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CHAPTER–III

INDIA AND THE ASEAN : HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

By the early centuries of the Christian era, many of Southeast

Asian Countries and India were a part of the world-trading

network. Though this period was marked by the domination of

Indian Ocean by Roman trade, it also witnessed the establishment

of trade relations between India and Southeast Asia. It also

presents an analysis of relations behind the increased economic

activities between India and Southeast Asia from 5-6th century

onwards and the resultant socio-political, economic and cultural

impact of this relationship on the region. Southeast Asia has been

portrayed and referred as the ‘Golden Island’ or ‘Golden Peninsula’

or ‘Yavadipa’ or ‘Suvarnadipa’ in the Indian literature from the early

centuries A.D. Apart from Ramayana, the Buddhist Jataka fables

also mention about Southeast Asia. The initial contact with the

knowledge of Indian cultural tradition came through the Southeast

Asian sailors.

India and ASEAN countries Cultural Relationship

India had contacts with most of the South-East Asian

countries from the earliest period of history. The geographical

names of the territories of South-East Asia exhibit Indian influence

on them. Sanskrit and Pali had been the language of culture and

administration in some of these countries. Many localities of the

region bear distinct Indian names. As for example, the very word

Indonesia means the Indian islands. Java has been identified by

some scholars as Java Dvipa-the island shaped like basely Corn,

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mentioned in the Ramayana. Suvarna Dvipa has been identified

with Sumatra. According to Poerbatjoroko a well-known Javanese

scholar, between seventy and eighty per cent of the words of

Javanese language are either pure Sanskrit or of Sanskritic origin.1

Bahasa Indonesia has got 12% of the Sanskrit vocabulary, the very

word Bahasa has its Sanskritic origin from Bhasa.2 Similar

examples of distinct Indian influence in the customs, languages,

dances, religious beliefs and patterns of behaviour, may be had in

most of the South-East Asian Countries.

M.C. Chagla, a Former Indian Minister in his inaugural

address at a Seminar on India and South-East Asia in 1966, had

aptly remarked:

“They (the delegates from South-East Asian Countries) must look upon

India as second home because there is lot indeed which unites India with the

South-East Asian countries and for want of expression I would rather call it a

bond-the bond of Sanskritic culture”.3

Buddhism

Buddhism is India's greatest gift to East Asia, and indeed to

the world. Blending with local traditions, it is the dominant religion

in Thailand, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Tibet,

Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim. It survives in one form or another in

China, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore, and it is one

of the officially recognized religions in predominantly Muslim

Indonesia. Siddhartha Gautama (the Buddha or “Enlightened one”)

was born to wealthy Nepalese family and he gained enlightenment

in “Bodh Gaya” in India. He preached widely in what are now Uttar

Pradesh, Bihar, and Southern Nepal. He probably spoke Prakrit, a

colloquial dialect of Sanskrit. In the third century BC, his teaching

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gained favour with Ashoka, the great Maurya emperor and

Budhism spread far and wide.

Buddhism also spread from India by sea. Seafaring traders

and missionaries from India carried Hindu-Buddhist ideas to the

elites of Southeast Asia. Two concepts in particular found ready

acceptance in the region: universal Kingship and the fusion of

Kingship and notions of divinity.4 Mandalas (circles of kings)

corresponded to the overlapping Kingdoms and diffused political

power characteristic of early Southeast Asia.5 Mandalas found

expression in sophisticated world maps depicting the entire cosmos

and the terrestrial world through the prism of Buddhist thought.

By 500 A.D., Sankskrit had become the hall mark of

civilization in much of Southeast Asia and was frequently the

official language of the court. It showed up in the names of both

cities and rulers. The names of more than 30 Cambodian kings end

with the suffix varman, “bastion”. The great maritime Kingdom in

Southern Sumatra, Srivijaya, was named after a king named

Vijaya, “Victorious”. Another Indian legacy visible today is the

Sanskrit element in many Southeast Asian languages, together

with the Indian origin of the alphabets in which those languages

are written.

The greatest of Indonesian nationalist leaders, President

Sukarno, wrote in a special article in The Hindu on January 4,

1946, “In the veins of every one of my people flow the blood of

Indian ancestors and the culture that we possess is steeped

through and through with Indian influences. Two thousand years

ago, people from your country came to Jawadvipa and

Suvarnadvipa in the spirit of brotherly love. They gave the

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initiatives to found powerful Kingdoms such as those of Sri Vijaya,

Mataram and Majapahit. We then learnt to worship the very God

that you now worship still and we fashioned a culture that even

today is largely identical with your own. Later we turned to Islam;

but that religion too was brought by people coming from both sides

of the Indus.”6

Ramayana and Mahabharta

The two epics of India-Ramayana and Mahabharata-occupied

special position in traditional literatures of many countries of

Southeast Asia region. Ramanayana is not only the epic of India; it

is also the national epic of Indonesia. It had been a perennial

source of inspiration in the past and continues to exercise its

charm and fascination even today. The simple story of Rama and

Sita has been told and retold a million times in innumerable ways

in different parts of the archipelago. The Ministry of Information

and Culture organized the First International Ramayana Festival in

Jakarta in August-September 1971. Scholars and artists from

India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Burma, Nepal, Malaysia, Singapore,

the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia participated in this

unique Seminar, whose objective was “to promote deeper cultural

understanding among nations.” Four years later, in 1975, New

Delhi picked up the threads and on the occasion of the 400th

anniversary of Tulsidas's Ramcharitmanas, the Sahitya Akademi

convened an international seminar on “Asian variations of

Ramayana.” The tradition of Ramayana theatre in India and the

theatre of South-East Asian are very closely related. The

Ramanayana is performed in many forms.

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In Thailand Rama's story has been painted, engraved or

performed with great popularity and enthusiasm. The people are so

respectful and fond of this story that although Buddhism is their

national religion, their king call himself Rama and from ancient

times Ramayana is performed as the royal dance drama. The

Ramayana story is painted or engraved in some of their famous

Buddhist temples. In Malaysia, the Ramayana performance

tradition has been mainly oral. Malaysian Ramayana is called

Hikayat Seri Ramo (Story of Rama). The oral tradition of Ramayana

is so strong that it has been mixed up with indigenous myths and

legends. In Laos also, Rama's story is very popular. It can be seen

in different forms-dance, music, visual arts and the Ramayana

dance drama. The Kampuchean Ramayana is called Ramker or

Ramkriti and is available in both prose and poetry. Burma or

Myanmar is a Buddhist country but the Ramayana tradition is

quite popular here too.7

The Southeast Asian leaders themselves acknowledged their

cultural indebtedness to India. Prince Sihanouk on the occasion of

inauguration of Jawaharlal Nehru Boulevard in Phnom Penh on

May 10, 1955, said:

When we refer to two thousand year old ties which united us

with India, it is not at all a hyperbole. In fact, it was about two

thousand years ago that the first navigaters, Indian merchants and

Brahims brought to our ancestors their gods, their techniques,

their organization. Briefly, India was for us what Greece was to the

Latin Occident.8

Prior to independence of India few nationalist leaders had

opportunity to acquaint themselves about the problems of the

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South East Asian countries. The Brussels Congress of the

oppressed nationalities in 1927 provided an occasion for the

meeting of the leaders fighting against colonialism. Indian leaders

came in contact with South East Asian freedom fighters and

discussed about the Dutch and French colonial exploitations.

