cleavage theories: how globalization changes the …paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_16430.pdf · 1...
TRANSCRIPT
1
Cleavage Theories:
How Globalization Changes the Basque Party System
Oliver Strijbis
University of Hamburg
and
Rafael Leonisio
University of the Basque Country
Paper prepared for the IPSA World Conference, Madrid, June 18-21, 2012.
Abstract
Recent studies have demonstrated that globalisation has led to a new cleavage between
proponents and opponents of cultural demarcation in various Western European countries.
This paper asks about the effects of globalisation on party systems which were already
characterised by a cultural cleavage between ethnic minorities and majorities before
globalisation. The paper tries to answer this question by applying different interpretations of
cleavage theory to electoral politics in the Basque Country. It is shown globalisation in
ethnically divided polities globalisation does not lead to a new political cleavage but impacts
on the existing ones.
2
Introduction
Despite its central place in political science the study of party system change is marked by
theoretical monotony. Since the seminal article of Martin Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan
(1967) large scale party system change is primarily explained with the cleavage approach. Its
main contender, rational choice institutionalism, which emphasizes the impact of the electoral
law, cannot be considered a comprehensive alternative theory, and alternative theories are
largely absent.1 Despite the limitations of approaches that emphasize the role of the electoral
law, the large bulk of the theoretical debate within the study of party systems has focused on
the relative importance of cleavages vs. electoral laws. Furthermore, scholars primarily
interested in the explanation of a national party system or the success of party families have
understood cleavage structures and electoral systems as the two main and largely autonomous
sources of the configuration of party systems.2
Leaving the partial challenge by rational choice institutionalism at side, the cleavage approach
has clearly been the dominant comprehensive account of party system change. On the one
hand this is the merit of Lipset and Rokkan's path-breaking work. On the other hand, the
dominance of the cleavage approach is due to its ambiguousness. It is this ambiguousness that
has allowed scholars to interpret the "cleavage theory" in a way that largely explains the
specific party system configuration of any party system under investigation. Hence, in order
to further develop theories of party system change it is important to surpass the ambiguity in
the cleavage literature by putting different interpretations of the cleavage approach against
each other. In this paper we will try to do a step in this direction by proposing three
interpretations of the cleavage theory or what might be called three different "cleavages
theories". The three theories deviate from each other with respect to their conceptualization of
change as a bottom-up vs. top-down process and the relevance of the strength of state-
boundaries for the formation of cleavages. 1 Rational choice institutionalism offers an alternative theory to explain variance in the number of parties, but
has little to say about the ideological configuration of the party system. Classical references are Duverger (1966),
Sartori (1997), and Cox (1997). See also Hug (2001) for a rational choice perspective on party formation and
Selb (2012) for a rational choice explanation of dynamic effects of electoral law. Downsian "spatial voting
theory" (Downs 1957) does not offer an account for party system change either, but it can be integrated into both
bottom-up and top-down approaches (see below). 2 On the study of party families see among others: Gould (1999) on the Liberals; Frey (2009), Kalyvas (1996),
and van Kersbergen (1995) on the Christian Democrats; Przeworski (1985), Bartolini (2000), and Kitschelt
(1988) on the Social Democrats; Bull (1995), Fennema and Waller (1991) on Communists; De Winter (1998)
and Tronconi (2009) on Regionalists; Urwin (1980) on Peasant Parties; Müller-Rommel (1998) on the Greens;
Ignazi (1992), Betz (2003), and Borschnier (2010) on the Populist Right.
3
The second aim of this article is contextualize cleavage theory to the process of globalisation
and its effect on party system change in ethnically divided polities. The impact of
globalization on party systems is one of the most fundamental questions for political scientists
today. It has been well understood for ethnically rather homogenous countries, but its impact
has been largely neglected in the realm of ethnically divided polities. Applying a new
structuralist interpretation of cleavage theory and contrasting it with alternative
interpretations, this paper tries to shed light on the impact of globalisation on party system
change in ethnically divided polities. The basic idea is that the way globalisation changes the
party system in the context of countries that have been ethnically heterogeneous already
before the recent wave of globalization is very different from that in historically
homogeneous countries.
Our analysis will consist of a "within-case" comparison of a particularly hard case: the
Basque party system. The emphasis will be on historical variation in structural conditions,
changes in political preferences among the population, and electoral choices. We will make
use of a wide variety of data sources including textual data, survey data, and data from
administrative sources.
The article is organized as follows. In a first section we elaborate on the cleavage theory. In a
second section we discuss the impact of globalisation on social and cultural structure as well
as the institutional setting in the Basque country. In the third section we describe the case
selection, data collection and methodological choices to our empirical analysis. In the fourth
section we provide the results of the empirical analysis. We conclude that in order to further
develop cleavage theory and understand the impact of globalisation on party system change in
ethnically divided polities future studies should focus on the conditions under which different
cleavage theories apply.
Cleavage theories
According to the famous theory of Lipset and Rokkan (1967:50) “the party systems of the
1960's reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920's”.
According to the concept of 'cleavage' advocated by Bartolini and Mair (1990:215; also
Bartolini 2000:16–17), a cleavage can be understood as the congruence of social structure,
values and preferences, and political organisations. Hence, the empirical observation of
stability in the party systems according to Bartolini and Mair's conceptualisation of the
cleavage concept can only be understood as caused by stasis at all three levels. Simultaneous
stability at the level of structure, preferences, and organisation, however, is rather rare. In
4
many cases the status quo is undermined by social change. For instance, in most European
countries deindustrialization has transformed the social stratification of the population. Hence,
economic transformation has restructured the social constituencies from which the political
parties traditionally draw their voters.
At least three different plausible interpretations of Lipset and Rokkan in such a situation of
structural change are possible.3 The first scenario is what we might call the structuralist
interpretation of the cleavage theory. This structuralism emphasizes the determinative role of
social structure on the evolution of voter values and preferences, and the adaptation of the
parties’ platforms to new voter demands. The structuralist theory contrasts with at least two
alternative interpretations of cleavage theory. Both come up with a different hypothesis on the
effect of structural change on the party system. The first theory, which we will call exit-voice
theory of cleavages (EVTC), also emphasizes the impact of structural change but holds that
this change might not necessarily lead to realignment but might also lead to a decoupling of
structure and electoral behaviour. The second of these two theories is a 'top-down'
interpretation of the cleavage theory, which posits that structural change might have little
impact on parties systems. Instead it argues that parties 'organize out' certain issues and so-
doing politicize other topics. Hence, we call this approach the organizational cleavage theory
(OCT).
