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China, the United States, and Prospectsfor Asian Space CooperationJames Clay MoltzPublished online: 09 Dec 2010.

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China, the United States, and Prospectsfor Asian Space CooperationJAMES CLAY MOLTZ*

With the rapid rise of competitive space activities within Asia, this study examines the

prospects for increasing international cooperation. After discussing relevant conceptual

issues, it surveys the space policies particularly of China, India, Japan, and South Korea and

examines the skewed patterns of cooperation seen at the international, regional, and bilateral

levels. It then analyzes the historical, technology, and political factors that have impeded,

especially regional, space cooperation in Asia to date. The study concludes that expanded

regional space cooperation is an unlikely near-term outcome, but the paper also argues that

the risks entailed in the current situation are growing and that US policy initiatives could

make a difference in helping to lead countries out of this dead-end.

Space programs are costly, typically invoke strong feelings of national pride, andoften are undertaken in the context of strategic competitions with foreign rivals. Notsurprisingly, these programs frequently take on a partial or even a predominantmilitary dimension. Such dynamics certainly characterized the so-called ‘first spaceage’ of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, making closecooperation difficult to achieve.1

In the emerging post-Cold War space environment, Asian countries—among themChina, India, Japan, and South Korea—have played an increasingly prominent role.The motives of these countries to date have been different from those of thesuperpowers, putting a greater emphasis on domestic political aims, commercial anddevelopmental motivations, and regional strategic goals, compared to geo-strategicmilitary competition. Indeed, most of these programs did not begin as military effortsand have had significant histories with an exclusively (or largely) civilian orientation.However, these seemingly favorable factors have begun to change in the past decade,with all of Asia’s major players developing significant military space applications,and at least one, China, actual space weapons.

As second-generation entrants, Asian space programs have differed in theirdevelopment from the superpowers’ space programs in the much larger degree ofinternational cooperation involved in their formation: including purchases of

*James Clay Moltz teaches at the Naval Postgraduate School. The views expressed in this paper are the author’salone and do not represent the official policies of the US Navy or the US government. The author thanks MargaretPearson and Gilbert Rozman for their comments and suggestions.

1. This term comes from William E. Burrows, This New Ocean: The Story of the First Space Age (New York:Random House, 1998).

Journal of Contemporary China (2011), 20(68), January, 69–87

ISSN 1067-0564 print/ 1469-9400 online/11/680069–19 q 2011 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/10670564.2011.520847

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technology, joint activities with outside partners, and aid to other countries. US–Soviet space technological developments, by contrast, took place autonomously.2

Cooperation of any sort between the two took over a decade to emerge. When it didoccur during the detente era, it involved little, if any, technology transfer. By contrast,space cooperation by Asian countries with other programs has been extensive andconsistent, as states have reached out to foreign partners and have attempted to carryout typical late-developing ‘import substitution’ strategies seen in other industrialfields (such as shipbuilding, electronics, and automobiles).

But meaningful integration of space programs within Asia—and particularlybetween the major players involved—has not occurred. This highly nationalistictrend among Asia’s leading space powers is more consistent with the jealoustendencies of US–Soviet space competition, yet is sharply at odds with the closecollaboration and deep industrial interpenetration seen today among advancedEuropean countries in space. Notably, bilateral dynamics in the US–Soviet spacecompetition eventually fostered mutual learning, restraint, and the formation of anumber of arms control agreements affecting space, thus providing surprisingstability in an otherwise competitive space relationship.3 Such developments—partlybecause of the absence of multilateral security talks in regard to space—have notemerged among Asia’s space powers.

Today, the United States and the Russian Federation—which arguably still possessthe world’s two most advanced space programs—now cooperate extensively in thearea of space technology. Russian engines power American Atlas rockets forlaunching US military payloads, and Russian Soyuz spacecraft routinely deliverAmerican astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS). No cooperation to thisdegree exists among Asia’s major space-faring nations. Ironically, current trends inAsia go against predictions by earlier theorists of political economy who argued thatspace might be an area uniquely suited to cooperation among advanced countries. AsVictor Basiuk argued in 1977: ‘Advanced technologies, because of their huge costs,large scale, and, in the case of nuclear weapons, immense destructive power, providean important impetus to international cooperation’.4 While we do see such trendstoday in Europe and in the US–Russian civil space context, this predicted integrationhas not taken place to date among the most developed space powers in Asia. It istherefore worth investigating why this is the case, why it matters, and what (ifanything) the United States might be able to do about it.

To address these issues, this study first provides a brief conceptual overview offactors involved in space cooperation generally. It then surveys the current status ofcooperation among Asia’s leading space programs, as well as the uniquelycompetitive dynamics surrounding two region-wide space cooperation organizationsheaded by China and Japan, respectively. Next, it turns to the important case of

2. The exception to this rule was the information, technology, and know-how provided by seized Germanscientists and engineers to both programs (and especially the American effort) following World War II. On thisassistance, see Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemunde and the Coming of the Ballistic MissileEra (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); and Burrows, This New Ocean.

3. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: StrategicRestraint and the Pursuit of National Interests (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).

4. Victor Basiuk, Technology, World Politics, and American Policy (New York: Columbia University Press,1977), p. 7.

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US–Chinese space cooperation, the difficulties that have plagued their bilateralinteractions since the late 1990s, and the pall their recent mutual isolation has castover Asian space cooperation more generally. Whether these problems can bemended by more engagement-oriented US policies under the Obama administrationor enhanced regional efforts to improve space cooperation remains to be seen. Thecomplicating factor of recent (and ongoing) North Korean efforts to enter into thespace realm will likely make solution of regional space security problems moredifficult. But the success or failure of such efforts will be an important factor ininfluencing overall regional trends in regards to space, either toward increasingnationalism and militarism or toward civil and commercial cooperation andmultilateral conflict prevention. Thus, the final section of this study examinespossible means of achieving greater collaboration among the region’s space powersand within the US–Chinese context, discussing the potential logic behind suchmoves and prospects for accomplishing them. The paper’s conclusion is not overlyoptimistic, given the requirement of serious, coordinated efforts over several years byvarious governments, but the alternative is likely to be a steady worsening of thegenerally hostile trends seen today, which could take on increasingly confrontationalmanifestations and spill over with negative effects on to other areas of regionalrelations. For these reasons, the issue of Asian space cooperation is not one that theUnited States can ignore.

