chapter vii - religion

7/30/2019 Chapter Vii - Religion

1/31


2/31

The Right to Religion

According to the Wikipedia Encyclopedia:1

Many states have freedom of religion established in their

constitution, though the exact legal consequences of this right varyfor historical and cultural reasons. Most states interpret freedomof religion as the freedom of long-established religiouscommunities to remain intact and not be destroyed. By extension,Democracies interpret "freedom of religion" as the right of eachindividual to freely choose to change, mix or abandon religion(s)altogether.

The modern legal concept of religions freedom as the union offreedom of belief and freedom of worship with the absence ofany state-sponsored religion, originated in the United States ofAmerica. The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom was written in1779 by Thomas Jefferson. It proclaimed:

[N]o man shall be compelled to frequent or support anyreligious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall beenforced, restrained, molested, or burdened in his body or goods,nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his religious opinions orbelief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument tomaintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and that the sameshall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.

In 1944 a joint committee of the Federal Council of Churches ofChrist in America and the Foreign Missions Conference of NorthAmerica, formulated a Statement on Religious Liberty:

Religious Liberty shall be interpreted to include freedom toworship according to conscience and to bring up children in thefaith of their parents; freedom for the individual to change hisreligion; freedom to preach, educate, publish and carry onmissionary activities; and freedom to organize with others, and toacquire and hold property, for these purposes.

In a Lincoln University publication,2 it defines:

Freedom of religion is a political principle that strives to forbidgovernment constraint on people's choices of beliefs. It requiresalso that people be free to act upon their beliefs. Religious freedomincludes the freedom to worship, to print instructional material, totrain teachers and to organize groups for their employment andschools in which to teach, including religion.

Lastly, it can be stated with precision that the principles of thefreedom of religion in the Philippines was adopted and taken from

1 www.wikipedia.org.

2 www.lincoln.edu.

146


3/31


numerous cases decided by the United States Supreme Court.Hence, before we discuss the concept of religious freedom in thePhilippine setting, it is imperative that we tackle the US concepts.

Freedom of Religion in the United States

(Adopted from a Lincoln University Publication entitled"Freedom of Religion")3

Religion has been at the center of some of the best and some ofthe worst movements in American history. Many of the early

colonists fled religious persecution in their former countries andcherished their right to worship, as they believed in their new country.The guiding principles that the framers intended to govern therelationship between religion and politics are set forth in Article VI ofthe US Constitution and in the opening 16 words of the First

Amendment of the Bill of Rights. This constitutional frameworkreflects the deep concern that the founders of the American nationhad about the relationship between church and state, and about theright of individuals to practice their religion freely.

Religious freedom is protected by two clauses in the FirstAmendment: the establishment clause and the free exercise clause.

Establishment Clause

The first of the First Amendment's two religion clauses reads:Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religionx x x. Note that the clause is absolute. It allows no law. It is alsonoteworthy that the clause forbids more than the establishment ofreligion by the government. It forbids even laws respecting anestablishment of religion. The establishment clause sets up a line ofdemarcation between the functions and operations of the institutionsof religion and government in our society. It is so because theframers of the First Amendment recognized that when the roles ofthe government and religion are intertwined, the result too often wasbloodshed or oppression.

For the first 150 years of that nations history, there were very fewoccasions for the courts to interpret the establishment clause

3 Ibid.

147


4/31


because the First Amendment had not yet been applied to the states.As written, the First Amendment applied only to Congress and thefederal government. In the wake of the Civil War, however, the 14th

Amendment was adopted. It reads in part that no state shall x x xdeprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process oflaw. x x x. In 1947 the Supreme Court held in Everson vs. Board ofEducation4 that the establishment clause is one of the libertiesprotected by the due-process clause. From that point on, allgovernment action, whether at the federal, state, or local level, mustabide by the restrictions of the establishment clause.

There is much debate about the meaning of the termestablishment of religion. Although judges rely on history, theframers other writings and prior judicial precedent, they sometimesdisagree. Some, including Chief Justice William Rehnquist, arguethat the term was intended to prohibit only the establishment of asingle national church or the preference of one religious sect overanother. Others, including a majority of the justices of the currentSupreme Court, believe the term prohibits the government frompromoting religion in general as well as the preference of one religion

over another. In the words of the Court in Everson:

The establishment of religion clause means at least this:Neither a state nor the federal government may set up a church.Neither can pass laws that aid one religion, aid all religions, orprefer one religion over another. Neither can force a person to goto or to remain away from church against his will or force him toprofess a belief or disbelief in any religion... Neither a state nor thefederal government may, openly or secretly, participate in theaffairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. Inthe words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religionby law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between churchand state.'"

To help interpret the establishment clause, the Court usesseveral tests, including the Lemon, coercion, endorsement andneutrality tests.

a. Lemon Test

The first of these tests is a three-part assessment sometimesreferred to as the Lemon test. The test derives its name from the

4 330 US 1.

148


5/31


1971 decision Lemon vs. Kurtzman5in which the Court struck down astate program providing aid to religious elementary and secondaryschools. Using the Lemon test, a court must first determine whether

the law or government action in question has a bona fide secularpurpose. This prong is based on the idea that government shouldonly concern itself in civil matters, leaving religion to the conscienceof the individual. Second, a court would ask whether the state actionhas the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Finally, thecourt would consider whether the action excessively entanglesreligion and government. While religion and government mustinteract at some points while co-existing in society, the concern hereis that they do not so overlap and intertwine that people havedifficulty differentiating between the two.

