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The Pathway to Regionalism:

A Historical Sociological Analysis of ASEAN Economic Community

*

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar

Graduate Student, MSc Politics with Research Methods, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield

Elmfield, Northumberland Road, Western Bank, Sheffield, England S10 2TU

[email protected]

**This Paper is prepared for the International Studies Association (ISA) Asia-Pacific Conference, City Univesity of Hong Kong, 25-27 June 2016. Please do not cite without explicit permission from the

author**

* The author acknowledges financial support from the Indonesian Endowment Fund for

Education (LPDP). The author is also grateful to Dr Simon Rushton for constructive comments over this draft.

mailto:[email protected]

Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism

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“The most important revolutionary force at work in the Third World today is not communism or socialism but capitalism…”

Richard Robison

Introduction

The beginning of 2016 has marked a new phase for the regional integration project in Southeast Asia: the coming of ‘ASEAN Community’ era. By this date, all member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has agreed to transform the region into a more complex form of cooperation under one regional community. The development dates back to the aftermath 1998-1999 financial crisis, when ten ASEAN member states have agreed to give more power for its regional organisation. Since the 2nd ASEAN Summit in Bali, 2003, ASEAN member states have agreed to establish ASEAN Community by 2015, which comprises three pillar of cooperation, including political security, economic, and social cultural. The ASEAN Summit in 2015 has extended this area of cooperation into a deeper multi-sectoral basis until 2025.

The development of latest political and economic integration in Southeast Asia has embraced a debate on the nature of regional integration: what makes the regionalism project in Southeast Asia possible? Early regionalism theorists basically argue that it is economic cooperation that enables the growing ‘resurgence’ of regionalism in world politics (Haas, 1958; see Hurrell, 1995; Hettne, 2005). The economic cooperation is arguably possible due to growing interdependency in world politics, particularly after the 1970s (Nye, 1970). This argument has been further developed by liberal-institutionalist approach, who believes on the institutionalisation of cooperation beyond state boundaries (Aris, 2009). On the other side of this debate was the critical theory, who contends that the ‘regional turn’ was in fact enabled by the changing discourse of capitalism in the region, which put the state at the sidelines of emerging regulatory capitalist regime in the region (see Jayasuriya, 2009; Jayasuriya and Hameiri, 2011).

This paper aims to offer both theoretical and analytical critique of those perspectives in order to explain the origin of regionalism in Southeast Asia. In so doing, it would be important to further understand the origin of capitalism in Southeast Asia before moving forward to analyse regionalism in Southeast Asia. Capitalist regional project, however, is not new for the region. Recent studies has demonstrated that Dutch and British regional project in Southeast Asia has been established during their mercantilist expansion in Southeast Asia, and contribute to the formation of ‘modern’ political economy(see Lawson and Buzan, 2015; Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015). However, even though their rules are formative to the capitalist system at that age, there has been also the role of local ruler who maintain feudal economy at the region in the capitalist system (van Klaveren, 1953). Their strong role was evident, for example, in maintaining culturrstelsel in Dutch Indies or performing local rule


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through British indirect rule in Malaya (see Frankema and Buelens, 2013; van Klaveren, 1953; Hamid, 2007). These ‘local’ origins also contributes to the formation of capitalism in the region. With the decolonisation in 1950s, which leads to the formation of ‘developmental states’ in the 1960s, these historical trajectories characterise the unique characteristics of ‘ersatz capitalism, which put strong state control alongside the capitalist economic development (Kunio, 1987).

How could we explain the rise of such that phenomenon? The ‘colonial’ origin of capitalism in Southeast Asia, which takes its root in the mercantilist political economy during the colonial era and its relations with local ruler the region, has led this paper to consider the framework of uneven and combined development –as developed by Trotsky (1930), and elaborated by Rosenberg (2009, 2010)— to comprehend the origin of economic regionalism in Southeast Asia. Drawing upon such framework, which is based on a broader Historical Sociological perspective, this paper argues that the construction of regionalism is neither driven by economic interdependence in the global economy nor the emergence of neoliberal form of ‘global governance’, but constructed historically ‘from within’ the social contestation in the region. Instead of tracing the origin of regionalism from the existing global order, as Hurrell (2007) suggest, this paper argues that it is the transformation of capitalism in the region, which is characterised by an uneven and combined nature of historical development in the region, that enables the ASEAN Economic Community. This paper will build that argument on the longue duree analysis of capitalism in Southeast Asia until the formation of ASEAN Economic Community.

To do so, this paper will be divided into four parts. The first part will discuss the theoretical approach to understand the origin of regionalism in Southeast Asia. More specifically, this research will outline the framework of ‘Uneven and Combined Development’ (UCD), as developed by Trotsky (1930) and several proponents of Historical Sociology in International Relations as the main theoretical approach (see Rosenberg, 2009; 2010; Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015). The second part will trace the historical trajectory of regionalism during the colonial era, which is arguably formative to capitalism in the region. This part will also trace the uneven and combined historical development that enables colonial mercantilist project and set birth to ‘Southeast Asia’ as a region.

The third part will elaborate the rise of ‘third world nationalism’ and ‘developmental state’ as post-colonial project in the region, which was slowly emerged in Southeast Asia after the World War. The moment of decolonisation was enabled by several factors, including the rise of nationalism, Japanese expansion, and the post-war crisis that gave momentum for declaration of independence in some countries. The fourth part will understand the formation of capital-based regionalism in ASEAN, which was began by the establishment of ASEAN, and moved forward to its transformation into a more complex form of regionalism under SEAN


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Community. This paper argues that the transformation is related to the changing discourse of capitalism in both domestic and global level. This part will bring about the framework of uneven and combined development to capture the recent trajectory of regional integration in Southeast Asia.

Theorising Southeast Asian Regionalism: The Framework of Uneven and Combined Development

Contending Perspectives on Southeast Asian Regionalism

There have been many attempts to theorise the recent regionalism in Southeast Asia from a wide range of perspectives, from ‘realism’ to ‘critical theory’ (see, for example, Narine 2002; Acharya and Stubbs, 2006; Kim, 2011; Quayle, 2013; Plummer, 1997; Gerard, 2014; Ikenberry and Mastanduno, 2005; Jayasuriya, 2004; 2008; Hameiri and Jayasuriya, 2009; Jones, 2011). This theoretical development enabled by some developments in the integration project in the region, which is arguably important in locating Southeast Asia in the changing context of world politics. Acharya and Stubbs (2006) argues that the rising theoretisation in Southeast Asian relations reflects the changing discourse of international politics that turns to ‘non-Western’ world, particularly after the financial crisis and growing crisis in world politics.

This bourgeoning literature has built up two competing views about integration and regionalism in Southeast Asia. The first view sees regionalism and regional integration in Southeast Asia as merely ‘state-led’ project. This view is shared by realist, constructivist, and to some extent ‘English-School’ approach that posits ‘state’ as the main actor in Southeast Asian relations. Realists, of course, believes that state is the only actor in Southeast Asian relations and is quite skeptical with the regional integration project, having emphasise security and stability as the centre of international relations of the region (Emmers, 2012). Constructivist, even though more ‘critical’, in terms of placing the importance of ‘structure’ over the agential status of the state, also believes that the state is remain central in the region (Haacke, 2003; Easton and Stubbs, 2006; also Acharya, 2003). This standpoint has also been acknowledged by the ‘English School’, who believes on the hierarchical nature of regional politics rather than ‘anarchy’ (see Narine, 2006; Quayle, 2013).

The second view, on the contrary, argues that regionalism and regional integration in Southeast Asia are also involving some non-state actors. Liberal-institutionalist and Critical Theory develops this anti-statist theoretical approach, albeit with different theoretical standpoint. On the one hand liberal-institutionalist argues that Southeast Asian regionalism has been marked by the growing interdependence in the world politics, that enables the non-state actor to be involved at the regional processes (see Nye and Keohane, 1971; Hurrell, 1995). More specifically, in Southeast Asia, liberal-institutionalist


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approach believes that the financial crisis in 1997-1998 has led the Southeast Asian countries to acknowledge the ‘region’ as the most important factor in delivering state policies, particularly in trade and development (Kim, 2011; Hettne, 2005).

