climate change and global warming: the role of the...
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Background Paper
Climate Change and Global Warming: The role of the International Community Koko Warner United Nations University
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Background Paper for WDR 2014 on Managing Risk for Development
CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL WARMING:
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Koko Warner1
June 2013
Abstract
The purpose of this background paper is to take stock of current knowledge about the risks
climate change poses to sustainable development and discuss issues associated with managing
that risk. In part because of the risks climate change poses to sustainable development, efforts to
target greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions globally have been the focus of international
discussions in an effort to achieve the broad participation necessary to manage the risk. The
paper examines these international efforts and discusses why managing this risk is so
challenging. It provides an assessment of the challenges and possible roles for the international
community to address climate change and manage the significant risks that will increasingly
affect the ability to attain sustainable development for current and future generations.
The paper argues that a central driver of climate change risk is mainstream economic
(development) models which aspire to carbon-intensive industrialization. Transformation to low-
carbon, climate resilient, sustainable development is an imperative to manage the risks associated
with climate change, but deep-seated challenges related to risk management, political economy,
and decision making under uncertainty continue to undermine these efforts. It notes that
unresolved climate-change risk poses a moderate threat to current sustainable development and a
severe threat to future sustainable development unless anthropogenic climate change and
development models which drive GHG emissions are reconciled.
The core message of the paper is that although regional solutions or “coalitions” of willing states
may be appropriate for some forms of climate policy—particularly efforts to manage risks of
climate variability like extreme weather events which may grow in magnitude and frequency
with climate change—the underlying systemic risk of climate change can only effectively be
addressed by global-scale reduction of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere.
1 The author acknowledges the help of Sönke Kreft (UNU-EHS) on climate policy issues, and Kristina Yuzva
(UNU-EHS) for preparation of the manuscript and literature reviews, Tom Willbanks, Karen O´Brian, Michael
Oppenheimer, Jörn Birkmann, Andrea Wendeler, Gary Yohe and other authors of the IPCC 5th
Assessment Report
for critical thinking and reading that informs this background paper, and Rasmus Heltberg and Inci Otker-Robe for
comments and suggestions. All views remain the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect World
Bank positions or views.
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Contents
1. Introduction 3
2. Climate change, drivers of risk, & challenges for sustainable development ................................ 4
2.1 Drivers of risk in social and ecological systems ................................................................... 4
2.2 Climate change and the consequences for sustainable development today .......................... 6
2.3 Climate change poses a severe threat to future sustainable development ............................. 8
3. Analysis of (insufficient) progress in efforts to curb the drivers of climate change .................... 9
3.1 Dilemma: Mainstream development aspires to carbon-intensive industrialization models 10
3.2 International efforts to manage climate change risks: avoid, adjust, accept some loss &
damage ...................................................................................................................................... 11
Loss and damage ................................................................................................................... 13
3.3 Transformation is imperative, but deep seated challenges remain ...................................... 14
(Myopic) Cost-benefit analysis. ............................................................................................ 14
Development priorities and uncertainty. ............................................................................... 15
Climate justice and distributional impacts............................................................................. 16
4. Roles & challenges of the international community to achieve broad participation &
compliance in reducing GHGs ............................................................................................................... 16
4.1 Contractual role: Strong on participation depending on distribution of benefits ................ 18
4.2 Prescriptive role: Weak on participation, weak on compliance .......................................... 19
4.3 Facilitative role: Strong on participation, opportunity to ratchet up compliance................ 19
5. Conclusions 20
5.1 Ingredients for Success ........................................................................................................ 20
Limiting the extent of anthropogenic climate change: Mitigation of GHG emissions. ........ 21
Adaptation, limits to adaptation, and loss and damage: Managing the negative impacts of
climate change ....................................................................................................................... 22
Facilitate a range of approaches and tools for managing risks of climatic stressors ............. 22
5.2 Outlook ................................................................................................................................ 24
References 26
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Introduction
The purpose of this background paper is to take stock of the current knowledge on climate
change and the risks it poses to sustainable development. The paper argues that climate change
poses a moderate threat to current sustainable development and a severe threat to future
sustainable development unless anthropogenic climate change and development models which
drive greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are reconciled. The ultimate responsibility for managing
the risks of climate change lies with the major emitting nations of the world, and the speed and
efficacy of their commitment and compliance in reducing GHG emissions will determine to a
large extent the opportunities for averting a climate crisis that would curb, or prevent, sustainable
development both in their own countries as well as in vulnerable developing countries in the
future.
This argument derives from a review of recent progress in understanding climate impacts. The
paper assesses recent meta-reviews of scientific literature including the 2012 Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and
Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX) and the IPCC 2007 AR4 Synthesis
Report, as well as practice including newest empirical findings in the context of drivers of risk
and sustainable development. The paper also illustrates the consequences for sustainable
development through emerging evidence about how vulnerable households attempt to manage
climatic risks. The paper examines international efforts to curb the drivers of climate change,
with the dilemma that a central driver of climate change risk is mainstream economic
(development) models which aspire to reproduce carbon-intensive industrialization.
Transformation to climate-resilient sustainable development (e.g. resilience of development to
climate changes) is an imperative to manage the risk of climate change to society. However,
deep seated challenges related to risk management remain. Stemming from this analysis, two
roles emerge for the international community: ameliorate climate change itself, and facilitate
approaches and tools for managing risks associated with climate change (adaptation solutions).
Managing climate change risks is crucial because of the irreversible threats it poses to
sustainable development. “Responding to climate change involves an iterative risk management
process that includes both adaptation and mitigation and takes into account climate change
damages, co-benefits, sustainability, equity, and attitudes toward risk” (IPCC, 2007: 22). The
unique fact about managing climate change risk is that climate change drives changes in Earth´s
life support systems that are vital for sustainable development (Yohe, 2012; Arndt et al. 2012).
Some elements of managing climate change risks are similar to risk management frameworks for
a wide array of decision making. Others—like the risk of undermining the systems upon which
human society depends for its existence and welfare—are unique. Climate change drives shift
earth systems upon which human society depend. These shifts in natural systems, such as ocean
temperatures and ph levels, atmospheric circulation patterns, regional climate patterns, and other
life-sustaining elements, are essentially irreversible in time periods relevant for human society as
it is organized currently. This sets climate change risk apart from the management of other kinds
of risks in the context of sustainable development.
Today, national governments and the international community are concerned about how to
prepare for the possible consequences of climate change, in particular associated changes in
ecosystems and societies that may become increasingly difficult to adjust sufficiently or in time.
These are areas of concern highlighted in Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
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Change, in particular in stressing that the ultimate objective of the Convention and any related
legal instruments is stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system and that such a level
should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic
development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” (UN,1992.)
The core message of this meta-review is that although regional solutions or “coalitions” of
willing states may be appropriate for some forms of climate policy—particularly efforts to
manage risks of climate variability (such as extreme weather events that may grow in magnitude
and frequency with climate change), the underlying systemic risk of climate change can only be
effectively addressed by global-scale reduction of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. The
paper concludes with an assessment of challenges and possible roles for the international
community for effective action to address climate change and manage the significant risks that
will increasingly affect the ability to attain sustainable development for current and future
generations.
The paper is organized as follows: Following the introduction, section 2 reviews climate change,
drivers of risk and challenges for sustainable development. Section 3 analyses efforts to curb the
drivers of climate change in policy processes, moving from mitigation efforts to a realization that
both mitigation ambitions and adaptation efforts are currently not sufficient to avoid some
amount of climate change related loss and damage. Section 4 examines roles and challenges of
the international community to achieve broad participation and compliance in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions against the backdrop of a targeted international climate change
agreement as well as a revamped sustainable development agenda in the year 2015. Section 5
concludes with reflections on the “ingredients for success” and possible next steps.