Space cooperation in Asia: nationalism over internationalism

As noted above, rival nations typically cooperate in sensitive fields involving dual-use technologies—such as space—on only a limited scale, at least until relations oftrust have been solidified or security concerns in other areas have dissipated. This isparticularly the case when there are asymmetries in the capabilities between states inthat field and they fear that an overly generous policy could assist in the rise ofpotential military rivals. Moreover, because of the close relationship between spacetechnologies and missile development, countries have typically guarded theseprograms very closely and viewed their neighbor’s programs with mistrust. Notably,the United States and the old Soviet Union (in contrast to Russia) often opposed thedevelopment of space-launch capabilities even by respective allies in Asia, such asSouth Korea and North Korea, for fear of upsetting the regional balance of power,creating new military uncertainties, and setting unfavorable precedents for dealinglater with potential proliferant states. Thus, space power has been, at times, a divisiveforce even among allies, often increasing political tensions and nationalism.

The multipolar nature of space competition in Asia and the lack of regionalsecurity organizations have also played a role in impeding cooperation. There are nobodies currently—outside of the United Nations—that bring together all of the keyplayers for space security discussions. Moreover, relatively hostile politicalrelationships still exist between many capitals in Asia (New Delhi–Beijing, NewDelhi–Islamabad, Seoul–Tokyo, Pyongyang–Seoul, and Tokyo–Beijing), whichhave lowered receptivity to possible cooperation in space. Finally, the relativeavailability of alternative partners (Russia, Ukraine, France, the United Kingdom,and, for some, the United States) with more advanced capabilities has made

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regional cooperation within Asia seem unnecessary and even undesirable, if a rivalmight thereby gain a comparative advantage.

Another critical factor has been the relatively closed nature of major Asianeconomies, which have traditionally resisted cooperative projects with potentialrivals, particularly in an area of technology deemed critical to the nation’s economicinfrastructure. Mercantilist strategies have therefore prevailed in space, withcountries seeking independent capabilities, shunning offers of cooperation, andblocking access to their domestic markets. For these reasons, market forces,interdependence, and practices based on national divisions of labor in differentaspects of space activity have not been able to emerge, as they have in other areas ofthe Asian marketplace. Instead, countries have behaved in a highly ‘un-economic’manner in regard to space, pouring large investments into redundant nationalprograms for reasons of security and prestige, which often have not made sense froma purely economic perspective.

Timing has also played a role in inhibiting space cooperation, as countries havesought to avoid revealing weaknesses and potentially being ‘locked into’ inferiorpositions relative to rivals. Asian countries have been relative late-comers in space,and the high cost of space programs, the sophistication of the technologies involved,and the need for specially trained personnel and an expensive infrastructure haveincreased the role of nationalism and limited the perceived value of cooperation withneighbors, particularly those with the potential to harm them. Indeed, it is hard tounderestimate how much the interplay between developmental and security needs hasaffected (and limited) space cooperation within Asia.

China’s economy suffered from severe underdevelopment and internal conflictthrough much of the Cold War. While it had deployed the medium-range, military-purpose Dong Feng 2A missile by the late 1960s, political factors—including theeffects of the Cultural Revolution—limited funding for space activity and greatlyreduced the training of qualified scientists and engineers.5 Its unique securitydilemma, characterized by hostile relations with both of the two superpowers, alsolimited its incentive (and ability) to reach out to other countries. As Brian Harveysummarizes, ‘From 1956–1977, with the exception of the brief period of the Sino-Soviet accord, China developed its space programme relying almost entirely on itsindigenous resources’.6 It finally emerged as a major space player in 2003, with itsfirst manned flight. Consistent with its self-identification during the Cold War, Chinahas recently taken the lead in using space for ‘soft power’ purposes,7 providing spacetechnology and training to scientists and engineers from less-developed countries inAfrica, Latin America, and Asia. But China has not neglected other national goals inthese initiatives, often reaching out specifically to those countries that possess energyor other resources of interest to China, such as Nigeria and Venezuela. Another keyarea of emphasis in Beijing’s international space policy—despite its January 2007anti-satellite (ASAT) test—has been its steady rhetorical support for efforts to

5. For a detailed history of this period in regard to space, see Brian Harvey, China’s Space Program: FromConception to Manned Spaceflight (New York: Springer-Praxis, 2004).

6. Ibid., p. 189.7. On this argument, see Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia University

Press, 2007).

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prevent an arms race in space. China has long backed an annual UN resolution on thisissue and, with Russia, has co-sponsored a proposed treaty at the UN Conference onDisarmament on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space.8

Although the United States has opposed this initiative—due to a belief that it couldlimit US missile defenses, neglects verification issues, and exempts China’s ownground-based ASAT system—China has scored points internationally for being oneof the leaders of the UN movement to keep weapons out of space. Broader Chinesecooperation with the United States in civil and commercial space since the late 1990shas been almost non-existent, largely due to US distrust and associated export controlrestrictions. By contrast, China has cooperated extensively in satellite developmentwith the United Kingdom and France.

India has long faced problems related to economic underdevelopment, a lack ofcritical technical resources, and competition from military demands associated withthe country’s ongoing conflicts with both China and Pakistan. For these reasons,scientists and officials opted to focus India’s limited space resources on civilianapplications, which allowed it to achieve steady success in meeting domesticeconomic needs outside of the control of the Indian military.9 Despite this non-military emphasis, geo-politics largely prevented significant space cooperation withthe United States, due to India’s security relationship with the Soviet Union, as wellas New Delhi’s own national preferences. Thus, while India engaged in some initialcooperation with NASA in the early 1960s and later built ground stations to useLANDSAT data, it did not engage in major civil or commercial cooperation with theUnited States during the Cold War, but neither did it form highly engaged space tieswith the Soviet Union. As Rajeev Lochan argues, ‘India chose the tougher route ofself-reliance for realization of these [space] systems over the easier alternative ofobtaining foreign space service under cooperative or commercial terms’.10 In the1970s and 1980s, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) moved fromsounding rockets to orbital flights, with an emphasis on developing communicationsto rural villages, telemedicine, and Earth remote-sensing to benefit agriculture,forestry, and fishing. Despite limited cooperation with the Soviet Union, whichincluded a flight by an Indian cosmonaut aboard the Salyut 7 space station in 1984, itstechnology development programs were otherwise largely autonomous.11

As for South Korea, the Korean War sharply set back its economic recovery afterWorld War II and put national attention on industrial development, food, and basicservices. Space represented an unapproachable luxury. Moreover, there was nomilitary need for it, given the alliance with the United States and US willingness toshare space-generated intelligence data on the North periodically. Later on, in the

8. For the text of the proposed treaty, see the ‘Reaching Critical Will’ website, Women’s International Leaguefor Peace and Freedom, available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/papers08/1session/Feb12%20Draft%20PPWT.pdf (accessed 3 June 2009).

