competition for corporate charters: transatlantic differences colin mayer saïd business school...
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Competition for Corporate Charters: Transatlantic
DifferencesColin Mayer
Saïd Business School
University of Oxford
The Issues
• Run to the top or bottom
• Impediments to competition
• Externalities
• Effective competition
• Outcomes – place of incorporation
• Share price reactions
Percentage of Listed Companies Under Majority Control
68 65.7 64.2
56.1
39.432.6
26.3
2.4 2 1.70
10
20
30
40
50
60
70 Austria
Belgium
Germany
Italy
NL
Spain
Sweden
UK
Nasdaq
NYSE
Source : country chapters in Barca and Becht (2001)
Percentage of Voting Blocks Associated With Different Types of Investors in
Germany
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Individuals and Families
Trusts & HoldingCompanies
Companies
Financial Institutions
Government
Porsche AGVoting Stock
Porsche AGNon-Voting
Porsche/PiechFamily Voting Pool
100% 10%*
Source : Hoppenstedt Guide 1999; * estimate
50:50 capital
Porsche AG
ING
Source : Form 20-F
100% capital 100% votes
ING Administratie Kantoor
Certificate Holders
100% capital 0% votes
ING Groep N.V.
Diversity of Financial Systems
• Banks versus markets
• Concentrated versus dispersed ownership
• Stakeholder versus shareholder
• Common versus civil law
• Single party versus coalition governments
Differences Particularly Pronounced in Europe
• Significance of banks and stock markets
• Size of blockholdings
• Nature of blockholdings
• Anti-takeover devices
• Legal and political systems
Causes: Investor Protection
• Financial development required for external financing
• External financing promotes growth
• Investor protection necessary condition for financial development
• Therefore, investor protection necessary condition for growth
Evidence from UK
• There was financial development without investor protection
• There was external financing without investor protection
• There wasn’t any more with it• Therefore investor protection was neither a
necessary nor sufficient condition for growth
First Caveat on Policy
Simple rules don’t work
Consequences: Agency Versus Investor Abuse
• Agency problem in dispersed systems
• Minority investor abuse in concentrated ownership system
Evidence on Performance in Europe
• Bank control limited
• Concentrated owners do not exercise control
• Independent directors do not intervene
• Takeovers do not discipline bad management
=>Most conventional wisdom is not accurate
Second Caveat on Harmonization
We don’t know much
Systems View
• Theory:
Different forms of information
Different types of control
Different degrees of commitment
• Evidence
Association of different systems with different economic activities
Example 1
• External equity financed and skill dependent industries grow particularly rapidly in countries with good information disclosure
• Particularly closely associated with R&D not fixed investment
• Relations dependent on stage of economic growth
Example 2
• VC firms are primarily financed by banks in Germany and Japan
• Bank financed VC firms invest in later stage activities than individual and corporate funded VC firms
Example 3Patent Specialization: USA and Germany
-0.80 -0.60 -0.40 -0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80
Agric.,Food P roc. Mach.
Civil Engineering
Transport
Machine Tools
Consumer Goods
Thermal P rocesses
Mechanical Elements
Environment Tech.
Handling Machinery
Audiovisual Tech.
Mater. P roc., Textiles
Electrical Machinery
Mater., Metallurgy
Engines, Pumps, Turbs.
Space Tech., Weapons
Control Systems
Organic Chemistry
Chemical Engineering
Basic Materials Chem.
Optics
Surf. Tech., Coating
Telecommunications
Macro.Chem.,Polymers
Agric., Food Chem.
Semiconductors
Nuclear Engineering
Biotechology
Pharmaceuticals
Information Tech.
Medical Technology
Germany USA
Third Caveat on Harmonization
There isn’t a best system
Different systems serve different purposes
Effect of Harmonization
• Presumes best practice
• Standardizes on presumed best practice
• Limits variation
• Discourages innovation
What is Required?
• Diversity
• Experimentation
• Innovation
How Should It Be Achieved?
• Choice not harmonization
• Enabling not prescriptive regulation
• Freedom to choose
• Strong disclosure
• Harmonization where there are cross-border externalities, as in banking
Arguments Against Freedom to Choose
• European playing-field is too unlevel
• Distorted by pursuit of private benefits
• Need to establish pre-conditions for competition
• Competition inimical to systems based on long-term relations
• Best system will not emerge through mobility
Perfect Competition and Product Differentiation
• Not seeking system that maximizes shareholder value
• Difference is that US is competition within a system
• Europe is selection between systems• Providing best environment (financial system,
labour markets, legal and political system) for diverse corporate activities
• Competition and survival of fittest in product markets not corporate form
Justification for Freedom of Mobility
• Allows matching of corporate activities with different systems
• Exploits not destroys diversity of European systems
• Through strong disclosure enhances not detracts from financial integration