Climate change, drivers of risk, & challenges for sustainable
development
In the anthropocene era, the interaction of humans with natural environments which they are
changing has led to patterns of loss and damage relevant for human society. Addressing these
risks affects how human society manages the negative impacts of climate change while pursuing
other goals, such as resilient and low-
emission development.
Drivers of risk in social and
ecological systems
Research has documented evidence
on the extent of human activities on
major Earth systems, including
changing concentrations of GHGs in
the atmosphere, driven by burning of
fossil fuels, deforestation, and
intensive agriculture. Geological
records indicate that profound shifts
4.76
4.61
4.90
5.13
5.20
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
4.9
5
5.1
5.2
5.3
1990 2000 2005 2008 2010
Em
issi
on
sM
illi
on
s
Agricultural Emissions: Methane + Nitrous Oxide(Thousand of Metric Tons of CO2 Equivalent)
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in earth systems and life forms have accompanied climatic changes in the past (Crutzen and
Stoermer, 2000). Human development alters global environmental systems including weather
patterns and longer-term regional climates. The recent reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC, 2007 and 2012) affirm that human-induced factors are responsible for
generating significant increases in temperatures around the world, with serious impacts on socio-
ecological systems. The energy basis for the development of industrialized societies is the
driving force behind global climate change (Oliver-Smith et al., 2012).
The potential impacts of unmitigated anthropogenic climate change have significant implications
for the current organization of human society. Questions arise on how to deal with those negative
biophysical impacts of climate change for which no clear, practical alternatives exist within the
boundaries of our current values, culture and economic systems. Some of these consequences
might be seen as climate change affecting the functionality of some low-lying island countries.
Further questions arise on how to deal with potentially reduced habitability of coastal zones and
dryland areas – many of which host dense human population concentrations, including
megacities. The potential changes that science suggests may be felt as early as this century raise
questions about the ability of environmental systems to adjust naturally. Further questions arise
about whether food production, the associated livelihoods of an estimated 2.6 billion people will
be able to continue in a sustainable manner .2
For example, sea level rise could redefine the borders of some countries, desertification and
glacial melt could shape the habitability of large areas of the world where people rely on arable
land and freshwater for survival, and temperature change could affect plant fertility and
biodiversity. Failure to address loss and damage on time could leave society unprepared to
manage and adjust to these negative climate change impacts.
Schellnhuber (2009) discusses tipping elements in earth systems, noting that “tipping point” is
often used to mean a critical threshold at which “a tiny perturbation can qualitatively alter the
state or development of a system”. Schellnhuber describes “tipping elements” as large-scale
components of the Earth system that may pass a tipping point. The graph below echoes some of
these systemic tipping elements as global average temperatures change: at risk will be the
foundations of sustainable development including food and livelihood security (particularly in
agricultural sectors worldwide, with associated trade impacts), water availability, impacts of
extreme weather events on major urban centers and infrastructure.
2See FAOSTAT 2010 agricultural population according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) definition, including farming, hunting, forests and fisheries available at:
http://faostat.fao.org and http://faostat.fao.org/site/550/default.aspx#ancor.
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Source: The Author.
Climate change and the consequences for sustainable development today
Climate change poses a moderate threat to current sustainable development. Research already
documents that many countries and communities worldwide are unable to adapt to changes in
climate patterns, and because of this they experience loss and damage. The latter arises from
inability to respond to climate stresses (that is, the costs of inaction), insufficiency of responses,
or the costs associated with existing coping and adaptive strategies (cf. erosive coping strategies
and mal-adaptation). Such costs can be monetary or non-monetary. Loss and damage is also
related to the extent of mitigation, since the potential costs of future climate change depend to a
large extent on the intensity of climatic disruptions, which, in turn, are a function of global
mitigation efforts.
Recent research (Warner and van der Geest, 2013) reveals that adaptation and loss and damage
occur as simultaneous processes, and that loss and damage is a real phenomena with tangible
consequences today. Some of the most notable current impacts are on household food production
and livelihoods, raising questions about the ability of adaptation measures, both formal and
informal, to stem the interacting negative impacts of climate change on vulnerable societies and
to safeguard sustainable development. Residual impacts of climate stressors occur and result in a
deepening of poverty and erosion of household living standards and health, when:
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existing coping/adaptation to biophysical impact is not enough to avoid loss and damage;
measures have costs (economic, social, cultural, health, etc.) that are not regained;
despite short-term merits, measures have negative effects in the longer term;
no measures are adopted–or possible–at all.
Across the nine research sites explored in Warner and van der Geest (2013), households were
struggling with climatic stressors, such as droughts and floods. Despite their efforts to cope with
the impacts of extreme weather events and adapt to slow-onset climatic changes, many
households incurred residual impacts along the lines of one or several of the pathways listed
above.
Table 2 shows the percentage of households in each research site experiencing particular climate
threats (slow-onset and sudden-onset), impacts, responses (coping or adapting) and residual loss
and damage. Climatic stressors are widely experienced in the research sites surveyed. For
example, in Bhutan, 91 percent of the households surveyed experienced changes in monsoon
patterns, which affected water availability for irrigated rice farming. In Kosrae, Micronesia, 87
percent of the households experienced coastal erosion. In Bangladesh, 99 percent experienced
salinity intrusion caused by cyclones and sea level rise. The proportion of respondents for whom
the climate stressor had a negative impact on the household economy was also high: over 80
percent in all the study sites. The most affected livelihood source was crop cultivation (see table
3). As the large majority of respondents practice subsistence agriculture, one can expect direct
impacts on food security.
Table 2: Core indicators of loss and damage indicators
Country Climate stressor Experienced Affected
household
Adopted
measures
Impact despite
measures
Loss and
Damage
Stressor (%) (%) (%) (%)
Bangladesh Salinity intrusion (%)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Bangladesh Salinity intrusion 99 99 81 70 74
Bhutan Changing monsoon 91 89 88 87 72
Gambia Drought 100 97 93 66 66
Kenya Flood 100 98 93 72 72
Micronesia Coastal erosion 87 80 60 92 66
Ethiopia Flood 100 100 98 96 93
Burkina Faso Drought 98 99 79 72 54
Mozambique Drought/flood 100 99 93 69 63
Source: Warner and van der Geest (2013).
Notes: percentages in columns (b) to (d) are not calculated over the whole survey sample. Columns (b) is a
proportion of the households in column (a); columns (c) is a proportion of those in column (b) etc. For example, in
Micronesia, 87% of the surveyed households experienced coastal erosion. Within this group 80% of the households
reported adverse effects on their households. 60% of the affected households in Micronesia adopted adaptation
measures to deal with coastal erosion, and 92% of the households that adopted measures reported that these
measures were not enough. Column (e), entitled ‘loss and damage’ is calculated over the whole survey population.
Calculation: e = (a*b*c*d) + (1-c*a*b), where the letters stand for the percentages in the columns. In words, it is the
proportion of the whole survey population that experienced adverse effects despite adopting measures to cope and
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adaptation effort plus the proportion of the total sample whose household was affected, but did not or could not
adopt any measures in response.
Table 3: Impacted economic factors
Country Impact 1 Impact 2 Impact 3
Bangladesh Crops (98%) Drinking water (90%)
Bhutan Crops (97%) Trees (23%) Livestock (12%)
Gambia Crops (99%) Food prices (89%) Livestock (74%)
Kenya Crops (98%) Food prices (95%) House/properties (66%)
Micronesia Trees (70% Crops (69%) House/properties (53%)
Ethiopia Crops (94%) Housing (79%) Stored food (77%)
Burkina Faso Crops (96%) Food prices (90%) Livestock (87%)
Mozambique Crops (100%) Food prices (83%) Livestock (35%)
Nepal Crops (86%) Food prices (61%) House/properties (33%)
Source: Warner and van der Geest (2013).
Note: Percentages are calculated over the households that experienced the climate threat (see table 2).
