
Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong
under the terms of law — and, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek
to obtain.
Respondent averred that it is an established principle that to entitle a
private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result
of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general to invoke the
judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must
show that he has sustained or is interest common to all members of the public.
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The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the
interests of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection
against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. Mere
apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw thepermit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.
Issue:
Whether or not by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no. 180 may be
declared unconstitutional
Ruling:The Supreme Court held in negative. In the first place, they believed that
the petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in
the form they seek to obtain and that there is no justiciable controversy
presented before the court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private
individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not
sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity
of executive and legislative action he must show that he has sustained commoninterest to all members of the public.
The power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when
the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection
against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of
actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of
statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims
under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the
constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be necessary to
determined a real and vital controversy between litigants. Thus, actions like this
are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief and the court
does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest
therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently
sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not
to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse by
officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate
the unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court
conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if
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the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the
Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official documents
was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance.
Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is hereby denied.
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TAN vs. MACAPAGAL
Facts:
On October 6, 1971 petitioners Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas andRogelio V. Fernandez, respectively, of Roxas City, Romblon and Davao City, filed
for declaratory relief as taxpayers, but purportedly suing on behalf of themselves
and the Filipino people, in assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution,
dealing with the range of the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating Constitutional
Convention was "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution
and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek torevise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government
other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution merely empowered
to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the
general plan laid down therein."
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have locus standi on the case Whether or not actual controversy is present in the instant case
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that there is no legal standing to sue obtained
by the petitioners, in the categorical and succinct language of Justice Laurel:
"The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 5 There has
been a relaxation of this rule. As to the requirement in making a taxpayers suit as
a basis for legal standing, a negative answers has been contemplated. The
person who impugns validity of a statue must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result to its enforcement.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled in accordance with the
controlling doctrine had the good sense to wait before filing his suit until after
the enactment of the statute for the submission to the electorate of certain
proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was only then that the matter was
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ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off.
The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being left
alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. The legislative and executive
branches are not bound to seek its advice as to what to do or not to do.Judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture. At such a time, it may pass on the
validity of what was done but only "when ... properly challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding.
As long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is noroom for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete
what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted.
Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is the command of the
Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine loses
force by being overruled or a new precedent being announced, it is controlling.
That is implicit in the rule of law.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
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DUMLAO vs. COMELEC
Facts:
This pertains to the Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunctionand/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others
allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa
Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional. Petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, a
former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, filed his certificate of candidacy for said
position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. He
specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution. He alleges that the aforecited provision is
directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is
based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.
His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two
however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of ataxpayer‘s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office
of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring
persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of
complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition filed contains the requisite of actual case or
controversy as a requisite for a review on certiorari
Whether or not the Batas Pambansa Blg.52 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination
of actual cases and controversies. Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality
of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as
being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution,
and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision.
Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that
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provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the
COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this
Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the
abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinionfrom this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record
Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction. Courts are
practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared
invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable
doubt. It is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications
for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are
reasonable, as in this case.
Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall
not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond
reasonable doubt. It is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe
qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided
they are reasonable, as in this case. The constitutionality of paragraph 1 section
4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is clear and unequivocal thus it does notdiscriminate and violate the equal protection rights of the petitioner.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is
disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone those charges
have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns
before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one
against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be
ineligible to run for public office.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of
only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion
of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can
stand by itself.
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Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is
hereby declared valid and that the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of
such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigationshall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void for
being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to
an accused.
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SUPLICO vs. NEDA
Facts:
An agreement made by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and HuJintao (Chinese President) held on October 2, 2007 regarding the ZTE National
Broadband Network Project. This case is a consolidation of cases filed by the
petitioner Rolex Suplico and the other petitioner questioning the act of the
Philippine Government in entering into such deal regarding the ZTE Project. The
respondents argues on the following grounds; that the court can no longer take
judicial review on the questioned act for there is no more justiciable controversy
to be resolved because the Philippine Government decided not to continuewith the ZTE National Broadband Network Project making it moot and
academic; that there is no perfected contract in this case that would prejudice
the government or public interest, stressing that it remained in the negotiation
stage; and that the matters raised concern executive policy, a political question
which the judiciary would generally pass upon.
Issue:Whether or not regardless of the its mootness the Court may take
cognizance
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that while there were occasions when the Court
passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered those petitions
moot and academic, the istant case does not fall under the exceptional cases.
It is no doubt that the petitions became moot when President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, acting in her official capacity during the meeting held on
October 2, 2007 in China, informed China‘s President Hu Jintao that the
Philippine Government had decided not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project
due to several reasons and constraints.
Under the Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, it is mandatory and the Court has
no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official acts of the President of
the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further
provided in the above-quoted rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the
foregoing facts without introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of
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cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project
during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as an
official act of the executive department, the Court must take judicial notice of
such official act without need of evidence. under Section 2, paragraph (m) ofRule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of the executive officials of
informing this Court of the government‘s decision not to continue with the ZTE-
NBN Project is also presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to
the contrary. Other than petitioner AHI‘s unsavory insinuation in its comment, the
Court finds no factual or legal basis to disregard this disputable presumption in
the present instance.