On the other hand, critical theorist --particularly those linked with ‘Murdoch School’ of Asian studies-- argues that it is the liberal governmentality project, rather than interdependence in world politics, that gives birth to Southeast Asian regional integration. This approach sees regionalism as merely an extension of state regulatory model to the ‘region’ in order to enlarge market base for growing capitalist class in the region (Hameiri and Jayasuriya, 2011). Nevertheless, this regulatory project has also enabled the rising advocacy of civil society and social movement in the region, which is organised under some banners such as ASEAN People’s Forum or ASEAN People’s Assembly (see Chandra, 2009; Gerard, 2014).

This competing perspectives, to some extent, reflects the ‘state debate’ in International Relations theory, which has emerged since early theoretical debate in the discipline (see Hobson, 2000). According to Hobson (2000), the state debate in International Relations theory has been marked by several ‘agential state power’, such as domestic, international, ‘statist’, and ‘internationalist’ (see Hobson, 2000).The ‘state debate’ in Southeast Asian regionalism theory has reflected the degree to which state has agential power, which is ‘high’ (represented by realist), ‘moderate’ (represented by constructivist and ‘English School’) and low (represented by liberal-institutionalist and critical theory). However, as Hobson suggested, this ‘state debate’ has also neglected the social source of ‘state power’, which is constructed historically within the state boundaries (see Hobson, 2000: 226).

This lacuna in regionalism theories, particularly those emerged to explain Southeat Asian regionalism. has made International Relations theory unable to catch-up broader trends in international politics before the state was institutionally established in IR (for example, before the 19th century) and thus failed to understand the dynamics of states in post-colonial societies (Hobson, 2000; see also Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015). To resolve such this problem, this paper attempts to re-conceptualise Southeast Asian regionalism through the framework of ‘uneven and combined development’.

Double Reading Trotsky: The Framework of Uneven and Combined Development

It is therefore important to move beyond the ‘state debate’ to understand regionalism and regional integration in Southeast Asia. This paper aims to offer the framework of ‘Uneven and Combined Development’ to investigate the social origin of regionalism in Southeat Asia. This framework was originally proposed by Leon Trotsky in his lengthy book, The History of Russian Revolution (1930) and recently elaborated by several International Relations theorist, most notably Justin Rosenberg (2009, 2010) and


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Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu (2015). Trotsky originally proposed the uneven and combined development as a law that govern the historical development of human society. Taking the case of Russian revolution, Trotsky argues that the revolution has in fact contained pecularities because its origin lies not in the domestic level, but in the intersection between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ level (Trotsky, 1930).

Trotsky argues that Russian revolution has been enabled by ‘the privilege of backwardness’ of Russian society, which aims to loop forward to catch-up the industrial development in Western European states (that is, England and Germany). This ‘historical backwardness’, according to Trotsky, marks the uneven characteristic of international society during that period. However, this historical backwardness has also created a privilege for Russian society to catch the industrialisation through inter-societal relations, for example trade and modernisation, which was started during the the Tsarism of Peter (1870). The Western Europe, suggest Trostky, serves as ‘the whip of external necessity that enable the progress of historical development and marks another feature of historical development, namely ‘the combined’ characteristic of historical development. Trotsky then argues that the Russian revolution was enabled by this uneven and combined characteristic, which enabled the crisis in Russia’s bourgeois society in the 1910s and led to the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 (Trotsky, 1930; cf. Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015).This ‘uneven and combined development was later proposed as law that govern human society and made possible the idea of ‘permanent revolution’, since it is not possible for only having a revolution in only one country (Trotsky, 1930; see also Lowy, 1981).

Trotsky’s framework of uneven and combined development has been criticised, primarily because of two reasons. First, in its original form, it contains a very clear Eurocentric tendency (see also Hobson, 2011; Bhambra, 2011; Shilliam, 2009). By putting the framework of uneven and combined development as a ‘law’, he tends to generalise all historical development into a single model of ‘progress’, that he believes should follow to capitalist development in Western Europe and then socialist revolution in Russia (Trotsky, 1930). By doing so, Trotsky has failed to understand the historical development in non-European world, which at that time has undergone the process of colonialism (Hobson, 2011). Second, with this Trotsky’s framework of uneven and combined development has also entrapped to the danger of stagism, which is also central in the capitalist idea of ‘stage of development’ (Bhambra, 2011; see also Rostow, 1959). It therefore reproduces not only a Eurocentric narrative of historical development, but will also mislead social theorist to a very ‘statist’ perspective of social science.

This ‘eurocentric’ trap has, however, been also a problem for Marxist theories (see Said, 1978; Mollaer, 2015). In order to getting rid of this spectre, Rosenberg (2009, 2010), Anievas and Nisancioglu (2015), Anievas (2014), Matin (2013), and Allinson (2016) re-elaborated this ‘law’ into a theoretical


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framework to understand not only Russian revolution, but also the entire characteristic of ‘the international’. Drawing upon Trotsky’s concept of uneven and combined development, Rosenberg (2006) argues that the framework of ‘uneven’ and ‘combined’ development should not only understood in terms of Russian revolution, but also the characteristics of ‘the international’ itself. Rosenberg proposes a view that the ‘uneven’ character of the international marked the multiple form of societies, which is originally drawn from their interactions with the nature (Rosenberg, 2006; see also Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015).

Therefore, rather than arguing that all societies need to undergo a ‘stage of development’ in order to loop into capitalist society, one should understand the very social nature of society based on their mode of production. The idea of ‘multiplicity of society’ has, however, characterised with the combined character of historical development, which is enabled by the inter-societal relations in the international world (Rosenberg, 2006). It leads to the possibility to acknowledge ‘pre-modern’/’pre-Westphalian globalisation, which is in fact occurs with some inter-civilisational dialogues between ‘the West’ and other part of the world (see Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015; Hobson, 2004; Hobson, 2011; Nisancioglu, 2014).

It is within this framework Anievas and Nisancioglu (2015) proposes the geopolitical approach to understand the origin of capitalism. According to Anievas and Nisancioglu, capitalism was not reproduced automatically in Europe, through the so-called ‘industrial revolution’, but was also enabled by the slave market in the Atlantic, labor market and mercantilist economic project in Southeast Asia, and the counterhegemonic strategy to prevent Ottoman’s invasion in Eastern Europe (Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015). Moreover, Anievas and Nisancioglu argues that it was the inter-societal interactions (some with peaceful way through trade, some with violent ways with slavery and invasion) that enables the birth of capitalism as a hegemonic social forces in the 19th century. In the similar vein, Lawson and Buzan (2015) also argues that the modernisation project in the 20th century, that is arguably central in the birth of ‘modern’ International Relations, was enabled by the uneven and combined historical development in the 19th century (Lawson and Buzan, 2015).

This re-conceptualisation of ‘Uneven and Combined Development’ has thus given some promises for non-Eurocentric account of Historical Materialist approach to world politics (see Mollaer, 2015; Tansel, 2015). To understand the historical development of a particular society, according to this framework, one needs to acknowledge the multiplicity of society and the inter-civilisational/inter-societal interactions that reproduce the mode of production in a society. Methodologically, it would also involve the longue-duree historical analysis to understand the continuity of change in world politics since colonial era (see Nisancioglu, 2012). It furthermore requires International Relations to free itself from the ‘prison of political science’ and acknowledges a more interdisciplinary approach to International Relations.


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The uses of uneven and combined development as a theoretical framework thus reject the English School assumption that ‘International Society’ was originally constructed from the European states and subsequently expanded to the ‘rest’ of the world (see, for example, Bull and Watson, 1984). This paper also in a different position with the theory of ‘norm localisation’, as demonstrated by Acharya (2004) in understanding Southeast Asian regionalism. Acharya, following constructivist theories, argues that the idea of ‘regionalism’ has had its origin in ‘external’ form of knowledge that was localised through the interaction between states in the region (see Acharya, 2004). This assumption has, as critically demonstrated by Hobson (2012), contained a degree of Eurocentric conception of world/regional politics, and therefore neglects the ‘non-Western’ subjectivity in theorising the world/regional politics.

Beyond State Debate: Southeast Asian Regionalism in a Longue Duree Historical Perspective

This theoretical approach has therefore led us to move beyond ‘state debate’ in theorising Southeast Asian regionalism. As discussed above, contending perspectives on Southeast Asian regionalism has been entrapped by a state-centric approach (although with various degree of ‘state agential status’) and therefore neglects the historicity of the state and the region itself. Rather, this paper argues that both state and non-state actors’ agential status should be historically and sociologically traced since the pre-colonial era. Therefore, it is important for us to re-assess the origin of Southeast Asia as a region, which was built since the pre-colonial era and, through the law of uneven and combined development, continue until the colonial era.

