chudnoff_therationalrolesintuition

7/30/2019 Chudnoff_TheRationalRolesIntuition

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TheRationalRolesofIntuition

ElijahChudnoff

Abstract:Intuitionsareoftenthoughtofasinputstotheoreticalreasoning.For

example,youmightformabeliefbytakinganintuitionatfacevalue,oryoumight

takeyourintuitionsasstartingpointsinthemethodofreflectiveequilibrium.The

aimofthispaperistoarguethatinadditiontotheserolesintuitionsalsoplay

action-guidingroles.Theargumentproceedsbyreflectiononthetransmissionof

justificationthroughinference.Accordingtoinferentialinternalists,inordertogain

justificationforbelievingtheconclusionofanargumentbyinferringitfromthe

premisesinthatargumentonemustseethatthepremisessupporttheconclusion.

Imotivatethisviewandendorsetheideathatonesseeingsuchasupportrelation

consistsofoneshavinganintuition.Inanumberofrecentpapers,PaulBoghossian

haspressedaregressargumentagainstinferentialinternalisminspiredbyLewis

CarrollsdialogueWhattheTortoiseSaidtoAchilles.Ideveloparesponseto

Bogossiansargumentaccordingtowhichintuitionsworklikementalimperatives

andinferencesarementalactionsperformedbyobeyingthem.Afterdevelopingthis

responsetoBoghossiansargument,Itakeupthequestionofwhatitisinvirtueof

whichintuitionsplayaguidancerole,whentheydoso.


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Wehaveattitudesbeliefs,desires,hopes,fears,intentionsandwe

performactionsmentalonessuchascountingsheepbeforefallingasleepand

bodilyonessuchasmakingthebedafterwakingup.Someoftheseattitudesand

actionsaremorereasonablethanothers.Wehaveexperiences,suchasperceptions,

bodilysensations,recollections,imaginings,andIwouldaddintuitions.Someof

theseplayrolesinmakingsomeofourattitudesandactionsmorereasonablethan

others.BytherationalrolesofatypeofexperienceImeantherolesexperiencesof

thattypeplayinmakingsomeofourattitudesandactionsmorereasonablethan

others.

InthispaperIwillexploretherationalrolesintuitionsplay.Twohavebeen

discussedwidelyrecently:

Justifier:Intuitionsjustifybeliefs.

Evidence:Intuitionsareevidenceforbeliefs.

Idontassumethesearethesamerationalrole.Idiscussbothofthembrieflybelow.

Mymainaiminthispaper,however,istodefendtheviewthatintuitionsplayan

additionalrationalrole.Toafirstapproximation:

Guidance:Intuitionsguideactions.1

1In this paper I focus on mental actions, though I think intuitions play a role in guiding some bodily

actions as well.


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Hereistheplan.

Insection1,IsetoutsomeassumptionsIwillmakeaboutthenatureof

intuition.Insection2,Idiscussthejustifierandevidenceroles.Insections3to5,I

makeacaseforthinkingthatintuitionsplaytheguidancerole.Theargument

proceedsbyreflectiononthetransmissionofjustificationthroughinference.

Accordingtoinferentialinternalists,inordertogainjustificationforbelievingthe

conclusionofanargumentbyinferringitfromthepremisesinthatargumentone

mustseethatthepremisessupporttheconclusion.Insection3,Imotivatethis

viewandendorsetheideathatonesseeingsuchasupportrelationconsistsof

oneshavinganintuition.Inanumberofrecentpapers,PaulBoghossianhas

pressedaregressargumentagainstinferentialinternalisminspiredbyLewis

CarrollsWhattheTortoiseSaidtoAchilles.2Insection4,IreviewBoghossians

argument,isolatingwhatItaketobeitsmainpremise.Insection5,Idevelopa

responsetoBogossiansargumentthatrequiresintuitionstoplaytheguidancerole.

Insection6,Ielaborateontheviewthatintuitionsplaytheguidancerolein

responsetotwoobjections.Andinsection7,Itakeupthequestionofwhatitisin

virtueofwhichintuitionsplayaguidancerole,whentheydoso.

1.WhatAreIntuitions?

Considerthreethesesaboutperception:

2(Carroll 1905), (Boghossian 2008).


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(1)Perceptualexperiencesare suigenerisexperiences;theyshouldnotbeidentifiedwithdoxasticattitudesordispositionssuchasbeliefs,or

inclinationstobelieve.3

(2)Perceptualexperiencespossesspresentationalphenomenology;wheneveryouhaveaperceptualexperiencerepresentingthatp,thereis

someq(maybe=p)suchthatinthesameexperienceitperceptually

seemstoyouthatq,andyouseemtobesensorilyawareofthechunkof

realitythatmakesqtrue.4

(3)Perceptualexperiencesfitintoyourstreamofconsciousnesslikeexperientialatoms;theyarenotconstitutedbyyourotherexperiences,

suchasyourimaginingsandconsciousthoughts.5

Inmyviewintuitionissimilartoperceptionwithrespecttothefirsttwopoints,and

dissimilarwithrespecttothethird.Thatis,Iendorsethefollowingthesesabout

intuition:

(4)Intuitionexperiencesaresuigenerisexperiences;theyshouldnotbeidentifiedwithdoxasticattitudesordispositionssuchasbeliefs,or

inclinationstobelieve.6

3Cf. (Jackson 1977), (Evans 1981), (Peacocke 1983), (Searle 1983), (Foster 2001), (Huemer 2001).

(Armstrong 1968) is a well-known defense of the opposing view; see also (Gler 2009).

4Cf. (McDowell 1994), (Robinson 1994), (Sturgeon 2000), (Foster 2001), (OShaughnessy 2002), (Crane2005), and (Johnston 2006). All agree that perception possesses presentational phenomenology, though

not all adopt the same gloss on what this amounts to. I explore the nature of presentational

phenomenology further in (Chudnoff 2012a).

5Contrast the views of some earlier writers according to which perceptual experiencesas opposed tomere sensationsare supplemented by imagination. For discussion see Strawsons Imagination and

Perception in (Strawson 2007).


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(5)Intuitionexperiencespossesspresentationalphenomenology;wheneveryouhaveanintuitionexperiencerepresentingthatp,thereissomeq

(maybe=p)suchthatinthesameexperienceitintuitivelyseemsto

youthatq,andyouseemtobeintuitivelyawareofthechunkofreality

thatmakesqtrue.7

(6)Intuitionexperiencesfitintoyourstreamofconsciousnesslikeexperientialmolecules;theyareconstitutedbyyourotherexperiences,

suchasyourimaginingsandconsciousthoughts.8

Ihavearguedfortheses(4)through(6)atlengthelsewhere.9HereIwillbriefly

indicatesomemotivationforacceptingthem.

Considerthefollowingtwoclaims:

(A)Ifa0(B)7+10>3+17

Both(A)and(B)aretruthswecancometoknow.Butthereisadifference.Formost

ofus(B)isonlyknowablebycalculationortestimony.(A),ontheotherhand,is

6Cf. (Bealer 1998, 2000, and 2002) and (Huemer 2001, 2008). For arguments in favor of the opposing

view see: (Williamson 2004, 2005, and 2007) and (Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 2009).7This viewthough not my way of putting itwas more common among earlier writers on intuition. In

(Chudnoff 2011b), I give reasons for attributing it to Descartes, Husserl, Russell, and Gdel. I would

add certain moral intuitionists such as John Balguy and Richard Price to the list of historical

proponents; see their works excerpted in (Raphael 1969). Among more recent writers, Butchvarov and

Bonjour seem to me to defend similar views; see (Butchvarov 1970) and (Bonjour 2005).

8Cf. (Husserl 1975, 2001), (Parsons 1980, 2007), and (Tieszen 1989, 2005). I believe Husserl was the firstto defend this view. It was common ground among those in the phenomenological tradition; see, for

example, (Reinach 1911), (Gurwitsch 1964), and (Lvinas1995).9See (Chudnoff 2011a, b, and c, 2012a and b,andforthcoming).


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somethingthatitispossibletojustsee,i.e.intuittobetrue,perhapsaftera

momentortwoofreflection.

Contrasttheexperienceyouhavewhenyouintuit(A)withtheexperience

youhavewhenyouconsciouslyjudge(B),saybecauseyoucalculateitorreceive

testimonythatitistrue.Anaturalwaytocharacterizewhatdistinguishesthe

intuitivewayofbecomingconvincedthat(A)istrueisthis.Inthiscase,youarenot

compelledbyauthorityorargumenttobelievethatifa0;nordo

youjustfindyourselfmysteriouslytemptedtobelievethisproposition.Rather,the

propositionismadetoseemtruetoyoubyyourapparentinsightintothebitof

mathematicalrealitythatmakesittrue,namelythedependenceof22aona.This

iswhyIsaythatintuitionshavepresentationalphenomenology.Ifintuitionshave

presentationalphenomenology,however,thentheyshouldntbeidentifiedwith

doxasticattitudesordispositions.Onemighthaveadoxasticattitudeordisposition

inlightofhavinganintuitionexperiencewithpresentationalphenomenology,but

thedoxasticattitudeordispositionitselfissomethingelse,sinceitispossibleto

havesuchanattitudeordisposition,evenaconsciousone,withouthavingany

presentationalphenomenology.

