chapter v. changes in labor relations 1....
TRANSCRIPT
Chapter V. Changes in Labor Relations 1. Introduction
Some time ago, Dunlop proposed the concept of industrial relations system to
refer to the basic values, laws, institutions and organizational practices that govern
employment relations (Dunlop, 1958). Later, in Foucault’s theory and in post-
structuralism, the system notion was criticized and the lattice or constellation concept
was proposed to take into account less rigid relations, with discontinuities, dispersions,
contradictions, and hard relations (cause-effect) together with more lax relations
(impressions, illustrations). Thus we may consider the industrial relations system as a
constellation of relations that are not all functional in relation to the whole, or in other
words, a not entirely coherent “system.” On the other hand, Dunlop’s definition is
strongly biased with its accent on the “regular” character of industrial relations, with
shared values and clearly established norms accepted by the actors, forming a system
with their institutions, similar to a Parsonian social system. It would seem that there are
no grounds for anomalistic conflict, and if it appears, it is only within the framework of
what the system itself has foreseen. Behind this functionalist conception of the industrial
relations system is the appearance of “organized capitalism,” linked to the interventionist,
benefactor State with its intention to harness interclass conflict within legally sanctioned
norms and channel it through mediating institutions (Hyman, 2001). All of this has been
part of the reality of 20th century relations between capital and labor, but not all of these
forms of relations may be reduced to the “industrial relations system,” and less so in an
underdeveloped country in which the double logic of these relations is evident on a daily
basis.
In any case, the industrial relations concept remits to various levels of analysis
which, without building a system, may be linked to other levels characteristic of labor
relations. In that respect, Katz and Kochan (1988) affirm that collective negotiation —the
center of industrial relations— may be contemplated at three levels:
Strategic: the objectives, structures and strategies of labor unions and management;
Functional: the collective negotiation process itself, implying a legal labor framework,
institutions and procedures, as well as customs and traditions; and
Workplace: how industrial relations and collective negotiation translate into a workplace.
Kochan and Katz refer in reality to the impertinence of separation between
industrial relations (IR) and labor relations (LR). This last concept is commonly referred
to as “the forms and mechanisms for interrelation used by subjects in the framework of
production organization for the purpose of making decisions on the conditions for
carrying out work and the distribution of results" (Bronstein, 1995). In other words,
interpenetration occurs between IR and LR depending on the problem under analysis, and
these concepts remit rather to capital-labor relation levels, not limited to the two named
(IR and LR) but also others which may be specified and revealed in each particular case.
The capital-labor (C-L) relation in Mexico is composed of spaces and levels not
necessarily found in the same way in all countries. Some are direct levels in the
workplace and others are mediated through institutions and organizations:
1) C-L relations in the work process. Similar to Kochan’s definition for the workplace,
although the accent need not be exclusively placed on those relations which point toward
worker integration into company purposes in the workplace or increased productive
efficiency. If we open the concept, leaving space for the dysfunctional, incoherencies and
conflict, we are left in part with coded relations (by the organization or by collective
contracting), and in part with practices which follow labor customs and the labor cultures
of workers and management that are not always shared or part of a system. There is no
reason to suppose that C-L work process relations form part of a single system, nor that
values are shared, nor that total integration is required for work process efficiency. For
example, it is important to consider the possibility of coercion in the work process
through not necessarily consensual norms vertically imposed by management. It is
evident that there are uncertain and undefined spaces in the work process, with mobile
borders in terms of coding, however there are also spaces characterized by implicit
negotiations and power balances among actors.
2) In the circulation of the labor force: factors related to worker income (wages) and
employment volume (labor market), among others. These relations have been an area
exclusively reserved for the collective bargaining process.
3) In the social reproduction of the labor force: may be broken down into management of
the labor force by the State, and management of the labor force by companies and labor
unions.
4) That of conflicts and collective negotiation, which may be present without having been
exhausted in the three previous levels. Levels related to negotiation and conflict would
include those found in relations between labor unions and the State, and in the labor law
system. The formal, practical aspect of the process of collective negotiation should be
included at another level, or as in Mexico, in “the two frameworks of collective
negotiation,” where the informal is not simply that which fills the spaces left by the
formal, but that which on occasion substitutes it. And finally, we would also have to
consider conflicts as including the level of the labor movement, understood as collective
worker action.
5) Union relations with the “political system,” including political parties, social
movements, NGOs, legislatures, and the governmental administrative apparatus.
6) Broader relations between labor unions, the State, and business organization (historic
agreements, corporatism, etc.).
In synthesis, the capital-labor relation in Mexico ranges from the workplace to
formal collective negotiation, State relations and the labor movement. To consider them
related within a system is not very realistic. In any case it would be a “system” filled with
contradictions, incoherencies, asynchronous changes and discontinuities. As a system it
would be of marginal use, in terms of revealing its dynamisms, and with that conception
we would be forced to focus on normative analysis instead of analyzing reality, which in
Mexico are aspects which quite possibly correspond to different frameworks.
The international controversy around the flexibility of the labor force began
around 1980. The connotations of this controversy are academic (Taylorism-Fordism
crisis) or related to management strategy (Toyotism), State posture (flexibilization
policies in labor law or the exclusion of labor unions in State policy design), and labor
unions (resistance to or negotiation of flexibility) nature.
According to some of these theorizations, Taylorism-Fordism has reached its limit
in fomenting increased productivity and linking mass production and mass consumption.
Flexible organizational forms are becoming alternatives to take its place.
-The flexibility of the labor force or flexible use of the labor force may consist of
various dimensions:
Numerical flexibility: flexible adjustment of the size of the labor force according to
production and market needs. This dimension may take the form of adjustment in full-
time, permanent personnel; temporary worker employment; outsourcing; and classified,
white-collar personnel.
Flexibility in the use of the labor force in the work process: its main forms may be
internal mobility and a multi-skill focus. Also included in this modality may be flexibility
in applying sanctions, elimination of blind promotions, and decreasing the categories in
the job scale.
Wage flexibility: flexibility in the work year, with per-hour pay and especially, income
according to individual or group productivity or performance.
Proposals for labor force flexibility have taken different forms, such as the
flexibilization of collective bargaining agreements, flexibilization of labor laws,
flexibility in productive process practice, and labor market flexibility. But labor
flexibilization may be unilateral or it may be bilateral with labor unions or workers.
2. Changing Labor Relations
During the era of the new economic model (1982 to the present), Mexican labor and
industrial relations have been transformed through three stages:
a) First stage: Unilateral flexibilization. Between 1985 and 1992 there was a general
tendency toward the flexibilization of labor relations and the loss of labor union presence
in the designing of State economic and labor policy. Some of the most important
collective bargaining agreements went through a flexibilization process during this period
(in aviation, oil, iron and steel, telecommunications, and automotive industries, to give
some examples), and flexibility meant unilateral, management power in production
decisions. Flexibility was particularly numerical and functional, but not wage-oriented
(De la Garza, 1998) (Pozas, 1992) (Montiel, 1991) (De la O and Quintero, 1992) (Rueda,
1993) (Quintero, 1993). There were many disputes related to the flexibilization of
collective bargaining agreements in large companies during this period, especially in
government-owned companies prior to their privatization. These disputes were resolved
against labor union positions, with the exception of Telmex. Government-linked labor
unions attempted one last show of resistance without breaking their relationship with the
State in the late 1980s, when they criticized neoliberalism and vindicated the ideology of
the Mexican Revolution, but due to the loyalties and policies maintained by labor union
leaders, to the exclusion of the interests of the rank and file, the resistance movement did
not reach a significant stage. Independent unions resisted as far as their limited capacities
allowed, but in general were defeated.
b) Second stage: Negotiating. The second stage covered a period from 1992 to 1994,
coinciding with the government’s promotion of productivity agreements with bonus
schemes as a form of wage recovery —a new wage concept, and the possibility of a new
social pact between labor unions, companies and the State to substitute that of the
Mexican Revolution. This is also when discussion focused on the crisis in State
corporatism, and the need for new State-allied but also company-allied unionism in the
battle for the competitive edge. This process officially began with signing of the National
Agreement on Increasing Productivity and Quality (Acuerdo Nacional para la Elevación
de la Productividad y la Calidad—ANEPC, 1992), in which labor unions are
acknowledged on paper as interlocutors in negotiations with management on corporate
modernization. This pact details the government’s proposed productivity agreement
adopting the latest total quality concepts; establishes bilaterality between companies and
labor unions; and enunciates a complete industrialization model. In the following section
we will analyze the path taken by the productivity pacts that emanated from this
agreement (De la Garza, 1993).
We can classify the productivity agreements in two types: active and passive. In
the first, labor unions are given the role of active interlocutors in corporate restructuring
plans, and the opportunity for broad participation in their design, implementation and
evaluation. With regard to the productivity program, labor unions may intervene in
decision-making involving technological, organizational, training, work conditions and
environment, and productivity measurement aspects and in determining the criteria for
distributing economic benefits.
Passive productivity pacts limit action by labor unions to merely accepting
management projects in exchange for preserving certain work conditions and especially
defining productivity incentives. In this case, labor unions do not participate in designing
the corresponding plans or determining productivity indicators. It is an instrumental pact
which does not modify labor relations between companies and labor unions. In other
words, it signifies giving companies free reign, in exchange for some supplementary
income for workers.
Starting at the outset of 1994 and in relation to NAFTA, the Mexican government
induced the establishment of productivity agreements between companies and labor
unions. The government also promised changes in the formula for annual wage increases,
from a calculation based on the following year’s projected inflation rate to a new formula
which would also take into account the previous year’s productivity increase.
In 1994, the Metropolitan Association of Industrial Relations Executives
(Asociación Metropolitana de Ejecutivos de Relaciones Industriales) conducted a
Productivity Agreements survey, and following are some of the most important results of
that survey:
• Most companies did not establish productivity agreements until 1994, in other
words, under pressure from the October 1993 Economic Pact between labor
unions, company owners and government.
• Individual bonus payments predominated.
• 58% of companies that signed collective bargaining agreements in early 1994 and
established agreements fixed the amount of 2% of base wages for bonuses, the
same as that established by the Pact for minimum wages.
The Labor Ministry carried out its own Productivity Agreements survey in 1994,
the results of which may be summarized as follows:
- Productivity agreements were highly concentrated in large companies; 87.8% of
agreements corresponded to companies with more than 300 workers.
- Only 50% of agreements mentioned measuring, diagnosing and economically
stimulating increased productivity.
- In 1994, 79.4% of agreements allocated 2% or less per bonus and these agreements
encompassed 87.2% of workers.
- Most agreements only considered general company performance and did not measure
individual, group or department productivity.
- The most common goals were reduced to merely attendance and punctuality.
All agreements used similar terms to declare each party’s commitment to confront
globalization challenges, promote a new work culture, and involve labor unions and
workers in productive modernization. They also recognized needs for new contents in
training and to move from confrontation and distrust between capital and labor toward a
climate of cooperation and collaboration. Differences exist among agreements as to
whether they promote individual, group or mixed bonuses. Some contemplate mixed
commissions while others make no such mention, or assign their occasional functions to
traditional labor union entities. Some agreements which include mixed commissions
assign them broad functions, approaching what we have called active strategy. The
determination of parameters for measuring and the forms of payment are established both
unilaterally and bilaterally. Some establish a maximum bonus amount in relation to base
wages while others do not indicate limits of any sort. The conditions for receiving
bonuses also vary: bonuses are rewarded in some cases simply for fulfillment of certain
previously established goals, while in others the percentage which may be received upon
surpassing certain previously-reached values in productivity is left open. Total resources
designated to bonuses may be previously established indicating an upper limit, or they
may depend on results obtained, with no established limit. Finally, it may be noted that
some companies offered productivity bonuses in exchange for flexibilization of collective
bargaining agreements, allowing a multi-skill focus, or reducing categories in wage
scales.
c) Third stage: Progress and limitations in flexibilization.
In the third stage of changes in labor relations, from December 1994 to the
present, the strategy for establishing productivity agreements and bonuses was initially
minimized, in response to the economic crisis initiated in December 1994 which
depressed real wages considerably and disabled the effect of bonuses on worker income.
Nevertheless, in mid-1995 the Mexican Workers Confederation (Confederación de
Trabajadores de México—CTM) and the Mexican Employers Confederation
(Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana) began negotiations toward a new
labor culture. The negotiations were finalized in August 1996 and proposed a new
relationship between labor unions and companies, focused on cooperation instead of
confrontation, with the aim of winning the battle for competitiveness. The document
incorporates the best-known total quality and just-in-time doctrines and it may be
considered an agreement of principles among labor and employer organizations for labor
law reform.
Over approximately the past ten years we have witnessed the flexibilization of
some of the most important collective bargaining agreements in Mexico. It may be that a
flexibility model is being defined —without bilaterality signifying the involvement of
labor unions.