This paper will conceptualise regionalism in terms of what Rosenberg (2010) termed as ‘multiplicity of society’ and ‘inter-societal interaction’. Firstly, regionalism needs to be theoretically understood as the formation of ‘order’ within a particular geopolitical spectrum. The geographical and geopolitical proximity constitutes the most important aspect of regionalism. However, it is the multiple societies within the geographical spectrum, who interacts each other, that gives birth to the regionalism. The formation of regionalism, therefore requires the ‘inter-societal interactions’, which then forms the notion ‘regional’ as the interaction goes beyond the political boundaries.

Therefore, our conceptual understanding of regionalism should be brought beyond the present-day conception of ‘state’. Regarding that, this paper proposes an argument that regionalism was built through a series of historical events in a long-term basis, built upon the interaction of many forms of societies throughtout the time. The idea of ‘Southeast Asia’ as a region has, as several Historians argues (see, for example, Reid, 1988, 1990; 1993, Laffan, 2003), been constructed since the age of Kingdoms. Preserved by ‘Mandala System of Anarchy’, Southeast Asia was historically evolved until the coming of Colonial Forces, who introduced mercantilist political economy and later the concept of ‘modern state’. The idea of Regionalism was then


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evolved until the State-System was fixated after the decolonisation processes. However, the decolonisation process did not necessarily followed by the establishment of ‘regionalism’. It was amidst the Cold War that the idea of regionalism was established in the form of ‘regional organisation’.

Therefore, neither ‘state-centric’ or ‘anti-statist’ approach will be taken in this paper to conceptualise ‘regionalism. Through the concept of uneven and combined development, this paper will understand region as a historically-evolved concept. The establishment of ASEAN, from this viewpoint, is only a ‘phase’ in the historical development of regionalism in Southeast Asia. Therefore, this paper will go beyond ‘state debate’ by tracing the origin of Southeast Asia region historically to the pre-colonial period. The ‘multiplicity of society’ will be important to assess the construction of ‘region’ in Southeast Asia. In contrast to ‘state-centric’ approach in Southeast Asian regionalism debate, this paper argues that ‘regionalism’ should be traced historically to the formation of ‘pre-colonial society’ in Southeast Asia, that is not limited only to the form of ‘state’ and is not exclusive on the form of ‘regional organisation’. Rather it was involved, for example, Kingdoms in the region (Melacca, Majapahit, Srivijaya, Demak) as well as its encounter with ‘external forces’ such as Islamic Caliphate, Muslim Merchants, or Chinese Qing dynasty.

Given this theoretical framework, this paper will move forward to identify the construction of economic regionalism in Southeast Asia. Through the passage of colonialism, this paper will show how the multiplicity of society in Southeast Asia embace the ‘age of commerce’ and ‘age of mercantilism’ as a continual form of colonial ‘economic regionalism’. The transformation will be critically discussed in the following section. Furthermore, the fixation of ‘colonial state’ in the 19th century gave birth to the ‘state-system’ and paved way to the foundation of ‘state-centric regionalism’ after decolonisation processes. It then preserved during the Cold War until the wake of Asian crisis in the region. Through the concept of uneven and combined development, this paper will put these series of events as a continuum of historical development of Southeast Asian regionalism.

The Uneven and Combined Origin of Southeast Asian Regionalism: A Longue Duree Trajectory

Mandala System and the Pre-Colonial Regional Order in Southeast Asia

Pre-colonial Southeast Asia has been marked by two important features: (1) the tributary system under the so-called ‘Mandala system of anarchy’ and (2) the ‘age of commerce’ that was enabled by the coming of traders from India, Middle East, and subsequently followed by European explorers (see Manggala, 2013; Shu, 2012; Reid, 1988; 1993). The ‘Mandala System of Anarchy’ marks the uneven characteristic of pre-colonial Southeat Asia, while the ‘age of commerce’ marks the combined characteristic of the region.


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According to Shu (2012, 2013), pre-colonial Southeast Asia has been marked by the ‘Mandala System of Anarchy’, which arguably put the region as an unstable system with no single hegemonic rule. Rather, there were competing hegemonic international order at that time. Under the Mandala System, several Empires and Kingdoms have competed to establish political presence through various strategies, but was (Shu, 2012; see also Manggala, 2013; Kang, 2010). Even though there are several ‘strong’ Empires who aim to establish hegemonic rule through tributary, trade, and maritime power, no powerful force was able to unite the region into a stable, hegemonic rule. For example, Chinese Sung Dynasty and Mongol’s Kubilai Khan was attempted to expand their power to Southeast Asia by invading Vietnam and Kampuchea and goes south to Malay and Indonesian archipelago. However, even though they gained some successes in the Indochina region, their imperial expansion was constrained by the emerging Javanese Majapahit Empire, who also built a strong maritime rule over the archipelago (Kang, 2013), It leads to the ‘anarchy within hierarchy’ in the pre-colonial Southeast Asian society, which forms a hierarchical international system but without hegemonic stability within the system (Shu, 2012, 2013).

Mandala System has its root in the anciet Indian conception of ‘statehood’. It was then adopted by the emerging Majapahit empire to set relations with other political forces in the region, most importantly the Qing Dynasty, Mongol, and Ayutthaya (Manggala, 2013). However, it was not the ‘anarchic’ character of Mandala System, as argued by Shu (2012, 2013), that made Southeadt Asia as emerging site of contentions within social forces in Asia. By practicing Mandala System, no strong political forces that was able to set an ‘united’ empire in the region. Even though, to some extent, Majapahit has been successful to maintain hegemonic maritime forces in the region (Lapian, 1996), its existence has also been depended upon the tributary system in the region. Therefore, this paper argues that ‘Mandala System’ was best explained in terms of political order, which sees the unstable region in the tributary political environment.

The ‘Mandala System’ precisely represents an ‘uneven’ character of Southeast Asian historical development. This ‘uneven’ character was preserved until the 14th century, which was marked by the coming of traders and explorers from Middle East, India, and Europe. The growing interaction in 13th-15th century, as suggested by Reid (1988; 1993) enables the inter-societal interactions in the region and subsequently leads to a slow wave of colonialism in the following centuries (see Reid, 1988; 1993; see also Manggala, 2013). Most importantly, the ‘new’ forces introduces some technological and social innovation that slowly weaken feudal tributary system in the region. For example, Muslim traders has brought a new religious order of trade and cooperation, which attracts people in the coastal society of Malay and Indonesian archipelago. The colonial forces also introduce some technological innovation in Europe, and put it in the


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international market in exchange with herbs and spices (Willis, 1994; Reid, 1988, 1993).

This era constitute, according to Anthony Reid, ‘the age of commerce’. This era was impactful to the regional political order. During this age, the strong Majapahit rule was subsequently replaced by the Muslim Demak Kingdom, who inherits Majapahit’s maritime forces, and the Sultanate in Melacca was overthrown by Portuguese navy, who set to build a new colony in Southeast Asia after ‘the age of discovery’ (see Toer, 1995). Chinese rule, although still maintained in Vietnam and Campuchea, was slowly weakened after the domestic turbulences (Kang, 2013).

The globalised features indicates the ‘combined’ characteristic of pre-colonial Southeast Asia. This feature, however, is central to the formation of colonial order in the region. Through the uneven and combined character of Southeast Asian historical development, five main colonial forces was able to set institutional rule in the region: Portuguese, Spanish, British, Dutch, and French. In 17th century, the Dutch was able to get rid of Spanish and Portuguese rule in Eastern Indonesia, therefore set a hegemonic rule over the Indonesian archipelago and ended the Portuguese-Spanish expansionist strategy (Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015). The Portuguese rule was remained limited in Eastern Timor, and Spanish was flee to the Mindanao and Luzon archipelago to establish the present-day Phillippines.

From ‘the Age of Commerce’ to ‘the Age of Mercantilism’

Mercantilism has been central to the early colonial rule. During early colonial rule, there are two competing discourses of colonialism in Southeast Asia: First, the ‘statist’ redisitributive approach, held by Portuguese (and to some extent Spanish) that relies upon taxation and tribute from colonies. Second, the ‘liberal’ mercantilist approach that relies upon trade and joint-stock companies, although also accompanied by strong military force. This approach was taken by Dutch, and later followed by the British. The late 17th century showed that the Dutch and British mercantilist projects have been established in Batavia (Dutch) and Singapore (British), while the Portuguese and Spanish has been driven out from the region (except in some small parts of East Timor and the Phillippines). It was arguably marks the early success of British and Dutch colonial rule in the region (see Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015: 231-232).