The vast majority of the survey respondents indicated that they adopted coping or adaptation
measures to counter adverse effects of extreme weather events and slow-onset changes. Among
the people who adopted such measures, most were not fully successful in avoiding residual
impacts. For example, in the Bhutan study area, 87 percent of households that adopted measures
reported that they were still experiencing adverse effects of changing monsoon patterns despite
these adaptation measures. Similar results were found, albeit with a variety of different coping
and adaptation measures, for all the other case studies. Of the households that adopted such
measures, in Micronesia, for example, 92 percent reported that they were still experiencing
adverse effects of the climatic stressor and resulting impacts on household development. The
same figure was 66 percent in the Gambia.
Climate change poses a severe threat to future sustainable development
Emerging scientific evidence suggests that potential for dangerous climate change is increasing,
and fossil fuel consumption and trends point towards a plus 4 degree world (box 1), spawning
discussions of how to manage such magnitude of loss and damage that may not be possible to
adjust to (Warner et al., 2012; Preston et al., 2013; Oliver-Smith et al., 2012). The Human
Development Report 2007/8 states that climate change “is not just a future scenario. Increased
exposure to droughts, floods and storms is already destroying opportunity and reinforcing
inequality. Meanwhile, there is overwhelming scientific evidence that the world is moving
towards the point at which irreversible ecological catastrophe becomes unavoidable. Business-
as-usual climate change points in a clear direction: unprecedented reversal in human
development in our lifetime and acute risks for our children and their grandchildren” (UNDP,
2007).
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(Insufficient) Progress in efforts to curb the drivers of climate change
The risks associated with climate change are driven by anthropogenic GHG emissions, as well as
with development implementation itself. Both of these issues imply a shared responsibility to
manage the risks—high-emission countries have a responsibility to mitigate emissions and low
emissions countries to pursue low-carbon development, and all countries to pursue development
pathways that enhance resilience to the risks that come along with climate change. The degree to
which nation states accept this shared risk management (mitigation and pursuing climate resilient
development pathways) affects the extent to which social and economic support systems helping
people manage risk (that is, households, enterprise and financial sector, the state and the global
community) can support and protect people from climate change and related risks.
Box 1: Key points from the 2011 IPCC Special Report on Extreme Events
Even without taking climate change into account, disaster risk will continue to increase in many countries as
more people and assets are exposed to weather extremes.
Evidence suggests that climate change has changed the magnitude and frequency of some extreme weather
and climate events (‘climate extremes’) in some regions already.
Climate change will have significant impacts on the severity and magnitude of climate extremes in the future.
For the coming two or three decades, the expected increase in climate extremes will probably be relatively
small compared to the normal year-to-year variations in such extremes. However, as climate change becomes
more dramatic, its effect on a range of climate extremes will become increasingly important and will play a
more significant role in disaster impacts.
There is better information on what we expect in terms of changes in extremes in various regions (rather than
just globally).
High levels of vulnerability, combined with more severe and frequent weather and climate extremes, may
result in some places, such as atolls, being increasingly difficult places in which to live and work.
A new balance needs to be struck between measures to reduce risk, transfer risk (e.g., through insurance) and
effectively prepare for and manage disaster impact in a changing climate. This balance will require a stronger
emphasis on anticipation and risk reduction.
In this context, existing risk management measures need to be improved as many countries are poorly
adapted to current extremes and risks, let alone those projected for the future.
Countries’ capacity to meet the challenges of observed and projected trends in disaster risk is determined by
the effectiveness of their national risk management systems.
In cases where vulnerability and exposure are high, capacity is low, and weather and climate extremes are
changing, more fundamental adjustments may be required to avoid the worst disaster losses.
Any delay in GHG mitigation is likely to lead to more severe and frequent climate extremes.
Source: Summarized from 2012 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on
Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX) .
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Dilemma: Mainstream development aspires to carbon-intensive industrialization models
The basic model of
development continues to
aspire to the fossil-fuel-
intensive systems in place
in most advanced
countries, from food
production to trade,
transport, and household
consumption. This largely
drives the paradigm of
sustainable development.
The mechanisms that have
evolved through global
negotiations to deal with
climate change fall short
in part because they are
embedded in a discourse
about limiting damage, rather than in a larger debate on dealing with human well-being (Sanwal,
2012). Halsinaes et al., (2008) argue that most existing development policies will not lead to a
sustainable development pattern, since they insufficiently address climate change and do not
(yet) integrate development policy with climate-resilient, mitigation-focused development
pathways. Bosnjakovi (2012) frames the management of climate change risks as the testing
ground for competitiveness and innovation potential of political and economic models for
achieving sustainability.
To address the risks of climate change, it will be necessary to reconcile anthropogenic climate
change and development models which drive GHG emissions (UNFCCC, 2012). Swart et al.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
CO
2 E
mis
sio
ns
in k
tT
ho
usa
nd
sCO2 Emissions by Income Level
HI UMI LMI LI
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
175
1
175
9
176
7
177
5
178
3
179
1
179
9
180
7
181
5
182
3
183
1
183
9
184
7
185
5
186
3
187
1
187
9
188
7
189
5
190
3
191
1
191
9
192
7
193
5
194
3
195
1
195
9
196
7
197
5
198
3
199
1
199
9
200
7
Carbon Emission from fossil fuels
Total from fossil-fuels (million metric tons of CO2)
from gas fuel consumption
from liquid fuel consumption
from solid fuel consumption
from cement production
from gas flaring
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2003 note that development choices affect future GHG emissions and that current preference for
carbon-intensive development in turn can constrain future development potential, as well as
increasing vulnerabilities to climate change (Frankhauser and Taub, 2011). Grist (2008) notes
that even adaptation approaches are aligned with “reformist discourses” of sustainable
development including “market environmentalism, ecological modernization and environmental
populism,” as opposed to more radical interpretations that call carbon intensive development
models and adaptation practices that are aligned with such systems into question. Yet policy
makers tend to prefer “tried and true” models of carbon intensive development which were used
throughout the industrial and green revolutions rather than less certain models of economic
development relying on low carbon energy forms and practices (Prato, 2008).
International efforts to manage climate change risks: avoid, adjust, accept some loss &
damage
International efforts to ameliorate the risk of climate change and the risks associated with it have
been going on for over 20 years, focusing on avoiding the risks of climate change since the
establishment of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change at the Rio Earth Summit in
1992 (Sanwal, 2012). The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to stabilize atmospheric
concentrations of GHGs at levels that would prevent “dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system” (UN, 1992). Historically, the underlying UNFCCC discourse on loss and
damage—and more broadly of climate change impacts on society—has evolved along two
parallel lines: mitigating GHGs emissions, and adapting gradually to the negative impacts of
anthropogenic climate change.
Mitigation and efforts to avoid the risks of climate change. From the early 1990s to the mid-
2000s, the climate change dialogue has been characterized by an emphasis on mitigation:
avoiding the causes of climate change first and cautioning polluters with the concept of ‘polluter
pays’ principle. The potential impacts of extreme weather events and longer-term impacts related
to sea level rise, glacial melt, desertification etc. were considered politically unacceptable and a
strong case for ambitious mitigation.
Against this background, one better understands the position of the Alliance of Small Island
States (AOSIS) and the idea that States harmed by loss and damage related to climate change
could seek compensation to rehabilitate their societies (ideally to pre-anthropogenic climate
change conditions). The AOSIS had articulated this proposal since the early 1990s, framing it as
a kind of “insurance” against a wide range of climate change impacts. The early focus was on
cautioning high emitting countries about the consequences of not curbing their emissions (e.g.,
polluter pays principle). The specter of liability and possibly needing to pay unsaid amounts of
money to compensate “sinking island states” or other countries facing a range of catastrophic
climate-related impacts made this area of negotiation controversial for many industrialized
countries. Human migration and displacement were not mentioned in official texts at this time,
but the AOSIS and other allies emphasized that sea level rise (which can lead to displacement)
could drastically change the existence of low-lying countries.
