compilation citizenship 3.docx

8/11/2019 compilation citizenship 3.docx

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Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of RepresentativeANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

En BancDoctrine:citizenship

Date: July 30, 1991

Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent

Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar forvoting purposes. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of

Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative

district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the privaterespondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district ofNorthern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised

on the following grounds:

1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent. A

motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,

however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989. Hence, these petitionsfor certiorari.

Issue:

WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed. The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose

Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in

the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a

resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish

colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was

brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the

province of Samar.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed

Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed,

Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and,

thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.

The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.

Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and

shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.

The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in

Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in anunequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First

Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.

On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision

of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath

of Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a

certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent)

was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.

There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs

and practices of the local populace were concerned.

After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better

education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.

Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board

Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked

for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later,

however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.

In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 ConstitutionalConvention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the

Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived

citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong,

respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to beaware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since i t was precisely amending the article on

this subject.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenshipupon reaching the age of majority; and

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth

without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect

Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born

citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect

Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of

Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to

correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was

automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother

and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was

not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born


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Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural

born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect

citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came ofage is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his

mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only

nine (9) years old.

He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would

be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite

of his already having been a citizen since 1957.

In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary

procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old

In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the

participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established

his life here in the Philippines.

Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his

premature taking of the oath of citizenship.

SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondents father of his

citizenship after his death. An attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a

direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine

citizenship to respondents father as null and void would run against the principle of dueprocess because he has already been laid to rest

Djumantan vs. Domingo

Facts: Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.

On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married

petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979. OnJanuary 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, arrived in Manila as the

"guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner

and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. Whenpetitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January

13, 1979, Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.As "guests," petitioner and her two

children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the

Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.

In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. On

March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to

that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner

was issued an alien certificate of registration. Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son,

Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letterto the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell.

The CID issued an order revoking the status of permanent resident given to petitioner, theBoard found the 2nd marriage irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Phils. There

was thus no basis for giving her the status of permanent residence, since she was an

Indonesian citizen and her marriage with a Filipino Citizen was not valid. Thus this petition

for certiorari

Issue: Whether or not the courts may review deportation proceedings

Held : Yes. Section 1 of Article 8 says Judicial Power includes 1) settle actual controversies

involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable 2) determine whether or not

there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. We need not resolve the validity of

petitioner's marriage to Banez, i f under the law the CID can validly deport petitioner as an

"undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Generally, the right of the

President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest isas absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country.

However, under clause 1 of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 an "alien who enters

the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statementsor without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of

entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to deportation.

The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and

"shall not be effected ... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five

years after the cause for deportation arises". Tolling the prescriptive period from November

19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into thecountry, more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her deportation

on September 27, 1990.

ANTONIO BENGSON III,petitioner, vs.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in SanClemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. On November 5, 1985, respondent

Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the UnitedStates. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship throughrepatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He was elected as the Representative of the

Second District of Pangasinan. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was thenrunning for reelection.

Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representatives

Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a

member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required

under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto

and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. The

HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
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ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American

citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippinecitizenship.

RULING: The petition is without merit.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the

manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes

by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization,

(2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)

desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War

II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a

Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

Repatriationresults in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized

Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino

citizen. If he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, hewill be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in theArmed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine

citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the

same in the Civil Registry respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a

natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bearsstressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status

before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

MERCADO VS. MANZANO

G.R. No. 135083, May 26 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates

for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Respondent was then

declared the winning candidate; however its proclamation was suspended in view of a pending

petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private

respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted thepetition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private

respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, Section 40(d) of the Local Government

Code provides that persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any electiveposition.

Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under

Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because

he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United

States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American

citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did

not lose his Filipino citizenship. From these facts, respondent is a dual citizen - both a Filipino

and a US citizen.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manzano is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

HELD: The petition was dismissed. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The

former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two ormore states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance,

such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to

the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private

respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was bornin San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is

concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause under

Article IV of the Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of thePhilippines to posses dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the

principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their

fathers country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered

citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine

citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously

owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is

involuntary, dual allegiance is the resul t of an individuals volition.

By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected

Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of suchcertificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing

any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a

permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the

Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so

without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are

concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have

said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the

Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received

his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this

country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.