Concomitant to its fundamental task as the ultimate citadel of justice and
legitimacy is the judiciary‘s role of strengthening political stability indispensable
to progress and national development. Pontificating on issues which no longer
legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy will do more harm than
good to the nation as a whole. Wise exercise of judicial discretion militates
against resolving the academic issues, as petitioners want this Court to do. This is
especially true where, as will be further discussed, the legal issues raised cannotbe resolved without previously establishing the factual basis or antecedents.
Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of
mootness. In the absence of actual justiciable controversies or disputes, the
Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is no
more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render
any ruling or make any pronouncement.
The Court is, therefore, constrained to dismiss the petitions and deny them
due course because of mootness and because their resolution requires
reception of evidence which cannot be done in an original petition brought
before the Supreme Court.
Wherefore, the petitions are dismissed.
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NORTH COTABATO vs. REPUBLIC
Facts:
This pertains to the consolidated cases filed by the petitioners enjoiningthe respondents from signing the agreement when the MILF had a negotiation
with the government of the Philippines through a Memorandum of Agreement
on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) that was scheduled to be signed by the
Philippines in Malaysia.
The court then issued an injunction pending the signing of the MOA-AD.
While pending, the government of the Philippines ordered the Peace Panel onAncestral Domain, represented by Sec. Rodolfo Garcia and others to cancel
the Memorandum of Agreement and then further argued that case is already
moot and academic, therefore, there is no actual controversy for the court to
take cognizance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court may take cognizance of this present case,regardless of being moot and academic
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that regardless of its mootness, the Court will
take cognizance of the case for it may be capable of repetition yet evasive for
review. Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot
with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the
subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "no matter what
the Supreme Court ultimately decides, the government will not sign the MOA."
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, this Court held that the "moot and academic"
principle not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in
resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds
that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of
exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
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Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged
conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power to hear and
determine the case and does not render the case moot especially when the
plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possiblerecurrence of the violation.
The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them
into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited above in David are just as
applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David, but also in other
cases where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events
that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding.
There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount
public interest, involving a significant part of the country's territory and the wide-
ranging political modifications of affected LGU‘s. The assertion that the MOA-AD
is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional
amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case,the government and its negotiating entity.
Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al. where the Court did not
"pontificate on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or
controversy as this will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole." The
present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what
was assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand-alone government
procurement contract for a national broadband network involving a one-time
contractual relation between two parties-the government and a private foreign
corporation. As the issues therein involved specific government procurement
policies and standard principles on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico
found nothing exceptional therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar
only to the transactions and parties involved in the controversy.
In the case at bar, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of
agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD
which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the
third such component to be undertaken following the implementation of the
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Security Aspect in August 2001 and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and
Development Aspect in May 2002. Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary,
in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General, has stated that
"no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides, the government will notsign the MOA-AD, "mootness will not set in light of the terms of the Tripoli
Agreement 2001. Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another
one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli
Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar or
significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of the Executive
Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an agreement that is
both constitutional and equitable because that is the only way that long-lastingpeace can be assured," it is minded to render a decision on the merits in the
present petitions to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
the public and, most especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF
regarding Ancestral Domain.
The present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply
the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number oflandmark cases. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly
the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the
Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will
again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions
are capable of repetition, in another or any form.
Wherefore, respondents' motion to dismiss is denied. The main and
intervening petitions are given due course and is hereby granted. The
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the
Constitution.
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IBP vs. ZAMORA
Facts:
This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer forissuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on the constitutional
grounds in the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the
deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police in
visibility patrols around the metropolis. Formulated Letter of Instruction the "LOI"
which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force
Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the
leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila through a sustained streetpatrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially
those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those
that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military
personnel.
Issue:
Whether or not the actions of the President was within the calling outpower of the president
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Martial law is not needed to be declared so
that President can call for help provided it is to suppress lawless violence. When
the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke
such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof.
However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President‘s action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power
to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped
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together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of theMarines, the civilian task of law enforcement is ―militarized‖ in violation of Sec. 3,
Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a
breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police
forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority
belonging to the PNP. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the
PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The realauthority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the
PNP, and not with the military.
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LOZANO vs. NOGRALES
Facts:
This pertains to the filing of the petitioners of this case in their capacities asconcerned citizens and taxpayers prayed for the nullification of House
Resolution No. 1109 entitled ―A Resolution Calling upon the Members of
Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or
Revise the Constitution, upon a Three-Fourths Vote of All the Members of the
Congress.
