citizen diplomacy in 1949

8/10/2019 Citizen Diplomacy in 1949

1/9

International Affairs: Citizen Diplomacy

Author(s): James MarshallReviewed work(s):Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Feb., 1949), pp. 83-90Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1950316.

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2/9

INTERNATIONALAFFAIRS

CITIZEN

DIPLOMACY

JAMES MARSHALL

United States National

Commission

for

UNESCO

One wonders what the ghosts of Talleyrand and Franklin

would

say

were they

to

visit the diplomatic

conferencesof today. Where

s the

suave

approach,

the

graceful phrase

concealingbloody warnings dropped by a

king to the music of a minuet

or passed by an ambassador o a minister

of state over the after-dinner

port? How surprised hey would

be at

the

blunt

Bevin

with his

frequently

unconcealed ll humor, at Molotov, rude

and blustering,at Byrnes publicly changing his course in

midstream, at

Marshallannouncingstate

policy in speeches rather than to plenipoten-

tiariesorthrough officialdocuments.

How surprisedTalleyrand and Franklin would be to think

of inter-

national relationscarriedon

pursuant o slogans such as open

covenants

openly arrived at. How

their shrewd eyes would have

twinkled at the

credulity

of

people

who

believed

that they had democratized

oreign

af-

fairs

through

such a

slogan.

The old school diplomats

would

scarely

have confusedheadlineswhich

report in large black type the

speeches of

the diplomats,orthe politicalgossip columnswhich purport o repeat the

whisperedasides of statesmen,

with covenants democratically

negotiated.

The fact

is

that although

we have gained publicity for foreign

affairs,

and that

in

itself is important,

we have not democratized oreign

affairs.

They are

still

the business

of technicians. They remain the

preserve

of

foreignoffices.

Of all administrative

departments, the diplomatic and

the

military

have been the least receptive

of democraticpatterns. As to

foreign rela-

tions, this has been the result of two fallacies: (1) the idea

that things

diplomaticare necessarilyand essentially top secret; (2)

the

misconcep-

tion

that the

Bevins, the

Molotovs, the Byrneses, and the Marshalls

can

conduct

foreign

relations without being required o give a blow by

blow

accounting

to

public opinion. The former is untrue; the

latter

no

longer

possible.But we still romanticizeabout the confidentialcharacter

of the

material of diplomacy and the

skilful intrigue which we deem

to be

the

art of the

statesman.

There are, however, in certain

democraticcountries roots

from

which

more democratic oreignrelationscould grow. The great institutionof the

question put by a memberof the House of Commons o the

prime

minis-

ter or

the minister of foreign

affairs not merely brings

information

to

the public, but inevitably humbles any would-be autocrat in

the

British

Foreign Office.The equally important institution of Congressional

hear-

83


3/9

84

THE

AMERICAN

POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

ings also has a

sobering

effect on

administrative officers.

For

a Congres-

sional committee can

not

only

call

the

Department

of

State

on the

carpet;

it can give an opportunity to the interested public to express its views

concerning the

principles

of

foreign

policy

and

the conduct of

foreign

re-

lations.

Such

parliamentary questions

and

committee

studies represent one

aspect of

democratizing

administration.

They

afford the

opportunity

for

a

public

canvassing

and examination of

the acts

and

aims

of

the adminis-

trators.

They make the public

partners

in

knowledge;

they give

to

the

public the facts

upon

which

they

may base

critical analyses and make

recommendations to

the administrators.

They

fall

short,

however,

of a

most fundamental element in democratic procedure. For to be able to

question

administrators

after

the

fact, after

they have

acted,

is insuffi-

cient. Action itself

remains untouched

by

the

democratic

process.

Not

until

there

is

broader

participation

in

the

planning,

the

development,

and

the

execution

of

foreign

policy

can it

be

said that the

people take part

in

their

own

foreign relations.

Occasionally, in

especially

dramatic situations, the

people make

their

opinions felt.

Thus it

was the

strong

popular reaction

to

the

by-passing

of the United Nations by President Truman that resulted in the Vanden-

berg

amendments to

the

proposals

to

aid

Greece and

Turkey.

But in

most

situations it is

the middle levels

of foreign

offices which,

untouched

to

any great degree by

the lay

public, mark the trails which

become

the

roads of

international

policy.

How can

you

expect the layman

to take part in

the planning,

develop-

ment, and execution

of

foreign policy?, the

foreign office

official will

in-

quire.