Nehru, the then Secretary General of Indian National Congress had

an opportunity to meet the Indonesian and the Indo-Chinese

delegates. Nehru evinced keen interest especially in the Indonesian

representatives in understanding the Indonesian people, their

names, their religion and their culture.9

India's independence was one of the greatest landmarks of

contemporary world history. Its real significance did not lie only in

the fact that one of the largest countries in the world won its

legitimate right to shape its own destiny but also that this event

brought about unique and far-reaching changes in the world-

power-structure. It started a chain reaction for the break-up of the

colonial system and paved the way for the emergence of a

purposeful and mediating role of independent Afro-Asian nations.

This role eventually contributed to super-power oriented world-

power-structure. India's emergence as an independent nation came

about at a time when the world was becoming ominously divided

between two Cold War blocs headed respectively by the United

States and the Soviet Union. India's nationalist leaders, particularly

J.L. Nehru viewed the bipolar world as a threat to global peace and

stability.

The main objective of Indian Foreign Policy were listed by

India's first Prime minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru as:

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...the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any power

or groups of powers, but through an independent approach to each

controversial and disputed issue; the liberation of subject peoples;

the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual; the

elimination of racial discrimination; and the elimination of want,

disease and ignorance which affect the greater part of the world's

population.10

Indian Foreign Policy objective strongly emphasised on anti-

colonialism, anti-racialism and international peace, not only for

normative reasons but for the practical necessity of promoting the

nation's economic development

Southeast Asia has always been integral part of the Indian

consciousness is borne out by the fact that the countries of

Southeast Asia so comprehensively embraced Buddhism in all its

aspects. This cultural and spiritual affinity became inseparable in

part of their ethos and way of life. Successive Indian Kings and

kingdoms from the first century AD and even before the beginning

of fifteenth century, had regarded Southeast Asia and the lands

lying beyond as vital for their own strength, security and sustained

development. This intricate and abiding web of relationships in

turn contributed significantly to India's sense of security in an

extended neighourhood in which India is neither seen as an alien

power nor as a country with colonial past. The relationship

spanning nearly 2500 years founded and nurtured on mutual

interest and security in which both partners costantly enriched and

reinforced each other. With the advent of the British in India the

struggle for influence between European powers that ensured all

over Southeast Asia, suspended the continuous interaction that

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existed between India and the region. Southeast Asia itself was

carved up into areas of influence by the major colonial powers, viz,

the British, French, Dutch and Portuguese. India's cultural and

commercial interaction with this region was therefore subordinated

to the political and strategic considerations of the great powers.

This left the ‘Indianized’ states of ‘Farther India’ free to nurture,

develop and evolve a distinct cultural personality of their own,

albeit heavily influenced by their long association with India and

China.11

The geographical location of India is such that she becomes

pivotal to the regions of South and South-East Asia. If one has to

consider any question affecting any of these regions Mr. Nehru

said, India “inevitably” comes into the pictures, and whatever

regions you may have in mind, the importance of India cannot be

ignored.”12 Because of this Central position, India is the “meeting

ground” between the various trends and forces, and between the

East and the West. For these reasons, said Mr. Nehru, India has to

play “a very important role in Asia, whether she likes it or not.”

After the Second World War, Burma was a British province,

virtually an exclusive Indian market and India was heavily

dependent on Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and

Indochina, for oil, tin, rubber, rice and timber. However there have

been curious fluctuations in Indian Trade figures with South-East

Asia. In 1950-51 India imported 50 percent of its rice, 17 percent

of its petroleum, 8 percent of its metals and 4 percent of its timber

from Southeast Asia. In 1951-52, it dropped down to 7 percent. It

is argued that the decline was due to India's seeking and forging

closer economic ties with the Western capitalist countries. It is

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interesting to speculate as to what extent were these fluctuations

due to indifference or lack of interest on the part of the Government

of India and to what extent they resulted from political turmoil,

instability in the South East Asian states or the directives of

powerful colonial interests acting in the region. It should not be

overlooked that until 1957 only Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia,

Thailand and Cambodia were independent. The two Vietnams were

nominally so and the civil war severely disrupted their economies.

Even Burma, Philippines and Indonesia were disturbed by sporadic

or chronic insurgencies.

Strategic and economic considerations apart Indian Interest

in South East Asian also drives from the presence of a large

number of Indian immigrants scattered in different states. It is

estimated that Indians in South East Asia number over 2 millions.

Although colonies of Indian traders had been founded in South

East Asian countries thousands of years ago; the Indian

immigration became large scale only when the European powers

established and extended their control in the region towards the

end of the 19th century. Indentured Indian labour was transported

to Burma and Malaya to work on sugar, tea, coffee and rubber

plantations or in mines, docks and railways. The labour force was

followed gradually by traders and professionals. With the passage

of time the Indians came to occupy an important place in the

economic life of the country of their adoption.13

Much of the interaction between Indian and maritime

Southeast Asian economies were driven by interest in the trade of

the South China Sea and Eastern Seas of Indonesia. Thus, the

Southeast Asian trade was entirely dependent upon the Indian

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Ocean and South China Sea. In the first three centuries of the

Christian era, the trading relations with India was established by

the distribution of Roman-Indian Rouletted pottery at a few coasts

including North coasts of Java, Bali and the coast of central

Vietnam. The Southeast Asian trade is well documented after

seventh century onwards. The seventh and eighth centuries AD

witnessed expansion in volume of Asian Sea trade involving

maritime Southeast, due to Chinese interest and parallel rise in the

demand from the prosperous centres on the East Coast of India.

In India's relations with South-East Asian countries, India

has several plus points. Historically Burma, Thailand, Malaysia,

Indonesia, Laos and Cambodia have been deeply influenced by

Indian political ideas, religion, art and language. The spread of

Indian cultural influences, leading to the cultural enrichment of

Southeast Asian countries, constitute a glorious chapter in

Southeast Asian and Indian history alike. Indianised Kingdoms like

Funan, Sri Kshetra, Pagan, Khemer, Sri Vijaya, Sailentra and

Majapahit, the familiar Indo-Sanskritic vocaboluary in Thai

language and Bahasa Indonesia; architectural monuments like

Angkar, Pagan, Borobudur and Lara Djon ggrong; literary

masterpieces like Ramakein, Amaramala, Arjuna Vivaha and

Bharata Yudha, the Wajang Kulit are based on the Ramayana and

Mahabharata traditions; the living Indian traditions in the island of

Bali-all these are testimony to the courage and zeal of Indian

princes, priests, poets, merchants and artisans.

India, since her Independence, may even during the period of

struggle for Independence, has visualized an ‘Asian Union based on

‘Asianism’ comprising the countries of Asia. This idea was equally

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shared by countries, like Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon, to name

but a few, of the region. It was in this background that India

convenened the first Asian Relations Conference in 1947. But the

Indian experience of the Conference diplomacy of general type was

not very encouraging.