The structuralist cleavage theory
Key to any structuralist theory is its conceptualization of 'structure'. The concept has meant
many different things in different disciplines. What has been common to all different
understandings is that structure refers to stability in the relationships between elements of a
whole (Piaget 1971). If such a general understanding is applied to sociology, however, and
the focus is narrowed to social structure it refers to the relative stability of relationships
between individuals (Easton 1990). However, there is more to the term structure. If it pointed
merely to relatively stable relationships between individuals social structure could be used as
a synonym to similar concepts such as 'organization' and would be of little analytical value
(Boudon 1971:18–19). Contrary to 'organization', 'social structure' refers to something more
fundamental in the sense of being less contingent, harder to change, and more latent.
Furthermore, the term 'social structure' seems to refer to a social force since it implies to have
a fundamental impact - it 'structures' - other aspects of social life (Sewell Jr. 1992:2). This
impact is fundamental because structure refers to "the tendency of patterns of relations to be
3 For the structuralist (bottom-up) and organizational (top-down) interpretations see Bornschier (2009, 2010).
5
reproduced, even when actors engaging in the relations are unaware of the patterns or do not
desire their reproduction" (Sewell Jr. 1992:3).
The alleged stability and hard to change nature of structures has provoked the critique of
constructivism that structure is an essentializing concept disregarding the constructed
character of all social life. However, 'structure' should be understood neither as purely
material nor entirely virtual. Instead it should be understood as pointing to a duality of
objective and subjective features (Giddens 1986). A duality that by Bourdieu has probably
most influentially been conceptualized as the 'habitus', which assumes a strong mutual
interrelationship between the objective conditions and its perception by the individual
(Bourdieu 1998). Hence, structures are best understood as "(...) sets of mutually sustaining
schemas and resources that empower and constrain social action and that tend to be
reproduced by that social action" (Sewell 1992, 19).4 It is due to this duality of material
conditions with mental schemes as one of its constituent features that structuralism understand
social structures as closely related to political preferences.
While the causal relationship between social structure and political preference is well
conceptualized by structuralist theory, the relation between political preferences and voting
behaviour is typically more implicit. Implicitly in many macro-sociological approaches to
voting behaviour the assumption is that in the long run issue voting is most important for
systematic changes in the party system.5 Hence, with respect to party competition
structuralism follows the spatial logic of party competition as formulated by Downs (see also
Bornschier 2010:69). To summarize, the new structuralist theory states that social structure
causally determines political preferences and that these preferences impact on electoral
choices. In the context of important structural change this might lead to what has been called
a realignment process. Since structural change can vary in tempo and profoundness, this
realignment process might vary from stasis to rapid change such as observed in several
Western European countries in the last decades.
4 The insight that resources - understood as materially existing media of power - alone do not contain any force
without being interpreted through mental schemas helps to avoid Marxist material determinism. On the other
hand the reference to the resource side of structure distinguishes new structuralism both from Lévy-Strauss' ideal
determinism and more recent sociological constructivism. 5 For instance Rogowski (1990:1–20) offers no account of how the political alliances that emerges from interest
constellations relative to free trade aggregate into its political organization. He simply assumes that they give
rise to 'cleavages' (in particular p. 20).
6
Organizational cleavage theory (OCT)
The organizational cleavage theory (OCT) consists of the most plausible reading of the
“freezing” hypothesis put forward by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). According to such a reading
the West European party systems have remained stable between the interwar period and the
1960s because the parties were able to stabilize their electorates through their mass
organizations (Mair 2001:28–33; Bornschier 2009). Parties, then, are able to create strong
bonds between representatives and voters through party identifications. Furthermore, through
socialization processes these bonds are transmitted over generations. Besides the creation of
party identities parties are able to 'organize out' certain issues while emphasizing others and
by so doing largely determine on which axis of competition elections are decided (Bornschier
2010). The stability of the party system is maintained since the parties are able to sustain their
bonds with the voters by emphasizing those conflicts, which have given rise to historical party
identifications.
This argument – that established parties are able to maintain their support by agenda setting –
rests on the assumption that only few issue dimensions can be salient for electoral politics at a
time. The argument is that voters might only be mobilised on very few issues. In its strongest
form it is assumed that there is a zero-sum relationship between cleavages (Kriesi and
Duyvendak 1995). Furthermore, it is assumed that established parties have an advantage in
agenda setting relative to challengers. This assumption is particularly emphasized by the
'cartelization theory' which states that established parties increasingly monopolize state
resources in order to secure their electoral support (Katz and Mair 1995). According to this
theory catch-all parties have lost mass membership, and since politicians have become
professionals, parties need to rely on state resources in order to run the campaigns that take
primarily take place in the mass media. In order to mutually secure these highly needed
resources the established parties form a cartel.
According to the OCT established parties are able to maintain electoral support despite
structural change. Hence, it is expected that social structure and electoral behaviour undergo a
process of dealignment. At the same time it is expected that the established parties are able to
set the political agenda and that this agenda is strongly restricted. Hence, it is assumed that
electoral competition takes place on those issues that are emphasized by the political parties.
This has two effects. First, it is expected that parties emphasize those issue dimensions on
which they are clearly opposed to each other, which should lead to the polarization of the
preferences on the issue dimension the established parties emphasize. Second, it is expected
that political preferences on the salient issue dimensions are strongly related the electoral
7
choices. In contrast, the relationship between social structure and voting decisions is expected
to be constantly weak.
Exit-voice theory of cleavages (EVTC)
While the structural and organizational interpretations of the cleavage theory differ in their
conceptualization of the causal relationship between social structure and political
organization, the exit-voice theory of cleavages (EVTC) focuses on the conditions under
which the relationship between social structure and political organization vary. The EVTC is
most strongly influenced by a strand of literature that has been developed through the most
profound examination with Stein Rokkan's writings (Bartolini 2000, 2005; Caramani 2004;
Kriesi 1998). It is no surprise that it is these authors that have been most aware of the dual
dimension of Rokkans' writings that are at the same time structuralist and historical
institutionalist. The way they have tried to solve the tension in Rokkans writings, which
oscillates between a structuralist and a historical institutionalist interpretation of party system
formation, is by also conceptualizing particularly influential political institutions as structures
(Bartolini 2000, 2005).
