CHAPTER IV

JAYANTA'S REFUTATION OF

P~RVAM~M&MSA PHILOSOPHY.

3hZt ta ' .c; view on pramarla i s al-real-:v :ir- ;; ?n$e?. .JsyanCs stls%es

1 t k a t c ~ n s c i o u a n e s : can be cx?erienc-le d i r e c t l y : Th2+ a?: 2 c t

is s lways s xeans ( ~ a r 2 n a ) t o an 2x9, an*. n o t t h e end i t s ? l f -.- :.~zic:-i the t3nZttas h 3 v e t n e r n ~ e l ~ ~ e s a . . ~ i t t e c l . :he 3 i r e c t . .

2 i n t e n t i o n o f t h e sou , ant: i n s11c;i a ca-5 t h z r c i s nq .jusl;i-

f i c a t i 2 n i n holF.in; t h a t t h e act b s 2 o m y ; ~ - t - t h e ; 2: 'i-l= no t

ivi9reover, z vcrb such s s f ldoes" i nc lu5ed i n t h e n e s n i n "

o f "k;lrskafl d i r e c t l y r e f r . r z t c ~ a? 3 c t . J3y311tzi f u r t : ? 2 ~ ? 3 i r ? t s

o u t t h 2 t when n, t h ine , e n t e r s i n t o a sp-:cii'ic r r l_? t ion with an

a c t , it i s c a l l e d a karaka. F o r t h e sake o f 2 r o d u c F n ~ an

a c t , karaka r e q u i r e s t h e c o l l o c a t i o n o f o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s 4

a l s o which i s e n d l e s s . If consc iousness i s n o t a n - a c t

b u t merely a r e s u l t t h e n the c o l l o c a t i o n of c o n d i t i o n s wi th

it, i s u s e l e s s . So , he p o i n t e d o u t t h a t consc iousness does

n o t be long t o t h e class o f a c t i o n 5 t h e r e f o r e , a c t i o n i s

u s e l e s s .

J a y a n t a f u r t h e r p o i n t s o u t t h a t even i f ' w2 a c c e p t

i t f o r t h e sake o f argument that consc iousnes s i s an a c t i o n ,

it c a n n o t be i n f e r r e d , 6 s i n c e h e r e i t i s n o t p o s s i b l e t o

frame t h e major ;7rernisc.

kno-~rledge (anadhizata ) i . L?. w1ic3 d o e s not a-j?rehsn"kn

a l r eaxy a2::)rehended o b j e c t . IS i s 2o" sc ? r o 3 e r , b e c u s s ,

wnether a ?ranGnl ra3veals novci o b j s c t s o r t h e s l r e a d y a92re- -a-

h-.nrec o b j e c t s is i .zinatoria1. Lvn -: if' 3, % e m s o C know1--4gn i s

d i r e c t e d -9mclrds an a l r c a - y a??rahen,le5 ':rgSj2r,t, it ? ~ Q C ? , U C P '

true kno:~;ledge, s i n c e t h e knowledge i s frr-s'n ?n tie o b j e c t

- ~Vlirn51?isakaz i s : though t h e s u c c e s s i ~ n o' c o y i t i ?n i s q o t t h e

kaowl~31;;~3 of t he new o b j e c t , yet i t i-- v a l i d Xr,olvl;-ii?v rJ ' 3rd

xi.- a s s e r t i o n i s t h a t t h e Bha t tas d e f i n i t i o n of t h e pramans . . -- . - is t o o narrow. A f t e r r e f u t i n g t h e i r views he p r e sen t s h i s

own view of t h e prarnana as fol2ow2;: - .- According t o J a y a n t a , Pramha is t h a t c-ollocation _- .-

o f consc ious- fac tors which r e s u l t s i n producing such a n

apprehension of knowable t h a t i s d i f f e r e n t from

i l l u s i o n and doubt. Thus, Jayan ta r e a f f i r m s t h a t pramana - .- i s t h e c o l l e c a t i o n of the both consc ious and unconscious condi-

t i o n s , d i s t i n c t from a s u b j e c t and a n o b j e c t . I t produces a

t r u e knowledge of t h e rea l o b j m t . I t is oth .>r thsn t h e

i l l u s i o n and t h e doubt.* We have d i s c u s s e d t h i s i n d e t a i l i n

t h e 5 t h c h a p t e r oT t h i s work,

.m- 1 . -- na - A.:h~lvzni tya? Ljars.;%aa jnanas -.- --

H-

bh ,~ - .~L t i v a a m - ti, j n r ~ l ~ ' rth? iti . .:..I. 2 . 2";. - - --- -- -- - -

2. 3h;ttanzil ? r s t y a k s - ; cT tn8 . Ibi' .

- - - k z r y a t v s t .- s:vyapar-:?cl;r,?kZryr? - bhqvecj. ... ity an2vasthZ. I b i ? - - - .. - -

iti - -- k i 5 kriyayz? I b i 4. m - . _ -_ .-

kZrzka6 .-. -- t a t t u phal=-n2v k a r o t i na kriyzm. I b i ? , p. 29. - - I____-- - -

n r~n i t va inabh idh idh iva t e : ~ a r n i h t a d a ~ i na.

/

visayapravrtt5sya przrnzye visesa\hSv5t. I b i d . p . 33. -. . - - -. -

pramSam iti yuktam. Ibid. p . 23. - CY- -

- -. - 17d'.l ;.lim:inns?c~;n-,e~t, o f ?erc- .pt ion refuted. -

- J a y c x t z 3 h a t t a r e j e c t s t - e MimEnsii t?eor:-r oC perce- j t ion .

w i t h a clev.,r anrl c l e a r 3bs rva t ion on th? f ~ 7 , l ~ ' r : i n q grqunds

. . d e is al.qo awars of t h e fact t n a t cven t h e c o 9 n e n t s t o r s o f

Jaiqnini':; own s c h o o l a r e no-tsne w i t - it. 50 fa r a s

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a r e concerne!, t hey draw f l r f e t c h e ? meanings

on account of the d i i f e r e n t <:in2 of i n t 2 r 2 r e t n t i o n s 05 the

sLltra " s a t sam?rayo&efl r i n 3 r i l y ?n t h e 5zs i s o f th:? ?nsiy- --- ..- --- t i c a l s ~ l l t t i n , , o f t h i s com?3un? into i t s c c s ~ ~ ; ~ o n e n t s in

v a r i o u s ways i . e . s a t Z i sa.;~ >rayoge , s,iti smipr yoge, 2nd

Jayanta state.; that though t h e i n d e c l i n a b l e p r e f i x

"sarn" - i n t he "sanl)rayoge" i n d i c a t e s such a sense-objec t

c o n t a c t as exc?u, les doubt and i l l u s i o n , t h e a;)proysriateness

of the sense-objec t -contac t being supersensuous, cannot $ 3

gerce ived . ' There fo re , doubt and i l l u s i o n s which are

c o n d i t i o n a l by t h e r e a l o b j e c t s , w i l l no t be excluded. 2

Fur the r , h e s t a t e s t h a t t h e sense -ab jec t - con tac t i s

i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e e f f e c t . The e f f e c t o f t h e sense-objec t -

c o n t a c t i s an apprehens ion b u t i f it i s not adequa te ly

q u a l i f i e d , i t does n o t b d i c a t e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f t h e

~7 ,-,-ob"m,-&-?r I a '- ,, , , i n t a c t .' . ..:'. 12: :. 53 i; " i n , i n :ix:i?x:! ng

ta exclucie h ? l l i l c i ~ z t i s n from the fie? . oL' '>ercr- . i t ion. 3

5.9, r..>-= I.,, :73ntact 0: the .:ens .:-o!-!j;?n blith th; e x i s t z n t

r e a l ob j z c t i . 2 ?ere ?? t ion :>n;i t:l,?t ~r.evr.!ll:; on?. v th.3 . l p ~ s :!nt

things. dut, it i s not s o j3erf.)rct.

Fur ther , Jayan ta r e fu te s t ; ~ e argument o f kcumgrila,

6 who s t a t e s i n h i . slokzvc?rt~;ilr? that this worr? t%a t sa f i~ rayoge t t -

i s p a r t i c i g l e , tne i n c i ~ c l i n a b l e wor1:i Ism' - s i g n i f i e s ?roper-

ness , t ne coii$ouna ' sa!nprayogef i s qual i f ied by t h e p a r t i - -

c i p l e ' s a t ' - and t h e sense of the s u t r a i s : "wlien t h e

con tac t o f t h e sense-organ with an o b j e c t t akes p l ace

proper ly , true sense percept ion i s s u e s f o r t h , and doubt and

i l l u s i o n s zre excluded from tne province o f percept ion;

because, they involve incor rec t sense o b j e c t - c o n t a c t , t h a t

the properness of sense-object-cont::ict i s supersensuous.

However, it i s n o t perceived. If i t i s he ld t h r ~ t such

"propernesst1 i s i n f e r r e d by the effect, it i s a l s o untenable

since e f f ec t i .e . apprehension, i s n o t d i r e c t l y q u a l i f i e d by

an xi< j e c t i v e sucn as ' 3t.o jz?p'.

Jayanta a l s o r e f u t e s 'me v r i t t i k z r a ( u p : ~ ~ a r s . ? ) w:?o -.I- .-

makes a r e c i ? r o c a l cl-rane,i. o - t h : ;.jlor~~,; "$stu ~=ln - ' t - h a t l ? e n - P

t n e t o g i v e a

t n i s i n t e r ? r e t a t i o n o f t'rie sE"Lra i s nst sufficient, b+caxse

8 it d e f i n e s doub: t8:>o.

- Xere t h e ?lin&sakas o b j e c t t h a t a cion'bt refsrs to

two d i s t i n c t o b j s c t s b u t on..'.:; st?nse grg,an do 3s n o t , z x e

in c o n t a c t w i th e i t h ' s r of then: i n order t o s e n e r z t e iz. 5 L .

. . To t h i s J a y m t a answers t h c t t i n such a ~ i t u : : ~ t i o n 2ven :n?

o b j e c t s a r e a l t e r n a t i v e l y r e f e r r e d t o t h e senL?-.-organ ?.nos

t h u s t h e d e f i n i t i o n a o n l i e s t o ' d o u b t ' a s well. 10

I n the fo rego ing pages t h e iqimZisaka's d e f i n i t i o n

o f p e r c e p t i o n is thoroughly r e f u t e d by Jayanta.

Here the Mimzmsakas may argue t h a t t h e i r i n t e n t i o n o r

t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e - s i i t r a k a r a i s not t o give a d e f i n i .

t i o n b u t only t o p o i n t ou t and b r i n g home t h e fact t h a t - 2 e r c e p t i o n is n o t t h e means of p roof f o r a s c e r t a i n i n g

dharma . 11

J a y a n t a refutes . -such a c o n t e n t i o n of t h o Nimzrnsakas;

Hel l then? 9 j h ~ t h e r i n ti?:. c a s2 m.-ntj.ofi~r:, i- is q c , ~ f i a l

p e r c e p t i o n ( laukika-pra tyaksa) o r yogic ? e x - - g t i o n i . e . - ? P t r a n s c e n d s n t a l p e r c q t i o n , ~d l i ch 1-!o+s not r-?ve%?_ .iilarm~.

They cannot r e s o r t t o both, becau:;~ f i r s t a l t - ,mat iv+z j.5

an uncountes ted p ropos i t ion m(: t h e sc?c~n"l?.t~mativ:? is

imnocs ib ln t o ezc lpe t h e f a i ~ l t or- z:?lE-cnntr2d:ction, b?c-?;~.se

accorciing t o then yogic ~ e r c e : - , t i , > n i s ,.;in;r,ly f l c t ior t . 17

'Therefore, i f t ranscendenta l perce13tion i s :I fiction

as t n e ~imZmsakas bo l i ev? , tlieg t h s r e w i l l be no minor

term i. e . p a k s ~ and t h e s u b j e c t of inferenci - w i l l e abz.:nt.

?fence no conclur ion w i l l be deciuccs!l, i n s?ii;? ol' t h e

nniadie terrn such as an i l l u rn ina to r only o f t h e " x i s t e n t

o b j e c t , a percep t ion e t c . 3 4

Thus t h e a n a l y s i s of Jayanta may bc summarised as

fu l lows: J a i m i n i ' s s u t r a s on p e r c e p t i o n does n o t s e r v e

any purpose i . e . it n e i t h e r provides a d e f i n i t i o n of percep-

t i o n n o r g i v e s a p rope r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f dhnrnla.

It may be observed tiere t h a t i n t h e prestv?nt case

J a y a n t a t s aim i s n o t conf ined sirnp1.y t o approve o r r e f u s e

t h e Mirngis% d e f i n i t i o n of pe rcep t ion . Actua l ly , he t r i e s t o

p r e s e n t a cornpreherlsive view o f t h e ~ i m ~ r n s a k a s which lnay

5.s of" u n i f y i n g riatuza i n s ,i. :o o f : i l l ti? r d i v rsi- , i 2s Lr i

various aspects.

.i:;o.c?;!??? irn2olltant in? is :~:3 r;th n o t i n 2 here th - 5 :

-. J a y a n t a has left prabh$kar** ",lt!7ge+:?~&?r I ? I ~ W B V ~ ~ ,

i t m a y bn cr)lzsidereii as 3:; VJZ-51: n o i ! i k 0 2 ; y,i?:;:i, 3.-CSUS:

. < " . --, -,- PY , .~~a .~ . ,sa :?-:re he x:j inly y . 5 'cys 52 K;~.-n,yyl.l , , hr-:i2, h?