Jawahar Lal Nehru believed that the Middle East and

Southeast Asia, both were geopolitically connected with India. As

early as March 8, 1949, Nehru said, this in the Constitutional

Assembly, “Look at the map. If you have to consider any question concerning

Southeast Asia, you cannot do so without India. While the Middle East may not

be directly connected with Southeast Asia, both are connected with India.”14

Asian Relations Conference

The Asian Relations Conference was held at New Delhi from

March 23 to April 2, 1947, under the aegis of the Indian Council of

World Affairs (ICWA). Then a New Delhi based non-government

organisation engaged itself in projecting India's viewpoint on

regional and global issues.15

Nehru had said while delivering a speech at Bombay August

22, 1946: “We have no doubt that, if we do meet, the Conference

will not put an end to the world's troubles. The Conference will help

to promote good relations with neighbouring countries. It will help

to pool ideas and experience with a view to raising living standards.

It will strengthen cultural, social and economic ties among the

peoples of Asia. The data papers presented at the Conference will

constitute valuable documents and the discussions on them will,

we hope, throw out suggestions for practical policy".16 Thus there

were broadly two objectives the holding the Conference: To promote

cooperation among the people of Asia: and secondly to understand

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Asia's problems, social, economic and political. The inaugural

address by Jawahar Lal Nehru had set in motion the tone and

tenor of the Asian Relations Conference. Nehru's speech were

around four main elements which interalia included: emphasis on

the need for Asian unity; the proclamation of Asia's arrival on the

international scene; the necessity of avoiding the articulation of

anti-western sentiments and the need for increased regional

cooperation.17 Explaining the rationale behind India hosting the

Conference, Nehru stated that the idea of convening such a

Conference had been mooted concomitantly by many countries of

Asia. It was the result of a widespread urge and an awareness that

“the time had come for us, people of Asia, to meet together, hold

together and advance together.” Nehru was aware that the idea of

holding the Conference was not a vague desire but a compulsion of

events which prompted all to think alike. Nehru asserted that there

were common problems between Asia and the Pacific, particularly

in the Southeast Asian region. He laid emphasis on the need to

work together to find a solution to these problems.

Nehru’s emphasis on “Universal Freedom” could be seen as

an ideological basis for future cooperation in Asia.

For S.W.R.D Bandaranaike at Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) who

had sent a message to the Conference, the Asian Relations

Conference was only the beginning of something much greater-a

federation of free and equal Asian countries.18 Shutan Sharia,

Prime Minister of Indonesia, expressed the hope that the

Conference would exercise great influence in bringing together the

people of the Asian countries.19

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The Chinese delegate on April 2, 1947 carved out the idea for

establishment of a permanent organization Asian Relations

Organization (ARO).

Bandung Conference 1955

Bandung Conference of 24 Asian-African countries, held at

Bandung in Indonesia from April 18 to 24, 1955, was an important

landmark in India's policy towards South-East Asia. The emergence

of free Asia in world affairs was a development of tremendous

significance which had changed the entire pattern of world politics.

The Indian Prime Minister and the other Asian leaders constantly

reminded the Western Powers to keep this reality in their mind

before deciding the matters relating to the continents of Asia and

Africa. Nehru played a unique role in consolidation and

development of the concept of Asian unity.

India played a dominating role in Bandung Conference.

Besides other things, the five principles of peaceful co-existance

were included in the final communique of the Conference. China

was successfully introduced as a peaceful, friendly and respected

member of the Asian-African Community after great efforts on

India’s part. The Indian Prime Minister and his delegation tried

their best to remove misunderstanding regarding Chinese

intentions. A number of meetings were arranged between Chinese

Premier Chou En-Lai and the South-East Asian leaders. It was the

result of Indian efforts that Cambodia and Laos proclaimed their

adherence to Non-Alignment and China gave assurance to them to

adopt the principles of peaceful co-existence as the basis of mutual

relations with her neighbours. Indonesian government signed an

agreement with the Chinese Government on the question of

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citizenship of Chinese people living in Indonesia in April 25, 1955.

Thus, it appeared at that moment that India was able to commit

China to the principles of peaceful co-existence and thereby had

succeeded in providing an alternative non-military strategy to

ensure peace and security in South-East Asia by applying a self-

imposed moral check on her aggressive intentions. From Indian

point of view, Bandung Conference was a great diplomatic success

and an event of historic importance.

The objective of Bandung Conference were promoting good

will and cooperation among Asian and African countries. However,

according to Wivilian J. Barnds, other important, if unspoken,

purposes were: “getting to know other nations and leaders, giving

Asia a more active role in world Affairs, and taking advantage of

China's professed peaceful intention to bind Beijing to a peaceful

policy”.20 Although the Soviet Union was not invited to the

Bandung Conference, Moscow was in favour of it, anticipating that

it would take an anti-Western tone. While Washington did not

oppose it, it was unenthusiastic about it, “fearing it would follow

the course hoped for by Moscow.”

China's participation at the Bandung Conference provided its

premier Chou En-Lai a golden opportunity to make friends with

Pakistan. In his two meetings with the Pakistani Prime Minister,

Mohammad Ali during the Conference, the Chinese Premier held

out an assurance that Beijing understood the fear and aspirations

of Pakistan and that Pakistan's membership of the defence pacts

was not directed against China. While inviting China to the

Bandung Conference, Nehru might have been nursing the hope

that Premier Chou would endorse his stand on regional and global

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issues just out of sheer gratitude, thereby helping in the elevation

of Nehru's status as the undisputed leader of Asia. But it proved

otherwise, Chou En-Lai not only hogged the limelight but also

signaled that, China was a serious contender for the leadership of

Asia.

Nehru faced further setbacks when some countries even

spoke in favour of military pacts for collective security, thereby

undermining the Indian Prime Minister's advocacy of a policy of

non-alignment.21 The Bandung Conference was also significant in

the sense that the South-East Asia once again stood between the

two traditional contestants, China and India for the first time in the

twentieth century after a long gap of time. Both the Asian gaints

had age-old relations with the people of the region. The Indian

intercourse with the region in the past was mainly economic and

cultural, devoid of any political domination or ambition, whereas,

Chinese expansion had clear imperialistic overtones. Whatever may

be the past record of the two countries, the countries of the region

were provided with an alternative choice to look for guidance and

assistance for the solution of their problems and need. In order to

win the friendship of South-East Asian countries and to isolate

India, China embarked upon vigorous competition in the

subsequent years. Despite India's keen interest in peace, stability

and security of South-East Asia, India was not in a position to

render the kind of economic assistance which most of the South-

East Asian countries were in need of. Whatever assistance or help

she could extend was essentially a matter of gesture rather than

substantial contribution to the development of their national

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economies. Besides, weak economic condition, adherence to the

policy of non-alignment was another serious limitation.

On India's part which perhaps restricted her activities in the

region, Bandung Conference was a great event for Indonesia.

Indonesian leaders were proud of the fact that their country was

potentially the most powerful country of South-East Asia and had a

glorious historical background. Bandung Conference brought

Indonesia into the limelight as she was the host country and her

Prime Minister was chosen to be the Chairman of the Conference. It

had boosted the ego of the Indonesian leaders and for them it was

the first step on the road to leadership of Asian-African world.