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JACOT VS DAL

FACTS:Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the Commission

on Elections(COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12

June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying him from running for the position

of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007National and Local Elections, on

the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United States(US)

citizenship. Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized

citizen of the US on 13 December1989. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine

citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and

Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles,

California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval ofpetitionersrequest, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo.

On 27 September2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. Six months after, on 26 March

2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the

Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and LocalElections were held. Petitioner garnered the highest numberof votes for the position of Vice

Mayor.On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution

disqualifying the petitioner fromrunning for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,

Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of hisUS citizenship.

ISSUE: whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007

local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.

HELD:Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not

substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign

citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225requires that natural-born citizensof the Philippines,who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of

allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine

citizenship.

By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the

Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a

situation might arise under Republic Act No.9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship

by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship. The

afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate

of Candidacywhich must be executed by any personwho wishes to run for public officein

Philippine elections. The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office,

who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal

and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized toadminister an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225compels natural-born Filipinos, who have

been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their

Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic ActNo. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines

, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciationof any and all foreign

citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their

certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections

Jacot v. Comelec

G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008

Facts:Petitioner Jacot assails Comelec Resolution affirming his disqualification from running for the

position of Vice-Mayor for failure to comply the citizenship requirement. Petitioner was a

natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized U.S citizen. Petitioner sought

to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under R.A No. 9225. Six months after, petitioner filedhis Certificate of Candidacy. Respondent Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the

COMELEC against petitioner arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as

required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 for holding such public office as

required by the Constitution and existing laws. When the local and national elections wereheld petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.

Thereafter, COMELEC finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner. Petitioner

filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was dismissed for lack of merit.

Issue:Whether or not petitioner has validly comply the citizenship requirement as required by law

for persons seeking public office.

Ruling:No. R.A 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already

naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. It specifically

provides that public office in the Philippines should meet the Constitutional requirements and

existing laws. At the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and

sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized toadminister an oath. Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under

Republic Act No. 9225 should not only take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run forelective posts in the Philippines. A candidate in Philippine elections must only have one

citizenship, that is, Philippine citizenship. This the petitioner fails to do.

A candidate who failed to comply with the election requirements applicable to dual citizens

and received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, oramount to a waiver of, the citizenship requirement. The will of the people as expressed

through the ballot cannot cure the ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the

candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictlyapplied. The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not

a matter of popularity. The appeal was DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution was AFFIRMED

and petitioner was DISQUALIFIED.

TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742

Facts: Petitioner, a natural-born Filipino citizen, became a naturalized Australian citizen

owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. In 2005, she filed an application tore-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia

pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and

Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. It was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance

to the Republic of the Philippines. In 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration ofRenunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous


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Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order certifying that she has ceased to be

an Australian citizen. Petitioner sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this

time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was

proclaimed as the winning candidate. Separate petitions for quo warranto questioning thepetitioners

eligibility were filed before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought thepetitionersdisqualification from

holding her elective post on the ground that she i s a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a

"personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer

authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. Petitioner

argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement.

Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified to hold her elective post

Held: No. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship fornatural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance

to the Republic.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restoresonesFilipino citizenship and all civil and political rightsand obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5.

Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her

Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines onDecember 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.

Before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian

citizenship in Canberra, Australia, which was not under oath, contrary to the exact mandate of

Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officerauthorized to administer oath. When the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no

occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room for application. Section 5(2) of

R.A. No. 9225 is one such instance: In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its categorical and

single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public

position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign

citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of

the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit

duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in

clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship. Failure to

renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of RepublicAct (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective

public office.

Another ruling:

The Court held that petitioner Sobejana-Condon was disqualified from running for elective

office for failure to renounce her Australian citizenship under oath contrary to the exact

mandate of Sec. 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an

officer authorized to administer oath.

The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and

sensible meaning and must thus be read literally. The foreign citizenship must be formally

rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath, the

Court held.

The Court further held that the petitioners act of running for public office does not suffice toserve as an effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While the Court has previously

declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidate is already

considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded

by the enactment of RA 9255 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition

of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. It added that the fact that

petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy since garnering the

most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the

application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of

popularity.