--..?nera:.ly c;uote:: by rs:je,!,in t:.! actual -,.;or4:: 3n.j s:;:r.;.tizes

wi'-,il .n,2;ifi;-til~ns. .#n ~ L X J ? ~ t l l : ~ c . 2 ~ ~ :nay bc ile 113: z t

sucs::s.sful remi,irk i n t a k i n , t'he:n t o t? 1(., :ii:;i~ly b-;r 33ir~tinf

out t 3 t ?eir :nut:l.illy conZl i c t i n ; a t - t i tudns , i n int.?r:~~ntin~::

tile '~ci.:ic I.i5 and i n in .? i rsc t l -y e-.t*iblj.shFn:., t h l f n c t t32.t

S3ut.>.ina1s d e f i n i t i o n o f 3e rcen t ion i s ?ror)sr'.

iJotes and References

Ni4. p t . I. p. 154. -

/

bh:~veyurna siilainbanau sarnsayavip3ryayau. I b i d . ?. 153. - 3. kZryato1vagatirvaktavyZ, karyai ca j:%a$ -

/

na ca tadvisesitameva prayogasya s:%rnyaktg.i -- . avagamayati. Ibid. p. 154.

1

5. s3tZn --- prayoga iti ca 2ara6 niralanbena - - -- va jEZnanivrttaye varnitam. I b i d . p. 154. -. . ... - - - .

dustatvacchukttikayogo varatih ra jateksanzt . Ibi3.. p .I54 -. . . ---- .- - Cf. S V . - p. 135. (pra-su) sl. 38.

7. satxti saptamyaiva gadgrthatvzdanarthad. Ibid. p .154.

samprayuktamindriyai. Ibid. 2. 154. .- - 10. maivam? na h i dhavagadiravat dvgvapi -- --

/

samsayas&vidi pratibhzsete, kintu

sthZnurvg puruso vetyanrdhiiritai katara .--- .- . C -

nunai ca tayoranyatarenendriyam Sam- - . /

prayuktabeveti ubhay~vamarsitv~cca sa6 -. - -

/

.sayasya yena samprayukta& caksuh - - - .-.

n z t i y a s t i h p a r i h r t a bhavat i . I b i d . 9. 154. . --C

- p r a t i an imi t ta tvameva viehiyate. I b i d . o . 154. - - -

1 2. k a t a r a s y a p r a tyaksasya dha,mai. p r a t i P -. -- - --

n r a t y a k s a s y a ? yogipra tksasya va? 1bi. i . p. 155. .- . - .- -

yog ip ra tyaksasya t u bhavatKmasiddhstvZt kasya . - - -.---

dharma6 ? ra t i a n i m i t t a t v a r a t i p Z d a n z 6 . I b i d . p . 155 . / /

14, evagca F h a ~ n i n o ' bhZvSdZsryZsiddllatEn s p r s e t - -- - - - -- -. -- . - . vidyam~no~alarnbhi~tvapratya~cs~+,v~di sgdhanai. I b i d . D . 155.

. . . - - -

cf . 1. sZksZtkZri ?ramZkaran& p r a t y a k s a i . TB. p.5. .- . - . -- -. . -- -

2. i n d r i y e n a r t h a s y a s a m i k a r s a d u t p a d y a t e --- . .

-jKCan&,.tatpratyaksarh. NV. on NS. 1 . I .4. - -. --.-' - - 3 . p r a t i g a t ~ aksam p r a t y a k s a i , MB, ( i n t r o ) 1.2.4. - . . .-

a tall p r a t y a k s jn"Gnakaranatva& p r a t y a k s a s y a - . -.- . -. l a k s a n d . I b i d , p. 42. - 0-0 -

4. i n d r y a j a n y d jn"r3:na& prs tyaksai . NSM, p. 233. -. .- -

6. i n d r i y g r t h a s a n n i k a r s a j a n y a i jza'narn pratyaksarh . . . .-

TS. p. 42.

Jaya:lt?, while d i s c u s s i n g t h e ant~mZna,>rarnZna d id not -. make any c r i t i c h s a of t h e ~ i r n ~ ~ s a k s , b u t t h e qllotes Kumarila

wno ha lds t h a t when the reason proving the ob jec t t o be

i n f e r r e d it i s nrovzd through percept ion and he analyae? /

t h e ~ e a n i n g of pGrvavzd, Segavat e x .

k7ea he d iscussed about vyapt i , t h e 3'nZttas view a l s o . . i s explained and i t may be noted t h a t t h e l a t t e r S h a t t a s . . seem t o have bee1 inf luenced by the naiyzyikas and so , w i t h

regard t o t h e method of t a rka ' i n 3 r d e r t o e l i x i n a t e evpn t h e

suspecious of i n v i s i b l e extraneous cond i t ions .

Jayanta r e f u t e s t h e view of t h e Pr&haXara on t h e b a s i s

of common experience. He nots : All a c t i o n s a r e n o t i o n o f

which upward movement and such o t h e r movements a r e t h e spec ie s .

This movement i s r e f e r r e d t o by t h e judgement "It movesw

and s o on. Which i s a perceptua l j udgment . Hence, it i s

n o t t e n a b l e t h a t all a c t i o n s are an inference .2 as holds t h e

fo l lower of t h e PrabhKkara. If conjunct ion .- and d i s j u n c t i o n of

world have been r e f e r r e d t o by such a judgement, t hen t h e

form of t h e judgement should h,?ve been t h a t it i s un i t ed

and d isuni ted b u t no t t h ? t it rnovC?S sines t h e ji~d;:ement

accor2s with i t s o b j e c t . 3

I f t h e judgeaent t h z t it noves r s f e r s t? i t s c ~ n j u n c t i o n s

and d is junct ions , then an objec t which s t ands s t i l l should be

r s f ~ r r e 2 t o , by t h e judgement t h a t it rnovos, s ince it has every

? o s s i b i l i t y o f containing both conjunct ion and disc9njunct ion. 4

k s t a b l e pos t on which a hawk s i t and frm wL?ich i t

flew away should be r e f s r r e d t o by t h e judgement t h a t t h e

:lost rnoves . The ? a s t and fu ture c ~ n junct ions and r i i sc?njl.lnc-

t i o n s a r e included i n t h e s2r i ?s, o u t t h e y can m v e r be

received. 6

If gevadat ta s t ands s t i l l o f t en having walked. some

d is tance t'nen conjunct ion belong t o him. A s such why s!?ould

not he be r e fe r red t o by the judgement t h a t Devadatta noves,

asks Jayanta. 7

The ground i s a l s o seen t o c o n t a i n an unin ter rupted

s e r i e s o f conjunct ions and d i s junc t ions . I t should a l s o - -d

be r e f e r r e d t o by t h e judgement t h a t the ground moves when

t he men are moving on t h e ground. 8

Jayanta records t h e vit3w of a n opponent who argues:

"The p rad ica te "moves' i s a s s e r t e d only of t h a t person

nose a c t i ~ n brings a ~ o u t conjunction snci .;isjunction znc'

t h a t t he praaicate i n ques t i~m does not a>ply to the gmund

s ince i t does no t produc- the conjunction and disjunction. 9

To t h i s he answrs : I n f l a t case it i s pro?er t o aAnit t h a t

the above grzbicate r ~ f e r s on ly t i 3 an i ict i - I bu t not t o

csnlunction and flisjunc30n sinci? suc t a r l j f r , v ~ n c ~ i . c E ~ L L ; ? -

blisheci by the! j o i n t rnetlloa ? f ~ r e e ~ n e n t ant; difP-lrenca. 10

I f con ju~c t ion ant 6.i.; jun::t i cin a r e referred t o 5 y tine

pradic~.t; . ':.lo..i?s ' tkel-! t l iey have t:' ex '> l> in 1,,1hy t :E:.T ho ld

-tnut the person moves but not t h e ;-?,round thou2.h botl-; the nerson

and the grow& corltain a i i k c c o : ~ juncti on and dis,junc t i o n .

Devadatta moves i s only t o be framed but not the judgement

t ha t the groiurd moves, becaua~? the ac t ion of 2evadatta i s

only responsible f o r conjunction and disjunction. Such 3

contention i s not log ica l ly tenable. The act ion being

supersensuous, we f a i l to know whether t he act ion inhears in

Devadatta o r i n the ground.'' Since it i s only inferred from

i t s e f f e c t , v i z , conjunction and dis junct ion. But the e f f e c t

showed i n common by both Devadatta and the ground. 12

'&en Devadatta walks on the ground we do never judge

t h a t t he ground moves, When the breeze constantly blows

over t he banks of a r i v e r and has connection with and

d i s junc t ion from t h e s l a b s of s tone on them we do never

judge t h a t the slabs of s tone move. 1 s Therefore we a r r i v e a t

the conclusion t h a t the verb " t o moverr r z f ~ r s only t o an

l c t i o n but not t o c ln junc t ion and d i s j ~ n c t i o n . ' ~ Xhen t h e

b i rd f l i e s hizh i n th.2 sky we perce ive t h a t it f l i e i n t h e

unsupported sky no conjunct ion i s yerceived s ince such s

contac t w i t h the sky belongs t o t h e supersensuous s k y a s

~ e l 1 . I ~ I t r?nains over impercept ible l i k e the con tac t of

t'ne a i r w i t h . the t r e e . If t h e two conjoining te-ms a r e no t

2e rce iv t~d thsn t h e i r con tac t i s n o t percziv2d. l6 I t may be

held thaz t:-ie contsc t o f the b i r d with a p a r t i c u l a r ;or t ion of

tne sky which i s marksd out ~y a f lood o f l i z h t i s perceived. 17

aefencs i s not tenablz . Wncn t h e s k y i s enveloped by

t h e dark clouds we perce ive i n t h e d a r k n ight t h a t t h e glow-

worm i s flying.18 I n t h a t sky t h e r ~ i s n e i t h e r broad l i g h t

nor darkness having p a r t s . There i s no objec t with which .. .-

t h e con tac t of the glowworm and from which i t s sepa ra t ion

will. be When t h e earthquake t akes p l ace we

experience t h a t the e a r t h i s quaking b u t n e i t h e r conjunct ion

nor -d$.-sjunction is seen. 20

Every e f f e c t has a cause. Conjunction and d i s j u n c t i o n

a r e e f f e c t s . O f course, t hey have a cause. This cause i s

no o t h e r than an ac t ion . Therefore, w e come to the conclu-

s ion t h a t an ac t ion is not infer red from i t s effect. The

; ~ c t i o n i s not a l s o i n f e r r e d frox conjunction. The l a s t

e f f e c t o f zn s c t i o n i s conjunction a d t h e ac t ' on pe r i shes

i n tile next moment. Hence an ac t ion which i s actuaTly

present cannot be i n f e r r e d fmm c o n ~ u n c t i o n , w i t h i t s , e f f e c t

The pradica te 'movest r e re r s t o a.7resen-t ~ c t i o n . It

cannot be i n fe r red from conjunction d is4unct ion so Ton. a s

it i s present . a c t i o n cones ints2 b n i n ~ i n tne f i r s t

xovernent. I t produces i n ths second movsrnent 5i::2unction,

which des t roys the e ? r l i e r contsc t i n t h e t h i r ? aovement.

In the fou r th moment it ?roduc':s a frc-sn s u b s quer~t con tac t

with s9me o t h e r ob jec t . I n the f i f t h moment it passzs away.

The subsequent con tac t i s not perceived when it comes i n t o

being s i n c e the percept ion of an o b j e c t i s causa l ly d e t e r

mined by i t s ob jec t . It i s the reason of the inference of

an a c t i o n t h e percept ion of the reason i s necessary. When

such percept ion takes place the action has passed away.

Hence, t h e a c t i o n which i s actually present canalot be

in fe r red . 22 ---

Xotes and P.l?f?rences

/ /

1 . adrsyopa'dhisa~kz t u t a rka i reva - . - --

n i r a sya t e IW. (Aim. ) p. 27. - - 2. ? a r i sa,:.ndafipa sya utksepanzdibned~vatah --. -

pra tyaksa tvz t na t a sya ni tyikmeyatvam. NM. p t , I , p . 195, ---- . - -

7. samyogavibh~gZla~ban~tve, t u - samyu j y a t e , vibha j ya t e - . -

iti p r a t i t i k y a t , ns z a l a t i t i . Tbid. p . 195. -- _-- - __. -

bhavet. . . - I b id . p. 195.

bhut abhgvi noh -. .-

samyogavibhzgayoh par ,~ksatva% varttamZnaj7oh grhanai -. .- __. . . ._II_ - ..----. ._ I_ .-- I b i d . p. 196.

bhGmavapi bhavet buddhih c a l a t i t i manusyavat . I b id . p. 196. 'F- - 0

9. manuse yatkr iygjanyatvai sariyogavibhggayoh .- - - t a t r i v a c a l a t i t i pratyayah. Ibid. p . '196. -.

10, - a y a i pratyayah na saEyogavibhZgEvala&banah. Ibf d. p . 196. 0 - ' + " -..

bhCmyKsrtet1. Ibid. p, 196, *-

tulyatvii t . Ibid. p . 196.

- I 5 . c a l a t i t i n r a tyayo i r s t sh . I b i d . :I. 196.

- - ----- -. . .__. . - 14. taszat -- l iriyavisaya eva ssilatii t i r : tyayan

(. - - -- -_1___ - -_-

- vihgyasi, v i h a r a t i , vihaigaae c a l a t i t i

16. L a ca gaganasaiyogah p r~ tyaksah ?ratyakse-,arT)vrt;t;i - -. . -.------. - "I-

t vat gandhavahamah~mhzsa~yogav~ t. Ibid . >. 196.

pa t r inah pratyaksa iti. Ibid. 1 2 . 196. - .- . . -- - / - /

n i s i t h e . ---a- szfidh kSrelpi c ~ l a t k.:sdyot? darsans t . I b i d . 7.197, -- --- - -.