Reflectiononexampleintuitionsseemstometoprovidesomemotivationfor

accepting(4)and(5).Whatabout(6)?Heretheconsiderationsareabitmore

involved.Atleastthreeobservationsarerelevant.

First,inhavinganintuitionapropositionappearstoyoutobetrue.

Second,thesamepropositioncanappeartoyoutobetrueindifferentways,

andthesedifferentwaysaresignificantenoughsothatweshouldcountthemas


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partoftheidentityoftheintuitionswithwhichtheyareassociated.Forexample,

maybeyouthinkthatoneintuitionmightjustifybelievingapropositionmorethan

anotherandthatthisisduetothefactthatitmakesthepropositionappeartobe

trueinaclearermannerthantheother.HereisanexamplefromDescartes:ifyou

trytointuitthatachiliagonhasmoresidesthana999sidedfigurebyimaginingit,

yourintuitionwillbelessclearthanifyoureliedsolelyonyourintellectualgraspof

thedifferencebetween1000sidesand999sides.

Third,thedifferencesinwayspropositionsappeartrueinintuitionsare

correlatedwithdifferencesinassociatedreflections.IntheexamplefromDescartes

thedifferencesintheintuitionsareassociatedwithdifferencesinaccompanying

thoughtsandimaginings.Astraightforwardapproachtoindividuatingintuitionsso

thattheiridentitiesincludewayspropositionsappeartobetrueininthemandnot

justthepropositionsthatdoappeartobetrueinthemistotakesuchthoughtsand

imaginingstobepartsoftheintuitions.Thissuggeststhat(6)istrue,i.e.that

intuitionsareconstitutedbyotherexperiencessuchasthoughtsandimaginings.

2.IntuitionsasJustifiersandasEvidence

Takeyourintuitionthatifa0.Youhavenoreasontoreject

thisclaimordistrustyourintuition.So,plausibly,yourintuitionmakesitthecase

thatyouhavejustificationforbelievingthatifa0.Suppose,

further,thatyoutakeyourintuitionatfacevalue.Youtherebyformajustifiedbelief


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thatifa0.Yourbeliefisjustifiedbecauseitisbasedonyour

intuition.

Theforegoingsuggeststhatatleastsomeintuitionsarejustifiers.Butitalso

suggeststhatweshoulddistinguishbetweentwowaysinwhichsuchintuitionsare

justifiers.Followingstandardterminology,someintuitionsarepropositional

justifiersandsomeintuitionsaredoxasticjustifiers.Ifanintuitionisapropositional

justifier,thenitmakesitthecasethatyouhavejustificationforabelief.Ifan

intuitionisadoxasticjustifier,thenitplusthefactthatyoubaseabeliefonitmake

itthecasethatyourbeliefisjustified.

Ifintuitionsarejustifiers,thenitisnaturaltoask:Invirtueofwhatdoesan

intuitionplaythejustifierrole,whenitdoesso?Thereareanumberofoptionsone

mightpursue.Twoinitialideasare:

Reliabilism:ifanintuitionplaysthejustifierrole,itdoessoinvirtueofbeing

areliableindicatorofthetruthofitscontent.10

Phenomenalism:ifanintuitionplaysthejustifierrole,itdoessoinvirtueof

havingacertainphenomenologywithrespecttoitscontent.11

Icalltheseinitialideas,sincetheyrequireandhavereceivedfurtherelaboration.My

ownviewisthatPhenomenalismisthepreferablestartingpoint,andthatitrequires

onesimpleelaboration:therelevantphenomenologyispresentational

10Cf. (Bealer 1998a, 1998b, 1999), (Goldman 2007), (Peacocke 2004), and (Sosa 2007, 2009).11Cf. (Huemer 2006).


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phenomenology,ascharacterizedinsection1.Whetherthisisthecorrectviewwill

notmakeadifferencetotherestofmydiscussion,soIwillnottakeupitsdefense

here.12

SofarIhaveframedmydiscussionintermsofjustification.Muchrecent

workonintuition,however,isframedintermsofevidence.ThequestionIwantto

considernowis:Howmightintuitionsbeingevidencerelatetothembeing

justifiers?

Ononewayofthinkingaboutevidence,thereisntmuchtosayinresponseto

thisquestionsinceevidenceisjustaterminologicalvariantofjustifier.Thatis:

Yourevidenceconsistsofwhateverisapropositionaljustifierforyou,i.e.

whatevermakesitthecasethatyouhavejustificationforbelieving

something.

Ifthisishowwethinkofevidence,theninsofarasweagreethatintuitionsplaythe

justifierrole,weshouldunderstandtheideathatintuitionsareevidencejustaswe

understandtheideathatintuitionsarejustifiers.

Butthereisanotherwayofthinkingaboutevidence,onwhichthe

relationshipbetweenintuitionsasjustifiersandasevidenceislessclear.Wemight

putitlikethis:

12For a defense, see (Chudnoff 2011a, and forthcoming).


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Yourevidenceconsistsofconsiderationsthatepistemicallycountinfavorof

oragainstyourhavingcertainbeliefs.

Thisformulationleavesopentwoissues.Oneissueisabouttheontologyof

evidence:aretheconsiderationsthatconstituteevidencefactsorpropositions?

Anotherissueisabouttheconditionsonpossessingevidence:mustthe

considerationsthatconstituteyourevidencebeknownorbelievedorbelievedwith

justificationorpropositionallyjustifiedforyouoretc?Theseareimportant

questions.ButtheissuesIamconcernedwithdonothingeonanswerstothem.

Ifwethinkofevidenceasepistemicallyfavorableconsiderations,then

insofarasweuseintuitiontopickoutakindofexperience,weshouldagreethat

intuitionsarenotevidence,sinceexperiencesarenotconsiderations.

Supposeweadoptthissecondwayofthinkingaboutevidenceandweuse

intuitiontopickoutakindofexperience.Giventhatyourintuitionsarenot

themselvesyourevidence,howdotheintuitionsthatyouhavestandwithrespectto

yourevidence?Sayyouintuitthatp.Whatfollowsaboutyourevidence?Hereare

somepossibilities:

- Yourevidencenowincludestheconsiderationthatp- Yourevidencenowincludestheconsiderationthatyouhavehadthe

intuitionthatp


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Supposethatthisisallthatfollowsaboutyourevidence.Thenitappearsthatthere

isaproblem.Whatevidencedoyouhaveforbelievingthatp?Theconsideration

thatpseemsquestion-begging.13Theconsiderationthatyouhavehadtheintuition

thatpisaboutyourownpsychology,and,onemightworry,evenifitlendssome

supporttobelievingp,thesupportitlendsisveryslight.14

Idontthinkthisismuchofaproblem.Supposeyoudonthaveverygood

evidenceforbelievingthatptheconsiderationsavailabletoyouareeither

question-beggingorpsychological.Stillyoumightbejustifiedinbelievingthatptoa

veryhighdegree.Thereasonwhyisthatevenifyourintuitionisnotitselfevidence,

anditsoccurrencedoesnotensurethatyouhavegoodevidenceforbelievingthatp,

still,itisajustifier,anditmightjustifyyouinbelievingthatptoaveryhighdegree.

Themoralisthatepistemicrationalitycannotbeunderstoodwhollyintermsof

evidence,ifevidenceisunderstoodinthesecondwaywehavedistinguished,as

consistingofepistemicallyfavorableconsiderations.Moreprecisely,thefollowing

claimfailstohold:ifyourintuitionexperiencerepresentingthatpjustifiesyouin

believingthatp,thenthejustificationyoutherebyhaveforbelievingthatpconsists

ofhavingevidenceforbelievingthatp.Ifitstrikesyouasincongruoustosaythat

youmighthaveahighdegreeofjustificationforbelievingthatp,thoughonlyslight

evidenceforbelievingthatp,thenthatjustmilitatesinfavorofunderstanding

evidencealongthelinesofthefirstwaydistinguishedabove,asconsistingof

justifiers.Thentheclaimthatifyourintuitionexperiencerepresentingthatp

13Cf. (Gler 2009) on this issue as it comes up in thinking about the relationship between perceptual

experiences and reasons for belief.

14Cf. (Goldman 2007), (Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 2009), (Williamson 2007), (Ichikawa forthcoming),(Cath ms).


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justifiesyouinbelievingthatp,thenthejustificationyoutherebyhaveforbelieving

thatpconsistsofhavingevidenceforbelievingthatpwillholdtrivially,sincethe

evidenceyouhavewilljustbethejustifier,i.e.theintuitionexperience.

3.InferentialInternalism

Theaimofthenextfoursectionstomakeacaseforthinkingthatintuitions

guideactionandthatthisisadistinctrationalrolefromthejustifierandevidence

roles.Theargumentwillfocusonapuzzleaboutinference.

Considerthefollowingargument:

(1)Everyevennumberisdivisibleby2.(2)Thenumberofpigsinthepeniseven.(3)So,thenumberofpigsinthepenisdivisibleby2.

Sayyouknow(1)fromschooland(2)fromcounting.Youseethat(1)and(2)

support(3).Soyouinfer(3)from(1)and(2)andtherebycometoknowthatthe

numberofpigsinthepenisdivisibleby2.