Bandung Conference of 1955 may also be considered a

watershed in India's relations with South-East Asia as a whole.

From then, it is generally regarded that a sort of stagnation

developed in her relations with countries of the region and her

global involvement became more evident in her foreign policy. It

was also believed that Government of India tended to take the

friendship and goodwill of the South-East Asians for granted and

did not take any concrete steps to keep it alive and progressing. It

is also felt that India did not bother to do anything to arrest the

trends which were going against the interests of the country in

some of the South-East Asian countries during the period. It is

even felt that the acceptance of the Chairmanship of the

International Control Committee (ICC) on Indo-China was

motivated, primarily, by her desire to perform an international

responsibility.22

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South-East Asian Countries and military Pact SEATO

A military pact for collective security better known as Manila

Treaty was signed to create South-East Asia Treaty (SEATO) in

August 1954. Coming in the wake of the Geneva settlement it

seemed doubly sinister. Just when the contemplated ‘peace area’

seemed possible, an anti-Communist collective defence system was

being erected. The inclusion of the territories of Vietnam, Laos and

Cambodia as protocol states in the treaty was apprehensive about

the effects of the treaty in which western powers played a major

role thereby ensuring their domination over Asian countries in a

new form. These reservations led India to denounce SEATO

vehemently. The US for its part, showed scant respect towards the

newly formed International Control Commission designed to

supervise a truce. In short, neither country endorsed the respective

mechanisms to safeguard peace in Indochina.

The new developments in International politics, and

particularly, the changing pattern of power-relations between

China and Russia, between America and Russia, between India and

Pakistan, between India and China, the escalation of the Vietnam

War and the rivalries among the countries of South and South East

Asia, had, on the other hand, affected the regional politics of South

and South East Asia, and, on the other hand, opened up new

prospects for initiatives in the field of developing closer cooperation

with the countries of the regions. A few countries of South East

Asia with their matured diplomatic experiences, the impact of the

new power configuration and due to their domestic compulsions

began to give serious thoughts on giving the old concept of regional

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cooperation a concrete organisational shape for dealing with their

common social, cultural and economic problems.

India and regional co-operation in South East Asian Countries

The revival of Interest in regionalism was noted in the debates

of Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) when

in 1960 it passed a resolution favouring regional economic

cooperation for trade and industries to which India was a party.

India welcomed the formation of the Association of South

East, (ASA), 1961. This was the first regional organisation

established by the states of the region on their own initiative. India,

though not its member, yet found in it, the possibility of a wider

regional organisation for mutual co-operation in social, cultural,

and economic fields. But because of the growing differences

between the Philippines and Malaysia and between Indonesia and

Malaya (now Malaysia) on the issue of the formation of the

Federation of Malaysia, chances of the development of any cohesive

regional organisation were becoming remote. As India was

supporting the proposed Federation of Malaysia and her own

relations with Indonesia and the Philippines were far from friendly

India was not in a position to retrieve the situation and help in the

development of the ASA. India became a founder-member of the

Asian Development Bank, 1966, and considered it as “an

encouraging augury for the growth of economic cooperation

amongst the countries of this region.”23

India welcomed these developments as further steps leading

towards a broad based regional organisation. She herself began to

accord a higher priority to the region of South East Asia in her

foreign and economic planning perspectives. This was, noticeable

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(1) in convening a Conference of her Ambassadors, High

Commissioners, Consuls of sea region to discuss India's future

relationship with the countries of South East Asia and the fresh

diplomatic steps necessary for achieving greater economic, social

and cultural spheres, (2) in resorting to personal diplomacy;24 (3) by

giving economic content to the policy of non-alignment and

friendship.25 She tried to diversify her trade and economic

relations. (4) and by building up her own military image and by

playing the role of a dominant partner in the sub-system of the

balance of Power more effectively. This emphasis on regional

cooperation for trade and industries was voiced by Mrs. Indira

Gandhi while inaugurating the 22nd session of the ECAFE on

March 22, 1966, at New Delhi when she said that “We value

regional co-operation not because Asia or the ECAFE is in

opposition to any other part of the world, but because we have

common tasks and common dreams.”26

Indo-Pak War and Reaction of ASEAN Countries

During the Indo-Pak war in 1965, India received passive

support from Singapore and Laos, Malaysia was at first neutral but

ultimately she lent strong support to India and, as a consequence,

Pakistan severed diplomatic relations with Malaysia. The leaders of

most of the South-East Asian countries were non-committal on the

Kashmir question. Of course, Prince Souvana Phouma of Laos was

reported to have expressed his willingness to support India on the

Kashmir question, as related by Hem Barua, one of the six

members of the Indian delegation visiting Malaysia, Singapore,

Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, after the Indo-Pak war.27 The Indo-

Pak war had it worst effect on Indo-Indonesian relations. In

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September, thousands of Indonesians demonstrated outside the

Indian and the US embassies. Later the protest rally turned really

violent. On that occasion Soekarno was reported to have said that

he appreciated the actions of the Jakarta youths in their

condemnation of India as an aggressor against Kashmir and

Pakistan.”28 In a resolution, the Provisional People's Congress of

Indonesia urged President Soekarno to aid Pakistan against India.

The Mahadatual Ulema Party, an Islamic Party of Indonesia,

announced that it was organizing volunteers to fight India in

Kashmir.29 It seemed that Soekarno also tried to create

international public opinion against India. He was reported to have

said:

It is the obligation of all nations belonging to the new

emerging forces to give help to Pakistan to face India's aggression.30

The Government of North Vietnam took an unambiguous stand in

favour of Pakistan. It blamed the US for the scheming of the war

between India and Pakistan.

China also gave an ultimatum to India, threatening to open a

second front in Ladakh and Sikkim against India. The Malaysian

Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman strongly condemned the Chinese

ultimatum to India and declared in Kuala Lumpur on September

20, 1965 that any intrusion by China into Indian territory would be

considered an aggression by his country. He said that “we will not

hesitate to condemn as much as we did in 1962”. Singapore's

sympathies also lay with India as Premier Lee Kuan Yew said on

September 9, 1965 that his country had sympathy “with India in

the Indo-Pak war because India is a friend of Singapore.” Among

other South-East Asian countries the Philippines and Thailand

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tried to remain neutral on Indo-Pak war. Their attitude was also

evident in the common attitude of the SEATO, which assured that

it would not involve itself in the India Pakistan war.

During his visit to Malaysia and Singapore in May 1967,

Indian Foreign Minister Chagla had, indeed said, “We will be very

happy to have bilateral arrangements with Singapore, with regard

to trade, commerce, and economic co-operation. But if Singapore

chooses to join any regional cooperation, we will be happy to join

such a grouping, if other members want India to do so. If others

want to have a small grouping, India will be very happy to remain

outside and help such a grouping-India does not want to dominate

any regional grouping.31

During the period of 1966-68 India signed direct bilateral

agreement for technical and economic co-operation with Southeast

Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand)

rather than through the ASEAN.