19. na t a t r a a l o k ~ v a v ~ a v ~ ne ca kagcana timir:~vayav? vii - - _^._- -- - - _ _ - -- - -

vidyate -- - -- iti kena saiyoE3 grhyyte, vibhEgt3! ~ a . I b i i : . ,I. 197, - -- _ . I--- - - -

20. bnukaipotpate ca jZte c a l a t i vasuaa t?ti -- -. - " .--- ---- -

m a t i r a s t i - na -- tatra -- ~ a i ~ o ~ a v i b h ~ ~ a u grhyete. I b id . p . 197. . --

/

kriyEy& tena anwGt& asakyatvat. I b i d . p. 197. . -

/

kr iyg anumgtumapi sakyg. Ibid. p . 197.

- J syan ta r e j e c t s t h e Mirn$osa t?;eory of Upsman. on t h e

cround t h a t t h e concept of upamit1 I .e . 3 cow i s l i k e a u

- gavya, 3rogounfied by t h e MhmZ~ss,k?s i s not base: on experi-

1 ., ence. wnat we experience i s t h a t a gavaya is like a cow.

zven i f we assume t h e s o s s i b l l i t y of the cDnverse judgement

i t w i l l be, a t the most, a juf;ge-nent o f rnernory. 30, i t csrc-iot

be a c l a s s by i t s e l f , a s such no d i s t i n c t instrvrnent i s

requi red t o produce it. Thus u?z.n?ns w i l l no t be a d i s t i n c t

3roof . 2

The ~im~hsakas hold t h a t it i s n o t t h e cow t h ? t mi~ht

have been e x p e r i ~ n c e d before, but t h e s i ~ i l i r i t y s u b s i s t i n g

i n t h e cow t h a t is being experienced h e r e and t h a t t o o f o r

the f i r s t t ime. But, Jayanta a s s e r t s t h a t t h e s i : a i l a r i t y 4

s u b s i s t i n g i n t h e cow a l s o previous ly perceived. S i m i l a r i t y ,

as belonging t o a cow can be experience^ without knowing t h e

s i m i l a r i t y belonging t o a , g n ~ a ~ a . ~ k%en a c i t i z e n s e e s a

gavaya i n a f o r e s t , he n e i t h e r r e c o l l e c t s an ' e lenhant '

no r a 'camel ' nor a 'horse' but an i n d i v i d u a l o f a d i s t i n c t " " --.

c l a s s . 6

So, Jayanta says t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l th ing perceived as -

similar t o the gavaya by a person i s r e c a l l e d on?!' i n h i s

mernory then2ver a gqvaya i s perceived ev,.n i f I*.. i s not

d i s t i n c r l y cognized.? Followin- t h e e a r i i c r l o . i c i a n s ,

Jay 4nta g ives a verbrtirn account of ' l~ t sy$yana t s line of'

t h o u g h t and Uddyotakara's i n t e e r e t a t i o n of the c o r n ~ o u n ~ ~

:;rasiddhasadnnmy as t h e szatezeqt of a r s l i ~ b l e 9eyson

a ~ s e r t i n t h e s i m i l iri t y betw.?en a knorm an(: an unknown

ob jec t an2 r e s u l t i n . inf ra-cogni t ion o f the r e l z t i o n of a

nzme with t h e named. 8

Accordin; t o t h e J e w l o g i c i a n s , ugam5na i s s e m u o u s

cogni t ion by a man of an unfqn i l z r t h i n 5 throu:.il a state-

ment of a r e l i a b l e person t h a t t h e u n f a n i l a r thin: reserllbles

a c e r t a i n o the r th ing fami l?r tc him. Y

According t o Gaut?ma upamGa a s t h e means 04 cognizing

an unknown ob jec t , through i t s s i n i l a r i t y t o another w e l l -

known ob jec t . " And a l s o he says t h a t ,upam&a i s n o t a

d i s t i n c t means of cogni t ion s ince t h e degree of s i m i l a r i t y

i . e . p e r f e c t , g r e a t o r p a r t i a l i s n o t precisely es tab l i shed . 11

Gautama s t a t e s t h a t upamiina does n o t depend upon t h e

qual i ty o r degree of s i m i l a r i t y , what i s required i s t h e

s i m i l a r i t y , of an unknown object with a well known ob jec t ,

Thus upamzna apprehends a thing which i s not grasped through

perception, inference o r ve r t e l t e s t imoni . ' V 5 t tsy:iy~ne-

star,s:; t n z t ur~angna i s t h c knov~l9dges o f ar: ~~nknovm 7 b j e c t

by Yneans o f i t s resemblance t o a knotm ob jec t . 13 Xnil a l s o

he stste. ; t h a t it i s t h e cogn i t ion o f t h e r 2 1 s t i o n o f a neme

w i t h the named. 14

Prof . V..'Lr. Jha has discussed i n h i s work s t u 6 i e s i n

l a n g u q e , L o ~ i c and Lpist imology, about t h e conce?t o f

upamanspramzna accord ing t o both nurva n?rn5&sake s c h o o l s i . e .

3hZt ta and FJrah5ksra. Then he d i scussed t h e arguments of . . - Jayantn a p i n s t 1G.rnEhsakas and :heir conrn~n-ts e t c .

The f3l lowing d i s c u s s i o n i s based on F r o f . h a ' s

ex2os i t ion . Jayanta s a y s t h a t even a s s o c i a t i o n o f t h e

s i : n i l a r i t y wi th t h e Goyal was ex?r-rienced b y thqt inan when

he was see ing t h e cow. l 5 Tn this the ~~1Im~msakas 53y thai.

funny inde-zd i s t h e answer of the Naiyayikas t h a t even

without s s e i n ~ t h e s o y a l , one can s e e t h e s i m i l a r i t y o f t h e

goyal d i e n s e e i n g t h e cow. 16

Jayan ta answers t h a t , it i s n o t funny because it i s a

fact that when t h e person i s s e e i n g the cow a t t h e same t ime - h e i s also see ing t h e s i m i l a r i t y of t h e goyal , b u t t h e only

s p e c i a l i t y i s t h i s t h a t h e s e e s it wi thou t t h e i n d i d u a l ,

namely, t h e goyal. l7 To t h i s t h e ~ I r n b s a k a s say t h a t i t

i s s t i l l more funny t o say t h a t t k ? s i m i l a r i t y is kngl,m

but without tne knowledge of t h e goyal. 18

To t h i s J s y a n t s calmly rel3lies by nut t ln: a zoun5er- -

quest ion t o t h ? Flim$ms~~kas. After s e e i n ? tlzc goyal i n the

f ~ r z s t how does a c i t i z e n rcmeaoer only t h e cow a:?d not a

:lorsc o r an els?:?ant. 19 - , n z t c o n t r o l s t .? is f a c t .

Therefore , the ~ ? m ~ h s a k a s should accep t t h e fact as they

cannot say t h i s has>sns without a n y reason t h a t he man w3o

szw a cow a l r eady , .,;.hen he say.? a gavaya renenbers only the

cow and n o t any o t h e r animal because, h e has the knowledge of

the a s s o c i a t i o n of t h e s i m i l a r i t y o.f 2oyal i n cow. Therefore,

this s s s o c i a t i o n a l a o can be the o b j z e t of r,:mcrnbrance, and

t h e ~ i m ~ m s s k a s , upami t i i s n o t n i n ~ b u t a rernenbrance. 20

Hotes and ?.efarances

/

1. prasiddhena h i s zd r sya i aprasiddhasya gamyate gava -MI__ - --

;avaya?indasjra nna tu yukto vi3aryayah M'i. ~ t . I. I . 211 ,--- - . - c f . I. NS - . 1.7.6.

N - - - 2. p r a jnatena s:?mznyZt ?r:i j~~?,ini~a.sy~

prajriZpanam upamZna6 iti. Fa. p. 23. - - - -

3. BgarnGi tasamskZrasnrt i yapeksam s5rCqy:-ii -. . __ u2arnZnari. - IN. p . 169.

upamanam. NVTT p . 169. -- -

anena /

sadrso

t s i l~ni rh - - kasysci t a s t i t i , p r , n i terevab:?&vZt 1ri:n - -- --- -

pramzna c i n t a y s l N24. p t . I . ?. 211. -. - - 3. - na tasmin e s a smrt ih . Ibid. p. 21 1. - - -.

/

c f . 1 . gavaya da r s ana i gosrnaranasya. SB, p. 44. -- 2 . x. p. 308. (upamha) s l . 4 .

/

4. gavayas&drsyasygpi t a t r a p%-varii grahanzt . p t .I. p .2 1 1 . -. /

5. - nanu anavagatagavayena gavi gavyasgdrsyd iti _I_-- .--

citraxfi. Ib id . p. 211. /

6. v i s i s t a i eva pinda6. Ib id . p . 211 - -.- #

7. drsyamgne smaranapathari a v a t a r a t i na i t r a iti. I b i d . n.211 -. - .. ---

svarzparh - . _ _ _ gcaksa te , sam j z s a a jf;is&bandha _ .- - -.- - .-

/

a t idesav&yG .- .- - eva upamgnai. I b i d . p . 205. ---

NB. 23. c f . 1. -

/ /

3. gavayasabdavacyatafi purusah at idesavzkya

smarana sahakar inah p m t y a k s a t gavaya .- - .-. . - /

gadZtgosZdrsyat -- . ~ ~ r a jznat t e n a p r a j z a p y a t t .- -

iti prxnanavygparah ?ra j;aPana!n u k t a i i ti. IWTT . 3. 169, --• ,-.I.--- -- --

1

4. gosadrso . __ gavayapadavkyah iti atidesavgkya- - .- smaranam vyaparah. 24K. p. 64. .- - . -

/ /

9. adyatangstu - - - vyacaksa te , s r ta t idesavakyasya .--- .- - . - - -

p ramztuh aprasiddhe pinde ?rasiddha - 9indasSrG -ya j%&

i n d r i y a ja6 sam j%sam jzisambanda p ra t ipa t t ipha lam

c f . samj%sam jEi saibandha jn"a'na$ uparni t ihi . TS . p . 49. -- .- -

N'M. p t . I. p. 205. - /

1 1 . a tyan tap raya i kadesa sa'dhax6yZt - upamgnasiddhih. MS. 2.1.44.

YatoktadosEnupapattih. Ibid. 2.1.45. . 13. NB. - p . 23.

N

14. sari js~sam jnisarnbandhh3& pra t i p s d y a t e - . Ibirj. 7 . 24.

15. Ni4. p t . I. p. 211 -

17. - na c i t ram, v y a k t i t i r a s k r t a s y a g rahana t . I b i d . 3 . 27 1 . - ----- . - 18. idamapi c i t r a t a r a h , grhzta&a ~ ~ a k t i t i r a s k r t a ;

I -. - .- ceti, vyaktih h i . - grhanameva t a t t i r a s k a r e -.-- nastyeva grhanai . I b i d . p. 21 1. -.-

anusmarat i , na karbhaA, na turangai . I b i d . 9. 2 1 1 . --.--- - --

/

IV.4 i~l~rn~&sa Theory of Sabda

Refutation of Verbal Testirnoni /

Jayanta while re fu t ing the Buddhists view of Sabda - -- /

pramana, i t he Buddhists ho ld t h a t sabda can be included i n - .- i n f e ren t i a l knowledge, so there i s no need of accepting the / f

sabda as independent source of va l id knowledge) i . e . , sabda - i s d i l f e r e n t from anumgna, extensivsly quotes Kumarila . Therefore obviously He i s not f o r t o r e fu t e the ?-qimZnsak~s

view on verbal testimony. &b i l e he quotes KumZrila, he i s - -.

2wars of the f a c t t h a t t he Minamsakas vinw on the na ture t h e

word, r e l a t i on of the words and meanin;,, un.iversa1, and the

inpor t of the sentence a r e not acceptable t o him. L e t us

examine Jayanta ' s view on those conce?ts.

The Nature of Mord.

Jayanta discusses e laborate ly over the problem and - . --,

supports t h e conventional Nygya view aga ins t the Mima'hsii

stand po in t . Jayanta Bhatta s t a t e s t h a t words do no t e x i s t s . *

before t h e i r production by human e f f o r t nor do we no t i ce

any veil which covers them.' According to . Jayanta words "

do not e x i s t s a f t e r t h e i r ut terance.2 The ~ h % s a k a s be l ieve

t h a t it i s not words bu t sounds which a r e produced by persons,

But Jayanta says t h a t t he re i s no proof f o r assuming the . -

~ q a n i f e c t a t i o n as s3unc i?d t n e o r i vinzl. 2s e t e r 3 a l ip lor l j .

I'loreover popu la r usage a l s o goes i n favour o f t h e , ) roduct ivo

7 nature of word..;. xna -il_so h e ? o i n t ~ out t!i ~t 33ny persons

i n d i f f e r e n t ?laces u t t 2r a worF: a t t h e s3me t i a c . 3a,6 it

been e t e r n a l , t h i s could not be :?ap~en:-5.. -l"'n=.refore words a r e

The Rela t ion of words an5 lvlzaninz -

Specula t ion about t h e r o l s t i g n subs is t inr ; bi.t~,q?.-.n wgr.r!

end meaning (padapsdartna s?_fibandh:1) 'r?:.%s be;?n cons tan t

endeavour of t h e philos>?hers. I n Indian n3i.I?s3.?'1v - . therc zre

two main views. On? i s t t ln r e l ? t i a n bst:~l?en VIJ:-,: >?,n?. i t s

!neaninz 2 5 natura l . , ~ , n d t h e oS,h?r t h - . t :?o1,? if c??vention.2!. . Aere Jayanta s sys t h a t t h e r I ? t i ? n b ~ t ~ n a : l t h e word an11 i t s

meaning i s created by G o i . 5

According t o ~ i k v a n ~ t h a the r e l a t i onship between t h e

word and its meaning can a l s o be e s t a b l i s h e d by the w i l l Man. 0

Jayanta raises s e r i o u s objec t ions t o t h e ~ i m ~ f n s a theory and

s t a t e s t h a t it i s unreasonable to mainta in t h a t the r e l a t i o n

between a word and its meaning i s e t e r n a l since t h e eternality

of this' r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not groved by any mean:; of knowledge. 7

The existence of s u b t l e power a ? a r t froin causi? arid a u x i l i a r y

condit ions cannot be accepted sincca it i s not cocniscd l i k e n

substance.

