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Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and the Question of Political Legitimacy: A Nineteenth-Century Saudi Qadi's DilemmaAuthor(s): M. J. CrawfordReviewed work(s):Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Aug., 1982), pp. 227-248Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/163672 .

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 14 (1982), 227-248 Printed in the United States of America

M. J. Crawford

CIVIL WAR, FOREIGN INTERVENTION, AND THE

QUESTION OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY: A

NINETEENTH-CENTURY SACUDI QADI'S

DILEMMA

The SacfidT Civil War, which developed after the death of the Imam Faisal at

al-Riyad in A.H. 1282/A.D. 1865, and which was largely responsible for thedebilitation and ultimate demise of the Second Sacfidl State, has received

relatively little attention from either SacildTor Western historians. In neglectingthis period, modern Sac'dl scholars may have been influenced by the con-sideration which led WahhabT chroniclers of an earlier generation to provideonly cursory treatment of the Civil War in their accounts of Najdi history; thedecade between the Imam Faisal's death and the resolution of the conflict in

1293/1876, characterised as it was by persistent fraternal rivalry and displays of

unprincipled political opportunism, does not represent a particularly creditableepisode in the history of the Al Saci'd. This attitude of comparative indifferenceto the history of the Civil War should not, however, be taken as indicating thatthe lessons to be drawn from this period were lost on the collective consciousnessof the SacildTruling house. That the recollection of the war lives on in the

family's memory is suggested not only by the reluctance and care with which thelate King Faisal moved against and finally ousted King Sa'id, his elder brother,but also by the united front which the Sac'dT princes today present to theoutside world, whatever their internal differences. At the same time, whilst it is

certainly true that the strife of the Civil War years expressed itself principally in

terms of the rivalry between the sons of the Imam Faisal, it would be a mistaketo assume without more ado that the dissension within the Al Saci'd supplies asufficient explanation for the character of the struggle. Concentration on theelement of competing ambitions may only serve to divert attention from the

religious and social context in which the conflict occurred. It is a pity thatWestern writers on the early history of Sa'cdi Arabia, such as Philby and

Rentz,' have tended to describe the vicissitudes of the first two Sac'id stateswithout interpreting them in the light of the religious background or the

prevailing social situation. In their historical method, arrangement of material,and selection of subject matter, these two authors and, to a lesser extent, Bayly

Winder2 reveal the extent of their debt to the writings of the Sa'udT chroniclers.Such dependence has led to the emergence of a tradition of Western histori-

ography that often fails to go beyond a somewhat haphazard cataloguing of

unexplained events. If we are to deepen our understanding of the WahhabT

? 1982 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/82/030227-22 $2.50



228 M. J. Crawford

movement, a willingness to analyse must be combined with a readiness to use

other contemporary Arabic sources. In particular, Wahhabi religious writingshave been neglected as an historical source despite the insight they supply into

the situation in Najd during the periods of the first and second Sa'udT states.It is ironic, although perhaps not coincidental, that the Civil War unfolded at

a time when political conditions in Najd were otherwise relatively stable. In the

first place, Sa'CdTrule was not greatly threatened from outside. Serious Egyptianinterference in the affairs of central Arabia, which had begun with Muhammad'Ali's successful campaign against the first Sa'cdl state, had terminated over two

decades previously. In the second place, by the time of his death the Imam Faisal

had managed to place the second Sa'idi state on a firm footing, even if his holdon Najd, al-Ahsa', and his other dominions was always slightly precarious. In

fact, the conflict that occurred between his sons tookplace against

the back-

ground of an established form of government hallowed by long-standing religiousand political traditions that were deeply rooted in Najd. The second Sa'ild state,like its predecessor, was based on an alliance between 'ulama' and umara'which had its origins in the pact made between Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab

and Muhammad ibn Sa'id in 1158/1745. The former had come to appreciate as

a result of the experiences of his early years that the regime of godliness could

only be established with the backing of temporal forces. If uncompromisingmonotheism were to be enforced, polytheism eliminated, jihad waged, the goodordered, the evil forbidden, the support of men of the sword was necessary.Since

temporal powerunrestrained and

unregulated bythe

preceptsof the

Shari'a resulted in tyranny and oppression, proper government required a

cooperative partnership between the 'ulama' and the umara'. The alliance of

1158/1745 established just such a relationship in an association which found

expression and embodiment in the development of a close liaison between the Al

Sa'ld and the family of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, the Al al-Shaikh. The

conceptual framework for this partnership was provided by the theory of the

state propounded in Ibn Taimiyya's famous work al-Siydsa al-Shar'iyya. Ac-

cording to Ibn Taimiyya, because the regime of godliness can only be instituted

by means of established temporal power, the exercise of authority for the benefit

of the people is a religious duty.3 Sincethe

purposeof the state is to enforce the

Holy Law, political legitimacy is correspondingly derived from the observance

and implementation of God's Law and from the enforcement of the regime of

godliness.4In the context of an imamate that drew its religious and moral authority from

the Sa'idi ruler's performance of his duty to sustain the Sharl'a and from his

link with the 'ulama' in general and the Al al-Shaikh in particular, the stance

adopted by eminent Wahhabl 'ulama' during the Civil War could only be a

matter of considerable importance. Even so, their historical role during these

years of internecine strife has never been studied; in their accounts of the period,5

neither Philby nor Winder mention the position taken, or the part played, by thereligious establishment. This omission is a little odd since the Al al-Shaikh had

always fulfilled an important function in helping to establish continuity of powerwithin the Al Sa'ld. Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab had himself organised the

recognition of Sa'id as wall 'l-cahd (i.e., heir apparent) to his father the Imam



Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and Political Legitimacy 229

CAbdal-cAziz in 1202/1787.6 Insofar as the practice of selecting a wai 'l-cahdwas followed thereafter, it seems to have involved designation by the existing

imam after due consultation with the leading Culama' of the time. The Al al-Shaikh furthermore played a crucial role in arranging an orderly succession

when an imam died: it was under the aegis of their most distinguished

representatives that oaths of allegiance (bai'a) were given to the next Sac'idTruler. The only occasion during the first SaCidT tate when dissension arose over

the succession appears to have been after the death of Imam Sacid, when one of

his uncles, 'Abd Allah bin Muhammad ibn Sacfd, contested the accession of the

late imam's son CAbdAllah.7 However, this occurred during the war against the

Egyptian expeditionary force to the Hijaz when there may have been some (quite

possibly justifiable) doubts about CAbdAllah bin Sacidd'sability to conduct a

successful defense of the Sac'idTempire. In the event, the latter was acclaimedimam and his great-uncle 'Abd Allah, who had always been a valuable memberof the Al Saci'd, gave way without a resort to arms which could only have

weakened the Sa'iidi state to the advantage of its external enemies. It was,

however, the unsuccessful contender's son Turki who was to be responsible for

restoring the fortunes of the Al Sacid after the Egyptian destruction of al-

Dar'iyya and the accompanying collapse of the first Sac'dT state. The emergenceof this section of the Al Saciud as the ruling house of the second Saciidi state

should not obscure the fact that it was a cadet branch of the family; its ultimate

success in eliminating all serious challenges to its pre-eminence from rival

elements within the Al Sacild was not assured until the last years of TurkT's on,the Imam Faisal. It was the tragedy of the Civil War that the hard-won gains of

Turki and the impressive achievements of Faisal were to be senselessly jeop-ardised and finally thrown away through the rivalryof the latter'ssons.

An investigation of the attitude adopted by the Al al-Shaikh during the Civil

War is not only of importance for determining the nature of the relationshipwhich its members had in practice with the Al Saci'd; it is also of significance in

the field of Wahhabi doctrine since it was only with the outbreak of the Civil

War that the WahhabT culama' began seriously to expound, elaborate, and

refine their notions of political authority. The Civil War presented the culamal

with a series of issues which they sought to resolve according to their perceptionof Islamic precepts but which cannot be described as specifically Islamic in

nature. Under any system, those involved with the law are faced with particular

problems when confronted with the acquisition of governmental authority byindividuals or groups assuming power in a manner incompatible with the

constitutional rules or practices of the pre-existing political order. The issues

raised by the realities of power can be ignored by neither the legal theorist nor

the legal practitioner, since each in his different way is concerned with the

relationship between validity and efficacy. Ibn Taimiyya's conception of the

state, which the Wahhabis had resurrected and put into practice, in fact

developed out of a response to the political realities of his own time, namely theextinction of the Caliphate and rule by Mamluke sultans who often used force to

acquire political power. Theories of the state which viewed political legitimacy as

deriving from the origins of power, that is, from designation by God or selection

by the Community, could no longer be accepted. The legitimacy of the sultans



230 M. J. Crawford

was instead to be seen as proceeding from their recognition and enforcement ofthe SharT'a which stood above them, existed independently of them and of their