Although the test has come under fire from several SupremeCourt justices, courts continue to use this test in most establishment-clause cases.

b. Lemon Test Redux

In its 1997 Agostini vs. Felton6

the Supreme Court modified theLemon test. By combining the last two elements, the Court nowused only the purpose prong and a modified version of the effectsprong. The Court in Agostini identified three primary criteria fordetermining whether a government action has a primary effect ofadvancing religion: 1) government indoctrination, 2) defining therecipients of government benefits based on religion, and 3)excessive entanglement between government and religion.

c. Coercion Test

Some justices propose allowing more government support forreligion than the Lemon test allows. These justices support theadoption of a test outlined by Justice Anthony Kennedy in his dissentin Allegheny County vs. ACLU7 and known as the coercion test.Under this test the government does not violate the establishmentclause unless it (1) provides direct aid to religion in a way that would

tend to establish a state church, or (2) coerces people to support or

5 403 US 602.

6 Case No. 96-552 and 96-553.

7 492 US 573.

149


6/31


participate in religion against their will. Under such a test, thegovernment would be permitted to erect such religious symbols as aNativity scene standing alone in a public school or other public

building at Christmas. But even the coercion test is subject tovarying interpretations, as illustrated in Lee vs. Weisman8 the 1992Rhode Island graduation-prayer decision in which Justices Kennedyand Antonin Scalia, applying the same test, reached different results.

d. Endorsement Test

The endorsement test, proposed by Justice Sandra DayOConnor, asks whether a particular government action amounts toan endorsement of religion. According to OConnor, a governmentaction is invalid if it creates a perception in the mind of a reasonableobserver that the government is either endorsing or disapproving ofreligion. She expressed her understanding of the establishmentclause in the 1984 case of Lynch vs. Donelly9 in which she states,The Establishment Clause prohibits government from makingadherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing inthe political community. Her fundamental concern was whether the

particular government action conveys a message to non-adherentsthat they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,favored members of the political community. OConnorsendorsement test has, on occasion, been subsumed into theLemon test. The justices have simply incorporated it into the first twoprongs of Lemon by asking if the challenged government act has thepurpose or effect of advancing or endorsing religion.

The endorsement test is often invoked in situations where thegovernment is engaged in expressive activities. Therefore, situationsinvolving such things as graduation prayers, religious signs ongovernment property, religion in the curriculum, etc., will usually beexamined in the light of this test.

e. Neutrality

While the Court looks into the endorsement test in matters ofexpression, questions involving use of government funds are

8 505 US 577.

9 465 US 668.

150


7/31


increasingly determined under the rubric of neutrality. Underneutrality, the government would treat religious groups the same asother similarly situated groups. This treatment allows religious

schools to participate in a generally available voucher program,allows states to provide computers to both religious and publicschools, and allows states to provide reading teachers to low-performing students, even if they attend a religious school. It alsoindicates that the faith-based initiatives proposed by President Bushmight be found constitutional, if structured appropriately.

The concept of neutrality in establishment-clause decisionsevolved through the years. Cited first as a guiding principle inEverson, neutrality meant government was neither ally nor adversaryof religion. Neutral aid referred to the qualitative property of the aid,such as the funding going to the parent for a secular service such asbusing. The rationale in Everson looked into the benefit to theparent, not to the religious school relieved of the responsibility ofproviding busing for its students.

Later cases recognized that all aid is in some way fungible, i.e. if

a religious school receives free math texts from the state, then themoney the school would have spent on secular texts can now bespent on religious material. This refocused the Courts attention noton the kind of aid that was provided, but who received and controlledthe aid. Decisions involving vocational training scholarships andproviding activity-fee monies to a college religious newspaper on thesame basis as other student groups showed the Court focused onthe individuals control over the funds and equal treatment betweenreligious and non-religious groups.

In the 2002 case of Zelman vs. Simmons-Harris,10 the pluralitydecision clearly defines neutrality as evenhandedness in terms ofwho may receive aid. A majority of the Court continues to find directaid to religious institutions for use in religious activitiesunconstitutional, but indirect aid to a religious group appearsconstitutional, as long as it is part of a neutrally applied program thatdirects the money through a parent or other third party who ultimatelycontrols the destination of the funds.

While many find this approach intuitively fair, others aredissatisfied. Various conservative religious groups raise concerns

10 Case No. 00-1751.

151


8/31


over diminishing the special place religion has historically played inconstitutional law by treating religious freedom the same as everyother kind of speech or discrimination claim. Strict separationist

groups argue that providing government funds to religious groupsviolates the consciences of taxpayers whose faith may conflict withthe religious missions of some groups who are eligible to receivefunding using an even-handed approach.

Although the Courts interpretation of the establishment clause isin flux, it is likely that for the foreseeable future a majority of the

justices will continue to view government neutrality toward religion asthe guiding principle. Neutrality means not favoring one religion overanother, not favoring religion over non-religion and vice versa.

Free Exercise Clause

"Congress shall make no law x x x prohibiting the free exercise(of religion)" is called the free-exercise clause of the First

Amendment. The free-exercise clause pertains to the right to freelyexercise ones religion. It states that the government shall make no

law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.

Although the text is absolute, the clause should not beinterpreted to mean absolute right to a course of conduct justbecause it is permitted by one's religion. The courts place somelimits on the exercise of religion. The Supreme Court has held thatreligious freedom must give way to reasonable restrictions that havebeen adopted to protect the health, safety and convenience of theentire community. For example, courts would not hold that the First

Amendment protects human sacrifice even if some religion requiresit. The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause so that thefreedom to believe is absolute, but the ability to act on those beliefsis not.