Both petitions seek to trigger a justifiable controversy that would warrant adefinitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for
the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged
that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the prescribed procedures to
amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the Philippines from the
complete process of proposing amendments to the Constitution and for lack of
thorough debates and consultations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has the jurisdiction to take cognizance over the
instant case
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in negative. It is well settled that it is the duty of
the judiciary to say what the law is. The determination of the nature, scope and
extent of the powers of government is the exclusive province of the judiciary,
such that any mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation of
constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere
fulfillment of its ―solemn and sacred obligation‖ under the Constitution. This
Court‘s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and
controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The ―case-or-
controversy‖ requirement bans this court from deciding ―abstract, hypothetical
or contingent questions,‖ lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice
concerning legislative or executive action. Any attempt at abstraction could
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only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary
does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality tolegislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination
of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.
An aspect of the ―case-or-controversy‖ requirement is the requisite of―ripeness.‖ the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness is that first, the fitness
of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties
entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of
ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
In the case at bar , the fitness of petitioners‘ case for the exercise of
judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently
proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. Moreover,
House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall
convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions
to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of
procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet
been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has
yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential
example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a
positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional
requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
mandates courts of justice to settle only "actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable."
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While the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of
locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of ―personal injury‖ to the
broader ―transcendental importance‖ doctrine, such liberality is not to be
abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to filepetitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.
In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is not
available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to
remedy a particular, concrete injury. When warranted by the presence of
indispensible minimums for judicial review, this Court shall not shun the duty to
resolve the constitutional challenge that may confront it.
Wherefore, petitions are dismissed.
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KILOSBAYAN vs. GUINGONA
Facts:
Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated is a non-stock domestic corporationcomposed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who
are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. The
petitioner filed this case against the respondent seeking to prohibit or restrain
the implementation of the ―Contract of Lease‖ executed by the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on-line lottery system, also known as
―lotto.‖ The respondent, however allege that the petitioners have no standing tomaintain the instant suit, citing the court‘s resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office.
The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office has decided to establish an on-
line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying
its sources of funds. Thus, PCSO conducted bidding for a possible ―partner‖ or
lessee on the said venture of PCSO. The Philippine Gaming ManagementCorporation (PGMC), owned by a Malaysian group of companies. After learning
that the PCSO was interested in operating on an online lottery system, the
Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc.
became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the
citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to
reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75%
foreign stockholdings to local investors. An open letter was sent to President
Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical
and moral concerns, however the project pushed through.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners has legal standing to file this case
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the preliminary issue on the locus standi of
the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A party's standing
before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the
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landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality
because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, and
technicalities of procedure." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Courthad declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be
entertained," or that it "enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not."
It would not further clarification of this complicated specialty of federal
jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any event more or less
determined by the specific circumstances of individual situations, to set out the
divergent grounds in support of standing in these cases.
Other cases where they have followed a liberal policy regarding locus
standi include those attacking the validity or legality of (a) an order allowing the
importation of rice in the light of the prohibition imposed by R.A. No. 3452; (b)
P.D. Nos. 991 and 1033 insofar as they proposed amendments to the
Constitution and P.D. No. 1031 insofar as it directed the COMELEC to supervise,
control, hold, and conduct the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976; (c)the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at Roppongi, Minato-
ku, Tokyo, Japan; (d) the approval without hearing by the Board of Investments
of the amended application of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation to
transfer the site of its plant from Bataan to Batangas and the validity of such
transfer and the shift of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or
liquefied petroleum gas; (e) the decisions, orders, rulings, and resolutions of the
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Commissioner of Customs, and the Fiscal Incentives Review Board exempting
the National Power Corporation from indirect tax and duties; (f) the orders of
the Energy Regulatory Board of 5 and 6 December 1990 on the ground that the
hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not
allow the petitioner substantial cross-examination; (g) Executive Order No. 478
which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported
crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products; (h) resolutions of the
Commission on Elections concerning the apportionment, by district, of the
number of elective members of Sanggunians; and (i) memorandum orders
issued by a Mayor affecting the Chief of Police of Pasay City.
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Supreme Court decided that the instant petition to be of transcendental
importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest
and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited
cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social,economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays
of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is
expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves
recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes
aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.
Wherefore, petitions are dismissed.
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KILOSBAYAN vs. MORATO
Facts:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement(ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO.
(Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or atleast P35,000 per terminal
annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8years.
PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the
expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million.
The petitioner, Kilosbayan, which is composed of a civic-spirited citizens, pastors,priest, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice
and national renewal. It seeks to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is
substantially the same as the Contract of Lease be nullified. Petitioners
contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with the violative of PCSO‘s
charter and the decision of the Supreme Court that violated the law on public
bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution
in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A.
ISSUES:
• Whether or not petitioners have legal standing in the case at bar
• Whether or not provisions of the Constitution are self-executing
RULING:
The Court ruled that petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these
various litigants with the same holding grounds has. Petitioners asset an interest
as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement for bring
taxpayer‘s suits. The standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled
rulings on ―real properties on interest‖ because no constitutional issues were
actually involved.