During her visit to Malaysia, Indira Gandhi, the then Prime

Minister of India, firmly reiterated India's support to regional co-

operation in Asia. She also suggested that regional cooperation in

Southeast Asia would be made viable only on broader regional

basis. The main purpose of Indira Gandhi's visit was to discuss the

increased economic and technical co-operation among the

countries of Southeast Asia. India tried for membership of the

ASEAN, but the proposition remained totally unacceptable as the

ASEAN Declaration did not provide for any country from outside

Southeast Asia region to be eligible for membership. It is also

believed that at that time the ASEAN countries had a fear of being

107

dominated by a big country like India if they made India a member

of that organization.

During Indira Gandhi's tenure the Americans were forced to

withdraw their troops from Indo-China region. Southeast Asian

region witnessed the miserable failure of the American Policy of

containment of communism. These international events affected

India's Foreign Policy and attitude towards Southeast Asia as well

Indira Gandhi attached due importance of developing relations with

the countries of Southeast Asia.

In May, 1968 Mrs. Indira Gandhi obliquely referred to the

possibility of India and other nations of the region joining the

ASEAN at a suitable date when she said that “We seek to promote

mutual understanding leading to agreement. We seek cooperation

and the establishment of positive, creative and mutually profitable

bilateral relations. And we hope that these will expand in measure

that we gain mutual trust into wider regional cooperation.”32In

pursuance of this India had established trade33 relations with the

member-states, forged new bonds of social and cultural contacts

and entered into mutually profitable joint venture agreements in

the field of certain industries.34

Speaking in Lok Sabha on February 1969 Dinesh Singh,

Minister for External Affairs declared:, “India is fully aware of her

role and position in South-East Asia.35 However Indian contribution

to the debate on the important political and strategic subjects in

the region has been negligible. Declaration of Indian Ocean as a

zone of peace, freedom of navigation in the Malacca Straits,

neutralization of South East Asia and the formation of ASEAN were

developments of significance. But Indians remained on the

108

periphery. They were passive spectators rather than interested

participants. At Lusaka Non-Aligned Nations Conference in 1970,

India together with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Laos,

besides others, agreed to exert special efforts for the adoption by

the UN of the declaration of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. India

also co-sponsored the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 2832

XXVII, designating the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace for all time.

From South East Asia, Indonesia, Khmer Republic, Laos and

Malaysia supported this Resolution.

ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Kuala Lumpur on November 19,

1971 arranged a Conference after deliberations where a declaration

was signed seeking neutralizations of South East Asia. The

declaration expressed the determination of ASEAN countries to

exert initially the necessary effort to secure recognition of, and

respect for South East Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and

neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference from

outside powers.36

Speaking on the concept of neutralization in Southeast Asia,

Swaran Singh the then foreign minister of India stated on May 4,

1972: “The Government of India holds the view that the South East

Asian region should be free from great power influence.”37 President

V.V. Giri during his visit to Malaysia also reiterated on March 5,

1973 Indian support for the Kuala Lumpur Declaration.38

Indo-Soviet Treaty and Reaction of ASEAN Countries

Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation was

signed at New Delhi on August, 9, 1971. It was the direct result of

the extra-ordinary circumstances prevailing at that time in the

Indian sub-continent having serious implications for India's

109

security. Considered from this point of view the conclusion of Indo-

Soviet Treaty was a remarkable achievement of Indian foreign

policy. But the dramatic conclusion of the treaty aroused

tremendous reaction at home and abroad including South-East

Asia. While the Indian public opinion was overwhelmingly in favour

of it, the press reactions outside India raised a number of questions

about its nature and implications for Indian foreign policy, for

example, whether India abandoned the policy of non-alignment and

whether it was a defence pact or a mutual defence Treaty, so on

and so forth. The source of all debate and criticisms rested on three

articles of the treaty dealing with military aspects of the co-

operation between two countries i.e. Articles VIII, IX and X. Article

IX was the central point in the entire controversy.39

The South-East Asian countries, majority of which are non-

communist and pro-west in their international outlook, viewed the

Indo-Soviet treaty with a sense of surprise.

In addition to these assessments the Indo-Soviet treaty was

widely commented upon by some of the regional newspapers in

South-East Asian countries.

The Straits Times (Singapore) observed that India's first treaty

involving any commitment to mutual defence was a reversal of

India's fundamental opposition to any military agreement, plainly

changed the conceptions of India's diplomatic strategy which had

been unquestioned since independence. The treaty marked India's

passage from neutrality to the sphere of Soviet influence.40

Tamil Nesan (Malaysia) observed “When the policy of non-

alignment is gaining strength in several countries including

Malaysia, it is rather shocking that India, which is one of the

110

countries responsible for that policy should now choose to

disregard it.... It is indeed unfortunate that India has now

entangled herself in the Cold War of the big powers.”41

The Djakarta Times, an English Newspaper of Indonesia

considered the treaty in its editorial on August 11, 1971, “Worthy

of special attention” because it was likely to affect the future of

Indo-Pak sub-continent and possibly the whole Asia. It held that

the Treaty had “widened and depeened the gap that separates India

and Pakistan and divided the sub-continent into distinct parts, one

going under Moscow's influence and the other Peking.”42 The Thai

daily, The Nation, too expressed similar views and cautioned India

and Pakistan to avoid blunders otherwise Bangladesh might be

converted into a Vietnam as a result of the Treaty. It observed that

military solution of Bangladesh was not possible just as was the

case of Vietnam in South-East Asia.43

On the basis of print media observations, it can be concluded

that there was deep-rooted apprehension among the South-East

Asian Countries about the possibility of increased Soviet

involvement in Asian affairs as a result of the treaty. They also

thought that it would enhance the super power rivalry in the Indian

Ocean and South-East Asia. The South-East Asian Countries like

the Western countries felt that India had forsaken the path of non-

alignment and had become a Soviet client.

South-East Asia and difference on Bangladesh Issue

The trouble in East Pakistan was the off-shoot of the deep

seated dissatisfaction in the hearts of Bengalis against the west

Punjab dominated Pakistan Government for its discriminatory

policies in social, economic and political fields. The immediate

111

reason of discontent was denial of political power which they

should have got according to the results of the first ever general

elections held in December 1970. In the elections the Awami

League secured sweeping victory against the People's Party of

Pakistan. But Because of Bhutto's (leader of PPP) unco-operative

attitude, President Yahya Khan, postponed the session of National

Assembly due to meet on March 3, 1971. In protest, Sheikh

Mujibur Rehman, the Awami League leader launched a civil

disobedience movement. General Tikka Khan was appointed

Governor of East Pakistan to control the situation which

deteriorated very fast and Bangladesh was proclaimed by Sheikh

Mujibur Rahman as an independent state on March 26, 1971. On

the same day Awami League was banned by the Pakistan

Government.

The outbreak of civil war in Pakistan created gigantic social

and economic problems for India. Approximately, 9, 899, 305

refugees had taken shelter in India between March 26 to December

16, 1971.44 maintenance of refugees was a great financial burden

on India. Pakistan wanted to drive out Hindus from East Pakistan

who were mostly the supporters of the Awami League.

India left no stone unturned to find a political solution to the

problem through peaceful means, though there was tremendous

domestic pressure in favour of taking military measures. Despite

this, Pakistan declared war against India on December 3, 1971.

