chapter3and4casedigestsforlandtitle

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BRACEWELL V. CA

FACTS:

Petitioner assails the CA decision which reversed that of the RTC which

granted petitioner’s application for confirmation of imperfect title

Sometime in 1908, Maria Cailles acquired a parcel of land in Las Pinasfrom the Dalandan and Jimenez families

Petitioner is the son of Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr. He

acquired the almost 10 sq.km. land from his mother by virtue of a Deed of

Sale

Petitioner filed with the court of first instance an application for

confirmation of imperfect title over the land

The CFI granted the petition but the same was assailed in the CA by the

republic on the grounds that the land in question was public domain. CAreversed the CFI decision

ISSUE:

Does petitioner have a right of title over the subject land?

HELD:

NO

The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove:

o The land is alienable public land, and

o That his open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession

and occupation of the same must be since time immemorial or

for the period prescribed by law (at least 30 years)

Applicant failed to prove that the land was inalienable – the government

conclusively showed that the land was only classified as alienable public

land in 1972 (the case was decided in 2000 and the application filed in

1963) Even if the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest were in possession

of the land since 1908, the land was incapable of private appropriation.

Adverse possession described in the law applies only to alienable portions

of the pubic domain

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership is

upon the applicant

CALICDAN V. CENDANA

FACTS:

This case involves a piece of land originally owned by Sixto Calicdan

until his death. He was survived by his wife, Fermina, and his three

children (including herein petitioner) Fermina, in a deed of donation inter vivos, conveyed the subject land to

one Silverio Cendana who immediately entered into possession of the

land and built a house on it where he lived until his death in 1998

Soledad Calicdan, petitioner, challenged this donation of the land in a

complaint filed with the trial court for the recovery of ownership,

possession and damages against Cendana

The trial court ruled in petitioner’s favor

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court

ISSUES:

Was the donation inter vivos valid?

Did the petitioner lose ownership of the land by prescription?

HELD:

ON THE DONATION:

o No

o Sixto inherited the land in question from his parents. This means

that the subject land was not part of the conjugal property of

Sixto and Fermina.

o Under the Spanish Civil Code, Fermina only had the right of

usufruct over the land. This means that the right she transmitted

to Cendana was only the right of usufruct.

ON THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND:

o Yeso Cendana became the rightful owner by virtue of extraordinary

acquisitive prescription

o Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other

real rights over property. Acquisitive prescription is either

ordinary or extraordinary. In extraordinary prescription,

ownership and other real rights over immovable property are

acquired through inunterrupted adverse possession thereof for

thirty years without need of just title or of good faith

o Adverse possession of Cendana for over 45 years shows that he

has met the requirements of law



DEL ROSARIO-IGBITEN V. REPUBLIC

FACTS:

Petitioners filed with the trial court an application for registration of landon the ground that they acquired it by purchase and had been in actual,

continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of the

subject property in the concept of owner for more than 30 years

The trial court traced the possession of property back to 1958 when a

Justina Hintog first declared the property for taxation purposes and the

trial court rendered a decision favorable to the petitioners

The republic through the OSG appealed the decision to the CA which

subsequently reversed the trial court decision

ISSUE:

Did the petitioners comply with the period of possession and occupation

required by the public land act?

HELD:

Nope

It is undisputed that the property I question is alienable public land

Section 48(b) of the PLA presently requires the possession and

occupation of the piece of land by the applicants since June 12, 1945 or

earlier.

As was established by the trial court, the earliest period the applicants

could claim ownership over the land is in 1958

Petitioners point out the amendment made by RA 6940 which reduced the

required period of possession and occupation of the lad to thirty years

prior to the filing of the application

This is erroneous because RA 6940 addresses sec. 44 of the PLA which

applies to free patents and not to judicial confirmation of an imperfect or

incomplete title to which section 48(b) applies

REPUBLIC V. MANNA PROPERTIES

FACTS:

Manna properties applied for the registration of two parcels of land in La

Union

The RTC granted the application and the CA, upon appeal by the OSG on behalf of the Republic, affirmed the RTC ruling

ISSUES:

Did Manna Properties fail to comply with the jurisdictional requirements

for original registration?

Has Manna Properties sufficiently proven possession of the property for

the requisite period?

HELD:

On the jurisdictional requirements:

o No, it was not their fault

o Petitioner faults Manna for the trial court’s exceeding of the 90-day period set by PD 1529 between the court order setting the

initial hearing date and the hearing itself

o “A party to an action has no control over the Administrator or

the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to

meddle unduly with the business of such official in the

performance of his duties”

On proving sufficient possession

o Noo The governing law is CA 141, or the PLA, which requires

possession since JUNE 12, 1945 OR EARLIER

o Manna only presented a tax declaration dated 1950 in evidence

While tax declarations can be sufficient basis of possession, the same must properly show the specific

date especially when the same is material

The tax declaration presented was issued in 1950 as a

“substitute tax declaration”

Also the form in which the tax declaration is made is

questionable because the same states that it was issued

under the rules of RA 7160 or the LGC of 1991 when it

was supposed to have been issued in 1950



RP V. HANOVER WORLDWIDE TRADING CORP.

FACTS:

Hanover applied with the RTC for the registration of title to two

properties found in Consolacion

Except for the Republic, no oppositors Case was called for trial and the RTC approved the application. This

decision was affirmed by the CA

ISSUES:

Did the RTC fail to acquire jurisdiction?

Did Hanover sufficiently prove compliance with the requisites of law for

the registration of land?

HELD:

On substance, petition is meritorious

On jurisdiction

o Noo Respondent complied with the requirements of law for the court

to acquire jurisdictiono Invoking doctrine laid down in Manna case, “it is unfair to

punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the

applicant has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the

applicant has complied with all the requirements of law”

On compliance

o No

o As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and

occupation for 30 years or more is not sufficient. It must now be

shown that possession and occupation of land by the applicant

started on June 12, 1945 or earlier.o While this is a factual issue not usually passed upon by the SC,

there are recognized exceptions when the inference made is

manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; when the findings of

fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on

which they are based

o The earliest date shown by applicant from taxdecs is 1965

o The respondent also failed to prove that the subject land was

declared inalienable by the DENR

SPS. LLANES V. REPUBLIC

FACTS:

Person A possessed Land X since 1930. In 1965 Person B bought Land X

from Person A. In 1995 Spouses Llanes bought Land X from Person B.Person A, Person B, and the Spouses Llanes all belong to the same

family.

In 1996, Spouses Llanes sold Land X to Company A. Company A filed an

application under the Property Registration Decree to register Land X.

However, the sale between Company A and Spouses Llanes didn’t push

through. Company A amended the application substituting the applicants

as the Spouses Llanes.

The Government opposed the application.

ISSUE:

Do Spouses Llanes have a right to Land X?

HELD:

Yes. Under the Property Registration Decree the applicant must prove (1)

the disputed property is alienable and disposable land of the public

domain (2) the applicant or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,

continues, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation (3) such

possession has been under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June

1945 or earlier

In this case, the Spouses Llanes proved Land X was declared alienable

and disposable on 26 March 1928 through the DENR and CENRO

certification. Further, the Spouses Llanes proved they and their

predecessors-in-interest have possessed Land X from 1930 onwards, well

before 12 June 1945. Lastly, generations of the Llanes family havedeclared Land X under their names and paid real property taxes on it,

giving evidence of possession in the concept of an owner.

chapter3and4casedigestsforlandtitle

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