An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit
cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same
parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues
of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. Therefore, the
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petitioners do not have legal standing on the case because they do not fall
under any of the categories of taxpayer‘s suits.
As to the provisions of the constitution that are invoked by the petitioners,Section 5, 12, 13 and 17 in the Article II of the Philippine Constitution, are not self-
executing where they do not confer the rights which can be enforced in the
courts but only to provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By
authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined
that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO
may be given this authority. That explains with what the court had said, ―the
morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se it isleft to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit‖. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court expounded the reason through stating that the policies and principles
invoked by the petitioners in this case do not permit of such right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology, indeed, as already stated, petitioner‘s
opposition is not really to the validity of the ELA but to lotteries which they regard
to be immoral. This is not, however, a legal issue, but a policy matter for
Congress to decide and Congress has permitted lotteries for charity.
Wherefore, the petition of as well as the motion for reconsideration is
Denied with finality.
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JOYA vs. PCGG
Facts:
Petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus withPrayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin The
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from auction sale
scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters
Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacañang and
the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central
Bank, alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his
relatives and cronies.
The petitioners averred that they have the legal standing to file this
petition because they are Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply
concerned with the preservation and protection of the country‘s artistic wealth,
they have the legal personality to restrain the respondents Executive Secretary
and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic
creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file the instant
petition
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the altruistic and noble purpose of the
petition notwithstanding, there is that basic legal question which must first be
resolved: whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this
Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case.
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity
of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless
there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the
question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case
or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must
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be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are
the first two (2) requisites.
On the first requisite, Supreme Court held that one having no right orinterest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in
an action. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is
brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by thedecree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest.
The interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a
desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law.
They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons fromdifferent parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation,
which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-
Philippine arts.
On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the
foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has
been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they
were placed on exhibit. Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of
antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and
dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an
occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by the
revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware were taken from
Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the
Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino
administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership
of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without
complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just
compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government,
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any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent
disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof
whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are
protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they arethe legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become
publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to
question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
Wherefore, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is
dismissed.
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CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY
Facts:
Respondent Public Estate Authority entered into a Joint VentureAgreement (JVA) with AMARRI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom
islands. The agreement also requires the reclamation of an additional two
hundred fifty hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to
complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-MCCRRP.
Petitioner Franklin I. Chavez filed this case as a taxpayer contending thatthe government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by respondent of the
reclaimed lands to AMARRI. The petitioner wants that PEA publicly disclose the
terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to
private corporations. And also, the petitioner further asserts that he seeks to
enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public
dominion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing on the case
RULING:
Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner has standing to bring this
taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its
constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the
right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the
application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The
thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the
sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the
Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second
issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of
the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply
with a constitutional duty to the nation.
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The petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In
Chavez v. PCGG, the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit
on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus "Besides, petitioner
emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is anissue of 'transcendental importance to the public.' He asserts that ordinary
taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity
of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised
are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social,
economic and moral well being of the people.'
The mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personalinterest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in
this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have set aside the
procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public
interest.
In Tañada v. Tuvera, in ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court
declared that the right they sought to be enforced 'is a public right recognizedby no less than the fundamental law of the land.' In Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, while reiterating Tañada, further declared that 'when a mandamus
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore,
part of the general 'public' which possesses the right.' Further, in Albano v. Reyes,
we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been involved
under the questioned contract for the development, management and
operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, 'public interest [was]
definitely involved considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in
the economic development of the country and the magnitude of the financial
consideration involved.' We concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure
provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding
the petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to
information and access to official records, documents and papers a right
guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a
former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two
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basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing,
Supreme Court ruled that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves
the enforcement of constitutional rights to information and to the equitable
diffusion of natural resources, matters of transcendental public importance, thepetitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The Public Estates Authority and Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation are permanently enjoined from
implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared
null and void ab initio.
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DAVID vs. ARROYO
Facts:
This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibitionalleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order
No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. On February 24,
2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of National Emergency
invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also
issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to
suppress and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the
same. The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 were stated as follows, Protest by theKMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for the
20th celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the
violent disposal of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf
David and Ronald Llamas.
Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of
news stories and various documents. Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran bythe police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and attempts on the
arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al. The petitioners assail that various
rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the
case at hand.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file the instant case
Ruling:
Locus standi is defined as ―a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question.‖ In private suits, standing is governed by the ―real -parties-in
interest‖ rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. It provides that ―every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.‖ Accordingly, the ―real-
party-in interest‖ is ―the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.‖ Succinctly put,
the plaintiff‘s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
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Here, the plaintiff who asserts a ―public right‖ in assailing an allegedly
illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may
be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be
suing as a ―stranger,‖ or in the category of a ―citizen,‖ or ‗taxpayer.‖ In eithercase, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection.
