china and mekong
TRANSCRIPT
China and the
Development of
the Mekong River
Jnani Pongpakatien, Aiwa Pooamorn, Thaniya Theungsang
Background
• Critical shared resource between China
(44% of Mekong = Lancang), Myanmar,
Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam
• Provide for the livelihoods of more than 80
million people
• China's 7 planned hydropower stations: tap
60% of the flow of the river
• Unilateral decision (Goh, 2009)
Is China thwarting
attempts to ensure
that all riparian states
benefit from the
development of the
Mekong River?
• Economic and Political
Aspects
• Ecological and Social
Impacts
• Conclusion
Economics • China's high demand for energy. Eight-dam
Lancang cascade designed to produce
15,600 MW (Cronin, 2009)
• Chinese state-owned corporations investing
in hydropower development in Lower
Mekong following a Build Operate Transfer
model. Local gov will control dam only
after 30 or 50 years. (Tao, 2012)
• Many dams are silting up much faster than
the 50-100 years originally anticipated
(Cronin, 2009)
Politics
• China’s own development of the river drives
the logic of building more dams further
downstream (Hirsch, 2011)
• US Lower Mekong Initiative to counter
China's influence (Hirsch, 2011)
• China is not a member of the Mekong River
Commission but is increasingly engaged as a
dialogue partner
• Bilateralism over multilateralism
Politics
• China will be able to control the quantity of
water released to downstream countries
(Goh, 2009)
• Worst affected states will be those furthest
downstream, Vietnam and Cambodia.
• Lack of any formal agreements means that
there are no safeguards in place
Ecological
• variety species endemic to Mekong
threatened to be extinct, less diversity, less
food source
• water level decreased, natural current
altered, Tonle Sap floodplain less fertile
• sediments locked up, less fertile land
downstream for agriculture
• saline water intrudes,vietnamese
agriculture decline
Fish Ladders
Fish dugong stingray
Ecological (continued)
• deforestation = severe irreversible damage
to the ecosystem
• Lifespan of the dam becomes much shorter
than expected, about 20 years left (Cronin,
2010)
• future pollution from future development
eg. copper & bauxite mining etc.
Fish is our life
Social
• Subsistence-based living becomes hard for
downstream; subsistence level fail,
industrial level thrive
• widening gap between the rich & poor
• Chinese resettlement caused by Lancang
dams (Goh, 2009)
• authority suppress the data & local
participation, local people's voice not heard
Social [cont]
• MRC is not being used as a voicing channel
• China doesn't look basin-wide, their EIA
focus only on impacts within its territory --
>disproportional impacts (Goh, 2009)
Poor ppls livelihoods
Conclusion
• Electricity generation and exports,
commercial navigation, boost econ
development
• Environmental and human security =
externalities?
• Poor channels for communication between
China and LM states
• LM states cannot challenge China directly o relative power (economics, military, etc.)
o Chinese aid and investment (infrastructures)
Is China thwarting attempts to ensure that
all riparian states benefit from the
development of the Mekong River?
Conclusion II •
• In general, yes o Even with the political interests for soft power...
o And China does bring in investment in SEAsian
countries...
o Economic interests - such as electricity generation
paramounts
o Revenue generated do not go to the local people
in the most part
o Irreversible ecological impacts
References
• Cronin, R. (2009). Mekong Dams and the
perils of peace. Survival, 51(6), 147-160.
• Goh, E. (2004). China in the Mekong River
basin: the regional security implications of
resource development on the Lancang
Jiang. Singapore: Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies.
• Hirsch, P. (2011). China and the Cascading
Geopolitics of Lower Mekong Dams. The
Asia Pacific Journal, 9(20).
• Tao, Z. (2012). The Inadequacies of Chinese
Overseas Investment Regulations: A Case
Study of the Myitsone Dam, Myanmar.
Retrieved from
http://www.icird.org/2012/files/papers/Zu
o%20Tao.pdf