There i s no i n v a i l a b l e rt?'eat,ion betp:?en :ncsnin., ?fi,-j

/

sa'cti. If t h i s power is ts be assurnea t h e as:,umption of - e convention becones un-avoi.f&bl~. iit:!?u?; c nvc:ntion the

n e m i n g csnnot be graspec!.. Tie fne ; :n i~g~ of ~ ~ ( 3 r d ~ !.eal-a?t

f r o m the speech and ac t ions o f t n e e l S 5 r s . This' ?roves

9 rn7 t h a t t h e i r r e l a t i o n to the objects is n o t eterrgl.. Lne - -.*

Xinamsakas hold t h s t a worr hac nn i n b ~ r n ?ewer o f r evea l

i t s meanin2. But Jayantz 3'nat.t= ) o i n t ? F o u t t h a t 'If the

:,ewer of reveal ing t h e mean in r of >n 3Sj r :c t where Lrlnate

~ s a m s i d h i k s ) i n a war? , it kroult hav:. r .ve?.!.ec! t?e o b j e c t

sven when it is, utt;eri?d mistake ju::;, 3 s a ner.1 '.an::,

i l l u m i n a t e s an ob jec t . 10 There fore J - y z n t ~ 392s not 2da i t

t h a t aif f e r e n t cmvention:: zr?: cr+.t:zc: by <if "r2nt

Tersons o r by t h e sa.rne perscn st d i f f e r c rn t t i l ies ~:~hr.n he

ut t : : rs a word. ' A l l w o r s are not eqoz! b-:cam ., God

c rea ted t h e conventions t h a t a p s r t i c u l z r word denotes a

o a r t i c u l a r ob jec t .

- - The f u r t h e r ob jec t ions a g a i n s t t h e mimais; view o f

e t e r n a l i t y of r e l a t i o n between the word and i ts meaning i s

t h a t i n such a case t h e l o c a l changes i n t h e meaning of words

would n o t have been there .12 So Jayanta f i n a l l y concludes

t h a t t h e theory of convention (samaya) adequately and

c o r r e c t l y expla ins t h e rl:lation s u b s i s t i n g between the word

and i t s meaning.

The Referent as t h e Univers:l ( J Z t i ) +

Jayanta r e f u t e s t h e %ionzus= t h e o r y of r e f e r e n t on t h e

f ~ l l o t r i n g grounds. The univclrcal i s n o t the meanin- o f a

w o r t s i n c e a word i s no t a mere szem y ( p . ~ t i p z ~ i k a ) o r a

cornbination of a stem an? inf lu2nce on i n 2 i c a t e s c a s e number

and gender s imultaneously and an u n i v ~ r s ~ l can n e i t h e r be

m r ~ e d with a number nor csn. i t have z czse o r a zender.

G .yznta 2 o i n t s ou t that ta?is 'ny?ot'nesis i s zrainst t h e r u l e s

of grammhr. ~ a d a 3 j a l i s t a t e s t h a t a u n i v e r s a l csnnot have

?ny gender o r number and thus it cannot be regarcled as t h e

roze ren t o f a word. l 3 I t i s not g o s s i b l e t o coc f ine t h e

un iv2r sa l cow. l 4 If un ive r sa l i s one i t c;l~not be a r e s e n t

i n d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s a t d i f f e r e n t pl t ices st t h e same

t ime. l 5 Again i f t h i s theory i s a c c q t e d the d s s t r u c t i o n s o f

one i n d i v i d u a l wuuld l ead t o the d e s t r u c t i ~ n of a l l . 16

The import o f t h e Sentence

Jayan ta r e f e r s t o a number of d ive rgen t views r ega rd ing

the import o f a sen tence . He in t roduces and r e j e c t s t h e n on

va r ious grounds and f i n a l l y proves t h a t i t i s t h e purpose

-which is to m g a r d e d as the import of We sentence. -'-Wen-

we use words such a s cow, horse , man, e l ephan t , and s o on.

The meaning of every word comes t o o u r consc iousness b u t when

we use a sentence as "Bring a white cow". The meanings of

A- ,.,:: i ?,:orr:. ir? this s e n t < - a c e a r e pres:?r?tz$ t o o u r min-l as

r s l - i t c d ZQ ot : ler words i n thz senter,ce. 1 a

Jayanta, c r i t i s i z i n g t h e ?rZ'l;h3k-; r s 's Anvitabl1idh;na va2a - theory, observes t h a t it i s t r u e t h a t one c o n ~ r e h e n s e meaning

from the usage of experienced gersons . '* It i s a l s o a f a c t

t n a t a l l l i n g u i s t i c t r a n s c t i o n s executed by means of sen tences

~ n d words conv2y the meaning by i 2 ~ i n t e f f n r t 1 9 but the

:allowing f a c t s go a g ~ i n s t t he ?ra'Dhakare theory of Anvita-

i n . If one i s t o grasr, t h? i n d i v i s i b l e i i i o l e of t h e

3 e a n i n ~ of a sentence i n th:-it case l e a r n i n g will be i n p o s s i b l e

s incn sentences a r e i n f i n i t e i n number. 20 TO i l l u s t r a t e t h e

r z l z t i o n of word meaning and the sen tence meaning t h e

?ro?ounders of t h e t heo ry of ~ n v i t a b i d a n a have r e f e r r e d t o

t h e example t he d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of a coinage have d i s t i n c t

func t ions . I f t h i s bears anologp t o wort! neaning and i s

admitted by the ~ r a b h a k a r a s , t h e d i f f e r e n t funct ion of each

word i s a l s o t o be admitted.

If t h e d i s t i n c t func t ion of every word i s n o t accepted

t h e n e c e s s i t y of t h e etemological a n a l y s i s o f t h e word f o r

t h e unders tanding of meaning w i l l become supe r f lous . Moreover,

i n such a case one may use t h e word, h o r s e , i n p l a c e of Itcow1l . -

even i f one in t ends t o convey t h e meaning of t h e s en tence

I t , ring a cowtf.

Jc;ranta o b j e c t s t n e Ebatzs t n e o r y o f a b h i - i t f i v a y a . . --- A . ,:-~at, a person understand:; t h e m s a n i n ~ o f a itrod, ?:hen he

i s ordered . These sen tences a r s n w c r r3placed by words.

I t i s impossible f o r a wor.~-~ t c , convey a con?l?te idea wi thout

n jv ing t h e :ss is tance o f o t h e r words.22 According t o t h e

l i n g u i s t s , a c o l l e c t i o n o l words e x p r e s ~ i n 5 a uni-t o f neaning

i s a sentence . " We cannot accep t t h a t a sin;;le word can 2 4 exl;ress sucn a u n i t o f meanin.:. On the cont rarv , as all.

b e a r e r s c o n j o i n t l y c a r r y a ?al lar?quin, s o a l l wort.!s wi thout

an 3xcept ion c o n j o i n t l y expre.55 t h ? rne8nin~ of s sen tence .

Fur the r Jayanta s t a t e s thz.t , moreover if a r;:ori+ could express

a s? l f complete meaning inde?enden of t l ;~ inean in~s o f o t h e r

words, all o t h e r words wmld be u s e l e s s . 25 Tiougi~ words i n

a sen tence perform a team work. 2 6

/

3 sabdae _I_ kuru, habda6 __ ma k&rsIh __ iti .-. vyavahart tarah -- prayuKjate. - NM. p t .I. p . 288.

/ /

4 . nkZdesesu -- ca yugapadupala6bhZt t esu , t e su desu .- - .-. . - .- - . -- -- I

kriyamZn%Z& upapadyate anekadesasaibanciha i ti. I b i d . p .288, .- - - -

ralabdha t advyu tpa t t i sspeksah sabdah avagamayati -. - -..-.-. . - - iti. Ib id . p. 346. -

I

6. ~ L v a r a icchii na s a k t i h kiritu icchiva .- - ,- -. - /

tengdhunikasaGketite ' p i s a k t i r a s t i I . eva iti . - NSM. p . 359. I

7. na ni tyah sambandhah upapadyate, sabdvadarthavacca - -.* -.. t&Iyasya t a sya pratyakssddinz pramgnena a p r a t y y a m ~ n a t v ~ t -. - - -- *--.. .-- * - ---.- NM. .. - pt. I. p . 341.

/

8. kalpayi tva ca s a k t i i aparihzryah samayah. I b i d . p .341. ---- -- - --- -.---- ----. - - - - . 9. abhidha'm%hidheyani yamayogah samaya ucyate. I b i d . p . 339. -.

/ /

10. ku t a sc i t abhinavzdapi dipgdiva sabdartha --

p a t i t i h sy5t . I b i d . p. 342. ----- . - /

1 2 . igvaravi --. r a c i tassaayanibaridhanah sabda rthavyav;lhGro --- ---- na angdi. Ibici. p. 345.

/

12, avestyacjhikarane ca ra jyasabr!sm%nr?hri! ~ras idr ihe a r t h e _-__ . . -- ".---I__- - . -- - --

varnitavantah bhavantah i t y a l a h avZrit:racifitanena, ..-- --. I . - . - - --- - .-

tazrnat sarnaiya eva sa&bandha iti 'plits6. I b i d . p. 344. - - - - - -- ~ f . avestau ~a j f ;asagyog~t k r a tupradhahlaaucyate . ;!I.?. 2.3.2.3. -- ..- --

13. t a t h a ca lifigavacana s iddhih. SB. 1.2.7.64. ---- -- " - -- " - ----- - -- /

I 4 . sabdatvad vyabhicaryatrn %o&bda tvantu d u r g h a t d . -

15. ohidnaih ayugapatkZl3i.h asamsrsta ih vinagvzra'i varnain -. . . -. . -.-

/ /

lo. -- anar%o&e ca gosabde zosabdatva6 kvav-rtt?:a-n: - -

vyiivrtta iti a v a ~ a r n y ~ t e . Ib id . p t . I T . p. 48. - .- - /

13. vyl-cpatt isca vrddhsvy?vaharSt. I b i c . n-. T I . 2. 151 . -- -

15;. s a r v g n ~ -- padzni k.\rye sani ~ a t y a v y a ~ r i y a n t e . Ibic . P t .I1 .T. 155. -- - - 20. bahu3rarnSda iti. Ib id . p t . 11. p. 155. -- - - 2 1 . padarthaparyantgyai vvutuattau nCnal:

n i r r r i h ~ r a n i ~ a i iyzn padasySrtnah iti. I b i i. a t .I1 . p. 155. . .--

I b i d . p t . 11, p . 151.

24. - na . kevalam padai prayujyate, prayuktamapi 6, na . * -4 - -

ta tkaryahgai . I b i d . p t . 11. p.153.

25. k i i samudgyibhih. I b i d . p t . 11. D. 151. - 20. sa6hatyarth:+m abhidadhat i padgni vaLkyai. ' b id . p t . '1. 3. 152

IV.5.l. 3hr.l t t . t~ View on ilrthTn,i+.t! r , j f : i t c d : -- . .- -----.--"

A s a g a i n s t s t h e Bhat tas , thd Naiy?yikas 4 o no t acc*?pt . . ? r th? :)at ti . Jnynnt:-i r e f u t e s t h e 'ihsttas cnntentinrf a r t h , ' i ~ q t + i . . i n t h e fol l2wing manner:

I n a l l ca:<e:; of presurnpti7n i t is n o t poss ib le t o know

t h e s p e c i f i c r l a t i o n e x i s t i n g between t h e two obJec ts . But

it i s a l s o a f a c t t h a t they a r e known t o be r e l a t ed i n a - general manner. S $ > , Jayanta holds that ar th i ipa t t i i s n o t

d i f f e r e n t from i n f e r e n c e .

Hs advances t h e "following arguments t o grove h i s t h e s i s

and t o r e f u t e t h e Bha%ta s tand poin t .. . .

The exanple of t h e so-cal led presumption i s a weak one

s ince Ar thapa t t i i s n o t d i f f e r e n t from a n inference. It i s *

r e a l l y absured t o presume t h e p a r t 3f a sentence s i n c e t h e

meaning o f t h e ~ b s e n t o a r t a l s o can be i n f ~ r r e d from i t s e f f e c t

which si:.rves t h e nurnose o f a gb~nuine mark. As fir;? i s i n f e r r e d

from smoke, so one can i n f e r t h e ' takina, of meal' a s t h e mark of

f labbiness on t h ? b a s i s of no t i c ing the g roa t bu lk of a person.