By emphasizing the capacity of political institutions to 'structure' electoral behaviour in a
similar way as cultural and economic structure, this theory can now theorize the impact of the
most important political institution in this context – the state – on electoral behaviour.6 So
doing this theory does not call into question Lipset and Rokkans' emphasis on the duality of
the economic and the cultural dimension implicit in their discussion of the national and
industrial revolution as two fundamental instances of structural change. Instead it only adds
that the cleavage formation, which has been so determinative for European party systems,
took place in the particular setting of consolidated nation-states. Once, however, the state
boundaries are 'restructuring', this dimension comes into play as an additional structural force.
Its main impact is that once state boundaries weaken citizens are less inclined into the
national political arena since the national cultural and economic structures loose impact on
their life.
By having the 'opportunity' to exit from the nation state they do not need to 'voice' their
political demands within the national political system. As a consequence, the cultural and
economic structures do not directly 'structure' political preferences and behaviour in such a
context. Hence, according to this approach one expects a dealignment between economic and
cultural structure and political behaviour when state boundaries loosen. At the same time it is
6 For the understanding of the political system as the most important 'structure' see Easton (1990).
8
assumed that in the context of weak state boundaries the relevance of regions is increasing
since they get more important in terms of the provision with public goods and economic
competition (Bartolini 2005:268–271). To the degree that these regional territorial boundaries
are congruent with cultural ones, it is therefore assumed that supranational integration goes
together with 'new' regionalism (Keating 2000).
Globalisation and party system change in divided societies
In an excellent review article, Brady et al. (2007) summarise the main results of the
globalisation research in economic and political sociology so far. They come to the
conclusion that there is today broad consensus that “since the 1960s, affluent democracies
have experienced a substantial increase in economic globalization” (2007, 314). This trend in
globalisation can been interpreted as a social revolution in a Rokkanian sense (Bartolini 2005,
Kriesi et al. 2008). Hence, globalisation is seen as such a fundamental historical juncture as
the national and industrial revolutions. Furthermore, to speak of globalisation as a social
revolution in a Rokkanian sense implies the idea that it fundamentally changes the social
structure of societies and that this will be accompanied by a change in the party systems.
The analysis of the impact of globalization on party systems has received quite some
attention. Maybe most noteworthy Kriesi et al. (2008) show that globalisation has led towards
an ‘ethnicization’ of politics (also Richmond 1984) with the result that party systems are
structured along two axis of competition in six Western European countries. According to
their analysis a cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation has created a new
cleavage dividing those striving for cultural demarcation and those for cultural openness,
meaning in particular preferences towards immigration and European integration (Kriesi et al.
2008, 4-14). This cleavage cross–cuts the still salient classical (economic) dimension between
economic liberalism and state intervention and so doing results in a two-dimensional
ideological space.7 While their study profits from an extremely well developed empirical
analysis it might not be that representative for European party systems in general. In
particular, it remains unclear how the new cultural cleavage impacts on party systems that are
historically structured along the centre-periphery cleavage.
7 In this ideological space the left occupies the position of those advancing internationalist values and leftist
economic policies, the liberals occupy a position also advance internationalist values but strive for economic
liberalism, and the new right advances cultural closure while being ambivalent on the economic dimension.
9
Globalization and structural change in ethnically divided polities
One of the main features of globalization in developed countries has been that it went together
with a decline in manufacturing (Brady et al. 2007:323). At the same time inequality between
countries has increased. In Europe globalisation has not only coincided with a general
increase of affluence as measured in GDP per capita, but also with a convergence of GDP per
capita. In particular in the European periphery the middle classes have – at least up to the
recent economic crisis – grown.
There are also some clear trends concerning the impact of globalization on cultural diversity.
On the one hand, the intensification of communication and mobility has the effect to lessen
the cultural distinctiveness between native groups. Under the impact of globalization the
number of languages spoken on a global scale, for example, is strongly diminishing (Harmon
and Loh 2010). Furthermore, the hegemony of Western culture in the realm of commerce
leads to a certain cultural congruence ("McWorldization"). Since this cultural convergence
does not take place between countries but also within societies, cultural distance is also
reduced between ethnic majority and minorities in ethnically divided societies.
On the other hand, increasing large-distant migration has increased cultural diversity in
immigration countries (Albrow 1996). Jointly, this has the effect that native ethnic minorities
are not only getting more similar in absolute terms, but also relatively. While in absolute
terms they get more similar since cultural boundaries between ethnic groups generally
decrease, in relative terms they get more similar since with large-distant migration
globalization adds a new source of cultural heterogeneity rendering cultural differences
between native ethnic groups rather secondary.
Finally, at the institutional level supranational integration can be considered a feature of
globalization (Kriesi et al. 2008, 3). In the context of Europe the most important development
in this respect is of course European integration. The process of European integration can be
conceptualized as process of state-building similar to that of the formation of the modern
nation-state. Obviously, the process of European integration remains in flux and the European
Union has not yet displaced the nation-state, but produced a complex multi-layered
institutional setting. By changing political competition to a multi-level game, European
integration has strengthened not only the supranational, but also the subnational arena. For
instance, European integration has strengthened regional minority representatives by
providing an opportunity to by-pass national governments and directly approach political
institutions of the EU such as the European Court of Justice or the European Commission
10
(Hooghe and Keating 2006). This seems to be congruent with the observation that ethnic
minorities tend to be in favour of further European integration.8
Globalization and structural change in the Basque Country
On the economic dimension globalization is associated with deindustrialization. The Basque
Country is traditionally the most industrialized region within Spain, but has undergone a
notable process of deindustrialization until the 1990s. At the same time the Basque country
has strongly profited from globalization, which can be deduced from spectacular rise in GDP
per capita (see Figure 1). Due to the strong economic growth and since also the middle classes
have profited from an improvement of living conditions globalisation has, in contrast to more
affluent polities in Western Europe, hardly produced losers. Consequently deindustrialization
has not produced a new political conflict, which can be deduced from the fact that the share of
opponents of European integration in the Basque Country has remained low until today.