9. On this point, see K. K. Nair, Space: The Frontiers of Modern Defence (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2002),p. 174.

10. Rajeev Lochan, ‘Some reflections on collective security in space’, in John M. Logsdon and James Clay Moltz,eds, Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives (Washington, DC: Space Policy Institute, George WashingtonUniversity, January 2008), p. 33.

11. A female astronaut, who grew up in India and later became an American citizen, participated in a USColumbia shuttle mission in early 2003, but perished during that shuttle’s breakup during re-entry.

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1970s and 1980s, the missile program of the Republic of Korea (ROK) faced strictUS range restrictions after a 1979 bilateral agreement limited their reach to 112 miles(180 kilometers),12 as Washington sought to reduce the chances of a missilecompetition on the Korean Peninsula. At South Korea’s urging, however, the UnitedStates and other member countries eventually agreed to accept the ROK into theMissile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 2001, whose rules had by thenchanged to allow peaceful space-launch programs in lieu of military missiles.Notably, even then, the United States declined to provide space-launch technology toSouth Korea, which Seoul eventually acquired from Russia. Thus, Seoul’s struggle toachieve space capabilities fostered strong feelings of nationalism, particularly givenits largely commercial orientation, MTCR membership, and belief that it was‘entitled’ to space-launch technology.

Meanwhile, North Korea also has had historical difficulties acquiring rockettechnology—at least openly—from abroad. The Soviet Union distrusted itssoutheastern neighbor and therefore limited transfers to unguided FROG missiles.13

But North Korea later managed to acquire more advanced Soviet Scud missiles fromSoviet partners in the Middle East (most notably Egypt) and reverse engineer them.Pyongyang is now urgently attempting to develop a space-launch capability via itsdomestic Taepodong-II missile, despite international sanctions against its efforts andserious resource constraints at the domestic level. From the outside, North Korea’smotivation seems to be a drive toward a strategic deterrent, but its domesticpropaganda emphasizes instead commercial factors and a desire for technologicalindependence.14 While some experts have discussed the possible inclusion of spacecooperation as an incentive within a long-term strategy of ‘cooperative threatreduction’ to wean North Korea off of its nuclear and missile interests,15 this idea hasnot yet achieved mainstream attention, largely because of dual-use concerns.

Japan, by contrast, has cooperated extensively with the United States, a factor thathas limited its incentive to reach out to its Asian neighbors. With the advent of its firstBasic Law on space activity in 1969, notably, Japan limited itself to non-military usesof space. For these reasons, it has not developed as quickly in space as it might haveunder ‘normal’ circumstances in other countries, given the size of its economy. Inboth the civilian and military fields, Japan was able to compensate by relying on UScapabilities, essentially ‘free riding’ on the alliance in regard to space. Still, Japan’stechnical know-how and economic prosperity helped it develop an early lead withinAsia in space science and in civilian technology, although the program sufferedduring Japan’s financial crisis in the 1990s. As China ramped up, Japan was bypassedin some areas, but North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat have caused a resurgence

12. On this point, see Daniel A. Pinkston, ‘North and South Korean space development: prospects for cooperationand conflict’, Astropolitics 4(2), (Summer 2006), p. 212.

13. FROG is a US military acronym standing for ‘Free Range Over Ground’. On Soviet policies towardPyongyang’s missile program, see Evgeniy P. Bazhanov, ‘Military-strategic aspects of the North Korean nuclearprogram’, in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds, The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security,Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 102–103.

14. Lewis Franklin of Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation has also recentlymade a provocative argument about the possible commercial motivations behind the North Korea program and theunsuitability of its current space-launch program for ballistic missile uses. Presentation by Franklin at the NASAAmes Research Center’s Space Futures Working Group, 20 February 2009.

15. Pinkston, ‘North and South Korean space development’, p. 221.

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of interest and nationalism regarding space capabilities in Japan, as have concernsover China’s recent rise in space. The Japanese government has begun paying moreattention to developing its own national infrastructure in regard to space. It hasfocused on the need to recruit young people from its declining population into thespace field. It is carrying out a series of high-profile human spaceflights, with anumber of astronauts scheduled to visit the ISS and the Japanese Kibo researchmodule in the coming years.16 Its deployment of Information-Gathering Satellites forreconnaissance, passage of a new Diet Law in 2008 allowing military space activities,and its Kaguya mission to map the Moon have all raised the profile of space. Recentpolicy debates have supported deployment of an early-warning satellite to detectmissile launches and even broached the subject of possible space-based defenses.17

These factors help explain why space cooperation developed later within Asia thanin Europe or between the two superpowers and why the conditions under which theyemerged did not foster regional cooperation. Such factors as the divisive influence ofthe Cold War alliance system in Asia and enduring security tensions among manycountries have all played a role in limiting space cooperation to date. Instead,countries have pursued opportunistic extra-regional ties (where possible) andotherwise pursued policies of domestic technological development and nationalautonomy.

Depending on the country, the spark for their recent drives to accelerate theirnational space capabilities varies. For China, the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars andBalkan conflicts of the 1990s, in which the US used precision-guided munitions andspace-based navigation systems, created a shock to the system. The Chinese militaryrecognized its woeful backwardness compared to this revolution in military affairsand began a push to remedy the situation, along with development of a concomitantcivil and commercial space infrastructure linked to broader Chinese politicaland economic goals. For Japan and South Korea, as noted above, North Korea’sTaepodong-I launch in 1998 and subsequent nuclear and missile activitieshighlighted their dependence on the United States and their inability to carry outtheir own information-gathering and monitoring activities from space, a situation thatboth countries found politically and militarily unacceptable. For India, the successfulflight in October 2003 of China’s Shenzhou V manned spacecraft acted as a sort of‘Sputnik’ in moving previously ‘backward’ China into an exclusive technologicalclub, putting India at risk of the loss of prestige, technological respect, and regionalinfluence if it failed to compete and carry out innovative space missions of its own.

Overall, China’s recent space accomplishments, exceptional drive, and recentmilitary uses of space have made it the main focal point for regional measures ofprogress. While there is uncertainty within Asia about the desirability of Chinesespace leadership, smaller countries have tended to bandwagon18 with Beijing becauseof its promises of ready technological assistance. For Japan, South Korea, and Indiathe challenge is how to keep up in the emerging space race and in what areas. In this

16. Author’s interviews with Japanese space analysts, industry representatives, and officials, Tokyo, 20–23 April2009.

17. Ibid.18. ‘Bandwagoning’ refers to the tendency of countries to side with the stronger player in an emerging conflict,

rather than seeking to ‘balance’ against it by building up one’s own capabilities or aligning with possible allies.