The intensity of the flexibilization of collective bargaining agreements in Mexico
depends on various factors:
1) Depending on the previous model. From the point of view of labor force
flexibility, collective bargaining agreements in Mexico have been dominated by the
“Mexican Revolution model,” although there have been three other sub-models
influenced by the first:
- The Mexican Revolution model is illustrated in the collective bargaining
agreements of the former, large state-owned corporations, especially the monopolies,
with strong corporatist unions and important PRI and government influence (oil,
electricity, railroads, telecommunications, etc.). This model also applied to large national
or transnational corporations with private capital and strong labor unions. These
collective bargaining agreements incorporated extensive economic benefits with
numerous lucrative advantages for the union as an organization, and strong protection for
workers in terms of job security, no internal mobility or multi-skill focus in the
production process, upon threat of sanctions. The agreements implied broad bilateral
relationships with labor unions in these areas but not in corporate strategic planning or in
technological or organizational changes (Mondragón, 1993) (Mondragón, 1994) (Mora et
al., 1990). This model is the one that has experienced the most transformation since the
1980s. Only some aspects remain to date without flexibilization, such as in the collective
bargaining agreement of the Mexican Electrical Workers Union and some of the
industrial branch agreements referred to as legal contracts (Boston Consulting Group and
Bufete Industrial, 1988).
- The sub-model in small and medium companies, which we might consider the
younger sibling of the model just described, since that is the ideal it follows. However,
these collective bargaining agreements are generally more flexible and unilateral (Morris,
1997) (Mercado, 1992).
- The sub-model focused on labor regulation of government employees, based on
the laws stipulated by ISSSTE, work in government offices, and general work conditions
(GWC). It is unilaterally rigid at the level of the mentioned laws (for example, in the
areas of job permanence, task assignment and benefits system), while flexible in the areas
of GWC due to its unilateral character and other aspects of labor force use. In the 1980s
and 1990s, flexibilization has also been applied to GWCs, although in some cases labor
unions have been able to play an active role in practice (Tiburcio, 1992).
- The sub-model in corporatist yellow unionism —linked to companies, not the
State. This model has always been flexible, with labor unions more concerned with
economic benefits than control over the work process. This model has changed little with
flexibility policies.
Flexibilization in Mexico has most affected the first-order collective bargaining
agreements —long presented as a conquest of the Mexican Revolution, in the sense of a
long process characterized by a historic alliance between the workers movement and the
State (Rodríguez, 1992). If we make a comparison according to the number of years a
company has been in operation, experience shows in general that the collective
bargaining agreements in the newer companies are more flexible than in older companies,
within the same branches.
The flexibilization implemented has most affected the following aspects:
introduction of new technology, work methods, work organization, and corporate
organizational structure, as well as other factors such as:
- use of temporary workers,
- use of outsourcing,
- classification of white-collar workers,
- internal mobility,
- multi-skill focus,
- reducing categories in wage scales,
- elimination of blind promotions, and
- greater management capacity to make adjustments in full-time, permanent
personnel.
In general we are looking at flexibilization that is not based on reaching
agreements, that has been achieved with either passivity or resistance on the part of labor
unions, and has tended to exclude those unions from important decision-making on the
use of the labor force in work processes and technological or organizational changes.
This is what we call unilateral flexibility, as opposed to a type of flexibility which, rather
than letting capital do as it wishes in the work process, looks for consensus, participation
and involvement from labor unions, in the interest of productivity and quality. Alongside
unilateral flexibility, we are witnessing the expansion of new forms of work organization
that presuppose worker involvement —however that involvement can take place either
with intervention by labor unions or with their exclusion, and the latter has been the most
common (Weeks, 1999).
2) The intensity of flexibility in collective bargaining agreements in Mexico also depends
on whether productivity and quality are at the immediate center of corporate strategy
(driven by competition). The greater the importance of productivity and quality for
remaining in the market in Mexico, the greater the tendency toward the flexibilization of
collective bargaining.
Within certain limits, flexibility allows companies to increase productivity (the
Marxist distinction between productivity and labor intensification is obscured in
neoclassic economic theories) because it allows more precise use of the labor force. If
this is modernizing flexibility (Toyotism), then we might also add the contribution to
productivity and quality represented by the interest, initiative and imagination of workers
who have a commitment to capital.
In general, management strategies focused on productivity tend to place emphasis
on:
- technological changes,
- changes in work organization, and/or
- changes in capital-labor relations.
3) Government policy with regard to companies and labor is also a factor in the intensity
of flexibility in collective bargaining. The Mexican government (through the Department
of Labor, for example) continues to maintain an important role with respect to
flexibilization in collective bargaining (Córdova, 1976). Companies, especially those
foreign-owned, sometimes demand flexibility in labor and labor union relations as a
comparative advantage (Cavazos et al., 1993). While this type of negotiation is not made
totally public, we have knowledge of some important cases such as the Ford plant in
Hermosillo, where the company obtained a flexible collective bargaining agreement in
advance —through authorities and labor union leaders— that is very different from the
agreements reached in other Ford plants in Mexico. On other occasions, it is not so much
through negotiations, but rather there is a tacit agreement in which Department of Labor
officials and labor union leaders understand that a new investment will require favorable
conditions, including flexibility in collective bargaining (De la Garza, 1992) (ACLAN,
1997).
4) Union strategy vis-à-vis flexibilization also plays a role. Here, it is important to
reiterate that unionism in Mexico may be divided into three broad tendencies: corporatist
(with its dependence on State policy), independent, and yellow (with dependence on
companies instead of on the State) unionism.
Each of these forms of labor unionism has adopted a different strategy in relation
to flexibilization in collective bargaining:
a) Corporatist unionism has adopted two strategies. In the first and most common,
no opposition is given to flexibilization, and in the best of cases, efforts are made to see
that the Federal Labor Law (Ley Federal de Trabajo—LFT) is respected. The second,
corresponding to some sectors of CTM, CROC and SNTE, consists of negotiating
proposals between labor unions and companies, to ensure that the labor union functions
as an interlocutor in the flexibilization process.
b) Independent unionism has also adopted two different positions. The most
common in this case is opposition, generally followed by defeat. And the second is to
attempt to function as interlocutors in the possible reorganization of work and collective
agreements, which is what FAT and UNT have done. (De la Garza and Melgoza, 1991).
c) Finally, yellow unionism has continued in its historic tradition of submission to
company policies.
The positions taken by labor unions have influenced the reconversion process in
the following ways: passive unions have allowed the most far-reaching examples of
reconversion and flexibilization; unions presenting opposition and resistance have not
detained these processes, however sometimes they have prevented them from being fully
imposed; and unions willing to negotiate compromises have managed to vary the form
and scope of reconversion, without submitting themselves to the weakening process
suffered by those offering resistance.
These labor union positions having an impact on the intensity of flexibilization
also vary according to the democracy practiced in the specific labor unions. Passive
strategies are almost always adopted with only marginal consultation with the rank and
file; unions negotiating compromises tend to consult with members and there is a certain
mobilization and discussion among members; and unions that take a confrontational
stance involve the rank and file membership to a greater degree in mobilization efforts.
5) The tradition of struggle and the worker’s culture. This element, intermixed with labor
union strategies, also has an impact on the intensity of flexibility. Some sectors of
workers have traditions of struggle that are part of their historic memory (Brief and Nord,
1990). The Mexican Electrical Workers Union is one example. These memories may
cause labor unions to consider certain forms of flexibility in collective bargaining as
lacking legitimacy, not only due to the consequences for workers but also because of the
threat to what unions view as their “legacy” won through many years of struggle and
negotiation. However, in addition to this historic memory of past struggles, it is also a
matter of socially acceptable working conditions, possibly influenced by the labor culture
in the region, and the type of worker. One reason that maquila factories are located along
the northern border may be because a new type of worker has been sought (young women
without experience in labor unions or collective bargaining). By locating in zones without
a broad-based social culture in terms of manufacturing labor, it is easier to establish
flexibility conditions that would not be readily accepted by workers in other zones
(Carrillo and Ramírez, 1990).
Taking into account the six factors that potentially have an impact on the intensity
of flexibilization in collective bargaining in Mexico, we can identify two types of
flexibility at the two poles of the spectrum that have been manifested so far in relation to
these factors:
1) First, at one pole we find maximum flexibility and unilaterality on the part of
companies in using the labor force in the work process. This situation can be found
especially in the new export-oriented industry in northern Mexico, combined with new
forms of work organization; with passive or yellow unions, coinciding with a government
policy aimed at attracting investment by offering the comparative advantage of low
wages coupled with work flexibility; with a working class lacking significant job or
collective bargaining experience; and located in zones not previously industrialized and
with undemocratic labor unions.
2) Secondly, we have moderate flexibility without total corporate unilaterality (De
la Garza and Melgoza, 1994). This can be found particularly in the old, reconverted
industry where new forms of work organization have also been applied; with
government-linked, neo-corporatist or independent unions; with a less rigid and unilateral
government policy than in the first case, for the purpose of avoiding employer-worker
and political conflicts; with an older working class having job and labor union
experience, and with a culture of protecting job positions; and with labor unions that are
more active and democratic than in the first. This second pole can be found in private,
modernized industry and government-owned industry.
2. Work flexibility in practice, in manufacturing production
The introduction of new organizational forms in Mexico does not lead to the same
level of numerical flexibility, or direct flexibility or outsourcing. In manufacturing
companies in the formal sector, full-time workers hired for indefinite periods of time
predominate, while part-time and hourly work is marginal. There may be two
explanations for this tendency. One is the long-standing monopoly maintained by labor
unions over the labor market and their historic demand for job security. It may be that the
last recourse offered by corporatist unions for workers in large Mexican companies is a
certain guarantee for job permanence, although the tendency is decreasing. However,
perhaps the most important explanation comes from management strategies with regard
to personnel, which take into account the potential negative effects on productivity from
extreme labor instability, combined with the fact that full-time workers are not so
expensive as to consider substituting them with temporary workers or outsourcing.
Table V-1: PERCENTAGE OF FULL-TIME, PART-TIME, HOURLY, AND
OUTSOURCING WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS IN 1991,
1994 AND 1999
Size Full-time Part-time
1991 1994 1999 1991 1994 1999
Total 85.6 85.5 88.2 0.5 0.4 0.67
Large 86.5 88.4 87.1 0.2 0.09 0.2
Medium 86.2 86.4 86.2 0.3 0.09 0.4
Small 89.1 91.8 90.0 0.8 0.6 1.0
Micro 77.1 78.4 89.7 1.3 0.7 1.2
(Continued)
Size Hourly Outsourcing
1991 1994 1999 1991 1994 1999
Total 0.1 0.03 0.36 1.9 0.2 1.0
Large 0.03 0.03 0.1 1.8 0.3 2.1
Medium 0.06 0.01 0.1 1.6 0.0 0.9
Small 0.4 0.02 0.8 1.7 0.3 1.0
Micro 0.1 0.05 0.6 2.7 0.0 0.2
Source: INEGI (1992, 1995, 1999), ENESTYC.
Note: The reason that the totals for 1999 do not add up to 100% is because there is also a
group of workers who earn salaries. This percentage is also extremely small for all sizes
of establishment —which may be one of few keys left for achieving stability in the area
of labor, and for the survival of one type of corporatist unionism.
As seen in the previous table, the percentage of full-time workers did not decrease
during the 1990s, while non-full time or temporary labor varied only slightly and
remained very secondary.
With regard to the various aspects of functional flexibility, we included them in our
analysis of new forms of work organization in Chapter IV.
In reference to wage flexibility, as we have mentioned, the National Agreement
on Increasing Productivity and Quality (Acuerdo Nacional para la Elevación de la
Productividad y la Calidad—ANEPC) was signed in 1992 among the highest-level labor
union, business and government officials. Its objective was to pressure companies to sign
productivity agreements with labor unions, in an attempt to convert those labor unions
(through an impulse coming from the top) into key players representing capital in
productivity programs, and to establish bonuses or incentives based on productivity. Up
until October 1993, no significant repercussions could be noted from ANEPC, but in that
month a new economic agreement established the partial indexing of minimum wages
with an increase in productivity, and called on company owners to sign productivity
agreements and to raise wages, in part because of that increased productivity. The result
was that by January 1994, the number of productivity agreements began to increase
rapidly. Can this be interpreted as a reverse of the ten-year trend toward unilateral
functional and numerical flexibility but not wage flexibility?
The percentage of workers subject to agreement and wage revision which
included bonuses reached a maximum of 56.5% in 1994, subsequently dropping to 12.1%
in 1996 and holding at that range to the present date. Total agreement and wage revisions
which included bonuses reached a maximum of 13.7% in 1995, dropping to half that
percentage in 1997, and remaining below the 1995 level to date. In other words, the
importance of bonuses has tended to diminish with respect to the number of companies
and workers involved, having reached the highest levels during the first two years of
application (1994 and 1995). Most of the agreements with bonuses correspond to
revisions at the local jurisdiction level, but the majority of workers affected were at the
federal level, although this is the sector that has decreased the most over the years.