Hence, instead of producing a new political conflict deindustrialization has changed the
structural conditions for the traditional economic cleavage between those in favor of more
state intervention and those for more economic liberalism.
Figure 1 about here
Cultural fragmentation in the Basque Country is produced by a sharp rise in immigration. The
share of foreigners in the Basque Country has risen from a low level around 1% in 1985 to
about 8% in 2010.9 But this share of immigrants in the Basque Country has, again in contrast
to more affluent regions in Western Europe, not led to a prominent conflict between those in
favor and those against migration. This is highlighted by the fact that only a minority
perceives immigration as one of the main problems in the Basque. In 2005 only about 1% of
the Basques perceived migration as a problem and also in 2009 only 5% of the Basques name
immigration as one of the three main problems (Euskobarometro 2005; 2009). This suggests
that immigration strengthens the trend towards cultural fragmentation and so-doing
undermines the structural basis of the Basque vs. Spanish conflict without leading towards a
new "cultural demarcation" cleavage. 8 The evidence so far largely rests on the pro-European integration preferences that are overwhelmingly adopted
by ethnic minority parties (for a review see Elias 2008:3–12). 9 It would be more precise to take the share foreign-born. Due to a lack of data availability we will, however,
stick to share of foreigners. Since naturalization laws in Spain are relatively strict we can, however, expect that
trends in the share of foreigners by large captures trends in the share of immigrant population.
11
It should also be noted that from a linguistic point of view cultural fragmentation has
remained weak. The Basque governments have attempted to foster the use of the Basque
language. Their education and communication policies that promote the use of the Basque
language had the intended effects to stabilize the share of inhabitants speaking Basque at
home (see Figure 2). However, cultural fragmentation has increased somewhat in that it has
led towards an increase in the share of Basque residents that understand both Spanish and
Basque. Hence, also the Basque nationalist language policies have lowered the linguistic
boundaries between the Spanish- and the Basque-speakers somewhat.
Figure 2 about here
Finally, also on the institutional level the impact of globalization has been profound without
producing a new axis of competition. Such as in most West European countries globalization
has went together with more supranational integration and devolution.10 In particular an
incremental process of devolution has shifted powers from the central state to the Basque
region (Martínez-Herrera 2002; Mansvelt Beck 2008). At the same time Spain integrated into
the European Union. In 1986 it became member of the European Economic Community and
belonged to the founding states of the European Union in 1993. Since then Spain is a full
member of the European Union and a founding member of the European Economic and
Monetary Union, which has introduced the common currency in 1999.
Figure 3 about here
While globalization is assumed to drive changes in the party system from the perspective of
structuralist cleavage theory and the EVTC, from the perspective of the organizational
cleavage theory (OCT) it is the discourse of the party elites that drives party system change.
In order to analyse the salience political parties attach to issue dimensions we use the data
provided by Leonisio and Strijbis (2011), which estimate the share of text related to issues of
nationalism and the left-right distinction. The political issues that have been put on the
political agenda by the party elites have varied across time (Figure 3). On average the
nationalist dimension has dominated the left-right dimension. During our period of
investigation the left-right dimension has been equally emphasized to the nationalist
dimension in both 1989 and the most recent decades. In 1989 the Basque Nationalist Party
10 On European trends in devolution see Hooghe et al. (2010).
12
and the Spanish Workers Party were forming a government coalition, while since 2008 the
economic crisis impacts on the political discourse. In 1999, however, the Basque dimension
has been highly salient due to the shift towards nationalist government coalitions that were
formed in fierce opposition to the pro-Spanish forces and ETA's break of the truce. Hence,
according to the OCT globalisation has, if anything, only impacted on the Basque party
system through changing the discourse of the political elites for instance when they have to
take a stand on the international financial crisis.
Data and method
In the previous sections we have elaborates laid out three different interpretations of cleavage
theory, the impact of globalisation on social structure in the Basque country, and the salience
Basque representatives attached to different issue dimension in the last twenty years. In the
next section we will present our empirical analysis of the impact of globalisation on the
Basque party system. Conducting a "within-case" comparison of the Basque Country has the
advantage that we can largely hold constant for the impact of the electoral system. This is
because the electoral system for the parliamentary elections of the Basque autonomous
parliament has remained quite stable.11 It counts three electoral districts with 25 seats each
and the electoral formula is d’Hondt. The only relevant change has been the electoral
threshold that has been decreased from 5% to 3% after the election of 1998. In the context of
this rather proportional electoral system we can assume strategic voting to remain at stable
levels (Selb 2009).
In our subsequent analysis we approach party system change by focusing on political
preferences and voting behaviour. For our analysis of the distribution of political preferences,
their relationship to class and cultural position, and electoral choices we rely on survey data.
We can rely on three surveys, which are the only ones that provide data on issue preferences
on the economic dimension. The three surveys are based on representative samples and have
been conducted 1989, 1999, and 2010. The datasets are from the “Survey on the Political and
Social Situation in the Basque Country 1989” (CIS 1975), the “Basque Version of the
European Values Survey in 1999” (EVS 1999), and the Euskobarometro 2010/2. The samples
consist of 2387, 1204, respective 1200 respondents and are restricted to the Basque
autonomous community.
11 This is only true if the prohibition of the political ally of ETA, HB (People's Unity), is not understood as part
of the electoral system (on the contesting parties see below). In order to not bias the analysis we included
abstention and blank votes as categories of electoral choice in the empirical analysis (see below).
13
Our independent and dependent variables are operationalised as follows. In order to measure
the cultural position of a respondent we rely on questions of language proficiency. This
indicator is able to grasp the respondents' cultural position rather well, since cultural distance
in the Basque Country is to an important degree related to the Basque language. In order to
grasp the socio-economic structure we use a slightly adapted version of Oesch’s 8-scale class
scheme (Oesch 2006) that includes the classical distinctions based on employment
relationships as proposed by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992:37), but also the segmental
distinctions based on the ‘work logic’ (see the Apendix).12 Latter is important in order to test
whether deindustrialization did not dissolve the political oppositions between social classes
but changed it into the opposition between social segments.