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regard, recent cooperation with the United States (and to some extent Russia) hasoffered some definite advantages.

In regard to Tokyo, the close alliance relationship with the United States continuesto benefit the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), NASA’s counterpart inJapan. Japanese astronauts have participated in 13 US shuttle missions since 1992.JAXA is an integral partner on the ISS and three Japanese astronauts have worked onthe station since 2008. Japan plans to continue this high level of activity thanks to therecent installation of its Kibo research module, which has received heavy publicity inJapan, making its astronauts well-known to the population and boosting the spaceprogram’s domestic and international prestige. Contact with NASA on missionplanning and future projects remains regular and intensive, and US commercial andmilitary space relations with Japan remain close.

A possibly similar US relationship is slowly evolving with South Korea, albeit stillon a much more limited scale. After an agreement reached in August 2008 betweenNASA and South Korea’s main space agency, the Korean Aerospace Research Institute(or KARI), the two sides have begun to identify specific areas of mutual interest. WhileNASA–KARI cooperation had earlier remained hamstrung by concerns abouttechnology transfer and issues related to the MTCR, KARI’s participation on the ISS inApril 2008 (via a South Korean astronaut delivered by a Russian launcher), robustsatellite activities, and plans for becoming a space-launch power have helped motivateNASA to open up a broader palate of possible cooperation. A recent working groupmeeting between NASA and KARI officials in Taejon, South Korea, resulted inconcrete projects for data exchange and cooperation in technology for space radiationmonitoring, with pledges for follow-up meetings in Washington.19 But Russiancooperation remains important too, especially as a source of technology. Moscow’sAngara booster is the first stage in the ROK’s planned Korean Space Launch Vehicle(KSLV)-1, although the rocket has not yet reached orbit in two attempts.

As far as US–India space cooperation is concerned, the relationship has grownrapidly since space’s inclusion in summit documents in late 2001. These eventsmarked the end of India’s isolation by the United States and a decision to embracebilateral cooperation as part of the global war on terrorism. Periodic meetings onspace topics followed. Since 2006, the United States has been working with Indiaon lunar cooperation, and India flew two US experiments on its 2008–2009Chandaryaan-1 orbital mission to the Moon. Although India is also cooperating withRussia on lunar exploration, contacts between NASA and the Indian Space ResearchOrganization continue to expand. The recent US–Indian strategic partnership in thenuclear sector and contacts in areas ranging from missile defense to anti-terrorism todemocracy promotion suggest that bilateral space cooperation will continue todevelop.

Asia’s competing regional space organizations: APSCO and APRSAF

Within the Asian region, the past decade and a half has seen the emergence of tworival space organizations, each seeking to ‘organize’ Asia’s space powers and their

19. Author’s interview with DeVon Fleming, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC, 8 May 2009.

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cooperative activities. While both bodies state as their goal the development ofregional space capabilities and the bridging of national boundaries for commoninterest and scientific advancement, the relative absence of cooperation between thetwo groups seems almost to hark back to the conflict between the Warsaw Pact andNATO in Europe during the Cold War—but this time for Asian ‘hearts and minds’ inregard to space.

China has played a leading role in the first of these organizations, which is formallybased in Beijing. Its origins date to 1992, when a trilateral meeting of China,Pakistan, and Thailand proposed an initiative called the Asia–Pacific MultilateralCooperation in Space Technology and Applications (AP-MCSTA).20 This groupeventually began cooperating in several areas, including the development of theSmall Multi-Mission Satellite (SMMS), which was launched using Chinesetechnology. Members decided to supplement the AP-MCSTA process with a 2005decision in Beijing to create the Asia–Pacific Space Cooperation Organization(APSCO): a formal, membership-only group with a dues-paying requirement. TheAPSCO organization now includes China, Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, andThailand, as well as Peru. Two other countries—Indonesia and Turkey—have signedthe convention but have not completed the domestic ratification procedures toformalize their memberships21; but China has not put all of its eggs in the APSCObasket. AP-MCSTA activities continue on a broader front. The group engages in jointresearch and data-exchange efforts, as well as formal training courses for scientistsand engineers from the Asian-Pacific region in space technology and remote sensingprovided at various Chinese universities and institutes. To date, some 200 traineesfrom both APSCO and AP-MCSTA countries have participated in this training.22 Inthis regard, China has been able to portray itself as a ‘purveyor’ of space know-howand technology to lesser-developed states in Asia and elsewhere.

A parallel organization is the Japanese-sponsored Asia–Pacific Regional SpaceAgency Forum (APRSAF). This body differs from APSCO in being a non-membership group that requires no dues or formal signing of a convention or charter.Instead, APRSAF is made up of cooperating national space programs that meetvoluntarily once or twice a year to exchange information on space activities andpromote regional space cooperation. APRSAF has met regularly since 1993 andinvolves many more countries than AP-MCSTA, although some states haveparticipated in only a few APRSAF meetings. Past participants have includedAustralia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Canada, Cambodia, China, France, Germany, India,Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, NewZealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, theUnited States, and Vietnam, as well as various international space organizations(including the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs).23 As a recent APRSAF documentstates: ‘APRSAF does not pursue legally binding agreements, but rather provides a

20. Website of the Secretariat of the Asia–Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology andApplications (AP-MCSTA), available at: http://www.apmcsta.org/CommonWeb/foreword.aspx (accessed 4 May2009).

21. Asia–Pacific Space Outlook 4(19), (December 2008), a publication of AP-MCSTA.22. Ibid.23. Asia–Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, organizational brochure (acquired from the Japan Space

Exploration Organization on 22 April 2009), undated.

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flexible framework to promote regional cooperation in space development andutilization through voluntary cooperative efforts of participating countries andorganizations’.24 The organization’s secretariat is based in Tokyo and is staffed bythe Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology(MEXT) and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). Recent APRSAFprojects have included Sentinel Asia, a disaster response monitoring network usingdata provided by Japanese satellites.