Questions of free exercise usually arise when a citizens civicobligation to comply with a law conflicts with that citizens religiousbeliefs or practices. If a law specifically singled out a specific religion

or particular religious practice, under the current Supreme Courtrulings it would violate the First Amendment. Controversy ariseswhen a law is generally applicable and religiously neutral butnevertheless has the accidental or unintentional effect ofinterfering with a particular religious practice or belief.

152


9/31


The Supreme Court has been closely divided on this issue. In its1990 decision Employment Division vs. Smith11 the Court greatly

narrowed a 35-year-old constitutional doctrine that had required agovernment entity to prove that it had a compelling interestwhenever a generally applicable law was found to infringe on aclaimants religious beliefs or practices. Under current constitutionallaw as explained in Smith, a government burden on a religious beliefor practice requires little justification as long as the law in question isdetermined to be generally applicable and does not target a specificreligion or religious practice. The Court in 1993 clarified how theseprinciples were to apply in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye vs.Hialeah.12 There, the Court closely analyzed a facially neutral andgenerally applicable law and determined that it was neither neutralnor generally applicable. Since the law burdened a religious practice(here the animal sacrifice ritual of the Santeria religion), thegovernment would have to demonstrate that it had a compellinginterest in passing the law. The Court would then strictly scrutinizethe governments claims. In Hialeah, the government could not meetthis burden and the law was stuck down.

The first Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of freeexercise was Reynolds vs. United States,13 in which the Court uphelda federal law banning polygamy over objections by Mormons whoclaimed that the practice was their religious duty. The Court inReynolds distinguished between religious belief and religiousconduct or action, stating that Congress was deprived of alllegislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actionswhich were in violation of social duties or subversive to good order.

Recognizing the religious defense, the Court said, would permitevery citizen to become a law unto himself. While the governmentcould not punish citizens because of their religious beliefs, it couldregulate religiously motivated conduct, provided that it had a rationalbasis for doing so. This rational basis test became the standard fordetermining whether a law that impinged on a religious practiceviolated the free-exercise clause. As that standard was easy for thegovernment to satisfy, for almost a century the courts generallyrejected religious-freedom claims against generally applicable laws.

11 485 US 667.

12 508 US 520.

13 98 US 145 (1878).

153


10/31


It is important to note also that until the decision of Cantwell v.

Connecticut,14 opened the door to federal litigation against the statesfor religion-clause claims (by ruling that the 14th Amendmentsprotections against state action incorporates or absorbs, the free-exercise clause of the First Amendment) there was no cause ofaction against the state for laws that may have impinged on religiouspractices. In effect, the Supreme Court did not have opportunity toreview this issue until the mid-20th century, when various free-exercise clause cases made their way through the state courts to theSupreme Court.

In its 1963 decision Sherbert vs. Verner15 the Supreme Courtfound that the Constitution afforded at least some degree ofgovernment accommodation of religious practices. Adele Sherbert, aSeventh-day Adventist, was discharged by her South Carolinaemployer because she would not work on Saturday, her faithsSabbath. When she could not find other employment that would notrequire her to work on Saturday, she filed a claim for unemployment

benefits. South Carolina law provided that a person was ineligible forbenefits if he or she failed, without good cause, to accept availablesuitable employment when offered. The State denied Sherbertbenefits, saying she had not accepted suitable employment whenoffered, even though she was required to work on a Sabbath. Thedecision was upheld by the South Carolina Supreme Court.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the state court decision.Justice William Brennan wrote that although the Court had

theretofore rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause togovernmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religiousbeliefs and principles, the conduct or actions so regulated hadinvariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace ororder. Since Sherberts conscientious objection to Saturday workwas not conduct within the reach of state legislation, any law thatresulted in an incidental burden to the free exercise of her religionmust be justified by a compelling state interest in the regulation of asubject within the States power to regulate.

Thus, in Sherbert, the Court adopted a compelling interest

14 310 US 296 (1940).

15 374 US 398.

154


11/31


standard that government must meet when a generally applicablelaw unintentionally burdened a claimants religious practices andbeliefs. The state in Sherbert could not demonstrate such

compelling interest: the mere possibility that allowing exemptions tothe unemployment compensation laws for Saturday worshipers mightresult in fraudulent or spurious claims was not sufficiently compelling,the Court reasoned. Even if an increase in fraudulent claims couldbe proved, the state would nevertheless have to show that noalternative regulations could combat such abuses without infringingFirst Amendment rights, thus also introducing a doctrine requiringthe government to demonstrate that it used the least restrictivemeans when enacting legislation that burdened a religious belief orpractice.

It is interesting and important to note the legal and social contextin which Justice Brennan articulated this compelling state intereststandard for free-exercise clause claims. The civil rights litigation ofthe 1950s and 1960s had greatly informed the Courts perspective. Ithad become clear to Brennan that the Court must give a heightenedscrutiny to cases in which fundamental rights were at stake and

require the state to demonstrate that the law in question served onlyinterests that were of paramount importance. A law having a merelyrational, important, valid or legitimate purpose could notwithstand a claim that it infringed on a fundamental right.

In 1972, the Court reaffirmed that a generally applicable law,neutral on its face may nonetheless violate the First Amendment ifsuch law unduly burdens the practice of religion. In Wisconsin vs.Yoder16 the Court held that the states interest in requiring a childs

compulsory attendance at school through age 16, though important,could not withstand a free-exercise claim by members of the Amishreligious sect. An Amish family claimed that requiring their childrento attend public schools after age 14 would expose them to wordlyinfluences against their traditionalist beliefs and undermine theinsular Amish community. The Court in Yoder noted that the purposeof mandatory education was to develop a productive, self-reliantcitizenry, but that the states purpose must be examined in light ofthe particular circumstances of the case. Since the Amish had a200-year tradition of training their adolescents to be productivemembers of their separated agrarian community, the governmentsinterests could still be achieved by requiring education only through

16 406 US 205.

