chapter iii audit reports on water issues -...

[ENVIRONMENT AUIDT REORTS ON WATER ISSUES BY CAG]

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Chapter III

Audit reports on Water issues

4.2.7 Unfruitful expenditure on a protected water supply scheme in Nellore District, Andhra Pradesh

Improper planning in the implementation of a Comprehensive Protected Water Supply

scheme by the Executive Engineer, RWS, Nellore, resulted in failure to provide protected

water to the targeted habitations besides unfruitful expenditure of Rs 8 crore.

Government sanctioned (March 2003) a comprehensive protected water supply scheme under

Pradhana Mantri Gramodaya Yojana (PMGY) to provide water to 85 habitations in Nellore

District. The work is to be carried out by the Executive Engineer, Rural Water Supply,

Nellore (EE) in three phases.

Government initially sanctioned Phase I of the scheme in March 2003 to cover 13 habitations

(estimated cost: Rs 4 crore). Phase II of the scheme was sanctioned in March 2005 to cover 47

habitations (estimated cost: Rs 5 crore). Proposal for Phase III of the scheme to cover

remaining 25 habitations submitted in September 2006 (estimated cost: Rs 5 crore) was

awaiting the Government‟s approval (July 2007).

It was observed (February 2007) that though the work under Phase I was completed

(expenditure: Rs 4 crore) way back in April 2005, the scheme had not been commissioned

mainly due to the delay in the acquisition of land for construction of approach road to the

intake well required for carrying heavy vertical turbine pump sets. Finally, the physical

possession of the land was taken over by the RWS division pending alienation of land and the

approach road was laid in May 2006. The pump sets were erected only in July 2006. Under

Phase II also, even after completion (October 2006) of the works (expenditure: Rs 3.99 crore)

the commissioning of the scheme was held up for want of power till February 2007. As of July

2007 both the phases had not been commissioned to cover the targeted habitations even after

four years of sanction of the scheme and water was released only to seven out of 60

habitations in the two phases. Government attributed (August 2007) the delay in

commissioning of the scheme to the delay in release of high tension (HT) load for

energisation.

Thus, due to improper planning by the EE, and lack of coordination firstly with the Revenue

authorities and APTRANSCO authorities, the social objective of supplying protected drinking

water to the specified habitations remains unachieved after incurring an expenditure of Rs 8

crore so far.

4.2.8 Delay in completion of check dams in Nellore District, Andhra Pradesh

The Executive Engineer, PR, Gudur, failed to complete check dams even after five to seven

years, after incurring an expenditure of Rs 3.86 crore resulting in non-creation of envisaged

irrigation potential besides denial of the provision of drinking water facility to the people of 15

villages.


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Government sanctioned (November 1998) construction of four check dams across the creeks

of Pulicat Lake (Nellore District) for creation of fresh water reservoir at an estimated cost of

Rs 2.80 crore. This was to irrigate 7280 acres of ayacut lands and provide drinking water to 15

villages in Chittamur and D.V. Satram mandals by recharging ground water sources. The

estimated cost was revised to Rs 5.24 crore in April 2002 with some additional provisions and

deviations. The works were entrusted to Ayacutdar2 Committees in October 1999 (two

works), July 2001 (one work) and October 2002 (one work) with a stipulation to complete the

works in all respects by July 2002 (three dams) and October 2003 (one dam). This was

extended from time to time, the latest being June 2006.

It was however observed (March 2006) from the records of the Executive Engineer,

Panchayati Raj, Gudur that none of the check dams had been completed even 5 to 7 years

after their entrustment. The works were stopped after incurring an expenditure of Rs.3.86

crore on the four check dams. The percentage of work completed was between 62 to 83 per

cent as shown in the table below:

The EE stated (January 2007) that the works were stopped mainly due to lack of funds and

attributed (April 2007) the inordinate delay in completion of the check dams to cyclones and

heavy rains and entrustment of work to ayacutdars without any skill and experience in the

execution of the works. As of March 2007, water was made available for irrigation of only

4460 acres as against the 7280 targeted. The proposals submitted (March 2007) by the District

Collector, Nellore, for sanction of Rs.1.66 crore (as per SSR 2006-07) to complete the

incomplete works were still awaiting government‟s approval as of July 2007.

Thus, failure of the EE to complete the check dams even after five to seven years and after

incurring an expenditure of Rs.3.86 crore, has resulted in the objective of creating irrigation

potential as envisaged not being achieved, besides denial of drinking water facility to people of

15 villages.

The matter was reported to the government in February 2007; their reply has not been

received (August 2007).

Sl no

Check dam

across the

stream at

Estimated

cost

Expenditure Due for

completion

Percent of

work

completed

Work stopped from

1 Buradagali

Kothapalem

1.69 1.87 July 2002 83 November 2001

2 Karikadu 0.68 0.46 July 2002 62 March 2006

3 Velukadu 0.60 0.37 July 2002 80 December 2002

4 Meezur 1.88 1.16 October

2003

71 December 2003

Total 4.85 3.86


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Performance Audit of Godavari Water Utilisation Authority in Andhra Pradesh

Highlights

Godavari Water Utilisation Authority was constituted (April 1999) to plan, promote and

operationalise schemes/projects for expeditious utilisation of allocated water of river

Godavari. Government prioritised (August 2004) six projects on the river under a concept

called “Jalayagnam” to complete them in two to five years for providing water to 16.32 lakh

acres in Telangana region and drinking water to the habitations enroute by lifting 135.68 tmc

water from river Godavari. A review of these projects disclosed that the progress of these

projects was hampered mainly due to delay in land acquisition and approval of designs. The

consultants were not made responsible for any deviations in quantities, designs and drawings

during execution. There was no suitable provision in the agreements to safeguard the

Government interest, resulting in reduction of substantial quantity of material with the benefit

passing on to the contractor. In many cases, the quality and quantity of materials required was

wrongly projected, estimates were unrealistic, advance payments were made contrary to

agreement, etc. resulting in contractors enjoying huge unintended and undue benefits.

3.2.1. Introduction

Godavari Water Disputes Tribunal allocated (July 1980) 1172.78 tmc water to Andhra

Pradesh from river Godavari. Government planned to utilize 1010.31 tmc water at 75 per cent

dependability including regeneration. Government constituted (April 1999) Godavari Water

Utilisation Authority (GWUA) under the chairmanship of the Chief Minister. The main

objectives of GWUA were to plan, promote and operationalise schemes/projects for the

expeditious utilization of allocated waters of river Godavari to provide irrigation to the

backward areas of the State.

Of the projects under the control of GWUA, the following six projects were prioritized

(August 2004) and proposed to be taken up as part of „Jalayagnam‟1.

1. J. Chokkarao Devadula Lift Irrigation Scheme (JCRDLIS)

2. Sripadasagar Project (SSP)

3. Alisagar Lift Irrigation Scheme (ALIS)

4. Arugula Rajaram Guthpa Lift Irrigation Scheme (ARGLIS) (v) Lendi Project and

5. Dummugudem Project consisting of Rajeev Sagar and Indira Sagar Lift Irrigation

Schemes

3.2.2. Organisational setup

1 Jalayagnam‟ is a concept propagated by the Government to bring more ayacut under

cultivation by completing irrigation projects in a record time Engineer-in-Chief (Overall administrative control and Lendi Project); Commissioner, Planning and Development of

Godavari Basin (Alisagar and Guthpa LI schemes); Chief Engineer, Godavari Lift Irrigation Scheme, Warangal (Devadula and Dummugudem LI Schemes) and Chief Engineer, SSP-FFC Karimnagar (SSP)


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The implementation of the projects was to be overseen by the Principal Secretary to

Government and Secretary to Government (Telangana Region) in Irrigation and Command

Area Development (I&CAD) Department at Secretariat level. Implementation and Tendering

Committee would oversee the process of tendering, evaluation and award of contracts.

Planning, budgeting, programming, implementation, execution and monitoring of the six

projects were distributed among four Heads of Departments (HOD) supported by

Superintending Engineers (SEs) at circle level and Executive Engineers (EEs) at divisional

level.

3.2.3 Audit objectives

The broad audit objectives of this performance audit were to ascertain whether:

project formulation and planning were comprehensive, detailed and accurate;

financial management was effective in the implementation of the projects;

the execution of the projects was as envisaged; and

the monitoring and evaluation was effective so as to achieve the objectives of the project.

3.2.4 Audit criteria

The audit criteria used for performance audit covered the following aspects of the schemes:

Detailed Project Reports (DPRs), approvals by Government and Internal Bench Mark

(IBM) estimates;

Government of India and State Government orders relating to land acquisition and rehabilitation

and resettlement packages; and

Monitoring, evaluation and quality control as required under the extant orders.

3.2.5 Scope and methodology of audit

A test-check of the records at Secretariat, four HODs, four Circles and nine out of 13 divisions

was conducted between January and April 2007 covering an expenditure of Rs 2463.24 crore

(76 per cent of total expenditure of Rs 3230.10 crore) in 12 out of 27 packages in respect of

four (out of six) projects under the control of GWUA.

An entry conference was held in January 2007 with Secretary to Government

(Telangana Region), I&CAD and all the HODs and the objectives of the performance audit

were explained to them. Physical evidences were obtained in the shape of replies to audit

queries, copies of documents, photographs, maps, etc. The audit observations were also

discussed with Secretary to Government and CEs in the exit conference held in August 2007.

The results of the review are presented in the succeeding paragraphs.

Audit findings

3.2.6 Project formulation

In order to overcome time and cost over runs of the projects and to develop the irrigation

potential without delay for the targeted population, Government decided (August 2004) to

take up the irrigation projects on a turn key basis i.e. awarding of all works on Engineering,


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Procurement, Construction (EPC) system to one agency. Under this, the agency to whom the

work is awarded, SSP Division-1, Ramagundam; SSP Division-3, LMD Colony, Karimnagar;

SSP Division-4, Mancherial; JCRDLIS Division-1, 2, 3 and 4, Chintagattu, Warangal; NSLI

Division-1 and 2, Nizamabad would investigate, survey, design and construct the project on a

turn key basis and then hand over to the Government. The advantage of this arrangement was

supposedly that there would not be any scope for deviation of quantities, revision of estimates

etc, as the agency was to complete the work at its quoted contract amount. Government

approved (August 2004) empanelment of contractors for participation in the procurement of

priority irrigation projects under EPC system.

Accordingly, Government decided to complete all the six projects in two to five years and

provide water to 16.32 lakh acres of ayacut in Telangana region by lifting 135.68 tmc water

from river Godavari. It would also provide drinking water to the habitations enroute. This

required preparation of estimates as accurate as possible so that deviations from estimates are

bare minimum. This increases the role of consultants to a great extent in devising a suitable

mechanism so that once designs are firmed up by department, no changes are made or if any,

it is minimum. Simultaneously, suitable provisions in the agreement should be made to

safeguard the Government interest, wherein the deviations are more than the prescribed limit.

A brief description of each project is given in Appendix 3.5. The deficiencies noticed in the

role of consultant, planning, land acquisition, rehabilitation, etc. are discussed below:

3.2.6.1 Role of consultants

As the projects were implemented on turnkey basis, the estimates were to be as accurate as

possible. Thus the role of consultant was pivotal in contributing to correct estimates to

facilitate timely completion of the projects.

Preparation of detailed project reports (DPRs) comprising detailed investigation, designs,

drawings, preparation of estimates and obtaining clearances required for the projects

from Central Water Commission (CWC), Government of India etc, in respect of five projects

was entrusted between February 2002 and April 2005 to two consultants for a total agreement

value of Rs 7.76 crore. An amount of Rs. 7.09 crore has been paid to the consultants as of

March 2007. However, a scrutiny of the terms of reference of the consultants, estimates,

designs and drawings prepared by them disclosed the following:

The tenders in respect of three projects (JCRDLIS, SSP and Dummugudem) were floated based

on different IBM estimates than those prepared by the consultants.

Survey, investigation, preparation of estimates, designs and drawings, etc, which were entrusted

to the consultants were again included in the scope of work put to tender for construction of the

projects under EPC turnkey system.

There were no provisions in the agreement of consultants and contractors so as to deal with the

deviations between the estimates drawn up by the consultants and the actual execution of work

by the contractors to safeguard the Government interest.

The contractors to whom the works were entrusted under EPC turnkey basis were allowed to

execute the works as per their own designs and drawings approved by the Chief Engineer,

Central Designs Organisation (CE, CDO) with little relevance to those prepared by the

consultants, though the same were approved by CE, CDO before calling the tender.


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All the clearances in respect of JCRDLIS and SSP have not yet (July 2007) been obtained by the

consultants although they have been paid their fees.

Thus, the estimates prepared by the consultants, finally approved and works actually executed

with reference to those designs were at variance with each other. Despite this, the consultants

were not made responsible for any deviations in quantities, designs and drawings during

execution.

3.2.6.2 Source and adequacy of water

The Department initially proposed to lift 36.25 tmc water in all three phases of JCRDLIS.

After making provision of 1.92 tmc water for drinking and 2.96 tmc water towards

evaporation losses, water available would be 31.37 tmc for irrigation of 6.47 lakh acres.

Government, with a view to bringing more land under irrigation, decided (December 2006) to

implement drip and sprinkler irrigation at micro level under all the major Lift Irrigation (LI)

schemes so as to irrigate 15000 acres per one tmc water.

Subsequently, the department proposed to irrigate 4.08 lakh acres under Phase-I and II

of JCRDLIS which would require 27.20 tmc water at 15000 acre per one tmc water. Contrary

to the above norms, the Department proposed to lift 12.43 tmc water only as against 27.20

tmc. Thus, the water proposed to be lifted (12.43 tmc) would not be sufficient to irrigate the

proposed ayacut of 4.08 lakh acres. Department however, stated (June 2007) that the

shortages would be covered under Phase-III of the project. Phase III works have yet to be

commenced as of August 2007. The mis-match between the proposed lifting of water and

ayacut contemplated is due to faulty formulation of policy and Government would not be able

to meet the targets under LI Schemes.

3.2.6.3 Non-availability of assured power supply

One of the functions of GWUA was to provide for dedicated power supply for the proposed

lift irrigation schemes on river Godavari. However, no power project has so far been

contemplated on the river for this purpose. The power requirement for five LI schemes was

assessed at 891.98 MW. The CWC has expressed (January 2005) doubt about the availability

of sufficient power in respect of JCRDLIS as the department had not made any firm proposal

for meeting their requirement of power. On the request and at the cost of the department,

APTRANSCO has been executing the electrical works such as extension of HT lines,

construction of separate sub-stations and fixing transformers. So far an amount of Rs 307.02

crore has been paid by the Irrigation Department to APTRANSCO for execution of electrical

works under JCRDLIS, ALIS and ARGLIS projects. However, no memorandum of

understanding/agreement has been concluded with APTRANSCO. As such, the successful

operation of LI schemes, in the absence of the assured power supply, is doubtful. The

Secretary to Government, I&CAD Department, accepting the audit observation in the exit

conference stated that steps were being taken for commissioning a Hydro- electric project on

river Godavari.

3.2.6.4 Overlapping of ayacut

CWC cleared the flood flow canal (FFC) of Sriram Sagar Project (SRSP) in 1996 with an

ayacut of 2.20 lakh acres in Karimnagar, Warangal and Nalgonda Districts. Phase-II of


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JCRDLIS was taken up in April 2005 with an ayacut of 2.85 lakh acres in the same districts.

It was, however, observed that the ayacut contemplated under phase-II of JCRDLIS

overlapped the ayacut contemplated under FFC to the extent of 60000 acres in Warangal and

Nalgonda Districts. Thus, it is evident that even the ayacut was not finalized by the CE,

JCRDLIS before concluding the agreements for Phase-II works. The SE, JCRDLIS Circle,

Warangal stated (June 2007) that it was proposed to transfer the overlapping ayacut from FFC

to JCRDLIS. However, no clearance for the changed ayacut has been obtained from the

CWC as of August 2007.

3.2.9.2 Alisagar Lift Irrigation Scheme (ALIS)

The IBM estimate for ALIS was technically sanctioned (August 2004) for Rs 172 crore and

entrusted (March 2005) to a contractor for an agreement value of Rs 163.98 crore at 3.91 per

cent discount on the ECV of Rs 170.65 crore. The scope of the work provided for fabrication

and laying of four rows MS pipeline with 1.80 m dia for a length of 5.60 km and 1.60 m dia

for a length of 1.53 km. Steel required for fabrication of pipes as per the estimate was 12358.37

MT. The basic parameters of the project given in the agreement were to be strictly adhered to

by the bidders, unless otherwise specified during detailed survey, investigation, engineering

and execution of the project. The bidders were required to review the same and incorporate

modifications/ improvements wherever required for optimising benefits without any

deviations from the basic parameters of the project.

During the execution, the number of rows was reduced to two and the alignment length was

also reduced to 6.21 km as per revised designs submitted by the contractor for pressure

pipeline (i.e., two rows of 2.2 m dia for 5.335 km and 1.8 m dia for 0.875 km). The revised

designs were also accepted (June 2005) by the CE, CDO. The contractor accordingly

fabricated and laid the pressure main for a length of 6.21 km by procuring a total quantity of

8455 MT of MS coil as against 12358.37 MT provided in the estimate. Thus, IBM estimate

prepared by the consultant and approved by the department was unrealistic and resulted in

undue benefit of Rs 20.54 crore being the cost of excess steel (3903.12 MT) at the rate of Rs

54768 per MT provided in the estimate duly deducting tender discount.

Similarly, as per the basic parameters stipulated in the agreement, the length of pressure

pipeline was 7.13 km. As per the price breakup given in the IBM estimate for excavation,

refilling, sand bed and CC block for laying of pipes was Rs 6.07 crore. However, as per the

designs furnished by the contractor and actual execution, the length of pipe line was reduced

to 6.21 km. Had the length of the pipe line been correctly assessed at the time of preparing

IBM estimates, the saving of Rs 75 lakh would have accrued to the department. The

contractor was thus unduly benefited to that extent.

Government replied (September 2007) that as the contract price was a firm lump sum on a

single source responsibility and the short utilisation of steel was due to change of designs and

drawings, the cost was not recovered from the contractor. The reply is not acceptable as the

bidder offered his rate, based on the project appraisal appended to the agreement and the

contractor was required to design, fabricate and lay four rows of 1.8 m and 1.6 m dia with 10

mm thick steel plate. Changing the scope of work with two rows of pressure pipeline of 2.2 m

and 1.8 m dia was an alternative design and not a modification. The adoption and execution


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of the alternative and economic design, resulted in savings to the extent of Rs. 21.29 crore

which would have accrued to Government had there been a suitable provision in the

agreements.

3.2.9.3 Arugula Rajaram Guthpa Lift Irrigation Scheme (ARGLIS)

The construction of ARGLIS was entrusted (February 2005) to a contractor under EPC

turnkey system for an agreement value of Rs 145.80 crore. The scope of work, inter-alia,

included manufacture, supply and laying of 2200 mm, 2000 mm and 1600 mm dia pressure

main for a total length of 27895 Running Metres (RMT). As per the agreement conditions, the

work was required to be executed according to the relevant IS codes. IS 1916-1989 stipulates

the inner lining thickness of 25 mm for 450 mm to 3000 mm dia pipes. An experts committee

constituted to discuss the details of IS codes pertaining to laying of steel pipes for schemes

already undertaken and the CE, CDO recommended for 25 mm thickness for inner lining as

per IS 1916-1989. However, the contractor manufactured and delivered the pressure mains

with 15 mm thickness inner lining as per IS 3589-2001, which is applicable for seamless and

welded carbon steel pipes. The Principal Secretary to Government, I&CAD Department,

based on another recommendation given (August 2005) by the Committee, approved

(November 2005) the pipeline with inner lining thickness of 12.5 mm to 15 mm to overcome

contractual obligations. As the contractor would have quoted his rates with 25 mm thickness

inner lining, the acceptance of the pressure mains with 15 mm thick inner lining resulted in

unintended benefit of Rs 32.47 lakh up to executed and paid quantity of 25496 RMT.

Government replied (September 2007) that the instructions to adopt 12.5 mm to 15 mm thick

inner lining were issued based on the recommendations of the committee. They further stated

that there was no unintended benefit to the contractor as the contract price was a firm lump

sum and on a single source responsibility.

The reply does not explain the reasons for incorporating in the agreement a condition for

executing as per IS code 1916-1989. Thus the decision of Government in accepting the lesser

thickness of inner lining during execution was contrary to the agreement conditions and

resulted in unintended benefit to the contractor.

3.2.9.4 Boosting up of IBM estimates: Sripadasagar Project (SSP)

The IBM estimate for stage-II phase I works of SSP was originally sanctioned for Rs 1757.18

crore. The work was entrusted (April 2005) to a contractor for an agreement value of Rs 1737

crore at 0.666 per cent excess over the estimate contract value (ECV) of Rs 1725.50 crore.

During execution, the estimate was revised to Rs 1688.86 crore for which the Administrative

and Technical approvals were accorded in August 2005 and March 2006 respectively.

Consequent to the revision of estimate, the ECV works out to Rs 1657.18 crore enhancing the

tender premium to 4.81 per cent, which is just below the permissible ceiling of five per cent.

A review (February 2007) of the estimates disclosed that even the revised estimate had been

inflated by Rs.349.85 crore extending unintended benefit to the contractor as detailed below.

Had the revised estimate been properly prepared, the contractor would not have qualified as

the tender premium would have exceeded five per cent.


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The requirement of MS steel plate for fabrication of pressure pipeline was assessed as 165735

MT in the approved (March 2006) estimate. However, based on the diametre of the pipes and

thickness of steel plates as approved by the CE, CDO, the actual quantity of steel requirement

was worked out by the SE, SSP Circle, Mancherial as 135255 MT with the extra loading of steel

quantity in the approved estimate working out to 30480 MT. The cost of the extra steel loaded

in the estimate at the rate of Rs 54837.70 per MT adopted in the estimate was Rs 167.15 crore.

There was a provision of Rs 68.90 crore in the estimate towards cost of excavation of gravity

canals for inter-connecting the tanks. However, the consultant agency had worked out the cost

of these items including the excavation of approach channels at Rs 25.16 crore. Thus, the extra

loading into the estimate works out to Rs 43.74 crore.

A provision of Rs 368.50 crore was made in the sanctioned (March 2006) estimate towards

Electro Mechanical (EM) works of SSP at the rate of Rs 2.75 crore per MW for 134 MW of

power required. In respect of another estimate sanctioned later in January 2007 for Indira Sagar

LIS (Dummugudem project), a rate of Rs 2 crore per MW was approved by the IBM

Committee. Thus, the rate adopted at Rs 2.75 crore per MW was unjustified and resulted in

excess provision of Rs 100.50 crore at the differential rate of Rs 0.75 crore per MW for 134

MW.

A rate of Rs 72 crore per tmc was adopted in the estimate for strengthening and improvement of

14 old tanks and formation of two new tanks. It was noticed from another estimate sanctioned

(January 2007) for Indira Sagar LIS that a rate of Rs 40 crore per tmc was adopted for formation

of new tanks as approved by IBM Committee. Thus, there was excess provision of Rs 38.46

crore for 1.202 tmc for all the 16 tanks.

Similarly, in the estimate for Stage-I phase II works of SSP (supply of 8.5 tmc water to NTPC),

a provision of Rs 29.15 crore was included towards EM works at a rate of Rs 2.92 crore per

MW for 10 MW. However, a rate of Rs 2 crore per MW was adopted for EM works in Indira

Sagar LIS as approved by the IBM Committee as most economical and workable. Thus, the

excess rate of Rs 0.92 crore per MW resulted in excess provision of Rs 9.15 crore per 10 MW in

the estimate.

3.2.12 Conclusions

There were serious deficiencies in the efficient, economic and effective implementation of the

projects undertaken under GWUA. The schemes were undertaken without proper care in

finalizing the ayacut, source and availability of assured power supply. There was delay in

acquisition of land and implementation of R&R packages, which hampered the progress

of works severely. The projects prioritised for completion before March 2007 were not

completed and consequently, the objectives of utilizing allocated water of river Godavari

and creating irrigation potential were not achieved. The agreements were one sided in favour

of the contractors and suitable provisions were not incorporated to protect Government

interest. The consultants were not made responsible for any deviations in quantities, designs

and drawings during execution. The contractors enjoyed huge undue benefits due to incorrect

projection of materials required, preparation of unrealistic estimates, etc. Despite being

monitored at all levels, the rate of progress in the works under SSP and JCRDLIS is not as per

the milestones fixed.

3.2.13 Recommendations


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Delay in acquisition of land, implementation of R&R packages, approval of designs and getting

clearances is to be avoided to complete the ongoing schemes/projects expeditiously so that the

allocated waters of river Godavari can be utilized to provide irrigation and drinking water to the

backward areas of the State.

For the successful operation of LI schemes, arrangements for assured power supply should be

quickly finalized.

It is essential that future IBM estimates are prepared as accurately as possible regarding

basic parameters of the project, designs and drawings etc., to avoid unintended benefits to the

contractors.

All conditions/clauses in tender schedules and agreements should be examined in consultation

with Law Department and suitable changes/ provisions may be made to safeguard the

Government interest in EPC system of contract.

Amount to the extent of liquidated damages due from contractor should not be released to him.

The above points were reported to Government in July 2007; their reply had not been received

(August 2007). The recommendations were accepted in the exit conference held in August

2007.

Performance Audit of Drinking Water Supply Schemes, Arunachal Pradesh

Highlights

The Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) is responsible for providing adequate

safe drinking water to the rural and urban population of the State. A review of the Rural

Drinking Water Supply Schemes revealed that there was shortfall in coverage of „Not

Covered‟ (NC) and „Partially Covered‟ (PC) habitations despite having sufficient funds.

Number of slipped back and quality affected habitations increased between 2002 and 2007.

Irregularities were noticed in other rural and urban water supply programmes such as

inadequate expenditure on water quality, monitoring and surveillance, un-productive and

wasteful expenditure, irregular expenditure, and non-execution of work as per approved

specification. Despite poor completion rates and increase in number of ongoing schemes, new

schemes were taken up every year which is indicative of poor planning.

3.2.1 Introduction

In order to provide adequate safe drinking water facilities to the rural and urban population,

the following Central and State sector programmes were implemented in the State:

Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP) in Central sector;

Accelerated Urban Water Supply Programme (AUWSP), in Central sector;

Rural Piped Water Supply Programme (RPWSP) under MNP in State sector;

Prime Minister‟s Gramodaya Yojana (PMGY) in State sector;

Urban Water Supply Projects (UWSP) funded under NLCPR/DONER.


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The ARWSP was introduced by GOI in 1972-73 with 100 per cent grants-in-aid to assist the

State to tackle water supply problems in identified problem villages10. With the introduction

of the Minimum Needs Programme (MNP) under State sector, the ARWSP was withdrawn in

1974-75 but re-introduced in 1977-78 to accelerate the pace of coverage of problem villages. In

1986 the programme was given a mission approach with the introduction of National

Drinking Water Mission (NDWM), which was renamed as the Rajiv Gandhi National

Drinking Water Mission (RGNDWM) in 1991. The RGNDWM covered ARWSP, sector

reforms programme, sub-mission projects and support services. The sector reforms

programme, which was launched by GOI on a pilot basis during 1999-2000, was modified and

launched as Swajaldhara on 25 December 2002. In 2000-01, a new scheme in rural sector

under the PMGY was launched by the GOI for taking up projects /schemes on sustainable

basis.

The Centrally sponsored AUWSP was launched to provide safe and adequate water supply

facilities to towns having population less than 20,000 (as per 1991 census) and to improve the

environment and the quality of life for better socio-economic condition of the country within a

fixed time frame.

MNP is a State sector scheme launched in 1974-75 with the objective of providing water

supply to any habitation regardless of its size/population/number of households. RPWSP and

PMGY programmes under State sector are also implemented in the State.

3.2.3 Scope of Audit

Performance review of various water supply programmes (under CSS and State Plan) covering

the period 2002–07 was conducted during April to June 2007. Records of the office of the CE,

PHED and six12 out of 16 divisions in six out of 15 districts were test checked in audit. The

divisions and districts 1were selected on the basis of simple random sampling covering an

expenditure of Rs.54.49 crore which is 38 per cent of the total expenditure of Rs.142.34 crore

during 2002-07.


The objectives of the review were to ascertain whether:

Survey of habitations was conducted effectively for authentic and reliable data;

Planning for implementation was adequate and the schemes/projects were properly executed;

Financial management was adequate and effective;

The mechanism for monitoring was adequate and effective;

The objectives of the programmes were achieved in an economical, efficient and effective manner.


Audit findings were benchmarked against the following criteria:

Guidelines of the GOI for implementation of the schemes;

Project reports, estimates and sanction letters of individual schemes and projects;

Quality assurance mechanism prescribed by GOI;

Prescribed monitoring mechanism.


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3.2.6 Audit Methodology

The performance audit commenced with an entry conference in April 2007 with the CE and

Additional CE, PHED wherein the audit objectives, criteria and scope of the review and audit

procedures were explained to the Department. An exit conference was held in November 2007

with the Secretary/Chief Engineer PHED and replies of the Government/Department have

been incorporated in the review at appropriate places.

3.2.7 Audit findings

The review revealed improper planning, unproductive and wasteful expenditure, and non-

execution of work as per approved specifications, lack of IEC/HRD and water quality

monitoring activities, improper utilisation of funds etc.

3.2.10 Implementation

3.2.10.1 Targets and achievement

The targets for coverage of habitations/schools under ARWSP and MNP/PMGY and

achievement there against during 2002-03 to 2006-07 were as under:

Source: Information furnished by the Department.

Year Habitation target Achievement schools

NC/PC to

FC

Population NC/PC

habitation

population Target achievement

2002-03 86 25,458 92 24,197 113 117

2003-04 169 19,736 152 17,778 143 146

2004-05 155 19,526 247 31,455 135 300

2005-06 379 50,322 329 45,713 257 347

2006-07 193 39,831 231 41,249 315 403

There was excess achievement of habitation coverage by seven and 25 per cent as compared to

targets fixed under ARWSP and MNP respectively. Achievement of coverage of schools was

also 36 and 16 per cent higher although there were unspent balances in almost all the years as

indicated in paragraph 3.2.9.3. This indicates that targets had not been set realistically taking

into account availability of funds.

3.2.11 Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme

3.2.11.1 Poor completion rate of works

During 2002-2007, the Department took up 4,607 schemes under ARWSP for execution, of

which 2,443 schemes (53 per cent) were completed as of March 2007 and 2,164 schemes were

in progress (March 2007). Total expenditure incurred upto March 2007 was Rs.326.23 crore.

Test check of six divisions17 revealed that out of 1,986 schemes taken up for execution under

ARWSP during 2002-07, 1,866 schemes were due for completion by March 2007. Against

these, only 1,000 schemes (54 per cent) including three schemes which were not due for

completion during 2006-07 were completed at the end of March 2007. The work on 557


13

schemes was in progress whereas 429 schemes were yet to be taken up (March 2007) as

detailed in Appendix-3.2.1. Reasons for failure in completion of the 869 schemes were not on

record. The Department however, stated (November 2007) that poor completion rate of works

was mainly due to shortfall in State share. This is not factually correct as ARWSP schemes are

fully funded by GOI.

Thus, due to poor completion rate of water supply schemes, the beneficiaries were deprived of

getting the benefit of drinking water.

3.2.11.2 Unauthorised expenditure

In two districts18 the State Government, during 2002-03 to 2005-06, sanctioned 10 WSS at an

estimated cost of Rs.87 lakh without obtaining technical clearance of the SLSCC. Out of these,

seven schemes were completed between 2004-05 and 2006-07 at a cost of Rs.70 lakh. Work on

the remaining three schemes against which an expenditure of Rs.8 lakh had been incurred was in

progress (March 2007). Thus, expenditure of Rs.78 lakh was unauthorized in the absence of the

technical sanction of the SLSCC.