There i s no d i f f e r e n c e i n t h r ~ e two instflncc:;. As thet-63

Es ti(, g r e a t d i f f e r e n c e between tliosc two types o f mark, t h e r ~

i d no d i f f lre-lnce between tine .+rth3i?,,ttti mf? the in fe rence . - 4

~f t h e Hirnansakas d e s e r t this young l a d y :\rho abso lu te ly

de .~enas upon you f o r h e r p ro tec t ion , then how w i l l the o t h e r

l a d i e s c o w t upon your p r o t e c t i o n wi th confidence. 1

Fur ther Jaysnta s a y s t h a t , i f w e d i scuss it deep ly ,

L then i t won't becorns d i f r e ren t from t h e inference. It can

v z r y w e l l be inclul ie- x.?ri th trle kavala-vya ti rekhi-anurnha . 5

az fu ta t ion o f S r t g r t i ~ a ? a t t i : -. The r o b l s m of s r u t 7r thZgat t i is mdch nore colnpl l>; t ' 7 n p l

J a y . n t a i l , ~ l d s t ha t , lccoraing ts the XaiyZyikss artha-

? a t t i i s not d i s t i n c t ~ramzna o f source o f v s l i d kno.,-:ledge, s o . - t h i s *Corn of presunpt ion t o o ( k r t l r t h ~ a t t i ) can be reducib le -. t o i n f e r m n ~ e . ~ KumZrile snulnerates i t as 9ne of t w o riain

Types of presumption and t r i ~ t o e s t a b l i s h i ts d i s t i n c t i o n 3nd

t r i e s t o e s t a b l i s h i t s d i s 3 n c t n e s s n o t only f m m o t h e r sources

o f knol-[in,: but o t h e r t ~ ~ t l s o f pres~xmption also. 5

praoh&ara, on t h e o t n z r hand does not find any ~ r o ~ r i e t y

e i t h e r i n assignin2 ail i n a 3 -,endent r o l e t3 it or i n corasidering

ground on which both of them discard s r t ~ r t h ~ a t t i i s 7

d i f f e r e n t . I

Fur ther J-iyanta says t h a t t he sentence "Bulky Devadatta

d ~ e s not e a t i n a dayf1 could l ead t o Dresurne to com>le~en ta ry

aeaning i . e . nsturcil food, in t he sane way i n w:?ich the smmke

leads t3 the inrs rence of f i r ., and a c t u a l l y spe~ l t ing t h e r e

i s no such d i f fe rence of ciicl process of inference from the /

JI.O':~SS of s m t ~ r t h ; ~ ~ a t t i .9 Yoreover, a port ion of t h e sentence

1s ?r&sumed i s no t meant f o r i n v i s i b l e meri t but f o r under-

standing t h e rel2vant meanin.2, and i n t h a t case there i s no

fault; i f one hol:!s t n a t t he conplementary meaning i s presumed

and not t h e comglementsry sentence; i n o t h z r woMs the

3resuaption r e l a t e s t o t h e f a c t and not t o t ~ e clause. 10

The r e l a t i o n o f i nva r i ab le concomitance may exist between

t h e two ob jec t s but i f one doe:: not know it t c be such than

he cannot i n f e r the o the r , simply knowing ons of tne two, /

and a l s o i n s m t a r t h a p a t t i though the probl21~is i s heared - . --̂ -.-------

s t i l l from our re;:~ea t e d obs ,~ rva t ions , we have l e a r n t t h a t

fa tness i s the e f f e c t of talxing m lax. And hence, there i s no

h a m ii', i n some cases, the prob ins i s perc,:ived and i n

some o t n c r casc:; it i s known by! v: r b a l testi.mony, So, t h e r e

i s d i fer-?rice ~ l t w e e ~ . ~ t h e r o b ~rrs of inference 31.16 rob ens

1v.T.2. The r e f l i t a t ion o f P&h&araf s defence:

This d i f f e rence i s mere ly v l r b a l buttpis not b w e d upon

t h e observat ion of new f a c t s . I f t h e o b j e c t t o be known i s

not known before then how can one know t h a t it will apDear

t o u s t a be a puzzle without having-such and such condi t ion? 11

I f one possessss t h e previous knowledge of t h e o b j e c t t hen

s;hat i s t h e go33 of e x ~ o s i n g the puzzl ing cha rac te r? 7 2

Because, we have d e f i n i t e l y known t h e o b j e c t which we a r e

now t r y i n g t o k n o ~ i n t h i s context . 13

The f%%bh~ittaras may contend zhat we have abreldy known

not msrely t h e ob jec t but a l s o the puzzl ing cha rac te r without

assuming such and such i n d i c a t o r . l 4 59 g r i a t i s i t s d i f f e rence

from in ference . Does not this s ta tement arnolmt t o t h i s t h a t

t he knowledge of i n v a r i a b l e comoni tance ?recedes presump-

t i o n . 15

I t i s a wrong statement t h a t t h e absence of l i v i n g

person from h i s h o w ( ob jpc t ive ly determines h i s presence

ou t s ide . q6 If t h e aosence f roa house i s an es tab l i shed f a c t

than i t s e f f e c t Ps subsequently produced by it sirrce, 3 cause

i s invdr i ab ly antec:<r?ent t o i t s e i F e c t . Suc5 a cauhe alone i s

~ r o d u c t i v e of i t s -.ffect.l6 NOP it i s tq be nnt ld here t h a t

i f one tries t o es-t;;lblisn causal connect jon b r a t w + ~ n t h e

ab:?ence of 4 person from h i s '3nuie snd h i s s t sy ing o u t s i d e

at t he next moment then an absurd s i t u 3 t i o n a r i s e s v i z . a t

the very moment of n i s absence he ne i th" : r s t a y s fnl"nor o u t s i d e

o f h i s house. 17

Hence, t h e cause rel3tinn loes n o t hold between one ' s

assence from hous2 3nd h i s pres2nce o u t s i d e . 3ut t h i s

discussion i s f r u t i l e s s s ince it hss no bearlng uoon t h e

point in quest ion. I n o t h e r words, such a di,?cussion does not

in;~rov? upon t h ? prabhSk,:ra thes is t h a t , ) resumpt ion i s a

!d i s t inc t source of knowledge. " So, Jayanta concludes t h z t ,

-4rti izpatti a s no t d i s t i n c t so:Jre:? sf knowledge and i t inc ludes

i n the infzrence .

Therefore witn t h i s :2i.scussion w e came t o understand that

t o s u b s m ~ a r t n @ a t t i i n inference what i s nos t e s s e n t i a l i s

th? sZmZnyatodrsta i n f e r e n c e without which tine doubt about t h e -.. . .- l i f e cannot be improved. So, l og ic i ans l i k e Jayanta hold

t h a t s ince the p u v o s e is served by t h e in fe rence t h e r e i s

no need of recognizing a r thzpa t t i as a d i s t i n c t source of - va l id knowledge.

According t o d iyzyika:; tae a r t h z p a t t i i s not considered

as a d i s t i n c t rnealzs or prarnzrla of valid knowledge and they " . 9 .̂

have t r i ed t o establish kh1.c. cogna.tion i n Kavalznvayi t y p e -.-

of irhference and chantend that a r t h z p a t t i i s a f o m of

3:1 -,-.,c: opponents c m 53 br?u:h'-t in%? ",e r3r-9 of i n f - r e m e .

22 -e i s n o t his q ~ u s e .

F u r t h e r t - ~ e ; ~ ?ut t h z c l ea r exnI?n,j t l3n t o i n c l u d e t he

arthcpntti in t"ne Kevzl_avyetir.-.kian~~3Zn-., ?r? t h e ground oC v-

9;ei.r five

Living Devzdatta has an ou t s i ? ? $x?stence

2. - he tu (Zeason)

B.:?c.:!us.?, be ing a l i v e he is nor snen in his ~ Q U S ~ .

( j i v i t v e s z t i ~nh20nKvZt) ,, , P -

Being a l i v n a pnsson who d o ? ~ n o t exist o u t s i d e , ca,nnot

have his non-exis tence a t home, j u s t l i k e anoth rr one who

e x i s t s n e i t h e r a t home nor ou t s i de , i s l o t l i v i n g ons.

C j i v i t v e - sa t i yah nn bah ihsa t tvavan na sa grhZbhZviin, -. - --. -- -. yathii - anayoh ko'pi yasya na grhaahgvah nz ' p i bahih sa t tvam

_-_I__- - . - -. - - na sa jivi). - --

4. Upansya ( ~ ~ ~ l i c a t i o n ) : :-!e i s n o t such i.e. Devadat tz

i s no t non- l iv ing one and y e t does n o t e s i . s t i n the house

(&a cZya4 t a t h z n e cZya& devadnt tah a j i v i , tathc"io1. g rhe n:1 --pa- C.---Y 4

. . exis:.~t~*:,? outs ide i -19- .:e fi.!.:: g ~ t : , i . l e ? ; J , ~ : : T , ~ ? ; G ;t2sm<hno --

. -. :$at ol^ t . , e above rnention::'.i :I.?: .:.;::'a -r:l of syllo:i.$,:, z inc?

free f ronl the cit?Zect.- . 3ut i n t:12 ? r . : " . ~ n t case t?:.? 7rob::ns

:irh$~hsva zbsence of Devcidatta o u t of hose is not as sue]:. - - 3 l ; c z u s ~ accortiing t o the ~ n n d i t i a n r ; 30110:+=?d by t;:? in fe rence

t112 ?roban::, should hare a co-existsnce wi t"ts probqndum,

i . e . "L:e absence of Devadatta a t home (as a probsnc) s ' .~ould

occupy a l o c u s w h ~ r e i n t h e ou t s ide ex i s t ence of Dnvadatts

i s seen.

The Naiyayikas r e p l y t h a t the g r h a h z v a does n o t co- -. e x i s t with t h e b a h i h s a t t a i s t h e i r wn>:ig impression, b u t i n

---( . - f a c t though non-existence o f Dewda t t a e x i s t s a t home, t h e

counter -pos i t iveness (p ra t iyog i tg} of the absence o f Deva-

d a t t a remains only i n Devadatts and n o t i n ~ r n a . Therefore 4-

it c3-exi s t ~ wi th its s r.Ybanc.;t~rr: n~m?l;:, Sr:.hihsatt-2. --- . . *..--

3eyond t h e s x s e organ c o n z ~ c t k o ~ czn kno~.,? t h z t grhani- -. - sthg~hsva-1 . i t iyo ~ i t v a exists in i t s ? , i k ~ ? i . e . D:?vadatta .- --- - .- and w i t h out sdcn p r r c e p t i o n t h - r ~ w i l l be n9 kn9::;Ledge of

l i ~ g o - ~ x - ~ n a r g a " t h i r C p e r c a p t i m o f tne ?rob- ns' with which --

inference cannot operate . Tht? ::aiygyikas renl y t o t h i s *'

objec t ion raised t h e two Devadatta

i s perceived by t h e r e l l t i o n of pra t iyogi tva . .

When perceiving Devadattats ebsence a t house, we perceive

not only his absence, but a l s o perceive Devadatta who i s

implied a s the geni t ive rnear~Lng of t h e word 'Devadattasya

abhsvah i n the sentence ' grhe deve?dattasya abhgvah ! S;n~e<, --.- --. - .- - . . . . I <

r e l a t i o n nesd.3 two relata f o r i t s knowledge and s ince i n

t h e case of "devadattays abhavahN on? rslatum ' a b s e n c e ' i s _ _ I - - . - ----..

'.i'he ?srce?tion of the c ? f ~ n t h r - ? o s i t i v c i s nrior +,Q t h e

;tno:qlei: e of its : j-:pnct2. Thu::., fir::,% ?e:-~pj.,?.3 ~ ~ v ' ~ j ~ ~ ~ t ~

r?:ld t h i s :~nrce?tua' c o g i t i . on r?:??ins in our m i n f . &hen

perceiving, :",is aablence a t hone w? r ,~nemS; l l r it? c ~ l ~ ~ t n r ~ o s f t i v e

L.e. 91vzdatt3 vhon lye had ?ercsis?5 be-"or?. Ar,? this remexber(3d

Uevad:;-::., i:: tn be r . : g a ~ d ? d hcrz z:; the ccnmt?r-,29;itive of

ths absence. Zonsider inc ;.i-t:-,er of the t i v 3 f s r t - . n c n t i o n e l

ways of ?erce iv in$ tie cwnter-nositive one can get the

Ijotes and Flef nrenczs

/ - - I . tvadekasaranai bslaximTrnutsrjya gacchatah kathz,: .-

3. k e v a l a ~ ~ a t i r e k i heturanvayzxi3.a eva garnakah. Ibid. 9. 60. _ - .

5. ?:no d iva na bhurikte cetyevamfidi vacasr tau - - - . - - -.- /

r ~ t r i b ~ l o janevi j s ~ n a 6 s r t a r t h 5 p a t t i r i s y a t e . SV. (arthii) 9.51 5-- -

/

6. ~ r t a ~ r h a n a m i d ~ n i m kimerthad? d r s t a i tyeva vaktavyai -. - .-. - -..-.-- ucyate abhidhgngntarameva ( d r s t t s r t o v e t i ) -..-.- --

upalabdhervZcakam. Ern3 ti ( a r t h a ) n. e9. - . ----

7. abhidh~n2ntarameva. I b id , p. 89.

8. avagamanai r&Zhksyasiddhaye tadarthakalpan,?meva --

yuktam. - NPi. p t . I. 9 . 67.

9. tadapyanumznena gadarthatviit . -. nesyate . NSM, p. 502. . ---

tatkalpanamevastu . - ki& sopgnzntarena . NN, Ibid.

1 1 . gamye t ~ v a d a ~ r h i t e s a t i tadgatamanupapadya ---- -.-..-- - . - . .. -. mznatvai karthamavadharyete? I b i d , p . 64.

12. g r h i t e t u gamye k i i tadgatiinup2padyamZnatvagrhanena? - * .--- - - - -. 0-

Ibid. p , 64.

13. sgddhyasya siddhatvgt . I b i d . p. 64. -- *-

14. p u s tadgatamanyath~'nupapedyarncnatvari grhxtamasfdi t i c e t . -- . - - . . I b i d . p. 64.