The existing literature suggests that the Basque parties compete on two main dimensions: the
economic left-right division and the cleavage between Basque nationalists and those loyal to
the Spanish state (Llera 2000, 1989, 1994; Linz 1986; Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1986).
Since, as we have argued in the previous chapter, globalisation did not lead to a new salient
issue dimension, we also focus the nationalist and economic dimensions of political
competition. In order to measure policy preferences along these two issue dimensions we run
principal component factor analyses with varimax rotation on items referring to policy
preferences, a well-established technique in electoral studies (e.g. Benoit and Laver, 2005;
Kriesi et al., 2008). We rely on two items which we presume correlate to the economic issues
of the traditional class cleavage and items that refer to the Basque nationalist conflict.
Appendix A lists the items and shows the results of the factor analyses. As expected, for each
of the factor analyses we find that the items measure two policy dimensions. The first factor
summarizes the items that refer to the “Basque conflict”, while the second factor summarizes
the two items that refer to economic policies. In our analyses we will use the first factor as a
variable which measures stances towards Basque nationalism and the second factor as a
variable which measures the respondents’ policy positions on the economic left-right
dimension. This indicator for ideological positions is superior to values on scales of self-
placements, since self-placements on the left-right scale might measure features distinct to
economic policy preferences (on the meaning of “left” and “right” see Knutsen 1998; Freire
2006).
12 His 8-class scheme is itself a reduced version of his 17-class scheme. The most important deviation of our
adaption to the original class scheme is that we do not - due to data restrictions - distinguish between work logic
at the level of the skilled workers.
14
In order to measure electoral behaviour we can rely on questions regarding party choice
during the regional elections in 1986 and 2009. Unfortunately, we cannot rely on post-
electoral surveys since they did not include questions on preferences on economic issues. The
time lag between the actual voting and the conduction of the survey (in particular for the 1986
election) is not ideal because voters might have forgotten their electoral choices. The time lag
in this case is, however, not that problematic since the political context did not significantly
change in this period.
In order to measure the effect of policy preferences on electoral choices we run multinomial
logistic (MNL) regressions. Given the probable violation of the independence of irrelevant
alternatives hypothesis, classical statistics guides seem to propose multinomial probit (MNP)
(e.g. Kennedy 2008:244–245). As Dow and Endersby (2004) have shown, however, within
the limits of typical data (a small sample and choice among few parties), MNP might be
susceptible to a number of estimation problems while the violation of the independence of
irrelevant alternatives might be neither particularly restrictive nor relevant. This, they argue,
is particularly true if the electoral choices are relatively fixed and stable (Dow and Endersby,
2004: 112), as is the case in the Basque Country (indeed, clearly more so than in the cases in
which Dow and Endersby successfully apply MNL).
Results
In the second section of this article, hypotheses on the relationships of social structure,
political preferences, and political discourse on party systems have been deduced. In the third
chapter the most important changes in social structure and the political discourse of the
Basque elites have been sketched. In this chapter we will test the hypotheses of the different
'cleavage theories' on the case of the Basque Country. The analysis will contain two parts.
First, we will focus on the determinants of the political preferences among the population.
Thereafter we will focus on the determinants of electoral decisions. But before conducting the
empirical analysis let's formulate the expectations on the basis of the theories (second section)
and the structural change and political debate that have taken place during the three time
points under consideration (Table 1).
Table 1 about here
From the structuralist theory the decrease in cultural distinctiveness between members of the
native ethnic minority and majority should lead towards depolarization in the demand for
15
policies on the cultural dimension. Since ethnic groups get culturally more similar we can also
expect that the demands concerning culture politics becomes more similar. Furthermore, we
can hypothesise that the stronger the trends in deindustrialization and the growth of the
middle classes, the more preferences concerning economic politics converge. This implies
that we can expect the left-right positions (in its traditional economic meaning) to become less
pronounced with deindustrialization. Hence, we also expect a depolarization in the political
demand along the economic dimension. Since we posit a strong congruence between structure
and preferences we do, however, not hypothesize a dealignment process. Instead, we expect
that social stratification and cultural traits remain strongly connected to political preferences
in the context of globalization. Furthermore, since we expect the electoral behaviour to be
motivated by the structurally determined politically preferences, we assume a strong
correlation between political preferences and party choice throughout all periods.
According to the OCT it is the political discourse that determines on which axis of
competition are salient and therefore polarized. Hence, according to the discourse of the
political representatives (Figure 3) both the economic and the nationalist dimension should be
moderately polarized in 1989 and 2010. For 1999 it is expected that preferences are
unpolarized on the economic dimension and strongly polarized on the nationalist dimension.
Furthermore, OCT assumes a rather week and if anything decreasing relationship between
structural position and political preferences, respective voting behaviour for all three time
points.
According to the exit-voice theory of cleavages (EVTC) we expect, due to the one-
dimensional path towards devolution and supranational integration, a depolarization on the
left-right dimension and increasing polarization on the nationalist dimension. This is in line
with some literature on ethnic minorities according to which a new regionalism or an ethnic
revival should be observed (Smith 1991; Hobsbawm 1990; Keating 2000; but see Strijbis
2011).13 Furthermore, according to the EVTC we can expect a weakening of the effect of
class on both political preferences and electoral decisions on the economic dimension, while
we expect an increasing impact of Basque language proficiency on nationalist preferences and
voting behaviour.
13 On the one hand it is assumed that European integration provokes a reconstruction of the cultural
distinctiveness of the peripheries (e.g. Smith 1992:62). On the other hand the strengthening of the sub- and
supranational level is perceived as a development that creates new opportunities for ethnic minority parties (De
Winter and Cachafeiro 2002).
16
Political preferences
Having summarized the expectations for Basque party politics according to the three theories
under consideration, let's focus now on the first dependent variable: political preferences.
Figure 4 depicts the distribution of the voters’ preferences over the three time points under
analysis. The distribution of the voters along these two dimensions is calculated as a Kernel
density function and presented as a three-dimensional contour plot (see Figures 4a-c). The
contours show the frequencies with which voters are positioned in a particular ideological
space. The boundaries of the plots are determined by the most extreme cases.