will, andgoverned

them as itgoverned

theirsubjects.8Such a view of the relationship between law and temporal power implicitly

supplies the foundation for legal continuity in a revolutionary situation andavoids the pitfalls of that theory of discontinuity which is a characteristic aspectof works of legal positivism written within the tradition of Western analyticaljurisprudence.9 According to this theory, which has its origin in the positivisticpreoccupation with the derivational validity of the individual rule or norm, everyillegal change in the constitution of a state is a revolution, and a revolutionoverturns the entire legal order, replacing it with a new system. The difficultywith this view is its lack of realism: it fails to distinguish between law-destroying

revolutions,on the one

hand,and mere

coups d'etat,on the other. In the case of

a coup d'etat, it is simply the rules of competence or succession that are changed;otherwise the content of the post-revolutionary legal system is similar to, evenidentical with, that of the pre-revolutionary legal system. When there is no

change in political ideology, conceptions of authority or sources of power, it

appears unrealistic to say that there has been a revolution establishing a

completely new legal order. Revolutionary situations can rarely be viewed insuch absolute terms. Moreover, a rigid application of the principle of con-stitutionalism also means that in the event of an illegal change in the state'sconstitution the rule which empowers the judge to act judicially is dissolved

togetherwith all other rules of that state's

legal system.The

judgeis

therebydeprived of his jurisdiction to settle disputes and to declare the law. In effect heis debarred from preserving and maintaining a basic level of continuity andcoherence in the field of law and from upholding the values of the society inwhich he holds office. It would seem more satisfactory to acknowledge that the

judge has a duty to the members of that society to consider the necessities of thecommon good and to pass judgment on the revolutionary change. Whilst the

judge would not wish to encourage usurpation, he must recognise the desirabilityof interpreting legal rules that are by and large effective as belonging to aconsistent legal system; so long as no restoration of the old constitutional

authority appears possible in the short term, it is appropriate that official actsshould be recognised as legally effective.10The problems associated with the theory of discontinuity arise out of the

difficulty of accommodating the element of continuity in a revolutionary situation

within the framework of a value-free jurisprudential system. Recognition of and

belief in the existence of a divine law, eternal and immutable, makes it possiblefor the theorist to avoid such problems, although this does not mean that the

legal practitioner is spared all awkward dilemmas when required to pass judg-ment upon revolutionary change. Under such a doctrine as that of Ibn Taimiyya,qad.s derive their jurisdiction not from any temporal constitution but from their

position as the guardians of God's Holy Law. They are not beholden to anyparticular political regime for their judicial authority but hold office by dint of

their independent status as interpretersand administrators of the Sharl'a. Their

ultimate loyalty, and indeed the fundamental allegiance of 'ulama' and Muslims

generally, is to the SharT'a and not to the imam. For the WahhabTfaithful,




however, this allegiance entailed a commitment to a specific interpretation of the

Shari'a and to a particular perception of the nature of God's Law. The WahhabT

'ulama' in general and the Al al-Shaikh in particular were not only qadis andmuftis but also the guardians of the religious and political system bequeathed to

them. This system was founded upon the pact originally made between

Muhammad ibn Sacild and Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, according to the

terms of which the latter had undertaken to stand by the Al Sacid. Whilst the

Wahhabi Culama' might therefore extend recognition at different times to therule of competing members of the Al Sac'd, they were only too well aware thatthe success of WahhabTdoctrines was indissolubly linked to the fortunes of the

Al Saciid upon whose support the proper regulation of society depended. The

Civil War was a double disaster for the WahhabT ulama': it weakened the Al

Saci'd and it sapped the strength of the WahhabTmovement by undermining itshold on the inhabitants of central and eastern Arabia.Just as in a revolutionary situation the responsibilities of the judge are best

viewed in relation to the social group of which he is a member and a representa-tive, so the ultimate loyalty of the most eminent of the Wahhabi culama' duringthe Civil War may perhaps best be expressed in terms of the community the

integrity of which they sought to preserve, rather than in terms simply of theSharica. A sense of the importance of communal solidarity had always been a

distinguishing feature of the HanbalT chool of law," but for the WahhabTs,withtheir narrow notion of the Islamic Community based upon the belief that theirs

was the sole community to obey the Law of God, communal solidarity had anespecial significance. An aspect of this emphasis on cohesion was the practice ofmutual exhortation. Every individual, according to Ibn Taimiyya's doctrines, hasthe right and duty to offer advice (nasTha)within the limits of his competence,12and it was the regular practice under the first and second Sacidi states for theimams both to take counsel of their subjects, as Ibn Taimiyya required them to

do,13and to offer advice in their turn. The culama' participated readily in thisexercise by addressing epistles to the imams, to the umara', to other culama',and to private individuals. Many of such risalas were published as long ago as

1346/1928 by Muhammad Rashid Rida in a four-volume collection that he

edited, entitled Majmucat al-Rasa'il wa-'l-Masaiil al-Najdiyya. It is a selectionof risalas from this collection which provides an insight, on the one hand, intothe role of the 'ulama' during the Civil War (for which it is an important, albeit

neglected, source) and, on the other hand, into their doctrinal treatment of

questions of temporal authority (on which there is otherwise a limited amount ofmaterial for the first and second Sacidi states).

The authors of these risalas were two members of the Al al-Shaikh who were

perhaps the most important religious figures of the second SacidT state. ShaikhCAbd l-Rahman bin Hasan had been taught by his grandfather, Muhammad ibn'Abd al-Wahhab, and had then become one of the qadTsof al-Darciyya, the

capital of the first Sacidi state, under the Imams Sacfid and CAbdAllah.14Uponthe destruction of the first Saciidi state by Muhammad cAlT's orces underIbrahTmPasha, Shaikh CAbdal-Rahman was taken to Egypt where he remainedfor eight years. In 1241/1825-6 he returned to Najd after the Imam Turki hadestablished himself'5 and in the years that followed became senior qad.i at al-



232 M. J. Crawford

Riyad and pre-eminent among the WahhabTculama'. He was finally joined byhis son 'Abd al-LatTfin 1264/1847-8. Shaikh 'Abd al-LatTfhad been born at

al-Dar'iyyain

1225/1810but had

accompaniedhis father to Cairo after the

conquest of the Sac'dT capital by the Egyptians. He remained there in exile forover thirty years. Upon his return he was made qadT n al-Ahsa' where he spentone year before rejoining his father as a qadT of al-Riyad.16 As his fatheradvanced in age, Shaikh 'Abd al-LatTfgradually assumed his mantle as leader ofthe Al al-Shaikh and foremost WahhabTcalim. When Palgrave visited al-Riyadin A.D. 1862-3, he met both Shaikh 'Abd al-Rahman and his son, describingShaikh 'Abd al-Rahman as being "in decrepit old age."'7 But the latter was stillalive in 1283/1866-7 when the Civil War began and it was he who was to

pronounce the official verdict of the religious establishment upon the rebellionwhich broke out in that

year.When he died in Dhu

'l-Hijja 1285/March 1869,it

was his son who, as head of the Al al-Shaikh and qadTat al-Riyad, had to supplythe necessary leadership to the WahhabT ulama' and the community as a whole.

The Imam Faisal died of old age in Rajab 1282/December 1865 and was

succeeded by his eldest son 'Abd Allah, whom he had previously nominated asheir apparent.18Another of the Imam Faisal's sons, Sacid, was not, however,

willing to accept the situation. Already during the old imam's lifetime there hadbeen rivalry between the two brothers, although their father had sought to

reduce it by separating them. Whereas 'Abd Allah acted as amir in al-Riyad,Saci'd was appointed governor of al-Kharj, al-Farac and al-Aflaj in the south; a

third brother, Muhammad, was based in the north, whilst the youngest, 'Abdal-Rahman, remained with his father and eldest brother in al-Riyad. Palgrave

regarded a contest between 'Abd Allah and Sacfid as inevitable and Pelly noted

that Sacid had long been a personal enemy of CAbdAllah; the former "would be

an aspirant for power should events favour him."'9 Certainly Sacfid did not wait

long after his father'sdeath before fleeing from al-Riyad and raising the standard

of revolt in 1283/1866-7.20 The response of Shaikh 'Abd al-Rahman to this

development was unequivocal. In a public risala he declared:

Youare to understand hatthecommunity al-jama'a) is a duty imposeduponIslamand

uponwhomeverprofesses slam.This is in line withthesayingof Godthe Exalted:"Holdfastto the covenantof Godin a bodyanddo not separate"Q. III. 103].Thecommunitycan only be achieved hroughobedience o whomeverGod has entrusted he rule of theMuslims.... You are [also] to understand hat God (mayHe be Glorifiedand Exalted)unitedyou in favourof your Imam'AbdAllah bin Faisalafterthe deathof his fatherFaisal (may God have mercy upon him). So the majority gave their oaths of allegiancebeforeme and those that did not had theirallegiance endered o me on theirbehalfbytheir leaders.The inhabitantsof Najd, both baduand townsfolk,agreedupon him andrendered obedience. None of them disagreed. Even his brother Sa'Cid bin Faisal gave

allegiance, for he had no claim to rule the Muslims either during the lifetime of his father

or thereafter.None of the Muslims urned o him and broke theirallegiance, ince it was

clearto you that he wasseeking o partwiththecommunity ndto sowdissensionamongthe Muslims against their imam in an effort to break allegiance to the imam.... Sa'iid

proceededin three matters,each of them detestable:he broke allegiancehimself,he

separatedhimself from the community,and he summonedthe people to breaktheir

allegianceo Islam.Accordingly, e andhissupportersmust be fought....21




In this risala Shaikh 'Abd al-Rahman gave expression to the traditional

WahhabTconcern with, and emphasis upon, the necessity of the community

system. The Imam Faisal had pronounced in one public epistle: "What isrequired is that you should hold true to, and be in accord upon, this religion, for

you have seen what public and private advantages (masalih) there are in the

community and what evil in religious and worldly affairs there is in fragmenta-tion."22The religion could not be upheld save in the context of the communityand there could be no community without obedience;23the community andobedience were two of the ten pillars of Islam.24 But this obedience, thoughstrict, was not regarded as passive in nature because the proper ordering of

society was seen as being the concern of each member of the community.

According to Ibn Taimiyya, the goal of wilaya is the ordering of the good and

the forbidding of evil (al-amr bi-'l-ma'ruif wa-'l-nahy 'an al-munkar),25and theWahhabTsalways considered its realisation and accomplishment as a collective

duty.26 As Shaikh 'Abd al-Rahman himself stated on one occasion before theImam Faisal's death, even if the imam relieved the remainder of the communityof the burden of imposing the regime of godliness, everyone was nevertheless

required to assist him in this task.27 This duty of ordering the good and

forbidding evil was not, however, to be taken as implying the right of revolt

against an unjust ruler. The WahhabTs, ollowing Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taimiyya,held the view that obedience was due to the imam whether or not he was a goodman, provided that he did not require his subjects to disobey God or the

Shari'a.28 In the words of Laoust, "le devoir d'ob6issance a l'imam est devenul'un des principes les plus essentiels de la sociologie politique du Wahhabisme."29

According to WahhabT tenets, SaCiid's rebellion could only be justified byreference to the prior commission by the Imam CAbdAllah of some major act of

impiety. There is no hint in the sources of any such act in the period before the

revolt; on the contrary, Ibn Bishr describes the Imam 'Abd Allah as very piousand virtuous.30 In the circumstances it is unfortunate that there is not moreinformation available about the Imam CAbd Allah's manner of governmentbecause, even if injustice on his part would not in WahhabT doctrine haveconstituted sufficient justification for rebellion against him, oppressive behaviour

by him would at least help to explain SaCid's capacity to draw support for hiscause. An important element in this may have been SaCfid's personality: incontrast to his brother's, it appears to have been open and attractive. Both IbnBishr and Palgrave speak of his liberalityand winning ways.3'

Initially, SaCid's cause did not prosper. After leaving al-Riyad he headed in

the direction of cAsTr nd gathered to his standard such disaffected elements as

the 'Ujman, to whom he was related both through his mother and by virtue of

marriage and who, in any event, had a grudge against the Imam CAbdAllah

because he had subdued them violently in the years 1276-7/1859-61.32Comingfrom cAsTr nd supported by the cUjman, SaC'd appeared in Wadi Dawasir in

the south where he was acclaimed by the local inhabitants. The Imam CAbdAllah responded by mobilising his brother Muhammad who defeated SaCid at

the battle of al-Mu'tala in 1283/1866-7. SaC'd fled wounded to Trucial Oman,whilst the Imam 'Abd Allah followed up his victory in 1285/1868-9 by exactingviolent retribution from the inhabitants of Wadi Dawasir.33 Temporarily, at



234 M. J. Crawford

least, the threat to the Imam 'Abd Allah's position had been removed-Sa'cdwas not to trouble his rule again until 1287/1870-1. Although Shaikh 'Abd al-

Rahman died in Dhui 'l-Hijja 1285/March 1869,34both he and Shaikh 'Abdal-LatTfplayed an important part in holding off the challenge. They condemnedSa'idd's actions and warned Ibn 'A'id of 'AsTr and other leaders againstfollowing or aiding Sa'id.35 Sacidd'sbanner was "the banner of ignorance":36hewas encouraging a reversion to the religious and political conditions of the era of

ignorance (al-jahiliyya) that had prevailed before the inception of the Wahhabimovement or Da'wa.

Such was the political situation and the attitude of the Al al-Shaikh until

Sa'cid's successful comeback in 1287/1870-1. In a reversal of fortunes whichcannot be explained aside from the social and economic conditions of the time

(referred to below), Sa'id entered al-Ahsa', defeated its defending force andsubsequently laid siege to it in al-Hufuif. The Imam 'Abd Allah despatched a

relieving army under his brother Muhammad, but Sac'd gained a significant

victory over it at the battle of Juida in Ramadan 1287/December 1870 and

incarcerated Muhammad bin Faisal in al-Qat.f.37The Imam CAbdAllah's initialreaction seems to have been one of panic. He fled northwards to al-QasTm,

perhaps in an endeavour to obtain help from the Ibn Rashid of Ha'il to whomhe was related by marriage.38No assistance was forthcoming, but the desperateruler did manage to draw the support of the Qahtan tribe, whose chief believed

that he had been slighted by Sa'cd. Thus encouraged, he returned to al-Riyad.

But in Muharram 1288/March-April 1871 Sa'Cid advanced on the capitalsupported by a large force composed, according to Shaikh CAbdal-La.tf, of the

'Ujman, the Dawasir, and people from al-Farac, al-Hariq, al-Aflaj and the Wadi

HanTfa.39As he continued his bloody progress towards al-Riyad, "accompaniedby the evildoers, profligates, and hypocrites of Najd,"40his brother retired withthe Qahtan to Ha'ir al-Subai' on the WadTHanTfato the south of the capital.His support had melted away,41and his position was further weakened when

SaCi'd seized his supply train at al-Jizca.42CAbdAllah did nothing to help theinhabitants of al-Riyad defend themselves against Safid,43 and Shaikh CAbd l-

LatiTf s one of the notables of the town became apprehensive about its fate

because there were now fewer than forty fighting men to protect it.44In a letterwritten to supporters of CAbdAllah amongst the BaniuTamTmof al-Hawta in the

south the Shaikh explained: "We did our utmost to help him [CAbdAllah], untilthere befell the Muslims something over which they had no power. We were infear for all the Muslims inhabiting the town lest prisoners be taken, veils

sundered [i.e., women violated], religious and worldly affairs ruined, and destruc-tion wrought...."45 He had good reason to be anxious about the conduct of

SaCfid'sfollowers, for this was a time when settled life in Najd was under veryserious pressure as a result of the economic circumstances of the time. Persistent

drought and consistently high prices beginning in 1287/1870-1, the year of

Saciid's victorious return, and continuing until 1290/1873-4, presented a realthreat to the precarious balance that enabled settled life to exist in centralArabia. Ibn cIsa, writing of the year 1288/1871-2, describes the prevailingsituation in these terms: "In this year the high prices and drought intensified.Carrion and the carcasses of donkeys were being eaten and many people died of




hunger. The inhabitants of Najd were afflicted with drought and hunger, killingand pillage, strife and sufferings, as death cast its shadow. We take refuge in Godfrom His wrath and

punishment."46Since no help could be expected from 'Abd Allah, Shaikh 'Abd al-Latif nowsaw it as incumbent upon someone in his position to go out to treat with Sacid,which he promptly did with 'Abd Allah's permission.47The Shaikh obviously

hoped that he would be able to arrange a settlement between the two warringbrothers. But when Safid imposed unacceptable conditions Shaikh 'Abd al-Latif

resigned himself to the task of arranging a truce which would protect the townfrom bloodshed, pillage and rapine.48There were those accompanying Sacidwho were urging him to sack the town and to pronounce takffr upon some of theurban notables and badi (i.e., charge them with unbelief or kufr), because oftheir association with CAbdAllah.49The Shaikh was

eagerto

prevent any suchoccurrence. A peace was arranged; to notables who came out and gave their

allegiance to Sacid, the latter tendered assurances of protection for persons and

property.50Yet when Sacid did enter the town without any resistance from its

inhabitants, his followers were guilty of pillage and plundering. Al-Jubaila onthe Wad? Hanifa, a short distance from the capital, was effectively destroyedalthough it is significant that Philby also attributes its decay to water failure.5'

Despite these events, Shaikh 'Abd al-Latif clearly felt that in the circumstanceshe had not done badly in defending the people of al-Riyad from the excesses of

revenge and greed.52

Having done his utmost to minimise conflict by seeking a reconciliationbetween the feuding brothers and by arranging for Sacid's peaceful entry into

al-Riyad, Shaikh CAbdal-Lat.f now had to face up to the question of theimamate. Prompted by the need to preserve the community system, he decidedto recognise Sacid as imam. Elaborating on his premise that "there can be noIslam save within the framework of the community and there can be no

community save within the framework of the imamate,"53he declared:

You know that the affairsof the Muslimscannot be rightwithoutan imam norcan therebe Islam n his absence.Thepurposesof religion anonlybe achieved, he pillarsof Islamupheld,and the provisionsof the Quranmadeclearwithinthecontext of the communityand the imamate. Dissensionbrings punishmentand decline in both religionand theaffairsof this worldandrightfulnesssharT'a]s never heresult.