Table V-2: AGREEMENT AND WAGE REVISIONS THAT INCLUDE BONUSES OR
INCENTIVES
Year National Federal Local
Revisions Workers Revisions Workers Revisions Workers
1994 2 629 1 203 071 1 505 1 126 555 1 124 76 516
1995 4 351 621 920 1 913 527 915 2 438 94 005
1996 2 870 273 655 832 216 550 2 038 57 105
1997 2 089 280 197 859 252 555 1 230 27 642
1998 2 700 314 099 1 044 282 916 1 656 31 183
1999 2699 314 788 932 274849 1767 39 939
2000 3 092 414 210 1183 365 504 1909 48 706
2001 2 898 344 987 880 304 346 2012 40 641
Source: STyPS (2001) Labor Statistics.
The global results from the policy of granting bonuses and incentives to workers, in terms
of any increase in their wages, are not encouraging: 90% of agreements signed in 1994
allotted a 2% increase for productivity, the same percentage assigned to minimum wages,
and any impact on wages has been extremely minimal (Ruiz Durán, 1998). By 1995, the
policy for recuperating real wages through productivity bonuses was cancelled out, given
a 51.9% inflation rate and an average productivity bonus rate of 1.2%.
Table V-3: WAGE INCREASES OBTAINED IN FEDERAL JURISDICTION
REVISIONS (Percentage of annual increases)
Year Direct
increase in
wage scale
From
adjustment
From
productivity
In benefits From
recalculating
wage scale
1996 21 0.6 0.4 1.3 0.0
1997 19.5 0.05 1.2 2.1 0.09
1998 17.7 0.05 1.2 1.5 0.08
1999 16.5 0.03 1.0 1.6 0.1
2000 12.4 0.04 1.8 1.4 0.1
2001 9.1 0.04 1.6 2.4 0.06
Source: STyPS (2001) Labor Statistics.
Table V-4: PERCENTAGE OF MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS OFFERING
PRODUCTIVITY BONUSES TO THEIR WORKERS AND PERCENTAGE OF
WORKER WAGES CORRESPONDING TO BONUSES, WHEN OFFERED (1994)
SIZE ESTABLISHMENTS WITH
PRODUCTIVITY
BONUSES
PERCENTAGE OF
WAGES
CORRESPONDING TO
BONUSES
Total 5.3 10.3
Large 36.8 8.6
Medium 29.1 8.9
Small 17.6 8.4
Micro 3.9 11.1
Source: INEGI (1995), ENESTYC.
The articulations between companies and their surroundings, specifically in terms of
where suppliers and clients are located, and the forming of productive chains through
outsourcing, were also analyzed in Chapter IV.
As explained in the Annex, numerical, functional and wage Flexibility Indexes
were calculated, and then used to calculate a General Flexibility Index, first using MIM
and ENESTYC surveys, later for a random sample of 1,000 collective bargaining
agreements under federal jurisdiction, and finally for another sample under local
jurisdiction.
The General Flexibility Indexes (MIM, 1994) are averages, and large
establishments are more flexible than medium and small establishments. As for the
differences between exporting and non-exporting manufacturing establishments as well
as those with national versus foreign capital, one might assume that exporting companies
and those with foreign capital would have more modern sociotechnical configurations.
We should first mention that since the survey did not discriminate among large exporters,
conclusions may not apply to companies with high exporting levels. However,
differences in overall flexibility did not vary significantly between exporters and non-
exporters, or according to national versus foreign capital. The more important variations
in flexibility may be observed by looking at company size, especially macro companies
(with more than 500 workers). Similar conclusions may be obtained from calculating the
general flexibility index on the basis of ENESTYC data.
Table V-5: General Work Flexibility Indexes in 1994
Flexibility Index
Total 0.51
Macro 0.59
Large 0.54
Medium 0.5
Small 0.47
Exporters or non-exporters
Exporters 0.50
Non-exporters 0.51
Source of capital
National 0.50
Foreign 0.51
Source: Based on MIM (1994) survey. Index varies between 0 and +1.
As for worker involvement in production, high involvement levels are infrequent in
exporting and non-exporting companies as well as those with national and foreign capital.
Low involvement of workers clearly predominated in all cases.
Table V-6: WORKER INVOLVEMENT LEVEL (Percentage of establishments)
(1994)
INVOLVEMENT EXPORTER SOURCE OF CAPITAL
Yes No Foreign National
Low 70.7 72.5 74.4 71.1
Medium 23.9 22.1 23.1 22.7
High 5.4 5.4 2.5 6.2
Source: MIM (1994).
We have built two indexes on bilaterality between labor unions, companies and
workers, on the basis of MIM survey data. The first (labor union bilaterality) looks at
whether labor unions participate with companies, formally or informally, in making
decisions regarding employing and not employing personnel, the work process,
organization, and technological changes. The second index (total bilaterality) also considers
full-time, permanent workers, in addition to labor unions, while using the same dimensions
of formal or informal co-participation.
The results indicate that high levels of bilaterality in any of its forms are infrequent,
although more common in large establishments.
Table V-7: High Levels of Formal, Informal and Total Bilaterality in Manufacturing
Industry (Percentage of establishments)
Labor union bilaterality Total bilaterality
Formal Informal
Large 8.3 5.3 14.3
Medium 5.6 1.4 0.0
Small 0.6 1.5 0.0
Source: MIM (1994).
In reference to companies negotiating with labor unions and workers on matters
of employment, production process, wages, technology and work organization, the
following two tables show low levels of total bilaterality (formal and informal, with labor
unions and/or workers) in exporters and non-exporters, with insignificant variations
between them. The index is also low among both national and foreign-owned companies,
while lower in foreign-owned.
Table V-8: TOTAL BILATERALITY INDEX 1994 (Percentage of establishments)
BILATERALITY INDEX EXPORTERS CAPITAL
Yes No Foreign National
Low 52.1 53.0 64.8 48.9
Medium 35.7 36.9 30.7 38.0
High 12.1 10.1 4.5 13.1
Source: MIM (1994).
Table V-9: FORMAL LABOR UNION-COMPANY BILATERALITY INDEX
(Percentage of establishments)
FORMAL BILATERALITY
INDEX
EXPORTER CAPITAL
Yes No Foreign National
Low 77.4 78.2 83.3 75.0
Medium 17.1 18.7 13.5 19.7
High 5.5 3.1 3.1 5.3
Source: MIM (1994).
When all the data on flexibility in labor relations is analyzed together —looking at
numerical aspects (facility to hire and fire personnel), functional aspects (multi-skill focus
and internal mobility), and wage aspects (wages based on productivity or quality)— we find
that it is likely that flexibility has advanced in Mexico, especially in large companies. The
level it has maintained, however, is not particularly high but rather at a mid-level.
With regard to zone-based differences in work flexibility and total bilaterality, we
find that in all cases the flexibility level was most often low, however bilaterality was
homogenously low in Tijuana and Yucatan, while in Aguascalientes and Orizaba it was
average in small and medium-sized industry and between low and average in large
companies in Orizaba. This indicates that modernization in work organization in large
companies in Tijuana and Aguascalientes has not been accompanied by bilaterality with
unions or workers. What has taken shape is possibly a modern authoritarian style of control
—different from the traditional authoritarian style in small and medium-sized companies in
Yucatan. The mid-level bilaterality found in Orizaba cannot be explained by new
management conceptions of participation and involvement by workers and unions, but
perhaps by its location in a zone characterized by an old style of unionism which, although
corporatist, preserves remnants of participation with companies in decision-making,
supported by collective bargaining agreements that are different from those in more recently
industrialized areas.
3. Labor unions and flexibility
In Mexico the unionization rate in manufacturing companies changed little between 1991
and 1998, as opposed to most countries, where this rate diminished. The explanation may
be twofold: first, as a consequence of the corporatist agreement for mutual protection
between the State and unions. Although the agreement has suffered from neoliberalism, it
has not been broken. Union leaders have less and less to offer their members but they
have been useful in supporting policies on wage contention and flexibility in large
companies. The logic of sweetheart contracts has predominated in management policies,
even in relations with marginally authentic unions. In Mexico it is considered preferable
to have a union managed by leaders with whom State-supported agreements can be
reached, instead of risking the eventual formation of independent unions.
Table V-10: Percentage of Manufacturing Establishments with Labor Unions in 1998
Size Total Large Medium Small Micro
Percentage of
establishments
with unions
8.1 90.1 79.9 42.7 4.2
Percentage of
unionized
workers
46.0 68.2 56.4 34.9 8.6
Source: INEGI (1999), ENESTYC.
Table V-11: Correlation Coefficients between Unionization Rate and Productive Process
and Labor Variables
1991 1998
Productivity 0.545 0.548
Percentage with new technology 0.272 --
Percentage that made changes in production
organization
0.949 0.83
Percentage of full-time workers 0.47 (1994)
Percentage that used temporary workers 0.791 0.603
Percentage that used outsourcing 0.897 0.206
Percentage with worker involvement 0.818
Average remuneration per worker 0.59 0.70 (1994)
Percentage of establishments with productivity
bonuses
0.74 (1994)
Source: Based on INEGI data (1992, 1999), ENESTYC.
The above table illustrates a positive correlation between the presence of unions
in manufacturing plants and productivity, new technology, changes in work organization,
full-time employment, employment of temporary workers, use of outsourcing, worker
participation in improving productivity, wages, and productivity bonuses.
It is certainly true that a high positive correlation between unionization and
company modernization does not necessarily signify that labor unions are active,
participative agents in that modernization. In fact, our bilaterality measures indicate the
opposite, but at least we find that labor unions are not an obstacle for innovation in
companies and work flexibility.
Large companies are the most innovative and at the same time show the highest
unionization rate. MIM survey results also show positive correlations between
unionization and productivity, as well as between unionization and average remuneration
per worker.
Table V-12: Unionization and Level of Productivity in Manufacturing Industry, 1994
(percentage of establishments)
Presence of union Low productivity Average productivity High productivity
Yes 88.3 0.51 11.2
No 94.9 0.0 5.1
Source: MIM (1994).
Close relations between labor unions and the State continue in Mexico, despite the
weakening of unions and the difficulty in eradicating the tradition of Department of
Labor intervention in labor relations (De la Garza, 1993b) (Middlebrook and Quintero,
1998). These relations are, however, in the process of being redefined in the aftermath of
the PRI’s electoral defeat in the year 2000. It is difficult to use the number of labor strikes
as an indicator of conflict. The calls to strike, strikes, and number of striking workers
diminished in 1994, and the downward trend continued throughout the decade, although
the number of striking workers rebounded notably in 1999. On the other hand, the
number of labor claims filed that did not imply a call to strike increased in 1995 and then
remained high. For some time now this appears to have become the legal channel for
worker discontent, and has demonstrated viability —given the way that union
representation functions in Mexico.
Table V-13: Labor Conflicts in Companies Under Federal and Local Jurisdiction
1990 1993 1994 1995 1999
Claims filed 78 956 131 931 136 170 158 664 120 774
Calls to strike registered 34 141 42 573 43 370 42 368 39 195
Strikes 829 629 588 577 257
Striking workers 68 782 48 350 47 746 31 019 61 113
Conflicts in public sector 5,026 2,564 3,026 6,543
Source: Statistical Annex of Ernesto Zedillo’s Sixth State of the Union Report (2000).
4. Changes in Collective Bargaining
1). Introduction
For collective bargaining purposes, Mexican legislation divides workers into
those governed by Constitutional Article 123, Section A and regulated by the Federal
Labor Law (LFT); those governed by Section B and regulated by the Federal Law for
Government Employees (Ley Federal de Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado); and those
not included in the above two groups and subject to other special regulations.
The first group corresponds in general to workers in the private sector and in most
state-owned companies. The second category applies in general to workers employed by
the federal government as well as by a few state-owned companies. And the third
category includes the marines, members of security forces, foreign service employees,
Federal Electoral Institute workers, and workers employed by state and municipal
governments (the latter of which are subject to their own laws with provisions similar to
those in the noted Section B).
Workers governed by Section A enjoy the Constitutional right to collective
bargaining; while workers governed by Section B and those in the exceptional category
do not.
The Law defines a collective bargaining agreement as an agreement reached
between one or various labor unions and one or various employers or employer unions to
establish the conditions for working in one or more companies or establishments.