That

is the

question

asked

by technicians in all

fields. The jurist

asked

it as

to

lay

arbitrators; yet we

know

today

that

commercial transac-

tions

are

facilitated by

arbitration, and labor

disputes

which are some-

times

fought

but

rarely settled in

courts are

more frequently solved

in

a

satisfactory

manner

by lay

arbitration

or

mediation. The

physician

and

the

psychiatrist often ask

similar

questions of

education; yet we

know

that

public health

and mental

hygiene cannot

progress except as

teachers

devote

themselves

to

these problems in the

schools. The

engineer and the

plant

manager put the

same

question in industry; yet we

know now

that

the

psychological effect of

worker

participation in

planning is to

increase

efficiency.

Professional pride,

professional

defensiveness, tends in

every

field to

discount

the

layman. It

tends to build

up a cult of

expertness, an

almost

mystical

cloud-throne guarded by

the

cherubim of a special

technical

language.

In

the field of

politics, in its

extreme form,

this separatism of

technicians leads to the

police state

with its NKVDs and

its

Gestapos to


4/9

INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS 85

liquidate presumptuous

laymen. In

its more moderate expression,

the

political technician

and the bureaucrat

simply treat the layman as

one

who lives on the wrong side of the tracks of wisdom.

Fortunately,

we have had some recent successful experiences

in the

par-

ticipation of laymen

in foreign relations.

These may not supply

sufficient

criteria

for final

judgment as to the effectiveness

of

democratic

procedures

in that field. But they point a way.

Just as we can say that a citizen

army

can be a top-flight instrument of war,

we now can add

that

there

is evi-

dence

that a citizen diplomacy is a promising implement

of

peace.

In 1945, the State Department invited

three or four

voluntary organi-

zations

especially

interested in the

agenda to send representatives to the

Chapultepec Conference held in Mexico City by the Western Hemisphere

nations. This

was a first hesitant experiment in citizen

diplomacy. At

the

San

Francisco Conference, the United States made another trial

of this

new technique.

It invited 42 national

organizations to send consultants to

the Conference

which was to draw the United Nations

Charter. These

organizations

represented, among

others, labor, business,

agriculture,

education, lawyers,

women, veterans,

religious, civic, and peace

groups.

They represented

thirty to forty million Americans associated

in volun-

tary organizations expressive of their interests as private citizens.

Almost daily

during the course of

the San Francisco Conference, these

consultants met with

members of the

American delegation,

their

advisers

or

technical experts,

and discussed

Conference developments with them.

They submitted memoranda on various

points at the

request of the dele-

gation. They gave

the delegation

the feel of the nation on

issues

which

arose-a much more personal and direct feel than could

be

had

through

the filter

of

editorial

writers and commentators.

These consultants, these laymen

participating in the

planning and de-

velopment

of

critical

international relations, made a

number of specific

proposals

to the American delegation which found

their way into

the

Charter.

For

example, under the leadership of Judge Joseph

M.

Proskauer,

the efforts of the consultants resulted

in the inclusion

of the human rights

provision.

The inclusion of education

in the field of the Economic

and

Social Council

was in large measure due to the work

of the

consultants

led

by

Dr.

William G. Carr and Dr.

George Zook.

The

presence and participation

of these consultants

at San Francisco

contributed immeasurably to American understanding of the Charter, to

American

eagerness

to join the United

Nations, and to the overwhelming

approval

of

the

Charter by the Senate. The support

of the

U.

N.

by

the

people

of

this country is largely attributable to the challenge

given

to

the

consultants

by their invitation to the

San Francisco Conference.

Further-

more, these consultants,

and more indirectly the

organizations

they


5/9

86

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL

SCIENCE REVIEW

represented,

had staked out

something of a vested interest

in the United

Nations as

a result of the time, thought, and

effort they had

devoted to the

creation of

the Charter.

A second instance of the democratization of foreign affairs is to be found

in the United States National

Commission

for UNESCO. This institution

grows out of

the provision of the UNESCO

constitution.

Article VII pro-

vides

that

each member

state shall make such arrangements

as suit

its

particular conditions for the

purpose of associating

its principal bodies in-

terested in educational, scientific, and cultural

matters

with the work of

the

Organization,

preferably by the

formation of a National

Commission

broadly

representative

of

the Government

and

such

bodies.

Such

National Commissions, or national cooperating bodies, according to the

constitution, are to act in

an advisory capacity

to their respective delega-

tions to

the

General Conference

and to their Governments

in

matters re-

lating to the Organization

and shall function

as agencies

of liaison in

all

matters of interest

to it,

and are to be consulted by their

governments

in

the selection

of delegates to UNESCO.