Anyonewho is acquaintedwith the principlesof the Shari'aknowsthat the people,inboth theirreligionand theirthis-worldly ffairs,require nd needthecommunity nd theimamate... 54

Sacid had acquired sovereign power (wilaya) by force: this constituted a validimamate. His rulings were legally effective and his commands had to be

obeyed.55 Such recognition of an usurper was in line with the principles and

practice accepted by the SunnTs hrough the centuries; the people were obliged to

obey and cooperate with such a person in ordering the good and forbidding eviland they were required to wage jihad with him and pay zakat to him. It was not

permissible to fight the usurper, to rebel against him in his turn, or to forsake theumma.56In propounding this view Shaikh 'Abd al-LatTfdeclared himself in fullaccord with the maxim that a tyrannical sultan was better than perpetual strife.



236 M. J. Crawford

On the other hand, the Shaikh's perception of affairs as a notable and qad. of

al-Riyad was not always shared by supporters of 'Abd Allah elsewhere, some of

whom obviously wanted to declare Sa'Cidan unbeliever.57In such a situation theShaikh must have felt himself a little isolated and would have welcomed theconcurrence of other Culami' in his view of Sacfid's status. On a later occasionwhen circumstances were similar, he was able to inform the Wahhabl faithful inal-Fara' that their local 'ulama3, Ibrahlm al-Shatharl in al-Hawta and Husainand Zaid Al al-Shaikh in al-Hariq, had expressed their agreement with him inletters that he had kept.58

The recognition of Sacfd's acquisition of power as establishing a valid

imamate must have been a distasteful matter for the head of the Al al-Shaikh.

Shaikh CAbd l-Latif had been outspoken in condemning Saciid's actions and he

cannot have found it easy to justify, in terms of the needs of the community, therecognition of a man as imam who had shown such naked disregard for that

community's interests. On the other hand, Shaikh CAbdal-Lati.f'sfaith in 'AbdAllah had been severely shaken during the last months of the latter's rule. In the

course of his flight to the north after first hearing of Saciid's victory at the battle

of Jiida, the Imam CAbdAllah had contacted the Ottomans with a view to

obtaining assistance from them against his brother. To this purpose he despatchedthe Imam Faisal's one-time appointee to the important post of Saciidi treasurer

in al-Qasim, 'Abd al-CAzizbin CAbdAllah Abf Butaiyin,59with letters and

presents to the walls of Baghdad and Basra.60Shaikh 'Abd al-Latif was appalled

and made no secret of his distress and alarm at this development. He rebukedCAbdAllah to his face and criticised him in letters and before his own pupils. He

told cAbdAllah to ask help of God alone and not to seek aid from "the deviant

state":61the latter course of action would lead to the destruction of the verybases of Islam. CAbdAllah's subsequent repentance and apologies, whilst theymight as a matter of religion erase what had gone before,62could hardly undo

the damage brought about by his loss of nerve. The Ottomans were alerted to the

opportunity for intervention. The active and ambitious governor of Baghdad,Midhat Pasha, was not to be put off by a letter from Shaikh CAbdal-Latlifin

which the wall was informed that CAbdAllah would achieve his purpose using

the inhabitants of Najd and the badu so that there was no necessity for anyOttoman soldiers to come.63 In these circumstances it is not surprising that the

Shaikh should have begun to entertain serious doubts as to whether CAbdAllah's

commitment to the community was really any stronger than his brother's. He

perceived CAbdAllah's position as embodying a contradiction: his imamate was

binding and yet his deposition was warranted by the course he had adopted.64As

matters stood, the Shaikh could hardly contemplate leaving al-Riyad in order to

rally support for CAbdAllah and to encourage resistance to Saciid as members of

the Al al-Shaikh had been known to do in the past when their favoured

candidate for power had been ousted by an usurper. Departure from the capital

might be seen as lending countenance to CAbdAllah's conduct in begging theOttomans for help. It would in any event make it impossible for the Shaikh to

maintain a basic level of continuity in the religious, legal and political affairs of

central Arabia, and would make it even harder for him to effect a settlement

between the feuding brothers. Such an action would connote an abdication of his




responsibility to the community as a notable of al-Riyad, as a qadi and mufti, asthe senior member of the Al al-Shaikh, and as the guardian of the Wahhabi

movement's integrity.Four years previously, the Sa'i!dTs had been unsuccessful in an attempt to

obtain assistance against the British from Namiq Pasha.65'Abd Allah's requestarrived in rather different circumstances in 1287-8 1870-1. The completion of theSuez Canal was an encouragement to the Ottomans to adopt a more forward

policy in eastern Arabia, and Midhat Pasha, who had become governor of

Baghdad in 1286/1869, was not one to neglect the opportunity presented by the

Sa'iid Civil War to further Ottoman interests without seriously antagonising theBritish. Although 'Abd Allah was regarded by the Ottomans as more "WahhabT"than his brother, whom they would have been just as happy to help should he

have been the one needing restoration, 'Abd Allah was appointed qd'im-maqdmof Najd by Imperial firman.66 In the spring and early summer of 1288/1871, aTurkish expeditionary force under the command of Nafidh Pasha landed in al-

Qat.f. In making this move the Ottomans purported to be motivated solely bythe desire to help 'Abd Allah and to restore their representative in Najd to

power. They conquered al-Ahsa' without encountering any substantial resistanceand proceeded to release Muhammad bin Faisal from captivity. 'Abd Allah, whohad been defeated by Sa'iid at the battle of al-Barra and had then retired withthe Qahtan to Ruwaida al-'Ard, now arrived in al-Ahsa' at the behest of theOttomans.67

The acceptance by supporters of 'Abd Allah of the strategem of requestingOttoman help was condemned by Shaikh 'Abd al-Latif as indicative of a

"preferencefor life in this world and its finery as against belief in God and His

Prophets."68It is clear, though, that the course of action adopted by the oustedruler found approval not only amongst the notables but also within the ranks ofthe 'ulama'. 'Abd Allah's emissary to Baghdad, 'Abd al-CAzizbin 'Abd AllahAbf Butaiyin, was himself the son of a Wahhabi 'alim who had been second

only to Shaikh 'Abd al-Rahman in importance during the early years of thesecond Sa'dTi state and who had diedjust before the Imam Faisal in 1282/1865.69This backing from amongst the 'ulama' for 'Abd Allah's resort to the Ottomans

found expression in a fatwa issued by Muhammad bin IbrahIm ibn 'Ajlan, one-time pupil of Shaikh CAbd l-Rahman and qadi of al-Hariq in al-Fara'.70 Shaikh'Abd al-Latif's reaction to this fatwa was unambiguously hostile:

Shaikh Muhammad bin 'Ajlan issued a risala which I did not suppose any reasonableman with understanding could issue, let alone a faqThand 'alim. I drew attention to theobvious errors and shameful ignorance which it contained and I concealed from the

peoplethe firstcopywhichcame into ourhandsas a precautionagainst ts disseminationand circulation amongst the populace and the rabble. The risala did, however, spread in

al-Kharj and al-Fara' and then a copy arrived in our town. Those overcome by capricewere enticed by it into straying from the course of right guidance.....71

In Shaikh 'Abd al-LatTf'sopinion, Ibn 'Ajlan's risala was nothing other than"the snare of the devil":72t sought to prove "the permissibility of betraying Godand His Prophet, of forsaking the land of the Muslims, of delivering it to therule of the polytheists, those who deny God all attributes and those who do not



238 M. J. Crawford

believe in God's signs, and of such other actions as result in the emergence of

their rule and the complete invalidation of the Holy Law....."73 The appearance

of such a fatwa at this juncture, declared the Shaikh, could only have disastrouseffects.74Hamad bin 'Atlq (d. 1301/1884), one of the more prominent WahhabT