India recognized Bangladesh on December 6 and launched military

action to help Mukti Bahini (Bangla Army) on December 16, 1971,

the Pakistani army surrendered to the Indian army and Bangladesh

was formally established.

112

Some ASEAN states however, preferred to wait for a cue from

major powers before making their move clear on recognizing

Bangladesh as an independent state. The Singapore Prime

Minister, Mr. Lee's statement in this respect was typical. He said:

“At the moment, besides India no other leading power has

accorded recognition to Bangladesh. I think, we ought, therefore, to

let countries, with much more sophisticated foreign offices, to work

the sums out; then perhaps we should look into the matter.”45

The Thai Government maintained strictly non-committal

position by not making any official statement regarding Indo-Pak

conflict. But, on the refugee question the Thai Government felt that

the UN should help to bring about solution of the enormous

problem faced by India. However, in the event of Indo-Pak conflict,

it stopped supply of fuel to Pakistan for military purposes.46 Burma

also stopped fuel supply to Pakistan after March 25, 1971 because

she did not want to be involved in the internal situation of

Pakistan. Burma was the first South East Asian country to

recognize the Republic of Bangladesh on January 13, 1972.

Indonesia seemed to be inclined to play a mediatory role

between India and Pakistan. President Suhar held a meeting of his

cabinet on December 6, 1971 to discuss the Indo-Pak crisis. Next

day he stated that while he was willing to act as a mediator

between the two countries, the two warring parties should realise

the consequences of war. He reminded them that “war is not the

only way to achieve the solution.47 Malaysia's attitude towards

Bangladesh episode was more or less similar to that of Indonesia.

The Malaysian Government tried to adopt strictly neutral position

over the Indo-Pak conflict. Bangladesh episode significantly pointed

113

to one fact that India stood in better position in South-East Asia

than she was in October 1962 and September 1965.

Towards Forging Close Ties with ASEAN

India's in 1974 arranged a peaceful nuclear explosion. It was

felt in the South-East Asian Countries that Indian explosion could

have significant implications for the region. President Marcos of the

Philippines in his address to the Bali Summit of ASEAN in

February 1976, while taking note of global geo-political factors

having implications for South-East Asia, observed: “To these

quadamirates we should perhaps add India which acquired the

capability of becoming a nuclear power. This is also a situation over

which ASEAN has no control.48 He thought that as a result of

acquisition of nuclear capability by India, her interest may

converge in South-East Asia as that of USA, USSR, China and

Japan.49

At the fall of Mrs. Indira Gandhi it was hoped that the pro-

Soviet tilt in the Indian foreign policy would go and that would help

India to better her relations with ASEAN countries very fast. In Its

first major foreign policy review the Janata Government expressed

its eagerness to cultivate closer and meaningful cooperation with

the South-East Asian Countries. The External Affairs Minister, Atal

Behari Vajpayee was reported to have said, in August 1977, in a

Conference of the Indian envoys of the region that in the past,

priorities accorded to that area had not been adequate. He added

that economic exchange would constitute a major part of Indian

foreign policy formulations in respect of the region.50

In keeping with this policy statement, a Conference of the

Indian envoys accredited to East and Southeast Asia was convened

114

in New Delhi in August 1977. Opening the Conference the Prime

Minister, Mr. Desai set the tone by stating that it was unfortunate

that India had been rather negligent about cultivating strong ties

with its neighbouring region. He stressed that the assembled

envoys should try to improve India's image in the region.51 The

main thrust of this Conference were Japan, China, ASEAN and

Vietnam.

There were two sides to the forging of ties with the ASEAN

countries, according to the envoys. One concerned ASEAN's

eagerness to pursue a dialogue with India in the field of commerce

and industry and the other dealt with coordinated planning of

ASEAN to locate and plan such projects. The joint ventures were

there as starters although their record of success had been a mixed

one. In this connection the President of the Federation of Indian

Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mr. D.P. Poddary urged the

Commerce Ministry and the Chambers of commerce to study the

items which had been suggested by the ASEAN secretariat for a

system of mutual prefacer. He was confident that some of these

items could be handled by Indian firms by setting up joint ventures

in the ASEAN region.52 Apart from the economic strategy the envoys

discussed the political and diplomatic aspects of the Southeast

Asian scene in which India faced some problems. India did not

quite know how to approach the two halves of Southeast Asia

without complicating its ties with either. It was obvious that the

Indochina states were keen for India to play a major role in their

economic development and were not too perturbed by India's moves

towards the ASEAN.

115

Eventually, the ASEAN side responded with a modest gesture

by sending the ASEAN Secretary General Datuk Ali Bin Abullah on

an exploratory mission to New Delhi in November 1978. After this

preliminary contact it took more than one and half years for the

first ASEAN India Official-Level meeting to take place. The first ever

official-level meeting between the five ASEAN Director Generals and

the Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs was held in

Kuala Lumpur on May 15-16, 1980.53 The ASEAN Secretary

General reffered to the meeting as a landmark in promoting

cooperation between ASEAN and India. India outlined the possible

areas of economic cooperation with ASEAN.

The ASEAN countries were disappointed with the Janata

Government for its lack of outright condemnation of Vietnamese

action in Kampuchea. Things worsened when Indira Gandhi

returned to power in 1980 and she went a step ahead of the Janata

Government in extending recognition to the Vietnam and backed

Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea on July 7, 1980. This despite

the fact that the ASEAN countries in general, and Malaysia in

particular (first significant visitor to India after Indira Gandhi's

return to power was the then Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia,

Mahathir Mohammad in January 1980) had specifically pointed out

that India's recognition of the Kampuchean regime would “cause

great disappointment of the ASEAN five.54 At the meeting of the

Commonwealth Heads of Government of Asian and Pacific region

held in September 1980, the Premier of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew,

had also expressed much displeasure about the Indian Policy on

Kampuchea and Afghanistan. As regards Afghanistan, he said that

he did not agree with Mrs. Indira Gandhi on the reasons for the

116

Russian intervention. Lee Khan Yew obviously had India in his

mind when he said that recognition did not earn legitimacy for a

puppet regime (Heng Samrin).55 The Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers

Conference held in New Delhi in February, 1981 also made it clear

that the problems of Kampuchea and Afghanistan remained the

sore point in the relations between India and the ASEAN.

After recognising the Heng Samrin regime, India did try to

mend fences with the ASEAN countries. Though it hosted two

important Non-Aligned meets in Delhi in 1981 and 1983 it kept the

seat of Kampuchea vacant in NAM when the conflict over who

represented that country, Samrin or Pol Pot, arose. Indira Gandhi

undertook an official tour of the Philippines in October 1981. The

main feature of Indira Gandhi's then policy towards the ASEAN was

that in the face of the hurdle of Indo China the path of a vital

relationship with ASEAN as a whole, it was better to improve

bilateral relations with individual ASEAN countries. As Mrs. Indira

Gandhi declared in Manila, “We consider ASEAN an important

factor in ensuring the peace and stability of this sensitive area.