Inwhatdoesyourseeingthat(1)and(2)support(3)consist?Plausibly,it

consistsofyourhavinganintuitionexperiencethatrepresentsthat(1)and(2)

support(3).Thisisahistoricallypopularideaatleastamongrationalists.15Here

aretwoconsiderationsinfavorofit.First,thesubjectmatteroftheclaimthat(1)

15See, for example, Descartes Rulesin (Descartes 1985), Ewings Reason and Intuitionin (Ewing

1968), (Pollock 1974), and (Bonjour 1998).


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and(2)support(3)issimilartothesubjectmatteroftypicalclaimsthatintuition

justifiese.g.theclaimthatifa0.Bothareclaimsaboutnon-

empiricalmatters.Itcouldbethattherearetwoormoredistinctsourcesof

justificationforclaimsaboutnon-empiricalmatters,butthisviewisprimafacie

unattractiveandshouldbeavoidedifpossible.Second,experiencesofthesortthat

maketheclaimthat(1)and(2)support(3)evidentaresimilartotypicalintuition

experiences.Specifically,theypossessthecharacteristicsofintuitionlistedin

section1:theyaresuigeneris,presentational,andconstitutedbythoughtsand

imaginings.

Thepuzzleaboutinferenceconcernsthesortoftransitionthatoccursfrom

yourintuitionthat(1)and(2)support(3)toyourinferring(3)from(1)and(2).

Thepuzzleisthattherearebothreasonstothinkthatthetransitionfromintuitionis

requiredforknowingbyinference andreasonstothinkthatthetransitionfrom

intuitionisnotrequiredforknowingbyinference.ThesolutionIwillproposeisthat

thereasonsforthinkingthatthetransitionfromintuitionisnotrequiredfor

knowingbyinferencedependonanassumptionaboutintuitionthatshouldbe

rejected.Theassumptionisthatintuitionhassolelymind-to-worlddirectionoffit,

likeabelieforanassertion.Iwillsuggestthatintuitionsometimeshasboththatand

world-to-minddirectionoffit,likeadesireoracommand.Inthesecasesintuitionis

whatRuthMillikanhascalledapushmi-pullyurepresentation:itbothdescribesa

stateofaffairsanddirectsanaction.16

16 (Millikan 1995).


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Inferentialinternaliststhinkthatthetransitionfromintuitionorsome

analogousmentalstateisrequiredforknowingbyinference.Thebalanceofthis

sectionisdedicatedtoexplaininginmoredetailwhatthisviewisandwhat

motivationthereisforadoptingit.

Hereareafewrecentformulationsofinferentialinternalism:

[a]TheinferentialinternalistiscommittedtotheviewthatforStobe

justifiedinbelievingPonthebasisofE,Smustnotonlybejustifiedin

believingEbutmustbejustifiedinbelievingthatEmakesprobableP(where

E'sentailingPcanbeviewedastheupperlimitofE'smakingprobableP).17

[b](SimpleInferentialInternalism):AdeductiveinferenceperformedbySis

warrant-transferringjustincase(a)Sisjustifiedinbelievingitspremises,

(b)S'sjustificationforbelievingitspremisesissuitablyindependentofhis

justificationforbelievingtheconclusion,and(c)Sisabletoknowby

reflectionalonethathispremisesprovidehimwithagoodreasonfor

believingtheconclusion.18

[c]InorderforonetohavepositiveepistemicstatusinvirtueofbelievingP

onthebasisofR,onemustbelievethatRevidentiallysupportsP,andone

musthavepositiveepistemicstatusinrelationtothatlaterbeliefaswell.19

17 (Fumerton 2006), page 101.

18 (Boghossian 2003), page 268 in the reprint in (Boghossian 2008).

19 (Leite 2008), page 422.


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Thereareimportantdifferencesamongtheseformulationsofinferential

internalism.I'llmentionfour.First,[a]and[c]aremoregeneralthan[b]:whereas

[b]isrestrictedtodeductiveinference,[a]and[c]rangeoveratleastallsortsof

inference,and[c]maybeevenfurtherovercasesofepistemicbasingthatdonot

involveinference.Second,whereas[a]and[c]aimtogivenecessaryconditionson

theacquisitionofinferentialjustification,[b]aimstogivenecessaryandsufficient

conditionsontheacquisitionofinferentialjustification.Third,[a]and[b]donot

requireyoutohaveabeliefabouttherelationbetweenpremiseandconclusionin

yourinference,but[c]does.Formulation[a],forexample,requiresthatyouhave

justificationforabeliefabouttherelationbetweenpremiseandconclusion,butitis

possibletohavejustificationforbelievingsomething,evenifyoudonotbelieveit.

Formulation[b],likewise,requiresthatyoubeabletoknowbyreflectionalone

abouttherelationbetweenpremiseandconclusion,butitdoesnotrequirethatyou

actuallydoknow,orevenhaveanybeliefaboutthematter.Formulation[c],onthe

otherhand,requiresthatyouhavesuchabelief.Fourth,[a]usesoneepistemic

notionjustification;[b]usesthreejustification,beinginapositiontoknow,and

warranttransmission;and[c]usesaschematiclettercoveringarangeofpositive

epistemicnotions.

Thesedifferencesaside,thereisanobviousfamilyresemblanceholding

among[a],[b],and[c].FromthemIdistillthefollowingview:


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(II-)Sknowsthatpbyinferringpfromq1...qNonlyifSintuitsthatq1...qN

supportp.

Thisviewismoregeneralthan[b]sinceitisaboutallinferences,butpotentiallyless

generalthan[c]sinceitisaboutinferentialjustificationonly,andnotepistemic

basingmoregenerally.Itissimilarto[a]and[c]inthatitaimstogiveanecessary

condition,notasufficientcondition,butitislesscommittalthanthem,asitissilent

onallconditionsoninferencesavetheonethatdistinguishesinferentialinternalism

fromotherviews.Itcommitstotheviewthatthementalstaterepresentingthe

supportrelationisanintuition.Giventhiscommitment,(II-)doesnotrequirethatS

mustbelievethatq1...qNsupportp,sinceitispossibletointuitsomethingandnot

believeit.Finally,itusesthenotionofknowledge,sinceanalogousprinciplesthat

useepistemicnotionsweakerthanknowledgeimply(II-).

(II-)doesnotseemtometobeaproperformulationofinferential

internalism,atleastinsofarasitiscommittedtoaprincipleaboutknowledge.20For

that,Ithinkweneedtoaddsomething:

(II)Sknowsthatpbyinferringpfromq1...qNonlyifSinferspfromq1...qNin

partbecauseSintuitsthatq1...qNsupportp.

20 It might be sufficient if reformulated as a principle about propositional justification. But, as indicated

above, if one is an inferential internalist about propositional justification, then one should be an

inferential internalist about doxastic justification and states, such as knowledge, requiring doxastic

justification.


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Thoughnoneof[a],[b],or[c]suggeststheadditionalconditionwhatwemightcall

thebecausalcondition21therearereasonstoincludeit.22Iwillmentionthree.

First,thereisastrategicreason:(II)isstrongerthan(II-),soifitcanbe

defended,socan(II -).Addingthebecausalconditiondoesn'thurtstrategically.

Second,thereisadialecticalreason:eventhoughBoghossiandoesnot

formulatethebecausalconditionin[b],inarguingagainstinferentialinternalismhe

takesittobecommittedtomorethanjust(II-),and(II)isaplausiblearticulationof

justwhatmore.23Ofcourse,aninferentialinternalistmightthenjustreplyto

Boghossianbydistinguishing(II-)from(II)andclaimingtoendorsetheformer,not

thelatter.24Butthisisunsatisfyingandthereasonwhyisthethird,andmost

important,reasonforadoptingformulation(II).

Thethirdreasonisthatthemostcompellingmotivationforinferential

internalismmotivates(II)asmuchasitmotivates(II-).Themostcompelling

motivationforinferentialinternalismderivesfromreflectiononcertainexamples.

Considerthefollowingtwoarguments.

ArgumentA

21 How exactly to understand the becausal condition is an issue I will discuss below.22 Brewer seems to endorse such a becausal condition in (Brewer 1995).

23 There might be a principlestronger than (II-) but weaker than (II) that best fits the conception ofinferential internalism Boghossion has in mind when he is arguing against the view. See footnote 27

below. Since I am defending the stronger principle, (II), whether this is so does not matter for my

purposes.

24 I am partly inclined to think that Leite's response to Boghossian's Carrollian argument consists in doing

precisely this: endorsing (II-), rejecting (II). See (Leite 2008), pages 429432. But I am not confident

that this is a correct interpretation. Leite says that one's appreciation of the relation between premise and

conclusion must play a role without doing something in one's inference. See page 432.


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(A1)ConnieandCyndiareaconeandacylinderwiththesamebaseand

height.

(A2)Therefore,CyndienclosesagreatervolumethanConnie.

ArgumentB

(B1)ConnieandCyndiareaconeandacylinderwiththesamebaseand

height.

(B2)Therefore,CyndienclosesthreetimesthevolumeofConnie.