Culamia of this period who had been qadi at al-Hilwa in al-Farac and was now

based in al-Aflaj,75condemned Ibn cAjlan'sviews as outright apostacy. Shaikh'Abd al-Latif conceded that Hamad bin 'AtTqhad been guilty of some errors in

making this attack but defended him when he came under criticism for having

gone too far in his charges.76 It is a pity that Shaikh 'Abd al-Lat.f's own

refutation has not been preserved but it is possible to deduce the main line of his

argument from a later risala that he addressed to Ibn CAjlan nd from observa-

tions which he made on Ibn cAjlan'sviews elsewhere. The Shaikh took it asundeniable that 'Abd Allah had approached idolaters for aid: the Ottomans were

"the most, or amongst the most, unbelieving people on this earth."77It was true

that the question of seeking help of polytheists in the event of dire need was

one on which opinions differed but the correct view was that the practicewas absolutely prohibited. In any case, as Muhammad bin 'AlTal-ShawkanT

(b. 1172/1759, d. 1250/1834) had shown, it was subject to various conditions

designed to prevent any evil from resulting: the plea for aid had to be in the

genuine interests of the Muslims; the idolaters to whom the request was directed

were not to possess, nor be supported by, governmental power; and the poly-

theists were not to play any role in the formation of policy.78 None of theseconditions was met in the present case, declared the Shaikh. In addition, theyrelated to the situation where help was requiredfrom polytheists in order to fightother polytheists. There could be no justification for seeking such help when it

was a question of crushing rebel Muslims. Anyone who used analogical reasoningto sanction this practice in a fatwa was following license and casting aside the

settled principles of the Salaf and the imams. Finally and conclusively, CAbd

Allah had not simply gone to the Ottomans for aid: he had attracted them into

Islamic territory and had then handed a portion of that territoryover to them so

that they could practise their idolatry there.79No sanction or support for CAbd

Allah's actions could be found in God's Law and people should not allow CAbdAllah's unholy alliance with the Turks, or Ottoman claims that they were come

only to help an imam, to deter or deflect them from the performance of their

duties as Muslims.80The most important duty resting on Muslims in the existing situation was the

obligation to wage jihad in order to recover al-Ahsa' from the Ottomans. Jihad

was required of Muslims with every imam, pious or impious, including Sacfid.81

In a ceaseless effort to undo the damage wrought by CAbdAllah's precipitationof Ottoman intervention, Shaikh CAbdal-Latif incited Saciudto jihad,82urgedother culama' to encourage the inhabitants of their areas to wage Holy War,83

and threatened residents of al-AhsZa with jihad under Sacld.84 He made aspecific point of declaring that when the enemy attacked the very territories of

Islam jihad became a personal, as opposed to a collective, duty.85"Fighting the

[Ottoman] State, the Turks, the Afranj, and the remainderof the unbelievers is,"he pronounced, "one of the greatest credits that can save one from the fire [on




the Day of Judgment]."86 But such was the prevailing military, political andeconomic situation that dislodging the Ottomans from eastern Arabia was an

unrealisable goal. Despite attempts to enlist the support of the British or at leastto ensure that they did not assist the Ottomans,87Sacid found himself unable tomake any real impression on the position of the Ottomans who, although unableto advance further into Najd, were consolidating their hold on al-Ahsa'. Sa'Cd'sown political position was insufficiently secure to enable him to wage a sustained

campaign against the Ottomans, and any hope that Shaikh CAbdal-LatTfmayhave nurtured that a call for jihad would lead to the formation of a united front

which would heal past divisions was doomed to disappointment. Further, if

political circumstances prevented the successful waging of jihad, economic

conditions made it equally certain that the Shaikh's attempts to prohibit frater-

nisation and association with the Ottomans and to impose a boycott upon themwould be attended by failure. His frequent expositions of Wahhabi doctrine onthe obligation of hijra suggest that he was encountering considerable difficulty in

making the inhabitants of central and eastern Arabia share his perception oftheir duties as Muslims.88Because of the drought and high prices many Najdiswere leaving home for al-Ahsa', al-Zubair, Basra, and Kuwait,89whilst theinhabitants of al-Ahsa' for their part had never been enthusiastic adherents ofthe WahhabT movement. The conduct of Sa'id's supporters, particularly the

cUjman, in eastern Arabia had not endeared Sac'idT rule to local residents.

Indeed, the anarchical conditions of the Civil War supplied the Ottoman

invaders with a propaganda weapon which they did not hesitate to use. Theircampaign for support seems to have elicited a generally favourable responsefrom settled elements in the population attracted by the Ottoman promise of justand stable government.90 This was disturbing for Shaikh 'Abd al-LatTf, but

equally worrying was the re-emergence in al-Ahsa' of religious practices con-demned by the WahhabTsand the accompanying encroachment into the area ofSufi influences. The fact that some of the 'ulama' of eastern Arabia favouredthe Ottomans must have reinforced the Shaikh's anxiety that the people of Najdmight also be seduced from their allegiance to Sacidi rule and the tenets ofWahhabism.

In the autumn of 1288/1871 the political situation changed radically. Sacid'ssupport had fallen away. The notables and inhabitants of al-Riyad had becomealienated by the unruly conduct of his baduifollowers, whilst the latter, never themost reliable of supporters, had perhaps always been more interested in the

prospect of booty which would alleviate their economic distress than in

championing the cause of the usurper. Sacfid was unable to prevent himself from

being forced out of al-Riyad where an uncle of the feuding brothers, 'Abd Allahbin Turki (d. 1290/1873), took control on behalf of his nephew 'Abd Allah.When he informed CAbdAllah and Nafidh Pasha of his success in ousting Sacfd,the Ottoman commander made him mudTrat al-Riyad until CAbdAllah's return

there. Then, when Sa'iud proceeded with the cUjman from al-Kharj to al-Ahsa'with a view to attacking the Ottomans, the combined forces of CAbdAllah andthe Turks inflicted a serious defeat on the expelled ruler. In the late autumn,however, Midhat Pasha himself arrived in the newly acquired Ottoman province.Having apparently received a petition from the leading shaikhs and merchants



240 M. J. Crawford

of the area, the wall of Baghdad decided that the Ottomans would govern Najdand al-Ahsa' by direct rule. In response to this purported deposition of the Al

Sa'iid, Abd Allah and Muhammad bin Faisal fled to al-Riyad..9 The welcomewhich the former received in the capital seems to have been guarded but hisclaim to have repented of his previous actions, when taken with the willingnessof at least some of al-Riyad's inhabitants to tender allegiance to him, was enoughto persuade Shaikh CAbdal-Latif that it was in the interests of Islam and theMuslims to recognise the reversion of the imamate to 'Abd Allah in accordancewith Sunni precepts.92The Shaikh even went so far as to suggest that nothinghad really changed since Sa'Cd had first rebelled against the Imam 'Abd Allah.

Writing to a man whose father was a supporter of Sacid he declared: "Yourfather and others know that the Muslims gave allegiance to CAbdAllah, Sacid

being one of them, and that the tender of allegiance was the outcome ofconsultation by the Muslims before their shaikh and imam in matters of religion,

my father (may God hallow his spirit). What has invalidated this?"93

When Sac'd entered into negotiations with the Ottomans during the summer

of 1289/1872, the reversal in the positions of the two rival brothers was almost

complete. But, despite the fact that his brother 'Abd al-Rahman and a cousin,Fahd bin Sunaitan, became hostages for him in Baghdad, Sa'id arrived at no

agreement with the Ottomans but instead concentrated his attentions on oustingCAbdAllah from al-Riyad.94 In 1290/1873, accompanied by the cUjman and

Dawasir he gained control of al-Kharj, defeated the inhabitants and then won a

victory over his brother and the people of al-Riyad at al-Jiz'a. While CAbdAllahtook refuge with the Qahtan, Sacfid advanced on the capital.95To Shaikh CAbd

al-Latif it must have seemed as though history was repeating itself. Anxious once

again about the conduct of Sacid's badu followers upon entering al-Riyad, he

hastened to write to Saciudasking that the capital be assured protection and that

the badi be restrained. He even gathered together a small group of townsfolk to

hold them off.96 Once Saciid had established himself in al-Riyad, the Shaikh

re-recognised the validity of his imamate.97With the Ottomans now desirous of

reducing their commitment in al-Ahsa' and so unwilling to respond to his pleasfor help, CAbdAllah appeared to be without any real prospect of recovering his

position as imam. A succession of events in 1291/1874-5, however, broughtabout a significant change in the overall situation. In Ramad.an/October-November of that year CAbdal-Rahman, the youngest son of the late Imam

Faisal and father of CAbdal-CAzTzwho was to found the third Sacild state,

returned with Fahd bin Sunaitan from Baghdad. Arriving in al-Ahsal, he led an

uprising against the Ottomans which the chief of the Muntafiq, as mutasarrif,crushed.98CAbdal-Rahman fled to join his brother Sacfid in al-Riyad. Not longafter his arrival Saciid died of disease in the capital.99