155


12/31


age 14. This would obviate the burden to the Amish communitysright to freely exercise its religion, while the states overriding interestwould still be served. In a clear statement of its doctrine, the Court in

Yoder held that [o]nly those interests of the highest order and thosenot otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the freeexercise of religion.

After Sherbert and Yoder, the Court applied the religious-exemption doctrine by examining two questions: Has thegovernment significantly burdened a sincerely motivated religiouspractice? If so, is the burden justified by a compelling state interest?Increasingly, however, the Court narrowed the concept of asignificant burden to religion and in a series of decisions throughoutthe 1980s, the Court rejected many free-exercise claims on thisbasis. The Court also became more willing to label state interests ascompelling in cases where religious practice was significantlyburdened by a general law.

It was clear that the Supreme Court was struggling with the issueof requiring accommodations based on the compelling-interest

standard. In its 1990 decision Employment Division v. Smith, still ahighly controversial opinion, the Court ruled that it would no longergive heightened scrutiny to the governments refusal to grantexemptions to generally applicable laws that unintentionally burdenreligious beliefs or practices.

In Smith, two counselors were fired from their jobs with a privatedrug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote at aceremony of the Native American Church. The two men, members

of the Native American Church, were determined to be ineligible forunemployment benefits because they had been fired for work-relatedmisconduct. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the prohibitionagainst sacramental peyote use was invalid under the free-exerciseclause and thus the men could not be denied unemployment benefitsfor such use. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the free-exerciseclause permits the state to prohibit sacramental peyote use and thestate can thus deny unemployment benefits to persons dischargedfor such use.

Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, declined to applythe balancing test of Sherbert v. Verner, greatly limiting the scope ofthat precedent. Instead Scalia reached back to the early opinion in

156


13/31


Reynolds v. U.S. (the polygamy case), claiming that to require thegovernment to show a compelling interest in enforcing a generallyapplicable law when such a law impedes on religiously motivated

conduct permits the individual to become a law unto himself,invites anarchy and would produce a constitutional anomaly. Itwould, Scalia claimed, make a citizens obligation to obey the lawcontingent on his religious beliefs. Scalia found that the Court hadnever in fact invalidated any government action on the basis of theSherbert compelling-interest test except the denial of unemploymentcompensation (that Smith was itself an unemployment compensationcase is not addressed in the decision). Scalia further stated that theonly decisions in which the Court had held that the First Amendmentbarred the application of a generally applicable law to religiouslymotivated conduct involved not just free-exercise clause claims, butthose claims in conjunction with other constitutional protections, suchas freedom of speech and the press or the right of parents to directthe education of their children (Yoder). The Smith case, the Courtsaid, did not involve such a hybrid situation.

In the three years following Smith, more than 50 reported free-

exercise cases were decided against religious groups andindividuals. As a result, more than 60 religious and civil libertiesgroups, including the American Civil Liberties Union, ConcernedWomen for America, People for the American Way and the National

Association of Evangelicals, joined to draft and support the passageof the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or RFRA. The act,which was signed by President Clinton on Nov. 17, 1993, restoredthe compelling-interest test and ensured its application in all caseswhere religious exercise is substantially burdened.

Also in 1993, the Supreme Court re-visited the religiousexemption issue in City of Hialeah. After a Santeria churchannounced plans to establish a house of worship in Hialeah, the cityenacted an ordinance prohibiting the ritual slaughter or sacrifice ofanimals, which is one of the religions principal forms of devotion.The Supreme Court found that the history of the ordinance showedthat it specifically targeted the Santeria practice of animal sacrificewhile providing numerous exemptions for other instances of animalslaughter, including Kosher slaughter. Since the ordinance bothburdened religious practice and was neither neutral nor generallyapplicable, the Court would apply strict scrutiny and the compellinginterest standard to the citys actions. The ordinances could not

157


14/31


withstand such scrutiny, the Court stated, holding them invalid underthe free-exercise clause.

While widely supported, RFRA was short-lived. On June 25,1997, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6-3, struck down the act asapplied to state and local governments. The Court in City of Boernevs. Flores17 held that Congress overstepped its bounds by forcingstates to provide more protection for religious liberty than the First

Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in EmploymentDivision v. Smith, required. While RFRA no longer applies to thestates, it is still applicable to the federal government, as seenrecently in several district court decisions.

In 2000, President Clinton signed the Religious Land Use andInstitutionalized Persons Act, or RLUIPA, which mandates the use ofthe compelling-interest and least- restrictive means standards forfree-exercise cases that involve infringements on religion from land-use laws and to persons institutionalized in prisons, hospitals andretirement or nursing homes. Cases challenging the constitutionalityof RLUIPA are also making their way through the federal appellate

courts.

Currently, 11 states have passed their own RFRAs, all of whichreinstate the compelling-interest test to varying degrees. In otherstates such as Minnesota, Massachusetts and Wisconsin thecourts have held that the compelling-interest test is applicable toreligion claims by virtue of their own state constitutions. In manystates, however, the level of protection that applies to free-exerciseclaims is uncertain.