ImagineSmith.Smithdoesnthaveanyparticularmathematicalexpertise.But

supposehehasjustificationforbelieving(A1)someonetellshimitisso,orhe

measuresithimself,orwhatever.From(A1)heinfers(A2).Plausibly,henowalso

hasjustificationforbelieving(A2).Suppose,ontheotherhand,hehasjustification

forbelieving(B1)werejustrelabeling(A1).From(B1)heinfers(B2).Isit

plausibleinthiscasetosaythathehasjustificationforbelieving(B2)?Ithinknot.

Why?

Onthefaceofit,itisbecausehecanintuitthat(A2)followsfrom(A1),buthe

cannotintuitthat(B2)followsfrom(B1).Itmighttakehimamomenttointuitthat

(A2)followsfrom(A1),butitiscertainlywithinhiscapabilities.Itisdifficultto

imaginehimintuitinginasimilarwaythat(B2)followsfrom(B1),however.Todo

this,hewouldhavetointuittheexactratioofthevolumeofaconetothevolumeof

acylinderwiththesamebaseandheight.Andthatisbeyondhislimitedcapabilities.


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NowsupposethatwhileSmithdoesintuitthat(A1)supports(A2),this

intuitionplaysnoroleinaccountingforwhyhemakestheinferencehedoes.

Supposehejustignoreshisintuitionandmakestheinferenceanyway.Doeshe,in

thisre-imaginedcase,gainjustificationforbelieving(A2)?No.Thereasonwhynot

isthateventhoughSmithintuitsthatthepremisesupportstheconclusion,hedoes

notinfertheconclusionfromthepremiseinlightofthisintuition,butindependently

ofit.ThisobservationsuggeststhatSmithmustnotonlyintuitthat(A1)supports

(A2)inorderforhisinferencetogivehimjustificationforbelieving(A2),but,also,

mustmakehisinferenceinpartbecausehehasthisintuition.Tosummarize:

reflectiononexamplesmotivates(II)asmuchasitmotivates(II-).25

4.BoghossiansCarrollianArgument

Consideraninferencethataccordswithmodusponens(MPP):

(1)Iftodayisthe20th,thenMarthaArgerichisplayingtodayinCarnegieHall.

(2)Todayisthe20th.(3)MarthaArgerichisplayingtodayinCarnegieHall.26

25 The point I am making here parallels a more familiar point about justified belief. In order to have a

justified belief that p it does not suffice to have a belief that p and justification for believing that p: one

must base one's belief that p on one's justification for believing that p. For further discussion, see(Feldman and Conee 1985).

26 The example is Boghossian's; (Boghossian 2003), page 267 in the reprint in (Boghossian 2008).


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Suppose(II)istrue.So:inorderknow(3)byinferringitfrom(1)and(2),onemust

intuitthat(1)and(2)support(3),andonemustinfer(3)from(1)and(2)atleastin

partbecauseofthisintuition.Thisraisesquestionsoftwosorts.

First,therearequestionsaboutone'sintuitionthat(1)and(2)support(3).

Whatisitsprecisecontent?Forexample,isitaboutMPPinferencesingeneral,or

aboutthisparticularMPPinference?Iwillsetthesequestionsasidefornow.I

returntotheminsection6.

Second,therearequestionsaboutthebecausalcondition.Whatexactlyisit

forone'sinferencetobemadeinpartbecauseofone'sintuition?Boghossianposesa

similarquestion:Wecanaskhowmyknowledgeofthevalidityoftheinference

from(1)and(2)to(3)issupposedtobearonmywarranttoinfer(3)?27Hismain

reasonforrejectinginferentialinternalismisthathedoesnotthinkthatthis

questionhasasatisfyinganswer:

Butitisveryhardtosee,onceagain,howmyputativelyjustifiedjudgment

thatmypremisesentailmyconclusioncouldbearonmyentitlementtodraw

theconclusioninanythingotherthaninferentialform,thus:

(iv)Thisparticularinferencefrom(1)and(2)to(3)isvalid.(v)Ifaninferenceisvalid,thenanyonewhoisjustifiedinbelieving

27 (Boghossian 2003), page 274 in the reprint in (Boghossian 2008). It is because Boghossian takes this to

be a question that inferential internalists must face that I believe he thinks inferential internalism iscommitted to more than (II

-). But it is because there is a difference between an intuition bearing on one's

warrant for inferring and an intuition bearing on one's inferring that I believe (II) might be too strong to

capture his conception of inferential internalism. As pointed out above, this doesn't matter for my

purposes. See footnote 30 for a reason to think a principle stronger than (II-) but weaker than (II) is still

too weak.


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itspremisesandknowsofitsvalidityisjustifiedininferringits

conclusion.

Therefore,

(vi)Anyonewhoisjustifiedinbelievingthepremisesofthisinferenceisjustifiedinbelievingitsconclusion.

(vii)Iamjustifiedinbelievingthepremises(1)and(2).

Therefore,

(viii)Iamjustifiedininferring(3).

Evenifweconceded,then,thatwehaverationalinsightintothevalidityof

specificinferences,wedonotescapethethreatofcircularitythatafflictsthe

internalistaccount.Onceagain,anabilitytoinferjustifiablyaccordingtoMPP

ispresupposed.28

InBoghossian'sargument(iv)isthecontentofmyintuitionthat(1)and(2)support

(3).Howdoesthecontentofthisintuitionbearonmyinferencefrom(1)and(2)to

(3)?Boghossianclaimsthatitcanonlydosobyfiguringinanotherinference,

namelytheinferencefrom(iv)andsupplementarypremisesto(viii),theconclusion

28 (Bohogssian 2003), pages 274275 in the reprint in (Boghossian 2008).


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thatIamjustifiedininferring(3).Ifallthisisso,thentheinferentialinternalistisin

trouble.Oneproblem,whichBoghossianpointsout,isthattheinferencefrom(iv)

andsupplementarypremisesto(viii)invokesMPP,thuslaunchingusonthesortof

regressCarrollillustratesinhisdialoguebetweentheTortoiseandAchilles.29

Anotherproblem,whichBoghossiandoesnotpointout,isthatthereisanadditional

questionabouthowpossessionoftheinformationin(viii)itselfbearsonmy

inference.PossessingtheinformationthatIamjustifiedininferring(3)isonething;

inferring(3)isanother.BytheconclusionofBoghossian'sargument,Istillhaven't

inferred(3),onlythatIamjustifiedininferring(3).30

ThemainpremiseinBoghossian'scaseagainstinferentialinternalismisthis:

MainPremise:Inordertomakeaninferencefromsomepremisestoa

conclusionbecauseofone'sintuitionthatthosepremisessupportthat

conclusion,onemusttaketheclaimthatthosepremisessupportthat

conclusionasapremiseinaninference.

MighttheinferentialinternalistsimplydenytheMainPremise,andtherebydeflect

Boghossian'scriticism?WhileIdothinkthattheinferentialinternalistoughttodeny

theMainPremise,Idonotthinkthatdoingsoitselfconstitutesanadequate

29 (Carroll 1905).30 Boghossian describes himself as exploring how (iv) might bear on my entitlement to infer (3), not on

my inferring (3). Perhaps, then, this additional problem is off his radar.But it shouldn't be. Suppose theinferential internalist has a good story about how (iv) bears on my entitlement to infer (3). There is still

the question: how does my entitlement to infer (3) bear on my inferring (3)? Just as one might possess

evidence for a belief, but believe independently of it, say on the basis of wishful thinking, so one might

possess entitlement for an inference, but infer independently of it, and so without transmitting

justification from premises to conclusion. Again, see (Feldmanand Conee 1985) for discussion ofjustified belief.


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responsetoBoghossian'scriticism.TheMainPremiseisplausible.Ithinkitis

unavoidablegivenacertainassumptionaboutthenatureoftheintuitiononeis,

accordingtoinferentialinternalists,supposedtohaveoftherelationbetween

premisesandconclusioninaninference.Inthenextsection,Iwillexplorethis

assumptionandhowitisboundupwiththeMainPremise.

5.IntuitioninAction

WhatmustintuitionbelikesothatBoghossian'sMainPremiseisfalseofit?

ThisisthequestionthatIwanttoaddressinthissection.

TherearetwoassumptionsthatIwillmake.First,inferringisamental

action.31Andsecond,thebecausalrelationbetweeninferenceandintuitionisnot

merelycausal;itisarationaltransition.32Whatisarationaltransition?Idonothave

adefinitiontogive.Supposeyoubelievethatpbecauseitperceptuallyseemstoyou

thatp.Thistransitionfromperceptiontobeliefisnotmerelycausalsinceitcan

makethebeliefrational.Supposeyoubecauseyouintendto.Thistransition

fromintentiontoactionisnotmerelycausalsince,providedtheintentionis

rational,itcanmaketheactionrational.Mysecondassumptionisthatinferringa

31 Compare: In making inferences, a being is ipso factoan agent (Burge 1998). (Peacocke 2008) and

(Gibbon 2009) agree. (Strawson 2003) disagrees, and though (Mele 2009) does not discuss inference inparticular, he develops a position toward mental action in general that is similar to Strawson's. Strawson

and Mele do agree with Burge, Peacocke, Gibbon, and myself on this much: when we make an

inference we are doing something for which we are immediatelyresponsible. We are responsible andthis distinguishes inferences from sneezes and hiccups. And this responsibility is immediate in the sense

that we are responsible and not just because we are responsible for some upstream cause of our

inference. The assumption that inferences are mental events for which we are immediately responsible

is likely strong enough for my purposes here. I cannot explore the issue in any further detail, however.