[Petitioner] is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a

sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any

elective office in the Philippines, held the Court.

The Court also held that it cannot read the Australian Citizen Act of 1978 under which

petitioner claim she deemed to have lost her Australian citizenship into RA 9225 as the Court

would be applying not what the legislative department has deemed wise to require. To do so

would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of thisRepublic.

Petitioner Sobejano-Condon was a natural-born Filipino citizen on August 8, 1944 but became

a naturalized Australian citizen due to her marriage to one Kevin Thomas Condon on

December 13, 1984. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine

citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Sec. 3 of RA

9225, which was approved and she took her oath of allegiance to the Republic on December 5,2005.

On September 18, 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian

Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,

Australia, which in turn issued the order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has

ceased to be an Australian citizen.

She ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in 2007 elections but lost her bid. She

ran again and won in the May 2010 elections, this time for position of Vice-Mayor, and tookher oath on May 13, 2010. However, private respondents Luis M. Bautista, et al., all

registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warrantoquestioning her

eligibility before the RTC on the issue of her dual citizenship and that she failed to execute apersonal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer

authorized to administer an oath.

The RTC on October 22, 2010 ruled that petitioners failure to comply with sec. 5(2) of RA

9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. It also nullified her proclamation as

winning candidate and declared the position of Vice-Mayor in Caba, La Union vacant.

Sobejana-Condon appealed to the COMELEC and the poll bodys Second Division dismissed

the same for failure to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. On motion for

reconsideration, the appeal was reinstated by the COMELEC en bancin its September 6, 2011

resolution. However, the COMELEC en banc,in the same resolution, concurred with the

findings and conclusions of the RTC. Thus, it dismissed petitioners instan t appeal for lack of

merit and affirmed the October 22, 2010 decision of the RTC, as well as granted the Motion

for Execution filed by private respondents.

The Court held also that the COMELEC en bancdid not commit grave abuse of discretionwhen it proceeded to decide the substantive merits of the petitioners appeal after ruling for


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reinstatement. It held that an appeal may be simultaneously reinstated and definitively

resolved by the COMELEC en banc in a resolution disposing of a motion for reconsideration

pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the Constitution and Sec. 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELECRules

of Procedure.

The Court further held that the COMELEC en banc has the power to order discretionary

execution of judgment which is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the

COMELECRules of Procedure.

Citing Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the Court also held that execution pending appeal

may be issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction.

The Court held that private respondents are not estopped from questioning petitionerseligibility to hold public office pursuant to Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Codewhich

allows the filing of quo warrantopetition within 10 days after the proclamation of the

elections results, which was what private respondents did. (GR No. 198742, Sobejana-

Condon v. COMELEC, August 10, 2012)

When the winning candidate in a local election has been disqualified with finality after

his proclamation, who succeeds him? The vice mayor/vice governor? Or the candidate

for the same position who received the next highest vote? -

A recent (April 13, 2013) SC decision in a disqualification case, penned by the Chief Justice

herself, has established a new/landmark election-law doctrine.

When a winning (ineligible) candidate in a local election (for mayor or vice governor) is

disqualified with finality after his proclamation, the candidate for the same position who

garnered the next highest vote shall be proclaimed the eligible winner.

The old doctrine was that the vice mayor or the vice governor, as the case may be, shall

succeed the disqualified winning candidate, not the candidate for the same position who had

received the next highest vote.

This ruling can benefit Mayor Alfredo Lim, who lost last month to Erap Estrada in the

mayoralty election in Manila.

Erap's disqualification case is now pending before the SC.

It seems that Mayor Lim still has a strong chance to be declared as the real (eligible) winner inthe election - that is, assuming that Erap loses in his disqualification case now pending before

the SC.

Mayor Lim has filed with the SC a motion to intervene to secure his legal interest under the

new doctrine, which is beneficial to him, being the candidate who garnered the next highest

vote in the Manila mayoralty election last May 2013. -

Excerpts:

"x x x.

With Amado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus

rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that

Amado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he

filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already

proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the

disqualification which Amado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

The affirmation of Amado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches

back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Amado is declared to be not a candidate at all

in the May 201 0 elections. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should

not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who

obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local

Government Code will not apply.

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