With its immediate neighbours, India's policy has been one of

seeking bilateral solutions through patient discussion.”56 In fact,

during a press conference in Manila, when she was asked about

whether India would join the ASEAN if invited, Mrs. Gandhi replied,

“well, I do not think I can give an answer to that now. But I can say

that our relationship with the individual countries of ASEAN has

improved. And we want to improve it further.57

Keeping up the trend, in March 1984, Mr. Natwar Singh (the

senior most official in the Foreign Ministry), visited Malaysia and

Singapore and stated that, notwithstanding differences over

117

Kampuchea, India was interested in improving its ties with

ASEAN.58 The Thai permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr.

Kun Asa Sarasin visited India in November 1984. The visit was

intended to lay the groundwork for enhanced mutual

understanding which could lead to a greater role for India and the

Soviet Union to promote peace in Southeast Asia.59 The Annual

Report of MEA admitted that the strain in relations had led to a

break down in high level contacts between India and ASEAN

between 1980-85.60

Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded Indira Gandhi as Prime

Minister in 1984, was very realistic in his approach. He actively

pursued a policy to strengthen seriously and enhance South-South

cooperation. Naturally, he attached importance to India's relations

with the countries in Southeast Asia. He visited Vietnam in 1985

and some other countries of Southeast Asia to forge friendly ties.

Vietnam also invited India for economic and technical cooperation

on large scale. India's policy towards this region was basically to

fulfill two objectives. First to promote the mutual economic

interests and Secondly to reduce the intensity of great-power

rivalries. This could be possible only when the countries in South

and Southeast Asia developed a common outlook strategically and

politically.

Rajiv Gandhi made his minister of state for External Affairs,

Natwar Singh shuttle between the ASEAN capitals and those of

Vietnam and Kampuchea (1985-88) to stress the common points

for successful negotiations. That Singh was heared patiently

everywhere was made possible because, while on the one hand

India had the confidence of Vietnam, on the other, its relations with

118

ASEAN had improved perceptibly, during the later years of Indira

Gandhi. It was not without importance that after a long gap,

Thailand's Foreign Minister, Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Savetsilla

visited India in March 1985. Rajiv Gandhi then visited Indonesia

and Thailand in October 1986. In fact, his trip to Thailand was the

first ever by an Indian head of the government since independence.

During Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Bangkok in October 1986, his Thai

counterpart, General Prem Tinsulanonda, urged India to use its

immense prestige and moral influence to help bring about a

political solution of the Kampuchean question in accordance with

the relevant UN resolutions.61

Following General Prem's suggestion that India could use its

diplomatic influence to resolve the Kampuchean issue, Minister of

State for External Affairs, Mr. Natwar Singh, embarked on a

‘shuttle diplomacy’ to promote a consensus between Vietnam and

the ASEAN states towards reaching a negotiated settlement of the

Kampuchean conflict. Mr. Singh visited the ASEAN states in March

1987. Prior to that he visited Vietnam in January 1987 followed by

another trip to Hanoi and Bangkok in July 1987. Following his

talks in Hanoi, Mr. Natwar Singh indicated that Vietnam, after the

Communist Party's Sixth Congress in December 1986, was showing

significant sign of flexibility. He observed that Vietnamese were

serious about withdrawal of troops from Kampuchea by 1990, but

were understandably keen to ensure that a future government in

Kampuchea would not be anti-Vietnam.62 In July 1988, India

hosted a meeting of the NAM group on Kampuchea. Cuba, India,

Indonesia, Vietnam and Zimbabwe participated in the meeting. The

group recommended that a special envoy be sent to get in touch

119

with the four Kampuchean factions to ascertain their views on

possible settlement of the conflict. India co-chaired the first

committee, which dealt with the establishment of an “International

Control Mechanism” in Paris in August 1989.

Indian Naval Activities and ASEAN

ASEAN states in general and Indonesia in particular felt ill at

ease with the flurry of Indian naval activities. The Indian navy

acquired twenty nine warships. India launched its first indigenous

submarine built with West German collaboration, in October 1989.

With its naval base at Vishakhapatnam and at Port Blair,

Andaman, India was seen by Jakarta as extending its sub-

continental policeman role further east. Responding to India's

extended profile, Thailand justified its acquisition of some Chinese

made frigates and considered buying a European-designed

helicopter carrier. It even whimsically proposed joint naval exercise

with Japan to safeguard regional security reportedly, with the

Indian threat in mind.63

In his speech after inducting the nuclear powered submarine,

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi observed:

When we look back into our history, two lessons are

apparent. One is that the defence of India requires our undisputed

mastery over the approaches to India by the sea. The second is that

while those who have conquered India through land were

eventually absorbed and assimilated into our society, those who

conquered us from the sea ruled us as alien masters and therefore

had to be rejected. If we are to keep the destiny of India in our

hands, we must have full control of the waters around us.....64

120

Thus the successive Indian governments had to repeatedly

stress the point that India was strengthening its naval power only

for self-defence and not for aggression. Even the non-Congress

government that assumed office in November 1989 under the

premiership of V.P. Singh highlighted the same rationale to the

ASEAN countries. For instance, Singh, while replying to a question

on India's Military build-up in Kuala Lumpur, said that India had

never been aggressive even out of necessity; and whenever its

forces had crossed the national borders they had always gone

back.65 It was odd that Indian leaders had to reiterate their

country's desire to live in peace with its maritime negihbouring

when there had been no precedence of any aggressive behaviour in

the past. It was a measure of policy failure on India's part that it

allowed itself to be viewed so negatively by the states in its

neighbouring region. However, after the initial dithering India

decided on a damage-control exercise. Adopting a more rational

approach and sensing the necessity to convincingly articulate its

aims in the Indian Ocean region India offered to hold Joint Naval

exercise with the ASEAN states.

Thus it may be summed up in the end that though there had

been very old historical, cultural and economic ties between India

and the countries of the South East Asia region, yet a number of

issues were there which resulted in the development of negative

perceptions on both sides. However the developments in last two

decades of the 20th century resulted in the forging of closer links

between India and ASEAN.

121

REFERENCES

1. Quoted in Hindustan Standard (Calcutta), December 30,

1962.

2. C.D. Paliwal, “India-Indonesia-a Cultural Exchange,

Indonesian Independence Day Souvenir 1975”, Indonesian

Embassy, New Delhi, See in Asis Kumar, Majumdar, South-

East Asia in Indian Foreign Policy: A study of India’s

Relations with South-East Asian Countries from 1962-82,

Naya Prokash, Calcutta, 1982, p.21.

3. Ibid.

4. Ellen I. Frost, “India's Role in East Asia: Lessons from

cultural and Historical Linkages”, RIS Discussion Paper,

January 2009, pp. 4-5.

5. ibid, p.5.

6. V. Suryanarayan, “Indian Cultural Influences in Indonesia”,

Dialogue, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2007, p. 137. See also Sukarno,

“Upsurge in Asia: Common Bonds of Freedom,” The Hindu,

January, 4, 1946.

7. Emunirathnam Reddy, “India's cultural Relations with

Southeast Asia: Retrospect and Prospect”, Monograph-XII,

Centre for Studies on Indochina and South Pacific, Sri

Venkerteshwara University, Triupati (AP), pp.3-5.

8. Induya Awasthi, "Ramayana Performances in India and

South-East Asia", Indian Horizons, Vol. 49, No. 394, 2002, pp.