/

I 5 . aho rnah~nanum~n~avi sesah id am h i purvarn -- pratibandhaprhanaaukt!n syZt . I b i d . 7 . 64. .- - u t t w a t t i s tu durbhana .- siddhe - h i g rhahgve tadatpsdah ksanzntare. I b id . p. 65. -. - . - -.

- t ena ika t r a - ksane jivanna grhe na Sahi rbhavet. Ibid. 9.65.

.-a - -._ -- - I 8. e s a vicaryamEna t u bhidyate nZnumKnatah . - -. .- - - .-

pratibzndhzdvina vas tu na vastvantarabodhaka&. I b i d . p .60, -- -. / /

19. da r sanar thzpa t t i - . .- rvi rodlyeva s r v a n ~ d a n u m i t ~ ~ n a ~ .- - -

20. -- j i v a t ah .- devadattasya bahih s ; i t ~ a i i -- -. /

17 - a t i y a t e geha'bhzva-darsanat . I b i < . - - -- "

c f . - i'41:I. --- p t . I . 9. 6 3 .

21. Tat . c i . v o l . 11. p t . , 2 . 533 --

The iiaiyzyikas do no t accept t h a t Anupal-ibdhi i s a

d i s t i n c t neans of v n l i d knowledge. They hold t h a t Non-

existents o f a pot on t h e ground i s not ici2nticql w i t h the

bare ground, i t i s r a t h e r a d j e c t i v a l t o it.' AbhHva i s the

c h a r a c t e r of t h e ground and i t i s perceive< i n the same ways

i n which the co lour , s i z e , e t c . of t h e grounj ar? perceive3

w i t h t h e perce?t ion o f t h e gmund. Th--refore, J ~ y a n t a

declared t h a t it i s wrong t o maintain t h a t a negat ive f a c t i s

knovin only by means o f negat ive means of proof ,2 a s hold t h e

Jayanta advisns t h e BhGttas, t h a t they should e i t h e r . . hold t h a t negat ion i s abso lu te ly unrea l s ince it has no

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o r they should accept t h e Ny5ya view t h a t - negat ion i s -perceived. A r t i c l e s of worship do not n e c e s s a r i l y

c h a n , ~ with t h e change o f worshipped beings. 4

A s regards t h e Bhiitta content ion t h a t negat ion cannot . . q u a l i f y the so called locus i . e . t h e ground i n t h e c a s e of

t h e negat ion of a j a r s i n c e it has n 2 i t h e r conjunct ion with

locus nor inherence i n i t , Jayanta s t a t e s t h a t t h e r e i s a

t h i r d type of r e l a t i o n of t h e qua l i fy ing t o t h e q u a l i f i e d ,

which i s q u i t e capable of se rv ing t h e purpose o f w e r c e i v i w

negation.

Thus? according t o the Xsiyiyikas t n e r e i s no

d i f f i c u l t y i n p o s t u l a t i n g 'non-existence' a s a d i s t i n c t

padzrtha t o be knovm by pe rcep t ion with the help o f the -

/ / /

r 2 l a t i o n ca l l ed - v i s e s a n a t a o r vise5yz - visesana bhzvs, - .-. - - C .- -

The supposi t ion t h a t t h e nezat ive e n t i t i e s a re t o be

known by a d i s t i n c t means of v s l i d knowledge a s ?ropounded

by t he Bhattas i s r e j e c t e d by t h e grounds, as mentioned - . . already.

I V . 6.2. Jayznta ' s Refu ta t ion of i3ra%hZkaras view:

'tie have a l ready pointed out that unlike t h e NyZya school

Prabhgkaras do no t accep t the onto1o:;ical exis tence of a

e n t i t y c a l l e d abhgva.

According t o them abhgva i s nothing b u t t h e l ocus o f it,

adhi karana svabhzva . - .- Jayanta has refuted $his hypothesis of Przbhgkaras on

the fol lowing grounds.

Jayanta s t , : t e s t h a t , it ha5 been s t a t e d by Priibhgkaras

t h a t t h e m i s :I d i s t i n c t i o n between un ive r sa l and c o n 6 i t i o n a l

non-percsption, a s i n t h e case of hidden water and a b s o l u t e

non-?erc?ption a s i n t h e case of demons and t h s t only

a b s o l u t e non-perception l e a d t o a nega t ive p r o p o s i t i o n , 5

To th i s , Jayanta o b j e c t s and s t a t e s t h a t , t he sky flowes

i s never serce ived , and t h e demon i s a l s o m v e r perce ived ,

s t i l l , . the sky flowes and t h e demon do no t st.?nd on t h e same

l e v e l of m s t a ~ h y s i c a l ex is tence . A demon may e x i s t t h e

a o s s i b i l i t y of i t s ex i s t znce i s a s su red by the s c r i p t u r e s

and inference . 6

Jayanta f u r t h e r o b i e c t s t h e hynothes is o f t h e Buddhists

i .e. t h e r e i s a tbrnporzry non-perception b u t i t s r e a l non-

pe rcep t ion c o n s i s t s o f repeated non-percention, i . e . t h e

non-perception of a v i s i b l e , o b j e c t nega t ion of an o b j e c t

i s determined. But i t i s not a f a c t t h a t i t s non-percsst ion

i s on ly determined. Therefore f o r t h e Buddhists t h i s i s

n e r e l y i d l e ' t a l k 8 I n o them&rds , i f t h e ~ r 6 b h & a r a s deny

o b j e c t i v e ex i s t ence t o abh&a then all t h e p o s i t i v e o b j e c t

wi th are negated -. by . t h e i r corresponding negat ions would be

e t e r n a l s i n c e the Pra3halaras do not subsc r ibe to t h e

hypothqs is t h a t they a r e t r a n s i t o r y . 9

I n t h i s context Jayanta ques t ions t h e P f i h & a r a s t h a t

what i s t h e e ; f e c t of a Time. e t c . which a c t s u3on a j a t 7

I t i s a b s o l u t e l y wron; t h a t t h e e f f e c t i n ques t ion i s a

s e r i e s o f pot-sherds, because t h e j a r should e x i s t and ?is-

charge i t s func t ion s i n c e it i s not destroyed. 10

Jayanta f u r t h e r mentions t h a t , i f t he Pm3halceras say

t h a t it does no t do s o , because it i s no t ?erc?ived, t h e n

they may be objec ted t h a t , why i s n o t t h i s endurable qn2

7 e r c e p t i b l e o b j e c t gerceived though a l l t h e c?nd i t ions of

i t s perce? t ion , i . e . t h e sense organ e t c . assemble? " But

Jayant2 o? ines :ha t ti12 a n s w r of t h i s w i l l bs t h a t , s inco

i t does n o t e x i s t , i t i s not perceived. 12

Jayanta f u r t h e r s t a t e s t h a t t h e ~ r z b h a k a r a s a l s o n u s t

hold t h a t a n ~ g a t i v e judgement i s self-luminous and cannot

e x i s t wi thout having and o b j e c t i v e r e fe rence s ince it i s a

judgement l i k e a l l o t h e r p o s i t i v e judgement. l 3 Thorefore, the

i m p l i c a t i o n of it i s t h a t negat ion i s o b j e c t i v e l y r e a l .

Moreover, as f a r a s t h e Prabhakaras a r e concerned, t hey

a r e known -to maintain t h a t a word r e f e r s t o t h e r e a l , t he re -

f o r e , t h e y cannot but accep t t h a t t h e indec l inab le tlnagll - r e f e r s t o t h e r e a l and i f they do so, they v i r t u a l l y a c c e p t

t h e r e a l i t y of abhzva. 14

It may be mention2d t h a t i n denyin.; the r e a l i t y of non-

ex i s t ence the l r abhakaras a r ? no t only discardin.? t h e t ime

honoured p r i n c i p l e of t h e r e a l i s t s b u t a l s o going a g a i n s t t h e /

s p i r i t of sabarabhasya. Jayznta f u r t h e r r,-marks t h a t it

does no t proper on the ? a s t of t h e Pra7ohakaras t o find f e u l t

with t h e e l d e r l y ones of h i s oT,m school . 15

F i n a l l y Jayanta s t ; t e s and conclu,-les that, i t i s more

thsn e n ~ u ~ r l o f c r i t i c i s m , bscause f u r t h e r wordy b a t t l e ci:~es

not beilav? US, and 2 . 1 ~ 9 small men like us should ?arcion the

rnistak2s of the g r e a t ones. l6 Therefore nzgat ion is r c f e r r e d

t o by a negat ive judgeaent which i s exgressed by t h e nega t ive

9 r o p o s i t i o n conta in in2 the 3 a r t i c l e "not" and t h i s viaw has

been 2rovad. 17

Notes and Kaferences

1. = Ifghato ngst iIf iti jEa'na8 ekam evedanai. 4 . ?t.I. p.82 - - -- - s f . I . asa tyar tha ngbhzvah iti cenno, anyalaksa no?anztteh. . -- . - 4

NS.. 229. A

/

2. p u ~ ~ s o k t i s u dosgna'i abh~vascopayu j ya t e .- --.- ~%.nag ryanta rgatat t a smzt abhgvgt - a a i bhgvachih . .

p t . I. p. 85. -

abhzva c ~ k s u s a j z ~ n a ---. visayova -. - abhyupeatgn. Ib id . 9.84.

/ /

na nama yZdrso yaksah balirapyasya tadrsah. I b i d . p. 85 - - -- _-__ -. _ . _ - -. -. c f . I . na abhgvah pr5mZnya$, 3rnrneyisiddheh. R 3 . 2.2.7. - --

- 0 - . -- -

2. abhzva i s no t a nisans of t r u e co;nition because, -

t h e r e i s no such object of t r u e cognit ion as an

absence, The Navya-NyZya Doctrine of igegation,

B.K. /

5. khapuspasya pisacasya mrdantarita varinah -.- -. -+. na khalu anupalabhyatve visesah p r a t i b h a i nah. - .-4 - -. Nivi. p t . I. p . 97. -

/

6. SgamSt yuktitgscei satvasarhbhgngngatah . sanradgnupalabho ' p i na p i k c a h khapuspavat. p .97. . - - . -

7. anupalabdhe punah anupalabdhi reva anupalabdhi riti -.

f / - 8. khapuspzdestu savisesan.?nu?alabdhyz abhzva ova n i s c i y a t e ,

-. - -.

9. anisyamsne - czbhsve bhZvSn5; p r a t i yog in i n i tya ta isGn .- . - . - p ra sa jye t a nah ie te ksanikastava. p, 98. - *- .

f

10, mudgarzdesca - k i 6 k a r y a i kapalapatal:ti c e t

ghatah t a r h a v i n a s t a t v a t svakSrya& na karoti kirb. p . 98. - . -. -.- - a - 1 1 . tadZn?rne.ya _. d r s t a sya s t h i r a s y s u s y a kirn krtam. . .- - . - - -

13. svaprakb;a . - ca n ~ s t I t i s a r h i t t i r b h a v a t a i - - mate na

- giyan te

/

upeksi tasca bhasyar ta i tyaho nayanaipunai. p . 98. -. -- .----- .- 16. a lagca bahunoktena vimardo' t ra na gobhate - -,

17. tasma't -. nastiti pratyayagarnyo 'bhavah iti siddham. p. 98. -. -

IV. 7. idIzm%sa theory of s r - l f -val id i ty of Pramzna refuted : -

J;lyanta r e j ec t s the hypothesis of t he ~ 3 i ~ ~ s a k a s t h a t

t he t r u t h of a piece of va l i d knowledge is i n t r i n s i c ,

(svatahpKm%yai) on t he following grounds. -.

J2yanta s t a r t s with questioning the ~imaiisakas t h a t

what i s the cor rec t meaning of the compound term "svatah-

pramanyam". Does t h e t r u t h of a judgement emanate f r o a t he

judgement i t s e l f . ' otherwise, do 2s a judgement r w e a l i t s

own t r u t h t o i t s e l f ? 2

Jayrinta answers t h a t , the f i r s t a l t e rna t i ve i s not

3 t enab l? , because, it i s not amendable. For ins tance, the

perce2tion o f blue object cgr rec t ly reveals a blue ob jec t a s

blue, the peArce?tual judgement i s t r u e so f a r as Cne blue

object i s concerned . 4 The judgement i s t rue i n such a

l imi ted sense because, i t i s l e a r n t t h a t it owes i t s existence

t o the sense object-contact. 5

Jayanta f u r t h e r s t a t e s , that a second a l t e r n a t i v e i s

a l so . 'not tenable, s ince , a t r u e perceptual ' judgement i t s e l f

can ne i the r , reveal i t s own t r u t h nor reveal t h a t of i t s 6 r e su l t i ng form. In other words, a perceptual judgement

can n e i t h e r grasp the t r u t h of i ts own s e l f nor t h a t of the

i l luminat ion of the object . Of t h e w two the perceptual

7 judgenent i s t h e knowing Frocess of t h e knower. I t remains

ev<?n t ranscenclental , according t o t h ? ~ i m ~ 6 s a k Z i s . Therefore,

it c m n o t g rasp t h e t r u t h of i t s own s e l f s ince t h e process

i t s e l f r .mains beyond tine grasp of i t s o m s e l f . The

r e s u l t i n g form of percept ion i s t h e i l l u m i n s t i o n of an o b j e c t

it i s i n no way connected with t h e e x t e r n a l sensz-organ.