Freedom of Religion in the Philippines

In the Philippine setting, the two concepts namely, theestablishment clause and the free exercise clause, ascomprehensively discussed in the preceding section, are clearlyapplicable. It can be gleaned from the wordings of the Constitutionthat no law shall be made establishing a state religion or any statute

that prohibits the free exercise or profession of any religion. One ofthe earlier cases that tackled this freedom is Aglipay vs. Ruiz.18 In

17 Case No. 95-2074.

18 64 Phil 201.

158


15/31


this case, our Supreme Court took a more liberal approach than theUS Supreme Court case ofEverson vs. Board of Education.

The petitioner, Msgr. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of thePhilippine Independent Church, seeks to prevent the respondentDirector of Posts from issuing and selling postage stampscommemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies ofManila that he would order the issuance of postage stampscommemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the RomanCatholic Church. The more important question raised refers to thealleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing andselling postage stamps commemorative of the 33th InternationalEucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondentis violative of the provisions of Section 13, subsection 3, Article VI, ofthe Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:

"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated,applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, orsupport of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or

system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such,except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary isassigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,orphanage, or leprosarium."

The Supreme Court, while discussing the background of the rightto religion in the Philippines, ruled:

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of theprinciple of separation of church and state. Without the necessityof adverting to the historical background of this principle in ourcountry, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of thehistory of mankind, has taught us that the union of church andstate is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when thestate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon inthe furtherance of their respective ends and aims. The MalolosConstitution recognized this principle of separation of church andstate in the early stages of our constitutional development; it wasinserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and

Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley'sInstructions to the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in thePhilippine Bill of 1902 and in the Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916,and finally embodied in the Constitution of the Philippines as thesupreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to saynow that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom.

159


16/31


All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest,in taking their oath to support and defend the Constitution, bindthemselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guaranteeof religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized

implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by ourConstitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate isnot inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denialof its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith toan active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator isrecognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purestprinciples of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highlyappreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of theirConstitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to

establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserveand develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the generalwelfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessingsof independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,"they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placedunfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men andnations. The elevating influence of religion in human society isrecognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain generalconcessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects anddenominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxationproperties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (Sec. 14, Sub-sec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and Sec. 1, Sub-sec.4, Ordinance appended thereto;

Assessment Law, Sec. 344, par. [c], Adm. Code). Sectarianaid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or otherreligious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armedforces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium (Sec.13, Sub-sec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optionalreligious instruction in the public schools is by constitutionalmandate allowed (Sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines,in relation to Sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy

Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are madelegal holidays (Sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular ideathat their observance is conducive to beneficial moral results. Thelaw allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certaincrimes against religious worship are considered crimes against thefundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, RevisedPenal Code).

x x x x x x x x x

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view.What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power todetermine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be"advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase"advantageous to the Government" does not authorize theviolation of the Constitution. It does not authorize theappropriation, use or application of public money or property for

160


17/31


the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In thepresent case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps inquestion by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of PublicWorks and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian

feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. Thestamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the RomanCatholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of thestamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from theletter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated onpage 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose inissuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippinesand attract more tourists to this country." The officials concernedmerely took advantage of an event considered of internationalimportance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people"(Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works andCommunications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936;p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stampsas actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing aCatholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map ofthe Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and aninscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International EucharisticCongress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not theEucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of thePhilippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that whilethe issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be

inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, theresulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman CatholicChurch, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We areof the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed inits activities simply because of incidental results, more or lessreligious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which couldlegitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The mainpurpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere-incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts,175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counselfor the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete separation ofchurch and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection aconstitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the sceneof religious intolerance and persecution, care should be taken thatat this stage of our political development nothing is done by theGovernment or its officials that may lead to the belief that theGovernment is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect orinstitution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of ActNo. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we havecome to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional

infraction in the case at bar. Act No. 4052 grants the Director ofPosts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works andCommunications, discretion to issue postage stamps with newdesigns "as often as may be deemed advantageous to theGovernment." Even if we were to assume that these officialsmade use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage

161


18/31


stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to takein weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and theunconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to befilled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as

coming within a constitutional inhibition.

InAmerican Bible Society vs. City of Manila,19plaintiff is a foreign,non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation. In the courseof its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing andselling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during theJapanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating thesame into several Philippine dialects. On May 29, 1953, the actingCity Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it wasconducting the business of general merchandise since November,1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit andmunicipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended,and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff tosecure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees,together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45.Plaintiff protested against this requirement, but the City Treasurer

demanded that plaintiff deposit and pay under protest the sum ofP5,891.45, if suit was to be taken in court regarding the same. Toavoid the closing of its business as well as, further fines andpenalties in the premises, on October 24, 1953, plaintiff paid to thedefendant under protest the said permit and license fees in theaforementioned amount.

On the main issue of whether the act of imposing license fees bythe City of Manila is an act restrictive the free exercise and

enjoyment of the religious profession and worship, the High Courtruled:

Article III, section 1, clause (7) of the Constitution of thePhilippines aforequoted, guarantees the freedom of religiousprofession and worship. "Religion has been spoken of as 'aprofession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates manto its Creator' (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil., 201). It has reference toone's views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligationsthey impose of reverence-to His being and character, and

obedience to His Will (Davis vs. Beason, 133 U.S., 342). Theconstitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment ofreligious profession and worship carries with it the right todisseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can

19 101 Phil 386.