Two or more labor unions may establish collective agreements with a single
employer, and two or more employers may establish collective agreements with a single
labor union within the same industrial branch. Collective bargaining agreements in
Mexico are generally established at the company or establishment level. The exceptions
are legal contracts established between one or several labor unions and several employers
in the same industrial sector. The only sectors with their own legal contracts are: textiles,
rubber, sugar, and radio/television. Although legal contracts establish working conditions
for the entire sector, complementary individual agreements may also be established with
specific companies.
For workers entitled to collective bargaining, a single Federal Labor Law exists at
the national level, but its application corresponds to state governments (local jurisdiction)
except in those cases considered within the law to be under federal jurisdiction.
Generally, the latter correspond to the sectors which are the most important economically
and in terms of number of workers (railroad, mining, oil, textiles, federal concession
transportation, telephone and telegraph communications, education, film, rubber, sugar,
petrochemical, metallurgic, iron and steel, automotive, pharmaceutical, cellulose and
paper, vegetable oils, food packaging and canning, beverage bottling, limestone, lumber,
glass, and tobacco) or companies operating in two or more states.
Generally there is one collective agreement per company or establishment which
is signed by the majority union, although its effects extend to all the workers. Collective
bargaining agreements in Mexico often include exclusion or closed shop clauses for
worker entry (only union-proposed workers may be hired) and termination (employer is
obligated to fire workers who are expelled or withdraw from the union).
Collective bargaining agreements signed by labor unions and employers should be
registered with the Conciliation and Arbitration Board, at the local office in each state for
those under local jurisdiction and at the federal office for those corresponding to federal
jurisdiction.
In the following section we will analyze the quantitative expansion of collective
bargaining in Mexico in recent years and the primary changes that took place in the
1990s. In the largest companies there are, of course, higher rates of unionization and of
formal regulation. Regulations are more frequently found in the definition of the
functions of job categories, employment of temporary workers, personnel selection,
productivity (possibly resulting from signing of specific agreements), and training. It
should be noted that the percentage of manufacturing establishments with no formal labor
regulation is a clear majority, although this percentage is minimal in large companies and
small in medium and small-sized establishments.
Table V-14: Rate of Labor Regulation in Manufacturing Industry in 1999
Total Large Medium Small Micro
Job
categories
7.23 74.08 64.69 36.56 3.98
Turnover 4.19 28.19 22.18 17.82 2.84
Temporary
workers
7.23 64.6 52.5 25.6 4.97
Outsourcing 1.61 16.84 9.8 4.91 1.16
White-collar
positions
3.18 26.19 22.75 16.14 1.86
Personnel
cutbacks
2.31 28.42 19.33 10.31 1.35
New
technologies
2.99 24.56 19.54 12.37 1.97
Changes in
work
3.74 27.14 21.7 14.76 2.58
organization
Personnel
selection
6.07 55.83 43.88 29.02 3.63
Quality and
productivity
8.61 53.85 42.89 35.14 6.0
Training 9.27 79.07 69.87 45.5 5.49
Promotion 5.17 61.46 51.6 27.23 2.64
Other 1.58 2.63 2.37 2.02 1.53
None 78.42 5.67 9.71 24.52 83.56
Source: INEGI (1999), ENESTYC. The rate of regulation is calculated as the percentage
of total establishments in which each dimension is formally regulated by contract or
agreement.
Approximately 15,000 collective bargaining agreements are registered with
Mexico’s Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board. As for agreements under local
jurisdiction, there are 104,064 registered at the Mexico City (Federal District) Local
Conciliation and Arbitration Board alone. The number of legal contracts is very low
because only a few industrial sectors are subject to this legal regimen (seven, four of
which are textile industry sub-branches). Nevertheless, contracts may be legally
registered but inactive for reasons such as the following: a) because the company or
union no longer exists, however notification was not given, or b) because the union
decided not to submit to revision. The Law allows but does not require ordinary revision
every two years. It is assumed that some contracts not subjected to revision, when both
union and company exist, are probably sweetheart contracts. A sweetheart contract is
registered with the Conciliation and Arbitration Board but is unknown to the workers,
and therefore may remain unchanged for long periods of time. However, a sweetheart
contract may be fictitiously reviewed and newly registered with the Board without
workers knowing if there were changes. In this case it statistically appears as active
although in reality it is fictitious. In other words, there is no reliable statistic to estimate
the number of sweetheart contracts in the country. Obtaining such an estimate would
require a field investigation, with all the political and safety implications.
Without assuming that the number of inactive contracts is equal to that of
sweetheart contracts, nor that all active contracts are not sweetheart contracts, it is
interesting to observe the percentage of contracts revised or the number of purely wage
revisions undertaken annually.
Table V-15: Number of Total Wage and Agreement Revisions (federal and local)
Year Revisions Workers affected
1994 26 489 2 127 801
1995 31 691 2 208 438
1996 34 940 2 258 029
1997 32 220 2 213 3454
1998 35 170 2 308 966
1999 38 747 2 492 762
2000 38 611 2 924 640
Source: STyPS (1999), Labor Statistics.
In 1998, approximately 11,792,520 waged workers potentially could have been
covered by a collective bargaining agreement according to the Labor Law (waged
workers older than 14 years of age, in establishments with more than 20 workers, without
considering the possibility that national unions may affiliate workers in establishments
with fewer than 20 workers, and excluding public administration and national defense
workers who are prohibited from signing collective bargaining agreements). According to
Table V-15, in that year alone, 19.6% underwent wage or agreement revisions, which are
presumably the workers with an active collective bargaining agreement. Between 1994
and 2000 the average yearly number of wage or agreement revisions was 33,981, and the
average number of affected workers was 2,361,997. Of the total revisions on average
between 1994 and 2000, 12.2% corresponded to those under federal jurisdiction, while in
number federal workers represented 66.3% of total revisions.
Table V-16: Wage and Agreement Revisions under Federal and Local Jurisdiction
Federal Local
Year Revisions Workers Revisions Workers
1994 3 170 1 525 739 23 319 602 062
1995 3 633 1 491 367 28 058 717 071
1996 3 686 1 491 454 31 254 766 575
1997 4 074 1 495 224 30 146 718 121
1998 4 525 1 567 955 30 645 741 011
1999 4 671 1 567 936 34 076 792 482
2000 5358 1 819 022 33 253 1 056 080
Source: STyPS (1999), Labor Statistics.
Table V-17: Collective Bargaining Agreements Registered with the Federal Conciliation
and Arbitration Board, by Type of Labor Confederation
Year CT CTM CROC CROM Indepen
1994 3 454 2 553 574 201 790
1995 3 165 2 231 573 161 619
1996 3 622 2 622 578 131 664
1997 3 673 2 568 632 176 691
1998 3 808 2 652 646 156 733
1999 3 964 2 593 757 206
2000 4 456 2 899 814 238 894
2001 4 495 2 901 893 225 1 176
Source: STyPS (2001), Labor Statistics.
CT: Labor Congress (Congreso del Trabajo); CTM: Mexican Workers Confederation
(Confederación de Trabajadores de México); CROC: Laborers and Small Farmers
Regional Confederation (Confederación Regional de Obreros y Campesinos); CROM:
Mexican Laborers Confederation (Confederación Obrera Mexicana); Indepen:
Independents.
Between 1994 and 2000, an average of 4,160 collective bargaining agreements were
registered with the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board. The Labor Congress
(Congreso del Trabajo — CT) accounted for 81.8% of the bargaining agreements
registered during that period. Independent and yellow unions accounted for 18.2% of the
contracts. Within the CT, CTM signed 76.1% of the collective bargaining agreements on
average; CROC 19.2%, and CROM only 5.3%. Since normal contract revisions are
biannual, we may estimate a total of 10,029 federal bargaining agreements under revision
in 1999 and 2000. In other words, of a total of 15,000 federal agreements, 66.9% are
active.
Table V-18: Branch Contracts Revisions Year Branch
Contracts
Workers Companies Individual
supplementary
contracts
Workers
1995 7 103 823 1 206 50 35 019
1996 7 101 760 1 228 66 30 419
1997 6 56 018 1 127 67 21 620
1998 7 101 188 1 472 62 63 125
1999 7 103 693 1 598 47 64 022
2000 8 148 631 1 690 25 9366
2001 4 53 635 1 447 20 7 752
Source: STyPS (2001), Labor Statistics.
Eight Branch contracts are subject to revision in Mexico, affecting an annual
average of 102,519 workers between 1995 and 2000. Over the years, the number of
workers protected by legal contracts has not changed much. In 2000, 8.2% of the total
workers affected by federal collective bargaining agreements and wage revisions at a
federal level were subject to Branch contracts. In 1999, only 2.9% had also signed single
agreements at a plant level apart from being ruled by a legal contract. 61.7% of the
workers were covered by this type of contract, however this percentage subsequently
decreased.
As far as the local collective bargaining agreements are concerned, between 1994
and 1999, there was an average of 29,583 agreement and wage revisions per year
engaging an average of 722,887 workers. In 1999, local revisions accounted for 87.9% of
the total revisions, but involved only 31.8% of the workers. An average of 335.7 workers
per revisions were involved in federal hiring and wage revisions, whereas only 23.2
workers were involved in local revisions.
The number of collective agreements reviewed locally may be very small in
relation to the total registered agreements. For example, in 1999 only 8,623 agreements
were reviewed in Mexico City out of a total of 104,064, i.e., 8.28%, (Mexico City Local
Conciliation and Arbitration Board 1999 Report, Labor Policy Report, No. 16, Mexico
City Labor Studies Executive Office). While some inactive bargaining agreements may
correspond to companies no longer existing, but not reported to the corresponding Board,
others may be sweetheart contracts, legal agreements whose very existence is unknown to
the workers.
Federal wage reviews in 1996 were -13.4 percentual points below that year’s
inflation and only 3.4 percentual points above the minimum wage increase. 1998
revisions were 1.8 points above inflation and 1.8 points above the minimum wage
increase, and 1999 figures were 2.2 and 2.5 respectively. As may be seen, minimum
wage increases continue to serve as parameters for the behavior shown by contracted
wages. Besides, the differences between minimum and contracted wages in average
percentual points were minimal. Between 1996 and 1999 that percentual difference was
only 2.5 points on average, which may be an indicator of union inefficiency in recovering
its members’ wages since minimum wage increases apply to all workers regardless of
union membership.
A. Federal Bargaining Agreements
The companies and unions that register their collective bargaining agreements with the
Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board are companies that have establishments in more
than one state. They may thus be assumed to be the bargaining agreements of the largest
companies, which have been most protective of their employees. For the purpose of an
analysis of numerical, functional and wage flexibility, a random sample was taken by branch
(as classified by the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board) of approximately 10% of
the universe of collective agreements (n=1000 contracts), using the same dimensions and
indicators as the MIM survey. The Indexes of Numerical, Wage and Functional Flexibility
were calculated as explained and may be found in the Annex. These indexes vary between –
1 and +1. Based on a survey of collective bargaining agreements carried out by the
Department of Labor, factorial analysis was conducted in order to determine numerical,
functional and wage flexibility coefficients and thereby estimate a general index of
flexibility.
The survey of federal collective bargaining agreements shows that in most
companies the items used to measure labor flexibility did not change between 1990 and
1996. However, in those cases where they did change, the trend toward greater flexibility
prevailed. The prevalence of provisions that had remained without changes is probably due
to the fact that the sample did not discriminate between large companies and companies of
other sizes, and that contract flexibility concentrates in large businesses.
Table V-19: CHANGE TOWARD COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN
THE 1990s (percentage of federal companies) n=1000 (1996)
Dimension Low Moderate High Undefined in
agreement
I-B 2.7 1.7 4.7 90.9
II-B
4.0
__
10.3
85.7
III-B Union
participates in
changes in labor
intensity
20.5
--
19.5
59.9
I-A
8.8
54.5
15.1
21.6
II-B
15.6
7.9 10.2 66.3
III-B
0.1
39.2
9.3
51.3
IV-A
5.0
15.1
1.1
78.8
IV-B
0.2
16.3 23.5 60.0
V-B 0.2 8.7 18.9 72.2
VI-B 0.5 5.5 8.8 85.2
VII-B 11.1 7.3 1.8 79.8
VIII-B 3.3 30.8 11.8 54.1
IX-B 1.8 19.2 26.7 52.2
X-B 17.1 11.4 28.2 48.2
I- C 78.6 6.1 12.2 3.1
II-C 16.8 -- 19.9 63.4
III-C Productivity or
quality bonuses
16.5
--
17.9
65.5
Source: CCT-JF-96.