Adapting and managing loss and damage. At least by 2007 and the release of the IPCC 4th
Assessment report, science was clear that some climate change was already a certainty, meaning
that countries would need to make sufficient adjustments to live with some amount of climate
change (adaptation).
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Adaptation was on the table before the Convention was agreed – in an active way from Small
Island Developing States (SIDs) and others, although majority of the efforts was devoted to
mitigation discussions. The IPCC 2nd
Assessment Report 1995 recommended stabilization of
GHG emissions at the then-current levels—and that an immediate reduction of 50-70 percent
was needed (IPCC, 1995). However, by the mid-2000s and with the publication of the IPCC 4th
Assessment Report in 2007, the process reflected a realization among scientists and policy
makers that emissions targets may be too low to prevent climate change. Hence, it would also be
necessary to discuss adaptation and issues around negative impacts of climatic change on human
society. Scientists and policy makers concurred that some impacts of climate change may already
be manifest and that adaptation was therefore a necessary complement to mitigation in order to
cushion the blow to society from some of the expected impacts of climate change. This
realization contributed to discussions about the need for adaptation finance, and activities that
would help countries (particularly those most vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate
change) to adapt, and to manage loss and damage. This track of discourse contributed to Parties
and Observers to the UNFCCC introducing ideas that were oriented towards implementation of
risk management and risk transfer as part of adaptation. Disaster risk management and reduction
have played a role in these adaptation-focused discussions, and manifested in the Bali Action
Plan and Cancun Adaptation Framework (box 2).
Box 2. Climate change negotiations
The Bali Action Plan calls for “Risk management and risk reduction strategies, including risk sharing and transfer
mechanisms such as insurance;” and consideration of “Disaster reduction strategies and means to address loss and
damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the
adverse effects of climate change” (UNFCCC, 2007).
The Bali Action Plan contained an entire section about (disaster) risk management and loss and damage associated
with climate change; however, possible association with compensation or liability was a cause for discomfort for
industrialized Parties. Throughout the international climate change negotiations following the Bali Action Plan
(UNFCCC, 2007), risk management and insurance were featured prominently in discussions of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) (UNFCCC 2008-2011). Developing countries
expressed that there will be unavoidable loss and damage from the adverse impact of climate change; it was
argued that a reference to risk reduction and loss and damage must be incorporated in institutional arrangement
and finance sections. Accordingly they advocated for a mechanism to address risk reduction, management and
sharing, including insurance and addressing loss and damages.1 Following Bali the developing countries
supported the AOSIS proposal for a mechanism for risk reduction, management and sharing to be established, that
has the following components:
(a) A risk management and prevention component to promote risk assessment and risk management tools and
strategies at all levels, with a view to facilitating and supporting the implementation of risk reduction and risk
management measures;
(b) An insurance component to address climate-related extreme weather events, and risks to crop production, food
security and livelihood;
(c) A rehabilitation and compensation component to address progressive negative impacts that result in loss and
damage (UNFCCC, 2009).
Following Bali, some Parties tried to subsume the section on risk management into other sections, cut it from the
discussions, and otherwise avoid discussions related to proposals around compensation for loss and damage.
Some industrialized countries preferred to address risk management and insurance and support building of
capacities necessary for that. However there has always been concern among developing countries that a
mechanism for loss and damage truly benefit the most vulnerable. This strategy required delicate steps, as
adaptation in the lead up to Bali and subsequently gained momentum, particularly among many G-77 and China
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Parties whose agreement would be necessary later in matters related to the larger hoped-for legally binding
agreement that was planned to be concluded in Copenhagen at COP15. It was intended that adaptation would
receive funding, and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities was repeatedly invoked. Bali
created the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), and the issue of loss and
damage was assigned to adaptation discussions from that time onwards At COP 15, the adaptation building block
came close to agreement between Parties, a subsequent draft negotiating text included several key references to
risk reduction and specific tools like insurance. At the time, loss and damage was addressed in paragraph 8 of the
AWG-LCA´s text related to adaptation. This marked a move towards enabling locally appropriate solutions and a
step away from a single approach that might address all needs associated with loss and damage. The timing for
these questions is notable: COP 15 produced the Copenhagen Accord, which pledges to counter the impacts from
climate change by funding "fast-track activities“ in the order of US$ 30 billion until 2012, rising to US$ 100
billion by 2020. As fast-track adaptation resources start to become available, Parties to the UNFCCC seek ideas
about ways to invest this money in ways that create leverage for adaptation.
COP16 and the Cancun Adaptation Framework. One of the questions for some Parties around managing the
impacts of climate change (including loss and damage) was how to move away from the compensation / liability
to an alternative framing of adaptation which would be in harmony with the emerging institutional infrastructure
around climate finance and governance. Parties wary of “compensation” may have wanted to maneuver the issue
of loss and damage out of the process; however, they needed to build consensus with the mass of countries that
are anticipated to experience loss and damage in the future. AOSIS continued to champion the need for the COP
to address loss and damage, and a compromise was found at COP16: The Conference of Parties decided in
Cancun to establish the SBI Work Program on loss and damage. Decision 1/CP.16 suggests that the Subsidiary
Body for Implementation (SBI) make recommendations on loss and damage to the Conference of the Parties for
its consideration at COP18, as well as to strengthen international cooperation and expertise to understand and
reduce loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including impacts related to
extreme weather events and slow onset events.
In December 2011, parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted
the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, which launched a new round of negotiations aimed at developing “a
protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force” for the post-2020 period.2
____________________________ 1 Oil producing countries advocate for response measures to be linked with this loss and damage issue; however,
this position is generally not accepted by most Party blocks. 2
Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (UNFCCC, 2011).
Lavanya Rajamani (2012) performed a legal analysis of the Durban Platform decision: Rajamani, L. (2012). “The
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action and the Future of the Climate Regime,” 61 International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 501 (2012).
Loss and damage. Managing loss and damage associated with climate change involves both
avoiding the potential for loss and damage in the future through appropriate mitigation and
adaptation, and preparing for and addressing actual loss and damage when it occurs (today and in
the future).
Choices about mitigation will be the main factor determining the degree of climate change, the
magnitude of loss and damage, the degree to which sustainable development will be
compromised, and the extent of adaptation needed, particularly from around 2030 (box 3). Until
2030, adaptation measures to the unavoidable changes have to be taken. Decisions that determine
the level, scale and efficacy of adaptation will affect societal ability to adjust to manifestations of
changes in climatic variability (e.g., shifts in seasonality of rainfall, heat waves, magnitude and
frequency of extreme weather events). The preeminent approach to loss and damage in the
medium- and longer-term—in terms of avoiding future loss and damage and minimizing impacts
in the short- and medium-term—lies in today’s choices about mitigation and adaptation. An
14
implicit decision not to take ambitious mitigation action at a global scale, and/or decisions not to
invest in and actively drive adaptation, could lead to loss and damage that exceeds the ability to
manage (at all scales).3
Box 3. What does a 4°C-world mean in the context of sustainable development?
At COP 16 (in Cancun, December 2011), Parties agreed “to hold the increase in global average temperature
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.” In 2010, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) “Emissions
Gap Report” 1 expected a gap in 2020 between expected emissions and the global emissions consistent with the
2°C target, even if pledges were implemented fully. One year later, a follow-up report concluded that even with
the full implementation of the current Cancun pledges, “the planet is heading to a temperature rise of at least 3.5°
C, but that could be even more if the 2020 pledges are not met.” 2 But even this might be an optimistic scenario.