162


19/31


only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression onthe grounds that there is a clear and present danger of anysubstantive evil which the State has the right to prevent." (Taadaand Fernando on the license tax--a flat tax imposed on the

exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights * * * The powerto impose license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeedas potent as the power of censorship which this Court hasrepeatedly struck down. * * * It is not a nominal fee imposed as aregulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activitiesin question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax leviedand collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whoseenjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press andreligion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That isalmost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flatlicense tax.'

Nor could dissemination of religious information be conditionedupon the approval of an official or manager even if the town wereowned by a corporation as held in the case of Marsh vs. State ofAlabama (326 U.S. 501), or. by the United States itself as held inthe case of Tucker vs. Texas (326 U.S. 517). In the former casethe Supreme Court expressed the opinion that the right to enjoyfreedom of the press and religion occupies a preferred position asagainst the constitutional right of property owners.

'When we balance the constitutional rights of owners of

property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press andreligion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that thelatter occupy a preferred position. * * * In our view thecircumstance that the property rights to the premises where thedeprivation of property here involved, took place, were held byothers than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State'spermitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as torestrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of suchrestraint by the application of a State statute.'" (Taada andFernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p.304-306).

Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, otherwise knownas the National Internal Revenue Code, provides:

Sec. 27. Exemptions From Tax On Corporations. The following organizations shall not be taxed under thisTitle in respect to income received by them as such; x x x

(e) Corporations or associations organized andoperated exclusively for religious, charitable, x x x oreducational purposes, x x x Provided, however, That theincome of whatever kind and character from any of its

properties, real or personal, or from any activityconducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made ofsuch income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under thisCode;" is a license taxa flat tax imposed on theexercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights x x x.The power to impose license tax on the exercise of these

163


20/31


21/31


saint's wooden image and making the image available to theCatholic church.

The preposterousness of that argument is rendered more

evident by the fact that counsel advanced that argument in behalfof the petitioner, Father Osmea, the parish priest.

The wooden image was purchased in connection with thecelebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, SanVicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion norinterfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrioresidents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass.Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed inthe church when the mass was celebrated.

If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta

and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intendedto facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisitionand display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal.

As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in ruralcommunities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery ofthe lives of the masses.

The barangay council designated a layman as the custodianof the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it isfavoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for thatarrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman'scustody, could easily be made available to any family desiring toborrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.

The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown intheir affidavits. Petitioner Garces swore that the said resolutionsfavored the Catholic church. On the other hand, petitioners Dagarand Edullantes swore that the resolutions prejudiced the Catholicsbecause they could see the image in the church only once a yearor during the fiesta.

Religion in the Educational Institutions

The more controversial issue is the freedom of religion inPhilippine schools. The issue takes a more significant discussiondue to the proliferation of schools and educational institutions run byreligious orders. At the onset, it must be noted that schools cannotpromulgate rules prohibiting students from exercising their freedomof religion or force them to follow school rules against their religious

beliefs. This rule is not only applicable to both sectarian and non-sectarian schools.

165


22/31


Thus, the DepEd21 requires, that pursuant to the Constitutionalguarantee on the rights of citizens to freedom of religion and non-discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, creed or color, all schools

should strive to ensure that these rights of students are protectedand strengthened. In view thereof, all schools, both public andprivate, are directed to review their policies to ensure that these aresensitive to the religious rights of students.

In the specific case of Muslim students, the following policiesshall be adopted:

a. Female Muslim school children should be allowed to use theirveil or headdress (hijab) inside the school campus;

b. In Physical Education (PE) classes, Muslim girls shall not berequired to wear shorts; they shall be allowed to wearappropriate clothing in accordance with their religious beliefs;

c. Muslim students shall not be required to participate in non-Muslim religious rites.22

Although the above directive mentions in particular the Muslimstudents, the rules are understood to be applicable to all religions.However, it is wrong for students to assert freedom of religion toexempt him or her from the religious policy of a sectarian school.The reason is simple. While students are not deprived of theirfreedom of religion, upon enrollment in a religious school, they havevoluntarily entered to abide by the school's religion and the policythereon.

The discussion on freedom of religion in schools will not becomplete without discussing the flag saluting controversy decided bythe Supreme Court.

The Ebralinag Doctrine

21 DepEd Order No. 53, series of 2001.

22 Ibid.

166


23/31


In the case of Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. The DivisionSuperintendent of Schools of Cebu, et al.,23 the sole issue waswhether or not school children who were members of the Jehovahs

Witnesses could be expelled for refusing to take part in the flagceremony due to religious beliefs.

The same question was raised in 1959, in Gerona, et al. vs. TheSecretary of Education, et al.24and Balbuna, et al. vs. The Secretaryof Education, et al.25

The Supreme Court upheld the expulsion in the Gerona case,declaring

The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of thePhilippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unityand cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and theConstitution guarantee and protect. Under a system of completeseparation of church and state in the government, the flag isutterly devoid of any religious ceremony. The flag salute is nomore a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by apublic official or by a candidate for admission to the bar.

In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, theState thru the Secretary of Education is not imposing a religion orreligious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merelyenforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all. xx

The children of Jehovahs Witnesses cannot be exemptedfrom participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right tosuch exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement willdisrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the schoolpopulation which by far constitutes the great majority.

The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitutiondoes not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance withreasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulationspromulgated by competent authority.

Balbuna reiterated Gerona, to wit:

The Secretary of Education was duly authorized by theLegislature thru Republic Act 1265 to promulgate said DepartmentOrder, and its provisions requiring the observance of the flag

salute, not being a religious ceremony but an act and profession of

23 219 SCRA 256.

24 106 Phil 1.

25 110 Phil 150.