British and Dutch mercantilism, in this era, was characterised by the involvement of big business enterprise, protected by military forces, to expand economic and political rule in the colony. The early 17th century witnessed the establishment of Dutch Vereniigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) and British East Indian Company (EIC), two joint-stock companies which set forth the mercantilist economic hegemony in the region. Both VOC and EIC played central rule in maintaining mercantilism in the region.


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The mercantilist project, however, did not only act as the ‘economic’ or ‘business’ tool for the colonial force, but also pivotal in re-establishing economic order in the region. As this paper will demonstrate, VOC and EIC institutional rule was originally based upon the nexus of political expansion and economic/businesss colonial necessity. Established in the early 17th century, VOC was granted monopoly by Dutch Kingdom to operate business in the East Indies, therefore acts as a pivot for Dutch capitalists hub in the region (Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015; see also Abdullah, 1994; Irwin, 1991). VOC was actually a ‘joint-stock’ company –originally operated to trade in Southeast Asia company and ship the goods to Europe— with a strong state support in operating their business venture. The British East India Company (EIC) also operates in the similar vein. It was granted monopoly to trade in East, South, and Southeast Asia by Queen Elizabeth I and subsequently acts an ‘agent’ of British imperialism in the region, acting behalf of British Empire (see Irwin, 1991; Tarling, 1999).

However, it was then evident that VOC and EIC did not necessarily operate merely as ‘business’ company. Rather, given the uneven condition in Southeast Asia, it was also accompanied by political forces in order to secure their position in the region and, furthermore, to make possible the early capitalist accumulation (see Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015; Abdullah, 1994; Sidel, 2015). It is in this case these companies did the ‘primitive’ accumulation process. Another strategy used by the Dutch and British to establish their colonial order was a form of ‘indirect rule’ by making some negotiations with local rulers and therefore give way to the practice of mercantilism in the region. (Kian, 2008).

The other picture of ‘mercantilist capitalist’ project was the Marxist conception of ‘primitive accumulation’ in Southeast Asia. This paper argues that it was during the age of mercantilism that the primitive accumulation process takes place for the first time in Southeast Asia. In Dutch East Indies, it began with the establishment of Batavia, the Capital of Dutch colony, by Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon-Coen after razed the Sunda Kelapa –a city ruled by Prince Jayakarta—to the ground and rebuild a new colonial city (van Goor, 2004). However, during the early 17th and 18th century, the main arena for ‘primitive accumulation’ was not Java, but the Ambon, Ternate, and several other part of ‘Eastern Indonesia’. It was due to the massive spice extraction that the ‘colonial force’ expands its power –first by the Portuguese and later by Dutch. It also involves some popular resistance of people in Ambon and Ternate, who fought against orang kaya in Molucca and subsequently oppressed by the Dutch through a violent military acts (Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015). It then, as suggested by Sidel (2015), constitute the so-called ‘capitalist accumulation’ in the Dutch Indies.

Meanwhile, the different process of capitalist accumulation takes place in Malaysia and the Singapore. While British has put only a little interest in ‘territorial’ aspect of its colonial rule in the 17th and 18th century, their activities were primarily based on trade. There had been a similar route of


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British capitalism, which also used joint-stock company (EIC) as a representative body of colonial force in the region. Unlike the Dutch, the British rule was originally settled from India, where the EIC was based, and indirectly rule several parts through business office. British presence has not been territorially-motivated until the 19th century, when the EIC’s business power has weakened and the ‘statist’ capitalist economy was embraced. It therefore, as would discussed in the latter part of this paper, enabled the ‘governmentalisation’ of British colonialialism in the region (Lewis, 2009; Bassett, 1999; Shani, 2006).

The above explanation of British and Dutch early colonial rule in the 17th and 18th century has characterised mercantilism as the main discourse in Southeast Asian relations. It was characterised by an international economic strategy with the formation of economic institution to stabilise such strategy (see Jayasuriya, 2003). At that age, the international relations was institutionalised through diplomatic treaties and the introduction of ‘transnational business companies’ which were backed by their states (VOC and EIC). It also constitute the coalitions between ‘domestic political forces’ and ‘transnational companies, either to discipline local resistance or to rule the trade (see Lewis, 2009; Bassett, 1999; Jayasuriya, 2003). This mercantilist project also characterises the multiplicity of society in the region, which also characterised the uneven and combined feature of colonial development in the region.

Through such mercantilist project, the colonial forces was able to challenge the more traditional Kingdoms in Indonesia, such as Mataram (which was established to continue the old ‘Demak’ Kingdom after Senopati move the capital to Central Javanese highland), Banjar, or Maluku. It then paved the way to the formation of centralised authority under the new ‘Colonial State’ after the VOC and the EIC was dissolved in the 18th and 19th century.

The Birth of Colonial State: Southeast Asia in the 19th Century

However, the late 18th century also witnessed a crisis in regional economy. The late 18th century witnessed the slow economic growth in the Dutch, following the Anglo-Dutch War that takes much resources out from both the Dutch and British. The economic crisis following the war was also reinforced by the corruption and infeffective trade in the VOC. It was then resulting to the increase of Dutch state debt and brought the VOC to its end (see Adams, 1996; de Vries, 1997). The British, however, survived for more than 50 years until the EIC was dissolved due to internal problems (Adams, 1996).

The dissolution of VOC and EIC brought a new era for Dutch and British colonialism. With the dissolution of both companies, the state then took control of the colonial economy. In the Dutch Indies, the Dutch State sent appointed a Governor General, with direct hierarchical coordination with Amsterdam, to rule Batavia. It was started with Johannes Siberg in 1801 and subsequently followed by other Governor-Generals. Since Siberg, Dutch


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colonial government takeover VOC’s power to rule East Indies. On the other hand, the British also set up a more ‘statist’ colonial government in Malaysia and the Singapore after the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, which was signed in 1824 to divide British and English territories, therefore ended the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. Before that, the Spanish has already established a captaincy in the Phillippines since the early colonial age.

This paper argues that there are four main features of ‘colonial state’ in the region. The first feature was the abolition of traditional rule over their sovereign territories, which was conducted either through direct or indirect rule. It leads to the Second and Third feature, namely the establishment of fixed territorial boundaries of colonial state, which was legitimised by treaties with local ruler or other colonial forces, and the formation of a centralised governmental and bureaucratic bodies to rule the state. The fourth feature was the integration of the ‘colonised’ society into a colonial rule through economic and social governmental techniques, which was in the making led into a modernisation process in the colonial society.

The abolition of traditional rule was the first task of colonial rule to vanquish the ‘domestic’ threat. Soon after the Anglo-Dutch Treaty in 1824, which releases British rule over Indonesia to the Dutch, several uprisings emerged in Java and other Islands (such as South Kalimantan and Minang). The establishment of Dutch colonial governmental bodies, which was originated since the Governorship of Siberg and Daendels in early 19th century, responded to this challenge by military acts. While the local uprisings was oppressed (the final revolt was the War in Aceh), the Dutch was subsequently able to politically administer rule in the present day Indonesia (see Carey, 2008)..

The abolition of traditional rule then paved way to the emergence of more complex of governance in Southeast Asia. It included at least two important variables: the establishment of ‘fixed’ territorial boundaries and the formation of colonial governmental bodies. The Anglo-Dutch Treaty (also known as Treaty of London) had fixated the territorial basis for both the British and the Dutch in Southeast Asia. Domestically, the Dutch has also been able to challenge the ‘traditional’ rule in the East Indies with several military expansion and war after subsequently finalise its territorial rule after their winning in Aceh in 1912 (see Ricklefs, 1991). The British, on the contrary, maintained local Sultanate as a political and legal entity under their territories, resulted in ‘indirect rule’ over their territories in the Malay Peninsula and the Singapore (Hamid, 2007). At the northern part of the region, the French consolidated their power by slowly defeating the local rulers –Annam Tomkin, Cochinchina, Cambodia, and subsequently Laos— and established a French protectorate in the Indochina (Brocheux and Hemery, 2009; Goscha, 2009). Spanish has, since 17th century, established its territorial rule over the Islands of Luzon and Mindanao, which subsequently formed the Phillippines.