1) Functional flexibility is high in federal collective bargaining agreements (which does not
mean this flexibility is applied in practice, but that in most cases agreement provisions are
not an obstacle for functional flexibility). This also confirms an old thesis we have been
working with since the last decade: that the collective bargaining model emerging from the
Mexican Revolutionary is about circulation, i.e. it includes job tenure and wage protections
(the purchase of labor force) but with low formal participation of the unions in the work
process. As far as functional flexibility (in the work process) is concerned, what prevails is a
lack of definition in the collective bargaining agreement, and, secondly, companies’ explicit
unilaterality in decision-making. Manifest stipulated rigidity is infrequent and there is very
little formal limitation on internal mobility, both mobility between shifts and geographic
mobility. Limitations are moderated to the worker’s multi-skilled nature. Seniority in
general is not the sole criterion for promotion, and working overtime or on mandatory rest
days does not depend solely on the worker’s will.
2) In contrast, regulation of numerical flexibility in bargaining agreements is significantly
higher than functional flexibility. It is high in reference to temporary work, and moderate
but not predominant in reference to the use of outsourcing, the use of white-collar workers,
and personnel cutbacks.
3) With regard to wage flexibility, there is accentuated rigidity since fixed biweekly or
monthly wages per category prevail and wages are highly regulated. Little importance is
given to punctuality, attendance, productivity and quality bonuses.
The conclusion is very clear. Functional flexibility is generally high in federal collective
bargaining agreements in Mexico, whereas numerical flexibility, and particularly wage
flexibility are more rigid. This does not mean that functional flexibility combines
extensively with new forms of work organization.
Table V-20: FEDERAL CONTRACTS: GENERAL INDEX OF WORK
FLEXIBILITY BY SECTOR (1996)
BRANCH INDEX
TEXTILE 0.80
ELECTRICITY 1.47
FILM 0.76
RUBBER 0.69
SUGAR 0.26
MINING 1.22
METALURGIC &
SIDERURGIC
1.23
PETROCHEMICALS 1.43
CEMENT 1.14
LIMESTONE 1.02
AUTOMOTIVE AND
AUTOPARTS
1.03
CHEMICAL &
PHARMACEUTICAL
0.76
CELLULOSE & PAPER 0.94
VEGETABLE OILS &
FATS
0.84
FOOD PRODUCTION 1.05
BEVERAGE
PRODUCTION
0.90
BASIC WOODABLES 0.78
GLASS 1.35
TOBACCO 0.59
DIRECTLY
ADMINISTRATED OR
DECENTRALIZED
1.23
FEDERAL CONTRACT
OR CONCESSION
0.73
UNDERTAKES WORK
IN FEDERAL ZONES
0.82
Source: CCT-JF-96. Index ranges from 0 to 3.
Table V-21: FEDERAL BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: GENERAL INDEX OF
WORK FLEXIBILITY BY STATE (1996)
STATE INDEX
AUGUASCALIENTES 0.75
BAJA CALIFORNIA 1.06
BAJA CALIFORNIA
SUR
1.25
COAHUILA 1.17
COLIMA 0.82
CHIAPAS 0.93
CHIHUAHUA 0.96
FEDERAL DISTRICT
(MÉXICO CITY)
0.91
DURANGO 0.83
GUANAJUATO 1.09
GUERRERO 0.94
HIDALGO 0.94
JALISCO 0.75
STATE OF MEXICO 0.76
MICHOACÁN 0.78
MORELOS 0.81
NAYARIT 0.75
NUEVO LEON 0.93
OAXACA 0.87
PUEBLA 0.99
QUERETARO 1.04
QUINTANA ROO 0.77
SAN LUIS POTOSÍ 1.15
SINALOA 1.09
SONORA 0.94
TABASCO 0.82
TAMAULIPAS 0.95
TLAXCALA 0.86
VERACRUZ 0.78
YUCATAN 0.98
ZACATECAS 1.03
UNIDENTIFIED 1.27
Source: CCT-JF-96. Index ranges from 0 to 3.
The following can be inferred from the sample of federal bargaining agreements:
1) They tended to exclude the unions from decision-making related to changes in
technology and work methods more than from the negotiation of work intensity.
2) More flexibility is observed in the hiring of temporary workers and white-collar
workers and in defining who are rank and file workers. There was less flexibility in the
use of outsourcing.
3) Mobility from posts or categories, shifts, or geographical location; overtime; job
promotion criteria, and working on mandatory rest days tended toward flexibilization.
Multi-skilled work was less flexible.
4) Wages continued to be extremely rigid.
5) The general index of flexibility was lower in the basic wood, chemical and
pharmaceutical, sugar, and rubber industries, and higher in the following branches:
electricity, mining, metallurgy and iron and steel, petrochemicals, and glass.
6) Analysis by state showed that the general index of flexibility was lower in
Aguascalientes, Nayarit, Michoacan, Quintana Roo and Veracruz, and higher in San Luis
Potosi, Baja California Sur, Baja California, Coahuila and Guanajuato.
An analysis of numerical, functional and wage flexibility levels per branch revealed the
following results:
1) The changes in numerical flexibility per branch tended toward greater flexibility in all
branches except filming. The highest levels were observed in the rubber, metallurgy and
iron and steel, automotive and auto parts, vegetable oils and fats, basic wood, and tobacco
industries.
2) In contrast, wage flexibility tended to remain rigid in all branches.
3) Data of CCT, JF, and the Department of Labor show that the higher the number of
establishments, the higher the indexes of flexibility.
B. Flexibility in Local Collective Bargaining Agreements
Labor relations in companies that do not belong to federal jurisdiction are administrated
by the state governments.
To summarize, relations and conflicts between capital and work most often go
through the legal channels of local jurisdiction through agreements reached outside court
and individual conflicts. As far as striking is concerned, when calling a strike or going on
strike, the local sphere is much more important than the federal sphere in quantitative
terms, particularly in the case of workers and unions in small companies.
Table V-22: UNION INTERVENTION IN TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, WORK
METHODS, AND INTENSITY. (Local jurisdiction) (Percentage of
total collective agreements) (1998)
I II III
Yes 27.65 14.90 17.77
No 12.46 9.89 13.04
Unspecified 59.89 75.21 69.20
Source: CCT-JL-98.
I: Union intervenes in technological change.
II: Union intervenes in the establishment of new work methods.
III: Union intervenes in changes in labor intensity.
Table V-23: INDICATORS OF WORK FLEXIBILITY (Local jurisdiction agreements)
(Percentage of total agreements) (1998)
Flexibility as appears
in the bargaining
agreement
I
1.86
II
1.15
III
2.44
IV
1.86
V
3.58
VI
2.15
VII
1.58
VIII
0.57
Company - union
agreement
57.16 13.32 7.59 45.42 17.05 16.05 13.61 5.44
Prohibited to the
company
0.86 1.15 0.57 - 0.72 0.86 1.15 1.00
Unrestricted for the
company
21.06 21.35 49.71 7.88 21.78 25.07 2.58 13.75
Unspecified 19.05 63.04 63.04 44.84 56.88 55.87 81.09 79.23
Source: CCT-JL-98.
I: Contracting temporary workers
II: Use of outsourcing
III: Hiring white-collar workers
IV: Personnel cutbacks
V: Post or category mobility
VI: Shift mobility
VII: Geographic mobility
VIII: Multi-skilled work
Table No V-24: MAIN JOB PROMOTION CRITERIA IN LOCAL COLLECTIVE
AGREEMENTS (Percentage of total agreements) (1998)
Seniority, schooling level and other 30.95
Skills or qualifications 16.47
Unspecified 52.58
Source: CCT-JL-98.
Table V-25: MANDATORY WORK ON REST DAYS AND OVERTIME IN LOCAL
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS (Percentage of total agreements) (1998)
Work on rest days Overtime
Voluntary 2.44 2.01
Mandatory 14.76 15.62
Company-union agreement 39.83 45.7
Unspecified 42.98 36.68
Source: CCT-JL-98.
Table V-26: BONUSES FORESEEN IN LOCAL BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
(Percentage of total agreements) (1998)
Punctuality and
attendance
Productivity or quality Other
Yes 17.34 15.33 20.92
No 12.32 10.60 55.16
Unspecified 70.34 74.07 23.92
Source: CCT-JL-98.
Based on our sample of local collective bargaining agreements conducted in 1998
summarized in the tables above, we can infer the same conclusion as that for the federal
collective bargaining agreements: that most local collective agreements were already
flexible long before the flexibility doctrines took root in Mexico. As explained in Chapter
I, a portion of Mexican companies have a traditional form of organization, which implies
important levels of arbitrariness in task performance, what we have called pre-Taylorist
flexibility. This non-scientific flexibility remains present and impacts the flexibility
indexes. Functional flexibility is higher than numerical or wage flexibility, and unions
hardly participate in changes in technology, organization and methods of work. The
unions, however, have also had to flexibilize, although most of them remain as flexible as
they used to be, particularly with regard to unspecified topics in the agreements, possibly
associated with non-systematic forms of organization and labor relations in which the
informal components are of greatest importance.
Table V-27: INDEXES OF FLEXIBILITY IN LOCAL COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
(1998)
Functional Wage Numerical General
Aguascalientes 0.34 -0.20 0.60 0.30
Jalisco -0.20 -0.29 0.25 -0.10
State of Mexico -0.07 -0.28 0.21 -0.05
Morelos 0.13 -0.09 0.34 0.11
Queretaro 0.38 -0.09 0.46 0.28
Sonora 0.01 -0.04 0.22 0.06
Veracruz 0.11 -0.22 0.25 0.07
Yucatán 0.26 -0.53 0.26 0.07
TOTAL STATES 0.07 -0.27 0.27 0.04
Source: CCT-JL-98. The Index ranges from –1 to +1.
C. Labor Legislation
Mexican labor laws have not yet been modified. A debate on the need for greater labor
law flexibility began in 1988, and still continues into the present. This debate intensified
following the implementation of NAFTA. The first modification proposals came from
employer organizations CONCANACO (employers in trade) and COPARMEX
(employers’ union). The debate focused on work flexibility. This focus was justified by
the new context of globalized markets and production, the modernization of the
productive process, the need to increase the investors’ level of trust, and, above all, the
need to increase productivity and quality (De Buen, 1989).
These initial proposals included the three classic aspects of work flexibility, as
well as boundaries for the conflict between workers and employers. In relation to
numerical flexibility, a revision of the notion of a compensation for job termination,
retirement simplification and the notion of back wages, was proposed together with a
reformulation of the agreement rescission process. Functional flexibility proposed
flexibilizing the workday, establishing multi-skilled work, and productivity commissions.
Wage flexibility proposed reformulating the notion of remunerative wages; and
estimating wages in relation to each company’s productivity and economic conditions; as
well as reformulating the notion of economic benefits and having them depend on the
company’s capacities, and establishing wages per hour.
With regard to worker-employer conflicts, the proposals included banning
solidarity strikes, establishing union responsibility when strikes are declared non-existent,
and greater restrictions to striking in public services.
In 1989, the PRI labor caucus persuaded the National Congress to undertake a
popular consultation on possible modifications to the Federal Labor Law. The
Department of Labor formed a tripartite commission to develop a bill, but no public
results were ever emitted. Since then employers have periodically called for a new labor
law and unions have been divided between those opposed to any amendment
(independent unionism, CTM, Mexican Electrical Workers Union), and those accepting
the modifications that do not affect the rights they have gained, especially those calling
for a new chapter in modernization and productivity (Mexican Telephone Workers
Union—STRM, Authentic Labor Front—FAT).
In 1994, employer organizations COPARMEX, CONCANACO and
CANACINTRA (industrialists) presented president-elect Ernesto Zedillo (PRI) with a
document that included a systematic proposal by the employers with a section on labor.
This document justifies changes in labor legislation as a means to achieve higher
competitiveness. According to the employers, the main points to be modified would be:
1) Functional and geographic mobility with multi-skilled work;
2) Temporary agreements, by hour or reduced workday;
3) Rationalizing causes for agreement rescission;
4) Limitations on labor lawsuit responsibilities in the payment of back wages;
5) Hourly wages;
6) Democratization of strikes: to certify the will of the majority of workers through
secret ballot before going on strike and in taking the decision to conclude the strike;
7) Elimination of conciliation and arbitration boards;
8) Elimination of legal contracts;
9) Establishment of training agreements that do not imply a labor relation;
10) Elimination of the blind wage scale and replacement with skill-based scale;
11) Establishment of labor and union benefits according to the conditions in each
company (which implies questioning how the social security system operates);
12) Elimination of the exclusionary clause for entry and termination;
13) Freedom to join a union, and
14) Apolitical unionism; eliminating relationships with political parties.
Employer organizations have not presented a common front to the labor law reform bills.