167


24/31


love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland whichthe flag stands for, does not violate the constitutional provision onfreedom of religion.26

However, in the Ebralinag case, the Supreme Court abandonedboth precedents, stating

The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, singthe national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge during a flagceremony on pain of being dismissed from ones job or beingexpelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the presentgeneration of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rightswhich guarantees their rights to free speech and free exercise ofreligious profession and worship.

x x x x x x x x x

The situation that the Court directly predicted in Gerona that:

The flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhapsconducted with very few participants, and the time will come whenwe would have citizens untaught and uninculcated in and notimbued with reverence for the flag and love of country, admirationfor national heroes, and patriotism - a pathetic, even tragicsituation, and all because a small portion of the school populationimposed its will, demanded and was granted an exemption.

(Gerona, p. 24)

We are not persuaded that by exempting the JehovahsWitnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem andreciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedlycomprises a small portion of the school population will shake upour part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation untaught anduninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag,patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes.(Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 1, 24). After all, what thepetitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not

exclusion from the public school where they may study theConstitution, the democratic way of life and form of government,and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culturebut also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taughtthe virtues of patriotism, respect for human rights and duties ofcitizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Section 3(2), ArticleXIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling orbanning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about thevery situation that this court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a smallreligious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in aceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly beconducive to love of country or respect for duly constitutedauthorities.

x x x x x x x x x

26 Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.

168


25/31


Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovahs Witnessesfrom the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right asPhilippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive freeeducation, for it is the duty of the State to protect and promote

the right of all citizens to quality education x x x and to make sucheducation accessible to all. (Section 1, Article XIV).

In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54,72-75, we upheld the exemption of members of the Iglesia niCristo, from the coverage of a closed shop agreement betweentheir employer and a union because it would violate the teaching oftheir church not to join any labor group.

x x x It is certain that not every conscience can beaccommodated by all laws of the land; but when general lawsconflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to begranted unless some compelling state interests intervene.(Sherbert vs. Berner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 970, 83 S.Ct. 1790.)

We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to theJehovahs Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flagceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, howeverbizarre those beliefs may seem to others.

Expressing reservations and concern over the serious adverse

effects the Ebralinagdoctrine may have on the authority of schools,colleges and universities to promulgate rules of conduct for theirstudents, Justice George R. Coquia27 wrote

The Philippine Supreme Court in reversing the Gerona casehad cited the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the WestVirginia vs. Barnette case, but applied the principle of freedom ofreligion. Actually, the Barnette case did not exactly rule onreligious objections. Justice Jackson, the ponente, held that theschool regulation in question violated the first/amendment to

compel anyone to express views or opinions which he did not hold.The issue which the Philippine Court should have addressed itselfin Ebralinag and Amolo cases is whether Department Order No. 8which implemented Republic Act No. 1265 was a valid secularpolicy. Is the Filipino flag really an image as idol?

Indeed the Filipino flag is a symbol of the Republic of thePhilippines utterly devoid of any religious significance. It does notrepresent idolatry or god. In fact it represents the Filipino people.It is entirely secular. The religious liberty as enshrined in theConstitution has never excluded legislation of general scope not

directed against doctrinal loyalties of particular sects.Conscientious scruples have not in the course of long struggle for

27 The Flag Salute Ruling: A Case of Valid Secular Policy on Religious

Freedom to Evade Civil Responsibility? published in the San Beda Law Journal,1994.

169


26/31


religious toleration relieved the individual from obedience to ageneral law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religiousbeliefs. Religious convictions which contravene the relevantconcerns of a political society do not relieve the citizen from the

discharge of political responsibilities. The inculcation of patriotismthrough flag salute ceremonies and reciting the pledge of loyalty isa valid concern of the State. It did not become invalid because itviolated religious principles of a certain religious sect.

Although the freedom of religion has been granted apreferred position in the group of legal values, it is not altogetherabsolute as all other rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. It maybe limited on consideration of public policy, safety and health.Religious doctrines may not be used as an excuse for thecommission of crimes, infringe upon the rights of others or evade

civic responsibilities that would be tantamount to making religiousbeliefs superior to the law of the land and in effect permitting everycitizen to be the law unto himself (Watson vs. Jones, 13 Wall, 679(1871)). This is shown in court rulings concerning conscientiousobjectors.

The decision allowing the witnesses of Jehovah fromparticipation in singing the national anthem and the flag salute, thereciting of the patriotic pledge on grounds of religious convictionmay open the way to grave consequences in the future in thePhilippines. It is very evident that the Supreme Court followed the

trend of decisions in the U.S. courts which reversed its owndecisions on similar issues. In seventeen major cases in theUnited States the U.S. Supreme Court reversed itself twice, inthree cases, the Court was divided into a 5 to 4 voting and others6 to 3 eliciting about 29 separate opinions.

The trend of decisions of United States Supreme Court hasinterpreted too liberally the concept of freedom of religion and theno establishment of religion clause of the constitution to such anextent of even justifying the freedom not to believe over those whobelieve. This is shown in the recent school prayer and Bible

reading cases in public schools. In George Wallace, Governor ofAlabama vs. Ismael Joffre, three Alabama statutes authorizing aperiod of silence in all public schools for meditation and voluntaryprayer were held to be unconstitutional as violative of the noestablishment of religion clause. The Court ruled that the prayereven voluntary in character was repugnant to the First Amendmentof the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court even legalizedabortion at a certain stage of pregnancy on the ground of thewomans right to personal privacy (Roe vs. Waade, 410 U.S. 113(1973)). In Doe vs. Bolton, 410 U.S. 1979 (1973) the Court heldunconstitutional a Georgia abortion law which prohibited abortion

before ending the first trimester of pregnancy.