32 In this I am in agreement with (Brewer 1995). It is worth emphasizing that being not merelycausal iscompatible with being causal.


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conclusionfromsomepremisesbecauseyouintuitthatthepremisessupportthe

conclusionisalso,likethesetwotransitions,notmerelycausalsinceitcanmakethe

inferencehavethepropertyofbeingjustification-transmitting.Thatis,inferences

madeinlightofintuitionsthattheirpremisessupporttheirconclusionssucceedin

transmittingjustificationyouhaveforbelievingtheirpremisestotheirconclusions.

Letussaythatarationaltransitionfromamentalstateisdirectjustincaseit

doesnotconsistintakingthecontentofthatmentalstateasapremiseinan

inference.Withtheaboveassumptionsandthisstipulationinplace,ourquestion

canberephrasedthisway:whatmustintuitionbelikesothatitispossibleforthere

tooccuradirectrationaltransitionfromittoamentalaction,specificallyan

inference?

Boghossianconsiderstwoparadigms:beliefandperception.

Butneitherseemstoprovideuswithagoodmodel.33Takebelieffirst.One

waytomakearationaltransitionfromabeliefistotakeitasapremiseinan

inference.Theinferencemightbetheoreticalleadingtoanotherbelief.Oritmight

bepracticalleadingtoanactionandperhapsevenamentalaction.Butinneither

caseistherationaltransitiondirect,foritconsistsintakingthebeliefasapremise

inaninference.

Takeperceptionthen.Onewaytomakearationaltransitionfromperception

istotakeitatfacevaluei.e.toformthebeliefthatpjustbecauseitperceptually

seemstoyouthatp.Thisleadstoabelief,however,notanaction,andsonota

mentalaction.Perhapsthereisanotherwaytothinkofthissortoftransition.

33 This claim seems to me to hold only assuming, as I am in the present discussion, orthodox conceptions

of belief and perception on which both only have a mind-to-world direction of fit. More on this below.


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Supposetakingaperceptionatfacevalueismakingajudgment,andthatmakinga

judgmentisamentalaction.Inference,then,mightstandtointuitionastakingat

facevaluestandstoperception:aninferenceisthementalactthatoccurswhenyou

takeyourintuitionthatsomepremisessupportsomeconclusionatfacevalue.While

Ithinkthatsomethinglikethisiscorrect,theanalogywithperceptiondoesnothelp

ustoseehowitcanbe.Whenyoutakeaperceptionatfacevalueyouformabelief

thatsharessomeofitscontent.So,ifinferringwerejusttakinganintuitionatface

value,thenitwouldresultinabeliefthatsharessomeoftheintuitionscontent,i.e.,

presumably,abeliefthatsomepremisessupportsomeconclusion.Butthisisnot

whatresultsfromaninference.Whatresultsisachangeintheepistemic

dependenciesamongyourbeliefs:afterinferring,youbelievetheconclusion

inferred,andyourbeliefinitisepistemicallydependentonyourbeliefsinthe

premisesfromwhichitisinferred.

Letusconsideroneotherrationalroleperceptionmightplay.Whilewalking

youmighttakeintoaccountwhatyouperceiveinnegotiatingobstacles,butwithout,

letussuppose,firstformingbeliefsaboutyourenvironmentandthentakingthese

beliefsaspremisesinpracticalinferencesabouthowtomove.Supposeyoustepto

thesidebecauseyouperceiveanobstacle.Isthisadirectrationaltransitionfrom

perceptiontoaction?Perhapsitis,but,again,itdoesnotprovideuswithagood

modelforintuition.Thereasonwhynotisthatitisatransitionthatoccursinthe

contextofabackgroundactivity:yousteptothesidebecauseyouperceivean

obstaclewhilewalking.Thisisnotacaseinwhichaperceptionalonewithouthelp


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fromothermentalstates,orabackgroundactivitygetsyouwalkinginthefirst

place.34

ReflectionslikethesemotivateBoghossian'sMainPremise.Thereis,

moreover,reasontothinkthatiftheonlyavailableparadigmsonwhichtomodel

appreciationwerebeliefandperception,thenBoghossian'sMainPremisewouldbe

compelling.Letusseewhy.

Perceptionandbeliefhavemind-to-worldasopposedtoworld-to-mind

directionoffit.ThedifferenceisillustratedbyafamousexamplefromAnscombe.35

Amanisshoppingaroundtowngettingtheitemsonalistthathiswifegavehim.A

detectiveisfollowinghimmakingalistofalltheitemsthathepurchases.Letus

supposethatbothmananddetectivehavedonetheirjobswell,sothattheirlists

readthesame.Theman'slisthasitems-to-listdirectionoffit:theitemsonthelist

aregivenandthelistdirectsthemantopurchasethoseitems.Ithasadirective

function.Thedetective'slisthaslist-to-itemsdirectionoffit:theitemspurchased

aregivenandthelistdescribeswhichitemshavebeenpurchased.Ithasa

descriptivefunction.Similarly,somementalstates,suchasbeliefsandperceptions,

havemind-to-worlddirectionoffit.Theworldisgivenandtheyfunctiontodescribe

it.Othermentalstates,suchasdesiresandintentions,haveworld-to-minddirection

offit.Theircontentsaregivenandtheyfunctiontodirecttheirsubjectstosatisfy

thosecontents.

34 One might defend the view that intuition works like perception does in the context of a background

activity by arguing that when we make inferences because of what we intuit we do so in the context of a

background activity of thinking, or reasoning, or working our way toward an inference, or something

else. This view seems implausible to me. Sometimes we just make an inference, and this isn't part ofany larger endeavor.

35 (Anscombe 1957), page 56.


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Ihavepickedoutthetwodifferentdirectionsoffitbytheirassociationwith

twodifferentfunctionalroles.Onemightwonderwhether(i)astatehasits

directionoffitinvirtueofitsfunctionalrole,(ii)astatehasitsfunctionalrolein

virtueofitsdirectionoffit,(iii)astatesfunctionalroleisidenticalto,orincludesas

apart,itsdirectionoffit,or(iv)astatehasitsdirectionoffitanditsfunctionalrole

invirtueofotherfactsaboutit,whichfactsensurethatthedirectionoffitand

functionalrolelineupinthewayIhaveindicated.Myapproachherewillbeto

remainneutralonthisissue.Formypurposeswhatmattersisthatdirectionsoffit

andfunctionalroleslineupasIhaveindicated:world-tomindstatesdirectand

mind-to-worldstatesdescribe.WhatultimatelyexplainsthisisanissueIwillleave

unresolved.36

Aboveweranthroughsomeconsiderationsthatsuggested,roughly,thatone

cannotdirectlyrationallyrespondtoabelieforaperceptionwithanaction.Youcan

takeabeliefintoaccountbytakingitasapremiseinaninference,whichinference

mightresultinaction.Youcantakeaperceptionintoaccountbyendorsingitwitha

belief,ormaybebyrelyingonittoguideanantecedentactivity.Butyoucannot,it

seems,takesuchstatesintoaccountbyjustactingonthem.Why?Anaturalideais

thatitispreciselybecauseoftheirdirectionoffit.Consider,then,thefollowing

generalprinciple:

36 For further discussion see: (Humberstone 1992), (Velleman 1992), (Smith 1994), (Millikan 1995),

(Platts 1997), (Sobel and Copp 2001), (Jacobson-Horowitz 2006), (Tenenbaum 2006),


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(Inertia)Itisimpossibletomakeadirectrationaltransitionfromamental

statewithsolelymind-to-worlddirectionoffittoanaction.37

Thequalificationsdirectandrationalareessential.Ononenaturalviewof

causation,itismetaphysicallypossibleforanythingtocauseanything.Soitis

metaphysicallypossibleforabelieforaperceptiontocauseanaction.Butthisis

compatiblewith(Inertia)because(Inertia)isaboutrationaltransitionnotmere

causation.Surelybeliefsandperceptionscanplaysomeroleinrationallyguiding

action.Butagainthisiscompatiblewith(Inertia)because(Inertia)isaboutdirect

rationaltransitionnotrationaltransitioningeneral.

Many,andlikelymost,philosopherswillfind(Inertia)oranearbyprinciple

attractive.38Theso-calledHumeanTheoryofMotivationentailsit.HereisMcihael

Smith'sformulationofthattheory'scentraltenet:

(P1)RattconstitutesamotivatingreasonofagentAtoiffthereissome

suchthatRattconsistsofanappropriatelyrelateddesireofAtoanda

beliefthatwereshetoshewould.39

37 If taking a perception at face value is a mental action, then (Inertia) requires qualification. Perhapssomething close to following would do: (Inertia*) Aside from taking a perception at face value, it is

impossible to make a direct rational transition from a mental state with solely mind-to-world direction

of fit to an action. I will set this complication aside. For first, it isn't clear that taking an experience at

face value is a mental action. And second, even if it is, this doesn't affect my discussion since, as

pointed out above, the transition from appreciation to inference can not be modeled on taking a

perception at face value.