In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a ―citizen‖ or ―taxpayer. This Court
adopted the ―direct injury‖ test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that
the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have ―a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result.‖The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and
Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409,
Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged ―direct injury‖
resulting from ―illegal arrest‖ and ―unlawful search‖ committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not
question their legal standing. In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen
alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue ofwhether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the
alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest
of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their
Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of
their basic rights, as applied in different cases, when the issue concerns a public
right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the
execution of the laws. In G.R. No. 171483, KMU‘s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it
legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of
their members. We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of
the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies
following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners,
Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential
injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence
of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
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This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the
whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue,
this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi. In G.R. No. 171424, Loren
Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there areno allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a
former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on
the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise
aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances
prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has
pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise ofno relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the
proceedings or result of her case.
To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits
with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions
thus call for the application of the ―transcendental importance‖ doctrine, a
relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the ―PP 1017 cases.‖This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed
from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully
attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
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GONZALES vs. NARVASA
Facts:
On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filedassailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants,
advisers and assistants.
In his capacity as citizen and as taxpayer, he seeks to enjoin the
Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner also prays that theExecutive Secretary be compelled through a mandamus to furnish the petitioner
with information requesting the names of executive officials holding multiple
positions in government, copies of their appointments and a list of the recipients
of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to
Malacañang.
Issue:Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a citizen
and as taxpayer
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to
bring suit as citizen. Petitioner did not in fact show what particularized interest
they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they still fall short of the requirements
to maintain action. Their interest in assailing the EO does not present to be of a
direct and personal character. Furthermore, they do not sustain or are in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropriation
granted from Congress but only an authorization by the president. There being
exercise by Congress of its taxing and spending power, petitioner cannot be
allowed to question the PCCR‘s creation. The petitioner has failed to show that
he is a real party in interest. In the petitioner‘s request of disclosure to public
information, the Court upheld that citizens may invoke before the courts the
right to information. When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a
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public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
the petitioner is a citizen.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed with the exception that respondentExecutive Secretary is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information
requested.
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PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA
Facts:
President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretariesof their respective departments without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, while Congress is in their regular session. Subsequently after the
Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously
appointed in an acting capacity.
Senators being the petitioners, assailing the constitutionality of theappointments, assert that ―while Congress is in session, there can be no
appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office
needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having
obtained its consent. Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can
issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session.
EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the President‘s power of appointment.
Issue:
Whether or not the President can issue appointments in an acting
capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. The essence of an appointment in
an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to
fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant
to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the
President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must
necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while
Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the
President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the
President‘s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
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secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her
choice even while Congress is in session. Ad interim appointments and acting
appointments are both effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim
appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas actingappointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily
filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing
the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo‘s issuance
of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of
Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
Wherefore, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby
dismissed.
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ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing theCrime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the
valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the
effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with
the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged ―vagueness‖ of the law in the
terms it uses. Particularly, in the terms; combination, series and unwarranted.
Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the
mentioned law.
Issue:Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi in attacking the
validity of the law using the facial challenge
Ruling:
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute
vagueness. The petitioner‘s contention that it would not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued.
Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner‘s
reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited
by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is
utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction
cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute
is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude.
Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be
made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
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chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge
to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.
With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute
on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons
or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face
invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that
they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities areconstitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the
Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
Wherefore, Court holds that RA 7080, known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659 the law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking
merit.
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UMALI vs. GUINGONA
Facts:
Petitioner Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureauof Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos
received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged
violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency
as Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance
and nonfeasance. Upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former
President authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of
the petitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to thePresidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for
investigation.
Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And was
directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets, and
Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. On October 6,
1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramosissued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service, with
forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.
ISSUES:
Whether or not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's right to Security of Tenure.
Whether or not Petitioner was denied due process of law.
Ruling:
The claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. Burden of
proof was on Umali, but he failed to adduce sufficient evidence. Petitioner was
not denied the right to due processes before the PCAGC. Records show
petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged
violations of internal revenue laws and regulations and he attended the
hearings before the investigatory body.
The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in his
motion for reconsideration before the RTC of Makati. It was too late to raise the
said issue for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings.
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Charges included in AO No. 152 were based on the results of investigation
conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the
Ombudsman.
The petition is dismissable; issues posited do not constitute a valid legal
basis for overturning decision arrived at by the CA. Taking into consideration
that the charges in the Ombudsman were dismissed, BIR and Commissioner‘s
office were no longer interested in pursuing the case, and due to the position
taken by the Sol. Gen, The Court hereby GRANTS the petition. AO No. 152 is
considered LIFTED, and petitioner can be allowed to retire with full benefits.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted
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LAUREL vs. GARCIA
Facts:
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, theirrepresentatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the
3,179 square meters of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo,
Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990.
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan
acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement
entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, and is part of the indemnification to theFilipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World
War II. As intended, the subject property became the site of the Philippine
Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976. Due to
the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi
property has remained undeveloped since that time.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by formerPhilippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the
subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm where, at the end of the
lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the
Philippine government. On August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a
committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government
properties in Tokyo and Kobe.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling
non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations‘ capital goods and services
in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including
the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first ―Whereas‖ clause. Amidst
opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been
pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting
with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum
floor price at $225 million.