Compared to cooperation on a bilateral basis by the countries involved, bothAPSCO and APRSAF remain rather limited efforts judged in terms of funding,operations, personnel, and dedicated technology. Moreover, there appears to be aninformal rivalry between the two groups, as rival training programs have targetedsimilar scientists in ‘target’ countries such as Thailand. There are exceptions to thesetrends, however. Japan provided remote-sensing data to China after its terribleearthquake in 2008 and there are several efforts underway to increase regionalcooperation in future tsunami prediction, relief, and monitoring operations. Still,these activities remain the exception.

Thus, trends in Asian space cooperation show considerable fragmentation. Thegeneral ‘rule’ for cooperation is that political factors still play a major role, and spaceactivity remains a wary competition among the various Asian players. As noted,much stronger ties exist either with less-developed countries or on a bilateral basiswith more-developed countries outside the region, such as Japanese, South Korean,and Indian relations with the United States, and South Korean, Chinese, and Indianrelations with European space powers (including Russia).

An important missing link is the virtual absence of space cooperation betweenChina and the United States since the late 1990s. Indeed, conservative militaryanalysts on both sides of the Pacific are now calling for increased offensive anddefensive military space capabilities, fomenting tensions and risking a US–Chinesespace arms race. Such trends could lead to instability, increased orbital space debris,and possibly interference with or even attacks on each other’s space assets. In thecommercial realm, meanwhile, strict US export controls have caused China to shiftits space outreach to new partners. British Surrey Satellites, Ltd, has built and soldsmall spacecraft to China. French Alcatel has begun to manufacture advancedsatellites (without US components) specifically for sale to the growing Chinesemarket. For these and other reasons, US–Chinese space cooperation is now beingactively reassessed in Washington by the Obama administration, but can these effortssucceed?

Is US–Chinese space cooperation possible?

The history of the US–Chinese space relationship has been complicated, involvingperiods of cooperation and mutual isolation. Given the relative size of the two spaceprograms and their recent demonstrative actions in the area of anti-satellite weaponry(although denied by both sides as intended against the other), it is worth examiningthis relationship in greater detail. Lack of progress in this important dyad is likely to

24. Ibid.

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reinforce the fragmented nature of existing Asian space cooperation and make theestablishment of trans-regional activities impossible, with these two emerging space‘poles’ increasingly pulling countries in one direction or the other.

US–Chinese space cooperation began in the late 1970s after the Deng Xiaopingreforms. While possessing a clearly anti-Soviet Union military motivation, earlyrelations between the two space programs resulted in surprisingly fruitful civiliancooperation. Specifically, China agreed to an Understanding on Cooperation in SpaceTechnology with the United States in 1979, leading to the establishment of a jointcommission and several working groups.25 As a result of these efforts, two Chineseexperiments flew on a US space shuttle mission in January 1992. Military-to-militarycooperation established under the Reagan administration—largely for collaborativeintelligence-gathering activities against the Soviet Union—helped facilitate spaceties by creating a higher-level framework of strategic cooperation. As Chinadeveloped its commercial Long March rockets, the United States agreed to allow UScompanies and foreign satellites with US technology (in both cases, with appropriateUS export control licensing) to use these low-cost boosters. In 1989, the two sidesagreed that up to nine commercial launches could take place over the next fiveyears,26 according to a quota system aimed at protecting higher-priced US launchers.Chinese commercial launches commenced in 1990 and had a series of successes untila number of explosions and other failures in 1992, 1995, and 1996. As a result of twoof these failures, the Loral and Hughes corporations, which were also sellingsatellites to China, provided some limited technical advice to Chinese space officialsto work out the problems.

But this commercial space cooperation got wrapped with fears at the time ofChinese spying at US nuclear facilities, stimulated by the Wen Ho Lee scandal at LosAlamos National Laboratory and related cases. The Congressionally mandated CoxCommittee charged in 1999 that Loral and Hughes had provided know-how of directrelevance to China’s nuclear delivery systems.27 While critics reviewing the Coxreport cast doubt on its findings and broad charges,28 legislation pushed through theRepublican-led Congress re-categorized all space technology as munitions itemsunder US International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) controls, essentiallybanning US–Chinese space commerce from that point forward.29 Scientificcooperation with China also ground to a halt, due to these new licensing requirementsand the opposition of Congressional conservatives to space cooperation with Beijing,particularly any Chinese participation that might involve the largely US-funded ISS.30

Since 1999, there have been periodic expert and official debates about US policyregarding space cooperation with China, particularly as US companies have lost

25. Harvey, China’s Space Program, p. 191.26. Ibid., p. 116.27. US House of Representatives, US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns With the People’s

Republic of China (unclassified version), available at: http://www.house.gov/coxreport/ (accessed 9 June 2009).28. See Alastair Iain Johnston, W. K. H. Panofsky, Marco Di Capua and Lewis R. Franklin, The Cox Committee

Report: An Assessment, edited by M. M. May (Center for International Security and Cooperation, StanfordUniversity, December 1999).

29. For more on the Cox Committee and the politics that surrounded it, see Johnson-Freese, Space as a StrategicAsset, pp. 153–158.

30. Partly as a result, China eventually developed plans for an autonomous space station, which it plans to launchby 2011. See ‘China plans to launch a space station by 2011’, Space News, (6 October 2008), p. 9.

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market share to European and Russian manufacturers. In October 2005, the Bushadministration began to move beyond the anti-cooperative US stance by providingspace debris data to China on the eve of its Shenzhou VI manned mission to help itavoid any possibly fatal collisions. In the spring of 2006, visiting the ChineseNational Space Administration (CNSA) Vice Administrator Luo Ge met with NASAchief Michael Griffin and invited him to visit China. Griffin’s eventual trip in the fallof 2006 resulted in frustration on the American side, as Chinese military officialsblocked access to certain locations promised by eager Chinese space officials,reflecting tension within China’s own program regarding official policies on spacecooperation.31 In the end, the two sides agreed to continue their dialogue, althoughChina’s January 2007 ASAT test caused a freeze as the US side signaled its obviousdispleasure at this dangerous release of long-lasting orbital debris. In July 2008,however, a NASA delegation visited China to continue low-level discussions onpossible areas of cooperation, and another meeting followed in Washington later inthe year. In April 2009, a NASA team (including one senior official) visited China tocontinue talks with CNSA officials on possible concrete activities in the areas of Earthremote-sensing and space science.32 In October 2010, NASA Administrator CharlesBolden visited China and reportedly discussed possible human spaceflightcooperation. The meetings have marked small, but concrete steps to rebuild civilspace cooperation between the two sides.