Between 2001-2006, 12 WSS at an estimated cost of Rs.2.21 crore were sanctioned and taken up

for execution in six districts. The schemes covered two public sector undertakings, seven

Government establishments, one Army camp and two tea estates. As of March 2007, seven

schemes were completed; two in progress and works of three schemes were yet to be

commenced. As of March 2007, total expenditure incurred was Rs.70 lakh. As no rural

habitation was covered under the scheme, providing water supply facilities to the above entities

was not within the scope of ARWSP. Thus, the expenditure of Rs.70 lakh incurred against seven

completed schemes and five incomplete schemes till March 2007 was unauthorized (Appendix-

3.2.2).

3.2.11.3 Doubtful expenditure

In five divisions19 17 schemes sanctioned between 2002-06 covering 17 habitations were

stated to have been completed at a cost of Rs.2.35 crore during 2004-07. But the villages where

the schemes were recorded to have been executed were either uninhabited or non-existent as

per 2001 census.

Thus the entire expenditure of Rs.2.35 crore appeared doubtful (Appendix-3.2.3).


14

3.2.11.4 Excess expenditure over approved cost

According to ARWSP guidelines, funds released under ARWSP should not be

utilised/adjusted against any cost escalation of schemes. The guidelines also laid down that

any expenditure incurred over and above the approved cost was to be met by the State

Government from its own resources. Test check, however, revealed that six divisions took up

22 water supply schemes at an estimated cost of Rs.2.85 crore during 1990-2003 and

completed them between 2002-07 after a delay ranging from two to 12 years at a cost of

Rs.3.44 crore resulting in cost overrun of Rs.59 lakh (Appendix-3.2.4). The Department stated

(November 2007) that the excess expenditure was within permissible limit of five per cent. The

contention of the Department is not acceptable as the ARWSP guidelines do not allow any

excess expenditure over approved cost.

3.2.11.5 Overlapping of scheme in same habitation

In Lower Subansiri, the State Government sanctioned (2003-04) one scheme (WSS at Byara

village), for Rs.12 lakh which was completed in 2004-05 at a cost of Rs.12 lakh. The

Department again took up WSS scheme for the same habitation in 2006-07 which was

completed during 2006-07 itself at a cost of Rs.14 lakh. The Department stated (November

2007) that there were two habitations with the same name of Byara as per CAP 99. The

contention of the Department is not acceptable as, as per census of 2001 Byara is one village

with a population of 92 only.

3.2.11.8 Sub-Mission projects

Sub Mission projects under ARWSP are to be taken up by the State for providing safe

drinking water to rural habitations facing water quality problems and for ensuring source

sustainability through rain water harvesting, artificial recharge etc. As per guidelines, an

annual action plan for coverage of habitations with quality related problems is to be

formulated and sent to Central Government for fund allocation and monitoring. Scrutiny

revealed that no annual action plan was formulated by the Department. The Department

however stated (November 2007) that in December 2005 it forwarded an action plan to GOI

under “Bharat Nirman programme”. Further development was awaited (November 2007).

According to a report of the North Eastern Regional Institute of Water and Land

Management for 2006, turbidity in water above permissible limit (> 5 NTU21) was found in

eight22 districts (23 locations) of the State. For arresting turbidity and bacteriological problem,

construction of slow sand filtration tank, pre-sedimentation tank, provision of chlorine dozer

and alum dozer were required to be provided in the estimates for execution of WSS. Test

check of records of four divisions (Yupia, Pasigaht, Along and Changlang) revealed that

between 2003-06, 12 WSS were sanctioned by GOI and completed by the Department at a

cost of Rs.1.52 crore in water quality problem areas. But the estimates of these schemes

neither included the items of works required for arresting turbidity and bacteriological

problems nor any measure was taken for arresting the turbidity of water. Water testing reports

(2003-07) of these divisions showed that turbidity of water in these areas ranged from 11 to 35

NTU.

Thus, non adoption of adequate measures for arresting quality problem of water in the areas

exposed the inhabitants of those areas to potential health risks.


15

3.2.12 Support services

3.2.12.1 Water quality monitoring

The Department established (2001-02) 13 district level water testing laboratories at a cost of

Rs.24 lakh with the Central assistance of Rs.48 lakh released between October 1997 and

February 2001. Utilisation of balance Rs.24 lakh was not on record. Test check of six

districts23 revealed that no technical persons were appointed till May 2007 and water testing

was carried out by the Sub Divisional Officer/Sectional Officer of the division with the help of

field kits. In June 2006, the Department signed an MoU with Defence Research Laboratory,

Tezpur to act as State Referral Institute (SRI) for community based National rural drinking

water quality, monitoring and surveillance programme. But there was no documentary

evidence indicating involvement and activity undertaken by SRI. In February 2006, GOI

released Rs.22 lakh for IEC and HRD activities and water quality monitoring and surveillance

activities, out of which the Department utilized Rs.14 lakh towards procurement of field kits

and arranging workshops till March 2007. Balance of Rs.8 lakh remained unutilised. Thus,

water quality monitoring and surveillance activities of the Department under ARWSP were

inadequate.

3.2.13 Sector reform/Swajaldhara

The main thrust of the programme was to institutionalize rural community participation

through enhancement of awareness for generating resources for meeting a part of the capital

cost of the project. The beneficiaries were to be properly trained, to plan, implement, operate,

maintain and manage the water supply schemes of their choice.

Under Sector Reforms, GOI approved 181 schemes in two districts (West Siang: 102, Lohit:

79) at a cost of Rs.16 crore and released (February 2000 and February 2004) Rs.6.81 crore. In

addition, the State Government realized Rs.60 lakh as beneficiaries‟ contribution and received

bank interest of Rs.43 lakh. The Department incurred an expenditure of Rs.7.23 crore and

completed 69 schemes till March 2005. The balance 112 schemes along with the balance fund

of Rs.61 lakh were transferred (May 2005) to Swajaldhara.

3.2.13.1 Incomplete schemes

Under Swajaldhara, planning and scheme formulation is to be done by District Water

Sanitation Committee (DWSC). Schemes technically cleared by DWSC are required to be

approved by the State Water and Sanitation Mission (SWSM). In February 2004, GOI

released Rs.2.24 crore out of the total allocation of Rs.4.47 crore. The DWSCs, on the basis of

availability of funds, sanctioned 90 schemes which were to be completed by March 2007. Out

of this, only 35 schemes (39 per cent) were completed till March 2007 at a cost of Rs.3.03

crore. Poor rate of completion was on account of non availability of funds. The balance fund

of Rs.2.23 crore was released by GOI only in February 2007. Out of 35 completed schemes,

only six schemes (Papumpare district) were handed over to the Village Committee as required

under the scheme guidelines.

3.2.15 Water supply programme under Non-lapsable Central Pool of Resource (NLCPR) and

AUWSP

3.2.15.1 Slow progress of works


16

Out of 13 water supply projects (12 projects under NLCPR/DONER and 1 project under

AUWSP) taken up during 2000-01 and 2006-07, seven projects were due for completion

between March 2003 and March 2007. Out of these, only one project (water supply at Along)

was recorded as completed and others remained incomplete (March 2007).

Delay in completion of the schemes was due to lack of proper work plan and poor financial

management as discussed below:

3.2.15.2 Incomplete Water Supply Scheme at Hapoli (Ziro) township

Under AUWSP, GOI approved (February 2004) construction of 1.56 MLD capacity Water

Treatment plant (WTP) at Hapoli at an estimated cost of Rs.4.97 crore on 50:50 share basis

(Central Government 50 per cent and State Government 50 per cent including five per cent

community contribution). The project was to be completed by September 2006. The division

increased the capacity of WTP from 1.56 MLD to 2.06 MLD without obtaining approval of

the Centre and a revised estimate was prepared for Rs.7.38 crore which was sanctioned by the

State Government in March 2006. The division incurred an expenditure of Rs.4.91 crore and

95 per cent of the civil works viz construction of treatment plant, sedimentation tank, intake,

service reservour, etc. were completed till March 2007. Although, the Department sought

additional funds of Rs.2.34 crore from the State Government in October 2006, no funds were

released till March 2007. The scheme remains incomplete after a lapse of more than three

years from the date of approval. This led to not only idle investment of Rs.4.91 crore on the

WSS but the beneficiaries were also deprived of safe drinking water.

3.2.15.3 Augmentation of Water Supply at Along-Idle expenditure

The work “Augmentation of Water Supply” at Along in West Siang district was

administratively approved by the State Government in March 1996 at an estimated cost of

Rs.3.54 crore under the State Plan scheme. The work was to be completed by March 1998. In

March 2001, the Department revised the estimated cost to Rs.5.77 crore which was technically

cleared by the GOI in August 2000, with the target of completion by March 2003. The

Department in March 2002 awarded the construction work to a local contractor at Rs.2.09

crore (excluding materials) with the stipulation to complete the work by March 2004. Test

check however, revealed that the estimate was again revised (June 2005) to Rs.8.15 crore with

a provision of extra work viz laying of DI pipes, construction of clear water reservoir and

anchor block etc, which was not technically cleared by GOI till March 2007 and expenditure

sanction was also not accorded by the State Government. Though, the division incurred an

expenditure of Rs.6.10 crore between March 1996 and March 2007, the project remained

incomplete as of March 2007.

Thus, expenditure of Rs.6.10 crore was idle and the objectives of taking up the project were

frustrated as the targeted population could not be provided with adequate safe drinking water

in time.

3.2.15.4 Incomplete Water supply scheme in Bomdila Township - Locking up of funds

The Union Ministry of Urban Development & Poverty Alleviation in May 2004 technically

approved a scheme for construction of a water treatment plant for Bomdila township at an


17

estimated cost of Rs.17.98 crore. The division incurred an expenditure of Rs.12.44 crore

towards procurement of DI pipes and partial execution of head work and construction of

water treatment plant till March 2007. However, the land allotted by the district authority in

January 2005 for the scheme belonged to the Army who disallowed construction and laying of

pipelines through their land. In March 2007, the Executive Engineer selected an alternative

alignment for laying pipelines.

Thus wrong selection of work site resulted in delay in completion which led to locking up of

funds of Rs.12.44 crore.

3.2.15.5 Augmentation of water supply at Naharlagun-Nirjuli township

• Extra expenditure

The GOI in May 2002 technically approved the augmentation of water supply at Naharlagun -

Nirjuli township at an estimated cost of Rs.11.78 crore under NLCPR. The State Government

after a delay of two years accorded administrative approval and expenditure sanction in

March 2004. The civil work was awarded to a contractor in May 2004 at tender value of

Rs.4.27 crore with the stipulation to complete the work by December 2006. The division

incurred an expenditure of Rs.14.62 crore (including cost of civil work) till March 2007. Thus

delay of more than two years in granting approval and consequent delay in completion of

work resulted in extra expenditure of Rs.2.84 crore with further liability of Rs.28 lakh required

for completion of the project apart from time overrun.

3.2.17 Conclusion

The process of selection and approval of schemes under ARWSP/Swajaldhara was not

transparent. Due to lack of vision and financial plan, there was piling up of incomplete

schemes. Poor planning and lack of prioritisation resulted in spreading out resources thinly

thereby leaving a majority of schemes incomplete and non-accrual of envisaged benefits.

Delay in completion/ taking up of execution of WSS resulted in cost overrun and idle

investment. The State Government failed to utilise the available funds depriving people of safe

drinking water. The funds were diverted from one scheme to another when diversions were

not permitted. Schemes for sustainability of sources and water quality improvement were not

taken up in the State. Objectives of the programmes were thus not achieved.


• The Department should prepare proper work plan before taking up execution of schemes so that

timely completion of schemes can be ensured to avoid cost overrun and idle investment;

• The Department should ensure that sufficient funds are allotted for completion of ongoing

schemes/projects before taking up new schemes;

• Fund provision under RPWSP, MNP and PMGY should be made as per funds released by the

GOI under ARWSP;

• The State Government and the Nodal Department should evolve effective monitoring system

for completion of the schemes/projects as scheduled.

The Department assured (November 2007) compliance with the recommendations at all

levels.


18

Perforamce of Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP), Chhattisgarh

Highlights

The Government of India (GOI) introduced (1972-73) Accelerated Rural Water Supply

Programme (ARWSP) to provide safe and potable drinking water at 40 litres per capita per

day (lpcd) to all rural habitations. The GOI provided Rs 239.63 crore during 2002-07, of

which State Government could not utilize Rs 58.78 crore. During new survey (2003), 17,968

new habitations emerged out of which 14,471 habitations were uncovered and 3,507

habitations remained for coverage as of February 2007. Allocation by the State for operation

and maintenance, source sustainability and quality remained low. There were instances of

incorrect reporting of figures. Some important findings of the performance audit are given

below:

Introduction

GOI introduced ARWSP in 1972-1973 with 100 per cent grants-in-aid to the states. It was

discontinued after introduction of Minimum Needs Programme

(MNP) during fifth five year plan in 1974-75 and was revived in 1977-1978. The programme

was given a mission approach1 under National Drinking Water Mission introduced in 1986.

A Comprehensive Action Plan was launched in 1999 under which Not Covered (NC) and

Partially Covered (PC) habitations were identified.

3.3.1 Programme Objectives

• To ensure coverage of all rural habitations especially to reach the un-reached with access to safe

drinking water.

• To ensure sustainability of the system and sources.

• To preserve quality of water by institutionalizing water quality monitoring and surveillance

through a catchment area approach.

Coverage Norms

• 40 Litres per capita per day (lpcd) of drinking water for human beings and

• One hand pump or stand post for every 250 persons.

Criteria for identification of problem habitation

(i) NC/NSS (No Safe Source) habitation.

• Drinking water source/point does not exist within 1.6 km of habitations in plains and 100

metres elevation in hilly areas;

• Habitations having a water source but are affected with quality problems and,

• Habitations where quantum of availability of safe water from any source is not enough to meet

drinking and cooking needs (less than eight lpcd).

(ii) Partial Covered (PC) Habitations-which have a safe drinking water source (either private

or public) within 1.6 km in plains and 100 metres in hilly areas but capacity of the system

ranges between 10 lpcd to 40 lpcd.


19

(iii) Fully Covered (FC) Habitations- all the remaining habitations

Under the programme priority was to be accorded for coverage of no safe source habitations.

Among them priority was to be given to those inhabited exclusively by SC/ST, quality

affected habitations with acute toxicity, upgradation of source level of safe source habitations

having less than 40 lpcd water to the level of 40 lpcd and coverage of schools and Anganwadis

without safe drinking water source.

The mission approach implied the provision of low cost solutions to identify problems

associated with the supply of safe drinking water through the application of scientific and

technological inputs.

Under ARWSP, funds for coverage of NC/PC was to be allocated in the ratio of 2:1.

3.3.2 Organisational Structure

In Chhattisgarh the Public Health Engineering Department (PHED), headed by the Engineer-

in-Chief is the nodal agency executing the programme. Under him there are two zones each

headed by CE with their headquarters at Raipur and Bilaspur. There is a mechanical

formation headed by the C.E. at Raipur. There are 25 Divisions (16 Civil, five Mechanical,

three Project and one Water recharge) in the state.

3.3.3 Audit Objectives

The main objective of the performance audit were to-

• ascertain whether planning for implementation of ARWSP was effective;

• assess the adequacy and effectiveness of financial control;

• assess whether schemes were properly prioritized and efficiently executed;

• assess whether priority was accorded to Operation and Maintenance (O & M) of existing water

supply sources, and

• ascertain the adequacy and effectiveness of the mechanism to monitor water quality and

sustainability.


Information was collected from the E-in-C office and records relating to the scheme for the

period 2002-03 to 2006-07 were scrutinized in seven2 out of 25 divisions selected through

random sampling.

3.3.5 Audit Criteria

The criteria used for the performance audit were taken from the rules, regulations and

provisions in:

(i) Guidelines for Implementation of Rural Water Supply Programme (August 2000);

(ii) Guidelines on Swajaldhara (June 2003);

(iii) Guidelines on Survey of Drinking Water Supply Status in Rural Habitations (February 2003);

(iv) Guidelines for National Rural Drinking Water Quality Monitoring and Surveillance

Programmed (January 2006);

(v) National Water Policy (April 2002); and

(vi) Draft Project Report and Project Implementation Plan for individual schemes.


20

Audit Findings

3.3.14 Water quality

Sub mission projects on water quality are undertaken by the states for providing safe water to

the rural habitations facing water quality problems but no action in this regard was initiated.

3.3.14.1 Water testing labs

Water testing labs exist in Jagdalpur, Ambikapur, Korba and the newly constructed district lab

at Raipur is being used as a guest house.

No annual targets were fixed by the E-in-C for testing of water samples and the number of

samples taken for testing from the existing and the new sources in Jagdalpur, Korba and

Ambikapur remained very low.

As per ARWSP guidelines, 15 per cent of the allocation of ARWSP funds was to be

earmarked for taking up sub mission projects to supply safe drinking water to rural habitations

facing water quality problems like fluorosis, brackishness and presence of arsenic/iron etc. It

was observed in audit that the State Government allocated Rs 85 lakh on this sub-mission

(0.13 percentage of ARWSP and MNP allocation). The required institutional set up for testing

the quality of water was not set up from the State to the block level as per guidelines and no

IEC activities were taken up to spread awareness about water born diseases and quality of

water in the test checked districts. In Jagdalpur district, it was seen that there were 3,090

quality affected habitations with excess iron (above eight parts per million) in 2002-03. The

number of such habitations increased to 4,478 in 2006. This slip back would have been

avoided by taking up adequate sub-mission projects.

As per ARWSP guidelines, in the coverage of no source habitations, priority was to be given

for coverage of quality affected habitations with acute toxicity.

3.3.14.2 Field testing kits

Objective of field testing kit is to monitor quality of all drinking water sources at Gram

Panchayat (GP) level. According to National Rural Drinking Water Quality and Surveillance

Programme, one field test kit shall be provided for each GP. GOI released (February 2006) Rs

59.77 lakh for procuring such kits. It was however, observed that kits were not procured up to

March 2007 in Raipur, Jagdalpur and Ambikapur districts while 40 field testing kits purchased

during 2006-07 in Korba were yet to be distributed. The E-in-C, PHED stated (August 2007)

that the program is taken up in the current financial year to achieve the goal. The reply proves

that field testing kits were not procured up to March 2007.

3.3.15 Drinking water in rural schools

The position of number of schools without drinking water facilities, targets for coverage and

achievement is given below:

Field testing kits not procured up to March 2007.


21

Year Numbers of

schools

without

drinking water

facility

Target Achieve

ment

Closing

balance

of

Schools

without

drinking

water at

end of year

Difference

between opening and

closing of previous

year

2002-03

03

11,592 1,448 1,137 10,455 N.A.

2003-04 15,356 5,928 4,569 10,787 4,901

2004-05 11,046 4,500 3,511 7,535 259

2005-06 6,596 6,596 3,996 2,600 (-) 939

2006-07 2,600 3,798 3,301 (-)701 No difference

Incorrect reports sent to GOI regarding drinking water in rural schools

The tabulation shows wide variation between the closing balance (CB) of one year and the

opening balance (OB) of the subsequent years, except during 2006-07. In the last year, against

2,600 uncovered schools in 2006-07 the achievement was shown as 3,301 which was not

possible.

Similarly, test check of records in Ambikapur revealed that the number of schools without

drinking water facility were 1,679 in 2004-05, out of which 388 were covered during the year.

However the number of uncovered schools was shown to be 99 in 2005-06 and against 68

number of uncovered schools in 2006-07 the achievement during the year was shown as 243.

In Korba against 101 uncovered schools during 2006-07 the achievement was shown as 253.

Thus the figures appeared to be inaccurate and exact status of drinking water in schools could

not be verified.

The figures of achievement reported in progress reports were unreliable.

3.3.16 Monitoring

Vigilance and Monitoring Committees were to be formed at the State level and district level. It

was observed that such committees were not formed at the State level as well as four test

checked districts. No evaluation study was carried out on the implementation of the rural

water supply programme in the state during the last five years.

It was noticed from the records of PHE (E/M) division, Jagdalpur that during 2002-03 to

2006-07 total targets for drilling of tube wells were 1,725 against which achievement was

shown as 1,752 tube wells. The PHE civil Dn. Jagdalpur during consolidation of progress

reports, however, changed the targets and achievements as 1,746 and 1,531. Similarly PHE

(E/M) division, Ambikapur drilled 266 tubewells during the year 2006-07 and during

consolidation of progress report it was changed as 155 by the PHE (Civil) division

Ambikapur.

On being pointed out in audit E.E., PHE, Jagdalpur and Korba did not furnish specific reply

in regard to reduction in figures.

During the years 2005-06 and 2006-07, 256 dry tube wells (206 in Korba and 50 in

Ambikapur) in rural NC/PC area were converted to successful tube wells through hydro

fracturing process. Installation of hand pumps and allied civil works were also done. But the

successful tube wells were not shown in the progress report during above period.


22

On being pointed out in audit, EE, PHE division, Korba stated (June 2007) that the targets

will be revised, while EE, PHE division, Ambikapur stated that action would be taken. These

cases indicated that the progress was not being reported accurately by these divisions and

monitoring of actual situation using progress reports would be difficult.

3.3.17 Rig Management

Out of 48,609 tubewells drilled, 16,504 tube wells were drilled by the departmental machines

(mechanical divisions) while 32,105 tubewells were drilled by the civil divisions through

contractors. It is observed that the department was not able to fully utilize the departmental

rigs as there was a shortfall of 10.8 to 21.17 per cent against the targets during 2005-06 and

2006-07.

3.3.18. Swajaldhara

As of March 2007 only 210 Swajaldhara was launched in December 2002. It involved a

participatory and swajaldhara demand driven approach and guidelines provided upto 20 per

cent allocation of funds under ARWSP. It was seen that the allocation of GOI ranged from

completed. No scheme was proposed during 2004-07.. The State Government did not enter

into MOU with the GOI as mandated in the guidelines. Neither were the communication and

capacity development units set up at the district levels. During the year 2002-03 to 2006-07,

312 schemes were sanctioned in the State out of which 210 schemes have been completed as

of March 2007. Out of total available funds of Rs 5.28 crore (GOI-Rs 4.74 crore and Rs 53.99

lakh-community share) for 312 schemes, 33 per cent of the funds remained unutilized as of

March 2007. No swajaldhara scheme was proposed during 2004 to 2007.

Test check of records of 83 sanctioned schemes in four10 districts revealed the following

deficiencies:

• In 19 out of 28 schemes in Korba, the community contribution was less than 10 per cent.

• Accounts were not audited by the Chartered Accountants in three out of four districts upto

March 2007.

• In three out of four districts (Raipur, Jagdalpur and Korba) the unutilized amount was not

returned to GOI upto March 2007 despite instructions in August 2006.

• In Korba, electrification work in 22 out of 24 Piped Water Supply Scheme remained incomplete

since 2003-04.

• Water quality test, rain water harvesting and ground water recharge system were not executed

in all 83 schemes.

On being pointed out in audit EE, PHE, Ambikapur stated (June 2007) that the accounts

would be audited by July 2007 and EE, PHE, Korba stated (June 2007) audit would be done.

EE, PHE, Raipur did not furnish specific reply regarding audit.

3.3.19 Conclusion

Implementation of ARWSP in the state suffered from deficiencies. The annual action plans

did not prioritize coverage of habitations as per guidelines. There was huge increase in the

number of problem habitations in the survey of 2003 and slip back in fully covered


23

habitations. There was savings in the central share of the funds while allocations by the state

for O&M, source sustainability and quality remained low. Piped water supply schemes were

executed inefficiently and there were instances of extra cost, non adherence to mix design and

delays. Field testing kits had not been procured and the monitoring committees had not been

formed. There was incorrect reporting of figures by divisions and discrepancies existed in the

data furnished to GOI.

3.3.20 Recommendation

• Annual action plans should be prepared in accordance with the scheme guidelines for prioritizing

the works efficiently.

• Coverage of NC habitations should be given priority in accordance with scheme guidelines.

• District level targets should be fixed to monitor quality of water and field testing kits be provided

to the functionaries.

• Works should be executed as per approved specification so as to avoid cost escalation.

Audit of Water Management System in Delhi

Delhi Jal Board (DJB) constituted under Delhi Jal Board Act 1998, is responsible for supply

and distribution of potable water to the inhabitants of National Capital Territory (NCT) of

Delhi. DJB receives raw water, mainly from Yamuna river, Bhakhra - Beas storage and upper

Ganga canal. Such raw water is received at the water treatment plants (WTPs) of DJB situated

at Chandrawal, Wazirabad, Bhagirathi, Haiderpur, Nangloi, Sonia Vihar and Bawana (not in

operation). The capacity of the water treatment plants is 710 million gallon per day (MGD).

The performance audit of the water management system in Delhi covers the period from

2002-03 to 2006-07.

Summary of recommendations

• In view of the serious problem of water shortage in Delhi, DJB may ensure that various plan

projects for augmentation of water production and supply are progressed and completed on time

through effective planning and implementation.

• The projects related to rationalization of water distribution may be executed promptly for

ensuring equitable distribution of available water.

• The system of plugging leakages may be strengthened with a view to minimizing wastages and

loss of revenue on account of non-revenue water. The specialized leak detection equipment may

be procured early.

• Effective steps may be taken to improve the quality of drinking water by adopting better quality

control methods and sustained monitoring in order to ensure that water being supplied is potable

and conforms to the standards prescribed by the Government. DJB may take effective steps to


24

minimize the number of unmetered connections to facilitate billing and revenue collection on

actual water consumption basis. The revenue collection machinery may be revamped and efforts

may be made to reduce the arrears of outstanding water charges.

3.1 Introduction

Delhi Jal Board (DJB) constituted under Delhi Jal Board Act 1998 is responsible for the

supply and distribution of potable water to the inhabitants of National Capital Territory

(NCT) of Delhi. The Water Treatment Plants (WTPs) situated at Chandrawal, Wazirabad,

Bhagirathi, Haiderpur, Nangloi, Bawana and Sonia Vihar with installed capacity of 710 MGD

receive raw water mainly from Yamuna river, Bhakhra - Beas storage and Upper Ganga

canal. In addition, 100 MGD of ground water is lifted through various ranney wells and tube

wells. DJB provides 780 MGD against the requirement of 1050 MGD of water due to

shortage of raw water.

DJB supplies water in bulk to New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) and Delhi Cantonment

Board (DCB). These agencies look after the distribution and supply of water to inhabitants

residing within their areas. There were 16 lakh water connections in MCD area of Delhi as of

March 2007.

The main functions of the Board pertaining to water management were to:

(i) Treat, supply and distribute water for household consumption or other purposes to those parts of

Delhi where there are houses, whether through pipes or by other means;

(ii) Regulate and manage the exploitation of ground water in Delhi in consultation with Central

Ground Water Authority;

(iii) Promote measures for conservation, recycling and re-use of water; and

(iv) Make provisions for un-filtered water supply.

3.2 Organizational set up

DJB functions under the Chairpersonship of the Chief Minister of the State and is assisted by

a Vice Chairperson who is nominated by the Speaker of the Legislature and 16 other members

consisting of 10 political and ex-officio members and six administrative/executive members.

Member (Water) heads the Engineering wing for water activities which is under the overall

control of Chief Executive Officer (CEO). He is assisted by Chief Engineers/Superintending

Engineers/Executive Engineers.

3.3 Scope of audit

The performance audit was conducted between April and August 2007, covering the period

2002-03 to 2006-07, through scrutiny of records at DJB Headquarters, WTPs/Booster

Pumping Stations, water construction/maintenance divisions and Zonal Revenue Officers.

The performance audit examined inter alia the progress of various plan schemes undertaken

by the Government of NCT of Delhi to improve the water supply situation in Delhi, initiatives

taken to conserve water as well as to improve the quality of water and the system of

assessment and collection of revenue.

3.4 Audit methodology


25

The audit methodology included:

• Selection of 27 out of 53 construction/maintenance divisions, 13 Zonal Revenue Officers (ZROs)

out of 25 and all nine water treatment plants. The selection was done by picking up the units

which were listed at even numbers from the list of offices.

• Ascertaining public perception regarding the functioning of DJB by circulating a questionnaire to

487 number of Residential Welfare Associations (RWAs) chosen at random out of 1100 number

of RWAs registered with „Bhagidari Cell‟ Government of NCT of Delhi.

• Seeking views of the DJB on the preliminary audit findings.

• Formulation of observations and make recommendations on the basis of the views and

comments of the DJB.

3.5 Audit objectives

The objectives of the audit were to verify whether:

• DJB ensured adequate supply of water to different parts of the city as per norms prescribed by the

Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India in terms of per capita supply.

• Various schemes undertaken to augment water supply were being implemented in a planned and

efficient manner.

• There was equitable distribution of water to different areas and the ancillary projects planned to

rationalise the water supply have been implemented timely.

• The leakage detection and its management was efficient and ensured prompt repair of

transmission and distribution network to minimise the loss of water.

• Effective action is taken to minimise loss of revenue on account of unmetered connections,

defective meters and theft of water etc.

• The quality of potable water at treatment plants, reservoirs and that being supplied to households

was as per norms; and

• Prompt action was taken to address the problems of the customers for ensuring better customer

satisfaction.

3.6 Audit criteria

The audit criteria used in the performance audit included:

• strategic goals and objectives, the targets to be achieved by the DJB for capacity building to

ensure sustainable water supply services;

• provision contained in the DJB Act, 1998 and plan documents;

• quality of water as per prescribed standards; and

• system of assessment and collection of revenue.

Audit Findings

Water is a prime national resource, a basic human need and a precious national asset. High

rate of urbanization and population growth in metropolitan cities in India including Delhi

have laid tremendous stress on drinking water supply systems. Growth process and expansion

of economic activities inevitably led to increasing demands for water for diverse purposes;

domestic, industrial, agricultural, recreation etc. The nation’s capital is perpetually in the grip

of a water crisis due to increasing gap between demand and supply.


26

To provide potable water supply at reasonable economic price to the satisfaction of the

habitants of NCT of Delhi is the mission of DJB. A memorandum was signed each year

between the Board and Government of NCT of Delhi with assurance of reduction in non-

revenue water, reduction of operating losses, replacement of defective meters, metering of un-

metered connections, augmentation of water supply by constructing various underground

reservoirs and construction, completion and commissioning of Sonia Vihar WTP with all

ancillary works on due date. Improvement of collection efficiency was a matter of utmost

concern. DJB failed in many of these areas as reflected in succeeding paragraphs.

3.7 Consultative Mechanism

As per Section 8 of DJB Act, 1998, the Government may constitute a Water Consultative

Council with the object:

• to advise the Board on policy matters and formulation of annual and five years plans;

• to give expert advice on administrative, financial and technical matters;

advise the Board on matter pertaining to the interest of consumers and issues affecting the

environment ; and

• to advise the Board on any matter on which the Board seeks its advice.

• The Council was constituted in August 1998 but no meeting was ever held as of August 2007.

This defeated the very purpose for which the Council was set up.

3.8 Water requirement, production and shortfall

The production capacity of water in Delhi during Tenth Plan period was 780 million gallon

per day (MGD) against the requirement of 1050 MGD (based on a norm of 60 gallon per

capita per day as per Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India norms prescribed

in the Master Plan of Delhi 2001), thus, leaving a wide demand-supply gap of 270 MGD. The

trends in the projected requirement, actual production and shortfall in supply of water during

Seventh to Tenth five year Plan were as given in the table below:

Table 3.1: Requirement viz-a-viz production of water

Five year

plan

Population

in lakh

Requirement* of

water in MGD

Production of

water in MGD

Shortfall Percentage

shortfall

7th (1985-

90)

94 658 437** 221 33.59

8th (1992-

97)

110 770 580 190 24.68

9th (1997-

02)

138 966 650 316 32.71

10th (2002-

07)

176 1050 780 270 25.71


27

Due to increasing urbanisation and population growth in Delhi, requirement of potable water

increased significantly from 658 MGD in Seventh Plan to 1050 MGD in Tenth Plan

registering a growth of 60 per cent.