The departure from the scene of one of the two original contestants in the

Civil War did not immediately resolve the dissension within the Al Sacid. If

anything, the number of rivals for power now increased. Sacid's death left thehead of the Al al-Shaikh apprehensive that feuding, bloodshed and general

anarchy would break out amongst the baduiand the townsfolk. CAbdAllah, who

must at this time have been at some distance from al-Riyad, could not be

contacted and it was not feasible to give him allegiance. Since the need to




preserve public order was imperative and Shaikh 'Abd al-Latif himself was

without sufficient power or support to undertake the task in person, it became

necessary to recognise a new imam:Whoever s acquaintedwiththe principlesof religion, he bases of Islamic urisprudence(usulal-fiqh),and what is requiredby wayof realising he best interests of the Muslims]andremoving he causes of evil,will findthe matterquiteclear.The ultimate ay(khitab)belongsnot with the ignorantrabblebut withyou, the ranksof the qadisand muftisandthose who are devoted to benefitingthe people and upholding the MuhammadanSharfca.. . .l

Since the idea of recognising a stand-in for 'Abd Allah did not appeal, the

leading members of the Al Sa'id in al-Riyad, together with their associates and

followers,chose to install 'Abd al-Rahman bin Faisal as

imam, havingrefused to

consider the transfer of power outside the Al Sa'ud. The decision made, Shaikh

'Abd al-Latif wrote risalas announcing the assumption of the imamate by 'Abd

al-Rahman and pleading for unity and an end to civil strife.'0l In fact, however,divisions within the ruling house only deepened as Sa'id's sons emerged as

contenders for power. In 1292/1875-6 Fahd bin Sunaitan was murdered byMuhammad bin Sa'cd in the mosque at al-Riyad.'02 This assassination must

have had an unsettling effect on 'Abd al-Rahman who became more receptive to

Shaikh 'Abd al-Latif's moves to bring about a peaceful settlement of the

differences that existed between the surviving sons of the Imam Faisal. With

'Abd Allah now advancing on al-Riyad, Muhammad with CAbdal-Rahman inthe capital after being defeated or outmanoeuvred by the latter at Tharmida',and 'Abd al-Rahman himself nervous about his own position and personal

safety, the prospects for peace had never been better. Shaikh 'Abd al-Lat.ifmade

the most of the opportunity by urging 'Abd al-Rahman to make peace and

surrenderthe reins of power to 'Abd Allah:

I continued to reiterate this advice to him daily until, approximately four days before

CAbdAllah's arrival, God facilitated his agreement to give precedence to 'Abd Allah and

to abdicate [from the imamate]. He recognised 'Abd Allah's right and entitlement on the

grounds of greater age and earlier tenure of the imamate. So, when the Imam 'Abd Allah

encamped in our vicinity, I exerted myself to ensure that Muhammad bin Faisal shouldappear before his brother and bring an assurance of protection for 'Abd al-Rahman, his

family and the town's inhabitants. I also worked very hard for a surrender [of the town].

Despite all that, when I went out to greet CAbdAllah, there were the people of al-Fara',the ignorant badu and accompanying hypocrites requesting his permission to plunder our

date palms and our property. I remarked in him a certain change [for the worse] as he

was scowling (whoever works with God loses nothing, whereas whoever thwarts God

finds nothing!). Thereafter, however, he exhibited magnanimity and tractability, claimingthat the people were [merely] engaging in talk and hearsay-a man's mount is miserable,

they alleged. I verified his claim to be contrite for he displayed before me a desire to be

forgiven together with contrition and remorse. So I tendered my allegiance to him on the

basis of the Book of God and the Sunna of His Prophet.'03

With the Imam 'Abd Allah's return to the capital and CAbd al-Rahman's

submission, the Civil War effectively came to an end as the three brothers united

in a coalition to defeat Sa'id's sons who fled from the capital. Yet the Shaikh



242 M. J. Crawford

did not long enjoy the fruits of his labours: he died in 1293/1876.104The secondSa'cdT state likewise did not long survive the conclusion of the Civil War, for ithad so weakened the

powerof the Al Sa'cd that the remains of their dominions

passed easily into the hands of Muhammad ibn Rashid of Ha'il.Shaikh 'Abd al-Lati.f's concern for the community during the period of the

Civil War had manifested itself most obviously in attempts to reconcile the rival

brothers, in efforts to restrain their supporters from excesses of pillage and

killing, and in an unceasing endeavour to dislodge the Ottomans from easternArabia. The Shaikh refused to identify himself with any one particular politicalfaction, preferringto place the interests of the WahhabT ommunity before thoseof any of the Sa'iidTcontenders for power. It may be that as a matter of personal

predilection Shaikh 'Abd al-Latif favoured 'Abd Allah: according to Pelly, the

Shaikh was one of CAbdAllah's fathers-in-law.'05The matter of 'Abd Allah'srelationship with the Ottomans apart, the Shaikh's main strictures seem to have

been reserved for SaCid. Furthermore, the general impression received from the

Shaikh's risalas is that throughout the Civil War 'Abd Allah enjoyed more

support amongst the 'ulama' and the WahhabTfaithful than did SaCild. But

'Abd Allah's decision to seek Ottoman help clearly alienated a substantial

number of his supporters, and it is difficult to believe that the Shaikh's attemptsto rally support to CAbdAllah by eliciting from him protestations of repentanceand contrition achieved any success; CAbdAllah's professions of remorse did not

prevent him on at least two occasions from making subsequent bids for Ottoman

help. The Shaikh himself did not spare 'Abd Allah from forthright criticism onthis issue but rather singled him out for condemnation, even though finally each

of the four brothers was compromised by association with the Ottomans.106CAbd

Allah's special offence was to involve the Ottomans in the internal affairs of

SacfdT Arabia; by his actions a fertile province with vital ports on the Arabian

Gulf was lost to the SacidT state at a time when the latter needed it most

because of the drought and high prices. However true it may have been, initially,that CAbdAllah's support was to be found among the strict Wahhabis and

Sacfd's in "the 'liberal' party,"107 o clearcut a configuration of forces did not

survive beyond 1287/1870-1. The culama' were divided over CAbdAllah's

actions and it was no longer possible for CAbdAllah to present himself as thechampion of "orthodox" Wahhabism.

In general, Shaikh CAbdal-LatT.feems to have been dissatisfied with the role

of the other Culama', blaming them in part for the sorry state of religion and

learning in contemporary Najd. According to Shaikh CAbdal-LatT.f,t was their

duty to play a positive part in guiding the populace since the common peoplewere all too easily led into error through their ignorance. But often the culama'

were silent or themselves led the people astray after succumbing to a dangerous

partisanship. It was important that they should provide a lead to the communityand should discourage those ignorant of the Sharica from making pronounce-

ments upon matters concerning the Holy Law which were properly within theexclusive purview of the culama3. The Najdis should be deterred in particularfrom wielding the weapons of sectarianism against each other. Shaikh Ibrahim

bin CAbdal-Malik Al al-Shaikh on one occasion advised Shaikh CAbdal-LatTf

that some of the WahhabT aithful had made charges of unbelief against those




pleased about the victory of the Al Shamir, a section of the 'Ujman habituallycamped in al-Kharj,108over "the Muslims." In answer to an enquiry as to

whether such takfir could be justified, Shaikh CAbd l-Latif replied that he knewof no grounds for such takfir and stated:

This path is the path of the innovators,those who are astrayand those who lack a

genuine fear of God in the voicing of their opinions and the performanceof their

activities.Such schadenfreudemay have numerouscauses,especially n view of the factthat therehas beenconsiderabledisorder, he ummahas been immersedn plunderand

bloodshed,and therehas been an intensification f troubleand distress.The truthand

rightguidancehavebeenobscured,gnorance ndcapricehavespread,plungingntofalse

opinionsand ruin have becomecommonplace,and oppressiveness nd blindnesshave

prevailed.Thereare few who adhereto the Book and the Sunna,indeedthere are few

who are acquaintedwith themand know the ambitof the provisionsof the Holy Lawrevealedby God.... To pronouncetakfir in such circumstancess evidence of the

ignoranceof those pronouncingt and of theirlack of knowledgeof the sourcesof theLaw.... The Shaikhal-Islam Ibn Taimiyya] tatesin his Egyptian atwasthat the Salafwereagreed hat thereshouldbe no takfirof rebels.So howcantherebe takfirmerelyon

thegroundsof schadenfreude?'09

This passage is significant because Shaikh CAbdal-Latif here displays a readyawareness and understanding not only of the extent to which in such circum-

stances takfir could constitute an instrument of fragmentation, but also of the

degree to which economic distress would naturally tend to sharpen social and

political divisions.If the course of the Civil War cannot be explained simply in terms of a conflict

between strict WahhabTsand their opponents in Najd, still less can one accede to

Kelly's proposition that the Civil War "was more than a personal contest for

power between the two brothers: it was also a contest between the settled

inhabitants of Najd and the Bedouin, between the strict adherents of Wahhabism

and those who found its precepts unpalatable, and each of the brothers was

identified with one of the factions.""? This hypothesis suggests that there existed