Progress on the commercial front, however, has not yet occurred, due to thecontinuing presence of strict US ITAR rules. What has developed in recent years hasbeen a growing consensus within the US military, industry, and, to a lesser extent,Congress that the ITAR regulations are no longer serving US interests.33 Within theHouse of Representatives, Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher (Dem., Calif.) stated inthe spring of 2009 that ITAR reform was her top priority and initiated legislation tochange existing rules. She has since then left Congress to take a position in theObama administration as the State Department’s undersecretary for arms control andnonproliferation.34 New regulations are now moving through the inter-agencyprocess. It seems likely, therefore, that such reforms will take place at some point inPresident Obama’s first term, possibly opening avenues for renewed US–Chinesescientific or commercial space cooperation.

Opponents of US–Chinese space cooperation, however, continue to fight suchchanges vehemently. Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (Rep., Calif.) warns that therewould be military risks from such cooperation, drawing a linkage between alleged

31. According to a US official who served on the advance team, CNSA officials had failed to get final militarysign-off for access to several sites on the approved CNSA–NASA list. Thus, NASA officials were denied access,although providing a false signal that the decision had been deliberately planned by China as part of a strategy tooffend the United States. (Author’s interview with US State Department official, name withheld by request, 21 April2009.)

32. Author’s interview with Christopher C. Blackerby, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC, 8 May 2009.33. See Turner Brinton, ‘Gen. Chilton: export controls pose threat to national security’, Space News, (23 March

2009), p. 20; Peter B. de Selding, ‘Satellite operators want access to Chinese rockets’, Space News, (30 March 2009),p. 24.

34. William J. Broad, ‘For US satellite makers, a no-cost bailout bid’, The New York Times, (2 April 2009) (onlineedition).

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transfers of know-how between the Hughes and the Loral corporations and theChinese Long March company in the 1990s to the current missile programs in Iran andNorth Korea.35 As Rohrabacher stated in a recent opinion piece, ‘Make no mistake,China’s eager pupils are making the most of this partnership’.36 Other conservativeanalysts make the case that China’s increasingly militaristic direction in space isinevitable and that cooperation by the United States will only strengthen China’shand.37

Despite recent evidence of Chinese cyber attacks on US military websites, thestrength of the anti-China lobby is waning under the pressure of US industry, seniormilitary officials, and reform-minded Democrats, who view current US efforts toisolate China in space as backfiring. Yet, while these forces carried more weight inCongressional debates before November 2010, the newly Republican-led House ofRepresentatives may try to block possible Obama administration space-relatedreforms or initiatives.

One stillborn shift in the broader international framework surrounding Asian spacecooperation was the agreement on a program of work in late May 2009 by countries at theConference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva—the first such consensus since 1996. USwillingness to discuss space security and Chinese willingness to discuss a fissile materialcut-off treaty seemed to provide the groundwork for the first formal internationalnegotiations addressing space security in a decade.38 However, Pakistan’s decision in thefall of 2009 to block consensus on the CD agenda has prevented the start of any formaldiscussions.

But the increasing crowding of space itself, the need for improved control over debris,and expanded efforts to avoid collisions are providing top-down pressures on allcountries—regardless of region—to cooperate more closely in ‘managing’ space. Whilerelatively autonomous policies were possible in the early decades of space activity,recent events (such as the 2007 Chinese ASAT test and the 2009 Iridium–Cosmoscollision) and the resultant increase in orbital debris have forced countries and theirmilitaries to begin thinking more collectively about space. The recent willingness of theUS Air Force to expand its international data sharing on conjunction analysis regardingspace debris and satellite collisions marks a significant evolution in American thinking.China’s restraint from conducting additional kinetic ASAT tests since 2007 may be partof the same learning curve. These factors suggest that increasing cooperation andtransparency may yet emerge in the coming years, since states recognize that thealternative is the possible loss of safe access to low-Earth orbital space.

This raises several questions. Can it be realistically argued that cooperativemechanisms in space will improve within Asia? If so, in what possible directionsmight such efforts lead? Alternatively, what factors might block these efforts? Thenext section considers some options for change, first in the broader internationalframework affecting space security, then in cooperation at the region-wide level, andfinally in possible new measures at the bilateral (especially US–Chinese) level.

35. Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, ‘Dangers of Chinese satellite technology’, Space News, (13 April 2009), p. 19.36. Ibid.37. Eric Sterner, ‘US–China space relations: maintaining an arm’s length’, Space News, (2 March 2009), p. 19.38. Walter Pincus, ‘UN hopes to ban new fissionable material, space-based weapons’, Washington Post, (2 June

2009).

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Possible options for expanding Asian space cooperation

Cooperative statements regarding space at the US–Chinese summit in November2009 may bode well for a potential change in direction. Actual progress could help‘push’ Asia more generally in a positive direction, providing a new framework forbuilding cooperation in other less-sensitive areas. While the Bush administrationfought consistently for ‘freedom of action’ in regard to military space, the Obamaadministration’s June 2010 National Space Policy has put a much greater emphasison collective security approaches and spoken of a willingness to contemplate newarms control measures for space. NASA’s budget woes have also increasedincentives for inernational cooperation. China has generally welcomed this newapproach and seems poised to engage in positive discussions. The security challenge,however, is that both China and Russia have invested considerable political capital intheir proposed Treaty on the Prohibition of the Placement of Weapons in OuterSpace. It also remains unclear whether China will agree to halt testing of its currentground-based ASAT system and rule out future developments of other weapons thatmight be used against US assets. Such moves would be consistent with past Chineserhetoric and could be seen as a means of both strengthening Chinese ‘soft power’ andlimiting US ‘hard power’ in regard to space, but they have not yet occurred. TheUnited States, on its part, would likely have to accept a ban on space-based missiledefenses, a key sticking point for China but one sure to elicit strong opposition amongconservatives in the US Congress and the defense community.

Another possible avenue for engaging China might be to renew efforts to bringBeijing into the Missile Technology Control Regime. While this would imposegreater restrictions on Chinese industry and its exports, it would also make China amember of the most important international ‘club’ dealing with missile issues. Fromthe US side, security concerns about sharing of confidential missile-relatedinformation and about Chinese domestic enforcement of MTCR regulations wouldhave to be overcome as well. This is not a small set of obstacles, but it is not animpossible one either given the possible benefits of bringing about enhanced Chineseexport control compliance in the missile arena.