The Employer Coordination Council (Consejo Coordinador Empresarial—CCE),
Mexico’s largest employer organization, has most decidedly supported the government’s
economic policy and while the State did not insist on labor reform, the CCE did not
consider it indispensable either. CONCAMIN adopted a similar position. In other words,
CONCANACO and COPARMEX have been the most insistent. Carlos Salinas de Gortari
promised a new labor law since the beginning of his presidential campaign (in 1988), but
his presidential period came to an end without such a reform. Upon completing his term
he identified two major pending reforms: labor and social security. The CTM was
initially not entirely opposed to reform (1989), but following presentation of the
COPARMEX-CONCANACO proposal, which was partially anti-corporatist, CTM
changed its position radically and since then has been reluctant to amendments. Between
May 1990 and May 1992 the State ceased to insist on reform, while employers continued
to claim it was necessary to make amendments and the CTM continued to oppose. A
truce of sorts between CTM and employers was established between May 1992 and
November 1993 in order to avoid hindering NAFTA negotiations. Since then, employers
have insisted on reform, CTM has opposed it, and the State has declared it is necessary
(De la Garza and Bouzas, 1998).
The controversy around the Federal Labor Law reform in 1995 was reinforced by
the proposals for labor market flexibilization contained in Zedillo’s National
Development Plan. Until 1996, the Department of Labor’s drive to reform the labor law
moved forward gradually, calling on CTM and COPARMEX to come to an agreement.
Negotiation was resumed with the mutual recognition of the need for a new labor culture.
It is in this context that the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional—
PAN) presented its labor reform bill. The PAN bill, formulated by Nestor de Buen, a
prestigious lawyer, contains two main new components: different aspects of work
flexibility, thus essentially coinciding with the COPARMEX and CONCANACO bills;
and the democratization of labor organizations, distanced from both the government’s
bills, and those of the labor and employer elites.
With regard to labor flexibility, the PAN bill changes basic principles of the labor
law prevailing in Mexico by denouncing the State’s protective role toward the weakest
part in the labor relation and replacing it with the role of guarding the balance between
the production factors. The other important change in the principles is the replacement of
the notion of social justice by the promotion of employment and productivity. Along this
line, labor flexibility appears in the bill in its three classic forms: numerical flexibility is a
company’s capacity to hire or fire personnel according to production needs; the notion of
an apprenticeship contract with a trial period; flexibilization of the termination of a labor
relation including a seniority premium, regardless of the cause of termination, which
replaces the 20 days per year plus three months’ wages and the previous premium
corresponding to 12 days’ wages per year of seniority; flexibilizes discontinuous work,
and regulates the use of outsourcing. On internal flexibility, the bill specifies that work
conditions may be subject to upward or downward changes. A company’s power to
change workers from their post, geographical location and shifts is extended, and the
distribution of time throughout the work week is also flexibilized (40 hours per week are
proposed) at the employer’s discretion according to production needs. Workers may be
made to work overtime and on mandatory rest days if production so requires. This
obligation, however, is not applicable to the weekly days of rest. In promotions, the bill
privileges capacity over seniority. With regard to wage flexibility (wages according to
productivity or quality), the bill does not propose one unique form of wages, such as
hourly wages, but rather opens clearer possibilities to multiple forms of payment than the
current laws. In summary, the PAN bill mainly proposes employer unilaterality. Except
for the two cases that are mentioned below, it is imposed flexibility without any previous
agreement with the workers. These two cases are: when employment is affected by
changes in technology or work organization. There are many changes in technology or
organization that do not imply personnel reduction, and they are left to the employer’s
discretion. The other aspect subject to bilaterality is productivity and training programs.
These programs follow the current productivity agreement model promoted by the
Department of Labor, noting that it is necessary to specify the program’s goals and
actions, productivity indicators, type of information workers are to be provided with, the
amount of the bonuses, and training.
The other great novelty in the PAN bill refers to labor organization
representativity and democratization. This theme in turn has two central aspects. The
elimination of the obligation to notify the Department of Labor of the creation of any
labor organization; where the workers are free to unionize or not, eliminating
exclusionary clauses, allowing collective and individual agreements to coexist, and
opening channels for white-collar workers to unionize; and, finally, eliminating
mandatory ratification of labor agreements before the Conciliation Boards, which are
replaced by Social Tribunals that depend on the judiciary branch.
The other important aspect of the democratization of labor organizations is the
creation of company committees, a different category from unions, which the bill in fact
places as the signatories and supervisors of labor agreements and as those in charge of
calling a strike. Unions are thereby reduced to a sort of open membership trend that may
participate with candidate teams in elections for the company committee, but do not
represent workers as such in collective bargaining. There is one exception in that the bill
foresees that bargaining should be articulated as an umbrella, from branch to company.
At the branch level, the majority union would represent the workers.
The bill draws on European experiences in the creation of company committees,
which represent all workers whether they are union members or not. These committees
are an expression of representative democracy through delegates with strong participation
of the rank and file in assemblies and strict supervision of the electoral processes. The
decision to call a strike is democratized by mandating worker assemblies as decision-
making bodies, while conciliation is considered voluntary. The company committee is
responsible for calling a strike and may desist at any moment. After a month’s strike, any
of the parties may request the strike be qualified. Time constraints are established for
strikes in branches that deliver services to the community. The bill retains the principles
prohibiting workers from being replaced during a strike or that a minority continue
working.
The Democratic Revolution Party (Partido de la Revolución Democrática—
PRD) recently developed a labor law bill. This bill recognizes the need to moderately
flexibilize labor relations and insists on eliminating government controls over union
registration, collective bargaining agreements and strikes. In 1998, the Department of
Labor called the official unions and the new workers’ confederation coming out of the
official lines, the National Workers Union (Unión Nacional de Trabajadores—UNT) to
negotiate possible labor law reforms with employer organizations. Very little progress
had been made, however. Only a preliminary bill of the Federal Code of Labor
Procedures, which has not yet been presented for approval to the National Congress.
Current positions are divided as follows: the Labor Congress (CT) and the UNT accept
the amendment as long as it does not infringe on acquired rights; employer
organizations and the government insist on flexibilization; PAN and PRD accept the
amendment, but only through their own bills; the May 1st Inter-union Organization
(Intersindical Primero de Mayo), which brought independent unionism together,
opposed the amendments. The recently created Mexican Labor Union Front (Frente
Sindical Mexicano), headed by the Mexican Electrical Workers Union (SME), also
opposes the amendments.
In the last days of November 2002, the PRI caucus presented the Working
Commission of the Chamber of Deputies with a new Labor Law bill that both employer
organizations and the Labor Congress had agreed upon. A few weeks earlier, the PRD
and the National Workers Union (UNT) had done the same. This was the peak point of a
long process begun in 1988, when both CONCANACO and COPARMEX started a
debate on the labor reform. Since then both organizations have defined the core aspects
the employers demand the reform should include: work flexibility in order to increase
company competitiveness, to favor modernization and to encourage investors' trust in
economic liberalization and globalization.
The last phase of the debate on the labor reform started with the creation of the Central
Decision-Making Group in mid-2001. Three different stages have unfolded since the bill
was presented: In the first stage, from July 2001 to February 2002, the Department of
Labor made attempts to get the employers, unionists of the Labor Congress and the UNT
to agree to a bill by consensus. The bracket method was followed during this period, i.e.,
only clauses that are agreed to by consensus are included, otherwise, the clauses where
there is disagreement are placed in brackets for the final decision to be taken by the
Mexican Congress in due time. Progress was minimal in this stage because of differences
between the UNT, on the one hand, and the Department of Labor, employer organizations
and the Labor Congress, on the other.
In the second stage, from February to July 2002, the UNT without abandoning the
Central Decision-Making Group developed and finally made its own bill public. The
PRD did the same and this forced the Department of Labor to speed up the process and
come up with a first draft in July 2002. In the third stage, from July to November 2002,
the two positions at the Central Decision-Making Group separated their paths, attacking
each other until in early November the UNT reached an agreement with the PRD and
they both presented their bill to the commission in charge at the Chamber of Deputies.
Some weeks later, the opposition headed by the Department of Labor also presented a bill
through the PRI’s workers caucus.
The labor law bill promoted by the Department of Labor started with a “Conceptual
Framework for the Modernization and Updating of the Labor Law” that set forth a radical
change in the principles of labor law prevailing in Mexico. It includes core elements of
the social doctrine of the Catholic Church, such as the notion that both workers and
employers enjoy the same human essence, the idea that law is based on the respect for the
human person and that a company must be conceived as a community of interests. The
principles of the Church’s social doctrine intertwined with elements of the managerial
doctrine of total quality through the concept of a new labor culture. This bill has two
main themes: work flexibility and restrictions to freedom of association, hiring and strike.
As far as work flexibility is concerned, it covers three dimensions although unequally.
Numerical flexibility —adjusting the number of workers to the product’s market
conditions— establishes contracts for undefined time with a trial period of 30 days
without the employer being responsible for paying a lay-off compensation, and training
contracts for up to three months. Functional flexibility or flexibility within the productive
process sets forth the possibility of discontinuous workdays, extension of tasks that is
agreed to, and changing the rest days contained in the agreements, as well as the
flexibilization of the workday may be adjusted on a daily basis according to production
needs without exceeding the total weekly or monthly hours. Performance and training are
also established as the main criteria for promotion. Wage flexibility is poorer than
numerical and functional flexibility and there is no explicit commitment to sharing
productivity profits through bonuses. At the most it proposes extending the training
commissions to productivity, but in this field the commissions only propose the
management make changes in machinery, work organization and labor relations, without
mentioning the distribution of profits.
On the contrary, this bill includes a detailed list of requirements to sign a collective
bargaining agreement: All labor union members must sign, the union registration office
must recognize the union’s leadership, their by-laws specifying that the company they
intend to sign an agreement with is within their field of action, as well as a list of union
members. Something similar happens with the procedure to call a strike for the signature
of the collective bargaining agreement: certified proof of the union’s registration, that its
by-laws specify that the company is within their field of action, a signed list of all the
workers in the union, certification by the authorities that the workers are part of the
union; when there is a collective agreement certification process, no similar lawsuit will
be accepted until a resolution is reached, and the secret ballot certified by the Department
of Labor has been established for calling a strike.
In other words, the Department of Labor bill summarizes most of the employers’
historical demands regarding a flexible reform. No mention was made of payment per
hour, benefits according to the company’s financial capacity or the elimination of
dropped wages. However, as a possible exchange between the interest of both employers
and the Department of Labor in flexibilizing, and the unions of the Labor Congress in
preserving their quasi-monopoly of labor representation, leaving aside the elimination of
exclusionary clauses, the prohibition of affiliating unions to political parties, sanctions to
union leaders who do not provide the workers with a copy of the union’s by-laws and the
collective bargaining agreement, the secret and direct ballot for the election of leadership,
and a new institute to register bargaining agreements and unions with open information
for those with a judiciary interest. Although these three last issues appeared in one of the
last drafts of the bill, they were eliminated upon delivering it at the Chamber of Deputies.
In other words, the Abascal bill, as it is known, provides the companies with labor
flexibility, imposes additional requirements to the registration of collective agreements,
to the signature of these agreements and to striking, and does not modify the current
situation for union registration. In terms of freedom of association, hiring and striking, it
is the employers, the CT union leaders and the government itself who end winning when
they agree to the continuity of corporatist labor relations that have ensured labor peace
for so long.
The bill presented by the UNT and the PRD comes from a functionalist and
institutionalist conception of industrial relations and sets forth the need for a social pact
between workers, employers and the State, implicit in the negotiation experience between
the telephone workers’ union and Telmex, the telephone company. This bill focuses on
the procedural aspects related with freedom of association, collective bargaining and
striking. It preserves the exclusionary clause for entry to work, but not for separation,
establishes the secret and direct ballot for the election of union leaders, and the national
registration of unions and collective contracts, the possibility of signing collective
contracts per branch and chains of production. It creates a new institution (National
Institute of Wages, Employment and Productivity). The Chamber of Deputies fixes the
minimum wages, as well as the distribution of profits, it proposes a 40 hour workweek
and a one and only minimum wage. As far as productivity is concerned, like in Abascal’s
bill, development is also limited. It adopts the concept of broadened productivity
contained in the telephone workers’ collective contract, which assumes the creation of
mixed productivity and training commissions in charge of diagnosing, developing
programs, evaluating programs, and proposing the distribution of the profits due to an
increase in productivity.
To conclude, the Abascal bill, apart from its substantial and procedural implications
on labor rights, can be interpreted as a step toward restoring corporatist relations between
employers, the State and the CT unions, but with a relative marginalization of political
parties. The bill synthesizes a large-scale exchange between the two main actors in labor
relations, labor flexibility and the workers’ quasi-monopolistic representation. This
refoundational agreement will require a definition of the new everyday practical rules of
labor relations at a federal level. The PAN governors, however, for some time now have
been in a modus vivendi with PRI unions. It is the workers and the unions that lose in this
situation; particularly the leadership of the telephone workers’ union which believed that
through their proposal for the creation of a new social pact in production, which had
turned out successful in Telmex, they would head the reforms, but this process proved
that it is not enough to have new ideas unless one has the necessary power to promote
their growth.