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It was then followed by the establishment of governmental bureaucratic entities within those colonial territories. There are two model of colonial governmental rule during this age. First, the ‘direct rule’ that involves the formation of ‘new’ legal, administrative, and political organisation to rule the colony. Second, the ‘indirect rule’ that maintained the legal rule of existing local Kingdom, while economically (and politically) extend the colonial authority through taxes or reports (see Iyer, 2010). Both direct and indirect rule leads to the integration of society to a new state structure. It thus led to what Foucault termed as ‘governmentalisation of state’ (see Foucault, 1991; see also Lemke, 2007). Through the establishment of colonial law and political rule, the Dutch government was able to expand its rule to society.). It was resulted in the massive capitalist accumulation, which then paved way to the exploitation of agriculture sector in Indonesia and brought huge amount of income to the Dutch (Maddison, 1989; see also Sidel, 2015).

This longue-duree reading of Southeast Asian political history has then embraced three important understandings of political development in the region, which characterises the ‘uneven’ and ‘combined’ origin of modern Southeast Asia. First, the ‘nation-state’ in the region has neither took origin from only pre-colonial and colonial state, but in fact a continuation between the two processes. Second, Southeast Asia, as a region, has a ‘globalised’ –or ‘combined’— origin since the very beginning. Third, given the ‘globalised’ nature of region, it is also evident that there has been multiple societies in Southeast Asia, which drives their interest through various mode of interactions.

The “Privileges of Colonial Backwardness”: Colonial Modernity and Regional Order

Prelude to Decolonisation: Modernisation and Colonialism in the 20th Century

The previous part of this paper has argued that the regionalism in Southeast Asia had its origin in the colonialism processes. The concept of ‘state’ was relatively unknown before the colonial forces introduced a modern ‘state-system’ through the fixation of territorial boundaries and the establishment of governmental bureaucratic structures. Furthermore, The pre-colonial and colonial era has marked the multiplicity of society and the high degree of inter-societal interaction in the region. It was through this mulitiplicity of societies in the region that the capitalism emerged in Southeast Asia, firstly as a ‘mercantilist project’ and subsequently, after the dissolution of VOC and EIC, as a state-led project to sustain the free trade. These characteristics gives the foundation to the formation of post-colonial state after the World War II.

The World War II marked the end of colonialism in the region and was followed by a wave of decolonisation. Nevertheless, decolonisation in Southeast Asia did not take place at once. It also underwent a long process


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and has particular historical roots. The roots and process can be traced back to the modernisation process and the rise of nationalist movement in the 20th century.

As discussed in the previous part,. the formation of ‘colonial state’ therefore marked a new phase of colonial history. It is within this age were the ‘proto’ state-system introduced in Southeast Asia. With fixed territorial boundaries and organised governmental bodies, the colonial states were transformed as an actor in Southeast Asian relations after the 19th century. At the beginning of 20th century, the four colonial forces (Spanish, French, British, and Dutch) had been able to fully took control of Southeast Asia, with the exception of Thailand, who remained sovereign and became the ‘border’ between British and French colonies over Southeast Asia. It then paved way to the constitution of ‘state-centric’ regionalism after the decoloniation took effect in the 20th century.

The modernisation process in colonial state, however, has been started since early 19th century. The modernisation process has embraced three vital characteristics, namely (1) the emergence of local middle class, who gained benefit from their inclusion into new colonial system of education, which in turn sowed the seed for nationalist movement; (2) industrialisation and the massive recruitment of workers, which led into the formation of ‘dual economic structure (with both agrarian and industrialising society developed in their own path); and (3) the racialised social structure, which was enabled by colonial approach to re-categorise society as a part of their development project.

In Dutch East Indies, the modernisation process began after the Diponegoro/Java War, with the formation of colonial bureaucratic organisations and the implementation of ‘cultivation system’ in Java. It also marked the primitive accumulation of capital, which then paved way to ‘plantation era’ (see Lawson and Buzan, 2015; Knight, 1992). The similar pattern also occurs in the colonial Malaya, firstly emerged through plantation industry. Those processes were then followed by the modernisation of colonial education system, which gives opportunity to pribumi/bumiputera (native people in Southeast Asia) to access education. The purpose of modernisation in education system were, at that time, simply to fulfill the needs of human resource in plantation industry, and more broadly colonial governmental system. The expansion of colonial bureaucratic offices required, to some extent, local officer to maintain administrative daily actitivities. It was within this purpose the educational system was reformed, primary in Indonesia and Malaysia.

However, the modernisation processes also brought about the new economic configuration in the colonial states. The reconfiguration of colonial economy was visible in Indonesia, with the emergence of ‘dual economy’ as the industrialisation process began in the late 19th century. The plantation industry was since then developed into manufacturing industry, which in


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process also created the working-class and the middle-class merchants. However, as economist JH Boeke noted, the agrarian economy was also developed in rural villages, thus constitutes ‘dual economy’ in Java (see also White, 1976). It then led to the formation of workers in big cities in Java (most notably Semarang, Surakarta, Surabaya and Batavia) and also the middle class in other cities (such as Yogyakarta, Banjarmasin, or Makassar. The processes also took place in Spanish Philippines, with the formation of emerging middle class and professional workers in big cities such as Manila.

Another important result of the state colonialism in the early 20th century was the origin of ‘racialised’ social structure in the region. As noted by Hirschmann (1987) and Shamsul (2001), the colonial political structure has embraced a racialized political structure in the modern Malaysia, which was enabled by the migration of people and the categorisation of people into racial/ethnic categories in colonial census (Hirschmann, 1987). It was within this era that the Tamil-Malayan society emerged as a political subject in the country, having been employed by British government as a part of their colonial project (see Baxstrom, 2000). The same pattern also occurred in colonial Indonesia, which placed race as a basis for the categorisation of society in colonial administrative structure. It then led into a racialized social and political structure in the 20th century.

The formation of modern economy in the colonial states, as well as the formation of executive and bureaucratic colonial bodies and the ‘racialisation of society’ thus paved way to the rise of political movement of pribumi people in Indonesia. The newly-educated people in Southeast Asia, who studied in big colonial cities or in the Europe, started to embrace the idea of nationalism through various ideological source. Among of them was Soekarno and Hatta (Indonesia), Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), or Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore). Most of them were originally influenced by socialism, which has been the dominant anti-imperialist ideology in the Europe in the early 20th century (Anderson, 1998).

The Rise of Nationalism

The most important achievement of 20th century for the decolonisation was, indeed, the rise of nationalism. Nationalist ideology sowed the seed for decolonisation in the region. However, the nationalists’ articulations varied in each countries. In Dutch East Indies, the nationalists in major cities (Surabaya, Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Batavia) were responded with both security (through the creation of intelligence secret services) and accommodative (through the inclusion of nationalist leader in Volksraad) approach (see Akbar, 2013; Elson, 2008). In Vietnam, the communists emerged as the main domestic opposition to resist the French Union. Jose Rizal firstly lead the nationalist movement in the Phillippines, but was turned down as the United States come in 1898. Meanwhile, in Singapore and Malaysia, the nationalists used a relatively cooperative approach with British


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colonialism, led into a slow arrival of decolonisation in these countries (see Hamid, 2007).

The different strategies and features of resistance in each Southeast Asian colonial states brought different results in the decolonisation processes. In Indonesia, and Vietnam, the strong and ‘long’ nature of resistance leads into the quick declaration of independence soon after the Japanese was repelled from the country. Burmese resistance was then followed by its independence by British in 1947. Meanwhile, the accommodative nature of nationalists in Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei made the decolonisation processes took place in the late 1950s and 1960s. The Phillippines obtained their independence from the United States soon after they won the World War II in 1945.

It is clear that, from these facts, that the modernisation processes and the emergence of ‘nationalist movement’ was also characterised by ‘uneven’ and ‘combined’ nature of historical development in the region. The formation of solid ‘colonial state’ in the 19th century has given some boundaries for the birth of nationalism, which since then identified themselves with the people within the colonial territorial boundaries. The formation of ‘Indonesia’ is an interesting case, where the nationalists began to define the modern country through the fixated ‘Dutch East Indies’ territorial boundaries. Even though they did not deny the existence of pre-colonial entities (such as Mataram or Majapahit), the political articulation of modern Indonesians were based on the people who live within the national boundaries of Dutch rule.

