Collapsing Methods of Handling the Nuclear Waste:

the KBS-3 method doesn’t work! but the DRD method provides freedom of immediate action

Nils-Axel Mörner

Head of Paleogeophysics & Geodynamics 1991-2005President of the INQUA Comission on Neotectonics 1981-1989

Editor of “Neotectonics Bulletin” 1978-1996Author of numerous papers and several books

“Paleoseismicity of Sweden-A novel paradigm”, “The tsunami threat: research and technology”

morner@pog.nu

Only by extending the seismic database backwards via paleoseismology, are we able to assess future hazards

in a meaningful way

The nuclear industry limits their analyses to seismology, fails in assessing the future risk correctly

and produces directly misleading scenarios

Paleoseismology records events of above M 5.5

The Swedish-Finnish case

With increasing time units, the maximum earthquake magnitude increases dramatically; from below 4.8 to well above 8.

Seismology <100 years <4.8Historical data last 600 years <5.5Late Holocene last 5000 years >>6 to ~7Deglacial phase 9–11 Ka BP >>8

This implies that we can only achieve a meaningful long-term seismic hazard assessment, if the paleoseismic records of past earthquake events are included.

The long-term seismic risk is totally different – a repository would not survive

After the Ice Ageland has gone up

by 800 min the centre

in Ångermanlandand by 450 mat Stockholm

These movements(vertical & horizontel)

made Sweden9000-10,000 years BP

a

high-seismic area

Even in the bordering zone, however, there are multiple records of postglacial earthquakes (above magnitude 6, the lower limit of geological recording)

in the Great Belt region in northern Germany in Poland (especially well recorded) in Kaliningrad region in Vilnius region in Estonia in NE Russia (very fine records) and other areas to come

Earthquakes – up to ~7 magnitude

Tsunamis – up to 20 m high

Methane venting – anytime, anywhere

1. Threats on Nuclear Power Plants

During the last 5000 years we have a record of 11 earthquakes in Sweden

reaching magnitudes of up to ~7

17 big tsunami-waves in Sweden during the last 13.000 years

Wave-height in meters: The Baltic blue & The Kattegatt green

Actual tsunami threat in the Bothnian Bay

2. Threats on a KBS-3 high-level nuclear waste repository in the bedrock

Earthquakes

Bedrock fracturing

Methane venting

Tsunamis

Repository aging

Ground water movements

etc.

Distribution of events in Sweden

As to paleoseismic magnitude, we have recorded The following distribution of our 59 events

Magnitude Number of events

>8 7

7–8 17

6–7 29

<6 6

As to paleoseismic frequency, we have recorded

7 earthquakes within 102 years in Mälardalen (10,490–10,388 vBP)

year magnitud epicenter10,490 6–7 Stockholm10,469 7–8 Mariefred10,447 6–7 Stockholm10,430 8–9 Stockholm10,400 7–8 Säffle10.410 ~6 Stockholm10,388 >8 Mariefred

Because we can tie the Swedish liquefaction structures to one single varve (year), we can calculate their spatial distribution & magnitude

Deformations at 3 sites 76 km apart in the autumn of varve 10,430 vBP, and the turbidite in 2 cores (from an area of turbidite spread of 200x320 km).

The safety distance used (from models) does not fit with observational facts implying that there is not room enough for a KBS-3 repository

Intensive fracturing of the bedrock up to 50 km from the epicentre. The Boda cave 12,5 km from epicentre is totally fractured into pieces.

The Boda Cave (above): a totally fractured bedrock hill with a 2600 m long system of subsurface passages.

Leggesta-Ärja a 6-8 m high fault dated 10,430 vBP

The main E–W fault that moved 6 times times in

10,490–10,388 vBP.

1 km the the North a new 6-8 m high fault was formed

This reveals the nonsense in SKB:s talk about a safe

distance of only 50-100 m

Repository at 500 m for 100,000 years: The claim of a ”safe zone” only 50-100 m from a regional fault is, of course, sheer nonsense.

Red River Fault in Vietnam recording a continual addition of new faults

no safe respect-distance can be identified here

Methane Venting Tectonics is a novel factor

recorded at several sites in Sweden and Finland

The last one occurred 2000 years ago and set up a 20 m high tsunami wave

This factor seems to invalidate all serious talk about guarantees and long-term safety

when it concerns a repository of KBS-3 type

= 168 liter

= 1 liter

M 8 earthquake in Hudiksvall at 9663 years BP

CONCLUSIONS1. The intensity of seismicity, the tsunami wave-heights and the

methane venting events recorded in Late Holocene time imply that the nuclear power plants operating today do so ignoring serious threats of active natural phenomena.