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Issue:
Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated
by the Philippine Government.
Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have theauthority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. As property of public dominion,
the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its
ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an
application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the socialgroup. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens;
it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of
appropriation. The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2
of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended
for some public service.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time foractual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial
property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from
public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership ―until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108
Phil. 335 [1960]).
An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public
service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code
must be definite. A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976
is not relinquishment of the Roppongi property‘s original purpose. Executive
Order No. 296, though its title declares an ―authority to sell‖, does not have a
provision in this text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured
from Japan for the government sector. It merely intends to make the properties
available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other
disposition.
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Further , President Aquino‘s approval of the recommendation by the
investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the
very least, conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the
Roppongi property. It does not have the force and effect of law since thePresident already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already
convened for more than a year. Assuming that the Roppongi property is no
longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the
respondents. There is no law authorizing its conveyance, and thus, the Court
sees no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issue raised by petitioner
Ojeda.
Wherefore, the petitions are granted.
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DANTE LIBAN vs. GORDON
Facts:
Petitioner Dante V. Liban et al, filed a petition in Court to declare RichardJ. Gordon as ―having forfeited his seat in the Senate.‖ The petitioners were
officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, while
respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) board of
Governors.
During Gordon‘s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the
Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the February 23, 2006meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors, in which the petitioners alleged that
by accepting the responsibility, Gordon deemed ceased to be a member of
the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution
Respondent contested that the petitioners‘ citation of a constitutional
provision had no basis, since PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Thus, prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution did notapply to his case. Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a volunteer service
to which is neither an office nor an employment.
Issue:
Whether or not by accepting the PNRC position, did Gordon forfeit his
Senate Seat.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that accepting the PNRC position does not
forfeit Gordon his sit in the senate. The Philippine National Red Cross is a private
organization performing public functions. It does not have government assets
and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC
is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities
obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors.
Apart from that, PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be,
autonomous, neutral and independent to be able to conduct its activities in
accord to their fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality,
independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality.
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Wherefore, Supreme Court declared that the office of the Chairman of
the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
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SERRANO de AGBAYANI vs. PNB
Facts:
A correct appreciation of the controlling doctrine as to the effect, if any,to be attached to a statute subsequently adjudged invalid, is decisive of this
appeal from a lower court decision. Plaintiff Francisco Serrano de Agbayani,
now appellee, was able to obtain a favorable judgment in her suit against
defendant, now appellant Philippine National Bank, permanently enjoining the
other defendant, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan, from proceeding with an
extra-judicial foreclosure sale of land belonging to plaintiff mortgaged to
appellant Bank to secure a loan declared no longer enforceable, theprescriptive period having lapsed.
There was thus a failure to sustain the defense raised by appellant that if
the moratorium under an Executive Order and later an Act subsequently found
unconstitutional were to be counted in the computation, then the right to
foreclose the mortgage was still subsisting.
Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00 from defendant Bank
dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage
duly registered covering property described in T.C.T. No. 11275 of the province
of Pangasinan. As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in
the amount of P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same year, defendant
instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office of defendant
Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance of the loan
remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both defendants on
August 10, 1959, her main allegation being that the mortgage sought to be
foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of
maturity, July 19, 1944. She sought and was able to obtain a writ of preliminary
injunction against defendant Provincial Sheriff. Defendant Bank in its answer
prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's own theory the defense
of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when
Executive Order No. 32 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent
legislative act extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to
be deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank took no
legal steps for the recovery of the loan.
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Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in ruling the case at bar
Ruling:The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff's suit is thus manifest. From
July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is
six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolled however, from
March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when
the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two
months and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially tothe foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before
prescription could be availed of as a defense.
Wherefore, the decision of January 27, 1960 is reversed and the suit of
plaintiff filed August 10, 1959 dismissed.
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HACIENDA LUISITA vs. PARC
Facts:
The Hacienda Luisita is a 6,443 hectare parcel of land originally owned bythe Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). In 1957, the
Spanish owners of Tabacalera decided to sell this land and its sugar mill, Central
Azucarera de Tarlac. Jose Cojuangco, Sr. took interest and requested
assistance from the Philippine government in raising the necessary funds
through: (a) the Central Bank, to obtain a dollar loan from the Manufacturer‘s
Trust Company in New York for the purchase of the sugar mill; and (b) the
Government Service Insurance System, to obtain a peso loan for the purchaseof the Hacienda.
The Central Bank used a portion of the country‘s dollar reserves as security
for Cojuangco‘s loan with the MTC on the condition that Cojuangco would
acquire Hacienda Luisita for distribution to farmers within 10 years from its
acquisition. On May 7, 1980, the Marcos government filed a case before the
Manila Regional Trial Court to compel Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita tothe Ministry of Agrarian Reform so that the land could be distributed to the
farmers. On December 2, 1985, the Manila RTC ordered Tadeco to surrender the
land to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.