It is within this political sphere Benedict Anderson famously argued that the nationalism was in fact a manifestation of ‘imagined communities’, where they define the ‘nation’ not to the similarity of race, but to the similarity of national consciousness – which is, for example, bound by the resistance against Dutch colonialism— and the emergence of modern political identity among colonised people (Anderson, 1987). The notion ‘imagined community’ as argued by Anderson, opens up a new understanding to nationalism as political identity in Southeast Asia. However, one would ask, what made the ‘imagined community’ possible in Southeast Asia? This paper argues that it is the Trotsky’s concept of ‘the whip of external necessity that leads to such formation of imagined community (Trotsky, 1930; Allinson and Anievas, 2009). The emergence of colonial modernisation, that opens up spaces for people in colonial state to obtain access to education and employment in Europe, served as the external necessity for the colonised people. Their interaction with Europe enabled the dissemination of new ideas, which were developed in Europe, to the people in colony.

The result of this interaction was the spread of nationalism. It was made possible from, for example, the movement of ‘Islamic reformation’ ideas from Saudi Arabia and Egypt to Malaysia and Indonesia, educational activities in Netherlands, Britain, and France, as well as participation in several anti-Imperialism conferences in 1930s (see Laffan, 2003; Utama, 2015).


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Nationalism, from this viewpoint, was a result of the uneven and combined character of historical development and was enabled by the unique combination between ‘modernity’, which was produced by colonialism, and ‘exchange of ideas’ between Southeast Asia, Middle East, and the Europe.

The ‘Japanese Factor’

However, it was not only nationalism that led into the decolonisation. The decolonisation process was also made possible by the crisis in the Asia-Pacific during the World War II. The ‘colonial state’, which was established in the 16th century (in the case of Spanish rule in Phillippines), and the 19th century (in cases of Dutch, British, and French), has since established a solid political base for colonial rule until the World War II, which oversaw the rise of Japan in Asia-Pacific. After the fall of Pearl Harbour, Japanese began to spread war to challenge colonial forces in the Pacific, subsequently ended the European colonial rule.

Japanese factor’ has also influential in sowing the seed of decolonisation in Southeast Asia. The coming of Japanese in the region has not only repelled some countries –Dutch and French— but also brought momentum to nationalist resistance in the former colonies of those countries. Even though Japanese did not gave any momentum for the resistance in Indonesia and French Indochina countries, the idea of independence remain vibrant within this era. It was the Japanese surrender to the Alliance that gave momentum for the declaration of independence, began by Soekarno and Hatta’s declaration of independent in Indonesia (August 1945) and subsequently followed by Ho Chi Min’s declaration in Vietnam (September 1945). The Phillippines, through a different route, obtained independence from the United States via the Treaty of Manila in July 1946.

If the ‘European Colonialism’ can be understood as the ‘whip of external necessity’ for the emergence of nationalist ideas and movement, ‘Japanese expansion’ then provides the condition for the articulation of nationalist ideas to build ‘nation-state’. Japanese establishment of local army, under PETA (Pembela Tanah Air) and mobilisations of local people in Indonesia and Indochina gave birth to the modern army in Southeast Asian states who were controlled by Japan. As Harry J Benda aptly noted (1956), Japanese occupation also repelled Europeans from Indonesian society, therefore construct the sense of ‘European as other’ after the War. Besides that, Japanese occupation also sowed seed for the political embrio of independence movement, who began to prepare the new state if the Japan loss the war (which was in fact happened in 1945) (see Benda, 1956; McCoy, 1980).

However, it is also important to consider that the Japanese occupation was occurred under the World War situation. Japanese occupation, therefore, took a different stance from that of European Colonialism. While European colonialism was primarily motivated by economic concern, such as


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maintaining capitalist rule over its colony, Japanese occupation was instead motivated primarily with military objective to expand its influence against the United States and British control in Asia Pacific. Therefore, even though the control was authoritarian, Japanese was yet to do any long-term development in the colony. Besides that, their control limited to several areas, for example Indochina and Indonesia. In severa areas, such as Phillippines, the United States hold a front to combat Japanese influence. British, however, remained strong in the Malaya.

This situation, once again, characterises the uneven nature of colonialism in the region during the World War II. The uneven character was led to the continuation of colonialism, in some parts, after the World War II. The British forces, for example, retained control over Malaya and the Singapore until the declaration of Malaysian state in 1957. However, the French was failed to regained their control over Vietnam (which led to the 1st Indochina War) and the Dutch has to leave its position in Indonesia after revolutionary war in 1945-49, except in small parts in West Papua. This region then integrated with Indonesia in the 1960s.

The uneven characteristic of Japanese occupation then brought some effects to the ‘uneven’ process of decolonisation in the region. In fact, several states obtained independence soon after the colonialization ended before 1950, while several other countries gained independence after 1950s and even three decades afterwards. Indonesia and Vietnam was the first to gained independence (1945), followed by Phillippines (1946), Burma (1948), Laos and Cambodia (1953), Malaysia (1957), Singapore (1963), and, after two decades, Brunei (1984). Another country, Timor Leste (formerly administered by Portuguese before occupied by Indonesia in 1976), gained independence in 1999. This uneven feature was then ‘combined’ with the formation of regionalism and regional organisation by the newly independent states.

The Uneven and Combined Pathway to Regionalism

Decolonisation, Development, and Great Power Politics in Southeast Asia

The decolonisation processes after the World War II did not took place at once. It was conducted in a wave, until the 1960s, where most of the state has been decolonised (except Brunei, who gained independence from the British in 1984 and Timor Leste, whose independence was obtained in 2001). It then marked the ‘uneven’ characteristic of regional politics after decolonisation. The multiple routes to decolonisation in the region also led to the multiple regional organisations after the decolonisation. At that time, there were two existing regional organisations, which represent two distinct feature of ‘political cooperation’ in the region. First, the ‘Bandung’ model, which aimed to gather all newly-independent countries into a spirit of ‘third world nationalism’ and ‘anti-colonialism. Second, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), a security treaty initiated by the United States in Southeast Asia and includes Phillippines and Thailand. This organisation


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served as the basis for security and economic cooperation in the region. These forms of regionalism were then dissolved after the establishment of ASEAN in 1967.

Why did the regionalism process were different at that time? There were several important factors behind this feature. The first factor was the different nature of decolonisation in the region. The second factor was the ‘uneven’ political economy of development in post-colonial states, which was caused by the different nature of decolonisation in the region. The third factor was the involvement of several ‘Great Powers’ who began to put Southeast Asia as the important ideological battlefield in the wake of Cold War. These factors has prevented the establishment of a solid regional organisation, particularly during 1950s.

The first factor was the divergent nature of decolonisation in Southeat Asia. As has been discussed in previous parts, the nature of decolonisation in the region was uneven due to different route to seek independence. Several states such as Indonesia, Vietnam, or Burma gained their independence through independence wars and military aggressions. The Dutch, after the World War II, attempted to regain control over its territories in Indonesia. However, the independence leaders declared resistance to Dutch military attempts. It was then resulted in the series of revolutionary battles until a roundtable conference in 1949. The similar pathway was also held by Vietnamese, whose declaration of independence ignited the first Indochina War against French campaign until the Geneva Conference in 1954. However, the Malaysian (and Singaporean) achieved their independence from British through a relatively peaceful means. The Malaysians obtained independence from British in 1957, following by the declaration of Singapore after some political unrest in early 1960s. Both of those states were included in ‘the Commonwealth’ soon after their independences. With a different route, Phillippines were peacefully obtained independence by the United States, having been the base for US military campaign during the World War II.

This factor then leads into the second factor behind the ‘regionalism’, namely the ‘uneven’ politics of development in each post-colonial states. Development was the biggest concern of post-colonial state, particularly in Southeast Asia (Weinstein, 1971). For states who obtained independence peacefully from their former colonisers, and still maintain linkages (such as Malaysia and Singapore), development was not a big deal. However, the problem were faced by states who obtained their independence by force, such as Indonesia or Vietnam. It was to resolve such this problem that Soekarno (Indonesia) and U Nu (Burma) came to their initiative to organise Bandung Conference in 1955.