According to the global carbon budget in 2010, growth rates of global emissions are not decreasing but
increasing. In a worst-case scenario, where no action is taken to dampen the rise in GHG emissions,
"temperatures would most likely rise by more than 5°C by the end of the century.” 3
_______________________ 1 See UNEP, 2010. The Emission Gap Report: Are the Copenhagen Accord Pledges Sufficient to Limit Global
Warming to 2° C or 1.5° C? http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport/index.as 2 Climate Action Tracker 2012. http://climateactiontracker.org/countries.html/
3 Pope (2008).
Transformation is imperative, but deep seated challenges remain
To manage and avoid the fundamental potential risks that climate change poses for human
society, it will be necessary to transform to climate resilient (development) pathways that allow
stabilization and then reduction of GHG emissions. Insufficient progress in reducing GHGs is
arguably not due to a lack of scientific information about the actual and potential consequences
of anthropogenic climate change for society. Perhaps most importantly, transformation towards
low-carbon growth pathways is essential, but challenges the way that risk management and
political priorities are structured today. Challenges to transformation (in order to manage climate
change risks) include incomplete cost-benefit analysis, national development priorities,
uncertainty around low-carbon pathways and dangerous climate thresholds, and different
interpretations about the distributional aspects of “climate justice”4.
(Myopic) Cost-benefit analysis
To date, efforts to significantly slow and reduce global GHG emissions have been halting at best,
accompanied by growing scientific consensus that society is already beginning to face limits to
the degree it can adapt to climate change. Myopic maximization of national interests, ignoring
systemic risk, and favoring a short-term and reactive approach to risks—ironically in the name of
sustainable development—have led governments to treat international climate negotiations as a
3 See, for example: Stern Review 2007.
4 Some interpret “climate justice” as a focus on the uneven distribution of the impact of climate change across
countries, while embrace the interpretation of “climate justice” as being about the differing views between
developing and developed countries over historical responsibility for climate change, and the “right” (or not) of
developing countries to have unconstrained industrial development along any pathway they choose—a right that was
exercised by those countries that have carbon-intensive economies today.
15
forum for carrying out global geopolitics rather than to meaningfully manage and reduce the
fundamental risks of climate change.
The level of GHG reductions necessary to meet the Convention targets depends on (1) the level
of temperature increase deemed to be safe; (2) the GHG concentration levels required to keep
global temperature shifts within an “acceptable” or “safe” envelope; and (3) choices made by
polluting nations about emission pathways to achieve “safe” GHG concentration levels (Article
2). In Copenhagen and Cancun, states specified the first factor, by agreeing to limit global
warming to no more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels.
There is consensus that cumulative global GHG emissions (as opposed to level of emissions at
any particular time) must be reduced to within a 2 degree limit. Yet the choice of pathways to
reduce emissions over time depends on a variety of other factors: Article 2 can be seen as a
baseline and a guide for choosing GHG emissions pathways: with the goal not to compromise
food production and sustainable development, so that food production and efforts to achieve
sustainable development are not sacrificed in those choices. Thus the overarching major goal is
to reduce cumulative GHG emissions, which will reduce negative climate change impacts.
Unfortunately, current mitigation efforts worldwide fall well behind of a pathway that would
limit global temperature change to 2°C or less.
Choices about emission reduction pathways involve weighing of costs (especially economic and
political) and benefits (Arrow et al., 1996). The goal of the Convention is both to “avoid
catastrophic climate change” as well as to maximize net benefits over time. Countries have the
incentive to reduce emissions only to the degree that benefits are greater than the costs, even
though calculating this ratio is challenging given the less tangible benefits (nonmarket goods and
services provided by ecosystems for example), and benefits (or avoided catastrophe scenarios)
that will only be realized fully in the future (Pew Center, 2010). In the context of the climate
negotiations, the environmental costs of dangerous climate change (and the implications for
societal wellbeing including sustainable development) diverge from the economic costs
perceived by individual negotiating States of reducing their GHGs.
Development priorities and uncertainty
States set their development priorities (Paris Declaration), and these are then self-financed or
financed through international development cooperation or other means. Nations generally do
not prioritize managing risk over needs considered more immediate, and the costs of changing
energy, agriculture, transportation, rural-urban policies, and trade systems towards less carbon
intensive pathways may appear much greater and much less certain in their outcomes than
pursuing business-as-usual approaches (which are carbon intensive). An emphasis on factor
productivity at the national and subnational level also affects State´s relative prioritization of
lowering GHGs.
Moreover, the outcomes of low-carbon growth paths are uncertain. States implicitly maximize
the benefits of current decisions without factoring in the full economic, environmental, and
social costs of carbon-intensive economic growth models. Beg et al (2002) find that
transformation to low-carbon development models can create opportunities for sustainable
development (such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, changes towards low-carbon
transport and land-use policies). Transformation will require changes to energy systems,
16
transport systems, buildings (Beg et al., 2002); adaptation in anticipation of, or in response to
observed or expected impacts (Kates et al., 2012); and taking into account ecosystems and
implications for human development.
Existing approaches to adaptation may go some way towards reducing the risks climate change
poses to development investments. But these approaches run the risk of committing societies to
unsustainable and maladaptive development patterns. Brown (2011) argues that many
assumptions are made by policy makers that development along business-as-usual lines can
simply be secured through the identification and implementation of appropriate adaptation
measures.
Climate justice and distributional impacts
A key message of IPCC assessment reports has been that countries most sensitive to negative
climate impacts are also those who have contributed least to changing global GHG emission
concentrations in the atmosphere. In this view, climate justice as a concept may guide decision
making about what level of climate change poses acceptable or inacceptable risks (such as
1.5°C? 2°C? 3 or 4 degrees or more?). In the UNFCCC discussions, climate justice appears in
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDRRC) that affects the means by
which GHG emissions are reduced, as well as other considerations, such as adaptation and
finance.
There are many different interpretations of climate justice. They range from a focus on historical
responsibility, responsibility to future generations, fair division of burdens based on current
capabilities, and rights-based approaches that claim an equal right of States and citizens to the
“atmospheric space.” 5
Some conceptions of climate justice hinder participation and compliance to commitments to
reduce GHG emissions. Tensions have arisen over interpretations and consequences of climate
justice and historical emissions and CBDRR by already-industrialized countries. In essence,
major emerging-market emitters invoke a right to develop (in carbon-intensive ways if needed),
while demanding that industrialized high-emitting countries bear the burden of GHG reductions
at a scale necessary to avoid dangerous climate change. Whatever the merits of the philosophical
argument, politically this stance reduces enthusiasm for engagement and cooperation by those
major emitters that would have to bear the costs of reducing emissions.
Roles and challenges of the international community to achieve broad
participation and compliance in reducing GHGs The major requirements to reduce and manage the risks of dangerous anthropogenic climate
change are participation (particularly of most or all major emitters, or some other means to
massively reduce GHGs) and means to enforce compliance in reducing GHGs. The well-
documented and analyzed risks associated with climate change has driven efforts by the
5
Compare Steve Vanderheiden (2009), Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change. Oxford
University Press: USA with Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach (2010), Climate Change Justice. Princeton
University Press.
17
international community to target the reduction of GHG emissions globally in an effort to
achieve the broad participation necessary to manage the risk.
There are challenges associated with creating strategies to address the drivers and risks of
climate change. Faced with financial crisis political strife, population growth and a multitude of
other challenges, decision makers may be tempted to postpone considering approaches to address
loss and damage related to climate change impacts. Moreover, skeptics (box 4) question the
evidence on linkages between loss and damage (related to natural hazards) and climate change,
and implicitly suggest waiting to address the issue until more evidence is available.
Box 4. Skeptics claim loss and damage related to extreme events cannot yet be attributed to climate change.
Would it be prudent to postpone the discussion until more conclusive evidence is found?
The findings of the SREX report have suggested uncertainty today about the relationship between climate change
and long-term trends in normalized losses from weather-related extreme events. These findings have led some
skeptics to focus on the current inability of science to definitively address the attribution of loss and damage from
weather extremes to climate change; however, in addition neglecting the precautionary principle,1 this critique is
misleading, based on current scientific understanding of links. The SREX findings reflect a lack of longer-term
evidence and gaps in research, rather than providing conclusive, positive evidence that there is no link between
extreme weather events and loss and damage.