DJB has not been able to keep pace with the rapid urbanization of the city. The water supply

infrastructure has failed to match the demand. Despite Government efforts to improve

production of potable water, the demand and supply gap persists in the range of about 25 to 34

per cent. Against the requirement of producing additional quantity of 400 MGD during Tenth

Plan to fully meet the projected requirement, DJB could increase production by only 130

MGD of water during this period. The percentage shortfall came down by seven per cent

during Tenth Plan mainly on account of increase in the production capacity (130 MGD) and

downward revision in water supply norms from 70 gallon per capita daily in Ninth Plan to 60

gallon per capita daily in Tenth Plan. Persisting shortfalls in production of potable water led to

significantly reduced supply of water to the residents of national capital at an average rate of

44 gallon per capita per day against the reduced norm of 60 gallon per capita per day. As per

Government‟s own admission, per capita water supply in different parts of the city is not

uniform indicating that certain areas of Delhi are severely affected by water supply shortage

and are getting supply much below the average rate of 44 gallon per capita per day.

3.9 Projects for augmenting water production and supply

DJB planned various schemes to increase production and improve supply of potable drinking

water to the inhabitants of Delhi. The major schemes identified for implementation during the

Tenth five year Plan were:

• Construction of 140 MGD WTP at Sonia Vihar for augmentation of water in Delhi;

• Recycling of waste water at Wazirabad, Chandrawal, Haiderpur and Bhagirathi for producing 45

MGD of safe potable water;

• Construction of Under Ground Reservoirs (UGRs) and Booster Pumping Stations (BPSs) all

over Delhi for rationalization and better distribution of water; and

• Renovation of Chandrawal water works.

An audit appraisal revealed that huge demand and supply gap persisted during Tenth Plan due

to delay in operationalisation of the Sonia Vihar WTP, non-completion of allied works of this

plant, delay in construction of re-cycling plants, delay in construction of UGRs and BPSs, lack

of planning to regulate and manage the exploration of ground water, and improper

management of leakages. The details of slippages in implementation of these projects are

discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

3.9.1 Sonia Vihar Water Treatment Plant

DJB constructed a 140 MGD WTP at Sonia Vihar in December 2004 at a cost of Rs. 188.80

crore to cater to the water requirement of the Trans Yamuna area as well as South Delhi.

Twenty three UGRs were also required to be constructed at an estimated cost of Rs. 194 crore

for the distribution of potable water that came out of the WTP. Out of 140 MGD, 90 MGD

water was to be allocated to South Delhi, 35 MGD to Tahirpur and 15 MGD to Shastri Park.

Audit scrutiny of the records revealed the following:


28

(i) The Sonia Vihar WTP was to become fully operational by December 2003. Though the

construction of the treatment plant was completed in December 2004, the plant could not be

made fully functional due to non-availability of raw water from Tehri Dam. The plant started

functioning only in June 2007 after the Government of Uttar Pradesh released 140 MGD raw

water for the plant. Thus, the projected augmentation of 140 MGD through Sonia Vihar

treatment plant could not be achieved during Tenth Plan due to delayed operationalisation of

the plant.

(ii) Though the plant has since become fully operational in June 2007, the plant is not

functioning at its full capacity due to non-construction of reservoirs and peripheral lines. Out

of 28 UGRs, only 10 UGRs have so far been commissioned as of August 2007. Due to non-

completion of the UGRs, the plant is treating only 112 to 119 MGD of water.

Thus, water supply to the residents of South Delhi, Tahirpur and Shastri Park was affected

due to delayed operationalisation of the plant and delay in completion of anciliary and

peripheral works.

Department stated (November 2007) that full supply of raw water from Tehri to plant was

available only during Monsoon Season and could utilize about 120 MGD. The reply of the

Department confirms the audit observation that the plant is not operating to its full capacity

even after four years of the original scheduled date of completion.

3.9.2 Recycling of waste water

During the course of treatment of raw water at WTPs, 8-10 per cent water goes waste due to

back wash of filters and the clarifloculators. In view of the scarcity of raw water, DJB

proposed to recycle waste water of existing WTPs of Haiderpur, Wazirabad, Bhagirathi and

Chandrawal to produce 45 MGD potable water. The status of creation of facilities for

recycling in these plants was as under:

Name of

recycling

plant

Date of

resolution

passed by the

Board

Date of

award

of

work

Tendered

amount

(Rs. in

crore)

Stipulated

date of

completion

Latest

position

Bhagirath(10 MGD)

27.07.99 at Rs. 6.18 crore

09.08.2005 13.34 14.10.2006 Work-in-progress

Wazirabad (11 MGD)

03.06.1999 Rs. 6.86 crore

December 2005

2780 14.04.2007 Only 40

per cent completed

Haiderpur (16 MGD)

24.09.1999 Rs. 10.44 Crore

23.09.2005 26.59 06.04.2007 Not yet commissioned

Chandrawal (8 MGD)

28.01.2005 Rs.14.66 crore

28.02.2007 12.86 28.06.2008 Work-in-progress


29

Despite the need for establishing recycling facilities being felt and accepted as early as 1999,

the DJB took six years in awarding the work for construction of these facilities at

Bhagirathi,Wazirabad and Haiderpur which led to enhancement in the project cost of first

three plants from Rs. 23.48 crore to Rs.67.73 crore (188 per cent). The Board also failed to

ensure completion of work on the three recycling WTPs by the stipulated dates. On account of

these delays, residents of Delhi were deprived of additional quantity of 37 MGD of water.

Department stated (November 2007) that there was a delay of three-four years in finalizing the

appropriate technical design and obtaining the views of evaluation committee.

The reply of the Department is not acceptable, as the entire project was to be implemented

during Tenth Plan to meet serious water shortages in Delhi and, therefore, technical design

should have been finalized and evaluated in a time bound manner.

3.9.3 Rationalization of water distribution and construction of more UGRs/BPSs

There is inequitable supply of water in different parts of city, as a result, some parts of Delhi

for example the Northern Zone receives far more water supply than the South Zone. Since

there was also significant mismatch between demand and supply of water, rational

distribution of the water that was available, was one of the priorities of the DJB to minimize

imbalance and improve customer satisfaction in affected areas. DJB engaged a consultant to

recommend the most appropriate arrangement required for rationalization of water

distribution. The study recommended construction of additional reservoirs and booster

pumping stations in West, North-West and South-West Delhi. On the basis of study

conducted by the consultant, DJB passed a resolution in July 2004 for the construction of 14

UGRs and BPS at different locations in Delhi at an estimated cost of Rs. 263 crore.

Audit analysed the progress achieved in construction of UGRs and observed that the work at

most of the locations has still not commenced. The status of construction of the reservoirs is

indicated in the table below:

Sl.

No

Name of

the

UGR‟s

Proposed

Capacity

(in

million

litres)

Date of award of

work

Tendered

amount

Rs. in

crore)

Stipulated

date of

completi

on

Position of

construction UGRs

as of August 2007

1. Nangloi

(Nilothi)

52.5 24.08.2006 43.00 10.03.2008 Work in progress

(physical progress

70% and financial

progress

60%) 2. Kirti

Nagar

20.9 15.02.2006 10.76 15.05.2007 Work in progress

(physical progress

65%

and financial

progress

50%)-


30

3. Pitampura 21.4 Work yet to be

awarded (Tender

opened on

17.08.2007)

- - Work not yet started

4. Awantika 20.0 - Work not

yet

awarde

ded.

- Work not yet started.

5. Qutub garh 7.8 Letter of intent to

be issued

- Work not yet

awarded

6. Janakpuri 15.5 -do- - - Work not yet

awarded

7. Daulatpur 5.2 25.06.2007 5.31 24.09.2008 Work in progress

8. Rohini,

Sector -7

20.5 Work not yet

awarded

- - Land has been

allotted

by DDA. Work

of construction

yet to commence

9. Karala 24.3 Work not

yet

awarded

- - The land is yet to

be

acquired 10. Sultanpur

Dabas

5.0 02.03.2006 4.21 01.03.2007 Work in progress

(Physical progress

25% and financial

progress

10 %). 11. Bawana 27.1 17.07.2007 15.00 16.01.2009 Work yet to be started.

12. Shakur

Basti

23.6 Work not

yet

awarded

- - Land yet to be allotted

by DDA

13 MBR at

Palla

48.9 Yet to be tendered - - Work yet to

commence.

14 Narela 5.8 Yet to be tendered Work yet to

commence.

After three years of passing of resolution by the Board to construct 14 UGRs, work had not

commenced on 10 UGRs as of August 2007. In two cases of construction of UGRs at Kirti

Nagar and Sultanpur Dabas, the work was to be completed by March 2007 and May 2007

respectively. However, the progress of work at these locations was extremely slow and so far

only 25 per cent and 65 per cent physical progress had been achieved respectively. In the

remaining two cases of UGRs at Nangloi and Daulatpur, the works are scheduled to be

completed in 2008. Thus, there were significant delays in commencement and completion of

UGRs at different locations in Delhi which delayed the rationalization of water distribution in

different parts of Delhi.

Department stated (November 2007) that there was no delay in the construction of the UGRs

as no specific time line was given for the construction. The Department added that these

UGRs were not required to be built immediately as their construction was to be synchronized

with the availability of water. The reply is not acceptable as (i) two works planned for

completion by May 2007 are far behind schedule, and (ii) timely commencement and

completion of other UGRs would have facilitated rationalized distribution of water already

available.

3.9.4 Renovation of Chandrawal water treatment plant


31

The erstwhile Delhi Water Supplies and Sewerage Disposal Undertaking had approved a

scheme of renovation of Chandrawal water works in February 1988 at a cost of Rs. 1.85 crore.

Subsequently, an estimate of Rs. 3.80 crore was also approved in August 2000 for renovation

of 20 old patersons and 10 Jessop make filters at Chandrawal water works. The CEO, DJB

decided to club both the estimates into a single scheme in March 2002. The tenders were

invited in August, 2005. Audit examination, however, disclosed that the tenders were yet to be

finalized as of August 2007. One of the reasons that was holding up finalization of the tenders

was non- review of the estimates which were framed in 1988. Despite approval of the

renovation work as early as 1988, the actual award and execution of work has been delayed

for about 20 years. Delay in carrying out necessary renovation and replacement of filters

would affect cost-effectiveness and efficiency of operations of the plant.

Executive Engineer (E&M) stated in September 2007 that delay in finalisation of renovation

work has led to deterioration of the condition of the plant to such an extent that no repair was

possible except for its complete replacement. EE further stated that DJB was incurring

substantial expenditure on maintenance of old filter media and the efficiency of the units had

drastically reduced. To maintain the supply, extra labour was required. If the implementation

was delayed further, the units might totally collapse leading to reduction in filtering capacity

and, thus, the production.

The reply of the EE supports the audit contention that the Department has not shown any

urgency in carrying out necessary renovation and repair work at the plant.

Recommendations

(i) Given the serious problem of water shortage in Delhi, the Board should ensure that various

plan projects for augmentation of water production and supply are progressed and completed

on time through effective planning, designing, tendering, execution and monitoring.

(ii) The projects identified and undertaken for rationalisation of water distribution may be

executed promptly for equitable distribution of available water.

3.10 Replacement of old distribution lines

The water distribution system in Delhi is more than a century old. Since some of the mains

are very old, replacement work of 797 km of water mains was carried out in the Ninth Plan.

Government of NCT of Delhi proposed a target of 1500 km replacement of old distribution

lines during the Tenth Plan. The Department fixed annual targets and achievements.

Audit scrutiny revealed that against the target of replacement of 1500 km old distribution lines

in the Tenth Plan, DJB fixed a target of 1147 km only (76 per cent). DJB could replace only

1125 km of the distribution line against this target. However, it seen in the context of the

overall target of the Tenth Plan (1500 km), the shortfall in achievement of target was 25 per

cent.

Further, while DJB‟s performance was lagging during the first three years of the Tenth Plan, it

over shot the target during the next two years of the Plan period, indicating that the annual

targets in the Tenth Plan were not set rationally.

3.11 Leak detection management


32

Leak detection and its management is very vital for any water utility as it results in substantial

saving of water that would have otherwise gone waste. It also helps ensuring supply of quality

water to the end users by controlling contamination in the distribution system. The

distribution net work of DJB is divided into different operating zones, each headed by an

officer of the rank of the Executive Engineer. Leakages are detected through

patrolling/surveying of trunk transmission mains and distribution networks by the

Departmental staff of Leak Detection Cell and various maintenance divisions (operating

Zones). The maintenance divisions are required to undertake repair work as soon as the leak is

detected. DJB has also set up central control room to receive complaints from the public

regarding water leakages. Appropriate follow up action is required to be taken by the

operating zones on receipt of such complaints.

An audit appraisal of leak management in DJB revealed the following:

3.11.1 Loss due to leakages and theft

As per Economic Survey of Delhi of 2005-06, the total distribution losses, which include

leakage in pipes and theft of water through unauthorized connections, was of the order of 40

per cent of the total water supply. This was abnormally high not only in comparison to the

acceptable norm of 15 per cent prescribed by the Ministry of Urban Development but also

quite high as compared to 10 to 20 per cent level of distribution losses in developing countries.

Efficient leak management can help address the problem of water shortage in Delhi to a

significant extent. 3.11.2 Lack of monitoring Leak Detection Cell of DJB conducts surveys of

transmission and distribution lines for detection of leaks and reports the leakages to the zones

concerned for immediate repair/corrective action. The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor

General of India for the year ended March 1997 had pointed out lack of feed back mechanism

in DJB for monitoring action taken by the respective zones for prompt plugging of leaks after

being reported by the Cell. Superintendent Engineer (P) Water confirmed (March 2007) that

the Cell did not get action taken reports from respective operating zones on regular basis

indicating that no significant improvement had taken place in detection and management of

leak, its control and follow up despite being pointed out by Audit. Department stated

(November 2007) that instructions have been issued to the staff for submission of timely action

taken reports in leak cases.

3.11.3 Delays in plugging leakages

The number of leakages detected by Leak Detection Cell during 2002-07 varied between 233

and 973. The number of leakages detected during 2006-07 was 822. Audit analysis of delay in

plugging leaks for the selected year of 2006-07 disclosed that:

(a) 101 leaks (12 per cent) remained unplugged as of March 2007. The period of pendency of

these leaks ranged between eight to 268 days. The Department in their reply (November 2007)

stated that leaks were plugged timely but due to delay in receipt of feed back from the

concerned divisions regarding repairing these leakages, the number of leakages non attended

appeared to be high. After being pointed out in audit, Department issued instructions for

timely submission of action taken reports (ATR) in leak cases. The reply of the Department

confirms the audit observation that no regular monitoring of leak cases is carried out to ensure


33

that zones concerned have taken timely action to repair the transmission and distribution

lines.

(b) Out of 721 leaks which were plugged in 2006-07, there were significant delays in 131 cases

(18 per cent) ranging upto 120 days or more as is shown in the table below:

Sl. No. Number of leaks Delay in plugging leaks

(beyond seven days)

1. 64 Upto 30 days

2. 39 30 to 90 days

3. 13 90 to 120 days

4. 15 Above 120 days

Delay in repairing of leakages resulted in estimated loss of 84 million gallon of water valuing

Rs.21.79 lakh for the year 2006-07.

3.11.4 Obsolete equipment

Efficient detection and management of leakage especially in underground water pipes would

require proper equipment for timely detection of leaks. Audit scrutiny of equipment inventory

of Leak Detection Cell of DJB disclosed that out of 92 leak detection equipment procured

during 1987-2000, only 12 equipment (13 per cent) were functional as of August 2007. Non-

availability of proper equipment with the Cell is bound to affect its capability to detect leaks

promptly in underground transmission network.

Audit examination further revealed that tenders were invited in June 2005 for the purchase of

41 leak detection equipment on the basis of report of a consultant submitted to the Board in

February 2005. The board awarded the work for the supply of specialized equipment at a cost

of Rs. 47.24 lakh in October 2006. The equipment required to be supplied by the firm by

August 2007 were awaited as of November 2007.

3.11.5 Delay in finalization of scheme for prevention of water wastage

The Board approved a scheme in October 1999 for study of unaccounted flow and prevention

of water wastage in Delhi at a cost of Rs.1.97 crore. It was after seven years that the Board

invited expression of interest in October 2006 and awarded work in July 2007 at a cost of

Rs.1.11 crore plus service tax and education cess. Thus, there was a delay of more than seven

years in initiating concrete action on the scheme for prevention of water wastages in Delhi

which highlights inefficiency of the leakage management system.

Recommendations

(i) Board may put in place an efficient computerized leakages monitoring system to ensure

that leakages in the transmission and distribution system are repaired by the respective zones

promptly within the time norms prescribed by the Board to minimize wastage of water and

loss of revenue.

(ii) The leakage detection infrastructure may be modernized and strengthened for quick

detection of leaks with the help of specialized equipment.

3.12 Quality control mechanism

3.12.1 Testing of alum used in treatment of water


34

Alum-Ferric (alum)/Poly-Aluminum Chloride (PAC), which are chemical coagulant, are used

in the treatment process of water in WTPs. DJB purchases alum and PAC centrally through

open tender for utilization at all WTPs. As per provision of the contract agreement, the

Department was required to get the samples of alum/PAC picked up at random and tested at

the National Physical Laboratory (NPL), New Delhi once in a month in the presence of the

officials of Director General Supplies and Disposal (DGS&D), firm‟s representatives and

DJB. Audit scrutiny revealed that only 13 samples were lifted during 2004-07 of which, seven

samples (54 per cent) did not conform to I.S. specification. By the time the test results were

received from NPL, the substandard alum/PAC had already been utilized during the course

of treatment process of potable water. Thus, there was no mechanism which assured DJB

about the purity and effectiveness of the chemicals before they were actually used in water

treatment. Use of untested chemicals for treatment of water may seriously compromise the

quality standards of water supplied to the residents of Delhi. Audit also observed that DJB did

not test alum/PAC in its own laboratories stationed at various water works, which were

equipped with required 14 instruments and chemicals for testing alum and PAC. Department

in their reply has confirmed that in cases where the samples tested by N.P.L. fails the test, the

material cannot be traced as it gets mixed with other supplies and consumed at the plant. The

Department further stated that to avoid the controversy between Department and DGS & D,

the system of third party test was introduced and testing by DJB was suspended.

3.12.2 Inadequate monitoring of water quality

DJB is expected to ensure that water supplied to the residents of NCT of Delhi is potable and

conforms to the standards prescribed by Bureau of Indian Standards, Government of India.

DJB has set up six water testing laboratories all over Delhi to check the quality of drinking

water being supplied. If the water samples are found unfit for drinking, reasons of

contamination are required to be investigated and the zonal maintenance staff has the

responsibility to rectify the problem immediately.

Audit examination disclosed that the number of samples found unsatisfactory has increased

considerably during last four years from 0.73 per cent in 2002-03 to 2.85 per cent in 2005-06

and 1.88 per cent in 2006-07. Details of samples tested and found unsatisfactory during 2002-

07 are in the table below:

Table 3.6: Samples found unsatisfactory

Year No. of

samples

taken

Samples found

unsatisfactory

% of samples found

unsatisfactory

2002-

03

103797 757 0

.

7

3 2003-

04

103842 776 0

.

7

5 2004-

05

113384 3201 2

.

8

2


35

2005-

06

104532 2982 2

.

8

5 2006-

07

110928 2090 1

.

8

8 The data is furnished by Director, Quality Control, DJB.

Scrutiny of records in the office of Director, Quality Control indicated that out of 2090

unsatisfactory samples reported during 2006-07, no ATRs were received in the Directorate in

respect of 1874 (90 per cent) unsatisfactory samples as of March 2007.

The Department stated (November 2007) that wherever unsatisfactory reports were received,

corrective action was taken within 24 hours but sometimes delays occurred due to

communication gap between the field officers and quality control.

Recommendations

(i) Appropriate mechanism should be put in place to ensure that adequate numbers of samples are

taken from all supplies received, for testing at NPL/departmental labs. DJB should ensure that

chemicals that have not been quality tested should not be used for purification of water in its

treatment plants.

(ii) DJB may take effective steps to improve quality of drinking water supplied to the residents of

Delhi by adopting better quality control procedures and mechanism at treatment plants and in

the transmission and distribution network.

3.13 Distribution of water

Supply of water from WTPs is shared among NDMC, DCB and MCD areas. It was noticed

that there was no metering system in MCD area to ascertain actual bulk supply of water to

each zone for distribution to consumers. Availability of water was assessed on capacity of

water lines. Besides, there was no co-ordination between distribution zones and their zonal

revenue officers to compare the quantity of water billed with quantity of water supplied.

Hence, audit was unable to ascertain zone-wise distribution losses. The Department stated

(November 2007) that DJB was planning to install the bulk meters in distribution system and

execution was expected by October 2008.

Recommendation

• Necessary steps may be taken for zone-wise metering of water distribution and collection of

revenue for effective monitoring of water losses and detection of revenue leakages.

3.16 Management of ground water

DJB, being the nodal agency for supply of water in Delhi, is expected to have comprehensive

data on the ground water potential and a plan/policy to regulate exploitation of ground water

in Delhi. Audit observed that as of November 2007, there was no policy in place to manage

ground water or regulate its exploitation. The Board was not aware of the quantity of ground

water being explored authorisedly and unauthorisedly. This indicates Board‟s failure to keep

watch over the exploration of ground water in Delhi.


36

DJB approved “Delhi Water Board Amendment Act, 2002” vide a resolution in May 2002 to

control, regulate and manage ground water. Later on, “Delhi Water Board Amendment Bill

2006”, to regulate and control the use of ground water in NCT Delhi, was put up for approval

of Board incorporating salient features of model bill circulated by Government of India in

2005. No legislation has been introduced or approved till date. The Department stated

(November 2007) that the bill has been approved by Delhi Cabinet and proposed to be placed

before Assembly shortly.

3.16.1 Rain water Harvesting

Rain water harvesting is a simple economical and eco-friendly technique of preserving water.

It is also an effective way of recharging ground water. Delhi Government approved a scheme

for “Setting up of Water Mission and use of new technologies for conservation, harvesting and

recycling of water” for implementation during Tenth five year Plan. Under the scheme,

financial assistance is given to Resident Welfare Associations/Group Housing Societies/

Schools etc., to a maximum of Rs.50,000 or 50 per cent of the cost of rain water harvesting

system, whichever is less. The maximum limit was increased to Rs. One lakh with effect from

02 February 2007. DJB has given financial assistance of Rs. 51.19 lakh in 108 cases during

February 2003 to March 2007. As per terms and conditions of agreement, the party receiving

the financial assistance was required to submit a report with regard to maintenance of rain

water harvesting system every six months–one before the onset of monsoon and one after the

monsoon was over. Further, the officials of DJB were required to carry out random inspection

of the rain water harvesting system to ensure that the system was properly maintained. In case

of default in the maintenance of the system, the entire amount paid as assistance was to be

recovered from the institution/party.

Audit scrutiny revealed that Department did not enforce the conditions of the agreement.

Consequently, during 2002-07, in 97 out of 108 cases (90 per cent) no maintenance reports

were received from the parties concerned. Only seven inspections (six per cent) were carried

out by the Department. In all the seven cases, the Department found the system either muddy,

silted or only partially functional. Agreeing with the Audit view, Department proposed

(November 2007) 100 per cent inspection of beneficiaries of rain water harvesting assistance

instead of present 25 per cent checking of beneficiaries for the proper maintenance of the

system.

Recommendation

• DJB may formulate a comprehensive policy/ plan for regulating ground water exploitation in

Delhi by authorized and unauthorized sources. Department may carry out periodical inspection

of the Rain Water Harvesting Systems where the financial assistance has been granted to

different beneficiaries/organizations.

3.17 Public perception regarding water supplied by DJB

To ascertain the level of public satisfaction on the quality of services provided by DJB, Audit

obtained a list of RWAs from the Government of NCT of Delhi maintained under the

Bhagidari Scheme. A detailed questionnaire was sent to randomly selected 485 RWAs out of

about 1100 registered RWAs in Delhi. The questions sought information on the number of

hours water was available, sufficiency of water, adequacy of pressure and whether it could


37

reach upper floor without assistance of a pump, quality of water supplied, the complaint

redressal mechanism and public awareness regarding execution of work done by the DJB.

Response was received from 113 RWAs which is tabulated as under:

Table 3.13: Public perception

Audit Questions RWAs response

Availability of water

40 per cent stated that they received water supply for less than 2 hours in a day

48 per cent received water for two to four hours a day

12 per cent received water for more than five hours a day

Sufficiency of water

37 per cent respondents stated that they received sufficient water

63 per cent did not have sufficient water

Quality of waters

67 per cent respondents found the water worthy for drinking

33 per cent respondents found it unfit for drinking

Complaints

44 per cent respondents were satisfied with the complaint redressal mechanism

41 per cent were not satisfied with the redressal of complaints and

15 per cent did not comment.

The responses received from RWAs indicated high level of dis-satisfaction both in terms of

sufficiency and quality of water supplied. The complaint redressal was also poor and the

duration of water supply in different parts of Delhi was highly skewed.

Recommendation

• The Board may strengthen the existing mechanism for settlement of complaints through

computerized registration and effective monitoring for timely redressal of grievances in a

satisfactory manner.

3.18 Follow up action on previous Audit Report

A performance appraisal on “Water Supply System in MCD” featured in the Report of the

Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year ended March 1997. The report had

pointed out the shortage of 20 gallons per capita demand daily, poor quality of water, losses

on account of free water supply to large category of consumers, unmetered water supply,

supply of water to consumers with defective meters, very high distribution losses largely on

account of absence of metering system and large uncollected water charges.

While forwarding the Action Taken Note, the Department assured (November 2005) to

reduce the arrear of water charges by fixing targets for collection of arrears in every zone,

setting up site recovery camps and arranging additional cash counters for collection of

revenue. DJB also mentioned that it had now permitted the consumers to purchase and install

their own meters in replacement of defective meters and bulk water meters were being

installed at WTPs in Haiderpur and Gokulpuri for measurement of water being issued for

distribution.


38

The current performance audit findings, however, indicate that no effective action has been

taken on the previous recommendations contained in the Audit Report for the year ended

March 1997.

3.19 Conclusion

DJB has been struggling to cope with the increasing demand for water supply. Most of its

projects for augmentation of water production capacity and rationalization of water

distribution in different parts of Delhi have fallen behind schedule compounding the problem

of water shortage in the National Capital. The leak detection management system is inefficient

and results in loss of substantial water from the transmission and distribution network. More

than 50 per cent of the water supplied does not fetch any revenue for the Government and the

satisfaction level of Resident Welfare Associations about the quantity and quality of water

supplied is very low. DJB has not formulated any comprehensive policy or plan for regulating

exploitation of ground water in Delhi. The projects for recycling of waste water have also not

been commissioned as planned. We would encourage the management to address these core

issues in the coming years.

Performance Audit of Imphal water supply scheme, Manipur

Highlights

The state government failed to formulate its state Water Policy as envisaged in the National

Water Policy, 2002 leading to an absence of policy initiatives and directives. Baseline survey

for assessing actual requirement of potable water and preservation of water resources had

never been conducted. Contamination of water was prevalent due to inadequate and

ineffective water treatment, leakages and unauthorized diversions. Improvement and

augmentation works could not be executed in a timely manner. Non-revision of water tariff

and laxity in revenue collection led to revenue realized and O&M costs. Supply of quality

drinking water could not be ensured due to lack of effective quality control mechanism.

3.2.1 Introduction

The Public Health

Engineering

Department (PHED)

is responsible for

ensuring sufficient

supply of clean and

safe drinking water

to all consumers of

the Imphal city and

nine other districts of

the State. This

primarily involves

developing strategies

for meeting the


39

demand of the ever-increasing population, planning and implementation of new water supply

schemes by adopting scientific techniques, proper maintenance of the existing water supply

system, besides timely revision of water tariff and generation of revenue with effective

mechanism of collection. The Imphal Water Supply Scheme (IWSS) consists of mainly two

components – augmentation of water supply to the city and improvement of the existing

system.

3.2.2 Organizational set up

The Commissioner (PHED) is the administrative head of the Department and the Chief

Engineer (CE), PHED, is the executive and technical head. The responsibility for all the

activities relating to IWSS vests with the CE who is assisted by an Additional Chief Engineer,

two Superintending Engineers (SEs) and five Executive Engineers (EEs) as shown in the

adjoining.

3.2.3 Scope of audit

Performance review of the IWSS was carried out during April to June 2007 and covered the

offices of the CE and four EEs for the period 2002-07.


The objectives of the performance review were to assess whether:

• the scheme achieved the objective of providing sufficient quantity of safe drinking water to the

targeted population;

• the financial management of the implementation of the scheme was efficient;

• planning and implementation of the scheme including policy formulation were done as required

under the scheme;

• operation and maintenance of water supply was effective;

• quality of water supplied was of acceptable standard; and

• there was effective monitoring and evaluation system in place.


The criteria benchmarked for achieving the audit objectives were:

• Targets and milestones set in the policy pronouncements;

• Scale of water requirement per consumer;

• Treatment norms for ensuring quality; and

• Codal provisions for execution of works.

3.2.6 Audit methodology

Audit methodology included holding of an entry conference (April 2007) with the Officers of

the Department, checking of records, documents of the selected Divisions and analysis of data


40

and documentary evidence on the basis of audit criteria to arrive at audit findings, conclusions

and recommendations. Audit also carried out a consumer survey to gauge the extent of

provision of potable drinking water to the people.

Audit findings were discussed with the Departmental authorities in an exit conference

(September 2007). The replies of the Department have been incorporated in the review at

appropriate places.

Audit findings

The important points noticed during the course of review are discussed in the

succeeding paragraphs:

3.2.7 Policy and planning

The National Water Policy inter alia envisaged (September 1987) formulation of a State Water

Policy (SWP) backed by an operational action plan to achieve the desired objective of

providing safe drinking water to the entire population of the State. However, the State

Government had neither formulated a SWP nor worked out any long term perspective plan

for capacity building to meet the ever increasing demand. Besides, no base line survey was

ever conducted to assess the present and future requirements of water despite population

growth and expansion of urban conglomerates.

The Department did not evolve any perspective plan and annual plan. Accordingly, there was

no operational plan to achieve various milestones. In the absence of long term perspective

plan and operational action plan, the Department did not fix annual targets for completing

various works (new construction, upgradation, improvement and maintenance).

Even the broad based targets including institutional reforms, preparation of master plan,

outstanding revenue collection, improvement of water testing laboratory, strengthening of

monitoring and evaluation as mentioned in the Manipur Annual Plan documents were not

achieved as of June 2007.

As per Administrative reports of the Department, the projected population, water requirement

and installed capacity of treatment plants in respect of Imphal city and adjoining area were as

shown below:

Table No.1

Source: Departmental records

Parameters/Year 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07

Population (in lakh) 5.65 Data not

available

7.13 7.16 7.16

Water requirement

(MLD)2

109 -do- 107 97 97

Installed capacity (MLD) 83.03 -do- 83.03 80.82 80.82

Short fall (MLD) 25.97 -do- 23.97 16.18 16.18


41

It may be observed from the above table that the Department had no scientific annual plan as

population and water requirement data are not in consonance with each other. It is also

observed that according to administrative report of the Department, the estimated population

increased from 5.65 lakh (2002-03) to 7.16 lakh (2006-07) in the last five years but water

requirement decreased from 109 MLD to 97 MLD. The projected population data

according to the Department‟s administrative report is also not credible as there is zero per

cent growth in the population from 2005-07. Since there was no effort to enhance the installed

capacity, instead of increasing, the installed capacity decreased by 2.21 MLD during these

years. Thus, due to faulty planning, the Department failed to synchronise the water

requirement against the population growth in advance.