109-19.

9. S.N. Mishra, India-the Cold War Years, South Asian

Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1994, p. 164.

122

10. Quoted in T.M.P. Mahadevan, “Indian Philosophy and the

Quest for Peace”, in Paul F. Power, India's Non-alignment

Policy, D.C. Heath, Boston, 1967, pp. 2-3. See also Kripa

Sridharan, The ASEAN region in India's Foreign Policy,

Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1996, p. 18.

11. A.N. Ram, “Historical Perspectives”, Seminar, 487, March

2000, P. 26.

12. India and Asia, Nehru's speech in the constituent Assembly,

September 1946, March 1949 and April 1961, India's Foreign

Policy-Publication Division, New Delhi, p.22.

13. V. Suryanaranyan, "Indo-ASEAN Matrix", Journal of India

Ocean Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3, July 1999, p.235.

14. See in Vishal Singh, “India and Southeast Asia”, International

Studies, July-December 1978, pp. 593-600., and V.

Suryanarayan, “India and Southeast Asia” India Quarterly,

July-September, 1978, pp. 263-77.

15. This conference was attended by delegates from Afghanistan,

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Burma(Myanmar), China, Laos,

Egypt, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kampuchea,

Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Korea (then undivided),

Malaya(Malaysia), Mongolia, Nepal, the Palestine Jewish

delegation, the Philippines, Siam (Thailand), Ceylon(Sri

Lanka), Tajikistan, Tibet, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,

and Vietnam. An Invitation to attend the Conference was

extended to Japan but it was not permitted to do so by the

occupation authorities there. Observers from Australia and

New Zealand also participated. Jawaharlal Nehru was the

moving spirit behind this Conference.

123

16. Quoted in Eric Gonsalves (ed.), Asian Relations, Lancer

Publishers, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 37-38. See also Prakash

Nanda, Rediscovering Asia-Evolution of India’s Look-East

policy, Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 2003, pp. 107-108.

17. Sisir Gupta, India, and Regional Integration in Asia, Asia

Publishing House, Bombay, 1964, p. 34.

18. Eric Gonsalus, op. cit., p. 41.

19. Ibid, p. 44-57.

20. William J Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers,

Praeger Publisher, New York, 1972, p. 138.

21. These countries were: Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Thailand,

Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Philippines.

22. Vishal Singh, “India and South-East Asia”, in Bimal Prasad

(ed.), India's Foreign Policy: Studies in Continuity and Change,

Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, p. 218.

23. Selected speeches of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, 1966-69, p.338.

24. In 1968-69, Mrs. Indira Gandhi went on a tour of South East

Asian Countries; a few countries were visited by President

V.V.Giri.

25. Kuldeep Nayar, India after Nehru, Vikas Publishing House,

New Delhi, 1975, p. 130.

26. Selected speeches of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Jan 1966-August

1969 ‘Common Tasks’, p. 322.

27. The Times of India, December, 1965.

28. Quoted in The Hindustan Times, September 10, 1965.

29. Ibid, September 12, 1965.

30. Quoted in L.P. Singh, “Dynamics of India-Indonesia

Relations”, Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 9, pp. 655-66.

124

31. Quoted in K.P. Saxena, Cooperation in Development: Problems

and Prospects for India and ASEAN, Sage Publications, New

Delhi, 1986, p. 53.

32. Selected Speeches of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, January 1966 to

August 1969, p. 455.

33. India's trade with South East Asians Countries started

increasing at the rate of 25% per year.

34. At that time India had 26 Joint Ventures in Malaysia, 6 in

Thailand, 2 in Indonesia. Birla was to start a coconut oil mill

in the Philippines where already a Textile mill was functioning

in Joint Collaboration.

35. Lok Sabha Debates, Series 4, Vol. 24, February 26, 1969, Col.

48. The statement was made when the government's attention

was drawn to a speech by Tan Sri Ghazail Bin Shafie,

Permanent Secretary, Minister of External Affairs, Malaysia

on December 10, 1968 about India's role in South East Asia.

36. See the text of the “ASEAN Declaration on the Neutralisation

of the South East Asia”, November 1971, in Foreign Affairs

(Malaysia) Vol. 4, no. 4, December 1971, pp. 57-59. See also

V. Suryanarayan, “Neutralization of South-East Asia:

Problems and Perspective,” Indian Quarterly, Vol. 31, No.1,

January-March 1975, pp. 46-61.

37. Lok Sabha Debates, May 4, 1972, Vol.14, Col. 9-10.

38. The Strait Times, Singapore, March 6, 1973, See also Ramesh

Dixit, South East Asia in India Policy–Problems of

Relationship with a Neighbouring Region, Radha

Publications, New Delhi, 1998. p. 67.

125

39. For detail see A. Appadorai, Select Documents on India's

Foreign Policy and Relations. 1947-1972, Vol. II, Oxford

University Press, Delhi, 1985, p. 136.

40. The Straits Times, August 10, 1971.

41. Mirror of Opinion, August 11, 1971, p. 5. See also Kripa

Sridharan, op. cit., p. 86-87.

42. N.M. Ghatate (ed.), Indo-Soviet Treaty Reactions and

Reflections, Indian Publishing House, New Delhi, 1972, p.

228.

43. Ibid, p. 227.

44. S.S. Bindra, Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent to Shimla

Agreement, New Delhi, 1981, p. 133. See also Saroj Pathak,

India and South-East Asia- A Study of Indian perspective and

Policy since 1962, Atma Ram & Sons, Delhi, 1990, p.139.

45. The Straits Times, January 10, 1972.

46. The National Herald, August 25, 1971.

47. The Times of India, December 8, 1971, see also The Djakarta

Times, December 8, 1971.

48. Asian Recorder, April 1-7, 1976.

49. The Hindu, February 24, 1976.

50. The Times of India, September, 2, 1977.

51. The Times of India, August 24, 1977.

52. Financial Express, December, 21, 1977.

53. For details of “the first official-level meeting between ASEAN

and India”, in Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 1980, pp. 162-66.

54. John W. Garver, “China-India Rivalry in Indo-China”, Asian

Survey, Vol.27, No.11, November 1987, pp. 1207-8.

55. The Statesman, 29, July 1980.

126

56. For details of “Gandhi's visit to Manila”, in Foreign Affairs

Record, Vol. XXVII, No. 10, October 1981, pp. 291-99.

57. Ibid, p. 296.

58. IDSA New Review of Japan, Southeast Asia, and Australia,

January-July, 1984, pp. 103-4.

59. IDSA New Review, October, 1984, p. 441.

60. See Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, Government

of India, 1985-86, p. 12.

61. Hindustan Times, October 20, 1986.

62. Asia Week, March 15, 1987, pp.12-13, See also Kripa

Sridharan, op. cit., p.167.

63. P. Lewis Young, “India's Nuclear Submarine Acquisition: A

Major Step towards Regional Dominance’, Asian Defence

Journal (Kuala Lumpur), November 1988, pp.4-18. See also

Times of India, March 28, 1989.

64. Rajiv Gandhi, Statements on Foreign Policy, January-March

1988, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, p. 18.

65. Quoted in Kripa Sridharan, op. cit., p. 177.