When Corazon Aquino became President of the Philippines, President Aquino
issued Presidential Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, which
outlined her agrarian reform program. EO No. 229 included a provision for the
Stock Distribution Option, a mode of complying with the land reform law that
did not require actual transfer of the land to the tiller. On June 10, 1988,
President Aquino signed into law Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law. The CARL included a provision that authorized stock
distribution as a mode of compliance; the SDO allowed a corporate landowner
to give its farmers and farm workers shares of its stocks in lieu of actually
distributing the land to them.
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to
DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the
resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI‘s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing
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the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Court
however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that
there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Courtcannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP
must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the
original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries to choose whether they want
to remain as HLI stockholders or choose actual land distribution.
Issues:
Whether or not operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case. Whether or not Republic Act No. 6657 known as CARL is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled the instant case using the operative fact
doctrine. The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is
applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the
doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies todecisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the
force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they
may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on
this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and
consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution
approving the SDP of HLI.
The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine
by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs
because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they
received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to
choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or
not.
On the second issue, Supreme Court held that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is
constitutional. The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on
the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the
earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case.
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Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no
longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that
in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent graveviolation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of
constitutionality.
Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby denied.
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SALAZAR vs. ACHACOSO
Facts:
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro in a sworn statement filed with thePhilippine Overseas Employment Administration charged petitioner Hortencia
Salazar with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent
petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the
complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no
license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator
Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner.
It was stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia
being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal
recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has, No valid license or authority
from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers
for overseas employment; Committed/are committing acts prohibited under
Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.
On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty.
Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents as members of
a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. The group
assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's
Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the
petitioner.
Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized
properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order
violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights,
and the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with
unreasonable force and intimidation.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration can
validly issue warrants of search and seizure or arrest under Article 38 of the Labor
Code.
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Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in negative. Under the new Constitution, it is only
a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. In one case, it was
declared that mayors may not exercise this power. Section 38, paragraph (c), ofthe Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential
Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to
Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of
authoritarian rule in its twilight moments. We reiterate that the Secretary ofLabor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence,
the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare
Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force
and effect. The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for
deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be
made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is
the sole domain of the courts.‖Furthermore, the search and seizure order was inthe nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void,
because it must identify specifically the things to be seized.
Wherefore, the petition is granted.
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PEOPLE vs MATEO
Facts:
On October 30, 1996, one for each count of rape in ten information filed,were filed against appellant Efren Mateo. The lower court found Mateo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
Solicitor General, however, assails the factual findings of the trial court and
recommends an acquittal of the appellant.
Issue:
Whether or not the case should directly be forwarded to the SupremeCourt by virtue of the express provision in the constitution
Ruling:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review
over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same
occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the moreserious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution
The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659,
as well as procedural rules contained in Section 3 of Rule 122, Section 10 of Rule
122, Section 13 of rule 124 and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court. It must
be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in
character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favor of
the accused. In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the
Court, there has been a marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point of
guilt or innocence of herein appellant.
Some are convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to
convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor
General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma.
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Wherefore, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to
run for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of
the IBP Board of Governors is hereby dismissed.
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In re: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA
Facts:
This is a Petition filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravaneraand Tony Velez, mainly seeking the disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard
De Vera from being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th
Intergrated Bar of the Philippines Regional Governors elections. Petitioner Garcia
is the Vice-President of the Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera
and Velez are the past President and the incumbent President, respectively, of
the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern
Mindanao, have had two National Presidents each. Following the rotation rule,
whoever will be elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in the
16th Regional Governors elections will automatically become the EVP for the
term July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005. Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that
respondent De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from the Pasay,
Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa. The transfer of IBP membership to Agusandel Sur, they add that he could have been disbarred in the United States for
misappropriating his clients funds had he not surrendered his California license to
practice law.
Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned for the position of
Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention held on May
22-24, 2003, a prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws. The respondent asserts that
the Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy, contending that the
election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the
qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal
matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and
administered by the IBP.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. De Vera can still practice the profession in the
Philippines
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Ruling:
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the
petitioners to seek the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being
elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao Region.
Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the
post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In
fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members of the
House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that
respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the
nomination. We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets thebasic requirements provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred.
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De
Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final
judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of
the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered
at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the caseto the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary
proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to
prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the
administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera‘s moral fitness to run for
governor.
On the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the
delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support
for his candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate
the same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court.
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SANGUNIANG BAYAN of TAGUIG vs. ESTRELLA
Facts:
The present controversy stems from an election protest filed by thenmayoral candidate Ricardo D. Papa, Jr. against Isidro B. Garcia, the candidate
proclaimed mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila in the May 8, 1995 elections. In his
protest, Papa impugned the results of all 713 precincts in the municipality.