38 I will generally suppress the qualification or a nearby principle, taking (Intertia) to stand for itself and

nearby principles.

39 (Smith 1994), page 92.


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Giventheplausibleassumptionthatamotivatingreasonisjustamentalstateto

whichonecandirectlyrationallyrespondwithanaction,theonlyifdirectionof(P1)

entails(Inertia).40TheHumeanTheoryofMotivationisstrongerthan(Inertia):that

is,theHumeanTheoryentails(Inertia),but(Inertia)doesnotentailtheHumean

Theory.Soanti-Humeanscanaccept(Inertia).And,infact,manydo.Manyanti-

Humeansdefendtheirviewpreciselybytryingtoshowhowacceptanceof(Inertia)

iscompatiblewithrejectionoftheHumeanTheoryofMotivation.Somearguethat

somebeliefshaveworld-to-minddirectionoffit.41Othersarguethatsomebeliefs,or

perceptions,areinseparablefromdesires.42Finally,othersarguethatamotivating

statewithaworld-to-minddirectionoffitcanariseoutof,orconsistin,the

presenceofotherstatesthatjusthavemind-to-worlddirectionoffit.43Whatallthis

suggestsisthat(Inertia)andnearbyprinciplesarephilosophicallywell-entrenched.

NowweareinapositiontodemonstrateBoghossian'sMainPremise.

(1)Inferenceisamentalaction;andthebecausalrelationbetweeninferenceandintuitionisrational,notmerelycausal.[Assumptions]

(2)Itisimpossibletomakeadirectrationaltransitionfromamentalstatewithsolelymind-to-worlddirectionoffittoanaction.[Inertia]

(3)Arationaltransitionfromamentalstateisdirectjustincaseitdoesnotconsistintakingthecontentofthatmentalstateasapremiseinan

40 One might argue that a motivating reason need not be a mental state. See (Dancy 2003). Even if this

proves correct, it would require only superficial modifications to my discussion here.

41 For discussion, both pro and con, see: (Altham 1986), (McNaughton 1991), (Smith 1994), (Little 1997),

(Jacobson-Horowitz 2006), and (Tenenbaum 2006).

42 For discussion see (Nagel 1970), (McDowell 1978, 1979), and (Dancy 1993, 2003).

43 See (Dancy 1993, 2003).


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inference.[Definition]

(4)Intuitionhassolelymind-to-worlddirectionoffit.[Premise](5)Boghossian'sMainPremise:Inordertomakeaninferencefromsome

premisestoaconclusionbecauseofone'sintuitionthatthosepremises

supportthatconclusion,onemusttaketheclaimthatthosepremises

supportthatconclusionasapremiseinaninference.[From(1),(2),(3),

and(4)]

Thedemonstrationisvalid.Theonlyquestionis:areallofitspremisestrue?(1)sets

outplausiblebackgroundassumptionsaboutinferenceandthebecausalrelation

betweeninferenceandintuitionthatIwillnotcallintoquestion.(3)isjusta

definition.Sotheonlycandidatesforrejectionare(2)and(4).Aspointedoutabove,

(2)isphilosophicallywell-entrenched,and,itseemstome,forgoodreason:itis

veryplausible.

Ibelieveweshouldgiveup(4).Intuitiondoesnothavesolelymind-to-world

directionoffit.

Oneargumentinfavorofthisviewisamodustollensargumentthatappeals

toinferentialinternalism.Theideaisthatif(4)istrue,thensoisBoghossiansMain

Premise,andifthatistrue,theninferentialinternalismisfalse,butinferential

internalismistrue,soweshouldreject(4).Ifindtheconsiderationsinfavorof

inferentialinternalismpersuasive,soIfindthisargumentpersuasive.Onemight

worrythatitisdialecticallyproblematicsinceitmightappearillegitimatetoassume

inferentialinternalism.Thisworryseemsmisplacedtome,however.Boghossian


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recognizestheforceoftheconsiderationsinfavorofinferentialinternalismand

arguesthatthisforceisoverriddenbyastrongerCarrollianargumentagainst

inferentialinternalism.Thestrengthofthatargument,however,dependsonthe

assumptionthatintuitionhassolelymind-to-worlddirectionoffit.Oncewe

recognizethatthisassumptionisnotmandatory,wehavetheoptionofrejectingit.

Onewaytoremovethisoptionistogivepositiveconsiderationsinfavorofthinking

thatintuitiondoeshavesolelymind-to-worlddirectionoffit,sothatthisisno

longeranassumption,butanindependentlysupportedpremise.Intheabsenceof

suchconsiderations,however,themodustollensargumentisdialecticallylegitimate.

Still,onemightwantareasontoreject(4)thatisindependentofcommitmentto

inferentialinternalism.

Anotherargumentinfavorofthinkingintuitionhasworld-to-minddirection

offitappealstothesamesortsofconsiderationsonemightappealtoinarguingthat

desirehasworld-to-minddirectionoffit.Sincedesireistheparadigmexampleofa

mentalstatewithworld-to-minddirectionoffit,itisraretofindargumentsinfavor

ofthinkingthatitdoeshaveworld-to-minddirectionoffit.Butifoneaimedtogive

suchanargument,hereishowitmightgo.Reflectionontherolesdesiresplayinour

livessuggeststhatwecandirectlyrationallyrespondtothemwithactions,soby

(Inertia),theydonothavesolelymind-to-worlddirectionoffit.Similarly,onemight

argueasfollows.Reflectionontherolesintuitionsplayinourlivessuggeststhatwe

candirectlyrationallyrespondtothemwithactionse.g.inferencessoby

(Inertia),theydonothavesolelymind-to-worlddirectionoffit.Onemightchallenge

(Inertia).Onemightchallengetheclaimaboutwhatreflectionontherolesintuitions


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playsuggests.Onemightchallengethereliabilityofthisreflection;thatis,perhapsit

doessuggesttheroleIhavedescribed,butitismistaken.Noneoftheseoptions

seemsplausibletome.Ihavealreadyreviewed(Inertia).Reflectionontheroles

instancesofakindofmentalstateplayinourlivesmightbelimitedandfalliblein

whatittellsusaboutthatmentalstate,butitdoesseemlikeareliablesourceof

informationaboutverybasicfeaturesofthoseroles.Finally,reflectiondoessuggest

thattheredoesntneedtobeanyintermediateinferencebetweenintuitionthatthe

premisesinanargumentsupportitsconclusionandinferringthatconclusionfrom

thosepremises.

Theforgoingsupportsthefollowing:

World-to-Mind:insomecases,tointuitthatsomepremisessupportsome

conclusionis,atleastinpart,tobeinamentalstatethathasworld-to-mind

directionoffit.

IftheWorld-to-Mindthesisiscorrect,andintuitionisn'tlikeperceptionorbelief

onorthodoxconceptionsofthesestatesthenwhatisitlike?Tocompareintuitions

withdesiresseemssilly.44Acomparisonwithintentionsseemsmoreplausible,but

stillforced.Abettercomparisoniswithstatessuchasfeltcommands,demands,and

obligationsthatcanbethoughtofasmentalimperatives.45Thisfitswiththe

44 Some philosophers use desire to pick out the general category of mental states with world-to-mind

direction of fit. I am not following this technical usage here.

45 Commands, demands, and obligations are not mental. The mental imperative is the impression a

command, demand, or obligation makes when felt. Maurice Mandelbaum appeals to mental imperatives

in exploring the phenomenology of moral experience; see (Mandelbaum 1955). Another area where

philosophers have found it useful to appeal to mental imperatives is in work on the nature of pain. Some


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metaphorsexpressedinphrasessuchasbeingmovedbytheforceofreasonor

beingcompelledbyreason.Mostlikely,however,anycomparisonwithother

stateswillbemoreorlessmisleading,sinceintuitionsaresuigenerismentalstates.

Inspecifyingthecontentwithrespecttowhichanintuitionhasworld-to-

minddirectionoffitIwillusethegeneralnotionofdirection.Tointuitthatsome

premisessupportsomeconclusion,then,is,atleastinpart,tobedirectedtodo

something,namelytobelievethatconclusiononthebasisofthosepremises.Itis

importanttoreadthisclaimproperly:thedirectionisto[believethatconclusionon

thebasisofthosepremises],notjustto[believethatconclusion].Oneofthethings

wecandoisformbeliefs.Anotherofthethingswecandoisbasesomebeliefson

others,thatis,modifytheepistemicdependenciesthatholdamongourbeliefs.46

WhatIamsuggesting,then,isthatinsomecasesintuitionsdirectonetodothis.

Here,then,isawaytothinkaboutthetransitionfromintuitiontoinference.

Takethemodusponensargumentfrom(1)iftodayisthe20th,thenMarthaArgerich

isplayingtodayinCarnegieHall,and(2)todayisthe20th,to(3)MarthaArgerichis

playingtodayinCarnegieHall.Supposeyouinfer(3)from(1)and(2)becauseyou

intuitthat(1)and(2)support(3).Yourintuitionisamentalstatethatdirectsyouto

believe(3)onthebasisofyourbeliefs(1)and(2).Yourinferenceisthemental

actionyouperformwhenyoudowhatyouaredirectedtodo.Thatis,yourinference

isthementalactionofbelieving(3)onthebasisof(1)and(2).EarlierIconsidered

theideathatinferencestandstointuitionastakingatfacevaluestandsto

writers defend an imperatival theory of pain; for discussion, see (Klein 2007, forthcoming) and (Hall

2008).