3.2.9 Implementation of Improvement works

Improvement of existing water distribution system and augmentation of old treatment plants

are the two most essential areas of focus for the Department for ensuring safe drinking water

facility for the increasing population of the city. In the course of scrutiny of these works the

following points were noticed:

The improvement of Imphal water supply consisted of the following three components:

Improvement of existing distribution system in selected areas of Imphal city (EC: Rs.71.11 lakh)

Upgradation of old treatment plant at Chinga (EC : Rs.86.56 lakh), and

Improvement of Ningthempukhri water supply scheme (WSS) (EC: Rs.93.28 lakh).

The first component had been completed in March 2004. But the remaining two components

were lingering behind schedule as discussed below:

3.2.9.1 Upgradation of old treatment plant at Chinga

The GOI sanctioned (August 2002) Rs.86.56 lakh for upgradation of the old treatment plant at

Chinga and released Rs.38.95 lakh (50 per cent) against its share of Rs.77.91 lakh. The project

was stipulated to be implemented within a period of two years and the balance share was to be

released during 2003-04 on receipt of utilization certificate. However, the Department

awarded nine works for upgradation only between September 2004 to March 2007 (Appendix

3.3). The delay in award of works ranged from more than one year to five years from the date

of sanction. Of the nine works, four had been completed (October 2006) and two are in

progress (September 2007). The remaining three works had not been started (July 2007). The

GOI had not released its balance share (July 2007) as the progress of works was not

satisfactory.

As per DPR (May 2002), the Project was to be constructed at Chinga hillock and its vicinity.

But due to non-availability of suitable site, this had later been shifted to Moirangkhom Bazar

(August 2003). The Department attributed the delay in completion to non-finalisation of

proper site and non-release of adequate funds. The reply of the Department is not tenable

considering that there were huge unspent balances at the end of each year and considerable

quantum of the funds released by the GOI had been retained by the State Government each


42

year during this period. The delay in finalization of suitable site indicates inadequate planning

for upgradation of the Chinga treatment plant.

The scheme was implemented with a view to provide potable water to 3,000 people. Due to

non-completion of the work, the intended benefit could not be provided to the targeted people.

3.2.9.2 Improvement of Ningthempukhri WSS

The GOI sanctioned (August 2002) Rs.93.28 lakh for “Improvement of Ningthempukhri

water supply scheme” to provide drinking water to 33,000 people and released (August 2002)

Rs.41.97 lakh (50 per cent) of its share of Rs.83.95 lakh with the stipulation to complete the

work within two years, the balance share was to be released during 2002-03 on receipt of

utilization certificate. Scrutiny of records revealed that the Department awarded seven

components of the work only in January to May 2004 (Appendix 3.4). The delay in award of

these items ranged from 16 to 20 months from the date of sanction. Out of seven works, five

had been completed (March 2005). The remaining two works relating to the improvement of

the schemes had been completed up to 30 to 90 per cent.

It was seen that the Department had paid (February 2004) Rs.17.59 lakh, being the cost of

1,500 RM of 200 mm pipe to its Stores Division for use in this WSS but the pipes were yet to

be received (July 2007). No action was taken for expediting delivery of the pipes from the

Stores Division as of July 2007.

Despite an expenditure of Rs.89.17 lakh incurred as of July 2007 on various items of work of

the scheme, drinking water could not be provided to the targeted

people.

3.2.10 Implementation of augmentation works

The augmentation of Imphal Water Supply consisted of the following works:

Augmentation from Singda dam by 9.08 MLD (EC : Rs.9.75 crore)

Replacement of old hume pipes by new ductile iron pipes from

Leimakhong to Iroisemba (EC: Rs.11 crore).

Augmentation from Iril river by constructing a treatment plant of 6.81 MLD at Irilbung

(EC: Rs.8.17 crore)

Tapping ground water from Potsangbam and Sekmai areas–Phase-II (6.81 MLD) (EC: Rs.6.73

crore), and

Utilization of Leisangkhong moat at Canchipur as a pre-settling tank for storing the water to be

pumped from the confluence point of Imphal and Iril rivers at Lilong (6.81 MLD) (EC: Rs.7.64

crore)

The first three works had been commissioned in September 2001, November 2003 and July

2007 respectively. Progress on the remaining projects is as under:

3.2.10.1 Scheme for tapping ground water from Potshangbam and Sekmai area, Phase II

The GOI sanctioned the scheme for tapping of ground water from Potshangbam and Sekmai

area, Phase – II to provide drinking water to 50,000 inhabitants and released (June 2005) an

amount of Rs.3.78 crore. The work was targeted to be completed by December 2006 which


43

was subsequently revised to March 2007. It was observed that out of 19 items of work, only

six items had been completed (February 2007), six partially completed (60 to 95 per cent) and

works on seven items were yet to be started (details shown in Appendix 3.5). Against a

projected cost of Rs.6.73 crore, a sum of Rs.7.24 crore had so far been spent (July 2007)

leading to a cost over-run of Rs.51 lakh. The Department could not furnish any reasons

for the delay and cost over-run. Due to non-completion of the Scheme, the problem of

drinking water in Imphal city could not be alleviated.

3.2.10.2 Scheme for utilization of Leishangkhong moat

The GOI sanctioned (March 1999) the scheme for utilization of Leishangkhong moat and

released (January 2003) an amount of Rs.5 crore being the first instalment. Ten items of works

were awarded (October 2003 to March 2006) after a delay ranging from nine months to more

than three years from the date of sanction (details shown in Appendix 3.6). The entire work

was projected to be completed by December 2005 which was subsequently revised to March

2006 and then to March 2007. However, only seven items of work were completed within the

stipulated period. Two items were completed (November 2006) with a delay ranging from 4

months to 30 months. The work of design and construction of treatment plant consisting of

clarifloculator, rapid sand filter, chemical dozing chambers etc., which was awarded (August

2004) at a tendered cost of Rs.1.93 crore for completion by June 2005 was still incomplete as

on July 2007.

Scrutiny of records revealed that the Department had initially (July 1998) contemplated

utilizing a part of the Leishangkhong moat (which was extending from Lilong to Canchipur)

as a pre-settling tank where the water pumped from the confluence point of Iril and Imphal

rivers was to be stored. From there the water was to be sent to the treatment plant to be

constructed at Canchipur and then to be sent to a ground sump of six lakh gallons capacity for

pumping into the distribution pipelines.

Subsequently(October 2003), the Department abandoned the idea of using the moat due to

encroachment problems at the site and changed it to laying of 350 mm pipes for 3,643 metres

from the confluence point of Iril and Imphal rivers to the treatment plant. Also, the plan of

constructing a ground sump of six lakh gallon capacities had been replaced by construction of

two sumps each of three lakh gallon capacity – one of them on a hillock. However, the

changed design was not technically cleared subsequently and the Department proceeded

without technical sanction.

The DPR, which was finalized in July 1998 did not even provide for soil testing for the

treatment plant. This item was added (December 2004) by the Department after a gap of six

years. The investigation was completed in January 2005. Thus, the DPR prepared by the

Department was deficient and it did not take into account all the possible eventualities.

The planning and project formulation process was thus deficient and suffered from adhocism.

Thus, even after spending Rs.6.90 crore (90 per cent) against the projected cost of Rs.7.63

crore, the project was yet to be completed (July 2007). The Department stated that the project

could not be completed by the target date due to prevailing law and order situation and

inadequate release of funds by the State Government. Had the scheme been completed in

time, 50,000 people could have been provided potable water.


44

IWSS Phase-I thus envisaged a capacity creation of 25.38 MLD for catering to water

requirement of 1.88 lakh people. It was observed that only one treatment plant with a capacity

of 6.81 MLD could be completed as of July 2007 and four treatment plants under Phase-I with

a capacity of 18.57 MLD could not be completed as discussed in the preceding paragraphs,

depriving 1.38 lakh people of their drinking water requirement.

Thus, a majority of the people targeted to be covered by the scheme were deprived of clean

drinking water and the problem is unlikely to be alleviated in the

near future.

3.2.12 Quality control

The Department is to ensure distribution of safe drinking water to the consumers of the city.

The quality of the drinking water should be free from contamination, ensured through

treatment plants. Periodical monitoring should be done by the authorities to ensure that

drinking water supplied to the consumers is of acceptable quality and that no health hazards

are caused by the water supplied to the people.

Several deficiencies in assurance of water quality were highlighted in the Audit Report of the

Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year 2005-06 (Paragraph 5.1.18). However,

the Department did not take proper steps to improve the water quality and the situation

worsened further as discussed below.

3.2.12.1 Analysis of water treatment

The raw water should be analysed for physical, chemical and bacteriological parameters and

suitable treatment and disinfection should be ensured before supply. Leak detection survey

and repairs to control underground leakages in the system are regular exercises that

should be undertaken as part of maintenance.

The Department recorded that it was maintaining its water quality as per WHO standards by

regularly collecting water samples and testing them for physical, chemical and bacteriological

analysis. But this contention is not evidenced by the records, which revealed that the

Department did not carry out analysis of raw water regularly by collecting adequate water

samples from different water sources. During 2002-07, only 528 water samples were collected

from the four test-checked treatment plants serving a population of 1,70,000 against 2,040

samples required to be collected as per Manual of water supply and treatment. The shortfall

varied from 70 to 76 per cent as shown in the table below:

Tests of water were conducted at the only existing State Laboratory, Imphal which was not

provided with adequate and trained technical staff and up to-date calibrated equipment. There

was also no evidence on record to show the Departmental efforts in strengthening the

existing laboratory and to establish another laboratory, if the existing laboratory was not

enough to handle the required number of samples.

It was further observed that the annual requirements of chemicals for the years 2002-2003 to

2006-07 were assessed at the same rate (Lime: 521.62 MT; Ferric alum: 1107.01 MT;

Chlorine: 237.33 MT). This reveals that the requirements were computed based on the

installed capacity of the treatment plants and not on actual requirement to be arrived at after

testing the turbidity and quality of water from time to time.


45

Examination of eighty water analysis reports pertaining to various water supply schemes

revealed that the turbidity of treated water was beyond the acceptable limit in 43 cases which

is 54 per cent of total reports scrutinised. Total dissolved solids in treated water increased in

comparison to raw water indicating that excess quantities of alum and chlorine had been used

in the treatment. In fact the presence of total dissolved solids was within limits in raw water.

Hardness of water increased after treatment in respect of 67 samples due to use of

disproportionate quantity of chemicals in some samples. Lime (Calcium carbonate) was also

added more than the requirement as was indicated by high level of total alkalinity in five

reports. Chloride content had also increased in treated water in 60 samples which indicates

use of more chlorine than required. This was substantiated by the results of a test check

conducted on Chinga Water Supply Scheme. During the last four years (200307) against the

annual requirements of 8.5 MT of Chlorine, the Department used 11 to 15 MT.

It was also observed that these reports did not contain any reference to any biological tests

being performed to ascertain total Coliforms and E. coli. These tests should be conducted on a

routine basis, especially for the surface water samples.

Thus, as the quality of the drinking water supplied to the city had not been checked, the

possibility of health hazard to consumers through consumption of such water cannot be

ruled out.

3.2.12.2 Water contamination and prevalence of water borne diseases

Scrutiny of records revealed that the Department had not made any effort to conduct any

survey of underground leakage, un-authorised tapping and en-route contamination of water as

of July 2007. However, there were indications that the water at the consumer‟s end was

contaminated as most of the consumers surveyed stated that they had to boil water before use.

Also, the incidence of water borne disease was very high as disclosed by the information

furnished by the Medical Department. It stated that during the last five years (2002-2006)

there were 8,633 cases of water borne diseases such as acute gastro enteritis, enteric fever,

ineffective hepatitis and dysentry. Details are shown in the following Table:

Table No. 8

Type of

disease

Name of

medical

Year Number of

cases

Total

institute 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Enteric fever RIMS 71 64 35 60 45 275

JNH 206 267 135 608

Acute

Gastroenteritis

RIMS 430 327 188 255 328 1528

JNH 3,186 285 1784 5255

Ineffective

Hepatitis

(A.E)

RIMS 24 18 18 30 44 134

JNH 104 160 234 498

Viral RIMS 5 15 3 4 2 29


46

Hepatitis JNH 124 85 97 306

Total 530 424 3,864 1,146 2,669 8,633

Source: Departmental records. RIMS: Regional Institute of Medical Sciences. JNH: Jawaharlal Nehru Hospital.

The table discloses that as many as 8,633 persons suffered from water borne diseases during

the period 2002-06. Of these, the number of persons suffering from acute gastroenteritis was

the highest with 6,783 persons suffering from it. The number of persons suffering from water

borne diseases has increased from 530 cases in 2002 to 2,669 cases in the year 2006 which is

an increase of more than 400 per cent. This clearly indicates that the drinking water

supplied by the Department was not free from harmful bacteria. Thus, the Department failed

to ensure supply of quality potable water free from microbes which has serious implications

for public health.

3.2.14 Results of consumer survey

The Department furnished a list of 22,074 consumers to whom it was supplying water as of

March 2007 (the list was not updated). The supply was to be made at the rate of 135 litres per

capita daily (lpcd) and frequency of supply being once or twice a day either in the morning or

in the evening or both.

3.2.14.1 Objective of survey: Audit conducted a postal survey of consumers of Imphal area to

elicit their opinion regarding effectiveness of water supply schemes and thereby to ascertain

whether the supply was regular, adequate in quantity and the water was safe for drinking and

whether water bills were being raised and issued regularly. The scope and sample size, survey

methodology and model of the questionnaire of the survey are given in Appendix .7. The

postal survey consisted of issuing a simple questionnaire to 818 consumers during June –

August 2007.

3.2.14.2 Survey response: 802 consumers (98 per cent) returned the questionnaires with their

responses. Two per cent of the questionnaires were returned by the Postal Department with the

comments “incorrect address/addressee not found”. This is indicative of the fact that some of

the addresses of the consumers with the Department were not correct or were incomplete.

3.2.14.3 Survey findings: Analysis of the responses disclosed the following facts:

Forty seven per cent of the respondents stated that they did not receive the supply regularly

whereas 57 per cent of respondents stated that the delivery was less than the norm of 135 lpcd.

Thirteen per cent of surveyed consumers received less than 50 litres, 15 per cent less than 100

litres and only 24 per cent of them received more than 100 litres of water.

Forty nine per cent of the respondents stated that water was not clean and was smelly and 88

per cent of the respondents stated that water was required to be boiled before drinking as the

quality of water supplied by the Department was not safe.

Thirty three per cent of them stated that water bills were not served regularly which goes to

prove that the Department is not very keen to collect the water charges from its consumers.

Some of the general comments offered by the consumers were (i) non-supply of water for a

long time (ii) unauthorised drawing of water from distribution pipe line by electrical pumps


47

(iii) non-repair of leakages (iv) large number of illegal connections (v) non-fitting of water taps

and (vi) delay in supply and dependence on private hawkers.

Results of the survey indicate that though the Department had incurred an enormous

expenditure in the implementation of the water supply schemes, it could not alleviate the

problem of drinking water by providing safe and sufficient drinking water.

3.2.15 Monitoring and evaluation

The Department had not undertaken any evaluation of its water supply system during the last

five years (2002-07) to identify weak areas and to take remedial action. Inspections were not

carried out at periodical intervals to detect cases of unauthorized connections, leakages and

loss of water for taking up effective remedial measures.

The control required to be exercised at the higher level (Chief Engineer and Additional Chief

Engineer) was also found inadequate. Monthly progress reports furnished to the Planning and

Development Department and Chief Minister‟s office were mostly incomplete as vital

information like scheduled dates/actual dates of commencement and completion of projects,

revised cost of work, reasons for delay and cost revision etc. were not mentioned in most of the

cases.

3.2.16 Conclusion

Implementation of the water supply schemes was tardy and the objective of providing potable

drinking water to the citizens could not be achieved. Planning and project formulation process

was deficient. Financial management was poor. Funds released by the GOI were not utilised

fully. Project sites were not settled in advance. Most of the projects were behind schedule and

as such the Department failed to achieve scheme objectives. Collection of water tax was poor

resulting in non-realisation of substantial portion of the Government revenue. Due to non-

revision of water tariff, revenue realised could not compensate the cost of operation and

maintenance. Water was contaminated due to inadequate and inefficient treatment and

underground leakage in the pipelines. Due to the absence of an effective monitoring and

evaluation mechanism, unauthorized connections, leakages/wastage of water remained

unchecked. As a result, the Public Health Engineering Department failed to provide safe and

sufficient drinking water to the consumers.


The Department should formulate a State Water Policy as envisaged in the National Water

Policy and formulate a Perspective Plan for capacity building to meet the water requirement of

Imphal city.

The performance of existing schemes should be enhanced by adopting effective measures to plug

the leakages and by preventing unauthorised diversions.

Adequate funds should be released to complete the water supply schemes in a timely manner and

execution of various water supply projects should be closely monitored.

The Department should ensure proper treatment of water and conduct periodical

inspections to prevent enroute contamination so as to ensure supply of safe drinking water.


48

Effective mechanism for realization of revenue should be evolved and water tariff structure

should be revised to compensate the cost of operation and maintenance.

Review on Urban Water Supply Schemes, Pondicherry

Highlights

Sixty one per cent of the total population of the Union Territory lives in urban areas and the department

implemented a number of water supply schemes mainly to create additional resources/infrastructure to

augment the existing water supply. Audit scrutiny of these schemes, however, revealed extraction of

ground water in excess of requirement and supply of water in excess of norms prescribed by Government of

India. This resulted in creation of unnecessary infrastructure and wastage of water.

3.1.1 Introduction

The Union Territory (UT) of Puducherry comprises four geographically isolated regions with

an urban population of 6.48 lakh. Drinking water requirement in urban areas of Puducherry

and Karaikal regions is met by utilising ground water resources. Mahe is provided with

drinking water by the Kerala Government on payment and this is augmented by ground water

resources. Yanam gets water from Godavari river supplied by Andhra Pradesh Government.

Tenth Plan (2002-07) laid stress on (a) qualitative improvement of water ensuring

sustainability of sources on long term basis and diminishing reliance on ground water by

increasing use of surface water through rain water harvesting measures (b) revamping the

existing system by creating additional resources or replacing quality affected/defunct sources,

constructing storage reservoirs, redesigning/relaying of distribution networks to balance

supply with demand and (c) monitoring of water supply through surveillance, revamping of

operation and maintenance systems and rationalisation of water tariff to deterrent level to

check wastage. To achieve these objectives, the UT Government implemented Water Supply

Schemes (WSS) in the urban areas during 2002-07 at a cost of Rs 103.27 crore (Capital : Rs

80.76 crore and Revenue: Rs 22.51 crore).

Central Public Health and Environmental Engineering Organisation (CPHEEO) prescribes

guidelines for economical designing of various components of WSS, norms for drinking water

supply to various categories of consumers and maintenance of WSS. Public Works

Department implements water supply augmentation schemes by adopting these guidelines.

Puducherry region has been divided into nine zones and works in three zones were

completed before the commencement of the tenth plan period. Works in three more zones

(Zone II, VI and IX) were completed during the tenth plan and works in the remaining three

zones are in progress (March 2007). In Karaikal, augmentation schemes in all the three zones

were completed. As there was huge shortfall in supply of water by Kerala Government to

Mahe region, the department had taken up (May 2003) laying of a direct pipeline from the

treatment plant in Kerala to the service reservoirs as a deposit work by Kerala Water

Authority. The work was completed in October 2006. In Yanam, only infrastructure

development works were carried out.

3.1.2 Organisational set up

The Chief Engineer (CE), who is the head of the department, is assisted by the Superintending

Engineer II (SE) and four Executive Engineers (EEs) one in each region in implementing

WSS. The Secretary to Government is the Administrative Head.


49

3.1.3 Audit objective

The performance of urban WSS executed in the four regions was reviewed in audit to assess:

the effectiveness of measures taken for qualitative improvements of water and sustainability of

sources with diminishing reliance on ground water and increased utilisation of surface water

the economy, efficiency and effectiveness in revamping the existing system and creation of

additional sources

the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the operation and maintenance system.


CPHEEO Manual

Government Plan Document

Central Public Works Department Works Manual

Government orders and circulars, instruction issued by Government/ CE/SE.

Rules on water connection policies in Union Territory of Puducherry

3.1.5 Audit coverage and methodology

Records relating to the execution of WSS by the four divisions of the department during the

year 2002-07, and the related records maintained in the office of SE and CE were reviewed

during January 2007 to May 2007. Site visits were conducted and discussions were held with

the officers. An entry conference was held in February 2007 with the CE. In the exit

conference held in June 2007, the Secretary to Government assured to review the status and

take up action on the audit observations.

Audit Comments

3.1.6 Sustainability of sources

All the four regions of the UT are situated in the coastal areas and excess extraction of ground

water would result in the sea water intrusion thereby affecting the quality of water in the

source. To avoid such excess extraction, the department had to formulate schemes to utilise

surface water through rain water harvesting measures. Audit scrutiny of the adherence to

these instructions by the department revealed the following:

3.1.6.1 Excess extraction of ground water

CPHEEO prescribed supply of 135 litres/70 litres per capita per day (lpcd) of water for cities

having sewerage system and not having sewage system respectively and an additional 15 per

cent for transmission loss. The department extracted ground water in Puducherry, Karaikal

and Mahe regions much in excess of requirement as detailed below:

Region Population

projected

from 2001 Census

Norm as

per CPHEEO

(in lpcd)

Water

requirement

(in million

litres per day

(mld))

Water

actually

drawn and

supplied

during the

month (in

mld)

Month Population


50

Puducherry May

2007

5,66,426 155.25 87.94 121.85

Karaikal March

2007

84,843

80.50

6.83

11.00

Mahe Novemb

er

2006

38,637

80.50

3.11

4.73*

Schemes to use surface water were not implemented due to non-acquisition of land

* 1.45 mld supplied by Kerala Government

Excessive drawal of ground water over the norms fixed would result in sea water intrusion as

was evidenced in the aquifer in the coastal areas of the Puducherry

region.

3.1.6.2 Non-utilisation of surface water

Drinking water requirement of Puducherry region is being met by ground water sources only.

With a view to utilise the existing surface water sources in Puducherry, Government

appointed a consultant (August 2001) and paid Rs 44 lakh for identifying water availability

from Oussudu and Bahour tanks. The report of the consultant (June 2002) recommended

utilisation of surplus water from Oussudu tank for about 4 to 5 months in a year till the year

2011 and for the entire year during 2012 to 2021. A site was selected in August 2003 for

constructing a treatment plant for using the water from this tank but the requisition for

acquisition of the land by invoking urgency provision of Land Acquisition Act was sent to the

Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) only in December 2005. Proposals for issue of notification

under section 4 (1) of the Act was submitted by the LAO in November 2006 along with the

approval of Chief Secretary for invoking urgency provision. It was, however, returned by the

Revenue Officer with a request to submit a revised proposal (January 2007) for acquiring the

land under normal acquisition proceedings as courts have taken strong exception for invoking

urgency provisions. The proposal was not submitted as of July 2007 as land use conversion

was to be obtained from Town and Country Planning Department. The avoidable delay in

acquiring land resulted in non-implementation of the scheme.

The department included a scheme for construction of a treatment plant in Karaikal for using

surface water of Arasalar river in the Annual Plan for 2002-03, but the estimate for the scheme

was prepared during 2005-06 and the scheme was sanctioned in July 2006. The tenders called

for in October 2006 were rejected by the CE in June 2007 on account of non-verification of

credentials of the bidders and retendering was yet to be done (August 2007).

In order to augment the short supply of drinking water in Mahe during summer months, the

department carried out (March 2001) detailed investigation through a consultant for

harvesting rain water and storing it in newly formed ponds. While one pond, constructed at a

cost of Rs 6.97 lakh in December 2004, was not put to use due to objections from the residents

fearing drying up of their wells, the proposals for issue of notification for acquiring land for the

other pond, sent by LAO in January 2004, was pending with Government (May 2007).

3.1.7 Revamping of existing systems to meet the demand


51

Water Supply Schemes comprise creation of sources with infiltration wells (for surface

water) and borewells (for ground water), construction of treatment plants (for surface water),

conveyance of treated water to sumps and service reservoirs and supply of water to consumers

through distribution system. CPHEEO has prescribed norms for arriving at the capacity of

various infrastructure to be created and their designed life period to improve the efficiency and

effectiveness of the schemes and economise the expenditure. The execution of various works

by the department disclosed the following deficiencies:

3.1.7.1 Wasteful expenditure due to poor planning

In order to augment the shortfall in water supply to Kanuvapet area, the EE, Public Health

Division, Puducherry constructed (January 2004) two borewells at a cost of Rs 2.72 lakh and

awarded (March 2004) the work of construction of compound wall to protect the structure and

the pumping main to be laid. The work was stopped after spending Rs 15.71 lakh due to

claim by a private party that the land on which one of the borewells was located and a portion

of the land used for constructing compound wall were his property. On verification, it was

found one of the borewells was not located within the boundary of Government land and

further work were not taken up. On account of demand from public for supply of quality

water, the EE proposed to use the other borewell located on Government land. The water

from this borewell was, however, found unfit due to higher total dissolved solids (July 2006).

In spite of this, the EE obtained Government sanction (September 2006) for laying pumping

main from this borewell to the existing overhead tank (OHT). The work was taken up in

December 2006 and completed in February 2007 at a cost of Rs 4.74 lakh. However, due to

poor quality of water, the department constructed another borewell (February 2007) and took

over one of the borewells constructed by Villianur Commune Panchayat and supplied water

to the public. Wrong location of borewell and construction of pumping main fully knowing

the poor quality of water from the source rendered the expenditure of Rs 23.17 lakh wasteful.

3.1.7.2 Wasteful expenditure on construction of storage facilities

CPHEEO manual provides for designing storage facilities like sump, OHT for 15 years to

facilitate carrying out extensions when required and to avoid expenditure far ahead of utility.

The department constructed a 20 lakh litres OHT (Rs 2.18 crore) and a six lakh litres sump

(Rs 26.27 lakh) for the Central Zone in Karaikal on the ground that the existing seven lakh

litres OHT was damaged and the existing 14 lakh litres sump would be insufficient. Audit

scrutiny of the estimate revealed that the Chief Engineer approved the work for a design

period of 30 years instead of 15 years. Had the guidelines of CPHEEO manual been followed,

17 lakh litres OHT and eight lakh litres sump would have been adequate for the zone.

Construction of OHT of three lakh litres capacity in excess of requirement and sump of six

lakh litres capacity resulted in a wasteful expenditure of Rs 58.97 lakh.

3.1.7.3 Unnecessary creation of infrastructure

CPHEEO recommended 70 lpcd as the maximum water supply level for domestic and

non-domestic purposes for towns without sewerage system and this includes requirement of

water for commercial, institutional and minor industries. CPHEEO also recommended a

maximum of 15 per cent of the total requirement towards unaccounted water supply. In

addition, water supply schemes should provide water for fire fighting, for institutions of


52

considerable magnitude and for major industries. It also stipulated that the storage facility

should be designed for continuous supply to consumers as intermittent supply are neither

desirable for the public health point of view nor economical. The capacity of OHTs where

power is available throughout 24 hours and 16 hours of pumping is possible should be for 15

per cent of daily demand and the capacity of the sumps for filling the OHT should be designed

for 50 per cent of the capacity of the OHT, if two fillings per day is resorted to. Yanam region

has an area of 20 square kilometres. The surface water received from Government of Andhra

Pradesh for this region is stored in three locations (Yanam Town, Kanakalapeta and

Dariyalathipa) which are interconnected. The water is treated in treatment plant with sand

filters and carried through pipelines to sumps constructed in different locations, pumped to

overhead tanks constructed nearby and distributed by gravity to consumers. The distribution

system for the whole region is interconnected. The region had three water treatment plants

(WTPs) with a total capacity of 5.75 mld, five OHTs and 12 sumps with a total capacity of 10

lakh litres and 12.05 lakh litres respectively as of March 2002. The department increased the

capacity of WTPs, OHTs and sumps to 14.75 mld, 32 lakh litres and 23.05 lakh litres during

2002-07 on the ground that the projected population in the year 2018 (designed period of 15

years) would be 90,300 and tail end areas had inadequate water. Audit scrutiny, however,

revealed that the projected population for the Yanam region in the year 2018 is only 50,000.

As there are no big institutions and major industries and the department is not supplying

treated water to industries, the water requirement for this population adopting the norms

prescribed by CPHEEO would be 4.735 mld5. Hence, the requirement of infrastructure would

be 4.735 mld of WTP, 7.5 lakh litres OHT6 and 3.75 lakh litres sump. As such, the

infrastructure existed as of March 2002 would be more than adequate. By boosting the

projected population to 90,300, adopting higher norms of 100 lpcd and including huge

quantity of water for institutional and industrial demand (4.19 mld), the department worked

out the water requirement for 2018 at 14.39 mld and constructed three WTPs with a total

capacity of nine mld, eight OHTs of 22 lakh litres capacity and eight sumps of 11 lakh litres

capacity at a total cost of Rs 10.73 crore (vide Appendix – 3.1). Failure to follow

CPHEEO guidelines resulted in creation of unnecessary infrastructure, wastage of water

and higher cost of maintenance.

Government contended (November 2007) that the additional infrastructure was provided to

cater to the projected population for 30 years (upto 2033) and the requirement of surrounding

population of neighbouring Andhra Pradesh and industrialisation was also considered. This

contention was not factual as the project reports considered the requirement of projected

population of 15 years as provided in CPHEEO guidelines but boosted the estimated

population and did not consider the requirement of population of neighbouring state. Besides,

water was not supplied to industries and there were no documents to support the requirement

of huge industrial demand.

3.1.8.1 Wastage of water

To avoid wastage and to conserve water, CPHEEO stipulated fixing of bulk water meters in

strategic points. The department fixed bulk meters in three out of five OHTs in Karaikal and

10 out of 37 OHTs in Puducherry only during 2006 . The Department has no equipment to

detect leakages in pipelines. To an audit query, the Assistant Engineer, Puducherry stated


53

that the leakage is being detected based on complaints from public/site supervision staff.

Failure to detect leakages in time would result in wastage of water and increase the

maintenance cost.

The rules for domestic water connection stipulate installation of water meters by the

department and raising of demands based on water actually consumed. The working

conditions of water meters in the four regions are as under:

Region Number of

connections

Meters not working Percentage of defective meters

Month Number

Puducherry

74,637*

March

2007

50,492

68

Karaikal

11,462

April

2007

5,180

45

Mahe

1,495

April

2007

403

27

Yanam

2,550

May

2007

2,550

100

* includes a portion of rural area

While 35,513 meters in Puducherry failed before 2004-05, 1,174 to 1,510 meters failed during

every quarter thereafter. All the meters in Yanam region did not function for the past seven

years. Defective meters prevented the department from billing the actual quantity of water

consumed.

In Yanam region, the department supplied 7.60 mld of water during November 2006 as

against 3.06 mld of water required for the present population of 38,064. The department

constructed a number of storage facilities on the ground of inadequacy of water in tail ends.

The excess delivery of water, however, indicated drawal of more water by the consumers of

initial reaches. As the size of the pipes used for house connections was fixed and the period of

supply is also regulated, such over drawal could only be made by tampering the water

connection pipes and using other mechanical devices. The EE had made no attempts to

conduct surveillance to detect any unauthorised drawal of water. Instead, he had created more

infrastructure to supply to the tail ends.

Government stated (November 2007) that new water meters would be provided at the

time of commissioning the new relaid pipeline.

3.1.8.3 Quality of water not ensured

The CPHEEO has prescribed physical, chemical and biological parameters for ensuring the

quality of drinking water supplied to the public. The department is required to employ suitable

treatment and disinfection methods to ensure quality of water before supply and to monitor

the quality of water at consumer‟s end. Audit scrutiny revealed that water from 54 out of 146

borewells in Puducherry region was directly supplied to consumers without any intermediate


54

storage. This water is not being treated with chlorine to minimise the risk of water borne

diseases. Besides, water supplied from four such borewells has higher iron content and water

from two borewells has higher nitrate content and this was not fit for consumption as drinking

water.