Further, the inconclusive SREX findings related to attribution of disaster losses to climate change highlight the
potential pitfalls of focusing only on extreme events to inform decision making about the wider spectrum of policy
that may be needed to address current and future negative climate change impacts. In time, science may develop to
the state where attribution of various manifestations of climate change may be attributable to anthropogenic
activities. Yet, it is likely that by the time science can conclusively establish those relationships, loss and damage
related to those impacts will already have occurred, with irreversible consequences. At that point, windows of
opportunity for shaping policies to anticipate, reduce, plan for, and manage negative climate change impacts
(ranging from extreme weather events to slow onset changes like sea level rise) will have been lost or have narrowed
significantly.
Art. 1 of the UNFCCC defines climate change as the “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to
human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate
variability observed over comparable time periods.” Following this definition, approaches to address loss and
damage only deal with the anthropogenic component of changing climate norms. However, extreme events are often
the starting point for actions by governments and communities. It is often not feasible to conduct activities that
discriminate the climate change component of extreme event from existing weather variability. Therefore, the
authors agree with the path of the UNFCCC work program on approaches to address loss and damage. The first step
is to engage in an option-based approach (including risk reduction, risk retention and risk transfer) that starts from
existing experience especially around managing loss and damage around existing climate variability, and from that
derive the action necessary on level of the UNFCCC. At the same time, slow-onset processes–an area were
experience is still sparse but growing–should always feature specifically in the discussion, to avoid a ‘status quo
bias.’
Policy discussions on loss and damage are important today because a “science and evidence only” approach will not
sufficiently anticipate and inform society about decision pathways and consequences related to the negative impacts
of climate change. Relying solely on questions of attribution truncates discussions and prevents full consideration of
a range of options to address loss and damage.
__________
1 See, for example, the United Nations Rio Declaration from the 1992 United Nations Earth Summit;
http://www.unesco.org/education/nfsunesco/pdf/RIO_E.PDF
18
Yet as the analysis indicates, it is not a lack of scientific evidence, but rather challenges of
negotiating and State interests which pose the greatest challenges to achieving broad
participation and compliance in reducing GHG emissions. Bodansky (2011) provides a three-part
analysis of international law in the context of climate change which offers clues to possible ways
forward.6 These three “roles” of international negotiations are: setting up contracts with rules and
compliance, prescribing norms, and facilitating actions. Each of these roles has strengths and
weaknesses, and moving forward the UNFCCC climate negotiations and other relevant stages
will need to combine these roles to effectively reduce and address the drivers of climate change,
encourage meaningful engagement by major emitters without omitting benefits for low-emitting
actors, and achieving some degree of climate justice or equitable outcome. This section draws on
an analysis of the Durban Platform of Action provided by the Harvard Project on Climate
Agreements.
Contractual role: Strong on participation depending on distribution of benefits
Usually, international negotiations are based on a contractual model. The rationale of contracts is
that they leave both sides better off. States engage in treaty negotiations because they think they
will be better off with a treaty than without one. If a treaty will not improve a country’s position,
then the country has no incentive to participate. Climate change agreements like the Kyoto
Protocol have been framed as imposing costs on particular countries (industrialized major
emitters), while offering global net benefits (free rider problem) of avoiding dangerous climate
change. The contractual model of international climate change negotiations does not say much
about how the benefits should be distributed among countries.
Typically, the relative power of actors determines which of those players gets the most benefits
from an agreement. However, Article 3 of the UNFCCC (with the principles of CBDRRC and
equity) holds that States with lesser responsibilities and capabilities should benefit relatively
more from climate change agreements than states with greater responsibilities and capabilities.
Ironically, these principles discourage engagement of major already-industrialized emitters,
create incentives for emerging economy major emitters to insist on developing-developed
country distinctions (rather than focusing on emissions reductions), and ensure incentives for
compliance to any internationally-binding agreements (Bodansky, 2004). Bodansky (2011)
points out that in some international agreements—such as arms control agreements and trade—
each state engages because participation delivers benefits (which individual actors or groups of
actors try to maximize).
Climate negotiations have difficulty fulfilling this contractual role for several reasons.
Complexity and the ability of a small number of states to block progress in decisions (e.g. no
voting rules in the UNFCCC) present challenges. Perhaps the largest challenge for a contractual
role of the international community is that major emitters (US and China notably) see no
incentive for reciprocal commitments, playing out larger geopolitical shifts on the stage of the
climate negotiations. As Bodansky (201:8) states “Climate change implicates virtually every area
of domestic policy, including industrial, agricultural, energy, transportation, and land-use policy.
As a result, the climate-change regime raises much greater domestic sensitivities than other
international regimes, which have a more limited scope.” Related to this, CBDRR can lead to
6 The remaining part of this section draws on an analysis of the Durban Platform of Action provided by the Harvard
Project on Climate Agreements.
19
outcomes where the distribution of benefits is highly unequal and States that receive fewer
benefits prefer no agreement to an inequitable one (for which they could be heavily criticized
domestically) (Brams and Taylor, 1996).
Prescriptive role: Weak on participation, weak on compliance
National legal systems are based on a set of norms that guide interactions among actors and
assign consequences should those norms be violated. In the international climate policy
discussions, the prescriptive role strives to achieve the “right” solution to avoid dangerous
climate change and impose this solution, even if participating states do not agree with the
prescription. Internationally, it is difficult to claim analogous institutions which can enforce
prescriptions and divvy out rewards and penalties. Bodansky (2004) notes the example of the
BASIC proposal (equitable sharing of the atmospheric space, with significant distributional
implications for major industrial emitters), and Palau´s request to the International Court of
Justice for an advisory opinion on state obligations to reduce GHGs. The latter allows rules to be
defined for States without a negotiations process (Bogdandy and Venzke, 2011). A prescriptive
role may shape international public opinion, but it is shackled by lack of means to enforce
compliance or encourage participation.
Facilitative role: Strong on participation, opportunity to ratchet up compliance
The UNFCCC is mandated to play a catalytic role in global efforts to ameliorate climate change
and its negative impacts. Much is underway at local (e.g., cities), national and regional levels to
mitigate GHGs which include the public and private sectors, civil society and other key
stakeholders. The UNFCCC process, as well as the larger international community, can play a
role in facilitating such activities around mitigation and adaptation (Schreurs 2008; Victor,
2011). The “catalytic role” also represents and improvement over business-as-usual: in spite of
widespread criticism, COPs are the stage upon which States make financial commitments for
climate-related investments, raise levels of ambition around GHG reductions, reach consensus on
areas of activity that require action and raise public awareness of the problem (which may
pressure States domestically to take action). In this way, the UNFCCC and international
community help ensure that the possibility to stay within a 2 degree scenario is not completely
precluded in the future, and may facilitate achieving a 3 or 4 degree world (as sub-optimal as the
consequences will be for all States, particularly vulnerable ones) rather than a 5 to 7 degree
world along current business-as-usual pathways.
Bodansky (2011) argues that a hybrid of the contractual and facilitative roles looks promising for
progress on reducing GHGs. This could involve “a core agreement and a number of optional
annexes among which countries could pick and choose. For example, one annex could consist of
Kyoto-style emissions targets and another could take the form of a schedule listing national laws
that countries commit to implement. The result would be a “house with many rooms” in which
all countries could find a place” (Bodansky, 2011:9). Such a mixed approach could allow
participating states to go at different paces as they reduce GHGs, provide flexibility and public
recognition for progress, and encourage participation and compliance. Bodansky notes that it is
possible to pursue a contractual approach—hard to achieve politically but with the benefit of
preventing dangerous climate change—as well as the mixed facilitative/contractual approach
which is less ambitious but politically more attainable (Bodansky 2011:9).