46 Of course, in some cases in order to do this we also have to form a belief. This is what happens whenwe reason our way to a new belief.


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perception.Thisanalogygavethewrongresults.Nowwehaveanimprovedanalogy.

Inferencestandstointuitionasactionstandstodirection.Thisanalogygivesthe

correctresults,sincefollowingadirectiontobelieveonethingonthebasisofother

thingsdoespreciselyresultinbelievingonethingonthebasisofotherthings.

TheWorld-to-MindthesisdefusesBoghossian'sCarrollianArgument.It

doesn'tdefusetheargumentbysimplyremovingonewayofdemonstratingitsMain

Premise,forperhapsthereareotherwaysofdemonstratingtheMainPremise.

Rather,theWorld-to-MindthesisdefusesBoghossian'sCarrollianArgumentby

providingaconceptionofintuitionthatallowsustoseewhythatargument'sMain

Premiseisfalse.Ifintuitionsometimeshasaworld-to-minddirectionoffit,thenitis

thesortofstatetowhichonecandirectlyrationallyrespondwithamentalaction.

Thecomparisonofintuitionwithfeltcommands,demands,andobligationshelpsto

makethisclear.Yourintuitiondirectsyoutobelievesomeconclusiononthebasisof

somepremises,andyourinferenceisthementalactioninwhichyoudowhatyou

aredirectedtodo.

6.ObjectionsandElaborations

ThedefenseoftheWorld-to-Mindthesisdevelopedintheprevioussectionis

incomplete.InthissectionIintroducetwoelaborationsinresponsetotwo

objections.


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ThefirstobjectionderivesfromGilbertHarman'sdiscussionofthedifference

betweentruthsaboutgoodreasoningandtruthsaboutlogicalconsequence.47

SupposeSintuitsthatPsupportsQ.SoSisinamentalstatethatdirectshimtobase

abeliefthatQonhisbeliefthatP.ThissuggeststhattheonlywayforStorationally

respondtohisintuitionistobelieveQonthebasisofP.Butitseemsanother

thingSmightdoisrevisehisbeliefinP.Thatis,hisintuitionthatPsupportsQmight

justaswellleadhimtogiveupPasbelieveQonthebasisofP.

Itwillhelptosetouttheworryintheformofaninconsistenttriad:

1. IfSintuitsthatPsupportsQ,thenSisinamentalstatethatdirectshimtobelieveQonthebasisofP.[World-to-Mind]

2. IfSisinamentalstatethatdirectshimtobelieveQonthebasisofP,thentheonlywayforStorationallyrespondtothismentalstateistobelieveQonthe

basisofP.[Premise]

3. ButitispossibleforStorationallyrespondtohisintuitionthatPsupportsQbyrevisinghisbeliefthatP.[Harman'sObservation]

Therearetwonaturalrepliestothisworry.

Thefirstistoreject(2).Directionsingeneralcanberesisted.Theythrow

theirweightinfavorofanaction,buttheydonotcompelit.Thisisclearfromthe

possibilityofreceivinginconsistentdirectionsi.e.directionsthatcannotjointlybe

satisfied.Itispossibletobedirectedto,takethisdirectionseriously,berational,

47 See (Harman 1986).


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andnot.Thereasonwhyisthatallthingsconsideredyoumighthavemostreason

todosomethingotherthan.Forexampleyoumightreceiveamorecompelling

directiontonot-.So(2)isfalse,and(1)and(3)arecompatiblewitheachother.

AnotherreplyistoarguethatexpressingHarmansObservationwith(3)is

makingpreciselytheconfusionthatHarmanaimedtoexpose.Distinguish(3)from

(3*):

(3*)ItispossibleforStorationallyrespondtohisintuitionthatQisalogical

consequenceofPbyrevisinghisbeliefthatP.

(3*)expressesHarmansObservation,but(3)doesnot.Thedifferenceisthat(3*)is

aboutthelogicalconsequencerelationand(3)isaboutwhatIhavebeencallingthe

supportrelation.SofarIhavenotnotemphasizedthisdistinctionsinceitdidnot

bearonthediscussion.Butnowitdoes.Therearemanydifferentrelationsinthe

vicinity.WhatIhaveinmindintalkingaboutthesupportrelationistherelationship

onesbeliefthatPhastobelievingthatQwhenonehasareasontobaseabeliefthat

QononesbeliefthatP.So,whenSintuitsthatPsupportsQ,whatSintuitsisthatS

hasareasontobaseabeliefthatQonSsbeliefthatP.AsHarmanpointsout,thisis

differentfromSintuitingthatQisaconsequenceofP,sinceQmightbea

consequenceofPwithoutShavingareasontobaseabeliefthatQonSsbeliefthat

P.

Notethat(3)mightstillbetrue.Butifitistrue,thisisbecausereasonsare

defeasible.AndthatisthepossibilitycapturedbythefirstreplyImadetotheworry.


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WhatdoesnotseempossibleisforStorationallyrespondtoanundefeated

intuitionthatPsupportsQi.e.anundefeatedintuitionthatShasareasontobasea

beliefthatQonSsbeliefthatPbyrevisinghisbeliefthatP.ForifitisrationalforS

torevisehisbeliefthatP,then,allthingsconsidered,Snolongerhasareasonto

baseabeliefthatQonSsbeliefthatP.

NowIturntothesecondobjection.Ihavesetoutconsiderationsinfavorof

thinkingthatintuitionhasworld-to-minddirectionoffit.Butitisobviousthat

intuition,likeperception,hasmind-to-worlddirectionoffit.Howcanthe

considerationsbesquaredwiththisobviousfact?

MyreplyhasalreadybeenforeshadowedinhowIformulatedtheWorld-to-

Mindthesis:tointuitthatsomepremisessupportsomeconclusionis,atleastin

part,tobeinamentalstatethathasworld-to-minddirectionoffit.Thisleavesopen

thepossibilitythatintuitionalsohasmind-to-worlddirectionoffit.Andthisisthe

replytothepresentobjectionthatIpropose.Intuitionshavebothmind-to-world

andworld-to-minddirectionoffit.TheyarewhatMillikancallspushmi-pullyu

representations.

Therearereasonstothinkintuitionisnotanisolatedcase.Millikanmentions

animalsignals,performativeutterances,innerrepresentationsthatanimalsuseto

navigate,intentions,andmentalrepresentationsofsocialnormsasexample

pushmi-pullyurepresentations.48Somephilosophersdefendtheviewthatmoral

judgmentsarepushmi-pullyurepresentations.49AndTimothyBaynehasrecently

48 See (Millikan 1995).49 This case has received the most discussion. See, for example, (Altham 1986), (McNaughton 1991),

(Smith 1994), (Little 1997), (Jacobson-Horowitz 2006), and (Tenenbaum 2006).


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arguedthatexperiencesofagency,suchasthefeelingofperformingsomeaction,

arepushmi-pullyurepresentations.50Anygivencaseisboundtoraiseitsown

controversies.Butthecategoryisdefensible,andiftherearebothconsiderationsin

favorofassigningarepresentationamind-to-worldandaworld-to-minddirection

offit,thentheseconsiderationsjointlyconstituteareasontoassignitboth.This

seemstometobethecasewithatleastsomeintuitions.

7.TheGroundofIntuitiveGuidance

The18thcenturymoralsensetheorist,FrancisHutcheson,skepticallyasked

hisrationalistcontemporariesWhatisthisconformityofactionstoreason?51John

Balguyanswered:

[the]questionamountsplainlytothis:whatdoesareasonablecreature

proposeinactingreasonably?Orwhatisitthatinduceshiswilltotake

councilofhisunderstanding?Asifthiswerenottheveryessenceofarational

action!52

ThequestionIwillpursueinthissectionwhatisitinvirtueofwhichanintuition

canplayanaction-guidingrationalrole?ismodeledonHutchesons.TheanswerI

willproposeismodeledonBalguys.

50 See (Bayne 2010).51(Raphael 1969), pg 361.52(Raphael 1969), pg 455.


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TheviewthatIwilldefendisthis:Intuitionsplayaction-guidingrational

rolesinvirtueofplayingjustifyingrationalroles.Eventhoughaction-guidingroles

aredistinctfromjustifyingroles,itcanbe,andIaminclinedtothinkthatitis,true

thatwhatexplainswhyintuitionscanplayaction-guidingrolesisthattheyplay

justifyingroles.ConsiderSmith.Invirtueofwhatdoeshisintuitionthat(A1)that

ConnieandCyndiareaconeandacylinderwiththesamebaseandeightsupports

believingthat(A2)thatCyndienclosesagreatervolumethanConnieguidehis

inference?Theanswer,inmyview,isthatitisbecausehisintuitionjustifieshimin

believingthat(A1)supports(A2).