2. The long-term storage of high-level nuclear waste in the bedrock according to the KBS-3 method seems firmly invalidated by modern geodynamics and observational facts with respect to paleoseismics, tsunamis and methane venting tectonics.

ReferencesMörner, N.-A., 2003. Paleoseismicity of Sweden - a novel paradigm. Contribution to INQUA from its Sub-commission on Paleoseismology, 320 pp.

Mörner, N.-A., 2008. Excursion Guide. Excursion No 11, 33rd IGC, 2008, 107 pp.

Mörner, N.-A., 2009. Late Holocene earthquake geology in Sweden. In: Reicherter, K., Michetti, A. M. & Silva, P. G. (eds) Palaeoseismology: Historical and Prehistorical Records of Earthquake Ground Effects for Seismic Hazard Assessment. Geological Society, London, Special Publications, 316, 179-188.

Mörner, N.-A., 2010. Natural, man-made and imagined disasters. Disaster Advances, 3 (2), 3-5

Mörner, N.-A., 2011. Paleoseismology: the application of multiple parameters in four case studies in Sweden. Quaternary International, 242, p. 65-75.

Mörner, N.-A. & Dawson, S., 2011. Traces of tsunami events in off shore and on shore environments. Case studies in the Maldives, Scotland and Sweden). In: The Tsunami Threat: research & technology (N.-A. Mörner, Ed.), p. 371-388.

Mörner, N.-A. & Sjöberg, R., 2011. Excursion guide. Second International Conference on Granite Caves. SSF, Svenska Grottor No. 12, 27 pp.

Mörner, N.-A., 2011. The Tsunami Threat: research & technology. 714 pp, InTech.

Now we know that the KBS-3 method does not work Now we have to do

something different

”the best under the circumstances”

This is a storage

in a Dry Rock Deposit (DRD)

– remaining accessible and controllable –

Freedom of Immediate Action – a DRD-repository

To hell with the KBS-3 method (the place where it rightly belongs)

Keep the control and freedom of action (only by the DRD method)

DRD is to do the best under the circumstances (no solution)

DRD is not a solution justifying extended nuclear power and uranium mining

DRD is much cheaper

DRD excludes Clab (the temporary storage of zero safety)

Mountains of high-level radioactive waste in the World

What to do with it?

CLAB offers no safe interim stock-piling

The NPPs offers no safe interim stock-pining

I propose a DRD-storage

ReserveIn case of questions

The high-level nuclear waste will have to be stored in one way or the other for at least 100,000 years

• To guarantee ”safety” for 100,000 years or more is of course impossible.

• No such claims are backed up by geodynamics and paleoseismics – on the contrary; such claims violate modern observational facts.

• Seismology covers far to short time periods to allow meaningful hazard assessments for time periods a 1000 times longer (or more).

• Instead, we have to rely on detailed paleoseismological records for meaningful hazard assessments over the time periods required.

The seismic database of the nuclear waste industry only consider seismology (and a few historical events)

The geological database is based on paleoseismology and its observational facts

When extended 100,000 years into the Future, the two databases give totally different pictures.

The energy release by the geological database exceeds that of the nuclear industries by 1000 billion times.

Therefore, it is highly unlikely that a repository of KBS-3 type would stay a chance of surviving intact over the required period of 100,000 years

Seismic Hazard Prediction for the next 100,000 yearsA: Blue box – based on seismic data only (SKB, Posiva)

max 1 M 6 event in 100,000 yearsB: Yellow box – based on paleoseismic data (Mörner)

100–1000 M 7 events, ~10 M 8 events and even some M ~9 events

The 18 Swedish tsunami events predominantly

represent events of intensity XI–XII

The methods used in Sweden and Finland

All the damage recorded on the Fukushima Dai-ichi Reactor Unit Number 4 was self-inflicted damage caused by the intense radioactivity of the irradiated fuel, which drove the temperature up to about 900-1000 degrees Celsius, whereupon the zirconium cladding reacted chemically with the steam from the boiling water, releasing hydrogen gas which caused the explosion;the additional heat from this exothermic chemical reaction also caused the zirconium to catch fire, accelerating the release of radioactive gases, vapors and ashes.