This conference was originally aimed to ‘discuss problems of common interest and concern to countries of Asia and Africa’ and ‘discussed ways and means by which their people could achieve fuller economic, cultural and political co-operation’ (Joint Communique, 1955). Therefore, the Bandung


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Conference was proposed to resolve the ‘uneven’ politics of development among post-colonial states through economic cooperation (see Nesadurai, 2008). However, ‘Bandung Conference’ was not set as merely a ‘statist’ project. It was also sided by several events (although not organised in Bandung) held by several non-state organisations, such as student, journalist, or literary community (see Wright, 1956; Nesadurai, 2008). It is important, therefore, to see Bandung Conference beyond ‘state project’. Rather, Bandung was set as a forum to facilitate various actors within a Asia-Africa cooperation project.

Nevertheless, this idea was not peacefully accepted by some other countries (such as Thailand and Phillippines), who used their established relations with the United States and the British to organise Southeast Asian Treaty Organisations (SEATO) as the basis of cooperation, rather than joining the ‘Third World’ counterparts in Bandung Conference. SEATO was, originally, a US-led initiative to counter the Communism in the region (Jorgensen-Dahl, 1982). The establishment was also enabled by ‘close’ relations between Phillippines and the United States, which was also joined by Thailand, whose conflict in Vietnam and its concern with regional instability led to the closer relations with the United States (see Nuechterlein, 1964).

It then marks the third factor, namely the involvement of United States and Soviet Union, who became two ‘great powers’ after the World War II, in the regional politics. The uneven politics of development paved way for the re-arrival of ‘Great Powers’, some of them were former colonisers, in the region. Soon after the World War II, Southeast Asia has been put as a potential arena for the expansion of both United States and Soviet Union’s power. The battlefield was visible in Vietnam, where Vietnamese campaign against French has led into the the contestation of Chinese-Soviet powers, who supported the pro-communists in Northern Vietnam, against the rival United States, who supported the Republican in Southern Vietnam. The conflict in 1950s were escalated into the Vietnam War until the lost of United States in the 1970s. The tension was also heated during early 1960s, where Indonesia began the politics of confrontation to reject Malaysia’s appointment at the UN Security Council, which was also followed by the establishment of Jakarta-Peking Accord in the following year.

ASEAN and the Rise of ‘Regional Capitalism’

This ‘uneven’ nature of post-colonial politics in Southeast Asia was then resolved by ‘the politics of combination’ in the 1960s through the establishment of ASEAN. The politics in the late 1950s and early 1960s showed the heated tension, not only between the ‘intra-regional’ actors (such as Indonesia and Malaysia, Malaysia and Singapore), but also involved external actors (such as crisis in Indochina). It was then resolved in the mid 1960s, after five Southeast Asian leaders met in Bangkok to discuss the possibility of a new regional organisation. The result of the meeting was the formation of ASEAN through Bangkok Declaration. In the declaration,


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Southeast Asian leaders were aimed to “establish a firm foundation for common action to promote regional cooperation in South-East Asia” and “determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities” (see Bangkok Declaration, 1967).

Firstly initiated restore stability in the region, amidst the heated tension in Indochina, ASEAN was then emerged as the main regional instititution in the region. ASEAN’s emergence was arguably enabled by the dissolution of SEATO in 1971 and the decline of ‘Bandung Spirit’ after some political changes in Asian and African states, including Indonesia and Burma. SEATO was dissolved due to internal dynamics within the regional organisation, , as well as the establishment of more complex security cooperation (see Jorgensenn-Dahl, 2016). The dissolution of SEATO made ASEAN as the only platform for security cooperation in the region, while the rise of New International Economic Order in 1971 successfully changed the ‘Third World’ nationalist discourse into cooperation and development.

The original form of ASEAN was marked by two distinct features: ‘state-centric’ approach to political security cooperation and market-based approach to economy. This feature has been inherently embedded within ASEAN and preserved after the Asian crisis in 1997. It is therefore important to explain ASEAN in relations to the political economy of development, industrialisation, and trade in the region. As Lee Jones aptly noted (2010), the formation of ASEAN needs to be understood as the reconfiguration of capital in Southeast Asia, which was made possible through the ‘domestification’ of capitalism within Keynesian Import-Substitution Industrialisation discourse. The reconfiguration of capital was also preserved by the making of ‘non-intervention’ consensus to preserve ‘sovereignty’ of each states and therefore provide some ‘security vanguard’ to protect the capitalist accumulation process internally (Jones, 2010; 2011 see also Shimizu, 2004).

ASEAN, therefore, marked the discourse of ‘state-centric’ regionalism in Southeast Asia. The formulation of several ASEAN norms in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), formulated in Bali, 1976 exemplifies the case. The treaty consists of 20 articles, which was divided into 3 chapters: amity, cooperation, and pacific settlement of disputes. In the treaty, ASEAN member states (originally consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Phillippines) agreed to, for example, “promote active cooperation in the economic, social, technical, scientific and administrative fields” (Article 4), which is guided by the principle of “(1) mutual respect for the independence and sovereignty; (2)The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference; (3) Non-interference in the internal affairs; (4) Settlement of disputes by peaceful means; (5) Renunciation of use of force; and (6) Effective cooperation” (Article 2).


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This treaty, which was followed by some agreements to build joint industrial projects, clearly show two discourses of ASEAN Regionalism, namely ‘economic development’ and ‘political stability’. Since 1976, ASEAN has been developed mean to enable the Keynesian industrialisation and development projects to be implemented in domestic level. On the one hand, ASEAN was projected as a ‘regional stronghold’, in order to build a suitable environment for trade and investment in the region. Some industrial initiatives, however, has not been successful due to lack of state commitment to fund joint industrial project (see Yoshimatsu, 2002). On the other hand, ASEAN was also projected to maintain regional stability in the region, by putting the principle of ‘non-interference’ and ‘respect to national sovereignty’ as the main rule of the game for regionalism. The main aim of this ‘security’ discourse, as aptly showed by Jones (2010), was to protect the capitalist accumulation processes from both external and internal threat. State, within the discourse, has been used as a ‘bodyguard’ of the capitalist development project in the region.

All of these regional capitalist project was enrooted in state-led developmentalist project, which has been initiated in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore since 1960s. Malaysia seem to adopt a developmentalist approach through ‘New Economic Policy’ project (1971-1990), which was continued by National Development Policy (1990-2000), thus leading to a strong state involvement in economy (see Gomez and Jomo, 1999). Singapore, with its strategic geopolitical position as the ‘financial’ and ‘trade’ hub in the region, adopted a relatively pragmatic developmentalist approach and enjoyed a continued growth and economic development (Pareira, 2008). Indonesia also began to adopt developmentalist policy since the rise of General Soeharto amidst political turbulence in 1965-66. While maintaining state dominance in economy, Soeharto introduced planned developmentalist economy through Pelita (Five-Years Development Programs) that sought to implant market economy with development processes (see Robison, 1986). These development, as portrayed by Kunio (1987), was followed by the emergence of ‘ersatz capitalism’, which combined the strong state control over capitalist economy.

The rise of ASEAN has arguably replaced the discourse of ‘Third Worldism’, which was initiated by Soekarno and U Nu through the Bandung Conference. Since Soekarno’s Asian and African Cooperation project was heavily based on state dominance, it was subject to political changes within domestic politics. As both Soekarno and U Nu was deposed through military coup d’etat in the 1960s, their international project has been constrained. In Southeast Asian context, the rise of General Soeharto in 1960s paved way to the changing discourse of Indonesia’s foreign policy towards a more ‘regional-based’ politics and, subsequently, a more American-friendly economic development (see Weinstein, 1971; Anwar, 1994). It is important, therefore, to see ASEAN as not only a project whose initiative comes from within the region, but also influenced by the Cold War politics. Even though


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the United States and its allies did not directly participate at ASEAN (unlike SEATO), the establishment of ASEAN has made some preconditions for the ‘pacification’ of Southeast Asian states and ‘domesticate’ Third World resistance, as previously initiated by Soekarno and U NU through Bandung Conference (see also Gerard, 2014).

Therefore, this paper argues that the early foundation of ASEAN was motivated by three important discourse. First, ASEAN was set as a mean to regionalising capitalism through cooperation and industrialisations; Second, ASEAN was also served as a tool to provide stable and secure political environment, which is a prerequisite for the stable economic development. Third, and the most important, ASEAN was also set as a mean to ‘domesticate’ some anti-capitalist tendency by putting the resistance under strong state control

‘Neoliberal Turn’: Post-Crisis Arrangement and ASEAN Economic Community

However, the state-centric discourse of regionalism has also been subject to internal constraint. In 1997-1998, ASEAN has to face the financial crisis in the region. The crisis started in Thailand, who witnessed the radical devaluation of the Thai baht in the financial market. Supported by the large foreign debt from Thai government, the crisis has made the Thai economy unstable and collapse (see Yamazawa, 1998; Wade and Veneroso, 1998). This crisis was then spread to several states: Indonesia and Malaysia was among the most notable country that was severely hit by the crisis. Indonesian Rupiah and Malaysian Ringgit was severaly devaluated, brought the worst economic uncertainty since 1965-66. Several small countries such as Brunei and Phillippines were also affected, even though in a less impact compared to Indonesia and Malaysia.