At the regional level, the increasing recognition of common interests inenvironmental monitoring and disaster relief has begun to shift mindsets within Asiancapitals about the desirability of cooperation. The 2004 tsunami and the 2008 Chineseearthquake led to unprecedented cooperation in disaster relief and in pressure for newregion-wide disaster prevention mechanisms. As Asia struggles to come to terms inthe coming years with the effects of global warming on crops, sea levels, river routes,and weather patterns, there will be increasing pressure to share data and develop moreeffective regional strategies. Put simply, there is a growing recognition amongexperts that purely national approaches are not likely to work and will only delay thepotential gains to be had from international cooperation. The logic of these ideas doesnot guarantee immediate change, but it does heighten the likelihood of the adoptionof a trans-national perspective by state leaders. The potential role of space in assistingin these efforts is already obvious and has begun, including in the unprecedentedcooperation between Japan and China in 2008 after the Sichuan earthquake.

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Given existing mistrust, the key to future success may be to focus on project-specific cooperation first, and then work ‘backwards’ to the establishment (if needed)of a cooperative regional organization. One idea at the project-level might be theestablishment of a region-wide data center to coordinate remote-sensing data on theregion. This could build trust and transparency, while facilitating more rapid andefficient responses to natural disasters and fostering contacts that might lead tofollow-on projects and new cooperative efforts in other areas. Organizationally, thecenter could build ties between the existing Chinese-led AP-MCSTA/APSCOorganization and that of the Japanese-sponsored APRSAF. From the scientific, dataexchange, and operational standpoints, it makes little sense to duplicate efforts, andthere could be considerable economies of scale in combining forces and focusing thelimited funds available into higher-value, joint projects. Training, moreover, wouldbe improved and could benefit from enhanced specialization if China and Japanidentified specific areas of space science and trained only in those areas accordingly.If the United States could also secure a role in such activities, further synergies mightbe developed. A new region-wide organization could later be formed (if deemeddesirable) to combine all of these elements.

In terms of space commerce, trends beyond Asia show that the internationalcommercial space industry is becoming more and more integrated, despite the effortsof individual Asian countries to control their technologies and favor domesticenterprises. The logic of globalization has affected space manufacturing just as it hasother industries, and there are clear advantages in terms of cost and technology tocooperation. The close US–Russian engagement in commercial launchers and inhuman spaceflight provides an excellent example of a cooperative outcome drivenlargely by this market logic. Asian countries facing increasing economic pressure inthe coming years may eventually be moved in a similar direction as they face a choiceof continuing to pay higher costs or beginning to work with erstwhile rivals. Progressin bilateral US–Chinese ties will likely be a major prerequisite for broader regionalcooperation, given the use of US technologies in a number of South Korean andJapanese products. US ITAR reform could send an important signal of a shift inattitude and thus pave the way for greater cooperation from US allies as well.

Most experts believe the space science will be the first step in any road to‘normalizing’ US–Chinese space relations. The three main areas of activity on theagendas of all of the world’s leading space programs—including those in Asia—inthe coming two decades are long-duration Earth orbital missions, lunar missions, andMars exploration. In the first instance, China is now barred by informal US andJapanese opposition from participation in the ISS. A decision by the Obamaadministration to attempt to change this policy could possibly cause China to give upits plan to deploy an autonomous space station, or, more likely, limit it to one smallprototype; but the fact that US shuttle missions to the ISS are already planned to endin 2011 make such prospects unlikely, although China could conceivably use its ownbooster or a Russian one.39

39. Reportedly, China’s Shenzhou spacecraft already has a compatible docking mechanism with the ISS, whichwas installed (with Russian guidance) for exactly this possible eventuality.

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Notably, in one of his first interviews after being confirmed as President Obama’sdirector of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, Dr John Holdrenheld out the possibility of significant new space cooperation with China, even in thepreviously controversial area of human spaceflight. Despite conservative Congres-sional opposition to such cooperation, Holdren speculated that in the gap periodbetween the end of the shuttle and the development of a new, man-rated US launcherbetween 2010 and 2015, the United States would rely on Russia and potentially otherforeign partners, adding: ‘It might also be the Chinese, depending on how ourrelationship develops’.40 Bolden’s trip in the fall of 2010 may have opened otherpossible avenues. While falling far short of a clear commitment, these comments andinitiatives signal high-level Obama administration support for investigating suchpreviously closed options.

Another forward-looking prospect for greater US–Chinese cooperation relates tofuture missions to the Moon. President George W. Bush’s speech in January 2004outlining the new US Vision for Space Exploration specifically rejected the idea ofanother space race and invited foreign participation in the lunar effort. Chinaparticipated in early meetings on the US Vision for Space Exploration during thisperiod, as did Russia, ESA, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. China is nowactive in the NASA-led Global Exploration Strategy, a space coordination effortamong 14 national space programs. Developing a plan to include Chinese taikonautsin any future post-space station missions would be a means of beginning to bridge thecurrent gap in the all-important human spaceflight sector and build a trulyinternational coalition for this work. Similarly, Mars research remains an importantlong-term target of both space exploration and eventual human spaceflight. A majorNASA, CNSA, or other effort to begin to combine forces in Mar research could helpbuild on common interests, develop experience in coordinated (or even combined)operations, begin real burden-sharing, and expand mutual knowledge and trust.

In the area of US–Chinese space security relations, one possible first step could bea bilateral pledge of non-interference with each other’s space assets, such as theUnited States and Russia currently maintain in regard to each other’s reconnaissancesatellites (to strengthen each other’s capability of monitoring US–Russian nucleararms treaties). Such a confidence-building measure could begin to alter the hostiledynamics seen in 2007 and 2008 in terms of ASAT actions by both sides. This, inturn, might improve prospects for broader arms control or space security agreementsincluding other states.

An assessment of cooperative prospects

Given these factors, it might seem logical to predict enhanced Asian scientific,commercial, and civil cooperation, as well as new measures in confidence-buildingand conflict prevention in the space security field. However, enduring historical andpolitical divisions in Asia and the security concerns raised by national rocketprograms in regard to possible WMD delivery systems, as well as the ongoing

40. American Associate for the Advancement of Science, ‘In full interview, John Holdren eschews new nukes,hints at space flight delays’, ScienceInsider, (8 April 2009).

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regional debates about the possible development and deployment of space weapons,whether land-, sea-, air-, or space-based systems, still make such predictionspremature. China’s ASAT activity and the US shootdown of an errant nationalsecurity satellite over the Pacific in February 2008—while intended for peacefulpurposes—have increased space-related fears within Asia. This has reduced trust andput many cooperative proposals on hold, despite the clear advantages they mightbring for all parties. The APSCO–APRSAF rivalry, and their split largely along thelines of political orientation, bodes poorly for new forms of region-wide integrationin space activities and the development of truly ‘international’ thinking about space.There is no evidence yet of close engagement and cooperation among leading Asianstates that might allow true burden-sharing and the reduction of competitive spaceimpulses through mutual interdependence, as seen in Europe.