3.1.9 Conclusion

The department exploited ground water in excess of requirement and did not exploit surface

water. More infrastructure were created unnecessarily and schemes were not implemented

within a time frame. Economical use of water was not enforced. Poor quality water was

supplied directly from four borewells in Puducherry.

Recommendations

Schemes for utilising surface water should be given priority.

Wastage of water should be prevented by fixing bulk meters, detecting leakages, replacing the

defective water meters and conducting surveillance.

Water tariff rationalisation should be considered.

The above points were referred to Government in August 2007; reply, except for observations

in respect of Yanam region, had not been received (January 2008).

Performance Audit of Working Of Irrigation Department, Punjab

Highlights

Performance audit of working of Irrigation Department disclosed cases of defective planning

and programme management besides over exploitation of underground water. There were

cases of delay in release of funds, administrative approvals accorded without ensuring pre-

requisites and construction of new channels without ensuring availability of water. Non-

tapping the hydro potential led to loss of power generation. Non-imparting of training

resulted in idle establishment and infrastructure.

3.1.1Introduction

The State of Punjab has primarily an agrarian economy; therefore water resources and

irrigation are central to it. The total geographical area of the State is 50.36 lakh hectares with

irrigable area of 42 lakh hectares. There are seven canal systems designed for culturable

command area (CCA) of 30.88 lakh hectares. The Department of Irrigation is responsible for

maintenance of canals, drains and dams, execution of flood protection and water-logging

works and river projects.

3.1.2 Organizational set-up

Principal Secretary Irrigation and Power (Administrative Secretary) is the overall in-charge of

the Department assisted by 12 Chief Engineers (CEs). In the field, the execution and research

works are executed through 210 Executive Engineers (EE) under the supervision of 54

Superintending Engineers (SE) or equivalent officers. The Director, Irrigation and Power

Research Institute (DIPR); Director, Punjab Irrigation Management Training Institute

(PIMTI) and CE, Vigilance and Quality Control (CE (V)) are responsible for research, training

and quality control activities respectively.



55

The main objectives of the performance audit are to assess whether:

budget estimates were prepared realistically and provisions made in approved five year/annual

plans were adhered to;

the sanctions to the project estimates were accorded timely and funds provided to avoid time

and cost overrun;

projects being executed by the Department were planned properly to achieve intended benefits

optimally and

available manpower was utilized optimally and training, research and vigilance control

activities were performed efficiently.


Provisions laid down in Punjab Public Works Department Code, Irrigation Manual of Orders

(IMO), Punjab Financial Rules and instructions/guidelines of Central Design Organization

(CDO), Central Water Commission (CWC), Vigilance and Quality Control wing were used as

audit criteria.

3.1.5 Scope of Audit and Methodology

The records of Administrative Secretary, five CEs out of 12 and 21 EEs out of 83

implementing units of the Department pertaining to the period 2000-07 were test checked

between September 2006 and March 2007. The selection of units was made by adopting

systematic sampling technique. Documentary evidence was gathered and analyzed to arrive

at the results of audit.

3.1.8 Environmental aspect

The total geographical area of the State is 50.36 lakh hectares with irrigable area of 42 lakh

hectares. The existing canal irrigation system is designed for CCA of 30.88 lakh hectares.

The details of area irrigated by canals and tubewells are given below:

Year Total

Geogra

phical

area

Net Area

sown

(percentag

e to total

area)

Net

irrigated

area

(percentage

toarea

sown)

Irrigation

By canals

(percentage

to irrigated

area)

Irrigation

By tube

wells

andwells

(percentage

to irrigated

area)

Irrigation

byother

means

(percentage

to irrigated

area)

No. of tube

wells (No. in

lakh)

Length of

canals (in

Kms)

2002-

03

50.36 42.24

(84)

40.35

(84)

11.48

(28.45)

28.80

(71.38)

0.07

(0.17)

11.33 13614

2003-

04

50.36 42.01

(83)

40.28

(83)

11.29

(28.03)

28.89

(71.72)

0.10

(0.25)

11.44 NA

2004-

05

50.36 42.00

(83)

40.35

(83)

11.01

(27.28)

29.19

(72.34)

0.15

(0.38)

11.68 14500

Though total length of canals increased from 13614 kilometers to 14500 kilometers during

2002-05 but there was continuous decrease in area irrigated by canals from 11.48 lakh hectares

to 11.01 lakh hectares owing to warabandi, disputes among farmers and tubewell irrigation

being a more convenient option over canal irrigation.


56

The decrease in area irrigated by canals during 2002-05 was taken over by the installation of

35000 new tubewells as area irrigated by tubewells increased from 28.80 lakh hectares to 29.19

lakh hectares during this period. Preference for tubewells over canal irrigation, among other

factors, was mainly due to non-existence of regulations to check installation of tubewells, its

independent use and ready availability of ground water.

3.1.8.1 Non-monitoring of ground water

To monitor the ground water, a project “Ground water investigation and integrated utilization

of water resources in the Punjab State” was taken up in 1971 estimated at Rs 1.80 crore to be

completed by 1975, which provided for research and development activities relating to ground

water. 62 exploratory bores (E-bores) were to be installed for examination of deep-water

aquifers to assess the scope and limitation of water resources and problems that may arise out

of over-exploitation of ground water resources. Subsequently the project was revised thrice

and as per the latest administrative approval (January 2006) the estimated cost of the project

has increased to Rs 98.63 crore. However, even after a lapse of more than thirty years only 32

E-bores were installed and work on two bores was in hand (November 2006). This defeated

the purpose of the project.

3.1.8.2 Over exploitation of ground water

Total area irrigated by canals constituted 28 per cent only of the total area sown in Punjab,

whereas area irrigated by tubewells was 72 per cent. The number of tubewells increased from

1.92 lakh (1971) to 11.68 lakh (2005). As per latest report of 2007 during 2003-04, 31.16 lakh

hectare meter of underground water was drafted against the recharge of 23.78 lakh hectare

meter resulting in over exploitation of underground water by 7.38 lakh hectare meter.

Due to unchecked drafting during 1984-2004, number of overexploited blocks increased from

53 (1984) to 103 (2004) with time, as detailed below:

Sr.

No.

Category of Blocks 1984 1986 1989 1992 1999 2004

1 Overexploited 53 55 62 63 73 103

2 Critical 7 9 7 7 11 5

3 Semi-critical 22 18 20 15 16 4

4 Safe 36 36 29 33 38 25

Total16 118 118 118 118 138 137

Thus, over exploitation of ground water led to continuous fall of ground water table in the

State rendering 103 blocks overexploited, five blocks critical and four blocks semi critical

leaving only 25 blocks (18 per cent) in the safe category.

In the absence of a system to monitor and scientifically regulate the use of ground water, there

is a trend towards over exploitation of ground water in most blocks.

In reply, the Director, Water Resources and Environment Directorate, Chandigarh while

admitting (July 2007) the facts attributed the problem of over exploitation to diverse aspects

including limited share of surface water, cropping pattern of wheat and paddy, adoption of

high yield variety of crops, pollution and contamination of surface water besides its easy


57

availability and uncontrolled use. As regards non-completion of installation of E-bores,

the Executive Engineer, Water Resources Investigation Division, Chandigarh attributed

it to paucity of funds.

3.1.9 Execution of works

3.1.9.1 Under utilisation of irrigation potential due to non-completion of project

Kandi canal, having a length of 130 kms (discharge of 500 cusecs) off-taking from Mukerian

Hydel Channel at RD 5575M/L proposed to be constructed in two stages which were

complimentary to each other. Stage-I including irrigation system designed for 22594 hectare

was completed in 1998 at a cost of Rs109.92 crore.

The State Government accorded administrative approval to Kandi Canal Stage-II for

extending irrigation facility to 29527 hectare in July 1998. As of March 2007, only 25 Kms of

canal against total length of 70.50 Kms was constructed after incurring total expenditure of Rs

52.26 crore.

Due to non-completion of Stage-II of the canal, against designed discharge of 500 cusecs only

242 cusecs could be released in already constructed Stage-I leading to creation of irrigation

potential of 15695 hectare against envisaged 22594 hectare. Further, even the created potential

was irrigated to the extent of 35.51 per cent only, as during 2002-06 against created potential of

62780 hectares (15695x4) only 22294 hectare were actually irrigated.

Further, the cost of the Stage-II also increased by Rs 128.48 crore from Rs 147.13 crore (May

1997) to Rs 275.61 crore (January 2007). Due to coverage of lesser area under irrigation the

projected potential increase in crop production of Rs 384.89 crore could not be achieved.

On being pointed out (January 2007), Executive Engineers concerned admitted the facts.

Shahpur Kandi Dam (SPKD) was to act as a balancing reservoir for the discharge from Ranjit

Sagar Dam (RSD) to the existing Upper Bari Doab Canal (UBDC) system. It was also to

generate 1042.92 million units of electricity per annum and create additional irrigation

potential of 5000 hectares in Punjab. The completion of SPKD was required to be completed

with RSD by March 2001. The total cost of the project (Rs 1,324 crore) was to be shared

between GOI and Punjab in the ratio of 2:1.

GOI released CLA of Rs 16.16 crore during 2002-03. The State Government released this

along with its share of Rs 8.08 crore after three years during 2006-07. Therefore, GOI did not

provide CLA between 2003 and 2007 so the project also remained incomplete even after

incurring an expenditure of Rs 80.27 crore (March 2007). The cost was revised to Rs 1,945

crore (September 2005 price level). Thus due to slow progress of work the aim of generating

6257.52 million units of power and creating irrigation potential of 5000 hectares could not be

achieved.

On being pointed out (May 2007), CE SPKD attributed (May 2007) the reasons to paucity of

funds.

• Gurusar minor completed in 1999 at a cost of Rs 0.99 crore was lying unused as provision of

working head of Malookpur distributory to feed the minor were not initially provided and a

necessary railway siphon was not built. EE demanded (March 2007) Rs 2.28 crore to raise parent


58

distributory and construct railway siphon. Rs 0.44 crore received for Railway siphon were

deposited with Railway authorities. However, balance funds to raise parent distributory were still

awaited (July 2007).

• Abhun minor completed in April 1998 at a cost of Rs 0.94 crore was lying unused as raising of its

parent distributory (Jandwala) to feed the minor was not provided for in the original estimate.

Revised estimate framed (October 2001) for Rs 1.42 crore but funds had not been provided (July

2007).

• Shikar reclamation distributory remodelled (2002) at a cost of Rs 0.33 crore was running with 12

cusecs water against enhanced capacity of 45 cusecs because provision of replacing pipe of 5

cusecs with an aqueduct to carry 21 cusecs discharge at RD 21032 crossing over Landa Nalla

was not provided for in the approved project. Neither the estimate to construct aqueduct has

been sanctioned nor the funds provided (July 2007).

Non-release of funds for remedy of omissions committed in project preparation at initial stage

rendered expenditure of Rs 2.26 crore as unfruitful. The potential for irrigating 6884 acres of

land and accompanying benefits envisaged could not be realized.

On being pointed out (November 2006 & March 2007), EEs attributed the reasons for non-

initiating remedial measure to non-receipt of funds.

3.1.9.6 Non-functional drainage schemes

The Government sanctioned 13 lift drainage schemes estimated at Rs 2.56 crore (November

1999) in order to provide outfall to the rain water collected in large depressions causing water

logging.

Scrutiny of the records (February 2007) of EE, Mansa Drainage Division, Mansa disclosed

that as per completion report submitted (May 2005) to Superintending Engineer, out of these

13 lift drainage schemes estimated at a cost of Rs 2.56 crore, nine were completed (2001-02) at

a cost of Rs 1.17 crore and leaving four schemes incomplete. In the four incomplete

schemes, civil works costing Rs 0.51 crore were completed in December 2002, but mechanical

and electrical works could not be taken up (March 2007). Nine completed lift drainage

schemes also remained non-functional since 2002 due to disconnection of electricity.

Department did not provide funds (February 2007) despite repeated demands submitted by the

EE to make these schemes functional.

Failure of the Department to provide funds for payment of electricity bills and for incomplete

schemes resulted in unfruitful expenditure of Rs 1.68 crore.

On being pointed out (February 2007), EE stated (February 2007) that the schemes will be

made operational on receipt of funds.

3.1.9.7 Execution of deficient contracts

State Government notified (July 2001) 136 sites on various canal systems for setting up Mini

Hydel Projects through private sector on Build, Operate and Own (BOO) basis. The

Department entered into a tri-partite agreement with Punjab Energy Development Agency

(PEDA) and private promoters for these projects. As per agreement, the promoter was to pay

lease money at the rate of Rs 90,000 per annum for 33 years initially, which was extendable

on mutual basis and cess at a rate of one paisa per unit of electricity generated and also would


59

compensate the loss of revenue to Department equal to the latest annual auction bid of each

site where the closure of functional water mill was necessitated for setting up of MHP.

Audit scrutiny (November 2006) of records of EE, Bathinda Canal Division, Bathinda

disclosed that three agreements were entered into (August 2001) with M/s Aqua Power

Limited (private promoter) for installing MHPs at three sites. The lease money amounting to

Rs 1.80 lakh (Lohgarh and Sidhana); cess amounting to Rs 3.39 lakh (Chak Bhai and

Lohgarh) and compensation amounting to Rs 33.95 lakh was not paid by the private promoter

(November 2006). Further, in case of delayed payment of lease amount, provision of interest

at the rate of 15 per cent per annum was made but no such condition was included in the

agreement for delayed payment of cess and compensation. This resulted in loss of interest of

Rs 9.03 lakh as of March 2007. Presently arrears of Rs 39.14 lakh were pending against private

promoters for lease, cess and compensation.

On being pointed out (November 2006), EE stated that the agreement was formulated at

higher level.

3.1.9.8 Inordinate delay in reclamation of land

With a view to reclaim 9559 acres in a period of 15 years, Kahan Singh Wala Reclamation

Channel off-taking from Main Branch of Ferozepur feeder and having a length of 58000 feet

was completed in 1983-84.

Scrutiny of the records (November 2006) of EE, Eastern Canal Division, Ferozepur disclosed

that ever since completion of channel, full supply level could not be maintained due to long

length, loamy sandy area and paucity of funds for maintenance. As such only 2572 acres was

reclaimed and 6987 acre of land was not reclaimed. The Department did not take any action

to reclaim balance 6987 acre of land for 22 years. A link channel for this purpose was

proposed (June 2006) at an estimate of Rs 1.02 crore off-taking at RD 42450/L of Nizamwah

Distributory to join at RD 38825/R of Kahan Singh Wala reclamation channel.

However, funds were awaited (July 2007).

As a result even though more than two decades have passed 6987 acres of land is yet to be

reclaimed. EE admitted (November 2006) the facts and informed that the work of link channel

was still under consideration.

3.1.12.3 Non-conducting of inspection

During the period 2002-07, 10 EEs were required to conduct 175 inspections according to the

Irrigation Manual of Manual of orders but carried out 74 inspections only resulting in shortfall

of 58 per cent, this would compromise the monitoring of sub-divisions. On being pointed out

(January and March 2007), the EEs assured compliance in future.

3.1.13 Conclusion

Performance audit of Irrigation Department disclosed cases of financial, planning and

programme mismanagement. Nine projects approved in annual plans were not

implemented depriving irrigation potential of 3.27 lakh hectares instead three projects not

included in the annual plans were executed indicating poor planning. Increase in

installation of tubewells rendered 103 blocks overexploited, five blocks critical and four


60

blocks semi critical out of 137 blocks in the State. Delay in providing funds, construction of

minors without adequate survey resulted in unfruitful expenditure of Rs 2.26 crore. Failure to

restore electric connections and completion of lift drainage schemes resulted in unfruitful

expenditure of Rs 1.68 crore. Short utilization of departmental machinery resulted in

unproductive expenditure of Rs 13.30 crore on establishment and non-inclusion of crew

charges in the operational cost of machinery resulted in non-recovery of Rs 3.43 crore from

client departments/agencies.

Recommendations

The Department should focus on completion of irrigation and power generation projects in a

time bound manner;

Effective steps should be taken to regulate exploitation of underground water through tubewells

and

Human resources and available infrastructure should optimally be utilized.

The above points were reported to Government (May 2007); reply has not been received (July

2007).

Perforamce audit of The Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP) in

Rajasthan

Highlights

The Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP) aims at providing safe and adequate

drinking water facilities to the rural population. More than 65,000 habitations in the State did not

have adequate drinking water mainly due to mismanagement of scheme funds and slow execution of

works taken up under the programme. Monitoring of the programme implementation was

inadequate and quality of water supplied was poor. There was no plan for water source

sustainability. The programmes for community participation in the water supply schemes and

Communication and Capacity Development were not successful in the State.

3.1.1 Introduction


61

The Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP), a Centrally sponsored scheme,

was revamped (April 1999) to provide safe and adequate drinking water facilities to the rural

population by supplementing the efforts of the State Government under Minimum Needs

Programme (MNP). The main objectives of ARWSP were:

• to ensure coverage of all rural habitations;

• to ensure sustainability of the systems and sources; and

• to preserve quality of water by institutionalising water quality monitoring and surveillance

through a catchments area approach.

Rajasthan covers about 10 per cent of total area of the country whereas availability of water is

less than one per cent. Ground water is the main source of water in the State. In many places

water is not potable due to excess contents of Chloride, Fluoride, Nitrate and Arsenic, etc.


In the State the programme is being implemented by Public Health Engineering Department

(PHED). Principal Secretary is the administrative head of PHED. The Chief Engineer (CE),

Rural is the overall in-charge of the ARWSP assisted by six Additional Chief Engineers

(ACEs) at Zonal level, 28

Superintending Engineers (SEs) at circle level and by Executive Engineers (EEs) of 98

Divisions. The

Rajasthan Water Supply and Sewerage Management Board (Board) headed by Minister,

PHED is an agency for policy formulation, technical advice, consolidation and control of

expenditure.


The audit objectives were to assess whether:

• the process of planning for ARWSP was effective;

• the survey of habitations conducted effectively and planning was based on authentic and reliable

data;

• the financial management was efficient;

• the schemes were executed economically and efficiently; and

• the mechanism for monitoring of water quality was adequate and effective.


Performance audit was conducted with reference to:

• ARWSP guidelines for planning and implementation of the projects;

• guidelines for National Rural Drinking Water Quality Monitoring and Surveillance

Programme;

• National Water Policy;


62

• Project Implementation Plan for individual schemes and

• instructions issued by the Central and the State Governments.


The performance audit was conducted (February to May 2007) to examine the

implementation of the ARWSP covering the period 2002-03 to 2006-07 by test check of

records of the CE (Headquarters), CE1 (Special Projects), CE (Rural) at Jaipur and of 19

Divisions

2 in seven Districts (out of 32) having 49 blocks (out of 237) and 8,130 villages (out of 39,753).

A meeting was held in January 2007 with the Principal Secretary, PHED to discuss the subject

of the performance audit, the audit objectives and the criteria.

3.1.6 Planning

Annual Action Plans (AAPs) were to be prepared by the CE with all necessary details

indicated in the programme guidelines and submitted to the Government of India (GOI)

(Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water Mission). Action Plans submitted to the GOI did not

focus on priority for coverage of Not Covered (NC) habitations, steps proposed to be taken to

function in mission-mode, in house plan for Human Resource Development, activities to be

taken up under sub-mission to tackle the problems of the targeted population including the

Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). Thus, the AAPs were not complete as per

provisions of guidelines. There was no plan for water source sustainability. In order to have a

complete understanding on the villages to be surveyed, maps were to be prepared before and

just after the survey. However, such maps were not prepared by PHED. The impact of the

shortcomings in planning on programme implementation has been commented at the

appropriate places.

3.1.7 Survey of habitations

To ascertain reliable information on the status of drinking water supply in rural habitations,

rural schools and the water source tested for quality problem with details of existing safe

drinking water supply system in such quality affected habitations, GOI issued instructions

(February 2003) to conduct a survey in accordance with the guidelines and submit the results

by September 2003. Government submitted the survey results in October 2003.

Based on the survey, Government reported the status of 1,21,133 habitations in the State to

GOI including 40,342 as fully covered (FC), 61,995 as partially covered (PC) and 18,796 as

not covered (NC). However, GOI considered 1,07,768 habitations (NC : 55,934; PC : 17,168

and FC : 34,666) as per the ARWSP norms (population less than 100 were not considered for

a habitation). State Government, however, planned for 1,22,250 habitations (NC: 65,213; PC:

17,159 and FC: 39,878). Thus, there was deviation from the ARWSP guidelines for deciding

the number of habitations and the AAPs were not based on correct data of habitation and the

category of habitation.

3.1.9.2 Extraction of ground water


63

The State suffers from scanty rainfall, inadequate surface water and depends mostly on ground

water. There was over extraction of ground water in 140 blocks (out of 237 blocks). The GOI

fixed (2000-01) five per cent of funds released under ARWSP for exclusive use on projects

relating to sustainability of water resources. Accordingly, State was to spend Rs 63.37 crore on

source sustainability. As the PHED had not formulated any plan for water source

sustainability, no sum could be spent on this component despite the fact that there was

indiscriminate and disproportionate level of ground water extraction. This resulted in non-

protection of precious natural resources.

3.1.9.3 Supply of drinking water in rural schools

Under the ARWSP, drinking water facility was to be provided to all rural schools by the end

of Tenth Plan. The targets of 2005-06 and 2006-07 for coverage of rural schools were not

achieved and shortfall was 64 and 57 percent respectively. As of March 2007, 8,195 schools

were not covered.


3.1.12.1 Quality affected villages not benefited

As of March 2001 there were 30,380 quality affected habitations which increased to 31,600 as

of March 2007. This showed that special emphasis was not given for coverage of quality

affected 24 habitations.

More than 50 per cent villages in test checked districts.were qaultiy affected.

Government planned (July 1994) to set up Fluoride Control Project (FCP) for providing

drinking water from Bisalpur dam to 669 fluoride affected villages and 23 en-route villages of

Ajmer District within four years.

The schemes were to be completed within two to three years from the date of sanctions. The

PPC of the Board sanctioned (July 1994 to January 2005) eight schemes costing Rs. 437..10

crore covering 692 villages and two towns. As off March 2007, two schemes were completed

including 153 villages already covered and 136 villages were covered through remaining

ongoing six schemes. Thus, actually no new villages were covered in these two schemes.

Delay in according sanctions and in execution of work resulted in deprival of intended benefit

to the 403 fluoride affected villages for a decade.

Further, the PPC sanctioned (2002-03) the Barmer Lift Drinking Water Project costing Rs

424.91 crore covering Barmer and Jaisalmer Districts. This included coverage of quality

affected 529 and 162 rural habitations of Barmer and Jaisalmer Districts respectively. The

revised sanction of the project for Rs 688.65 crore was accorded by PPC in February 2007.

The project was taken up in March 2007 after a lapse of four years from the date of original

sanction and the State could incur only Rs 5.22 lakh upto March 2007. Poor financial and

physical performance of the project showed lack of seriousness to cover the quality affected

habitations of both the districts.

3.1.12.2 Supply of unsafe water to public

As per ARWSP guidelines the potable water (at least eight litre per capita per day) for

drinking and cooking purposes is to be provided to all habitations. Test check of records of


64

Balotra and Bikaner divisions showed that from five water supply schemes unsafe water

containing "Total Dissolved Solid" (TDS) between 1920 PPM and 4000 PPM as against

permissible limit upto 1500 PPM was being supplied (April 2003) to 49 habitations of 31,844

population. Expenditure incurred on these schemes was Rs 4.79 crore.

3.1.12.3 Water Quality Monitoring and Surveillance

For institutionalising the Water Quality Monitoring and Surveillance System, the National

Rural Drinking Water Quality Monitoring and Surveillance Programme (NRDWQM&SP)

was launched (February 2006). GOI was to provide complete assistance for implementation of

The programme. GOI released (February 2006) Rs. 72.43 lakh for monitoring and

surveillance activies, of which only Rs. 1.99 lakh was spent.

District Level Surveillance Coordinator and State Referral Institute as of March 2007. Field

Testing Kits worth Rs 69.79 lakh were not procured (April 2007) after a lapse of more than

one year from sanction. Thus, water quality monitoring mechanism was not evolved

efficiently. Further, the GOI released (February 2006) Rs 2.02 crore for Human Resource

Development (HRD) and Information, Education and Communication (IEC) activities. The

PHED transferred (January-March 2007) the money to Communication and Capacity

Development Unit (CCDU) after a lapse of 11 to 13 months. The utilisation of funds could

not be verified as CCDU did not submit the audited accounts as of May 2007.

3.1.14 Sector reform

The GOI launched (1999-2000) the Sector Reform Project for institutionalising community

based Rural Drinking Water Supply Programme. The basic concept of the reform project was

to ensure community participation in the water supply schemes. Ten per cent of the capital cost

of the scheme was to be paid by the beneficiaries. The GOI sanctioned (2000-02) Sector

Reform Pilot Projects for four districts at a cost of Rs.

141.71 crore . Test check in Rajsamand and Sikar Districts showed the following:

• District Water and Sanitation Mission (DWSM) of Rajsamand and Sikar received (2000-

02) Rs 23.14 crore from GOI. Of this, Rs 6.05 crore was transferred to the District Water

and Sanitation Committees (DWSCs), Jaipur and Alwar. The committees spent Rs

12.49 crore on Sector Reform and Rs 4.60 crore was lying unutilised as of March 2007.

• DWSCs sanctioned and took up 199 Water Supply Schemes costing Rs 22.14 crore

during 2002-04. In 34 schemes (Sikar District), public contribution of Rs 43.13 lakh was

not received and in 27 schemes contribution of Rs 15.99 lakh against Rs 33.81 lakh was

received. Thus, there was short receipt of beneficiary contribution to the extent of Rs

60.95 lakh. Of the 138 schemes for which contribution received, 78 schemes were

completed.

• As of March 2007, 101 Schemes (Sikar: 80 and Rajsamand: 21) were lying incomplete

for more than two years after spending Rs 5.67 crore. The DWSCs attributed this to

delay in execution of the works by the Village Water and Sanitation Committees

(VWSCs). Of the 98 completed schemes, 68 schemes were handed over to the VWSCs


65 | P a g e

and 13 were closed due to non-taking/handing over the charge of schemes by Sarpanch,

power disconnection, etc.

• The SE, Sikar circle stated (May 2007) that the schemes were not maintained properly by

VWSC as they considered that the power charges to be high and nearby schemes being

maintained by the State Government. The contention of SE was not tenable because the

selection of schemes was determined on the basis of users preference and requirement

combined with affordability and willingness to contribute towards implementation,

(capital cost), and O&M.

3.1.17 Evaluation

ARWSP guidelines envisage that the State Government should take up monitoring and

evaluation studies through reputed organisations/institutions on the implementation of

the rural water supply programme. However, no such study was undertaken (2002-07)

by the State Government.

Implementation of ARWSP in the State during 1997-2001 was reviewed and included in

the Audit Report (Civil) for 2000-01 (Para 4.2). The Report discussed by the Public

Accounts Committee during February

2003 and November 2006, the recommendations were awaited. However, some

irregularities related to uncovered habitations, non-providing the safe drinking water to

habitations, not giving emphasis on SC/ST habitations, improper implementations of

sector reform and computerisation, slow spending of central assistance commented in

the earlier Audit Report were persisting as already discussed in this Report.

3.1.18 Conclusion

The annual action plans were not drawn adequately. Poor financial management led to

diversion of funds, depriving the State of Central assistance of Rs 188.59 crore.

Adequate drinking water was not provided to more than 65,000 habitations. Special

emphasis was not given to cover water quality affected habitations (31,600). Schemes

were not executed properly. There were delays in completion of fluoride control projects

and coverage of rural schools in providing drinking water. There was cost overrun of Rs

8.70 crore due to delays in finalisation of tenders and issue of sanctions. Cases of

avoidable/extra expenditure, blocking of funds and unfruitful expenditure of scheme

funds were also noticed. The sector reform project was not implemented effectively. The

Monitoring and Investigation units were working without the technical experts.

Irregularities noticed in the implementation of ARWSP included in Report of the

Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year ending 31 March 2001 (Civil),

Government of Rajasthan were found to be still persisting.


• Annual Action Plans should be drawn focusing on incomplete projects, priority for

covering of habitations, water source sustainability.


66 | P a g e

• Government should improve financial management to avoid diversion of funds and

depriving the State of Central assistance.

• Government should ensure the completion of the schemes in time to provide adequate

drinking water to rural population.

• Government should give special emphasis to cover water quality affected habitations.

• To check the over extraction of ground water prompt action should be taken by the

Government and action for sustainability of water sources should be taken to protect the

production capacity of sources.

• Government should strengthen monitoring by appointing hydrologist, geophysicist and

computer specialist and ensure following on recommendation of Public Accounts

Committee.

The matter was reported to the Government in June 2007; reply has not been received

(September 2007).

Performance Audit of Urban water supply in Sikkim.

Performance Audit of Urban Water Supply System revealed non-framing of ‘State Water Policy’ in

line with the ‘National Water Policy’ and absence of long-term perspective planning. Baseline

survey for assessing actual requirement of potable water and preservation of water sources had never

been conducted. Contamination of water was prevalent due to inadequate and ineffective water

treatment and alignment of pipelines through drains and jhoras. Leakages and wastage of water

was rampant as the Department failed to put in place vigilance mechanism to detect un-authorised

connections and wastage of water. There was excess and unnecessary expenditure in execution of

works while beneficiary participation in creation of assets could not be obtained. Water tariff fixed

by the Department was devoid of any cost analysis and revenue collection lax leading to huge gap

between the revenue earned vis-à-vis operation and maintenance costs.

3.5.1 Introduction

The Water Security and Public Health Engineering Department (WS&PHED) is

responsible for ensuring sufficient supply of clean and safe drinking water to all

consumers of the capital town of Gangtok, eight other notified towns37

and 55 Rural

Marketing Centres (RMCs)38

in Sikkim. This primarily involved:

(i) planningand implementation of new water supply schemes/programmes,

(ii) adequate and timely maintenance and repairs of the existing water supply systems and

(iii) developing strategies to meet the increasing demand for water due to population growth,

besides timely formulation of water tariff and collection of revenue.

3.5.2 Organisational set-up

The responsibility of all activities relating to urban water supply system vested with


67 | P a g e

the Principal Chief Engineer-cum-Secretary, Water Security and Public Health

Engineering Department (WS&PHED), supported by an Additional Chief Engineer

at the Headquarters and a number of other engineers and staff.


Records relating to the period from 2001-02 to 2005-06 in the office of the Principal

Chief Engineer-cum-Secretary and three (North-East, Gangtok and Revenue) out of

the five Divisional Engineers‟ offices were reviewed during the Performance Audit

carried out between May and June 2006. About 40 per cent (Rs. 40 crore) of the total

expenditure of Rs. 100 crore on water supply schemes undertaken/ completed during

the period were test-checked in Audit during this period.

3.5.4 Audit Objective

The primary objective of the Performance Audit was to assess the efficiency and

effectiveness of various programmes in the WS&PHE Department in ensuring

supply of sufficient and safe drinking water to the consumers. This entailed assessing

and verifying whether:

• The State Water Policy was formulated and implemented in an efficacious manner;

• Sustainability of the water sources was ensured;

• Adequate treatment facility existed for ensuring prescribed drinking water quality;

• Infrastructure maintenance / up-gradation was adequate;

• Works were executed economically, efficiently and effectively; and

• Monitoring, evaluation and vigilance mechanism was adequate, efficient and effective.


For arriving at conclusions against the above Audit objectives, the following criteria

were adopted in Audit:

• Targets and milestones set in the policy pronouncements of the Government,

• Norms / scale for discharge capacity of water sources and requirement of water per

consumer as prescribed,

• Treatment as per prescribed norms for ensuring quality,

• Codal provisions for execution of works, and

• Norms / standards for replacement/ up-gradation and maintenance of assets.