Themainreasonforthisviewderivesfromtheobservationaboutrationality

thatBalguyseemstometohaveinmind.InexpandingonBalguysclaim,itwillbe

helpfultohaveasimplerclaimtoserveasamodel.Considerthefollowing:

Inastatewiththeappropriatelaws,parkingnexttoafirehydrant

constitutesparkingillegally.

Theaboveseemsstraightforwardenough,buttherearethreeobservationsworth

emphasizing.First,Inastatewiththeappropriatelaws,isessential.Withoutthe

laws,parkingnexttoafirehydrantmightnotbeillegal.Second,nothingneedsto

happeninadditiontoparkingnexttoafirehydrantinorderforyoutoparkillegally:

giventhelaws,parkingnexttoafirehydrantcountsasparkingillegally.Thisisthe

pointofinvokingthenotionofconstitution.Third,ifyourcarisparkednexttothe


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firehydrantthenitisparkedillegally,butitisstillalsoparkednexttothefire

hydrant.Itisnotasiftheonepropertytakestheplaceoftheother.

AsIunderstandBalguy,heismakingasimilarpointaboutrationality,

graspingreasons,andguidanceofthewill.HereishowIwouldputit:

Inarationalperson,amentalstatee.g.anintuitionthatjustifiesbelieving

thatonehasareasontoconstitutesamentalstatethatguidesoneto.

Herearethreeobservationsanalogoustothosemadeabove,thoughinreverse

order.IwillmaketheminrelationtoSmithandhisinferenceof(A2)from(A1).

First,ifSmithsintuitionthat(A1)supports(A2)justifieshiminbelievingthat(A2)

supports(A1),thenitguideshisinferring(A2)from(A1),butitstillalsojustifies

himinbelievingthat(A1)support(A2).Justaswiththecar,itisnotasiftheone

propertytakestheplaceoftheother.Sooneintuitioncanplayboththejustifying

andtheaction-guidingrole.Second,nothingneedstohappeninadditiontoSmiths

intuitionjustifyinghiminbelievingthat(A1)supports(A2)forittoguidehis

inferring(A2)from(A1).Inparticular,Smithdoesnotneedtogothroughanyextra

bitofreasoning,sothereisnothreatofaCarrollianregressreemergingatthispoint.

Third,Inarationalperson,playsarolesimilartothatplayedbyInastatewith

theappropriatelaws.Partofwhatitisforastatetohavetheappropriatelawsis

forittobeastateinwhichparkingnexttoafirehydrantconstitutesparking

illegally.Similarly,onewaytocaptureapopularideaaboutrationalityistosaythat

partofwhatitisforapersontoberationalistobeapersonforwhommentalstates


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thatplayjustifyingroleswithrespecttoreasonsconstitutementalstatesthatplay

action-guidingroles.53Onemightworryaboutpressingtheanalogytoofar.The

statehaslawsanditisinvirtueofthesethatparkingnexttoafirehydrant

constitutesparkingillegally.Maybetherearelawsofrationalityanditisinvirtueof

thesethatmentalstatesthatplayjustifyingroleswithrespecttopropositionsabout

reasonsconstitutementalstatesthatplayaction-guidingroles.Butperhaps

rationalitycannotbearticulatedbyasetoflaws.Allthatmattersformypurposes

hereisthatwhateverthenatureofrationalityturnsouttobe,thatnaturewillmake

itsothatinsofarasapersonisrationalmentalstatesthatplayjustifyingroleswith

respecttopropositionsaboutreasonsconstitutementalstatesthatplayaction-

guidingrolesforthatperson.

Thisviewofthegroundofintuitiveguidanceprovidesabasisforresponding

toanobjectiontotheviewthatintuitionsarepushmi-pullyurepresentations.The

objectioncanbeputlikethis.SupposeSsintuitionthatPsupportsQbothdirectsS

tobelieveQonthebasisofP,andpresentsitastruethatPsupportsQ.Ifthereare

thesetwopartsoftheintuitionthedirectivepartandthedescriptivepartthen

theremustbesomestoryabouthowaninferencethatismadeinresponsetothe

intuitionrelatestobothparts.Ifitisjustaresponsetothedirectivepart,thenitis

justasiftheinferenceismadeinignoranceoftheinformationthatPsupportsQ.Ifit

53 Compare: a rational person who judges there to be compelling reason to do A normally forms the

intention to do A, and this judgment is sufficient explanation of that intention and of the agents acting

on it (since this action is part of what such an intention involves). There is no need to invoke an

additional form of motivation beyond the judgment and the reasons it recognizes, some further force to,

as it were, get the limbs in motion. (Scanlon 1998), pages 3334. And: For me to be a theoreticallyrational person is not merely for me to be capable of performing logical and inductive operations, but

for me to be appropriately convinced by them: my conviction in the premises must carry through, so to

speak to a conviction in the conclusion. (Korsgaard 1986), pg 14.


42/52

isjustaresponsetothedescriptivepart,thenitisaviolationof(Inertia).Ifitisa

responsetosomeinferentialintegrationofthetwoparts,thenitwillleadtoa

Carrollianregress.Inbrief,introducingtheseconddirectionoffitseemstohaveput

usbackinsquareone.

Thereplytothisobjectionisthatthereisafourthoption.Thefirsttwo

optionsseemclearlymistakentome.InmyviewwhenSinfersQfromPbecausehe

intuitsthatPsupportsQhisinferenceisaresponsetotheintuitionasawhole,not

tooneoranotherpartofit.Thisraisesthequestion,however:howarethetwoparts

fusedtogetherintoawholetowhichSmightrespond?Thethirdoptiondescribed

abovesuggestsitisbyinferentialintegrationi.e.astwopartsofaninference.But

thisisalsoclearlymistakensinceitleadstoCarrollianregress.Whatisneededisan

accountofhowthetwopartsarefusedtogetherintoawholethatdoesnotappealto

theirinferentialintegration.Theaccountofintuitiveguidancesuggestssuchan

account:thedescriptivepartconstitutesthedirectivepart.

Anotherobjectiontotheviewthatintuitionsplayaction-guidingrolesin

virtueofplayingjustifyingrolesisthatitrendersintuitionsdispensableasguidesto

action.Ivebeenarguingthatintuitionsplayaction-guidingrolesthatcannotbe

assimilatedto,eveniftheyareexplainedby,theirjustifyingroles.But,onemight

wondernow,whatwasthepoint?Supposeintuitionscouldplayaction-guidingroles

invirtueofjustifyingbeliefsaboutreasonsforaction.Thentheyneednt,sinceall

guidancemightderivefromthebeliefssojustified.Allintuitionsneedtodoisjustify

beliefs,andthenthesebeliefsguideouractions.


43/52

Twoinitialpoints.First,noteitsimplydoesnotfollowfromtheclaimthat

intuitionsguideactioninvirtueofjustifyingbeliefsaboutreasonsforactionthat

beliefsaboutreasonsforactioncanthemselvesguideaction.Humeanscouldvery

wellberightaboutthemotivationalinefficacyofbelief.WhileIthinkthereis

somethingtothisidea,Iwillnottakeitonasacommitment.Second,onemight

concedethatintuitionsaredispensableasguidestoaction,butstillthinktheydoin

factguideaction,andsothinkitisworthsheddinglightonthematter.Itisnotasif

everyworthyobjectofinvestigationmustbeindispensible.Thatsaid,letsseeif

intuitionsreallyaredispensableasguidestoaction.

Itseemstomethatbetweenthetwobeliefsandintuitionsbeliefsare

moredispensablethanintuitionsasguidestoaction.Contrastthefollowingtwo

claims.ThefirstismyglossonBalguy:inarationalperson,amentalstatee.g.an

intuitionthatjustifiesbelievingthatonehasareasontoconstitutesamental

statethatguidesoneto.Thesecondisasimilarlookingalternative:inarational

person,amentalstatee.g.abeliefthatrepresentsthatonehasareasonto

constitutesamentalstatethatguidesoneto.Ithinkweshouldbelessconfident

inthisalternativeclaim.Itmightbethatconsistencyrequiresactinginaccordance

withwhatyoubelieveyourreasonsforactionare.Butsupposethesebeliefsare

unjustified.Theninsofarasyouarerational,youshouldgivethemup,notactin

accordancewiththem.Soitseemsthatifbeliefsplayaction-guidingroles,this

dependsontheirbeingjustifiedbyintuitions.Ontheotherhand,ifintuitionsabout

reasonsforactionplayaction-guidingroles,theirabilitytodosodoesnotdepend

ontheirleadingtobeliefs.Youcanactinlightofthejustificationyouhavefor


44/52

believingthatyouhaveareasontoactwithoutformingthebeliefthatyouhavethat

reasontoact.Infact,thisislikelythenorm.Beliefsarementalstateswithacertain

degreeofpermanency.Mostofouractionshavelittlesignificancebeyondthe

momentoftheiroccurrence.Itwouldbesillytoformstandingbeliefsaboutwhat

reasonsyouhaveforalltheactionsyouperforminlife.Soitseemsthatifintuitions

playaction-guidingroles,theirdoingsodoesnotdependontheirleadingtobeliefs.

Thereisreasontothink,then,thatbeliefsaremoredispensablethanintuitionsas

guidestoaction.54

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