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Conclusions
To date, efforts to significantly slow and reduce global GHGs emissions have been halting at
best, accompanied by growing scientific consensus that society is already beginning to face
limits to the degree it can adapt to climate change. It is not lack of scientific evidence that
hinders progress in reducing the drivers of climate change: Rather, myopic maximization of
national interests, ignoring systemic risk, and favoring a short-term and reactive approach to
risks—ironically in the name of (sustainable) development—have led governments to treat
international climate negotiations as a forum for carrying out global geopolitics rather than to
meaningfully manage and reduce the fundamental risks of climate change.
Global efforts to curb the drivers of climate change have been shackled by disagreements over
differentiated responsibilities (e.g. whether only historical emitters have to mitigate, or also up-
and-coming industrializing countries), and shifting geopolitics which give these newly
industrializing countries more power internationally (Carter et al. 2011; Banerjee 2012). Those
countries with the most to lose from climate change—vulnerable, mostly developing or least
developed countries—have the least ability to influence global emissions (Ruhl, 2012). Further,
climate policy and decisions about investment in development are made in highly uncertain
conditions where both the benefits and costs of a particular climate policy (such as mitigating
GHG emissions vis-à-vis the pursuit of standard fossil-fuel intensive energy policy) are unknown
(Anda et al., 2009; Paoli, 1997).
Although regional solutions or “coalitions” of willing States may be appropriate for some forms
of climate policy—particularly efforts to manage risks of climate variability like extreme
weather events which may grow in magnitude and frequency with climate change—the
underlying systemic risk of climate change can only effectively be addressed by global-scale
reduction of GHGs concentrations in the atmosphere.
Ingredients for Success
Success in addressing climate change is, simply defined, to sufficiently slow and reduce the
drivers of climate change—the set of GHG emissions associated with carbon-intensive
anthropogenic activities—at scale and in time to allow natural and social systems to adjust
without major disruption to food security or sustainable development (UN, 1992, Article 2).
Success in managing climate change risk would mean that the anticipated negative impacts could
be contained or reduced while shifting gradually to new forms of organization that will enable
humans to continue living in balance with new states of climate in the future.
“Both causes and solutions for loss and damage are found in social-climate interactions. From this
perspective, loss and damage from climate change is essentially an anthropogenic phenomenon, with social roots as
well as social solutions. Understanding the causes of loss and damage – anthropogenic climate change and the way
climate change impacts interact with elements of human society – is at the foundation of all policy and efforts to
address it. Unfortunately, to date, neither the concept of social vulnerability or social resilience has yet led to
policies or practices that have significantly reduced losses or damages related to climatic stressors in much of the
world. This is in part because of a continuing scientific and policy emphasis on the biophysical processes, rather
than how these processes interact with human society. There is a bias in the pervading neoliberal economic regime
that privileges economic growth over sustainable development.” (Oliver-Smith et al., 2012)
21
Ingredients for success are clear but challenging to attain due to the nature of the approach to
achieving GHG emissions through international negotiations involving all or almost all countries
of the world: participation and compliance by the most significant polluters is the key to success
in reducing as much as possible the drivers of global climate change.
Limiting the extent of anthropogenic climate change: Mitigation of GHG emissions
In spite of the challenges outlined above, progress can and must be made in both reducing GHG
emissions and dealing with the consequences of climate change impacts. The international
community has a role to play in both of these tasks.
The Durban Decision (COP17, December 2011) allowed for the possibility of another protocol
(building on and departing from the Kyoto Protocol model) to provide participation and
compliance of major emitters. The Durban Decision also open the way for another legal
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force to guide discussions on emissions reductions,
and to be concluded no later than 2015 and coming into effect in 2020. The agreement in the
climate negotiations showed a combination of a contractual and facilitative role. A new climate
agreement will need to be as focused and contractual as possible, but as comprehensive and as
voluntary as necessary to make progress. Key issues include whether or not a new agreement has
legally binding or voluntary status (participation), and the degree to which reporting and
monitoring (compliance) is voluntary or mandatory (and subject to international review). There
is scope for international diplomacy and leadership—as witnessed at COP16 led by Mexico and
COP17 led by South Africa—to foster solutions that balance the need for participation and
compliance with geopolitical realities and State self-interest.
However, the international community can only serve as a conduit for States. The large
emitters—the United States and other industrialized countries, and China, India and emerging
economies—must see it in their own interest to transform from carbon-intensive economic
models to low-carbon pathways. For success, ways must be found for states to take action
because it benefits their power incentives, their domestic constituencies, and their economic
priorities. The local interactions of climate change and society may influence these incentives
and are difficult to make global inferences against without an analysis of political economy. For
example, retreating polar ice could provide incentives and disincentives for lower GHG
emissions: Thawing permafrost is already causing a dozen or so native Alaskan villages to
undertake community relocation; but open summer passage across the polar region could also
provide access to new mineral and other resources, and have strategic military or other values.
Time scales also prove a challenge: GHGs today will not translate for some time into benefits for
nation states. Due to large uncertainties and the dilemma of managing global public goods,
incentives for forging low-carbon pathways could thus likely come from outside of the climate
change realm, such as the race for non-carbon energy sources and energy independence.
Except for the emergence of an alternative to the current nation-state, the ultimate responsibility
for managing the risks of climate change lies with the major emitting nations of the world, and
the speed and efficacy of their commitment and compliance in reducing GHG emissions will
determine to a large extent the opportunities for averting a climate crisis which could curb or
prevent sustainable development both in their own countries as well as in vulnerable developing
countries in the future.
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Adaptation, limits to adaptation, and loss and damage: Managing the negative impacts of
climate change
The international community has already and will continue to achieve success in facilitating
enhanced understanding, policy coherence, and implementation of means to address the negative
impacts of climate change. In spite of the challenges, international and national policy fora, as
well as communities of policy, science, and practice have many tools to help them begin to
improve capacity to deal with the negative impacts of climate change. Tapping into and jump-
start action in professional and practitioner communities and processes should be an essential
next step for the UNFCCC process. Progress has been and will continue to be achieved in areas
such as finance (Green Climate Fund), technology (Technology Facility), capacity building,
planning (National Adaptation Planning processes), adaptation (Cancun Adaptation Framework)
and a wide array of risk management measures to both facilitate adaptation as well as to help
manage risk when limits to adaptation are approached or passed (loss and damage).
Facilitate a range of approaches and tools for managing risks of climatic stressors
The international community can in coming years foster progress in managing climate change
risk in sustainable, resilient, incentive-compatible ways. The Cancun Adaptation Framework
(2010) recognized “the need to strengthen international cooperation and expertise to
understand and reduce loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate
change, including impacts related to extreme weather events and slow onset events ” (UNFCCC,
2010). Paragraph 28(a) of the Cancun Adaptation Framework invites views and information on
possible approaches to address loss and damage, including a climate risk insurance facility (para
28(a)):
“Options for risk management and reduction; risk sharing and transfer mechanisms such
as insurance, including options for micro-insurance; and resilience building,
including through economic diversification” (para 28(b))
“Approaches for addressing rehabilitation measures associated with slow onset events”
(para 28(c)).
The Cancun Adaptation Framework asked the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) to
make recommendations on loss and damage to the Conference of the Parties for its consideration
at COP 18 (para 29), as well as to strengthen international cooperation and expertise to
understand and reduce loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change,
including impacts related to extreme weather events and slow onset events (para 25).
Challenges of addressing loss and damage from extreme weather events
The burden of climate change—and the potential that it will severely constrain sustainable
development in the future—is not evenly distributed across the world because of differing
exposures, vulnerabilities and coping capabilities. Because the risks often fall more heavily on
those least able to reduce or recover from them, the UNFCCC and wider international
community have been exploring ways to assist the most vulnerable people and countries. All
countries will require pathways that lead to a more climate resilient development in the face of
potentially growing weather extremes and incremental, profound shifts in natural systems, like
sea level rise and desertification driven by climate change.