Instead, space activity still continues to be linked in most Asian capitals to concepts oftechnological security, nationalism, prestige, and regional competition. Spacecooperation tends to be oriented toward increasing relative national capabilities andadvantages through technology acquisition, rather than creating collective goods forregion-wide benefit. Asia’s space powers remain highly suspicious of sharingoperational information about their spacecraft and launch vehicles—due to dual-useconcerns—and remain hesitant to take significant new initiatives to cooperate withmajor potential rivals, although they are willing to provide some benefits to less-developed countries. Unlike the US–Soviet relationship during the Cold War, there isstill little ongoing contact between leading Asian space officials that might foster suchdialogue regarding space and more options for other partnerships. The availability oftechnology from Europe, Russia, and—in certain areas and for certain partners—theUnited States, continues to be a significant factor drawing China, India, South Korea,and Japan away from each other. Put simply, despite emerging market forces, space–environmental pressures, and the presence of increasing collective security incentives,there seems to be no multilateral consensus within Asia on the need to cooperate inspace. This is not to say, however, that the situation is static and unchanging. Indeed,small signs of cooperative initiatives and greater openness are beginning to be seen in theareas of space science and commerce. Japan, for example, announced in June 2009 aneffort with five other space agencies (including India’s ISRO and South Korea’s KARI,but not China’s CNSA) to cooperate on the design of small Earth observation satellitesand microsatellites,41 but this project remains an exception to the rule, at present.

Over the past decade, negative political events have also played a role in derailingpotential progress in space cooperation. The prerequisites for real change, if it is tooccur, are likely to be found in an array of overlapping, positive conditions, whichwill take strong and steady political leadership—and some degree of luck—to create.These include: (1) progress in data exchanges and functional cooperation in regionaldisaster warning and Earth observation; (2) gradual expansion of commercial ties andnational willingness to use foreign satellite launchers within Asia; (3) the continuedabsence of direct US–Chinese military confrontations (along the lines of the 2001EP-3 incident or a Taiwan independence scenario); (4) greater willingness by theChinese government (and particularly its military) to open its space activities to

41. ‘Six Asian nations partner on satellite development’, Space News, (8 June 2009), p. 18.

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foreign (especially US) representatives;42 (5) efforts by the United States to broadenthe boundaries of acceptable space cooperation with Asian countries (especiallyChina) by revision of its export control policies; (6) willingness by China to refrainfrom ASAT testing and by the United States to refrain from deployment of space-based missile defense interceptors; and (7) continued Asian progress toward nucleararms reduction and support for nonproliferation measures.

In regard to this last item, unfortunately, success or failure in dealing with theNorth Korean nuclear/missile threat is likely to affect Asian space cooperation.Specifically, to the extent that cooperative security models (such as the Six-PartyTalks) succeed, they are more likely to have positive spin-off effects in other areas,such as space. By contrast, if they fail and countries again begin to take sides eitherfor or against North Korea, these divisions could spill over into hostile developmentsin space, as countries fall back on typical national-security responses and ‘hunkerdown’ in the face of perceived international threats. While China and Russiaeventually joined a watered-down effort by the United States, South Korea, and Japanin the spring of 2009 to condemn Pyongyang’s further efforts to developspace/missile technology, Beijing and Moscow still continue to assert North Korea’sright to peaceful space access, creating a basic conflict of interests within the Six-Party Talks. Moreover, China’s unwillingness to condemn North Korea of theCheonan’s sinking suggests a potentially growing rift with the United States, SouthKorea, and Japan on how to deal with Pyongyang. Thus, China’s future choicesin regard to this shared global security concern could play a significant role indetermining whether meaningful collective security concepts will be advanced inAsia or not. Space is likely to be either a victim or a beneficiary of this decision, aswill US–Chinese relations more generally.

Conclusion

Despite the potential scientific-, economic-, and security-related value of cooperationamong major space-faring countries in Asia, such relations to date have been largelyabsent and broader notions of interdependence and shared interests in space have notyet taken root. Existing regional trends, moreover, do not point to rapid progresstoward multilateral rapprochement, burden-sharing, and close engagement. Whilethis is not an especially optimistic conclusion, it should also not be too surprising.Space is still a relatively new, highly competitive, and military relevant area. At thesame time, a number of factors are putting greater pressure on states and raising theincentives for space cooperation. As US–Chinese discussions continue to seek outavenues for progress and as common threats to regional security in terms of climatechange and natural disasters occupy more of decision-makers’ attention spans, spacecooperation may be a beneficiary. Progress, however, is not likely to be rapid andthere is considerable ground for backpedaling in the case of new obstacles orincidents. For these reasons, the best that can be predicted at this point is a picture of

42. It is noteworthy that China’s commercial partners in Europe have commented on the surprising access theyhave been given to Chinese space facilities, in sharp contrast to the US experience. This suggests that Chineserestraints may not be as set in stone as often feared on the US side. Money may talk, so perhaps time will tell in thisregard.

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slow progress. Ironically, formal, region-wide cooperative mechanisms for spacemay be the last to emerge, due to enduring political divisions and security mistrustwithin the region. China and Japan also have invested significant political andeconomic capital in their separate space organizations for the region and are unlikelyto abandon them in the near term.

At the same time, supporters of cooperation should take heart in the growingknowledge at the regional level of shared problems in space security (such as orbitaldebris) and the benefits of cooperation in disaster monitoring. Commercial andbudgetary factors are also increasingly driving countries—including the UnitedStates—toward greater cooperation in space. Military dynamics are currently movingin an uncertain direction, with strong competitive tendencies but also a growingrealization that war in space will be harmful to all and that, therefore, tensions need tobe reduced.

Given all of these complex factors, it may be tempting for Asian decision-makersto avoid dealing with space issues. Unfortunately, given the rapid dynamics in thisfield and their linkage to national security, they will demand greater attention in thecoming years if threats to space assets and possible spillovers to regional conflictmore generally are to be avoided. US policy in this regard could play a significant rolein helping to increase incentives for China to become a responsible player in spaceand to signal to US allies that space commerce with China can be conducted safelyand to mutual benefit. If Asia’s space powers begin to recognize their commoninterests and work toward greater collaboration in their civil, commercial, scientific,and security-related activities in space, problems currently foreseeable from existingtrends in Asian space competition might eventually be avoided.

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