Figures 4a-c about here
Figure 4a shows the distribution of the voters in 1989. It gives the picture of an electorate that
is strongly polarized on the nationalist dimension and moderately on the economic left-right
dimension. On the nationalist dimension the distribution is bimodal and has a long tale to the
nationalist side. This means that while in 1989 the typical Basque citizen holds a moderate
position on the Basque nationalist dimension a significant minority holds more extreme
nationalist positions. On the left-right axis the peak is much higher, which indicates that the
preferences come closer to a normal distribution. Nevertheless, some minor peaks and
moderate long tails indicate that there is also some polarization on this dimension.
As our main focus is on the dynamic perspective it is now interesting to see the changes in the
ideological distributions of the voters that have taken place from 1989 over 1999 to 2010.14
The voters’ attitudes on the Basque-Spanish divide show very strong polarization on the
nationalist dimension. Figure 4b clearly shows three camps: a minor pro-Spanish one, a large
moderate Basque nationalist one, and a considerable extreme nationalist one. In 2010 the
distribution of the preferences is still bimodal showing strong polarization. Relative to 1999
the polarization on the nationalist dimension has, however, somewhat decreased. In particular
in 1999 the polarization is highest which is suggested by the fact that both peaks are clearly
separated from each other through few citizens in between. On the economic left-right
dimension we observe a trend towards depolarization. The trend can be deduced from the fact
that the tails get shorter from 1999 to 2010.
The development from moderate to very high, to high polarization on the nationalist
dimension goes against the structuralist theory, which predicts a steady process of
14 The differences in the values on the dimensions between the three time points cannot be interpreted - only the
overall distributions.
17
depolarization. Only the decrease in polarization between 1999 and 2010 is correctly
predicted by this approach. Exactly the opposite is true for the exit-voice theory which
predicts an "ethnic revival". This trend has, however, only taken place between 1989 and
1999. It has at least partly been reversed after. It is the OCT which comes closest to a correct
prediction of the temporal variance in preferences on the nationalist dimension. However,
according to this theory we would expect even less polarization on the nationalist dimension
in 2010.
The process of depolarization on the economic left-right dimension is in line with both the
structuralist and the exit-voice perspective. On the one hand depolarization goes together with
the deindustrialisation of the 1980s and early 1990s. On the other hand it is consistent with
the posited relationship between supranational integration and dealignment on the economic
dimension. It does, however, not go together with the hypothesis deduced from the OCT
according to which one would expect a resurgence of moderate polarization in 2010.
Voting behaviour
So far we have tested implications of three cleavage theories on the temporal variation of
political preferences. An additional piece of evidence to the explanation of party system
change in the Basque Country can be provided by the analysis of the relationship between
social structure, political preferences, and voting behaviour.
In order to be able to interpret temporal variance in voting behaviour it is necessary to have
basic knowledge about the Basque party system. The Basque Country (along with Navarra) is
the only Spanish Autonomous Community in which an average of seven political forces
compete successfully in obtaining parliamentary representation (Llera 2000). The relevant
political parties that contest Basque elections have underwent some change during the period
of analysis. Among the seven most relevant political parties are four Basque nationalist and
three Spanish loyalist. To the former belongs the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), which is
the most prominent political force in the Basque Country (Llera 2000). In fact, the PNV won,
with the exception of the Spanish national elections in 1993 and 2008, all elections held in the
Basque Country. It has led the Basque government from the beginning of the Basque
autonomy in 1979 until 2009, and has negotiated agreements with all of the Basque political
forces in various institutions. In 1986, the PNV split, and with Basque Solidarity (EA),
another moderate nationalistic party emerged. Although PNV and EA were initially rivals,
they have been strategic allies since 1994, sharing the duties of government and even forming
electoral coalitions.
18
Another important force among the Basque nationalists is the Izquierda Abertzale (Patriotic
Left), which organized itself as a large anti-system movement with roots in both nationalism
and extremist leftism (Mata, 1993). Its historical acronym is HB (People's Unity), although it
has several times changed its name such as in 1998 when it presented itself as ‘We Basque
Citizens’ (EH). The Izquierda Abertzale forms the political arm of the terrorist group ETA
and, due to its affiliation with the group, the party was banned in 2002. Since 2004 Aralar, a
political party that emerged from a strand that was critical to the violence of ETA within the
Izquierda Abertzale, has tried to mobilize the traditional electorate of the HB.
On the other side of the spectrum, there were three main parties in the non-nationalist field
during that period. The three branches of the national parties are the Basque section of the
People’s Party (PP), the United Left (IU), and the PSE-EE (Socialist Party of the Basque
Country - Basque Left), which is a merger of the Basque section of the Spanish Socialist
Worker’s Party and EE (Basque Left). Despite the fact that in theory IU is not considered
nationalistic, it has been a loyal ally of the PNV and the EA since 1998, joining them to form
part of the Basque government in 2001.
Table 2 about here
Having described the offer-side of the electoral competition in the Basque Country we can
now go on to analyze variance in voting behavior in 1989 and 2009. Lets look first at the
bivariate analysis in Table 2. This analysis helps us to understand the changes in the strength
of the associations. Important results are that language proficiency is strongly related to
electoral behavior in 1986 and 2009 while occupation is not. Furthermore, on both
dimensions we can remark a decline in the association which is a sign of moderate
dealignment. With regard to the association between political preferences and electoral
choices we find the nationalist dimension clearly more salient than the economic dimension at
both time points. However, we find the economic dimension somewhat more salient in 2009
than in 1986 while the nationalist dimension somewhat less. In general, however, the
associations are remarkably similar between 1986 and 2009.
The results on voting behavior do not match perfectly with any of the three theories. On the
economic dimension we see something like a dealignment process combined with increasing
relevance of political preferences on this dimension, which seems to be most in line with the
OTC. On the cultural dimension, in contrast we find continuously strong relationships
between language proficiency, preferences on the nationalist dimension and electoral
19
decisions, which is most in line with the structural theory. The stability of the results is not in
line with the EVTC, according to which we would expect a decline in class voting over time.
Table 3 about here
The picture does not change if we look at the multivariate analysis (Table 3). It does,
however, show even more clearly than Table 2 that the cultural dimension is far more salient
than the economic axis of competition. This is clearly revealed by the fact that neither
occupational stratification nor preferences on economic issues are strongly related to electoral
choices if analyzed in multivariate models. In fact, the share of variance in voting decisions
which is correctly predicted by 'economic' variables is so low that one might question whether
the political space in the Basque Country is two-dimensional at all.