a fixed line between the settled and the nomadic in Najd whereas, in reality, the

interdependent, interlocking life-styles of townsfolk, oasis-dwellers, agricultural-

ists, pastoralists, and nomads did not lend themselves to such neat categorisation.Tribal bonds cut across social ties resultingfrom shared life-styles and established

links of another sort; it was not only the nomads who exhibited the characteristic

features of tribalism. When settled life came under increasing strain as a con-

sequence of the drought of 1287-90/1870-4, social dislocation manifested itself

not in a straightforward battle between the settled and the nomadic populationfor the increasingly meagre food and water resources, but in a disintegration of

the community system within settlements as old social divisions revived that the

Wahhabi movement had always striven to eliminate. If Kelly's thesis is under-

mined by the way in which Palgrave's identification of CAbdAllah with the

townsfolk and SaCi'dwith the badfi is contradicted by Pelly who reverses theirbases of support,11'it is entirely overturned by the weight of evidence contained

in Shaikh 'Abd al-Lat.f's risalas. Although it is unfortunate that more informa-

tion is not available about the nature of the divisions in the four crucial areas to

the south of al-Riy~ad-al-Kharj, al-Aflaj, al-Fara', and Wadi al-Dawasir-it



244 M. J. Crawford

seems clear that both 'Abd Allah and Sac'd were drawing support from allsocial groups. Badu obviously exploited SaCfid'sbid for power but they were not

the only ones to be attracted to his flag. One may surmise that as the authorityof the government weakened, previously suppressed tribal disputes and rivalries

re-emerged in an aggravated form, with the Qahtan as the core of 'Abd Allah's

support"2 and the 'Ujman as the basis of Sa'idd's. Thus the practice of tribal

raiding and feuding between quarters in towns resumed as the process of socialand political fragmentation accelerated under the strain imposed by economicconditions and foreign intervention.

This was the context for Shaikh CAbd l-Latif's pleas for the preservation and

maintenance of the community system, which he saw as the ultimate politicaland social good. In pursuit of this goal he advocated an attitude of pragmatism.

As he declared at one point to Hamad bin 'AtTq,

The objectof legislationand ordinances s to realisethe best interests of the Muslims]andto wardoff the causes of corruption o far as possible.Thismay onlybe possiblebycommitting he lesserof two evils or by lettingslip the lesserof two advantages.Takingthe individuals, imesand conditions nto considerations a principleof importance nd

anyone who disregardsand neglectsit is guilty of the most seriouscrimeagainstthe

peopleand the HolyLaw....113

In the face of frequent changes of power at al-Riyad (as many as eight changes in

the eleven years from 1282/1865 to 1293/1876, according to Philby's calcula-

tions),"4 the Shaikh showed a keen awareness of what was possible and whatwas not. His influence as qadi and mufti was restricted because of the quietiststance he chose to adopt, yet his role during the Civil War was not a passive one.

There is no evidence that he ever tried overtly to exploit the significance which

candidates for power and other NajdTswould naturally have attached to a grantof recognition by him. But, even if he does not seem at any stage to have

threatened to withhold recognition or to grant it only subject to explicit condi-

tions, he always made his views plain. He spoke for the forces of conciliation and

internal unity, of opposition to foreign invasion and interference, and of ad-

herence to the religious and political traditions of Najd. Steadfast in his ideals

but flexible in his approach, the Shaikh stood for a clearly recognisable policy.In an era of confusion and conflict, he supplied a lead to those who placed a

premium on communal solidarity and feared religious deviation, political frag-mentation and social divisiveness. In the struggle against fitna, he seemed to

embody the very conscience of the WahhabT ommunity.

NOTES

Author's note. I should like to record my thanks to Mr. Albert Hourani and Dr. Derek Hopwood of

St. Antony's College, Oxford, for their comments on an earlier version of this article. Needless to

say, I am solely responsible for any remaining errors.ISee esp. H. St. J. Philby, Sa'udi Arabia (London, 1955); G. Rentz, "Muhammad ibn CAbdal-

Wahhab (1703/04-1792) and the Beginnings of the Unitarian Empire in Arabia," Ph.D. diss.,

University of California, Berkeley, 1948.

2Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century(London, 1965).31bnTaimiyya, al-Siydsa al-Sharciyya (Baghdad, n.d.), p. 165.




4See H. Laoust, Essai sur les Doctrines Sociales et Politiques de TakT-d-DTn hmad b. Taimiya

(Cairo, 1939), pp. 297-299; idem, Le Traitede Droit Public d'Ibn TaimTyaBeirut, 1948), p. xxxv.

5Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, pp. 218-226; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century,pp. 229-263.

6Ibn Bishr, CUnwan al-Majd fT TarTkhNajd (Beirut, n.d.), p. 75. There appears to be nomention in the sources of the Imam 'Abd al-'AzTzhimself ever having been designated in advance as

successor to his father, Muhammad ibn Sa'iud (see Rentz, "Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab,"p. 141

n. 2).7'Abd al-Rah-im,al-Dawla al-Sacuidiyyaal-Ula, 2d ed. (Cairo, 1976), pp. 231, 317. See also Philby,

Sa'udi Arabia, p. 170.

8See generally H. A. R. Gibb, "Constitutional Organisation" in M. Khadduri and H. Liebesny,

eds., Law in the Middle East (Washington D.C., 1955), pp. 1-27; idem, "Some Considerations on the

Sunni Theory of the Caliphate" in his Studies on the Civilisation of Islam (London, 1962),

pp. 141-150.

9The works most often discussed in this connection are those of Hans Kelsen, esp. his General

Theory of Law and State (New York, 1961) and Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles:

University of California Press, 1967) and H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, 1961). Forsome critical writings, see A. W. B. Simpson, ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 2d ser. (Oxford,

1973).10Apassage from al-Ghazzali quoted by Gibb ("Constitutional Organisation," p. 20) is in point

here: "Which is the better part, that we should declare that the qadls are divested of their functions,

that all wilayat are invalid, that no marriages can be legally contracted, that all executive actions in

all parts of the earth are null and void, and to allow that the whole creation is living in sin-or to

recognise that the imamate is held by a valid contract, and that all executive acts and jurisdictions are

valid, given the circumstances as they are and the necessity of these times?"I Laoust, Le Traite,p. xxiii.

12Laoust, Essai sur . .. Ibn Taimiya, pp. 255, 312-313.

131bn Taimiyya, al-Siyasa al-SharCiyya, pp. 161-162; Laoust, Essai sur ... Ibn Taimiyya,

pp.301-302.141bnBishr, 'Unwan al-Majd, p. 88.

15Ibid.,pp. 259-260.

161bid.,pp. 260, 375-376 (editor's note).17W. G. Palgrave, Centraland Eastern Arabia (2 vols.; London, 1865), 1, 379. A picture of Shaikh

'Abd al-LatTf s given by Palgrave, ibid., II, 20-22. L. Pelly observes in his Report on a Journey to

Riyadh (Cambridge, 1978), p. 4, that at the time of his visit (A.D. 1865) Shaikh CAbd l-Rahman was

living in retirement.

18Philby,Sacudi Arabia, p. 218. Palgrave, writing of A.D. 1862-63, states that 'Abd Allah was heir

apparent and active administrator of the kingdom (Central and Eastern Arabia, 11, 36, 64-65, 73).

19Pelly, Report, p. 69.

201bncIsa, TarTkh acd al-Hawddith al- Waqicaff Najd (al-Riyad, 1386/1966), p. 177.

21Kitab al-Tman wa-'l-Radd cala Ahl al-Bida', pp. 7-8, in RashTdRida, ed., Majmucat al-Rasadil

wa-il-Masa'il al-Najdiyya (4 vols.; Cairo, 1346/1928), II, pt. I.

22al-AllusT, arnkhNajd, 2d ed. (Cairo, 1347/1928-29), p. 107.

23So declared by the Imam Faisal to the inhabitants of al-Qa.sim (Ibn Bishr, CUnwanal-Majd,

p. 367).24Public risala of the Imam Faisal quoted in Ibn Bishr, cUnwan al-Majd, p. 349.

25Laoust, Essai sur . .. Ibn Taimiya,p. 298.

26Rida, ed., MaljmaCatl-Rasa'il, IV, p. 555.

27Public risala quoted in Ibn Bishr, cUnwan al-Majd, p. 266.

281bnSahman, ed., al-Hadiyya al-Sunniyya wa-'l-Tu.hfaal- Wahhabiyya, 2d ed. (Cairo, 1344/1925-

26), p. 109.

29Essaisur . .. Ibn Taimiya, p. 527.

301bnBishr, cUnwanal-Majd, p. 308.