The Performance Audit process began with group discussions (February 2006) with

various stake holders, followed by selection of sample based on multistage sampling

combining simple random sampling and probability proportionate to size


68 | P a g e

(expenditure). Before commencement of the field Audit, Audit engagement letter

(April 2006) was sent to the Department followed by entry conference (May 2006)

wherein the broad performance indicators and criteria for evaluating implementation

of the water supply system were discussed and agreed to.

Questionnaires were issued on various aspects like targets, achievement and status of

various water supply projects etc. The data provided by the Department was

analysed with reference to original records in three divisional offices and head office

and discussed with senior officers of the Department. At the end of the Audit, exit

conference was held (September 2006) and the report finalised after taking into

consideration the views of the Department during the exit conference.

Auditfindings

3.5.7 Policy and planning

A National Water Policy (NWP) adopted in September 1987 and reviewed and

updated in April 2002 inter alia envisaged formulation of State Water Policy (SWP)

backed by an operational action plan to achieve the desired objective of provision of

safe drinking water to entire population. The State Government, however, had

neither formulated a SWP nor worked out any long term perspective plan to build

capacity for increased demand in future. Besides, no base line survey was ever

conducted to assess the present and future requirements of water given the

population growth and expansion of urban conglomerates. Absence of policy

directives resulted in the following deficiencies:

3.5.7.1 No annual targets fixed

The WS&PHED did not have annual targets for accomplishing various works (new

construction, up-gradation and maintenance) since there was no long term

perspective plan in place. Audit analysis revealed that even the broad based targets

(institutional reforms, preparation of master plan, outsourcing revenue collection, contain

leakages and establishment of water testing laboratories in all districts) mentioned in the

State Plan documents (2002-07) were not achieved as of September 2006. There was

no time frame set by the Department as to when each of these targets would be met.

The Department while accepting the Audit observation stated (September 2006) that

necessary steps would be initiated to formulate SWP, master plan, institutional

reforms and establishment of laboratories.

3.5.7.2 Misplaced priority

In terms of population coverage, the capital town of Gangtok was shown as „fully

covered’ while the seven notified towns and 34 Rural Marketing Centres (out of 55)

were shown as „partially covered’. But despite the fact that there was still some

coverage to be done / achieved, the Department took up construction of water

fountain and beautification works like laying of tiles and compound lighting etc. at

Selep in Gangtok for Rs. 71.50 lakh during 2005-06. This indicated misplaced

priorities by the Department in its planning.


69 | P a g e

3.5.7.3 Preservation of water sources

The water supply systems of the State were based on snow-fed rivers and mountain

streams which were sensitive to pollution, population growth and environmental

degradation. Audit scrutiny revealed that the Department had not conducted any

detailed study to record the gradual decline in the yield of water from the sources and

had not initiated any tangible action for preservation of ecology and water sources.

3.5.7.4 Non-metering of consumers

Sikkim Water Supply and Water Tax Act 1986 stipulated fixation of water charges

for supply of water under the Act on metered basis or on the basis of number of taps

installed. The Department chose to fix water charges on the basis of number of taps

installed rather than on metered consumption although the former had several well

known inherent deficiencies.

The Government fixed (Notification dated 3 October 2001) water charges on

metered basis at the rate of Rs. 3 per 1,000 litres (minimum) for industrial units,

commercial establishments and residential premises where the Department made

bulk supply of water. In terms of the notification, water meters were to be procured

and installed by the consumers themselves. The average consumption of water per

capita per day for urban areas was estimated at 135 litres by the Department, which

translated to 4,050 litres per capita per month, indicating bulk consumption. At this

rate, annual water consumption for the year 2005–06 would be 60,750 lakh litres for

a population of 1.25 lakh of Gangtok. The revenue from water charges for the year

2005-06 would, therefore, work out to Rs. 1.82 crore, if realised on metered basis.

Against this, the revenue realised on the prevailing tap based tariff for the year 2005-

06 was only Rs. 30.53 lakh – a difference of Rs. 1.51 crore in one year alone.

Metering of domestic connections was also recommended (February 2005) in a

report by AUSAID39

. However, the Department had failed to adopt a clear policy on

this issue so far.

In reply, the Department stated (September 2006) that metering of the water supply

system of Gangtok would be taken up once the detailed project report submitted to

Asian Development Bank for funding was cleared.

3.5.7.5 Revenue generation vis-à-vis O & M cost

Scrutiny revealed that the methodology adopted by the Department to fix water

charges was not based on an analysis of the operating cost, depreciation and assets

replacement cost vis-à-vis the anticipated revenue. Tariff structures were neither

revised periodically nor did the Department/Government fix any norms for such

regular revision. During 2001-02 to 2005-06, water tariff was revised only once

(October 2001). Thus there was a huge gap between the operation & maintenance

cost (not including depreciation) and the corresponding revenue realised as indicated

below:

Table- 3.5.1


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(Rupees in lakh)

Particulars 2001-

02

2002-

03

2003-

04

2004-

05

2005-06 Total

O & M 320.20 325.26 417.94 334.71 332.46 1,730.57

Revenue 38.34 57.29 56.96 73.71 80.69 306.99 Difference 281.86 267.97 360.98 261.00 251.77 1,423.58

Source: Detailed Appropriation Accounts and Finance Accounts

It was seen that while formulating the water supply schemes, the Department

invariably projected a favourable cost benefit ratio on the basis of which the projects

were sanctioned by the funding agencies. However, in reality, the Department did

not take resolute steps to translate the projections into a reality leading to gap

between the revenue earned and the O & M cost and consequential huge financial

liability of Rs. 14.24 crore during the five year period alone.

3.5.7.6 Leakage / wastage of water

The Department had not fixed any norms for probable maximum quantity of leakage

from a water supply system. The ‘Gangtok Water Supply System’, supplied 30 to 36

million litres per day (mld) of water for catering to the requirement of the city. For

the Gangtok population of 1.25 lakh the requirement of water per day would be

16.86 mld40

at the rate of 135 lpcd41

.

Thus 13.14 mld of water, which constituted 44 per cent of the minimum daily

discharge (30 mld) from the treatment plant was unaccounted for. Similarly, the

loss/leakage of water from systems in the other towns and RMCs ranged from 7 to

80 per cent of the quantity of water released from the respective sources.

The Central Public Health & Environmental Engineering Organisation norm for

leakage / loss was 10 per cent. Compared to this norm, the loss/leakage/pilferage of

water at 44 per cent for Gangtok and 20 to 80 per cent for other towns and RMCs was

abnormally high. The Department had not put in a policy to mitigate the problem by

installation of bulk meters at various points in the feeder lines, strengthening of

vigilance and surveillance mechanism etc.

In reply, the Department stated (September 2006) that after completion of the

ongoing augmentation works wastage/leakages in Gangtok would be minimised and

similar exercise shall be carried out in other towns and RMCs in a phased manner.

3.5.8 Budget and Financial Management

Budget estimates, actual expenditure, savings and excess figures under revenue and

capital head during the period from 2001-02 to 2005-06 were as under:

Table- 3.5.2

(Rupees in lakh)

Year Budget on Act ual Saving (- (+)


71 | P a g e

Expenditu

re

)/Excess

Revenue Capita

l

Provis

i

Total Revenu

e

Capital Total Revenue Capital Total

2001-

02

521.15 976.32 1,497.

47

520.44 974.30 1,494.7

4

-0.71

(0.14)

-2.02 (0.21) -2.73

(0.18)

2002-

03

543.45 1,031.

01

1,574.

46

541.00 1,030.85 1,571.8

5

-2.45

(0.45)

-0.16 (0.02) -2.61

(0.17)

2003-

04

661.62 966.87 1,628.

49

663.02 893.43 1,556.4

5

1.40

(0.21)

-73.44

(7.59)

-72.04

(4.42)

2004-

05

352.55 2,183.

12

2,535.

67

349.93 2,186.92 2,536.8

5

-2.62

(0.74)

3.80 (0.17) 1.18

(0.05)

2005-

06

603.18 2,413.

13

3,016.

31

609.93 2,201.92 2,811.8

5

6.75

(1.12)

-211.21

(8.75)

-204.46

(6.78)

Total 2681.95 7570.4

5

10252.

40

2684.32 7287.42 9971.7

4

2.37 -283.03 -280.66

Source: Appropriation Accounts. Figures in brackets represent percentage

Analysis of budgetary and financial management revealed the following defects:

3.5.8.1 Significant savings

Significant savings of Rs. 0.72 crore during 2003-04 and Rs. 2.04 crore in 2005-06

was due to delayed/non-receipt (December 2003) of funds from GOI.

3.5.8.2 Substantial committed liability

The Department incurred substantial financial liability year after year without

adequate budgetary support in contravention of the State Public Works Code leading

to accumulated committed liability increasing from Rs. 57.74 lakh in 2001-02 to Rs.

1.10 crore in 2003-04. It however dipped thereafter to Rs. 92.18 lakh in 2004-05 and

Rs. 28.23 lakh in 2005-0642

. The spending Department as well as the Finance,

Revenue and Expenditure Department failed to impose any restriction on creation of

liabilities beyond the approved allocation indicating inadequate budgetary control.

The Department stated (September 2006) that it shall be more vigilant in future.

3.5.9 Implementation of Projects/Schemes

During the period 2001-06, the Department had undertaken 43 schemes/projects for

execution, out of which 28 were completed and 15 were under progress (ranging

between 20 to 99 per cent of completion) as of March 2006. Out of the above, 14 projects

were selected for scrutiny in Audit; the results are enumerated in the succeeding

paragraphs:

3.5.9.1 Avoidable wasteful expenditure on abandonment of Rangpo Water Supply System

due to faulty design

The Department took up (January 2003) the “augmentation of the Rangpo water

supply system by lifting water from Rangpo Khola” at an estimated cost of Rs. 1.31

crore though it was fully aware of the design flaw issues in the new venture pointed


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out (July 2001) to it by the Principal Secretary-cum-Development Commissioner,

Planning and Development Department. A similar project by the Animal Husbandry

& Veterinary Services (AH & VS) Department had also failed in the past. The result

was that while the civil works and procurement of pipes and fittings were

progressing, the entire foundation work of the Pumping Station and the intake

structure were damaged due to flooding of the river during May 2003, as initially

apprehended. To make good the damage and ensure viability of the project, the

Department proposed revision of the original estimates of Rs. 1.31 crore to Rs. 1.87

crore by making extensive changes to the scope of work. The revised proposal was

however turned down (January 2004) by NABARD and in the absence of fund, the

project was suspended after incurring Rs. 1.02 crore. The Additional Chief Engineer

also proposed (September 2005) closure of the project. No decision on the matter had

been taken as of September 2006. Thus, despite failure of AH & VS in similar project

and knowing there was design flaws the Department went ahead with the Rangpo

water supply System rendering the whole expenditure as wasteful.

3.5.9.2 Irregular and excess contingency provision

The Department irregularly inflated the contingency provision to Rs. 1.16 crore (13

per cent of the work value) as against the stipulated provision of 3 per cent (Rs. 26.13

lakh) as per the Sikkim Public Works Code, in case of the „Augmentation of

Gangtok Water Supply Scheme, Phase – II‟ project thereby making excess provision

of Rs. 89.79 lakh. This excess amount was diverted in meeting expenditure on

muster roll, maintenance of sewerage system and buildings, etc which were not

related to the project.

3.5.9.3 Avoidable excess projection of expenditure in carpeting works

The project „Augmentation of Gangtok Water Supply Scheme, Phase – II‟ envisaged

carpeting of damaged road surfaces wherever the pipelines were laid along the roads

for total length of 14,150 metres in 28 sub-works. However, in the analysis of costs

for carpeting works, the width of the surface to be carpeted was taken as 100 cm

instead of 60 cm (actual width of the trench), thereby unduly inflating the quantities of

labour and materials consumed and incurring excess expenditure of Rs. 22.64 lakh.

3.5.9.4 Excess purchase of sockets

In addition to procurement of pipes for laying of water supply lines, the Department

also purchased sockets for connecting the pipes. Test check revealed that all the pipes

procured by the Department invariably came with a socket attached at one end. The

Department, however, never took into account the sockets that came with the pipes

and instead procured additional sockets worth Rs. 24.87 lakh during the year 2001-

02 to 2005-06 leading to extra expenditure as there was no requirement for additional

sockets for joining the pipes.

In reply, Department stated (September 2006) that cutting of pipes to shorter lengths

at places necessitated additional sockets. The reply is not tenable as the Department


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had never taken into account the sockets already available with pipes when newly

purchased, as seen during scrutiny of their purchase proposals.

3.5.9.5 Estimation of quantity of steel for RCC works

Audit scrutiny revealed that in all nine43

schemes out of 14 involving construction of

RCC structures, the method of estimation of steel by the Department was

fundamentally flawed as the detailed drawings of RCC structures and the bar bending

schedules44

as prescribed in principles of civil engineering were never prepared.

Resultantly, the Department used different quantities of steel per unit volume of

RCC in different schemes within the same State for the same type of work as can be

seen from the table below:

Table-3.5.3

Sl

1.

2.

3.4.

Item of work

RCC sedimentation

tanks Intake tanks

Reservoir/

distribution tanks

Distribution

chambers

Requirement of steel

130 kg per cum (1 case) , 160 kg per cum (2 cases) and

192.44 kg per cum (3 cases). 160 kg per cum (1 case), 130

kg per cum (4 cases) and 128 kg per cum (2 cases) 160 kg

per cum (5 cases) and 130 kg per cum (1 case) 82 kg per

cum, 110 kg per cum and 130 kg per cum

In reply, the Department stated (September 2006) that the quantity of steel varied

widely from 47 to 300 kg/cum of concrete and the same was permissible under

Indian Standard Code of Practice for re-enforced concrete works. The reply was not

tenable as it did not explain the reasons for such a wide variation, particularly when

all these structures were built for similar purposes in almost similar terrain.


Water supplied to public must be potable from the point of view of its chemical,

physical and biological characteristics. The Department was, however, found

wanting in this respect despite substantial investments so far in this sector during the

period under Audit as is evident from following observations:

3.5.10.1 Pre distribution treatment

The Department had not attached the desired importance to pre-distributed water

treatment as out of 35 water supply systems in the State, only five had full water

treatment facilities (with sedimentation, filtration and disinfection) while the remaining 30

systems had partial treatment facilities (physical application of bleaching powder and alum

only). Inadequate treatment of water was fraught with the risk of health hazard,

outbreak of water borne diseases, etc. Audit point was borne out by the fact that

instances of water borne diseases like diarrhoea, gastroenteritis, cholera afflicting


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42,843, 48,573 and 50,617 persons resulting in five, two and one death had come to

notice of the Health Department of the State Government during 2003, 2004 and

2005 respectively due to consumption of contaminated water. In reply, the WS &

PHED stated (September 2006) that it would provide full treatment facilities for all

the systems under its purview in a phased manner as per availability of resources. But

Audit scrutiny revealed that the Department had not made any time bound plan for

achieving the same.

3.5.10.2 Ineffective water treatment

Scrutiny of test reports of Central Water Testing Laboratory, Selep for 34 months

between June 2002 to October 2005 revealed bacterial contamination of water in one

or the other consumer points in the reports of as many as 30 months indicating

ineffective treatment of bacteriological contamination. This rendered the expenditure

on chemicals, salaries and wages of chemist, lab attendants and the equipments

largely ineffective. Similarly, test reports (June 2002) in respect of Mangan, Phodong

and Chungthang in the North District also indicated bacteriological contamination.

In reply, the Department stated (September 2006) that the consumers lines were laid

through jhoras and drains which may probably be the source of contamination for

which remedial measures had been initiated. However as of September 2006, no

progress could be seen during physical verification by the departmental officials in

the presence of Audit.

3.5.10.3 En-route contamination of water

Survey (November 2002) conducted under the Aus-aid project indicated coliform

contamination of water leading to high gastro-intestinal related morbidity. Physical

verification by Audit in the presence of Departmental Officers confirmed the enroute

contamination of water due to cross-contamination between sewer lines and drains

with water lines as can be seen from the photograph below:

While accepting the Audit observation, the Department assured (September 2006) to

initiate action for removal of consumer supply lines from the jhoras / drains to

mitigate the problem.

3.5.11 People participation and recovery of charges

With a view to inculcate a sense of participation and ownership, it is widely

advocated to ensure beneficiary participation and recover user charges so as to offset

O&M cost to the maximum extent possible. The GOI guidelines on Accelerated

Urban Water Supply Programme (AUWSP) stipulated 5 per cent beneficiary

contribution towards creation of water supply systems. The Department was found

wanting in this respect as elucidated in the following paragraphs:

3.5.11.1 Recovery of beneficiary contribution


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The Department proposed (June 2000) to proportionately offset 5 per cent of

estimated cost as community participation by way of carriage of materials, land

donation, shram daan etc. while implementing AUWSP in Jorethang and Singtam at

an expenditure of Rs. 4.62 crore (Singtam -Rs. 1.26 crore, Jorethang – Rs. 3.36 crore)

during 2002-04. However, during actual execution, the Department failed to achieve

this and instead incurred an expenditure of Rs. 23.10 lakh. During 2004-05, in a

water supply scheme implemented under the Aus-Aid project in the Arithang area of

Gangtok, a local NGO (ECOSS) could offset 30 per cent (Rs. 23.44 lakh) of the

project cost (Rs. 77.33 lakh) through the community participation whereas the

Department failed to seek the full and unequivocal support and participation of the

beneficiary communities.

The Department could have saved Rs. 3.64 crore (5 per cent of Rs. 72.70 crore)45

during the period 2001-06 had it ensured community participation. Reply of the

Department (September 2006) that people‟s participation was realised through

donation of land is not tenable as no value was mentioned for land and no

community participation in the form of labour was taken. As mentioned above the

NGO managed to offset 30 per cent of the cost in case of the Aus-aid project.

3.5.11.2 Arrears of revenue

As mentioned in preceding paragraph, every consumer was billed on the basis of the

number of taps and was required to pay the water charges every month. It was,

however, noticed that the Revenue divisions of the Department had failed to collect

the revenue in time from the consumers leading to substantial increase in arrears of

revenue from Rs. 52.40 lakh in 2001-02 to Rs. 56.57 lakh as of March 2006. The

major defaulter was Gangtok sub-division (Rs.

32.52 lakh) followed by Namchi sub-division (Rs. 11.53 lakh).

The huge arrear of revenue is indicative of the lackadaisical approach of

departmental authority to ensure timely collection of Government revenue.

3.5.12 Monitoring and Evaluation

The Department had not created any monitoring and evaluation cell till date. There

was no central authority within the Department to independently monitor the

schemes and evaluate their effectiveness. There was no periodic inspection of supply

connections to consumers to detect cases of unauthorised connections, leakages and

losses of water despite presence of adequate staff (JEs & AEs) to do the same. The

level of oversight required to be exercised at the highest level (PCE-cum-Secretary

and Additional Chief Engineers) was also found inadequate. It was seen that the

monthly progress reports furnished to Planning & Development Department and the

Chief Minister‟s office were mostly incomplete as vital information like scheduled

date of commencement of projects, actual date of commencement and completion,

revised cost of works, reasons for delay and cost revision etc were not mentioned in

most cases.


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In reply, the Department agreed (September 2006) to set up a monitoring and

evaluation cell.

The Department had also not undertaken any evaluation of its water supply systems

during the last five years to assess whether the consumers were being supplied with

sufficient drinking water and to identify weak areas and take consequent remedial

actions. A study conducted (February 2005) by Aus-aid on Gangtok water Supply

systems, inter alia, concluded that there was very high incidence of unauthorised

connections, leakage / wastage of water and cross contamination of water with drain

and sewer lines.

3.5.12.1 Inventory of Assets

The Department had not evolved any system of asset accounting in the form of Asset

Registers. Due to this deficiency, an accurate track of assets created by the

Department since inception till date could not be made available to Audit. It was

also not clear how the Department calculated its budget estimate and how it

monitored the requirement of regular maintenance/ replacement to its assets

suffering erosion due to time and usage in the absence of a comprehensive listing of

its assets.

In reply, the Department stated (September 2006) that it shall initiate the work in this

regard during the current financial year itself.

3.5.12.2 Testing for quality of material

There was no system in the Department to conduct test to determine the quality of

materials like pipes and fittings, steel, cement, sand and stone aggregates used

extensively in construction of the projects. No quality testing laboratory was

established in the State till date. In reply, Department stated that it was proposing to

establish a testing laboratory during 11th

Plan period.

3.5.12.3 Vigilance mechanism to detect un-authorised connections

Survey conducted (February 2005) under Aus-aid project indicated a very high

incidence of un-authorised connections, against the Department‟s assessment of un-

authorised connections of 17 per cent (1,676 nos.). Despite the above facts, the

Department had not constituted any vigilance mechanism towards regular vigil and

detection of un-authorised connections although the Department was not short of

manpower. Detection and regularisation of unauthorised connections could have

earned the Department minimum recurring revenue of Rs. 6.23 lakh per annum

calculated at the minimum rate of Rs. 31 per connection per month.

In reply, the Department stated (September 2006) that unauthorised connections

were being checked and would be eliminated by the next two years.

3.5.13 Conclusion

The Water Security and Public Health Engineering Department failed to conduct baseline


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survey for assessing the actual requirement and usage of water by the consumers. As

contamination of water was prevalent due to inadequate and ineffective water treatment and

alignment of pipelines through drains and jhoras, the quality of water supplied to the

consumers also could not be assured. Due to absence of an effective monitoring and vigilance

mechanism, un-authorised connections, leakage / wastage of water continued unchecked.


Following recommendations are made:

The Department should take immediate steps to:

• Expedite formulation of a State Water Policy;

• Conduct baseline survey and prepare master plan for future planning;

• Prioritise activities to accord utmost priority to uncovered areas;

• Improve water quality to supply hygienic and safe water by adequate pre-distribution

treatment and prevent en-route contamination;

• Introduce volumetric tariff for making the Department a self sustaining entity;

• Inculcate sense of participation and ownership among the users by realising

beneficiaries contribution and publicise all its programme;

• Evolve system of asset accounting in the form of Asset Registers;

• In respect of projects completed and in progress it should display information as

required in the Right to Information Act.


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Performance Audit of Conservation and Management of Dal Lake (2006)

Housing and Urban Development, Jammu and Kashmir

3.2 Conservation and Management of Dal Lake

Dal Lake has been playing a major role in the economy of the State by attracting tourists

and by providing a means of livelihood for a large number of people. This review focuses

on the effectiveness of implementation of the Programmes relating to Lake conservation

and rehabilitation by the State Government.

Highlights

The open area of the Lake had reduced to 12 square kilometers (2006) from 24

square kilometers (1962) and its average depth had also reduced to three meters,

with no significant improvement in overall health of the Lake despite incurring

expenditure of Rs. 235.70 crore. Problems like excessive weed growth,

deterioration in the water quality, discharge of sewage/nutrients into the Lake

body and deposition of silt persisted. (Paragraphs: 3.2.1 and 3.2.10)

Under the Lake Conservation Programme, against the target of acquiring 4,580

kanals of hamlet land and 3,741 structures, only 590 kanals of land (13 per cent) and

528 structures (14 per cent) had been acquired as of March 2006. (Paragraph:

3.2.10.1)

Failure of the Jammu and Kashmir Lakes and Waterways Development

Authorityto ascertain the use of the acquired land in the Master Plan of the

Srinagar City prior to its acquisition, rendered expenditure of Rs. 8.32 crore

unfruitful, besides adversely affecting the evacuation programme of the Lake

dwellers. (Paragraph: 3.2.10.1)

Despite undertaking Catchment Area Management Works, the rate at which the

silt had entered the Lake had increased from 7,254 tonnes per year (between

August 1998 and August 2003) to 22,354 tonnes per year (between September 2003

and August 2005). (Paragraph: 3.2.10.2)

Due to destruction of their breeding ground and other environmental stress, the

fish species had undergone decrease in their size and population. (Paragraph:

3.2.10.3)

The Authority did not prepare an inventory of assets/liabilities inherited by it


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from the Urban Environmental Engineering Department, nor was the status of

on-going works obtained from the implementing divisions. (Paragraph: 3.2.15)

3.2.1 Introduction

Kashmir Valley is gifted with a number of natural water bodies having great

ecological and socio-economic significance. Dal Lake, one of such natural bodies is

said to be the cradle of Kashmir civilization and has played a major role in the

economy of the State by attracting tourists and also conduct of agricultural activities

like nelumbium♥

cultivation, harvesting typhus for mat weaving, etc. In addition,

people within its periphery live in houseboats and hamlets and also perform

agricultural activities on hamlets.

With the coming up of commercial establishments in and around its periphery, direct

discharge of sewage and waste water into it, denudation of its catchment area and

inflow of silt have adversely affected the health of the Lake and has resulted in water

pollution and reduction in its water expanse from 24 square kilometers (1962) to

11.98 square kilometers∝

(2006). The average depth of the Lake had also reduced to

three meters. Problems like excessive weed growth, deterioration in the water

quality, direct discharge of sewage and nutrients into the Lake body and deposition

of silt persisted. Treatment of its catchment area too had shown no positive results,

as inflow of silt from the area into the Lake body continued. According to a Survey

conducted (2005) by the State Pollution Control Board (SPCB), the Lake was rapidly

turning into marshy area due to the presence of large quantity of nutrients, which

increase plant life and cause environmental damage, resulting in dying of the Lake.

3.2.2 Implementation of Dal Lake Conservation Project

With a view to improving the water quality of the lake and also saving it from further

degradation, the State Government launched the Project “Conservation of Dal-

Nigeen Lake” in 1977. The work on the Project was started in 1978-79 and was

implemented through the State Urban Environment Engineering Department

(UEED) up to 1996-97. During March 1997, the Project was transferred to the

Jammu and Kashmir Lakes and Waterways Development Authority; (Authority)

created during 1997 in pursuance of Jammu and Kashmir Development Act, 1970,

and was also included in the „National Lakes Conservation Plan‟ (NLCP) under the

Ministry of Environment and Forest (MOEF), Government of India (GOI).

The Authority conceived (August 1997) two Programmes viz. Lake Conservation

Programme and the Rehabilitation Programme. The salient features of the

Programme are:

Lake Conservation Programme

• Evacuation of the hamlet population by acquiring propriety land of the lake

dwellers alongwith the structures erected thereon, and restoring the area to the


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Lake sewerage treatment,solid waste management, water quality monitoring

desilting, dredging and weed control and Catchment Management

Rehabilitation Programme

• Acquisition of the watery area, surrounding the hamlets

• Resettlement of the dislocated hamlet population in new housing colonies.

3.2.3 Organisational Structure

The Authority, under the administrative control of the Housing and Urban

Development Department, is managed by a Board comprising nine members

including the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, appointed by the Government. The

day-to-day activities are looked after by the Vice-Chairman, assisted by various

Officers.


The performance of the Jammu and Kashmir Lakes and Waterways Authority in

implementation of programmes aimed at saving the Lake from further degradation,

covering the period 1997-2006, was reviewed in audit during 2005-06.


Audit of the Authority was undertaken with a view to assessing:

• whether the Projects were designed carefully after adequate planning the impact of implementation of the Conservation and Rehabilitation Programmes;

• Effectiveness of measures taken to curb direct discharge of sewage and solid waste into the Lake;

• Effectiveness of the steps taken to improve the quality of water of the Lake; and

• Whether adequate financial controls existed in the Authority.


Performance of the Authority was assessed against the following audit criteria:

• Provisions of the Project Report and National Lakes Conservation Plan

• Projections in the Survey reports and plan documents

• Targets fixed for conservation and rehabilitation programmes

3.2.7 Audit Methodology

Audit evidence was collected through a test-check of the records of the Authority

(pertaining to the Lake Divisions–I and II, Mechanical Division, Land Acquisition

and Monitoring Laboratory), UEED, MOEF, Draft Project Report, Watershed

Management, Agenda notes, and other records like, cashbooks, vouchers, stock

registers, etc. In addition, Survey Reports of the State Pollution Control Board,

Central Soil Salinity Research Institute, Karnal and Alternate Hydro Energy Centre,


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Roorke were also examined. Records for test-check were selected on a random

sampling basis.

Besides, the Audit team also conducted (August 2006) a Survey to have a first hand

knowledge about the impact of the Rehabilitation programme with respect to

resettlement of the dislocated families in new housing colonies. The Survey was

based on audio-visual tapes and written statements obtained from the representatives

of about 30 families, who had either been resettled in new housing colonies or were

expected to shift to new places.

The Audit Plan and the Audit Objectives were discussed in the entry conference held

with the Vice Chairperson of the Authority. Audit conclusions arrived at in the

performance review were also discussed (October 2006) with the Commissioner

Secretary, Housing and Urban Development Department and the Vice Chairperson

of the Authority in the exit conference. The replies of the Authority have been

incorporated in the relevant paragraphs, where appropriate.

3.2.8 Project Planning and Funding Pattern

The programme on Lake Conservation was initially (1997) proposed to be funded on

70:30 pattern (70 per cent by the Central Government and 30 per cent by the State

Government). From June 2003, the Central Government decided to wholly finance

the programme. The Detailed Project Report (DPR) on the programme was prepared

by the Authority through the Alternate Hydro Energy Centre, Roorkee (AHEC) in

October 2000 and was approved by the Central Government (MOEF) in September

2005. The project was estimated to cost Rs. 298.76 crore and the target date of its

completion is 2010.

The Rehabilitation Programme was the responsibility of the State Government. The

programme was approved by the State Government in May 2001 at an estimated

cost of Rs. 135 crore.

3.2.9 Financial Management

Prior to the approval of the Project Report by the MOEF, the Planning Commission

released (1997-98 to 2001-02) Rs. 106.68 crore to the State Government as

Additional Central Assistance for Lake Conservation Programme. In November

2005, an amount of Rs 40 crore was released by the MOEF to the Authority.

Besides, the State Government released Rs. 26.13 crore to the Authority between

1997-98 and 2005-06.

The expenditure on Direction and Administration varying between 17 and 60 per cent

of the expenditure on conservation was on the higher side compared to establishment

charges of 7.5 per cent recovered by the Public Works Department for execution of

Government works. The Authority stated (October 2006) that increase in the

expenditure on Direction and Administration was due to increase in the pay and

allowances of the employees, and that the matter was being seriously watched.


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3.2.9.1 Non preparation of Accounts

In terms of Section 21 of the Jammu and Kashmir Development Act, 1970, the

Authority was required to prepare annual accounts in consultation with the auditor

to be appointed by the Government. The Authority, despite having a full fledged

Accounts Wing, had not prepared its accounts, nor had engaged chartered

accountants, indicating laxity. In the absence of the finalised accounts, its financial

position and details of assets/liabilities could not be ascertained. Non-preparation of

accounts is also fraught with the risk of irregularities, frauds, etc. going undetected.

The Authority had also not prepared the accounting manual nor had prescribed the

accounting procedures, thereby violating the provisions of the Act. The Authority

stated (October 2006) that the accounts could not be prepared due to the absence of

the financial mechanism required for commercial pattern of accounts, and that the

Government had been requested (January 2006) to appoint a chartered accountant,

which had not been done till date.

The Office Complex of the Authority was gutted in February 2005, in which the

records of the Authority including cash books, vouchers, etc. were destroyed. The

records had not been reconstructed as of March 2006. The Authority stated (October

2006) that efforts were afoot to reconstruct the records.

3.2.10 Impact of the Programmes

Up to March 1997, the UEED spent Rs. 72 crore on the developmental activities of

the Lake. The Authority incurred a further amount of Rs. 163.70 crore between

1997-98 and 2005-06, as detailed in Table-3.8 above. The Authority contends

(October 2006) that there was improvement in the health of the Lake, due to various

measures taken by it. The reply is not tenable, as despite incurring an aggregate

expenditure of Rs. 235.70 crore by the UEED and the Authority, there was no

significant improvement in the overall health of the Lake, as discussed in the

succeeding paragraphs.

3.2.10.1 Reduction in the Water Expanse

There were 58 hamlets •

within the Lake, situated towards its western shore. About

6,550 families resided aboard these hamlets, and had proprietary rights over 6,000

kanals of hamlet land within the Lake and 14,547 kanals of watery land (water area).