Once we focus entirely on the nationalist dimension we observe a long-term development that
is in line with the structuralist interpretation of the cleavage theory: depolarization at constant
levels of structural and ideological voting. However, the increase in polarization between
1986 and 1998 is in line with the OCT. Hence, one might conclude that the structuralist
cleavage theory is able to explain party system change in the long run while the OCT can
explain deviances from the structural pattern in the short run. For proponents of cleavage
theory this will come with no surprise – cleavage theory as formulated by Lipset and
Rokkanthis has always combined structural and organizational variables for the explanation
of party system change. However, as argued above, it has not been clear about when structural
and when organizational features are more important. The EVTC is an attempt to solve this
problem of 'overdetermination' by arriving at a synthesis of structural and organizational
cleavage theories. As this analysis has shown at least for the Basque case, however, the EVTC
has been a failed attempt.
Conclusion
Has this article added anything to the development of cleavage theory and hence to the
understanding of party system change? And has it helped to understand how globalization
affects party systems in ethnically divided polities? We think that the questions can be
answered with a qualified 'yes'.
First, we think that this article has added to theory development by disentangling different
interpretations of cleavage theories. In order to arrive at a parsimonious while at the same
time powerful theory of party system change these different 'cleavage theories' have to be
20
combined in a clever way. As this article has shown the exit-voice theory of cleavages has to
be regarded as a failed attempt in this direction. Hence, and here is an important limitation of
this article, such a synthesis still remains to be developed in the future.
Second, we think this article has helped to understand the impact of globalization on party
system change in divided polities by showing that it does not give rise to a new political
cleavage but impacts on existing ones. The article has provided some evidence that
globalization has, through deindustrialization and cultural fragmentation, decreased
polarization on the existing economic and the cultural axis of competition. However, much
empirical research remains to be conducted for a more authoritative test of our theory. Future
research should for instance include programmatic change of the political parties and assess
variance in structurally determined voting for more elections at different political levels.
Hence, this piece of research should be understood as only one piece of evidence in a much
larger project on party system change in general and party politics in ethnically divided
polities in particular.
21
Literature
Albrow, M. 1996. The Global Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bartolini, Stefano. 2005. Restructuring Europe. Centre Formation, System Building, and
Political Structuring between the nation state and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bartolini, Stefano. 2000. The Political Mobilisation of the European Left, 1860-1980; The Class Cleavage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bartolini, Stefano, and Peter Mair. 1990. Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: the Stabilisation of European Electorates, 1885-1985. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Betz, Hans-George. 2003. “The new politics of resentment: Radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe.” Comparative Politics 25(4):413–427.
Bornschier, Simon. 2010. Cleavage politics and the populist right: the new cultural conflict in Western Europe. Temple University Press.
Bornschier, Simon. 2009. “Cleavage Politics in Old and New Democracies.” Living Reviews in Democracy 1. Retrieved September 22, 2011 (http://democracy.livingreviews.org/index.php/lrd/article/viewArticle/lrd-2009-6).
Boudon, Raymond. 1971. The uses of structuralism. Heinemann. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1998. Praktische Vernunft: zur Theorie des Handelns. Suhrkamp. Brady, David, Jason Beckfield, and Wei Zhao. 2007. “The Consequences of Economic
Globalization for Affluent Democracies.” Annual Review of Sociology 33(1):313–334. Retrieved June 19, 2012.
Bull, Martin J. 1995. “The West European communist movement in the late twentieth century.” West European Politics 18:78–97.
Caramani, Daniele. 2004. The Nationalization of Politics; The Formation of National Electorates and Party Systems in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making votes count: strategic coordination in the world’s electoral systems. Cambridge University Press.
Dow, Jay K., and James W. Endersby. 2004. “Multinomial probit and multinomial logit: a comparison of choice models for voting research.” Electoral Studies 23(1):107–122. Retrieved June 20, 2012.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An economic theory of democracy. Harper. Duverger, Maurice. 1966. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern
State. Taylor & Francis. Easton, David. 1990. The analysis of political structure. Routledge. Elias, Anwen. 2008. Minority Nationalist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative
Study. Taylor & Francis. Erikson, Robert, and John H. Goldthorpe. 1992. The constant flux: a study of class mobility in
industrial societies. Clarendon Press. Fennema, Meindert, and Michael Waller. 1991. Communist parties in Western Europe:
decline or adaptation? Blackwell. Freire, André. 2006. “Bringing Social Identities Back In: The Social Anchors of Left-Right
Orientation in Western Europe.” International Political Science Review 27(4):359–378. Retrieved June 19, 2012.
Frey, Timotheos. 2009. Die Christdemokratie in Westeuropa: der schmale Grat zum Erfolg. Nomos.
Giddens, Anthony. 1986. The constitution of society: outline of the theory of structuration. University of California Press.
Gould, Andrew. 1999. Origins of liberal dominance: state, church, and party in nineteenth-century Europe. University of Michigan Press.
22
Gunther, Richard, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad. 1986. Spain after Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System. Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Harmon, David, and Jonathan Loh. 2010. “The index of linguistic diversity: A new quantitative measure of trends in the status of the world’s languages.” Retrieved June 18, 2012 (http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/handle/10125/4474).
Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1990. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hooghe, Liesbet, and Michael Keating. 2006. “Bypassing the nation-state? Regions and the EU policy process.” Pp. 269–286 in European Union: power and policy-making, edited by Jeremy John Richardson. Routledge.
Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Arjan H. Schakel. 2010. The Rise of Regional Authority: a Comparative Study of 42 Democracies. Taylor & Francis.
Hug, Simon. 2001. Altering party systems: strategic behavior and the emergence of new political parties in Western democracies. University of Michigan Press.
Ignazi, Piero. 1992. “The silent counter-revolution.” European Journal of Political Research 22(1):3–34.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 1996. The rise of Christian Democracy in Europe. Cornell University Press.
Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. 1995. “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy The Emergence of the Cartel Party.” Party Politics 1(1):5–28. Retrieved May 22, 2012.