These clauses

stem largely

from

proposals made in this country

and pushed

by the United States delega-

tion to

the

Conference

in

London

which

prepared

the

draft

of

the

UNESCO

constitution

in

1945.

How did

the State Department treat

the

opportunity

to

apply

on

a

per-

manent basis

the experiences with the consultants

at San

Francisco? How

did it

make

use of this

invitation

to

gain popular support

for UNESCO

and

bring

democratic procedures

into

one

phase

of

international

rela-

tions? It drew

closer its cloak of bureaucratic

pride.

It

consulted

its little

entourage of

trusted advisers, who regarded

not

only diplomacy

but

also

education,

science, and

culture as the

domain

of the

expert.

It caused to

be introduced into Congress

a

joint

resolution authorizing

the

Secretary

of State to designate, for such periods of service as he may determine, not

to

exceed

30 persons broadly

representative

of

the

educational, scientific,

and cultural

interests

of the

United

States,

to serve on

the National

Com-

mission.

In

other words,

the

Department

of

State

intended

to

keep

a

tight

hold

on

popular

participation through hand-picked

individuals.

But

this

is

quite different

from the

United States

associating its principal

bodies

interested

in

educational, scientific,

and cultural

matters

with

the

work

of

the Organization.

The

bodies themselves

could

be represented only

by

persons

of

their

own

choice.

A number of

organizations

which had been

urging

the

establishment of

UNESCO appeared before

Congress to protest

this

attempt

to

create

a

house organ

of the State Department out

of the opportunity

for

popular

participation

in

our international cultural

relations.

The

whole

point

of

a

national commission

would have been missed

if the principal

bodies in


6/9

INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS

87

this

country

interested in

educational,

scientific,

and

cultural

matters had

been

omitted. The

voice

of

UNESCO

would

rarely reach

the

schoolroom

or

the

woman's club

or

the

laboratory

except

through

the

releases of

the

State Department or the pronouncements of its 30 representative favor-

ites. Nor

would

the

desire

of great

numbers of

people to

participate in

the

development

of

the

UNESCO

program,

in

playingsa

part in

international

relations in their

own fields,

have been

tapped by the

official

plan.

The

Congress was

induced to

change

the

proposed

organization of

the

United

States

National

Commission

for

UNESCO.

It

provided

for

a

National

Commission of 100

members,

40

of whom

were to be

outstand-

ing

persons

selected

by the

Secretary of

State,

including

not

more than 10

federal government employees, not more than 15 representatives of state

and

local

educational,

scientific,

and

cultural

interests, and

not more than

15

persons

chosen

at

large, and

60

representatives of

principal

national

voluntary

organizations

interested in

educational,

scientific, and

cultural

matters.

The

Commission

is

vested

with

power

to review

periodically

the

list

of

organizations

designating

representatives

in

order

to

achieve

a

desirable rotation

among

organizations

represented.

In

addition,

the

National

Commission is

directed to call

general

con-

ferences

for

the

discussion of

matters

relating to

UNESCO,

to

which

conferences organizations actively interested in

the

problems

of

UNESCO

shall

be

invited to

send

representatives,

and

special

conferences of

experts

to

consider

specific

matters

relating

to

UNESCO. In this

way,

representa-

tives of

popular

organizations

and

experts,

as well

as

individual

national

and local

leaders,

are

enabled

to

take

part

in

the

development

of

policy

and

the

domestic

operation of

the

program of

UNESCO.

The

first

meeting

of

the

National

Commission

took

place in

September,

1946, with

leadership

taken by

the

representatives of

national

organiza-

tions. The interest was intense, and the National Commission spent the

greater

part

of

three

days in

developing

a

program

for

the

American

delegation to

the

UNESCO

Conference. At

the

conclusion

of

the Commis-

sion

meeting,

the

Executive

Committee met with

Assistant

Secretary

of

State William

Benton

to

discuss the

names of

possible

delegates

to

the

UNESCO

Conference to

be held

in

Paris in

November, 1946.

There

was

also

discussion

of

the

principles

to

be

applied

in

the

selection

of

the

dele-

gation. As

selected,

the

delegation

was

made

up

largely of

persons

who

were

members of

the

National

Commission

and

almost

entirely

of

persons

who

had

been

discussed and

supported

by

the

Executive

Committee.

At

the

conference of

UNESCO held

in

Paris in

1946,

the American dele-

gation was in

large

measure successful in

establishing its point of

view

on

the

program of

the

Organization. This

does

not

mean,

of

course, that

the

American

delegation

had

its own

way

in

everything. It

did

not.