ANNEX
Methodology to estimate indexes of flexibility based on different sources of information.
A-1: DIMENSIONS OF WORK FLEXIBILITY FOR CCT-JF-96 AND
CCT-JL-98
I : Dimensions of Work Flexibility
Union or workers intervention in changes in technology and/or work organization (to be informed=A;
to participate in the decision to make a change=B; to participate in implementing changes=C; to
participate in the evaluation of the changes=D)
II: Employment Flexibility
Union or workers intervention in the selection of new personnel.
Note: Participation may include the union proposing new personnel, a mixed selection commission
that prepares, supervises and evaluates the tests for the new workers. Exclusionary clauses assume
union intervention in this area.
Readjustment negotiated by personnel between the company and the union or workers and/or job-
termination compensation over and above what is stipulated in the Federal Labor Law.
Note: Any condition for layoff or readjustment of personnel over and above what is stipulated in the
Federal Labor Law should be considered in this item.
Limitations to the employment of temporary workers (hired for a specific task or period of time).
Note: Limitations may range from establishing percentages for occasional and temporary worker to
the simple consideration that the union must be in agreement.
Limitations on the use of outsourcing.
Note: Similar to the previous point.
Limitations to the creation of new jobs for white-collar workers or to increasing their numbers.
Note: Simply listing the white-collar posts is already a limitation.
III: Work Process Flexibility
Existence of a catalog of basic posts.
III-B: Workers’ express unwillingness to multi-skilled work.
Note: A restriction to multi-skilled work may appear as a precise definition of a job’s functions,
explicit prohibition to workers being assigned tasks that are different from those for which they
were hired, or a simple negotiation between the company and the union when it is the workers’
functions that need to be changed.
Restrictions to internal mobility from categories, job posts, departments, shifts, or job locations.
Regulations over and above what the Federal Labor Law stipulates for overtime.
: It includes more mandatory rest days than what the Federal Labor Law stipulates.
Participation of the union or workers whenever workers are sanctioned.
Participation of the union or workers in defining work methods, production or productivity norms,
or quality parameters.
Note: Participation may range from the existence of productivity or method commissions to
having to include the union in agreeing on the changes.
Participation of the union or workers in health, safety or training commissions.
IV: Wage Flexibility. Bonuses or incentives for:
IV.1. punctuality and attendance,
IV.2. productivity and attendance, or
IV.3. other aspects.
1. ENESTYC
Numerical flexibility: percentage of part time, hourly, outsourced and temporary
workers; percentage of white-collar workers (a simple aggregated index was formed with
the percentages) (Fn)
Functional flexibility: internal turnover (Ff)
Wage flexibility: percentage of bonuses in total remunerations (Fs)
A general index of flexibility was formed using factorial analysis of the form
IF = a Fn +bFf +cFs
2. Industrialization Models
The same indicators corresponding to the dimensions of Schematic A-I.
Numerical flexibility: employment of temporary workers, outsourcers, white-collar
employees, limitations to personnel cutbacks; Functional flexibility: multi-skilled work,
internal mobility, elimination of the blind scale, workday elasticity; Wages flexibility:
wages according to productivity, punctuality and attendance, training.
3. Federal and local collective bargaining agreements (CCT-JF-96, CCT-JL-98)
The dimensions used to measure flexibility are the same as those used in the Model
survey (MIM-94).
Two calculations are possible with this data: the percentage of bargaining agreements that
changed toward flexibility, and an index of change toward flexibility (IF) with the
following formula:
Assessment of each item in each contract
IF= Number of items for each type of flexibility Number of bargaining agreements with changes in flexibility
Finally, the analysis of work flexibility is defined according to the different dimensions
for which indexes of flexibility are constructed.
A-2: ESTIMATED INDEXES OF FLEXIBILITY BASED ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT REVISIONS
A) FUNCTIONAL FLEXIBILITY
QUESTION LOW (-1) MODERATE (0) HIGH (+1) UNDETERMINED
I.B
I. UNION INTERVENTION IN
TECHNOLOGICAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
Bilateral
determination
(2)
Obligatory
consultation
(1)
Unilateral
determination
(3)
Unspecified
(4)
II.B
II. UNION INTERVENTION
ESTABLISHING WORK METHODS
YES
(1)
Not considered
NO
(2)
Unspecified
(4)
III.B
III. UNION PARTICIPATION IN
CHANGES IN LABOR INTENSITY
YES
(1)
Not considered
NO
(2)
Unspecified
(4)
IV.B
VII. MOBILITY BETWEEN POSTS
OR CATEGORIES
Prohibited
(3)
Limited by Collective
Bargaining
Agreement
(1 and 2)
Unrestricted
(4)
Unspecified
(5)
V.B
IX. MOBILITY BETWEEN SHIFTS
Prohibited
(3)
Limited by Collective
Bargaining
Agreement (1 and 2)
Unrestricted
4)
Unspecified
(5)
VI.B
X. GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY
Prohibited
(3)
Limited by Collective
Bargaining
Agreement
(1 and 2)
Unrestricted
(4)
Unspecified
(5)
VII.B
XI. MULTI-SKILLED WORK
Prohibited
(3)
Limited by Collective
Bargaining
Agreement (1 and 2)
Unrestricted
(4)
Unspecified
(5)
VIII.B
XII. PRIMARY PROMOTION
CRITERION
Seniority
(1)
Schooling, seniority
and other
(4 and 5)
Skills, training
( 2 and 3)
Unspecified
(6)
IX.B
XIII. OVERTIME
Voluntary
(1)
Agreement
(3)
Mandatory
(2)
Unspecified
(4)
X.B
XIV. WORK ON REST DAYS
Voluntary
(1)
Agreement
(3)
Mandatory
(2)
Unspecified
(4)
B) EXTERNAL NUMERICAL FLEXIBILITY
QUESTION LOW (-1) MODERATE (0) HIGH (+1) UNDETERMINED
I.A
IV. HIRING TEMPORARY WORKERS
Prohibited
(3)
Limited by Collective
Bargaining
Agreement (1 and 2)
Company is free
(4)
Unspecified
(5)
II.A
V. USE OF OUTSOURCING
Prohibited
(3)
Limited by Collective
Bargaining
Agreement (1 and 2)
Company is free
(4)
Unspecified
(5)
III.A
VI. HIRING WHITE-COLLAR
EMPLOYEES
Prohibited
(3)
Limited by Collective
Bargaining
Agreement
(1 and 2)
Company is free
(4)
Unspecified
(5)
IV.A
VII. WORKER CUTBACKS
Prohibited
(3)
Limited by Collective
Bargaining
Agreement (1 and 2)
Company is free
(4)
Unspecified
(5)
C) WAGE FLEXIBILITY
QUESTION LOW (-1) MIDDLE (0) HIGH (+1) UNDETERMINED
I.C
XVA. FORM OF PAYMENT
Per day or per
Base wage plus
week (2) commission
(4)
Per hour or per intensity
(1 and 3)
Unspecified
(5)
II.C
XVI. PUNCTUALITY OR ATTENDANCE
BONUSES
No
(2)
Yes
(1)
Unspecified
(3)
III.C
XVII. PRODUCTIVITY OR QUALITY
BONUSES
No
(2)
Yes
(1)
Unspecified
(3)
Note: The numbers in brackets correspond to the options in the questions of the questionnaire applied to
analyze each collective bargaining agreement. These numbers per question were normalized between -1
and 1. Situations were also found in which the item was not specified in the Agreement.
An index for each type of flexibility (numerical, functional and wage) will be estimated
with the aforementioned formula. A general index of aggregated flexibility will be
constructed:
IF= aFn + bFf + cFs
Coefficients a, b and c were assumed to be the same as those obtained through factorial
analysis of the survey of bargaining agreements made by the Labor Department.
For the analysis of numerical, functional and wage flexibility, a random sample was taken
per branch (as classified by the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board) of
approximately 10% of the universe of collective bargaining agreements (n=1000 contracts).
The same dimensions and indicators used for the MIM survey were applied. The numerical,
wage and functional indexes were calculated as explained in chapter I, with variations
between –1 and +1. As explained in chapter I, factorial analysis was conducted of the survey
of collective bargaining agreements to determine the coefficients of numerical, functional
and wage flexibility and thereby estimate a general index of flexibility.
ESTIMATING WEIGHT FACTORS FOR THE INDEX OF WORK FLEXIBILITY APPLIED TO THE
SURVEY OF INDUSTRIALIZATION MODELS AND TO THE SAMPLES OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Three factorials were made based on Department of Labor Collective Bargaining Agreements, one for
each dimension of flexibility (numerical, functional and wages).
As can be seen in the following table, the specific weight factors were taken from the final matrix for
each item of each dimension.
With this very same base, each item was multiplied by its specific weight factor, and the items of each
dimension were added (the indexes of numerical, functional and wage flexibility in that base).
The aggregation of the three indexes of flexibility constitutes the index of work flexibility.
Simple aggregate indexes were estimated for each dimension (without weighting).
Absolute weight factors were obtained per dimension by dividing the total aggregation of weighted
indexes per dimension between the total aggregations of the corresponding indexes without weighting.
These absolute weight factors were standardized (adding up to 100) and relative weight factors were
obtained to estimate the indexes of flexibility in models and both federal and local collective
agreements.
NUMERICAL
FLEXIBILITY
FUNCTIONAL
FLEXIBILITY
WAGE
FLEXIBILITY
TOTAL AGGREGATION OF INDEXES WITH FACTORIAL
POWER
0.14 -0.01 -0.01
TOTAL AGGREGATION OF SIMPLE INDEXES -0.24 0.08 0.4
ABSOLUTE WEIGHT FACTORS -0.583 -0.125 -0.025
RELATIVE (final) WEIGHT FACTORS 0.795 0.170 0.034
Note: Carlos Salas made the calculation of factorial indexes
A-3: INDEX OF WORK FLEXIBILITY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS (1999)
WEIGHTING FACTORS PER VARIABLE OF EACH DIMENSION OF FLEXIBILITY
NUMERICAL
FLEXIBILITY
FUNCTIONAL
FLEXIBILITY
WAGE
FLEXIBILITY
P11 .813
P12 .788
P13 .930
P14 .557
P22 .861
P23 .889
P24I .929
P25 .920
P26 0.666
P27 0.738
P28 0.670
P29 0.243
P30 0.324
P31 0.080
P32 0.470
P33 0.518
P34 0.512
P35 0.537
P36 0.600
P37 0.399
P38 0.555
P39 0.336
P40 0.403
P47 0.165
P51 0.254
P52 -0.074
P53 0.273
P54 -0.049
P57 0.129
P59 0.280
P60 0.110
P61 0.151
P63 0.197
P49 0.16382918
P102 0.02369231
P103 0.14376119
P105 0.11598784
P106 0.18862785
P107 0.56892359
P108 0.55359542
P109 0.27489621
P110 0.59118127
P111 0.46615302
P112 0.59721258
P113 0.75192175
P114 0.70133279
P64 0.004
The following equation resulted:
IF = 0.795Nf + 0.17 Ff + 0.034 Wf
where IF = general index of flexibility
Nf = Index of numerical flexibility
Ff = Index of functional flexibility
Wf = Index of wage flexibility
A-4: INDEXES OF WAGE FLEXIBILITY PER BRANCH (1996)
BRANCH INDEX STANDARD
DEVIATION
MINIMUM MAXIMUM NO.
CASES
TOTAL -0.49 0.64 -1.00 1.00 906
1 TEXTILE -0.49 0.72 -1.00 1.00 36
2 ELECTRICITY -0.91 0.27 -1.00 0.00 19
3 FILMING -0.93 0.29 -1.00 1.00 106
4 RUBBER -0.76 0.42 -1.00 0.00 11
5 SUGAR -0.33 0.00 -0.33 -0.33 1
6 MINING -0.79 0.43 -1.00 0.00 14
7 METALLURGY AND IRON AND STEEL -0.29 0.65 -1.00 1.00 35
8 HIDROCARBONS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
9 PETROCHEMICALS 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.33 3
10 CEMENT -0.42 0.60 -1.00 1.00 21
11 LIMESTONE -0.63 0.52 -1.00 0.00 8
12 AUTOMOTIVE AND AUTOPARTS -0.48 0.52 -1.00 0.33 40
13 CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL -0.57 0.51 -1.00 0.33 104
14 CELLULOSE AND PAPER -0.33 0.51 -1.00 0.33 12
15 VEGETABLE OILS AND FATS -0.70 0.48 -1.00 0.00 10
16 FOOD PRODUCTION -0.31 0.71 -1.00 1.00 138
17 BEVERAGE PRODUCTION -0.51 0.63 -1.00 1.00 84
18 RAILROADS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
19 BASIC WOOD -0.64 0.50 -1.00 0.00 14
20 GLASS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3
21 TOBACCO -1.00 0.00 -1.00 -1.00 2
22 DIRECTLY ADMINISTRATED / DECENTRALIZED -0.10 0.63 -1.00 0.33 7
23 FEDERAL AGREEMENT OR CONCESSION -0.29 0.85 -1.00 1.00 152
24 COMPANIES WORKING IN FEDERAL ZONES -0.45 0.44 -1.00 0.67 86
Source: CCT-JF-96. Index ranges from –1 to +1.