Therefore t r u t h of tne i l luminat ion of an o b j e c t i s never

perce ived . The i n n e r percept ion canngt be competent enough

t o p e r c e i v e it. I t i s important t.o a s c e r t a i n thn t r u t h of

t h e r e s u l t i n g form of t h e perceptual ?recess s ince t h e

i n n e r pe rcep t ion i s absent when t h e i ' i lun innt ion of t h e

o b j e c t t a k ? s place.' Therefor-., ths n p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e

t r u t n of 2 judgement i s self evident s :~ou ld not ba t e n ? b l e ,

s i n c e t h e pe rcep t ion f a i l s t o e ra s9 t h e t r u t h of a judgement. 9

Jayan ta f u f l n e r mentions t h a t t h e t r u t h of a judgement

i s i n f e r r e d n e i t h e r the t r u t h of t h e process of pe rcep t ion

o r t h a t o f i t s r e s u l t i n g f o m ; hecause, t h e truth of t h e

r e s u l t i n g form cannot be determined by means of i n f e r e n c e

s i n c e no mark an i n v a r i a b l e means t o in fe rence , i s known t o

us. l o But the r e s u l t i.,e., i l l umina t ion of ar! o b j e c t , i s t h e a

e f f e c t of the knowing 'process of a knower. So, it i s the

mark of t h e s a i d process . This mark o f t h e middle term i s

u n i v e r s a l l y accompanied only by such a major t e r n a s i s an

a c t i v i t y . Hence, by means of t h i s mark, o r w e i n f e r mere

e x i s t e n c e o f an a c t i v i t y , i .e. 3 process; i n itac:lf bu t

nothing e l s e . Hence, t h e t rut 'k of a knowin; o r o c e s s cannot

be i n f e r r e d from t h e ~ ~ O V P mzrk. 11

I n t h i s connect ion Jayanta put two quest ions t o t h e

~ ~ m ~ m s a k a s :

1 . Does t h e mark rsrnain unqual i li e?? 12

2. G r i s it q u a l i f i e d by t h e q d j e c t i v e wtrue t l? . 13

Jayantz s t a t e s t h a t i f the f i r s t one i s answered i n t h e

~ f f i r m a t i v e , then any and every r r - su l t t r u e o r untrue will

l ead t o t h e in fe rence of t h e t r u t h o f a judgement. 14

Therefore i n t h a t c a s e no judgeaent should be f 3 l . s ~ .

d i t n regard t o t h e second ques t ion no d i f i n i t e answer can be

g iven beczuse, t h e r e i s no t a n g i b l e m y of f inding ou t t h e

t r u t h of t h e mark. 15

Jayanta f u r t h e r s t a t e s t h a t i f t h e ~ i r n ~ & s a k a s contend

t h a t the very experience i s t h e source o f t h e i l l u m i n a t i o n of

a n o b j e c t because t h e b lue t h i n g r e v e a l s i t s e l f a s t h e o b j e c t

of awareness of b l u e , t h i s awareness i t s e l f i s a p iece of

t r u e knowledge b u t noth ing e l se ,16 t h e n t h e same l o g i c i s

a 9 p l i c a b l e t o the c a s e s of i l l u s i o n , when we mistake pearl

f o r s i l v e r because t h e r e i s only the -experience o f s i l v e r , bu

n o t t h a t of i t s t r u t h . 17

- I n t h i s connection t h e Mimahsakas nay contend t h ~ t when

we mistaKe inother o f -pea r l f o r s i l v e r a corres?onding contra-

d i c t o r y judgement a r i s e s , con t rad ic t s i t and i n v a l i d a t e s it. 18

To t h i s Jayanta s t a t e s t h a t , i f t h i s i s t h e f a c t of almgst

every i l l u s o r y judgement, t hen it i s rsasonable t o assuae i t s

t r u t h . 19

Xere, t h e ~Zrna'6sakas may contend t h a t though t h e

i n p e l l e n t judgement amounts t o be a doubt y e t i t i s not

experienced t o be such,2o because, nobody experiences an

ob jec t and expresses h i s judgement i n the form i n d i c a t i v e

of a doubt. For example, when a Serson s e e s a s i l v e r , docs

he s ay , "This i s s i l v e r o r not'?" 3 u t he co:!~.!lunicates h i s

pe rcep tua l judgenent by means of the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h i s

i s s i l v e r . An ord inary person who i s under t h e sw?y of a

doubt does not proceed t o have t h e o o j e c t which i s doubted,

whereas he i s su re of t h e o b j e c t he moves f o r it." Therefore

the ~ Z m ~ s a k a s argument i s t h a t wlzy do you asce ibe t h e

c h a r a c t e r of a doubt t o a judgement which i s no t experienced

t o be so? 22

- e. To t h i s Jayanta - jo in i s s u e s wi th the Mimamsakas andv-

e s t a b l i s h e s his poin t by t h e fol lowing argument. Jayanta

says t h a t it i s a fact that Judgement i n ques t ion rl?fers t o

a s i n g l e ob jec t and t h a t t h e r e . . i s no o s c i l l a t i o n between

two a l t e r n a t i v 2 s . 3u t s t i l l it does n ~ t furnis i i t he knower

with a means t o determine t n e t r u e n a t u r e of t h e objec t .

If by fo rce of l o g i c , r?presents t o i t , a s a doubt, a doubt

a l s o , assumes t h e form of a judzenent. 2 3 For, i n s t ance ,

when the a s c e t i c s , having no f ixed abode, see a w e l l from a

d i s t ance they th ink t h a t t he re i s water i n t h e Though

the p r i o r j u d g e z x t t h a t t h i s i s s b l v e r r e f e r s t o a s i n g l e

o b j e c t y e t i t i s v i r t u a l l y nothing b u t a doubt, aga in i f i t s

t r u t h i s ascer t2 ined then how can it be cont.rai<icted sometimes

a f t e r ? 25 On the o t h e r hand, i f i t i s known t o be unt rue then

how can i t impel a 7erson t o move? 26

I n t h i s context Jayanta asks t h e ~ i m ~ r h s a k a s t h a t , a s we

can know it n e i t h e r a s t r u e nor as un t rue so, i t should be

a doubt. Iihy a r e you angry upon us ?27

Jayanta f u r t h e r mentions t h a t , it i s a t ruism t h a t

though t h i s -event of consciousness i s not experienced a s a

doubt y e t it i s l o g i c a l l y es tab l i shed t h a t i t i s a true. 28

Even i f we move f o r ou r accustomed o b j e c t s , a t r u e judgement

does n o t guide us , we i n f e r t h a t t h i s i s a doubt from a major . .. ..... .

premise obtained by an induct ion. 29 Therefore a l l movements

are preceded by a doubt. I n t h i s d i scuss ion J a y a n t a t s c r i t i c a l .

remarks are a s follows:

Jayanta says t h a t , we a r e no t b e n t u20n proving t ~ e

t h e s i s t h a t a judgement, on i t s appearanca, ? a r t & k e s o f t h e

c h a r a c t e r of a d m b t . ' O But what we mean t o s a y i s t h a t

when a judgement comes i n t o being i t i s not known t o be

t r u e . de s h a l l c a l l a judgeinent a:; one of doubt , i f it

remains i n d e f i n i t e a s t o t h e na tu re of i t s t r u t h . I n o t h e r

words, t h e t h e s i s t h a t t h e t r u t h of judgement i s s e l f ev ident

does no t s t and t o reason. If he does no t c a r r y t h e assurance

of i t s own t r u t h along with i t s e l f then it i s no t c e r t a i n l y

t r u e . Thus, i t involvas an element of unc2r t a in ty . A s it i s

doubtful t o same e x t e n t , s o it comes wi th in t h e provincs o f a

doubt i n t h e wide s snse . Therefore it has been t h a t t h e

t r u t h of a judgement on i t s coming i n t o bein,:, cznnot be

grasped. The truL2 of a judgement can n e i t h e r be d i r e c t l y

Orence. apprshended, not be i n d i r e c t l y k n o w by i n f , 31 Hence,

t h e t h e s i s t h a t a judgement cognizes i t s own t r u t h i s d i f f i -

c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h . 32 Fmm th i s d i scuss ion it can be s a i d

t h a t t h e ~ i m ~ b s a k a s hypothes is t h a t . t h e t r u t h of a p i e c e of

v a l i d knowledge i s i n t r i n s i c (prEim5nyamavatah) . . i s a b s o l u t e l y

o b j e c t i v e l y n o t t enab le .

Now i n t h i s con tex t J2yanta op ines t h a t t h e hypo thes i s

of the ~Ima'msakas t h a t the t r u t h of t h e vedas is a l s o

i n t r i n s i c . Since t h e y have no o t h e r source o f t r u t h because

they have no author , i s n o t sound. I f t h e vedas a r e not -

composed by an au thor then they cannot be held t o be t r u e

because t h e good q u a l i t i e s which a r e responsible f o r t he

v a l i d i t y of t h e vedas w i l l a l so be conspicuous by t h e i r

absence. 33 Therefore vedas have an author t h a t is God, Now

~ i r n ~ i s a k a s may ob j ec t t h a t , how can a person who has d i r e c t

knowledge of a l l t ranscendenta l objects cornpose t he vedas

and teach us? Since t he vedas contain such in junc t ions a s

persor ibe ac t i ons which a r e conducive t o various transcen-

den ta l r e s u l t s , l y ing beyond the ranse of a11 o ther proof. 34

To t h i s Jayanta gives a reply t h a t , any and everyman

cannot zompose t h e vedas. The lo rd of all gods who i s

thoroughly competent t o cr.?ate the th r3e worles i s t h e

author of t he vedas. 33 -

Jayanta f u r t h e r says t h a t , God su+asses a l l i n h i s

exce l lence , has omniscience, e t e rna l b l i s s and compassion.

He i s immune from f i v e e v i l s such a s transcendental i l l u s i o n

e t c . , and he has n e i t h e r worldly exis tence nor organic l i f e

nor su f f e r ings .% Therefore vedas a r e v a l i d s ince t h e r e a r e

composed by a r e l a i a b l e person i . e . God, but no t because of

no au thorsh ip , on t h e o t h e r words anzdi ,

I n t h e conclusion por t ion, Jaynnta s t a t e s t h a t the

knowledge of t h e g r a c t i c a l e f f i c i ency of aq object a s s u r e s

us o f t h e t m t h o f t h e impel len t judgement. 37 It has

- 38 been s t a t e d i n the PSB t h a t a xan moves f o r an ob jec t en

he r i g h t l y cognizes i t and it;, i s movement i s crowned with

success then h i s knowledge i s roved t o b 5 t r u e becsuse of

i t s accordance with i t s ob j a c t . 39 A t t h e o u t s e t t h e judgement,

being no t clouded by a doubt, is assumed as true and l a t e r

on i t i s proved t o be t r u s . S i a i l n rly, t h e falsehood of a

judgement i s e x t r i n s i c a l l y determined. Hence, bot'z t h e

t r u t h and the f ~ l s e h ~ o d of judgements are ? x t r i q c a l l y

determined. 40

Notes and Rt~ferenc2s

1 . kiui svata eva pramgnlpsya prrSira&ya& bhavatl . WI. p t . I. p .24, - - - - 0 - - . . - - 2. u t a svayameva t a t pram&& Ztmanah - - -i__*-

prgrngnyam grhngt i iti . Ibid. p. 241 . . . - -.- - 3. aprZmZnikatvZt. -. I b i d .

tannTlafi -- p r a t i t g v a t >ratyaksm ?ramgna;- Ib id . -- . . - 5 . idriyartnasannikarsotpannamiti. I b i d .

6 . - na t z v a t svapram~nyaparicchede tct pra t - . -- - --

zksa i p ramznam t adv i j E ~ n a s ~ a vZ 3 rZrnZnya5 ___ - -- . * - - . -- - .- - grhnlyzt , ta tphalasya - vZ. - I b i d .

7. j~ZtrvyZ2aKtmano - . . -- -- j g ~ n a s ~ z bhavanmat ---- e

ni tyaparoksatvat . - - pratyaksatah par icchedG . --- .. ._-I_ . - . nupa2attau -. . - .. . tatpramgnyasya9i kathak

_ . --.

p r a t yaks ena grhznak . Ib id . -- .- ---.-

yathar tha tZvasZya samarthamiti kathanZyai,

tadznim - anubhCyamZnatvZt . Ibid . 9. tasmGna pratyaksasyaiva visayah --.-.

/

1C. phalasya t gva t tanniscaye liflgatvameva tzvat /

na kasyac i t pasyamah. Ib id . - _-I___.

phalani bhavedapi l i f iga i ghalasya kriyZmEtra -- -- ---.- . --- -

utsaha te - na ya tha r t tatva: laksanarn _orZmgnyai. Ib id . - -.-.-

/

12. .t:!l :Obi :~h.rl..nrh ni. rviscsanam \ r < ' t , l" b i i " ] . _ _ _^_._ - ---- . . - - C . . C ...- - .

14. ya tah kutascana pha lg t ttatpGmCinyiinumrTne -. --a-

n na - i d ~ n i m k i f ; c i t apramznafi bhavet . I b i d . ----- . - .-- ---

16. n i l a samvedanataya phalam sva ta eva p rskasa te , - --

na k y a t . I b i d . --

- t h a t v a s a m v i t t i r i t i , I b i d . .-

1 8. -- nanu ta t ra ba'dhakap r a tyayopanipztena

ayath%%hatva& upanfya te . I b id .

19. t adasa tve na taccharika?. p k t i m a t i . I b i d . p. 242. - 20. sa&;ayotpi . - t a d a ngnubhiiyate. I b i d .