The Asian crisis in 1997-1998 has brought about the crisis of state-centric regionalism project, proven with ASEAN’s inability to deal with financial crisis in the region. It then led ASEAN member states to reconfigure the regional architecture after the crisis. The result was the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community in 2003, along with two other pillars of ASEAN Community –ASEAN Political Security Community and ASEAN Social Cultural Community—which was aimed to create a more ‘open’ economy through trade liberalisation and more complex regional arrangement (see Bali Concord II, 2003).

This development thus marked the ‘neoliberal turn’ in Southeast Asian economic regionalism. The Blueprint of ASEAN Economic Community (2009) mentioned four important elements: (a) a single market and production base, (b) a highly competitive economic region, (c) a region of equitable economic development, and (d) a region fully integrated into the global economy. These core elements are then institutionalised into a more complex of

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thai_baht

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_debt


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cooperation in state level, with the primary aim to facilitate business and market development in the region.

The establishment of ASEAN Community has also been followed by further institutionalisation of the regional integration process. Since 2003, ASEAN leaders have agreed to meet annually in the ASEAN Summit to discuss the progress of regional integration. In the Ministry level, ASEAN was also institutionalised, first by reorganising ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as the main locus of decision-making within the regional institution, and afterwards by putting cooperation agenda within each ministries or sectoral bodies. Through this arrangement, ASEAN Economic Community has been projected the main agenda for all ASEAN member states in order to facilitate the regional market development.

This form of regionalism clearly showed that ASEAN has moved to the ‘state-centric’ form of economic cooperation. Within this discourse, the ‘state-based’ discourse of regional cooperation was abandoned, replaced by free trade and institutionalisation of cooperation in all level of ministries, as well as the strengthened function of ASEAN Secretariat. As aptly showed by Jayasuriya and Hameiri (2011), this form has produced the discourse of ‘regulatory regionalism’., which aims to preserve the interest of particular social class (namely big businessmen) under the regulatory framework of state policies. This also reproduced what Kanishka Jayasuriya termed as ‘embedded mercantilism’, which is characterised by four core elements: (1) a set of international economic strategies; (2) 2. a set of governance structures in accordance with regional economic governance; (3) a set of normative constructs for interactions with other states or other entities; and (4) a coalition between domestic and regional political-economy structures across the region, enabled by trade liberalisation and regional economic cooperation (see Jayasuriya, 2003).

This form of cooperation, however, was not a unique idea. It was during this era the discourse of inter-regionalism emerged, particularly between ASEAN and the European Union (EU) to strengthen financial and trade cooperation between the two regional institutions (see Borzel and Risse, 2009). European Union, in this case, became a ‘mirror’ for ASEAN economic integration project. The establishment of ‘single market’ and more specifically ‘single labor market’ (established under Mutual Recognition Act) exemplifies this case, mirroring what the EU has done in 1990s. The emergence of the so-called inter-regionalism project through, for example, ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting), has also enabled the adoption of European integration trajectory to ASEAN integration project. The Asia Europe Meeting provides a learning site for ASEAN to learn about regionalism, therefore establishes a ‘mirror’ for the institutionalisation processes within the region (see Gilson, 2002). The European Union, therefore, serves as ‘the whip of external necessity’ that enables the combined characteristic of ASEAN regionalism project.


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Therefore, it can be concluded that the formation of ASEAN represents the institutionalisation of ‘capital’ in the region. The process has, however, had its roots in the colonial modernisation projects in the late 19th century, where colonial states in Southeast Asia opened industrialisation as a mean to consolidate capitalism in the colony through trad and development. The decolonisation process transformed the industrialisation and trade into a new form of inter-state relations, which was marked by two discourses of regionalism (Bandung Conference and SEATO). The establishment of ASEAN institutionalised the ‘capital’ to the regional level, particularly after the Asian crisis in 1997-1998. Regionalism, since this era, has been linked to the consolidation of capitalism in the region.

Most importantly, the establishment of ASEAN has to be understood as an attempt to preserve capitalism, which has been established in the region since colonial era. Even though there have been different features of regionalism in the region, the aim was still to the same, that is to preserve capitalist accumulation in the region. The establishment of ASEAN is only an attempt to re-locate the accumulation process in accordance with the rising globalisation in world politics, which was enabled by industrial, technological, and digital revolution in Southeast Asia. The law of uneven and combined development enabled the transformation of capitalism in the regional context.

Conclusion: Rethinking the Origin of Southeast Asian Regionalism

In the History of Russian Revolution, Leon Trotsky (1930) said that, “the fundamental and most stable feature of Russian history is the slow tempo of her development, with the economic backwardness, primitiveness of social forms, and low level of culture resulting from it”. It seems that the feature of Southeast Asian history, from a critical viewpoint, follows the similar path. This paper attempts to trace the origin of regionalism in Southeast Asia through a longue-duree historical perspective. Through a Historical Sociological inquiry, this paper has demonstrated that the uneven and combined development was the very nature of historical development in Southeast Asia and the characterises the development of regionalism since the pre-colonial era.

Regionalism in Southeat Asia has been constructed since the pre-colonial era, dates back to the 12th and 13th century. This paper argues that the pre-colonial era was marked by ‘the Mandala System’ as the main feature of regionalism. The regional order, at that time, was marked by the absence of a single hegemonic force in the regional politics. However, as the mobility of trade was massively exploded in the 15th century, the uneven feature of Mandala System was combined with its interaction with external societies, leads to the ‘age of commerce’. Early colonial period introduced ‘the mercantilist economy’, which was then replaced by the ‘modern’ formation of regionalism in the 19th century, based upon the colonial state,


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industrialisation, and the migration of workers. It then led to the emergence of ‘primitive capitalist accumulation’ and thus sowed seed to modern capitalism in the next century.

The decolonisation processes in the 20th century transferred all power to the new independent states. However, it was also evident that the post-colonial states was, to some extent, reproduced the discourse of colonial statebuilding and political economy. The feature of regionalism after colonial era has been heavily linked to preserve state capitalism in the region, which was invented during the modernisation processes in late 19th century. The latter development of ASEAN Economic Community was projected to reconfigure capitalism to deal with such financial crisis in the region, therefore move the locus of capitalist accumulation in a broader level.

Given such a historical trajectory, this paper offers two insights for the origin of regionalism in Southeast Asia. First, regionalism has its origin in the continuum of colonial development in Southeast Asia, which was most notably enabled by the ‘politics of combination’ during the age of commerce in the 15th century. Second, the objective of colonial development, since its early formation, has been served to cultivate capitalist economy in the region. The history of economic regionalism in Southeast Asia, therefore, is the history of capitalist development. The uneven and combined characteristic of the region enabled the transformation and evolution of capitalism in their new forms.

Therefore, this paper makes case for the importance of ‘historical origin’ of regionalism. It is clear that the pre-colonial and early colonial rule did not see ‘state’ as the main actor. Rather, mercantilist business actors (such as VOC and EIC) or Islamic merchants and travelers also played role in creating regionalism in Southeast Asia. The post-independence regionalism, such as Bandung Conference, also reflected the involvement of non-state actors in the region. It was the establishment of ASEAN that put ‘state’ as the central actor in regionalism.

Therefore, this paper suggest that regionalism should be understood through the notion of ‘multiplicity of society’ in the region rather than simply put it as merely put it into the ‘state debate’. Through this approach, regionalism will be understood as a historically-evolved political project, which consists not only political units within the region, but also units outside the region. The law of uneven and combined development enables the inter-societal interactions within a particular geopolitical boundaries, therefore defined (also historically) such a concept named ‘region’. This framework therefore enable the identification of form of regionalisms beyond ASEAN. It is thus the task of Historical Sociology to unpack, and furthermore re-understand Southeast Asian regionalism as a site of contentions between particular social forces throughout the time.


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