These lake dwellers undertake agricultural activities on these hamlets and in the

process reclaim the Lake area by filling or by converting floating gardens♠

into hard

landmass and raise structures thereon. This contributes to the shrinkage of the Lake

area, besides causing deterioration in its water quality, as the sewage/solid wastes

generated by the hamlet population is discharged directly into the Lake body. In this

connection, it is pertinent to mention that the Finance Minister of the State had in

his budget speech (March 2005) set a target of increasing the clear water expanse of

the Lake area by about three square kilometers during 2005-06.

The Lake Conservation Programme envisaged acquisition of hamlet land alongwith


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the structures erected thereon and restoration of the area to the Lake body. It was

however observed in audit that the pace of implementation of the programme was

unsatisfactory. Against the target of acquiring 4,580 kanals of hamlet land and 3,741

structures by March 2006, only 590 kanals of land (13 per cent) and 528 structures (14

per cent) had been acquired (March 2006) at an expenditure of Rs. 20.80 crore. It was

also observed that the area so acquired could not be restored to the Lake body except

at Gadda Mohalla (where 38 structures had been raised), as the property had been

acquired at isolated spots in a sporadic manner instead of in clusters. As a result,

inspite of incurring an expenditure of Rs. 20.80 crore, the programme objectives

could not be achieved in full rendering the expenditure largely unfruitful.

The Dal dwellers had proprietary rights of watery land within the Lake. To prevent

the dislocated dwellers from returning to the Lake and filling up this watery land for

residential/agricultural purposes, it was proposed (January 1999) to acquire 14,547

kanals of watery area under the Rehabilitation Programme. However, against the

target of acquiring 14,547 kanals, only 1,055 kanals had been acquired as of March

2006.

Besides, against 11,000 plots required (January 1999) for rehabilitation of the hamlet

population, the Authority had only 1,539 plots (March 2006) at Bemina, Panch

Kherwari, Botakadal, Agro Bagh, Devdebagh, JKPCC Bagh, Habibullah Nowshehri

Colony and Habak. The Authority identified (January 1999) 7831 kanals of land at

Chandpora, Telbal, Harwan and Pazwalpora to develop as Colonies for

rehabilitation of the Lake dwellers. The land could not be put to any use, as the sites

were declared „green belt area‟ in the Master Plan of Srinagar City. The Authority

informed (October 2006) that the State Government had recently allotted 7526 kanals

and 7 marlas of land at Rakh-i-Arth, which could help in expediting the process of

resettlement and rehabilitation.

According to the Authority records•

, out of 1,539 plots, only 1,252 plots were allotted

to the beneficiaries prior to March 1999. Out of the remaining 87 plots, 65 were

converted into play fields, ten were annexed to Imambada, eight were undersized,

three were under illegal occupation and one plot was converted into a graveyard.

The Authority had not initiated action to get the illegal occupants evicted. The

remaining 200 plots had not been allotted (March 2006).

Similarly, the Authority acquired 581 kanals and 6 Marlas of land during July 1997

and October 2003 (cost: Rs. 8.32 crore) at Guptganga and Chandpora. The land was,

however, not allotted to the dwellers as these sites were also declared as green belt

area in the Master Plan of Srinagar City. Failure of the Authority to ascertain the use

of the acquired land in the Master Plan of the Srinagar City prior to acquisition,

rendered the expenditure of Rs. 8.32 crore unfruitful, besides adversely affecting the

evacuation programme of the Lake dwellers. The Authority, while admitting slow

progress in Rehabilitation and Resettlement Programmes, stated (October 2006) that

the State Government had agreed to change the land use of 550 kanals of land at


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Chandpora. Further developments in the matter are awaited. (November 2006).

3.2.10.2 Reduction in the depth of the Lake

According to the Project Report on Lake Conservation Programme, the catchment

area of the Lake was 314 square kilometers, of which 148 square kilometers had been

identified as prone to soil erosion. As per this Report, about 15 tonnes of

phosphorus, 323 tonnes of nitrogen and 80 thousand tonnes of silt flow into the Lake

annually, especially through Telbal Nallah. The inflow of nutrients and silt into the

Lake results in excessive growth of weed and silt deposition, which reduce the depth

of the Lake and also cause shrinkage of the water expanse.

With a view to checking soil erosion and reducing the sediment and nutrient flow

into the Lake, the Authority had incurred (up to March 2006) Rs. 7.54 crore on

catchment conservation works since its inception. Also, to arrest the inflow of silt

through Telbal Nallah, a Settling basin, to act as silt arrester was commissioned in

1997-98 to allow flowing of decanted water into the Lake. The Authority spent a

further amount of Rs. 7.59 crore on the Settling basin up to the end of March 2006.

According to the Authority (October 2006), 99 square kilometers of the catchment

area had been treated from the erosion point of view through the Soil Conservation

Department. It was further stated that, with the installation of the Settling basin,

there had been reduction in the silt inflow to the Lake by 20 per cent, and that there

was further scope in the reduction of silt inflow with the increase in age and quantum

of afforestation. It was however, observed in audit that the rate at which the silt had

entered the Lake had increased from 7,254 tonnes per year (between August 1998

and August 2003) to 22,354 tonnes per year (between September 2003 and August

2005). Also, according to the DPR, the efficiency of the Settling basin had varied

between 7 and 54 per cent only, from May 1998 to June 2000. The Authority also

stated (October 2006) that no Catchment Management Works were undertaken by it

during 2003-2006, but were initiated in 2006-07. However, according to the

Expenditure Statement of the Authority, an amount of Rs. 1.05 crore had already

been shown as spent on Catchment Management Works during 2003-2006.

3.2.10.3 Excessive Weed Growth

Indiscriminate disposal of sewage and solid wastes into the Lake is the major cause

of contamination of its waters. According to the Survey conducted by the State

Pollution Control Board (SPCB) in December 2005, there was deterioration in the

water quality of the Lake due to the discharge of untreated wastes from human

settlements living in the peripheral areas of the Lake, houseboats, shikaras and

hamlets. While organic constituents present in the solid wastes cause depletion of

dissolved oxygen in its waters, the inorganic constituents add to the nutrient content,

thereby resulting in excessive weed growth. The Authority stated (October 2006) that

a Restoration and Management Plan had been framed to remedy the problem.

Undesirable level of organic compounds also affects aquatic life and production of


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agricultural products. According to the Project Feasibility Report (August 1997) out

of 37 species of fish found in Kashmir, 17 are available from the Lake. The

ecological disturbances, according to the Report, had greatly harmed the local fish,

which are adapted to living in clean waters. Due to the destruction of their breeding

ground, introduction of grass carp species by Fisheries Department and other

environmental stresses, the fish species had undergone a decrease in their size and

population. The SPCB also held that increase in fish mortality and

disappearance/decline of some species of the fish was due to the inflow of sewage

and wastes into the Lake. The Authority took no remedial measures with regard to

Fisheries Management and their conservation. The contention of the Authority

(October 2006) that fish growth in water bodies was being looked after by the

Fisheries Department is not tenable as the management and conservation of fisheries

as per the DPR was the mandate of the Authority.

3.2.10.4 Weed Harvesting and De-weeding

The Authority incurred Rs. 6.78 crore on harvesting and de-weeding activities during

1997-2006. According to the Authority (October 2006), the Lake grows about 80

thousand tonnes of biomass, of which less than 40-50 per cent was extracted annually.

However, according to a Research conducted (2004) by the University of Kashmir,

mechanical de-weeding and harvesting activities had an adverse effect on the health

of the Lake, as there was undesirable growth of species of flora and fauna. Despite

observations of the University, the Authority continued the harvesting operations.

The Laboratory wing of the Authority also pointed out that the activity had proved

to be just „cosmetic treatment‟ and that too for a short period.

3.2.10.5 Presence of heavy metals in the Lake body

Results2 of the soil tests indicated the presence of heavy metals like manganese,

copper, lead, nickel, cadmium, and arsenic in the Lake body. These heavy metals

concentrate in the living tissues through food chain, which results in high level of

these elements in aquatic life, ultimately being consumed by the humans at the top of

the food chain. Pathological effects of these elements can cause damage to brain,

liver and kidneys. The percentage of these elements in the Lake body as brought out

in the following table was far above the permissible limits.

Table 3.9

Name of the

element

Presence (Mg.

/Litre)

Permissible limit

(Mg. /Litre)

Excess per Litre

(Percentage) (one unit:

1000)

Iron 68.57 0.30 68.27 (22.76)

Manganese 5.89 0.10 5.79 (5.79)

2 Conducted by the Central Soil Salinity Research Institute, Karnal during February 1999.


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Copper 4.89 0.05 4.84 (9.68)

Lead 3.37 0.10 3.27 (3.27)

Cadmium 0.10 0.01 0.09 (0.9)

Chromium 0.81 0.05 0.76 (1.52)

Arsenic 48.00 0.05 47.95 (95.9)

(Source: Central Soil Salinity Research Institute, Karnal)

The Authority contended (October 2006) that test results pertained to the soil

samples dredged out along Northern Foreshore Road from a depth of 2-3 meters and

could not be generalized for the Lake water composition. The contention is not

tenable as the sediment wherefrom the sample was taken for conducting tests,

formed an integral part of the Lake body. The Authority also maintained (October

2006) that reduction in conductivity, and quantities of calcium, chlorine, nitrates-

nitrogen, iron and phosphates were indicators of improvement in the health

condition of the Lake. The reply is silent about the presence of more harmful heavy

metals like manganese, copper, lead, nickel, cadmium, and arsenic in the Lake body

as pointed out by Audit.

The deteriorating condition of the Lake body could be remedied to a great extent by

sewage treatment and houseboat sanitation. Audit observed that the Authority

largely failed to effectively implement these schemes as discussed in the succeeding

paragraphs.

3.2.10.6 Sewage Treatment Plants

The Lake has been used as a receptacle for large quantities of waste water and

untreated human wastes from the peripheral areas through a number of drains that

enter into it.

With a view to arresting the inflow of waste water and sewage into the Lake, the

Authority proposed to install six Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) at different spots

around the periphery of the Lake. However, the Ministry of Urban Development and

Poverty Alleviation, GOI expressed its doubt over the effectiveness of the treatment

plants during cold conditions and the sustainability of huge maintenance costs. Audit

scrutiny also revealed that the DPR did not include a Plan for connecting houses to

the Treatment Plants.

However, inspite of the concerns expressed by the Ministry, the Authority allotted

(August 2004) the work of construction of three STPs at Hazratbal, Habak and Laam

(Nishat) to a private firm at a cost of Rs. 8.90 crore, with the scheduled date of

completion as May 2005. Out of three STPs, two STPs at Hazratbal and Habak had

been commissioned during February and April 2006. The Authority claimed

(October 2006) that the STPs were working efficiently and that the health of the lake

would improve after the work of construction of all the STPs was completed and

commissioned. However, according to the analytical report of the Research and

Monitoring Division of the Authority (August 2006), concentration of some of the


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nutrients present in the waste water increased at the outflow stage vis-à-vis inflow

stage, despite receiving treatment at the STPs. The percentage efficiency of the two

STPs ranged between 63.39 and (-) 366.3. Also, the treatment plants did not match

the prescribed norms, particularly with regard to inorganic nutrients viz. nitrogen

and phosphorus. According to the Report, measures were required to be taken for

effective treatment of sewage to prevent detrimental impact on the Lake ecology as

entry of raw sewage was one of the major causes of the enhanced eutrophyα

of the

Lake. The contention of the Authority (October 2006) that the plants were working

efficiently is, therefore, not acceptable.

3.2.11 Houseboat Sanitation

Besides the peripheral area of the Lake, human settlements residing within the Lake

in houseboats, shikaras and hamlets also contribute to generation of solid and liquid

wastes. According to the Deputy Director, Tourism (January 2004), there are 1094

houseboats and 2800 shikaras located within the Lake, which accommodate a large

chunk of people including tourists. The houseboats have attached toilets, which

discharge sewage directly into the Lake. The total quantity of solid waste and sewage

generated by the people living in these houseboats and shikaras annually, was of the

order of 4.80 lakh♣

kilograms of solid waste and 49.91♠

million litres of sewage.

Though the Authority undertook a number of Pilot Projects to remedy the problem

and incurred Rs. 38.50 lakh on Pilot studies, none of the studies could provide an

implementable solution (March 2006), as none of the solutions/suggestions was

found viable.

The Authority stated (October 2006) that action had been initiated to carry the

effluents after primary treatment by sewers laid on the bed of the Lake to STP.

Further progress in the matter is awaited (November 2006).

3.2.12 Construction of Outfall Channel/Conduit at Brari-Numbal

Brari-Numbal basin (a part of the main Lake), was getting water from the Lake via

Nowpora and discharging it into Anchar Lake through Nallah Mar. After the closure

of Nallah Mar due to the construction of a road over it, the Brari-Numbal basin

became a dead pocket. The sewage and wastewater of the surrounding areas

accumulated in it and it also became a source of pollution to the main Lake. To

overcome this problem, it was proposed to connect the basin to River Jhelum at New

Fateh Kadal. The Contract for construction of an outfall channel/conduit (total

length 479 meters) was awarded (January 1996) by the UEED to a contractor at an

estimated cost of Rs. 3.80 crore to be completed in 30 months. The work could not

be completed within the scheduled period as obstacles like structures, water pipes

and LT lines were coming in the alignment of the channel. However, according to

the Authority (October 2006), the Channel had been laid in March 2006 at an

expenditure of Rs. 3.87 crore, thereby involving time and cost overruns of over eight

years and Rs. 7 lakh, respectively, besides polluting the Lake body for this period.


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3.2.13 Unauthorised Constructions/Encroachments

The Lake dwellers encroach upon the water body of the Lake by filling it with earth

around each cluster. Despite the Authority having its own Enforcement Wing to

check encroachment within the Lake, the same continued unabated. The Authority

had failed to stop fresh encroachments involving conversion of watery area into hard

landmass and establishment of fresh structures, thereon. The Authority stated

(October 2006) that out of about 316 kanals of land mass formed by illegal

encroachment of water area, 40 kanals had been removed, and that the remaining

encroachments were in a scattered manner in patches of one or two marlas each in a

cluster. The Authority intended (October 2006) to acquire the entire clusters to be

dredged out along with encroachments.

Audit scrutiny (March 2006) also revealed that the periphery of the Lake had also

been encroached upon and illegal structures had been established thereon. The

Authority stated (October 2006) that the demolition of the unauthorised structures

was a continuous process and as of October 2006, 602 demolitions had been

conducted and 728 structures brought down. Moreover, out of 141 plots allotted by

the UEED in the Bemina colony prior to 1997, only four allottees were Lake

dwellers and the remaining plots had been encroached upon illegally (February 2003)

and continued to be so occupied (March 2006).

3.2.14 Stock/Stores Management

Stock items costing Rs. 108 crore were transferred to the Authority from the UEED.

The inventory included usable items like chain-link fencing (valued at Rs. 14.57 lakh)

and RCC pipes of varied specifications (valued at Rs. 73.17 lakh) and damaged items

worth Rs. 11.18 lakh. The Authority neither utilised the usable items on on-going

works, nor disposed off the damaged items, thereby incurring wasteful expenditure

on their storage.

It was also observed during audit that the UEED (Lake Division-I) had placed (1995)

orders for fabrication of gates/gearings for Nallah Amir Khan at a cost of Rs. 24

lakh, of which Rs. 22.80 lakh were advanced to a Firm. The gates were not installed

due to change of their fabrication design, and the material was lying with the Firm.

The Authority stated (October 2006) that most of the material was being utilized for

construction of new gated headworks/navigational channels, and that the unutilised

material would be put to use shortly.

3.2.15 Non-preparation of Inventory of Assets/Liabilities

The Authority did not prepare an inventory of the assets and liabilities inherited by it

from the UEED, nor was the status of on-going works obtained from the

implementing Divisions. Further, expenditure incurred by the UEED up to March

1997 included Rs. 3.66 crore advanced by it to the Director Tourism (Rs. 2 crore),

Collector, Land Acquisition (Rs. 16 lakh) and Director Health Services (Rs. 1.50


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crore) for acquisition of land, houseboat sites and shifting of leper hospital. The

amount remained outstanding with these Departments, as none of these works was

executed. The Authority stated (October 2006) that steps would be taken to recover

the amount or jobs got executed by the Departments.

3.2.16.1 Wasteful expenditure

The MOEF was to appoint consultants of its own choice for preparation of the

Project Report on Lake Conservation Programme, as it provided full funding of the

Programme. Despite this, the Authority appointed (May 1998) a Delhi-based private

consultancy firm for preparation of the Detailed Project Report. Audit observed that

the appointment was made without resorting to tendering process to ascertain

competitiveness of rates and ascertaining whether the firm had the requisite expertise

in preparing such Reports. The firm submitted its Report in September 1998, which

was not approved by the MOEF, as it was found deficient in many ways. As a result

Rs. 67.72 lakh paid♥

to the firm was rendered wasteful. The Authority stated

(October 2006) that the case was under investigation with the Vigilance

Organisation.

3.2.16.2 Excess Fuel Consumption

The Authority owns two diesel-run harvesters (K.K.Dal and K.K.Nigeen) used for

de-weeding purposes. Audit observed that the Authority had not fixed norms for fuel

consumption of the harvesters. Test-check of log books of the harvesters revealed that

the machines put to use for 18,821.3 hours (K.K.Dal: 10,461.3 hours up to 31

October 2000 and K.K.Nigeen: 8,360 hours up to 9 November 2000) had consumed

1,69,391.7 litres of fuel at nine litres/hour. Audit observed that beyond 31 October

2000 and 9 November 2000, the harvesters consumed only four litres/per hour.

Utilisation of excess quantity of fuel up to 31 October 2000/9 November 2000

resulted in extra consumption of 94,106.5 litres of fuel costing Rs. 11.81 lakh♦

, with

consequent loss to the Authority. Though the Authority admitted the Audit

contention, reasons for the excess consumption were not intimated and the case was

stated (October 2006) to be under investigation with the Vigilance Organisation.

3.2.17 Monitoring/evaluation and Internal Control

1. 3.2.17.1 A Committee constituted (August 2003) by the MOEF to assess the

status of the progress of the Project, recommended the appointment of a Project

Management Committee to ensure effective implementation of the project within the

stipulated period. The Report also provided for the constitution of a Scientific

Advisory Committee to oversee various aspects of the Programme and preparation of

Programme Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) chart. It was observed that

no such Committees had been constituted nor was the PERT chart framed. The

Authority stated (October 2006) that the process of formation of a Project

Management Consultancy was in its final stage and would be in place shortly. It was

also stated that a Monitoring Committee had been constituted (June 2006) to ensure


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effective monitoring.

2. 3.2.17.2 No internal controls/vigilance mechanism existed in the Authority.

The Authority had also not established (February 2006) an Internal Audit Wing.

Besides, a number of cases of works/purchases were under investigation with the

State Vigilance Department. According to the Authority, the outcome of the

vigilance investigation was awaited (November 2006).

3.2.18 Conclusion

Dal Lake, a unique natural body and a major contributer towards the State‟s

economy, has been a victim of environmental degradation over the years. It has

suffered heavily due to lack of planning in implementation of both Conservation as

well as Rehabilitation Programmes.

Despite incurring of huge expenditure in different spells on various activities

connected with the development of the Lake, no appreciable improvement could be

discerned in the overall health of the Lake in its conservation, as well as

rehabilitation of the people. Problems like excessive weed growth, direct discharge of

sewage/nutrients in to the Lake body, deposition of silt and encroachments, which

are the main contributory factors for its degradation, have remained unresolved.

These have also contributed to the reduction in the water expanse and the average

depth of the Lake. The Authority has also not been able to find a workable solution

to the problem of houseboat sanitation.

Concentration of heavy metals in the Lake waters was far above the permissible

limits. Pathological effects of these elements can cause damage to the brain, liver and

kidneys.

The pace of implementation of the Rehabilitation Programme was poor. Lack of

adequate planning was visible throughout. Land acquired by the Authority under the

Programme could not be allotted to the dwellers, as these sites were situated in the

green belt of the Master Plan of the Srinagar city.

The performance of the Authority in financial matters was also not encouraging.

Though the Authority was created about 10 years back, it has neither finalised any of

its accounts nor prepared the Accounts Manual. Besides, there was no monitoring

mechanism to physically verify and evaluate the work done by the Authority and the

funds spent in achieving the targets.


• The Authority should frame a time-bound Action Plan with milestones, while

prioritizing both conservational and rehabilitation activities, to deal with various

problems endangering the existence of the Lake.

• Measures should be taken to check inflow of sediments and nutrients in to the Lake

from the catchment areas. Similarly, agricultural practices should be modified to

check soil erosion.


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• Deteriorating water quality of the Lake is a matter of great concern and needs to be

remedied on top priority basis.

• The Authority should work out a sustainable alternative for drainage and treatment of

sewage.

• Monitoring mechanisms need to be established for overseeing the implementation of

works. Also, the Authority needs to institute a system of surveillance/vigilance to report

cases of encroachment, and the persons responsible for encroaching upon the Lake area

should be dealt with firmly.

Performance Audit of sewerage Schemes in Himachal Pradesh

Highlights

Hygienic sanitation facilities are essential for healthy living. The State Government was

required to provide these facilities to 56 towns of the State through Sewerage schemes. The

Government had, however, not prepared any master plan to provide sewerage facilities to

cover all the towns in a phased manner. Funds provided for sewerage schemes were

diverted to irrigation and water supply schemes and there were instances of abnormal

delays in completion of schemes. Sewage treatment plants provided in the schemes were

not being utilised fully mainly because of non-release of sewerage connections due to lack

of awareness among the beneficiaries about its utility. The main points noticed in audit

were as under:

3.2.1 Introduction

Hygienic sanitation facilities are essential for healthy living. Sewerage programmes

have come to assume immense importance in Himachal Pradesh in view of the fact

that most of the towns in the State serve as health resorts or pilgrim centres. About

80 per cent of the water used by the community comes out of houses in the form of

waste water, which, unless properly collected, conveyed, treated and safely disposed

off, may eventually pollute the precious water resources and cause environmental

degradation. It has become imperative for the State Government to set up efficient

sewerage systems in all its urban areas.

According to the 2001 census, the total population of the State is 60.78 lakh, out of

which, 54.82 lakh (90.19 per cent) live in rural areas and the remaining 5.96 lakh (9.81

per cent) in urban areas. Of the total urban population of

5.96 lakh, sewerage facility has been provided to 2.71 lakh (45.47 per cent) as of April

2006. In respect of 2.26 lakh urban population provision of sewerage facilities is in

progress while 0.99 lakh people are yet to be covered (April 2006). The State

Government has not framed any policy to provide sewerage facility in the rural

areas.

There are 56 towns1

in the State which are classified into six categories on the basis


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of population. The Irrigation and Public Health (I&PH) Department has been

entrusted with the job of providing efficient sewerage system in 49 towns as six

towns2

are under Cantonment Boards and one town (Parwanoo) is under the

Housing Board. Out of 49 towns, sewerage schemes have been commissioned in 10

towns between 1997-1998 and 2005-2006 and work in 23 towns, taken up for

execution between 1991-1992 and 2005-2006, is in progress. The remaining 16

towns (Population: 0.99 lakh) have neither any sewerage facility, nor were any

sewerage works administratively approved as of March 2006.


The organisational set up of the Irrigation and Public Health (I&PH) Department is

as under:

3.2.3 Scope of audit

Twenty four divisions covering 33 towns are entrusted with the execution of

sewerage schemes in the State. Records pertaining to the selection and execution of

sewerage schemes in 11 divisions3

of 16 towns for the period 2001-2006 were test-

checked during October 2005-April 2006. The sample check in terms of divisions

was thus 45.83 per cent covering 48 per cent of towns and 79.25 per cent of the total

expenditure (Rs 131.52 crore). This was supplemented by the information obtained

from the Engineer-in-Chief and the Superintending Engineer, Planning and

Investigation-I in March-April 2006.


A performance audit of the sewerage schemes in the State was conducted with a

view to assessing the:

efficiency and effectiveness in planning and execution of various sewerage schemes;

adequacy in providing hygienic sanitation facilities to the public;

Effectiveness of the internal control mechanism.


The audit criteria used for assessing the performance of various schemes were:

Selection criteria for providing sewerage schemes in accordance with the laid down

policy of the Government.

Targets fixed for providing sewerage schemes in classified towns.

Arrangement of funds for providing, maintenance and operation of sewerage systems.


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Mechanism evolved to inspect and monitor the ongoing and completed

schemes.


Before commencing the audit, the audit scope, objectives and criteria were discussed

(October 2005) with the Chief Engineer (I&PH) in an entry conference. The selection

of divisions and towns for test-check was based on multistage stratified sampling

methodology. Audit conclusions were drawn after scrutiny of records, analysis of

available data by issuing audit memos and questionnaires and obtaining the response

of departmental functionaries at various levels. The audit findings were discussed

with the Principal Secretary (I&PH) in an exit conference (May 2006), and the views

of the Government were incorporated at appropriate places in the report.

3.2.7 Audit findings

3.2.7.1 Financial outlay and expenditure

Expenditure on sewerage schemes during 2001-2006 was met partly out of State

funds (61 per cent) and partly from loans obtained from the Organisation of Oil

Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) and Housing and Urban Development

Corporation (HUDCO) (39 per cent). In addition, special problems grant of Rs 30

crore under the award of the Eleventh Finance Commission (EFC) was also received

from the Government of India during 2001-2005 for providing sewerage systems in

Dharamshala, Hamirpur and Jawalamukhi towns. The budget allotment and

expenditure thereagainst on sewerage schemes during 2001-2006 was as under:

Table: 3.2.1

(Rupees in crore)

Year State Sector Special problems

grantunder

EFC

awarded

Funds

alloted

Expenditure

incurred

Variation

excess

(+)

savings (-

)

Funds alloted Expenditure

incurred

Variations

excess (+)

savings (-)

2001-

2002

26.84 27.00 (+) 0.16 6.00 6.00

2002-

2003

14.50 14.45 (-) 0.05 6.00 3.71 (-) 2.29

2003-

2004

19.25 18.47 () 0.78 9.13 9.13

2004-

2005

19.98 20.60 (+) 0.62 8.87 6.03 () 2.84

2005-

2006

26.19 26.13 () 0.06

Total 106.76 106.65 (-) 0.11 30.00 24.87 (-) 5.13

Source: Departmental figures


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It was noticed in audit that against the allocation of Rs 30 crore by the EFC, Rs

24.87 crore was spent by the Divisional Officers on sewerage systems of these towns

during 2001-2005. The Principal Secretary attributed (May 2006) the shortfall in

expenditure to less receipt of letter of credit (LOC) from the Finance Department.

Evidently, the EFC funds of Rs 5.13 crore had been diverted at the Government

level, as LOC was short released to this extent to the department.

Test-check of records in the selected divisions revealed the following:

3.2.7.2 Diversion of funds

In Kullu division, against the allotment of Rs 3.12 crore during 2001-2006 for

providing sewerage system, funds amounting to Rs 1.30 crore were actually spent by

the EE between 2001-2002 and 2005-2006 on augmentation and maintenance of

water supply schemes, improvement of flow irrigation schemes, renovation of the

residences of EE and SE. The cost was however, debited to the accounts of

Sewerage Scheme, Kullu. The Principal Secretary admitted (June 2006) that the

expenditure was irregular and stated that the defaulting officer had been charge-

sheeted and that wrong booking of expenditure would be rectified on the availability

of funds.

Similarly, in Hamirpur division, Rs 1.76 crore was alloted during 2001-2002 for

providing sewerage system to Hamirpur town. Of these, Rs 1.44 crore was diverted

and spent on augmentation of various water supply schemes during 2001-2002 but

was debited to the accounts of the Sewerage Scheme, Hamirpur. While confirming

the facts, the Principal Secretary stated (May 2006) that the funds would be credited

to the sewerage scheme during the current financial year, and that inquiry had been

ordered in to the matter.

Clearly, utilisation of funds amounting to Rs 2.74 crore on various works other than

on sewerage schemes, had a decelerating effect on the ongoing sewerage schemes for

Kullu and Hamirpur towns.

3.2.8 Planning and physical performance

3.2.8.1 Selection of schemes

The category-wise details of 49 towns, where efficient sewerage systems were to be

provided by the I&PH Department and their status is given in Appendix-XVIII.

The Government had not prepared any master plan for providing sewerage systems

to cover all the towns within a specified time frame. However, as per the policy

adopted (1985) by the department, the first priority for providing sewerage systems

was to be given to the district headquarters, followed by pilgrim and tourist centres

and the remaining towns were to be covered last. It was, however, noticed that the

district headquarters of Sirmour (Nahan) and famous tourist/pilgrim centres like

Banjar, Rewalsar and Talai had not been covered as of March 2006. Seven towns of

Class-VI category viz. Arki, Bhuntar, Chowari, Jubbal, Kotkhai, Nadaun and


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Sarkaghat which were neither district headquarters nor famous tourist centres had

been selected for providing sewerage systems and works in these towns were in

progress (April 2006). Similarly, Baddi town which falls under Class-III category

and is coming up as an industrial area had not been covered (June 2006).

The Principal Secretary stated (June 2006) that socio-environmental improvement

coupled with the pace of providing adequate water in the town was also a criteria for

taking up the development of sewerage schemes in a particular town. However,

reasons for non-coverage of Nahan, Baddi and four tourist/pilgrim centres, ibid, and

why the Government did not follow the specified norms laid down by it were not

intimated.

3.2.8.2 Targets and achievement

The department had 23 ongoing schemes in hand in June 2006 which included 20

schemes taken up for execution between 1991-1992 and 2000-2001. The remaining

three schemes were taken up for execution between 2001-2002 and 2005-2006.

Details of sewerage schemes targeted for completion during 2001-2006 were as

under:

Table: 3.2.2

Targeted year

of completion

Name of the

sewerage

scheme/town

targeted for

completion

Year of start

of work

Year of completion/(percentage

of physical progress of schemes)

Remarks

2001-2002 (i) Rampur

phase-II

1991-1992 In progress/ (87) Not completed

even after delay

of over four

years

(ii) Shimla 1998-1999 2005-2006 Delayed by four

years

2002-2003 (i) Ghumarwin 1994-1995 2005-2006 Delayed by

three years

(ii) Manali 1994-1995 2005-2006 Delayed by

three years

2004-2005 Jawalamukhi 1998-1999 2005-2006 Delayed by one

year

2005-2006 (i) Arki 1998-1999 In progress/ (82) Stipulated

period for

completion

already over in

March 2006.

(ii)

Jogindernagar

1999-2000 In progress/ (88)

Thus, the yearly targets for completion of seven sewerage schemes fixed for 2001-

2006 were not achieved. The Principal Secretary attributed (June 2006) the delay in

completion of two sewerage schemes (Ghumarwin and Shimla) to the subsequent

increase in sewer network and change in the sites of the treatment plants due to poor

strata/land disputes. Reasons for the delay in completion of the remaining five


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schemes were not intimated. However, the E-in-C attributed (April 2006) the non-

achievement of targets fixed during 2001-2006, to insufficient funds. The contention

is not tenable because the funds provided during 2001-2006 were not utilised fully.

3.2.8.3 Time and cost overrun

Four divisions4

took up the execution of five sewerage schemes between 1991-1992

and 1998-1999 at an estimated cost of Rs 69.76 crore. The schemes were scheduled

to be completed within two to five years from the dates of their commencement. Of

these, two schemes (Manali and Shimla), estimated to cost Rs 51.77 crore, were

completed at a cost of Rs 82.14 crore during 2005-2006 after a delay of 18 to 80

months, involving a cost overrun of Rs 30.37 crore which ranged between 53 and

128 per cent. The remaining three schemes (Kullu, Rampur Phase-II and Solan)

estimated to cost Rs 17.99 crore with physical progress ranging between 72 and 88

per cent, were under implementation as of March 2006, involving a cost overrun of Rs

12.09 crore. The time and cost overrun in these three cases ranged between 84 and

108 months and 40 and 128 per cent respectively, as detailed in Appendix-XIX.