But

be-

cause of

the

preparation

that

had been

made by the

National

Commission


7/9

88

THE

AMERICAN

POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

and the staff of the State Department,

it was

one of the best prepared, if

not the best

prepared, delegations

at the conference on matters

of pro-

gram and policy.

Where the United States delegation

failed

was on points

that had not been discussed by the National Commission-the matter of

administration,

the matter

of budgeting, the matter of the

appointment

of the Director-General.

The failure of the United

States delegation

in these respects was due

in part

to

the inadequacy of

the State Department's

political preparations,

that is, its understanding of

the temper of

other delegations.

But

above

all, it was

due to the fact that the delegation itself

was not adequately

pre-

pared.

And in the case of the director-generalship

it can

hardly be said

that the delegation had its heart in supporting the American candidate.

There was

no one who did

not respect him, but there was unquestionable

resentment in

the delegation that the important

matter of policy

involved

in

the selection

of

a

Director-General

had never been discussed with

the

National Commission.

The

Department had therefore failed

to gain

both

the immediate

wholehearted support of its

delegation and

the support of

the people at home who must

play a fundamental

r6le in making UNESCO

effective

in

this

country.

At

the

Mexico

City Conference

in 1947,

there was another example

of

the danger of

leaving cultural relations to State Department determina-

tion. The United States abstained

from voting

on the resolution to admit

Hungary

to membership in UNESCO.

Although the

United States dele-

gation

was almost unanimously opposed to bringing into

UNESCO

the

political problems that beset

the United Nations,

State Department policy

overrode

these objections

and directed the delegation

to refrain

from

voting

because United States

policy

in

the United

Nations

had

opposed

the admission of Hungary. This

was an unfortunate

introduction of power

politics into the cultural field, which most of the lay members of the dele-

gation

and some of the departmental advisers

appreciated.

It

is unfortu-

nate

that the United States

National Commission did not have

an oppor-

tunity

to

express

its

view

on this

point.

Certainly

the

lesson of

the

consultants of

San

Francisco

had application

here. Their

participation demonstrated the

strength of the

following

that

could be

developed throughout

the country when representatives

of

great

popular organizations

took part in the Conference.

There are,

of

course, thousands

of organizations in this country

which

cannot find a place in the limited

membership

of the National Commission

for

UNESCO.

They, too,

have a part to play in broadening

international

understanding through education,

science,

and culture. Under the pro-

visions of the enabling act, there have been

a national conference

in Phil-

adelphia

and

regional conferences

in Denver

and San Francisco

in which

members

of

these organizations found opportunities

to become

acquainted


8/9


9/9

90

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL

SCIENCE

REVIEW

Again,

in the Foreign Assistance

Act provision

has been

made for a

Public

Advisory Board

consisting

of the administrator

and 12 additional

members appointed

by the President

subject

to

Senatorial

approval.

It

is unfortunate that neither act goes one step further, permitting voluntary

organizations

to nominate members

of the two commissions

and of the

Public

Advisory Board.

Both at the San

Francisco

Conference and

in the United

States National

Commission

for

UNESCO,

business,

agriculture,

labor, education,

science,

the arts, higher

learning

in

the

various fields

of culture,

the

churches,

and

women's

groups

have demonstrated their

capacity

to bring

to the

responsible

public

officials the

voice and

support of the

American

people.

These experiments-and the provisions of the Smith-Mundt bill-indi-

cate

the road

to democratizing

foreign

relations, one

of the

most resistant

fields

to the

entry

of

the

layman.

It is questionable

whether peace

can be preserved

by the efforts

of

technicians,

even the most

high-minded.

They sit alternately

on pedestals

and

in

anxious seats,

neither

of

which is

favorable

to

a free

flow of under-

standing

with

the

public

in whose

name

they purport

to

speak. If,

how-

ever,

as the constitution

of

UNESCO proclaims,

wars

begin

in

the

minds

of men,

and it

is

in the

minds of

men

that

the defenses

of

peace

must

be

constructed,

the

great

resource

of

the

minds of

laymen

must be tapped

and

conduits

prepared

through

which

their energies

may

flow

to the main-

tenance

of an

affirmative peace.

If,

as we commonly believe

today,

it is men rather

than states that are

the ultimate foundations

of

good

will, then

every possible

means must

be

explored

to enable

men to

plan

and

participate

in

the

expression

of inter-

national good

will.

We shall

continue

to

require

the

skills

of

Talleyrands

and

Franklins.

But

to

be

effective

in

maintaining peace,

they

must

now

speak the minds of citizen diplomats, of great masses of people, rather than

of

dynasties,

political parties,

or

ruling groups.

citizen diplomacy in 1949

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