What should be an ominous warning was the JehovahsWitnesses in the United States did after winning the Barnette caseWitnesses. In several states they made utterances both oral andwritten also on grounds of religious freedom depreciating the war

170


27/31


effort. They publicly presented their views on the obnoxiousnature of the flag salute and pledge of allegiance to it. The U.S.Supreme Court in Taylor vs. Mississippi (319 U.S. 538 [1943])even reversed the conviction of the Witnesses on the ground that

if the Court has just decided in (Barnette) case that Witnesses hadthe right to refuse to salute the flag because it violated theirreligious conviction, they could not be convicted for stating theirreasons and beliefs upon which they rested their non-compliance.The U.S. Supreme Court evaded the issue of the seditious words.

The crying need at this time in the Philippines is morediscipline and not freedom especially if such freedom amounts tolicense. Article XIV, Section 3 of the Philippine Constitution whichprovides that all educational institutions shall inculcate patriotismand nationalism will be rendered ineffective. It is the sad

experience in the Philippines that even graduates of the PhilippineMilitary Academy which is supposed to be a premier and modelschool for training of the youth for discipline, patriotism, loyalty andlove of country are the ones initiating rebellion to overthrow theduly constituted authorities. They have openly uttered seditiouswords and defiance of their superiors and not one of them havebeen prosecuted in their acts.

Students in the state university in open defiances of schoolauthorities refuse to attend their classes contesting the authority ofa duly elected President of the university. Almost every week

students hold rallies and demonstration in the university belt, athickly populated area, obstructing traffic and disrupting classes inthe schools on trivial causes all in the name of freedom.

The United States is already a well-established and politicallystable country, with strong economy. It can afford to tolerateseditious acts. The authorities even allow groups to burn andtrample on the U.S. flag. It is not in the Philippines. ThePhilippines which is still on its way of building a nation is not inposition to absurd the excesses of freedom now practiced in theUnited States. The Philippines has in fact been cited as basket

case of U.S. style democracy run amuck. A London analystdescribed the Philippines as an Asian country but its culture isSpanish, with an overlay of Latin American and North Americaninfluence. People know that the Philippines has a carbon copy ofthe American constitution, but what happened? (Time, June 14,1993).28

In the light of the Ebralinagdoctrine, sectarian schools must nowask whether they can subject students to disciplinary action forrefusing on religious grounds to participate in the religious activities

and rites of the school. Can a catholic school compel a non-believerto attend first Friday mass in school on pain of disciplinary sanction?

28 Ibid., pp. 58-64.

171


28/31


29/31


30/31


when he halted a religious procession, attacking the participantstherein with the help of three (3) men. An officer disturbs theceremonies when his behavior paralyzes or interrupts a religiousmanifestation or prevents it from being carried out with the usual

formality or devotion. The privilege of religious worship cannot besuspended by any person even on the pretense of authority.

Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, likewise punishes anyindividual who in a place devoted to religious worship or during thecelebration of any religious ceremony shall perform an actnotoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the faithful. (seeUS vs. Balcuesta, 25 Phil. 223 [1917]; People vs. Reyes, CA G.R.No. 13633-R, July 27, 1955).

An act is considered notoriously offensive to the religiousfeelings when it ridicules or makes light of anything devoted toreligious ceremonies; and when it plays with, damages or destroysany object of veneration of the faithful. x x x.

Proper Norms of Proselytism

It may be concluded that although the exercise of religion iscomplemented and oftentimes reinforced by the guarantee offreedom of speech, of the press and of the right to assembly andpetition under the Constitution, the latter freedom may not be usedas a cloak, under cover of which one may run counter to theinterests of the State. The right to natural liberty, as in the case of

every natural right, is measured and limited by natural moral law.The citizen has the right to think, to speak, to write, to print, and topublish freely, but with decency and with truth proximately orremotely rests on moral law. The rights of free speech and freepress may not be stretched so as to interfere with the rights ofothers, or to violate public regulations or the penal laws of the land,enacted for the good order and general welfare of the people.

In fine, religion calls for affirmations and actions manifestingthose beliefs. It is protected by the Constitution when clearlyrepresented as religious, but only in the realm of belief or some

manifestations affecting such belief.The exercise of the freedom of religious worship or profession

and including the right to proselytize especially in pluralisticsocieties is now subject to certain regulatory norms. For in the useof all freedoms, the moral principle of personal and socialresponsibility is to be observed. In the exercise of their rights,individual men and social groups are bound by the moral law tohave respect both for the rights of others and for their own dutiestoward others and for the common welfare for all. Men are to dealwith their fellows in justice and civility. Furthermore, society haspretext of freedom of religion. It is the special duty of governmentto provide this protection. Its action of course is to be controlled byjuridical norms which are in conformity with the objective moralorder.

While religious bodies or individuals have the right not to behindered in their public teaching and witness to their faith, in

174


31/31


spreading religious faith, everyone ought at all times to refrain fromany manner of action which might constitute coercion, or kind ofpersuasion that would be dishonorable or unworthy, especiallywhen dealing with the poor or uneducated people. Such a manner

of action would have to be considered an abuse of ones own rightand a violation of the right of others. As it is, the proper spread ofthe gospel should be distinguished from proselytism. The latterhas been termed as a corruption of missionary work by appeal tohidden forms of coercion or by propaganda unworthy of thegospel. It is more of an abuse of religious freedom.

***

175

chapter vii - religion

Documents