Keating, Michael. 2000. The new regionalism in Western Europe: territorial restructuring and political change. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Kennedy, Peter. 2008. A Guide to Econometrics. MIT Press. Kersbergen, Kees van. 1995. Social capitalism: a study of Christian democracy and the
welfare state. Routledge. Kitschelt, Herbert. 1988. “Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive
Party Systems.” World Politics 40(2):194–234. Knutsen, Oddbjørn. 1998. “The Strength of the Partisan Component of Left-Right Identity A
Comparative Longitudinal Study of Left-Right Party Polarization in Eight West European Countries.” Party Politics 4(1):5–31. Retrieved June 19, 2012.
Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1998. “The transformation of cleavage politics The 1997 Stein Rokkan lecture.” European Journal of Political Research 33(2):165–185. Retrieved June 19, 2012.
Kriesi, Hanspeter, and Jan Willem Duyvendak. 1995. “National Cleavage Structures.” Pp. 3–25 in New Social Movements in Western Europe: a Comparative Analysis, edited by Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco Giugni. Routledge.
Leonisio, Rafael, and Oliver Strijbis. 2011. “Izquierda-Derecha vs Centro-Periferia: una aproximación al discurso de los partidos políticos vascos (1977-2009).” Revista Española de Ciencia Política (26):63–85.
Linz, Juan José. 1986. Conflicto en Euskadi. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe. Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan. 1967. “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter
Alignments. An Introduction.” Pp. 1–64 in Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, edited by Stein Rokkan and Seymour M. Lipset.
Llera, Francisco José. 1989. “Continuidad y cambio en la política vasca: notas sobre identidades sociales y cultura política.” Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas 47:107–135.
Llera, Francisco José. 2000. “Los gobiernos de coalición en el País Vasco.” in Coaliciones políticas y gobernabilidad, edited by Jordi Matas. Barcelona: ICPS.
23
Llera, Francisco José. 1994. Los vascos y la política. Bilbao: UPV. Mair, Peter. 2001. “The freezing hypothesis: An evaluation.” Pp. 24–41 in Party systems and
voter alignments revisited, edited by Lauri Karvonen and Stein Kuhnle. Routledge. Mansvelt Beck, Jan. 2008. “The Basque power-sharing experience: from a destructive to a
constructive conflict?” Nations and Nationalism 14(1):61–83. Retrieved June 22, 2012.
Martínez-Herrera, Enric. 2002. “From nation-building to building identification with political communities: Consequences of political decentralisation in Spain, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, 1978–2001.” European Journal of Political Research 41(4):421–453. Retrieved June 22, 2012.
Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand. 1998. “Explaining the electoral success of Green parties: a cross-national analysis.” Environmental Politics 7(4):145–154.
Oesch, Daniel. 2006. “Coming to Grips with a Changing Class Structure.” International Sociology 21(2):263 –288. Retrieved September 12, 2011.
Piaget, Jean. 1971. Structuralism. Harper & Row. Przeworski, Adam. 1985. Capitalism and Social Democracy. Cambridge University Press. Richmond, A.H. 1984. “Ethnic nationalism and postindustrialism.” Ethnic and Racial studies
7(1):4–18. Rogowski, Ronald. 1990. Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political
Alignments. Princeton University Press. Sartori, Giovanni. 1997. Comparative constitutional engineering: an inquiry into structures,
incentives, and outcomes. New York University Press. Selb, Peter. 2012. “Strategic adaptation to new electoral systems.” European Journal of
Political Research no–no. Retrieved June 19, 2012. Sewell Jr., William H. 1992. “A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation.”
American Journal of Sociology 98(1):1–29. Smith, Anthony D. 1991. National Identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press. Smith, Anthony D. 1992. “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity.” International
Affairs 68(1). Strijbis, Oliver. 2011. “From Native to Immigrant Minorities: Ethnic Mobilization in Western
Europe since World War I.” Unpublished Manuscript, University of St.Gallen. Tronconi, Filippo. 2009. I partiti etnoregionalisti: la politica dell’identità territoriale in
Europa occidentale. Il mulino. Urwin, Derek W. 1980. From ploughshare to ballotbox: the politics of agrarian defence in
Europe. Universitetsforlaget. De Winter, Lieven. 1998. “Conclusion: A Comparative Analysis of the Electoral, Office and
Policy Success of Ethnoregionalist Parties.” Pp. 204–247 in Regionalist Parties in Western Europe, edited by Lieven De Winter and Huri Türsan. London and New York: Routledge.
De Winter, Lieven, and Margarita Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro. 2002. “European Integration and Ethnoregionalist Parties.” Party Politics 8(4):483–503.
24
Figure 1: Economic trends in the Basque Country, 1985-2011
5000
1000
015
000
2000
025
000
3000
0Eu
ros
(cur
rent
val
ues)
0.2
.4.6
.8R
atio
of a
ctiv
e po
pula
tion
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010time
agriculture industryconstruction servicesGDP per capita
Source: Eustat
25
Figure 2: Language use at home and country of birth in the Basque Country, 1985-2011
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8R
atio
inha
bita
nts
0.2
.4.6
.8R
atio
inha
bita
nts
2 ye
ars
or o
lder
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Basque Basque and SpanishSpanish Foreign born
Source: Eustat
26
Figure 3: Salience of the nationalist relative to the left-right issue dimension in the Basque
Country, 1980-2009
Note: Higher values indicate stronger salience of issues concerning nationalism relative to other issue
dimensions.
Source: Leonisio and Strijbis 2011
27
Table 1: Overview of hypotheses according to three cleavage theories
Theories
Polarization of economic preferences
Polarization of cultural preferences
Strenght of class voting
Strength of cultural voting
Voting along economic preferences
Voting along cultural preferences
Structural cleavage theory
Declining Declining Constantly strong
Constantly strong
Constantly strong
Constantly strong
Organizational cleavage theory
Moderate in 1989 and 2009, weak in 1998
Moderate in 1989 and 2009, strong in 1999
Constantly weak
Constantly weak
Moderate in 1989 and 2009
Moderate in 1989 and 2009
Exit-voice cleavage theory
Declining Increasing Declining Increasing Declining Increasing
28
Figure 4a-c: Distribution of political preferences in the Basque Country, 1989-2010
1989
29
1999
30
2010