/

21. na h i . sarnsayZn& p r a v a r t t a n t e l a u k i k a -- /

kfntu n i sc invan t a eva visayamit i . I b i d . - - - -. . ' 22. - k i & mnanubhaya mgna eva Zmpyate samsyah? I b i d . -. - . /

23. eka t a r ag rayamap i ayam pratyayah tanniscayopaya vi rahz t .- - . / 3.

samsayakot ipa t i t a eva baladbhavat i - I b i d * - 24. a s t i Gpe j a l a i i t i bhiksavo manyante.. I b i d . - I___ - - .- 25. katha6 k v a c i t visaAvadet? Ib id . -- - -

26. katha6 pumssam p r a v a r t t a y e t ? B i d . .--

27. ubh&hyZmapi em--- rfipZbhy;.irti a t h a tasygnupagrhah " - -- --- -- -.

Y O ' ~ ; I & sa6Laya eva syZt iti kim nah prakupyasi? I b i d . -A .- "- -- --. - - -.

2 8 . ananubh~yamanotpi nygygt abhyaste v isaye - .- a v i n a ~ h a v a s m a r a n ~ t - -- s a pa r ika lpya te . I b i d .

- - - - - -

/

29, n iscayanimi t tasya tadznim avidyamanatvat,

samsayajananahetosca samagrya3 s a n n i h i t a t v g t . I b i d . /

30. g a La sa rva tha sahsayasamarthane . /

asmZka5 abhinivesah. I b i d . p , 243.

atmanah ?ram$atvaparicchedZyo~;Zt. I b i d . - . 32. tasmgt svaya6 prgm?inya6 grhyate iti -- .- -.- -

esah dughatah paksah. I b i d . - .-. .- .- . 73 . 1 . a s a t i v2ktar i pr5mZnya h e t k Z i g u n k & ap i -_ . - -.- --

abhavena tatprZmSnyasyZpi abhzvat . I b i d , p . 267. - .- / /

2 . saXsZddrstr naroktatvam sabde ygvarina nisci tam. .-. badh&nutpattimZtrena - .- - na tZvattatpramZnatS. I b i d . -.-

c f badhZnutgattim=trena vaidikyaln p r a t z t e h przznyam . . -

na bhavit& a r h a t i . MDV. p . 96. - 34. vede --. pram~n~ntarasamspars ' a rah i tav ic i t ra -.

/

karmaphalagada sgdhyasSdhanabhavopadesini /

k a t h a i tadarthasa7tsZddarso purusah ' --- C .

upadestg bhavet? - NM. p t . I. p. 267. / /

35. vedasya purusah k a r t & na h i yzdrsa tadrsah * - - - . --• .- ..

1

k i n t u tr i lokyanirmgnanipunah paramesvarah. Ibid . - .-. . /

cf. 1 . vedasya purusah k a r t h kascana skxkartavyah, .-C. - - . .

0

yasca t r i l o k y a nirmzna nipunah MDV. p. 97 -.- . .-

/ /

klasakarmavipak-diparZmarsavivarjitah. E, p t . I . p. 267. /

37. ar thakr iyajEa 'nZt prZmZnya n i s cayah . I S i d . p . 248. .- . pramanamantarena na a r t h a p r a t i p a t t i h , na -. - --

arthapratipattimantarena pravrttis2TmZrthya$. NB. p. 3. - a -

39. p ramanto a r t h a p r a t i p a t t a u p r a v r t t i sCmZrthyZt .- ---. a r t h a v a t pramihari. NT4. ?t. I . p. 248. .- -

c f . g. p . 3.

i t y a t o dvayamagi - p a r a t a h . NM. p t . I . p . 248. - -- -

IV. t3 ?limgisa View on Univr-rsals I-cefuted:

I t nas a l r e . 6 ~ been pointed ou t t h a t t h e Bhat tas accep t . . un ive r sa l s a s -. Zkr t i . They accept t h e r e l a t i o n between .- and i t s locus t o be i d e n t i fy-cum-dif fe rence . (bhedaghat i ta

abheda) .

Jayanta i n h i s 1,iM has c r i t i c i s e d and refuted t h e S h a t t a s . . theory of sihanya. 3e maintains t h a t , t h e Bhattas theory o f . .

identi ty-cum-difference ' as a r e l z t i o n between - j Z t i and i t s

l ocus , does no t s tand t o l o g i c . His a rguaents fol lows t h e

same l i n e of thought a s t k , t of h i s predecessors. Against. -

t h i s theory of i.i e n t i t y - c w - d i f furence ' ~ a n d a l i k ~ r a Sr idhara-

r a i sc?s t he followinfJ ob jec t s : Whether

t h e un ive r sa l s m.c t h e i nd iv idua l i s ' i d e n t i c a l I o r ' d i f f e r e n t ' . If i t i s i d e n t i c a l thsn t n s y should n o t be t r e a t e d a s two

e n t i t i e s , but one only, s i n c e t h e e n t i t i e s , which a r e csznized

as i d e n t i c a l carulot be regarded as d i f f e r e n t . On t h e o t h e r

hand, i f tiley a r e d i f f e r e n t , then Kumiiri lals theory s t ands

s e l f r e n t e d , because, one cannot have t h e d i f f e r e n c e without

accept ing t h e d i f f e r ence i n o b j e c t s , I

According t o t h e Naiyzyikas d i f f e r e n c e of c o g n i t i o n s i s

incompatible wi th t h e i d e n t i t y of o b j e c t s .

crl' ,ne argument:: n::.ncly, t he univ5rsa l and t h e i n d i v i d u a l

a r s i s e n t i c a l , because they a r ~ ; never co?,nize,,? sep-irately,

and never share s e p a r a t e locus , has no f o r c e . This d i s t i n c -

t i o n between t h e t w ~ , which do not sha re diff2ren-t l ocus , i s

i n t a i n e d on tlie b a s i s o f t h e i r c o ~ n i t i o n s , experience. /

~ r a t T t i ' s h e d ~ t bnedos t i desa bhedastu na i s y a t e : d e c l a r e s - . * I I - .-

These cons ide ra t ions conclusively e s t a b l i s : ~ t h a t t h e

un ive r sa l i s d i Pferent from the ; ~ a r t i c u l a r s i n vhic:: i t

s u b s i s t s . I

Ud,?..y%na i n h i s Atmatattvavivekn recorc'5 t!-iis obj .?c t ion

o f t!ie 3 '1attas: If tile Universal i s abso lu te ly d i f f e re f i t

from the i n d i v i d u a l , how t3en they co-exis t i n th? same sub-

s t ratum. If t l i e i r a b s o l u t e d i f f e renc - . i s n o t a b a r t o t h e i r

co -ex i s t ence , t hen why do cowness an,! horseness n o t co -ex i s t .

To t h i s , he answers: co-exis tence pre-supposes numerical

d i f f e r e n c e what i s a s s e r t e d i s t h a f t h i n g s sha r ing a coxmon

l o c u s a r e numerical ly d i f f e r e n t . This does not n e c e s s a r i l y

mean t h a t , nwner iaa l ly d i f f e r e n t e n t i t i e s must C O - ~ % $ S ~ S Some-

t h i n g ca -ex i s t s and ' o t h e r s n o t .

If i t i s argued t h a t , why,is t h e r t+ la t ion of co-exis tence

i z t r u e i n some cases, qnd n o t i n o t h e r s , t h e Xaiyaylka

r e ? l i e s : Suc.2 2 q u e s t i o n i s i l l e g i t i m a t e . The u l t i n a t o

n ,a tu re o f t h i n g s isc covered i n u n c o n t r a i c t e d e x p e r i e n c e ar?

ul iques t ionab le . $5 p e r c e i v e cowness e x i s t i n ? w i t h t h e i n d i -

v i d u a l cotris and n o t w i tn horses. T h i s i s t h e u l t i n : < t = . n a t u r n 7

of t h i n g s . '

Notes and R e f e r e n c s s

1 . g. g t . 11. p. 7

a l s o llyZya Xanda l i , 3eliara5, 1895, p. 516.

NM. - p t . 11. p. 6 .

2. I b i d . pp. 6 , 7 .

3. Atmatattvanveka Chss . I 940. p?. I 71 - 181 .

I V . 9 ~ ? m ~ m s a view a g a i n s t samavaya, Refuted:

The Naiyayikas acce2t t h e complete d i s t i n c t i o n of t h e

s s t s where tile r e l a t i o n of st?m?vaya i s pos tu la ted . For examgle

whole i s d i s t i n c t from i t s p a r t s , q u a l i t i e s and ac t ions a r e

d i f f e r e n t from t h e i r substratums substances, and C . , & C.

And experience i s the proof f o r t h a t . A t the same time, they

a r e inseparable and do not occu!~y d i f f e r e n t space. To o b j e c t

t h e acceptance of samavgya between o b j e c t s proved t o be

inseparable i s t o f a i r l y f - i l t o see the implicat ion of such

an acceptance. A s says s r idhsra .

"That r - l a t i o n should be understood a s samavGa which

causes d i f f e r e n t and separa te e n t i t i e s t o blend together . I t

precludes t h e independent exis tence of any one of them. 1

Thus it amounts t o say i n o rde r t o maintain t h e

i n s e p a r a b i l i t y and a t t h e same time t h e d i s t i n c t n e s s o f . -

o b j e c t s r e l a t ed . Samavsya i s accepted by the NaiyCyikas.

A s t o t h e objec t ion o f the Bhat tas t h a t t h e r e i s no . . v a l i d ground i n e s t a b l i s h i a Bamavea, t h e answer i s t h a t ,

samavzya can very well be perceived as an ob jec t o f v a l i d

cogni t ion and if t h e ~TrnSrisakas are n o t happy with t h a t

i$ can be e s t ab l i shed by $&a, a t any case of d i s p u t e .

/

Nengesa t h e f a t h e r of neologic forwarded a number of in fe rences

t o e s t a b l i s h :aamavgYa? To mention only one.

.by q u a l i f i e d cogni t ion which shows a q u a l i f i e r

qua l i f icand type of s t r u c t u r t ? has t h r e e primary f a c t o r s i n it

as i ts ob jec t s namely, q u a l i f i e r , qua l i f i cand 2nd a r e l a t i o n .

Thus oy t h i s inference a r e l a t i o n g e t s e s t ab l i shed . There

i s another s t rong l o g i c a l assumption i n f a v m r o f such

supp3sition t h a t any objnc t of t r u e knowledge must be an

onto1ogic;il r e a l i t y . I t i s assumsd further t h a t such 3

r ea l e n t i t y caus-3s t h s c ~ g n i t i o n i n t h e 2resence of nece.;sary

condit ions. Anci it i s t z i s assumption t h a t prevents t h e

a r i s in ; of the knowl?dga of non e n t i t y sky flower o r barren-

son.

Again t h e objec t ion o f negress-ad-infinituii i n t h e

theor-1 of samavzya i s based on a wrong not ion of t h e concc7t.

I t i s u n j u s t o r r a t h e r wrong t o s ay t h a t samavgya being an

independent e n t i t y from i t s r e l a t a , should requi re another

r 2 l a t i o n of i ts na tu re it. with i ts r e l a t a and

s o on. For, Naiyzyikas accept r i g h t l y t h a t samaviiya i s

e t e r n a l one, bein.. i t s e l f the na tu re o f t h e r e l a t i o n of

~ e r s i s t e n c ? , docs no t requi re l y o t h e r r e l a t i ~ n . ~ And if

c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s a r e coined, it would be on the verba l

leva1 only, o r .it t h e b e s t we can sziy t'nem as the r e p e t i t i o n

1 7 7 of t h e saae r e l a t i o n . Thus r e l a t i o n s r , r', r , etc . , a r e

simpty t h e saeciaens o f t h e r e l a t i o n s r. To sup?ose such

r e l a t i o n s a s t h e d i f f e rence between t h e terms and i t s e l f i s

j u s t a r e ? e t i t i ~ n . ~ ~ r a ; a s t a ? ~ d a i n h i s Bhiisya r e p l i e s t o

such ques t ions by pointin:; o u t t h e f a c t t h a t ffS?in,?" r s s i d e s

i n every indiv idual ob jec t and t h e r e i s no d i s t i n c t i o n of

var ious "beingsn. Moreover it needs no !'beingft t o c o n t a c t

i t with '"being", i s mat te r of f a c t . S imi la r ly samavzy? i t s e l f

being the nature of r e l a t i o n r equ i re s no fu r the r r e l a t i o n t o

con tac t i t with samavgva. It must be Some i n aind here t h a t

a XaiyaLyika c l ~ e s not r e l i s h i n f u r t h e r assum?tion o f s?m:vKya

n o t becausz t h a t t ? e samavaya i s i d e n t i c s 1 with i t s r e l a t a

but , because the r e l a t i o n of samavaya can contyct t h e two

r e l a t a and i t s ownself as' wel l , by t h e r<? la t ion sva-2. Thus

i t can be s a i d t h a t t h e Naiyayikas rnaintain a d m b l e funct ion

of samavaya of connecting two insapa rab les and connectins

i t s e l f witn both t h e r e l a t a .

liow caming t o Bhat tas they p o s t u l a t e , as aentioned *

e a r l i e r , a p e c u l i a r r e l a t i o n c a l l e d i d e n t i t y i n cua d i f f e r e n c e

which sounds odd i n t h e very f ace of it. As one can see " -. -

d i f f e r e n c e has no room s o f a r as i d e n t i t y . i s concerned and

t h e v i c e versa hence pecu l i a r ; I n t h i s regard t h e c r i t i c i s m

o f Jayanta Bhat ta may 'be worth not ing.

Jayanta further states and concludes that "under t h e

samavsya c~f various imaginations men being c ~ f u s ? d enter-

t a i n t h e KumZrilafs hypothesis Yns t is what is universal

is ?articular, what i s one i s many, what i s eternzl is

noncthernal and what i s , i s n o t . L2-k t i e m iw+ll in t h i s

donain of e r r o r s . 5