On February 11, 1997, respondent issued an order directing the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to examine the contested ballots in the presence of
a representative of both parties. The pertinent portion of the order provided thatso as to enable the court to get a complete overview of the matter, it was
better to have a handwriting expert examine the questioned ballots to settle
once and for all the questions and objections relative to the ballots.
Complainants claim that: respondent gave unwarranted benefits to Papa and
caused, on the other hand, undue injury to Mayor Garcia as well as to the
people of Taguig by depriving the latter of their duly elected mayor, and giving
Papa unwarranted benefits; the decision and reports were prepared, issued,and executed with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable
negligence; that respondent conspired, confederated, and confabulated with
the NBI officials concerned and Papa to make the NBI Reports and the decision
favorable to Papa; that respondent did not bother to check the figures and to
analyze the data contained in the reports, allegedly because a careful perusal
of said reports would have led to the discovery of flaws and mistakes; and that
the hasty transfer of ballot boxes from respondent's sala to that of Judge
Vivencio Baclig violated Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code which
requires the examination and appreciation of the ballots to be done by the
judge himself rather than mere reliance on the work of the Revision Committee.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Estrella acted in accordance with his duty
Ruling:
In the case at bench, the NBI necessarily examined xerox copies of 14,664
ballots from 713 precincts and without the guidance of objections from revisors,
the NBI document examiner, on his own initiative and determination, sorted out
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as written by one person 12,274 ballots in six (6) groups. This was done in a record
time of less than two (2) months, from March 31, 1997 to May 19, 1997.
To conduct this kind of examination, involving enormous number ofballots, is almost impossible to accomplish. One would have to spread the
14,664 ballots from 713 precincts beside each other, in a floor or table space
bigger than the size of a basketball court, and by going over those thousands of
ballots, pick at random groups of ballots – six groups in all – and, by examining
them, reach a conclusion that the ballots in each of these groups were written
by one person.
It is no doubt that this is simply an impossible procedure. And we are not
convinced that through this method, the NBI could correctly and with scientific
precision invalidate 12,724 ballots of the protestee.
Indubitably, the foregoing has raised the suspicion of partiality on the part
of respondent. Verily, a judge must promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary. These stringent standards are intended to assureparties of just and equitable decisions and of a judiciary that is capable of
dispensing impartial justice in every issue in every trial.
Wherefore, Judge Santiago G. Estrella is hereby found guilty of serious
misconduct, partiality, and inexcusable negligence, and is ordered to pay a fine
in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
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SOLID HOMES Inc. vs. LACERNA
Facts:
On 1 April 1977, respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe,represented by their attorney-in-fact, Proceso F. Cruz, as buyers, entered into a
Contract to sell with petitioner Solid Homes, Inc., a corporation engaged in the
development and sale of subdivision lots, as seller. The subject of the said
Contract to Sell was a parcel of land located at Lot 3, Block I, Phase II, Loyola
Grand Villas, Quezon City, with a total area of 600 square meters, more or less.
The total contract price agreed upon by the parties for the said parcel of land
was P172,260.00, to be paid in the manner stipulated.
The respondents made the down payment and several monthly
installments. When the respondents had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase
price, they demanded the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the subject property upon the final payment
of the balance. But the petitioner did not comply with the demands of the
respondents.
The respondents whereupon filed against the petitioner a Complaint for
Delivery of Title and Execution of Deed of Sale with Damages, dated 28 June
1990, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In their
Complaint, respondents alleged that as their outstanding balance was only
P5,928.18, they were already demanding the execution and delivery of the
Deed of Sale and the TCT of the subject property upon final payment of the said
amount.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Answer, together with its Answer
dated 17 September 1990, asserting that the respondents have no cause of
action against it because the respondents failed to show that they had
complied with their obligations under the Contract to Sell, since the respondents
had not yet paid in full the total purchase price of the subject property. In view
of the said non-payment, the petitioner considered the Contract to Sell
abandoned by the respondents and rescinded in accordance with the
provisions of the same contract.
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Issues:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in not reversing the
decision of the Office of the President.
Ruling:
The Petition is unmeritorious. The constitutional mandate that, ―no decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based,‖ does not preclude the validity of
―memorandum decisions,‖ which adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
This Court likewise declared that ―memorandum decisions‖ comply with
the constitutional mandate. It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative
proceedings, as in the case a bar. Said section applies only to decisions
rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled ―Judiciary,‖ and all of
its provisions have particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of
government.
Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of
executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige to meet the
requirements under Section 14, Article VIII. Given the fact that the respondents
have not yet paid in full the purchase price of the subject property so they have
yet no right to demand the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the
TCT, nevertheless, it was still within the HLURB Arbiter‘s discretion to proceed
hearing the respondents‘ complaint in pursuit of a judicious, speedy and
inexpensive determination of the parties‘ claims and defenses. Since petitioner
did not rescind the Contract to Sell it executed with the respondents by a
notarial act, the said Contract still stands. Both parties must comply with their
obligations under the said Contract. As ruled by the HLURB Board of