A-5: INDEXES OF WAGE FLEXIBILITY BY STATE (1996)
STATE INDEX STANDARD
DEVIATION
MINIMUM MAXIMUM NO. CASES
TOTAL -0.49 0.64 -1.00 1.00 906
1 AUGUASCALIENTES -0.30 0.84 -1.00 1.00 10
2 BAJA CALIFORNIA -0.40 0.64 -1.00 1.00 24
3 BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR -0.28 0.75 -1.00 0.50 3
4 CAMPECHE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
5 COAHUILA -0.45 0.67 -1.00 1.00 22
6 COLIMA -0.47 0.51 -1.00 0.00 5
7 CHIAPAS -0.38 0.83 -1.00 1.00 7
8 CHIHUAHUA -0.43 0.58 -1.00 0.67 14
9 FEDERAL DISTRICT
(MÉXICO CITY)
-0.47 0.62 -1.00 1.00 230
10 DURANGO -0.46 0.66 -1.00 1.00 13
11 GUANAJUATO -0.51 0.68 -1.00 1.00 30
12 GUERRERO -0.50 0.72 -1.00 1.00 10
13 HIDALGO -0.64 0.69 -1.00 1.00 20
14 JALISCO -0.57 0.64 -1.00 1.00 86
15 MÉXICO -0.48 0.65 -1.00 1.00 134
16 MICHOACÁN -0.80 0.43 -1.00 0.33 15
17 MORELOS -0.26 0.92 -1.00 1.00 9
18 NAYARIT -0.71 0.60 -1.00 0.67 8
19 NUEVO LEON -0.27 0.78 -1.00 1.00 34
20 OAXACA -0.81 0.46 -1.00 0.33 12
21 PUEBLA -0.47 0.67 -1.00 1.00 31
22 QUERETARO -0.36 0.69 -1.00 1.00 11
23 QUINTANA ROO -0.61 0.44 -1.00 0.00 6
24 SAN LUIS POTOSI 0.10 0.53 -1.00 0.50 7
25 SINALOA -0.44 0.58 -1.00 1.00 21
26 SONORA -0.61 0.52 -1.00 0.50 23
27 TABASCO -0.67 0.58 -1.00 0.00 3
28 TAMAULIPAS -0.58 0.62 -1.00 1.00 24
29 TLAXCALA -0.37 0.79 -1.00 1.00 9
30 VERACRUZ -0.55 0.64 -1.00 1.00 64
31 YUCATÁN -0.60 0.59 -1.00 0.50 8
32 ZACATECAS -1.00 0.00 -1.00 -1.00 5
99 UNSPECIFIED -0.58 0.61 -1.00 0.33 8
Source: CCT-JF-96. Index ranges from –1 to +1
A-6: INDEXES OF NUMERICAL FLEXIBILITY BY STATE (1996)
STATE INDEX STANDARD
DEVIATION
MINIMUM MAXIMUM NO. CASES
TOTAL 0.37 0.40 -1.00 1.00 931
1 AUGUASCALIENTES 0.36 0.39 0.00 1.00 10
2 BAJA CALIFORNIA 0.43 0.38 0.00 1.00 25
3 BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR 0.19 0.17 0.00 0.33 3
4 CAMPECHE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
5 COAHUILA 0.30 0.40 -0.33 1.00 22
6 COLIMA 0.07 0.68 -1.00 0.67 5
7 CHIAPAS 0.21 0.44 -0.33 1.00 7
8 CHIHUAHUA 0.29 0.38 -0.33 1.00 14
9 FEDERAL DISTRICT (MÉXICO
CITY)
0.45 0.40 -0.67 1.00 240
10 DURANGO 0.45 0.44 0.00 1.00 13
11 GUANAJUATO 0.44 0.40 -0.33 1.00 30
12 GUERRERO 0.52 0.41 0.00 1.00 10
13 HIDALGO 0.31 0.36 0.00 1.00 20
14 JALISCO 0.40 0.39 -0.50 1.00 88
15 MÉXICO 0.47 0.40 -1.00 1.00 138
16 MICHOACÁN 0.35 0.33 0.00 1.00 15
17 MORELOS 0.69 0.32 0.33 1.00 9
18 NAYARIT 0.29 0.36 0.00 1.00 8
19 NUEVO LEON 0.22 0.39 -0.50 1.00 34
20 OAXACA 0.18 0.31 -0.33 0.67 12
21 PUEBLA 0.10 0.39 -1.00 1.00 37
22 QUERETARO 0.32 0.27 0.00 0.67 11
23 QUINTANA ROO 0.33 0.56 -0.33 1.00 6
24 SAN LUIS POTOSÍ 0.24 0.30 0.00 0.67 7
25 SINALOA 0.19 0.26 0.00 1.00 21
26 SONORA 0.29 0.47 -0.33 1.00 23
27 TABASCO 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.33 3
28 TAMAULIPAS 0.32 0.43 -0.33 1.00 25
29 TLAXCALA 0.29 0.28 0.00 0.75 10
30 VERACRUZ 0.31 0.36 -0.33 1.00 64
31 YUCATÁN 0.13 0.25 -0.33 0.33 8
32 ZACATECAS 0.28 0.39 0.00 0.75 5
99 UNSPECIFIED 0.02 0.69 -1.00 0.75 8
Source: CCT-JF-96. Index ranges from –1 to +1
A-7: INDEXES OF FUNCTIONAL FLEXIBILITY BY STATE (1996)
STATE INDEX STANDARD
DEVIATION
MINIMUM MAXIMUM NO. CASES
TOTAL 0.11 0.24 -0.40 0.90 841
1 AUGUASCALIENTES 0.06 0.26 -0.30 0.60 10
2 BAJA CALIFORNIA 0.19 0.22 -0.20 0.80 24
3 BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR 0.13 0.40 -0.30 0.50 3
4 CAMPECHE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
5 COAHUILA 0.20 0.34 -0.30 0.80 22
6 COLIMA 0.00 0.35 -0.30 0.30 4
7 CHIAPAS 0.09 0.30 -0.30 0.40 7
8 CHIHUAHUA 0.07 0.23 -0.30 0.40 14
9 FEDERAL DISTRICT
(MÉXICO CITY)
0.16 0.21 -0.30 0.90 220
10 DURANGO 0.13 0.23 -0.30 0.50 12
11 GUANAJUATO 0.15 0.28 -0.30 0.70 30
12 GUERRERO 0.05 0.23 -0.30 0.40 10
13 HIDALGO 0.10 0.29 -0.30 0.60 18
14 JALISCO 0.04 0.21 -0.30 0.60 70
15 MÉXICO 0.10 0.19 -0.30 0.60 120
16 MICHOACAN 0.06 0.19 -0.30 0.30 13
17 MORELOS 0.11 0.14 -0.20 0.20 8
18 NAYARIT -0.04 0.18 -0.30 0.20 5
19 NUEVO LEON 0.09 0.22 -0.30 0.50 33
20 OAXACA 0.08 0.23 -0.30 0.40 11
21 PUEBLA 0.15 0.24 -0.40 0.70 30
22 QUERETARO 0.20 0.28 -0.30 0.70 11
23 QUINTANA ROO 0.12 0.43 -0.30 0.80 6
24 SAN LUIS POTOSI 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.50 7
25 SINALOA 0.18 0.29 -0.20 0.80 21
26 SONORA 0.06 0.26 -0.30 0.60 22
27 TABASCO -0.17 0.23 -0.30 0.10 3
28 TAMAULIPAS 0.03 0.28 -0.30 0.60 23
29 TLAXCALA 0.04 0.29 -0.30 0.50 8
30 VERACRUZ 0.03 0.24 -0.30 0.60 55
31 YUCATÁN 0.01 0.27 -0.30 0.40 8
32 ZACATECAS 0.00 0.42 -0.30 0.60 5
99 UNSPECIFIED 0.09 0.21 -0.20 0.40 8
Source: CCT-JF-96. Index ranges from –1 to +1
A-8: INDEXES OF FUNCTIONAL FLEXIBILITY BY BRANCH (1996)
BRANCH INDEX STANDARD
DEVIATION
MINIMUM MAXIMUM NO. CASES
TOTAL 0.11 0.24 -0.40 0.90 841
1 TEXTILE 0.08 0.19 -0.40 0.60 37
2 ELECTRICITY 0.09 0.22 -0.30 0.60 19
3 FILMING -0.25 0.16 -0.30 0.90 106
4 RUBBER 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.30 11
5 SUGAR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
6 MINING 0.14 0.16 -0.10 0.40 14
7 METALLURGY AND IRON AND STEEL 0.17 0.19 -0.10 0.70 34
8 HIDROCARBONS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
9 PETROCHEMICALS 0.27 0.23 0.00 0.40 3
10 CEMENT 0.54 0.21 0.20 0.80 21
11 LIMESTONE 0.16 0.18 -0.10 0.40 8
12 AUTOMOTIVE AND AUTOPARTS 0.17 0.26 -0.20 0.70 39
13 CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL 0.19 0.20 -0.20 0.80 91
14 CELLULOSE AND PAPER 0.12 0.14 -0.10 0.40 12
15 VEGETABLE OILS AND FATS 0.17 0.13 0.00 0.40 9
16 FOOD PRODUCTION 0.17 0.16 -0.10 0.70 132
17 BEVERAGE PRODUCTION 0.19 0.17 -0.20 0.60 73
18 RAILROADS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
19 BASIC WOOD 0.26 0.09 0.20 0.40 8
20 GLASS 0.30 0.10 0.20 0.40 3
21 TOBACCO 0.35 0.35 0.10 0.60 2
22 DIRECTLY ADMINISTRATED / DECENTRALIZED -0.08 0.17 -0.30 0.10 6
23 FEDERAL AGREEMENT OR CONCESSION 0.16 0.15 -0.20 0.60 132
24 COMPANIES WORKING IN FEDERAL ZONES 0.03 0.17 -0.20 0.50 81
Source: CCT-JF-96. Index ranges from –1 to +1
A-9: INDEXES OF NUMERICAL FLEXIBILITY PER BRANCH (1996)
BRANCH INDEX STANDARD
DEVIATION
MINIMUM MAXIMUM NO. CASES
TOTAL 0.37 0.40 -1.00 1.00 931
1 TEXTILE 0.19 0.41 -1.00 1.00 47 2 ELECTRICITY 0.02 0.23 -0.50 0.67 19 3 FILMING -0.03 0.16 -1.00 0.75 106 4 RUBBER 0.45 0.44 -0.33 1.00 14 5 SUGAR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 6 MINING 0.32 0.37 0.00 1.00 14 7 METALLURGY AND IRON AND STEEL 0.52 0.32 0.00 1.00 36 8 HIDROCARBONS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 9 PETROCHEMICAL 0.19 0.39 -0.25 0.50 3
10 CEMENT 0.23 0.24 -0.33 0.50 21 11 LIMESTONE 0.21 0.25 0.00 0.67 8 12 AUTOMOTIVE AND AUTOPARTS 0.33 0.31 0.00 1.00 40 13 CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL 0.51 0.29 -0.33 1.00 106 14 CELLULOSE AND PAPER 0.15 0.19 0.00 0.50 12 15 VEGETABLE OLIZ 0.13 0.17 0.00 0.33 10 16 FOOD PRODUCTION 0.65 0.35 -1.00 1.00 138 17 BEVERAGE PRODUCTION 0.26 0.30 -0.33 1.00 84 18 RAILROADS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 19 BASIC LUMBER 0.35 0.46 -0.33 1.00 14 20 GLASS 0.22 0.38 0.00 0.67 3 21 TOBACCO 0.50 0.71 0.00 1.00 2 22 DIRECTLY ADMINISTRATED / DECENTRALIZED 0.26 0.35 0.00 1.00 7 23 FEDERAL CONTRACT OR CONCESSION 0.61 0.42 -1.00 1.00 159 24 UNDERTAKE WORKS IN FEDERAL ZONES 0.19 0.37 -1.00 1.00 87
Source: CCT-JF-96. Index ranges from –1 to +1
BILATERALITY INDEX
A standardized index was built to analyze bilaterality, starting from the union in each establishment
and workers’ formal and informal levels of intervention. Four aggregate scales were constructed the
results of which were summed and divided by four. The result of that division was standardized and
divided into three ranges: high, moderate, and low bilaterality indexes.