23
The international community can help foster proactive planning and management of climate-
related stressors as a central part of decision making now and in the future (box 5). This will
become increasingly necessary because patterns of loss and damage related to climate change
threaten to derail climate resilient development in many parts of the world. Delays in action will
worsen the plight of developing countries and further raise the cost of taking necessary action.
Box 5. Strategies for managing weather extremes
Strategies are needed to manage unexpected shocks from weather extremes that complement and facilitate the
design of strategies to address longer-term incremental loss and damage associated with climate change. Risk
assessment as required by insurance approaches can help identify climate stressors and thresholds. Insurance can
help manage loss and damage from weather extremes in ways that bolster rather than diminish efforts to achieve
climate resilient development.
Insurance-related approaches are designed for managing losses and damages caused by events which cannot be
foreseen where and when they occur. Prudently employing a combination of insurance-like approaches/solutions
with risk reduction measures, such as early warning, education, infrastructure strengthening and maintenance and
livelihood strengthening, creates a space of reduced societal disruption when extreme weather events happen.
Approaches that manage unexpected extremes can create a buffer for developing countries (i.e. by providing
financial liquidity through fast payouts immediately after a loss event), and help the international community
better plan issues like financial needs (for adaptation and managing loss and damage). The convention could
establish a global climate risk insurance facility coordinated internationally but operationalized through a series of
regional risk management platforms which could receive funding from sources such as the Green Climate Fund,
established at COP 16, Parties, in decision 1/CP.16 as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the
Convention under Article 11 (UNFCCC, 2010).1The climate risk insurance facility could incentivize loss
reduction and resilience-building, create more certainty in investing and other decision making, and facilitate the
provision of timely finance to prepare for and recover from extreme weather events that would be carried out in
the regional risk management platforms.
Insurance-related approaches, in combination with a wide range of other approaches at the local, national,
regional and international levels, can contribute to creating a space of certainty within which it is safe to make
investments in climate resilient development and thus must be part of a comprehensive strategy to manage
climate-related stressors now and in the future.
In the recent past, a wide variety of insurance and other risk transfer mechanisms have been introduced at
different scales in emerging markets, including inter alia catastrophe risk insurance facilities at the national and
regional level, catastrophe bonds, solidarity funds, and a variety of other financial risk transfer measures.
Combining private or public-privately supported insurance with other forms of social protection at the local level
can help low-income people to better absorb shocks. Including risk transfer mechanisms in national budgets can
contribute to climate resilient development. At the regional and international level, countries can create insurance
pools that build on solidarity concepts to share and transfer loss and damage from extreme weather events.
As the hazard situation for the most vulnerable people in developing countries is in many instances increasing due
to processes they have not caused themselves, in the interest of fairness, countries, which have contributed to a
larger share of human induced climate change, should consider supporting risk management activities of the most
vulnerable._____________________________
1 The Fund aims to support programmes and projects that limits and reduce greenhouse gas emissions in
developing countries in order to move towards low-emission and climate-resilient development (see
http://gcfund.net/about-the-fund/mandate-and-governance.html).
A role for the Convention in managing climate risks
The Convention has a unique role to play in facilitating short and long term strategies to address
loss and damage. The international community in general (such as in operational activities and
24
policies), and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in particular (such as in a 2015
climate agreement) can facilitate enhanced risk management capacity which includes
assessment, assuring policy coherence, and catalyzing implementation. Global climate risk
management capacities—coordinated with climate policy and the UNFCCC but operationalized
elsewhere such as with the assistance of international financial institutions (IFIs) which have
pioneered such measures—could be implemented through regional risk management platforms
and could fulfill three functions to address loss and damage, and to also complement adaptation
and mitigation efforts:
Assess loss and damage. The climate risk insurance facility can provide guidelines for
assessing loss and damage. Technical assistance may involve pooling technical expertise
and collaborative networks worldwide, coordinating data repositories and encouraging
coherence across information frameworks (such as adequate standards for data gathering,
open source remote sensing, and other information needed to assess risk exposures) that is
sensitive to vulnerable groups and people.
Facilitate regional and international dialogue to advance policy coherence and
regulations on insurance-related measures that address loss and damage at the local,
national and regional levels. Such dialogue should improve conditions for regulators and
decision makers in developing countries to develop appropriate local, national and regional
financial risk management approaches including insurance. Policy coherence should
enhance consumer protection, links to resilience building and risk reduction, and links to
adaptation and national development planning processes.
Operationalize a global risk insurance facility through regional risk management to
address loss and damage, including regional risk insurance pools(along the lines of
those already in place or starting in the Caribbean, in Southeast Europe, and in the Pacific)
which on the longer term could become part of a future global system for managing
weather extremes. This operationalization would include appropriate financial and other
support. These regional platforms can provide technical assistance to facilitate appropriate
combinations of insurance measures with other tools to address the impacts of extreme
weather events. Enable systematic capacity development for risk management tools and
expertise within governments and civil society, particularly through the use of country or
sectoral risk officers. Capacity development could include participatory design processes
so that approaches to address loss and damage including insurance complement and
strengthen social safety networks and other resilience-building measures.
Outlook
It is clear that without the commitment of major emitters to both reduce GHG emissions and
share the benefits of doing so with less-emitting but more vulnerable countries, it will be difficult
if not impossible to reduce GHGs at scale and in ways that avoid dangerous anthropogenic
climate change. The results of moving beyond a 2°C /1.5°C limit, or towards even a 4° scenario
as science currently indicates, are that sustainable development could be severely constrained
and even undone.
25
The international community can play a role of facilitating contracts which ensure high
participation and compliance (difficult to date due to conflicting State interests), one that
imposes norms and prescriptions (limited in effecting wider participation or compliance), and
one that facilitates joint actions (successful to date in addressing risks, but less so in achieving
GHG reductions). As we move towards the landmark year 2015—when the post-2015
sustainable development agenda will be set, and when the next international climate agreement is
anticipated—it will be essential that both contractual and facilitative roles be pursued by the
international community. Much can be achieved in terms of enhancing risk management
activities and capacity—such as calls for regional platforms, insurance pools, enhanced social
safety nets through international cooperation. To the degree that it can also encourage norms
without dampening participation, a prescriptive role can also be played.
The greatest opportunities for progress in reducing climate change risks lie in aligning national
interests with GHG reductions. National action will also be crucial in practical and leadership
terms, particularly in large, high-emissions countries like the United States, China, and India.
Although regional solutions or “coalitions” of willing States may be appropriate for some forms
of climate policy—particularly efforts to manage risks of climate variability like extreme
weather events which may grow in magnitude and frequency with climate change—the
underlying systemic risk of climate change can only effectively be addressed by global-scale
reduction of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. It may emerge that coalitions of willing
States can make progress in particular areas as a starting point to strengthening overall long-term
commitment to lowering GHGs. Technology may emerge that facilitates the lowering of GHGs,
or other as yet unforeseen developments may make it possible to achieve drastically lower
GHGs. But without a profound slow-down and then reduction of GHGs in the atmosphere,
climate-related risks will continue to place a drag on, and in some places un-do, hard-won
advances in, economic and social development worldwide.
In conclusion, the core ideas of this paper bear repeating: Climate change risk poses a severe
threat to future sustainable development unless anthropogenic climate change and development
models which drive GHG emissions are reconciled. The ultimate responsibility for managing the
risks of climate change lies with the major emitting nations of the world, along with a proactive
international community that facilitates and encourages their actions. The speed and efficacy of
these nations’ commitment and compliance in reducing GHG emissions will determine to a large
extent the opportunities for averting a climate crisis which could curb or prevent sustainable
development both in their own countries as well as in vulnerable developing countries in the
future.
26
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