31Seeibid., p. 308; Palgrave, Central and EasternArabia, 11,74.

321bncIsa, TarTkhbacd al-Hawadith, pp. 173-174. See also Philby, Sacudi Arabia, pp. 210-212;

Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 170-172.

331bncIsa, Tarnkhbacd al-Hawadith, pp. 177-178.



246 M. J. Crawford

341bid.,p. 178.

35Risalaxi, pp. 69-70, composed by Shaikh 'Abd al-LatTf, n Rida, ed., Majmuaat al-Rasa'il, Vol.

III. This volume comprises 76 risalas written by Shaikh CAbd l-LatT.f nd collected by Ibn Sahman,

one of his pupils and an eminent 'clim during the early decades of the third Sa'cdT state. Allsubsequent references to numbered risalas relate to epistles by Shaikh 'Abd al-LatTf ontained in this

collection.36Risala xxvi, p. 171. Parts of this risala and of the one specifically referred to in the preceding

note have been translated in C. Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia (London, 1981), pp. 104-108.

But her translations of these two important risalas should be treated with great caution.

371bnC'sa, TarTkh a'd al-Hawddith, pp. 179-181.

38J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf (2 vols.; Calcutta, 1915), I, 1131-1132; Dari al-

RashTd,Nubdha TarTkhiyya an Najd (al-Riyad, 1386/1966), p. 89.

39Risalaxi, p. 70.

40Risalaxlvi, p. 274.

41Risalasxi, p. 70, xlvi, p. 274.

42Philby,Sacudi Arabia, p. 221.43Risalaxxviii, p. 180.

4Risala xi, p. 70. Helms points out that the number forty generally refers in Najd to an unknown

quantity (The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, p. 124, n. 63).45Risalaxxviii, p. 179.

461bncIsa, Tarnkhba'd al-Hawadith, pp. 181-182.

47Risalaxxviii, p. 179.

48Risala xlvi, pp. 274-275. By way of justification for his actions, the Shaikh cites as a historical

precedent the truce sought and obtained from Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt by the people of al-Dar'iyya,

including members of the Al al-Shaikh and other 'ulama', during the last days of the first Sa'idistate (Risala xxviii, p. 180).

49Risalaxi, p. 70.

50Risalaxlvi, p. 275.51Arabia of the Wahhabis (London, 1977), p. 73 n. 2. See also al-Jasir, MadTnatal-Riydd (al-

Riyid., 1386/1966), p. 110;DarTal-Rashid, Nubdha, p. 50.

52Risalaxi, p. 70. See also Rida, ed., Majmu'at al-Rasd'il, I, 411.

53Risalaxxvi, pp. 170-171.

541bid.,p. 172.

55Risalaxi, p. 70.

56Risalasxxv, pp. 167-168, xxvi, pp. 172-173.

57Risalaxi, p. 70.

58Risalaxxv, p. 168. This risala dates from Sa'ud's second period as imam. Shaikh 'Abd al-Latif

adopted an identical position on each occasion.

59See Ibn Bishr, cUnwan al-Majd, p. 374. Palgrave encountered 'Abd al-'Aziz and speaks

unfavourably of him (Centraland EasternArabia, I, 275-277, 292).

6?Ibn C'sa, TarTkhba'd al-Hawadith, p. 181; Amin Sac'd, TarTkh l-Dawla al-Saciudiyya(Beirut,

1964), I, 173.

61Risalaxi, p. 70.

62Risalaxxvi, p. 172.

63Risalaxlvi, p. 274.

641bid.

65Winder,Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 237-238.

66J.B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795-1880 (Oxford, 1968), pp. 719-720.

671bn Tsa, TarTkhba'd al-Hawadith, pp. 182-183. For the Ottoman expedition in the context of

Anglo-Ottoman relations and the affairs of the Arabian Gulf generally, see Kelly, Britain and the

Persian Gulf, chap. 15.

68Risalaxlvi, p. 275.69Ibn'Tsa, TarTkh a'd al-Hawddith, p. 177. 'Abd al-'AzTzhimself died fighting for the Imam CAbd

Allah against Muhammad ibn RashTd n 1301/1884 (ibid., p. 192).70IbnBishr, 'Unwan al-Majd, p. 261.

71Risalaxxiv, p. 161.




72Risalaix, p. 61.

73Risalaiv, p. 38.

74Ibid.,p.

39.

751bnBishr, 'Unwdn al-Majd, p. 261; Ibn 'Tsa, TarTkh a'd al-Hawadith, p. 192, n. 1.

76Risalaxxiv, pp. 160-165. See also Rida, ed., Majmu'at al-Rasadil, 1, 412-413.

77Risalax, p. 67.

781bnSahman, the c'lim who collected Shaikh 'Abd al-LatTfs risalas, observes at one point that

the Shaikh is wrong in thinking that the basic requirement that the help be necessary relates to the

dire need of the ruler in terms of his own power. What is in question is necessity from the point of

view of religion (Risala xxiv, p. 165).79SeeRisalas x, pp. 67-68, xxiv, pp. 163-165, xxvi, pp. 172-173, xlvi, pp. 275-276.

80SeeRisala xxvi, pp. 171-173.

81Risalasix, p. 63, xxvi, p. 174.


83See Risalas xlvii, pp. 277-278, xlviii, pp. 280-281.84Risalaxxxix, p. 229.

85Risalasiv, p. 39, viii, pp. 57-58, xxvii, p. 177.


87SeeKelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 721, 727; Lorimer, Gazetteer, 1, 1132-1133; Winder,Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 257-258. Shaikh 'Abd al-Latif's views on Sacfd's

diplomatic manoeuvres are unrecorded but, in general, he seems to have regardedthe British as beingin league with the Ottomans.

88The most elaborate discussions by Shaikh CAbdal-Latif of the duty of hijra are contained in

Risalas ii-ix, xxvii, xxix.

891bn 'Tsa, TarTkhba'd al-Hawadith, p. 184. Shaikh 'Abd al-LatTfcomplained at this time of

desertion by the badui Risala xlviii, p. 281).

90See Risalas ii, p. 23, iii, p. 33, iv, p. 38, vii, p. 53.91For this period, see Ibn 'Tsa, TarTkhba'd al-Hawadith, p. 183; al-Jasir, MadTnat al-Riyad,

p. 109;Kelly, Britainand the Persian Gulf, pp. 736-737.

92SeeRisalas xi, pp. 70-71, xxvi, p. 172.

93Risala lxi, p. 318. The references in this risala to CAbdAllah's return and to jihad support the

conclusion that it was written during the period of 'Abd Allah's second reign as imam.

94For the history of Sa'id's negotiations with the Ottomans, see Lorimer, Gazetteer, 1, 971, 1131;

al-'Azzaw, TarTkhal-'Irdq (Baghdad, 1353/1935-1376/1956), VIII, 15; Kelly, Britain and the

Persian Gulf, pp. 739-741.

951bn Tsa, TarTkh acd al-Hawddith, pp. 184-185.

96Risalaxi, p. 71.

97Risalaxxv, pp. 167-168.

98See Ibn 'Isa, TarTkhba'd al-Hawadith, pp. 186-187. According to Kelly, 'Abd al-Rahman'soriginal object was not so much to fall out with the Ottomans as to compel them to appoint him

mutasarrifof al-Ahsa' (Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 762).991bn Tsa, TarTkh a'd al-Hawddith, p. 187.

'00Risalaxi, pp. 71-72.

101Risalaxxv, p. 168.

1021bnTsa, TarTkh a'd al-Hawddith, p. 188.

103Risalaxi, p. 72. Lorimer seems to have misread the situation because he states that after the

death of Sacid. 'Abd al-Rahman "was inclined to make terms with his half-brother 'Abdullah, but

the Wahhabi priesthood, on account of the latter's connection with the Turks, would have none of

him..." (Gazetteer, 1, 1134).04Ibn Tsa, TarTkh a'd al-Hawadith, p. 188.

'O5Pelly,Report, p. 4.'061tis worth remembering in this context that the Imam Faisal had himself paid tribute to the

Ottomans (see Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century,pp. 206-207).

'07Palgrave,Centraland EasternArabia, II, 74.

108Lorimer,Gazetteer, II, 54.

'09Risalaii, pp. 20-21.



248 M. J. Crawford

l0OKelly, ritainand the Persian Gulf, p. 717.tlPelly, Report, p. 69.

112t isinteresting

to note that Shaikh 'Abd al-Lat.fregarded

theQahtan

asgenerally abiding bythe Shari'a (Risala xlii, pp. 261-262). Lorimer describes the Qahtan as "'austerely fanatical' in

religious matters to an unusual degree"(Gazetteer, II, 1471).113Risalaxxxii, p. 188. See also Ibn Taimiyya, al-Siydsa al-Sharciyya, p. 47.

14Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, p. 226.

civil war foeign intervention and teh question of politcal legitimacy a nineteenth century saudi...

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