The Principal Secretary attributed (June 2006) the delay in completion of the

schemes to land disputes, damages by floods, delay in acquisition of land, insufficient

provision of funds, unrealistic stipulated period for completion of work, price

escalation, etc. The contention is not tenable as all the technical and financial

aspects including fixation of a realistic period for completion, should have been

visualised before taking up the works.

3.2.8.4 Non-utilisation of sewerage facility at Jawalamukhi town

The work relating to provision of sewerage system to the pilgrim town Jawalamukhi

was originally sanctioned in January 1999 for Rs 9.62 crore and stipulated to be

completed by March 2004. The cost was later revised to Rs 6.89 crore in January

2004. The town was divided into two zones (A and B) depending upon the

topography of the area. The system was designed for a population of 12,983 plus

50,245 pilgrims upto the year 2033 with the provision of a septic tank (zone A) as

disposal point and a Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) of 2.83 million litres per day

(MLD) capacity (zone B). The work was taken up for execution during 1998-1999

and the system was commissioned in October 2005. Expenditure of Rs 7.49 crore

had been incurred on the work as of March 2006.

Test-check of the records of Dehra division revealed (March 2006) that zone „A‟ was

ready for releasing connections in December 2003 but no sewerage connection had

been released to the beneficiaries as of March 2006. The work of zone „B‟ alongwith

the STP was commissioned in October 2005. It was noticed in audit that against the

1,325 estimated sewer connections, only one connection had been released as of

March 2006. Thus, the benefit of the expenditure of Rs 7.49 crore incurred on the

scheme had not been derived upto March 2006.

The EE confirmed the facts and stated (March 2006) that the sewerage connections


97 | P a g e

could not be released, as the beneficiaries had not come forward to deposit the

connection charges. The Principal Secretary, however, stated (June 2006) that more

than 400 application forms had been issued to the consumers, against which, 80

sewer connections stood sanctioned and 33 released to the consumers. The reply of

the Government indicated that adequate action for educating the public regarding

the benefits of the sewerage system had not been taken during the execution stage.

The existing sewerage system of Shimla was not sufficient to serve the present

population of the town. The treatment plants had been damaged badly and the

water sources downstream the disposal point were being contaminated. To augment

the sewerage system, administrative approval and expenditure sanction was accorded

(February 1999) for Rs 47.76 crore. The project was to be financed by the Oil

Producing and Exporting Countries and the State Government in the ratio of 73:27.

The project involved construction of six STPs of 35.63 MLD capacity and laying of

179 kms of sewer line network. The system was commissioned during October 2005

at an expenditure of Rs 73 crore.

Test-check of records of the Sewage Treatment Plant Construction division, Shimla

revealed (November 2005) that different STPs completed between April 2002 and

September 2004 were put into operation with partial sewage and were not working at

optimum level. Based on the present population (1,95,303 persons in 2006), the level

of sewage being generated in the town was assessed at 23.44 MLD, against which,

only 3.77 MLD (16 per cent) was being received for treatment in all the six STPs at

the end of March 2006. It was noticed that no/negligible sewage was being received

at the points identified for connectivity with newly laid sewer system. An

expenditure of Rs 3.01 crore had been incurred on operation and maintenance of

these STPs upto March 2006. Less receipt of sewage being tapped in the STPs than

the assessed level was attributed (November 2005) by the EE to damage/choking of

sewer lines of the already existing sewerage system.

The Manual on Sewerage and Sewage Treatment provides that improvements and

de-bottleneck works of the existing system if necessary, should be planned for

execution prior to taking up the project. It was, however, noticed that de-

bottlenecking of the existing sewerage system was neither planned nor carried out

prior to taking up the execution of the new project for the town.

The Principal Secretary attributed (June 2006) less receipt of sewage to many missing

links of the existing system, which required to be bridged. It was further stated that

the work would be undertaken during 2006-2007 for which a sum of Rs 250 lakh had

been demanded. The contention is not tenable, as the de-bottlenecking of the

existing system should have been planned and carried out before taking up the new

project. Thus the intended objective of providing a pollution free environment and

checking the contamination of water sources downstream of the disposal points

remained un-achieved even after incurring an expenditure of Rs 76.01 crore.


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3.2.8.6 Non-operation of sewerage scheme at Sri Naina Devi Ji town

The sewerage scheme for Sri Naina Devi Ji town was taken up for execution in

August 1994 and completed in March 1998 at a cost of Rs 1.87 crore to serve an

existing population of 14,280 persons.

Test-check of records of Bilaspur division revealed (December 2005) that the STP

constructed was not put into operation since the commissioning of the scheme. It

was noticed that the STP was not functioning due to the leakage/bursting of pipes

midway and inadequate staff for its operation.

The Principal Secretary stated (June 2006) that the system was put to use after May

2006. Due to the non-operation of the STP, the sewerage scheme provided at a cost

of Rs 1.87 crore had not served any purpose during the last eight years.

3.2.8.7 Idle investment on Sewage Treatment Plant at Solan

Sewerage scheme, Solan was administratively approved (November 1995) for Rs

4.55 crore. The scheme was designed for a period of 34 years (upto the year 2029)

including four years for execution and completion. The town was divided into three

zones (A, B and C) after taking into account the geographical and topographical

conditions. The work of providing STP of

2.90 MLD capacity for zone B was taken up for execution in February 1998 and

completed in March 2001 at a cost of Rs 1.18 crore.

Test-check of records of Solan division revealed (November 2005) that the STP had

not been made functional as of October 2005 due to non-laying of sewerage network

of zone B. It was further noticed that against the laying of total sewerage network of

19,190 metres pipes in zone B only 7,314 metres pipes had been laid as of October

2005.

The Principal Secretary stated (June 2006) that the sewer lines were passing through

thickly populated/busy streets and there were lot of hindrances. He further stated

that the sewerage network for zone B could not be accelerated due to paucity of

funds. The contention is not tenable because budget allotment of Rs 9.95 crore was

available against which Rs 7.56 crore were spent on various components of the

scheme during 2001-2006. Evidently, due to lackadaisical planning, resources were

scattered and construction of STP and sewerage network for zone B was not

synchronised which resulted in idle investment on the STP since March 2001.

3.2.8.8 Avoidable and unfruitful expenditure on sewerage schemes for

Hamirpur and Kullu towns

The construction of an STP of 3.13 MLD capacity for zone-I of sewerage scheme for

Hamirpur town, was awarded (September 1998) to a contractor for a lump sum

tendered cost of Rs 89 lakh. The work was stipulated to be completed by September


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2001.

Test-check of the records of Hamirpur division revealed (February 2006) that the

contractor started the work in October 1998 and stopped the same in July 2003 for

want of sufficient land for the construction of STP and non-availability of access to

the site. The contractor had been paid Rs 20.21 lakh till stoppage of work. As the

contractor failed to resume the work, the contract was rescinded in December 2004.

It was further noticed in audit that the land was acquired by the department about

three and a half years after the award of the work of STP to the contractor.

The balance work of the STP was awarded (June 2006) to another contractor for Rs

96.50 lakh. Thus, improper planning and failure of the department to provide

requisite land to the contractor in time, had resulted in extra avoidable expenditure

of Rs 27.71 lakh5

.

The Principal Secretary stated (June 2006) that Government land measuring 344.30

square metres was made available to the contractor. The contention is not tenable, as

a land measuring 3569.11 square metres was required for the construction of STP.

The work relating to laying of sewerage network alongwith STP of 2.57 MLD

capacity at Lanka Bekar for zone-II of Kullu town was taken up for execution in

April 2000 by the Kullu division No.I. It was noticed (December 2005) in audit that

the sewerage network costing Rs 2.06 crore was completed in April 2004 but the

work of STP awarded (April 2000) to a contractor for Rs 67.70 lakh had not been

taken up for execution as of March 2004 due to change of site. The contractor was

provided (September 2001) an alternative site, but he neither signed the agreement

nor executed the work. The work was cancelled after four years (April 2004) and

was again awarded (August 2005) at a cost of Rs 1.11 crore to another contractor

with a stipulation to complete it in six months. However, the work had not been

taken up for execution for want of transfer of forest land.

The Principal Secretary stated (June 2006) that the permission for transfer of forest

land had been received recently and that the work was being started. The reply of the

Principal Secretary indicated improper planning, as timely action in selection of

proper site before award of work had not been taken by the department, which

resulted in unfruitful expenditure of Rs 2.06 crore and

Rs 20.21 lakh + Rs 96.50 lakh (-) Rs 89.00 lakh = Rs 27.71 lakh.

avoidable extra expenditure of Rs 43.30 lakh (Rs 111 lakh minus Rs 67.70 lakh).

3.2.8.9 Avoidable delay in completion of sewerage scheme and infructuous

expenditure

The Phase-II work of providing sewerage facilities to Rampur town was completed

in July 2000 at a cost of Rs 2.25 crore except for laying and jointing of 400 metres

trunk sewer line in steep rocky portion and flushing tank.

Test-check of records of Rampur division revealed (October 2005) that the sewerage


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system was badly damaged due to flash floods in river Sutlej on 31 July 2000. It was

further noticed that the approval to the estimate for restoration works was not

accorded by the CE and a revised estimate for Rs 4.56 crore, which included a

provision of Rs 35.27 lakh for various flood protection works was sent by the EE in

February 2005 to the CE. This estimate was, however, received back in April 2005

with some observations which had not been attended to as of October 2005.

In the meantime, flash floods in river Sutlej re-occurred on 26 June 2005 and

damaged the STP at Khopri and trunk sewer line. The damages were assessed at Rs

39.41 lakh.

The EE stated (October 2005) that protection work could not be carried out for want

of approval of the estimate by the competent authority. The Principal Secretary

stated (June 2006) that the restoration works of damages due to floods, which were

likely to cost Rs 39.42 lakh had been undertaken. Had the department carried out

the flood protection works on time keeping in view the likelihood of flash floods

ocurring in river Sutlej, the damages of Rs 39.41 lakh caused to the scheme could

have been minimised.

The reconstruction of STP at Chuhabagh (Rampur town) as a safe alternate site was

awarded (2000-2001) to a contractor at a tendered cost of Rs 29.84 lakh but the work

could not be taken up for execution due to nonfinalisation of the site. However, site

development works and laying and jointing of trunk sewer line at the proposed

alternate site were carried out during 2000-2002 at an expenditure of Rs 17 lakh. As

the work of construction of STP was not taken up by the contractor, the agreement

was cancelled in June 2004 by the EE. Scrutiny of the records further revealed that

the developed site was taken over by the EE, B&R division Rampur in July 2003 for

construction of a new bus stand.

The Principal Secretary stated (June 2006) that the matter regarding adjustment of Rs

17 lakh incurred by the department on the old site was under correspondence with

the PWD authorities. Thus, delay in finalisation of site for construction of STP and

non-handing over of the same to the contractor resulted in infructuous expenditure of

Rs 17 lakh besides depriving the beneficiaries of the intended sewerage facilities.

3.2.9 Other deficiencies

3.2.9.1 Unauthorised splitting of works

The CEs, Dharamshala and Mandi accorded technical sanction to the detailed

estimates of various works of five sewerage schemes6

for Rs 20.78 crore between

September 1998 and February 2004. Test-check of records of five divisions7

revealed

that major portions of works (estimated to cost Rs 7.95 crore) of these schemes were

split up into 173 agreements and awarded to 57 contractors between December 2001

and November 2005. These works were awarded to the contractors at a consolidated

cost of Rs 11.75 crore. The tendered rates quoted by the contractors ranged between

35 per cent below and 500 per cent above the amount put to tender. The abnormal gap


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between the lowest and the highest offers of the contractors was indicative of the

irrational award of works by the EEs. Benefit of competitive rates was thus not

derived by floating single tender for each work. Approval of the competent authority

to split up sanction had also not been obtained.

The Principal Secretary informed (June 2006) that detailed instructions had been

issued to the field officers to avoid splitting of the works and to ensure that

competitive rates were availed after giving proper publicity through the newspapers.

3.2.9.2 Irregular payments

In three divisions, 11 works relating to construction of STPs and laying and jointing

of cast iron (CI)/ductile iron pipes were completed between March 2001 and

October 2005. It was noticed that gross payment of Rs 20.05 crore was made to the

contractors which included Rs 3.15 crore on account of deviated/substituted items.

Approval of the competent authority for the deviated/substituted items had not been

obtained as of March 2006 as required under rules.

The Principal Secretary stated (June 2006) that the deviation would be got approved

from the competent authority at the time of finalisation of bills. The contention is

not tenable as codal provisions should have been adhered to.

3.2.9.3 Undue financial benefit to contractors

A sewerage scheme for Joginder Nagar town was technically sanctioned in

December 2002 for Rs 4.35 crore. The sub-works i.e. providing, laying and testing of

sewer lines including construction of manholes, RCC supporting pillars, flushing

tanks and allied works were awarded (March 2003) to four contractors (estimated

cost: Rs 2.41 crore) by splitting the work into five agreements at a tendered cost of Rs

4.23 crore.

Test-check of records of Padhar division revealed (January 2006) that the contractors

were paid a secured advance of Rs 1.89 crore against the admissible amount of Rs

1.55 crore resulting in undue financial benefit of Rs 34 lakh.

The EE admitted (January 2006) the facts. The Principal Secretary stated (June

2006) that the secured advance had almost been recovered from the running bills of

the contractors. The reply is not tenable as undue benefit was extended to the

contractors in contravention of the rules.

The EEs of three divisions9

awarded 16 sub-works of providing sewerage schemes to

Dharamshala, Hamirpur and Joginder Nagar towns between January 2001 and

March 2005 for Rs 8.11 crore. The contractors neither completed the respective

works within the stipulated period ranging between 3 and 18 months nor did they

apply for extension of time. Action under the agreements to levy compensation had

also not been taken. This resulted in non-recovery of Rs 1.14 crore10

from the

contractors and undue benefit to them to this extent.

The Principal Secretary stated (June 2006) that action to grant extension in time limit


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or levy compensation was being taken on merits in each case. The contention is not

tenable as timely action to levy compensation and recovery thereof should have been

taken as per the provisions of the agreement.

3.2.9.4 Avoidable payment of interest

In Kullu division No.I, in the case of construction of STP of 1.823 MLD capacity

under the sewerage scheme, an arbitration award for Rs 41.24 lakh was announced

(November 1997) in favour of the contractor. This award included Rs 7.98 lakh on

account of interest at the rate of 12 per cent for two years.

It was noticed in audit that the EE drew Rs 33.26 lakh (excluding interest) and

deposited the same with the Deputy Commissioner, Kullu in March 1998 for

keeping it in small savings instead of depositing the same with the Registry of the

High Court, till a decision on an appeal filed by the Department in the High Court of

Himachal Pradesh was received. The appeal was, however, dismissed (January

2004) and the award of the Arbitrator was upheld. Consequently, the department

paid Rs 89.16 lakh which included interest of Rs 47.92 lakh at the rate of 18 per cent

as required from the date of award (November 1997) to the date of payment (May

2004).

The Principal Secretary stated (June 2006) that “the entire delay was caused by the

High Court which could not be challenged”. The contention is not acceptable

because in terms of DG (Works), CPWD, Memo No. DG (W)/Con/59, dated 9th

June 1993 (also part of the CPWD Manual as Para 36.45), in cases where the awards

are interest bearing and are proposed to be challenged, the awarded amount may be

deposited in the court as provided under the provisions of Order 24 of CPC in order

to avoid the accrual of interest thereon.

3.2.9.5 Blocking of funds due to non-utilisation of pipes

The EE, Hamirpur division procured 1445.50 metres CI pipes valued at Rs 41.61

lakh between October 2002 and April 2004 from a Kolkata based firm for providing

sewerage system to three zones of Hamirpur town. It was noticed in audit that the

work of laying and jointing of CI pipes in zones-I and II awarded to two contractors

during January and March 2003 had not been taken up for execution (February

2006) due to disputes in the alignment of laying of the pipes. As a result, the CI pipes

purchased for providing sewerage system for Hamirpur could not be put to use. It

was further noticed that 40 metres of CI pipe of 350 mm dia was transferred to

Dharamshala division during February 2004. The balance 1405.50 metres pipe

valued at Rs 40.65 lakh was lying unutilised in the material at site account register of

the works, resulting in blocking of funds.

The Principal Secretary stated (June 2006) that action to terminate the contract was

under way and that tenders would be invited afresh to complete the balance work in

tough terrain. The reply is not tenable as pipes should have been procured only after

site disputes were resolved.


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3.2.9.6 Procurement of material without requirement

The EEs, Kullu -I and Mandi divisions procured cast iron bends, tees and pipes

valued at Rs 11.20 lakh between December 2000 and June 2001. It was noticed in

audit that the material was not required for use in sewerage schemes for Kullu and

Mandi towns and the entire material had been lying unutilised.

The EE, Kullu-I division stated (December 2005) that reasons for procurement of

material were not available on record. The EE, Mandi division stated (February

2006) that the material could not be utilised due to change in alignment and the same

was not required now for use on the scheme. The Principal Secretary stated (June

2006) that in unplanned hilly towns the requirement of special fittings could not be

assessed accurately. The contention is not tenable as the fittings were procured

without any requirement.

3.2.10 Lack of internal control

3.2.10.1 Inadequate inspection of works

To ensure quality and timely completion of the works, E-in-C issued instructions in

June 1994 and April 2000 for inspection of major and targeted schemes at least once

a month by the EE concerned, once in 2 months by the SE and once in three months

by the CE. No mechanism was evolved for inspection of completed works.

A perusal of the inspection notes/records in eleven test-checked divisions revealed

that in respect of 13 completed/ongoing sewerage schemes, 260, 390 and 780

inspections were required to be conducted during 2001-2006 by the CE, SE and EE

respectively against which, only 35, 69 and 281 inspections respectively were

conducted. None of the test-checked divisions produced any inspection notes of the

works inspected by the EEs during the period. In Solan division, 16 and 19

inspections were stated to have been conducted by the CE and SE respectively during

2001-2006 but no inspection notes were produced to audit. Evidently, the works

were not inspected adequately.

The Principal Secretary stated (June 2006) that the department had observed such

negligence and consequently issued (April 2000) instructions to the CEs/SEs/EEs to

submit inspection notes of works to the Government.

3.2.10.2 Accounts of completed works not closed

In three divisions, four sewerage schemes (Sri Naina Devi Ji, New Bilaspur town,

Manali town and Mandi town) were undertaken between 1997-98 and 2004-2005 at

a total cost of Rs 28.05 crore but the requisite completion reports were not prepared,

as required. The divisions were thus, not aware of unadjusted liabilities of completed

schemes. This is fraught with the risk of accommodating fraudulent accounting

adjustments. The Principal Secretary stated (June 2006) that necessary directions for

preparation of completion reports had been issued by the E-in-C during June 2006.

3.2.11 Monitoring and evaluation


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The execution/completion of works was required to be monitored effectively by the

E-in-C to ensure that for each work, targets relating to time, cost, services, etc., were

achieved. However, no monitoring cell was created to watch the progress of works.

The Principal Secretary stated (June 2006) that the execution and completion of

works was being monitored effectively by the SE (Planning and Investigation).

It was, however, noticed that periodical progress reports (physical and financial)

received from the field officers were neither scrutinised properly nor effective follow

up action taken. The reports did not indicate time frame fixed for completion of

schemes and held up works. As a result, 16 sewerage schemes taken up for

construction more than five years back remained incomplete. The works taken up

for execution had, however, not been monitored resulting in unplanned execution of

works as pointed out in various paragraphs.

Although the programme was implemented in the State during 1985, no evaluation

studies had been conducted as of (March 2006) to assess the level achievement of its

objectives.

3.2.12 Conclusion

The State Government had not prepared a master plan to provide sewerage facilities

to cover all 56 towns of the State in a phased manner. Funds provided for sewerage

schemes amounting to Rs 5.13 crore were unauthorisedly diverted to irrigation and

water supply schemes. In disregard of Government policy, smaller towns were taken

up for sewerage schemes in preference to district headquarters and famous pilgrim

and tourist centres. There were cost and time overruns in several schemes, and some

schemes were under-utilised or not utilised. Audit also noticed instances of undue

financial benefits being provided to contractors.


A long term master plan for providing sewerage schemes to various towns within a specified

time frame needs to be prepared.

Adequate funds need to be provided to accelerate sewerage facilities in classified towns in a

time bound manner.

It needs to be ensured that sewerage facilities provided through huge investments do not

remain unutilised and the STPs are utilised to their optimum capacity.

A system may be evolved to ensure adequate inspection and monitoring of

completed/ongoing schemes.

Performance Audit of Implementation of Watershed Development Programmes

(2006) by Panchayat and Rural Development Department, Chhattisgarh .


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Highlights

Watershed Development Programmes were taken up to obviate the drought

conditions, prevention of desertification and for improving the land fertility thus

improving the socio-economic conditions of economically weaker section.

Implementation of Watershed Development Programmes during 2001-06 was

hampered as the planning of watershed projects and selection of villages under the

programmes was defective. Components were not executed in prescribed sequence

and some were neglected. The progress of activities in test-checked districts

during the first four/five years was 62 per cent.

3.3.1 Introduction

Watershed development projects were undertaken in the State to overcome the

problems of drought, prevention of desertification of lands and improve the socio-

economic condition of economically weaker sections. The projects were taken up

under the Centrally sponsored schemes viz., Drought Prone Area Programme

(DPAP) for non-arable lands since 1987, Integrated Wasteland Development

Programme (IWDP) for developing wastelands since 1989 by the Rural

Development Department, National Watershed Development Project for Rainfed

Areas (NWDPRA) and River Valley Project (RVP) by the Agriculture Department.

This review covers the implementation of DPAP and IWDP. The primary objectives

of both programmes, inter-alia, included conservation of soil, water and other natural

resources through watershed development with the help of low cost and locally

accessible technologies such as in-situ soil and moisture conservation measures,

afforestation etc. Involvement of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and people's

participation in planning and implementation, adoption of local technology in the

projects and maintenance of assets were key features of these programmes. Total

expenditure on DPAP and IWDP was Rs.149.62 crore during 2001-06.

3.3.2 Organisational Set-up

At State level, the Development Commissioner (DC), Panchayat and Rural

Development Department is in overall charge of implementation of watershed

development programme. A watershed development cell was established in March

2005 under Development Commissioner to sanction new watershed projects, review

the progress reports and monitor and supervision.

At the district level these programmes are being implemented by the Chief Executive

Officer (CEO), Zila Panchayat (ZPs) through the Project Implementing Agencies

(PIA)1

headed by Project Officers (PO). Each PIA supervises one or more watershed

projects2

.

At watershed3

level, the programmes are executed through Watershed Committees

(WCs)4

in association with Self Help Groups (SHGs)5

and Users Groups (UGs)6

.


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Audit objectives were to assess whether:

The financial management was effective and efficient;

the planning for watershed projects was adequate;

projects were selected as per prescribed criteria and approved

guidelines;

all the components of the projects were implemented as prescribed and in proper

sequence to achieve the desired results;

completed projects were handed over to watershed committees for maintenance; and

the maintenance of records, supervision and monitoring were effective


The audit criteria were:

Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India

(Guidelines).

DPAP manual prepared by GOI.

Circulars and orders issued by Government of Chhattisgarh, Panchayat and Rural

Development department.

Project plan of each watershed project and records pertaining to its implementation.

3.3.5 Audit Coverage and Methodology

The implementation of DPAP and IWDP for the period from 2001-02 to 2005-06

was reviewed during April to June 2005 and July to August 2006 in the offices of the

Development Commissioner (DC) and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), Zila

Panchayats at Durg, Jagdalpur, Korba, Raipur and Rajnandgaon. Out of 792 DPAP

and 49 IWDP watershed projects in the State, 486 DPAP and 10 IWDP watershed

projects were test checked involving expenditure of Rs. 86.25 crore out of total

expenditure of Rs. 149.62 crore for the State. Audit objective/criteria were finalised

after entry conference with the Special Secretary, Panchayat and Rural Development

(February 2006). The exit conference was held with the Secretary, Panchayat and

Rural Development Department (September 2006), to discuss the audit findings,

conclusion and recommendations of the review. Views expressed in the conferences

have been taken into account while finalising the performance audit.

Audit findings


Both the programmes are Centrally Sponsored on cost sharing basis between the


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Government of India (GOI) and the State Government in the ratio 75:25 (DPAP)

and 11:1 (IWDP). GOI and the State Government release their shares to ZPs which

are kept in bank account. ZPs in turn release funds to PIAs and WCs through

Account Payee cheques, which are deposited in the bank accounts. Eighty per cent

of funds are earmarked for development works by WCs. Funds for training (5 per

cent) and community organization (5 per cent) are transferred to PIAs. The

administrative expenses (10 per cent) is shared between PIAs and WCs. WCs, PIAs

and ZPs prepare accounts annually which are audited by Chartered Accountants

(CA). WCs and PIAs submit monthly reports on physical and financial progress to

ZPs. ZPs submit their annual account along with Utilisation Certificates (UCs) to

GOI. During 2001-06 an amount of Rs.95.98 crore and Rs.53.64 crore was incurred

under DPAP and IWDP respectively.

3.3.6.1 Retention of money by PIAs and WCs

In test checked districts, ZPs had reported expenditure of Rs.37.78 crore (Durg

Rs.9.42 crore, Jagdalpur Rs.9.83 crore, Korba Rs.7.64 crore and Rajnandgaon

Rs.10.89 crore) in UC to GOI for both the programmes during 2001-05 as against

actual expenditure of Rs.29.95 crore (Durg Rs.8.04 crore, Jagdalpur Rs.9.10 crore,

Korba Rs.6.79 crore and Rajnandgaon Rs.6.02 crore). Rs.7.83 crore was retained by

PIAs and WCs. The amount was lying unutilised in the Bank accounts of PIAs and

WCs.

3.3.6.2 Diversion of earmarked funds

According to the guidelines, any shortfalls in utilisation of earmarked components

shall be duly refunded to the ZP and the expenditure under project components shall

be limited to the percentage ceilings fixed. However in Durg, Jagdalpur and

Rajnandgaon an amount of Rs.1.17 crore (Rs.1.10 crore DPAP and Rs.7 lakh

IWDP) earmarked for administrative overheads, community organisation and

training component was not refunded to the ZPs concerned and was used by PIA

and WCs for Entry Point Activities7

(EPA) and works components in excess of

ceilings fixed without obtaining approval of the ZPs, CEO.

3.3.6.3 Non-refund of unspent amount

An amount of Rs.24 lakh (Korba Rs.21 lakh and Jagdalpur Rs.3 lakh) pertaining to

86 completed projects of Phase-I was lying (July 2006) in the Bank account of Zila

Panchayat (Rs.10.72 lakh), PIAs and WCs (Rs.13.26 lakh) since November 2002 and

was required to be refunded to GOI and State Government. CEO, ZP Jagdalpur

replied that amount would be refunded after getting guidance from DC and CEO,

ZP Korba replied (June 2005) that the amount will be refunded after getting back the

amount from PIA and WCs. The reply was not acceptable in view of clear cut

instructions in the guidelines.

3.3.7 Programme Management

Implementation of programme was to be designed to prevent soil erosion and


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improve land fertility through contour/vegetative bunding in the first year and

improve moisture content through water harvesting engineering structures and allied

activities in subsequent years of the project.

3.3.7.1 Planning for watersheds

The programmes provided for preparation of five year perspective plans and annual

plans. The watershed treatment plans were to be prepared according to targeted area

and nature of activities which were to be carried out on the nonarable land including

degraded land, wasteland, Government land and community land. Only physical

and financial targets and set of activities to be carried out every year were shown in

plan documents. There were no descriptions of studies or assessments of local needs,

topography, hydrological profile, soil components etc. to justify/explain how the

selected activities would fit in with the holistic development of the watershed. In the

absence details an adhoc selection of works were put in project plans with little

correlation to each other. Consequently, the execution was also adhoc and

unplanned, the prescribed sequence of activities/works was not followed.

Project Implementation Agencies (PIA) were to be selected from the State

Government Departments, Universities and voluntary organizations working in

projects. Each PIA had to select watershed development teams (WDT) with

members from multiple disciplines such as Agriculture, Engineering, Horticulture,

Sociology etc. within three months from the date of formation of PIA. It was noticed

during test check that PIAs had only Government officials from different

departments. Thus participation of various groups at PIA level was virtually non-

existent. It was observed in sample check that 276 out of 295 PIA members were

Government officers.

3.3.7.2 Selection of Watershed Projects

The main criteria for selection of watershed projects was preponderance of

wastelands, common lands, acute shortage of drinking water and where actual wages

were lower than the minimum wages. Scrutiny showed that in many projects these

criteria and size norms were not followed as described in succeeding paragraphs.

Watershed projects in areas with preponderance of Agricultural land

In three districts8

eight watershed projects were selected by concerned ZPs under

IWDP. Of the total 45,028 ha geographical area in these three districts, an area of

44,778 ha land was selected by ZPs which included 36,595 ha (82 per cent)

agricultural land. Thus of the cost of work undertaken at Rs.26.87 crore for 44,778

ha land, Rs.16.90 crore was spent in areas which had preponderance of agricultural

land. CEO, ZPs stated that the selection was made as per Government instructions.

Reply of CEOs was not acceptable as watershed projects were selected by PIAs and

ZPs and then sent to the Government for approval. It was further seen from project

plans of DPAP blocks of Rajnandgaon district that 179

villages were selected where

percentage of agricultural land ranged between 70 to 100 per cent. CEO, ZP


109 | P a g e

intimated that being declared DPAP blocks, complete block was to be treated hence

these villages were selected. Reply of CEO, ZP was not acceptable as selection was

to be made from those villages in these blocks which were drought affected and

where wasteland existed.

Variations on prescribed watershed size

As per guidelines recommended size of watersheds was 500 ha to facilitate effective

supervision and development in time frame of five years. Test check of project plans

of DPAP 6th, 7th and 8th batches of ZP Korba showed that areas of villages under

watersheds were grossly overstated as shown below:

Name and total geographical area of

villages in

Area of village inflated and

selected for

DPAP 6th batch watershed development

Barbahari - 300 ha 500 ha

Bhalwaltikra-160 ha 500 ha

Patpara-47 ha, Baharapara 50 ha 125 ha, 125 ha

Mahuapani-173 ha 200 ha

Duggupara-35 ha 250 ha

Lalmatia-53 ha 250 ha

Bagdeva-66 ha 250 ha

Consequently, much higher resources were utilized in these villages (based on per

hectare rate of Rs.6000) by overstating the area.

In 7th and 8th batch DPAP projects, small portions of many villages were combined to

form watersheds in Korba. Eight villages with 2433 ha, 5 villages with 1511 ha, 6

villages with 1041 ha and 8 villages with 1570 ha respectively were combined to form

watersheds of 500 ha each.

CEO, ZP Korba stated that the selection of villages was made by the geohydrologist

posted at Bilaspur. Reply was not acceptable. The overstatement of area of villages

could not be attributed to the geohydrologist. It was also observed that Korba was the

only district to have small portions of as many as eight villages in a single watershed.

Against the prescribed norm of 500 ha, area of 47 under sized watersheds ranged

between 42.124 ha to 400 ha in Durg, Jagdalpur, Korba and Rajnandgaon districts

were irregularly taken up for treatment at a cost of Rs.4.55 crore. On the other hand, in

Durg and Raipur districts, the area of 40 . over sized watersheds ranged between 619 to

1371 ha. Reasons for selection of under sized/over sized watersheds were not on

record and not clarified by CEO, ZPs.

3.3.7.3 Physical Achievements

As per guidelines, the targeted areas were to be treated within a period of five years

from the date of sanction by GOI. Position of land treated under 274 watershed

projects sanctioned and completed/largely completed during 200106 in test checked

districts Durg, Jagdalpur, Korba, Raipur and Rajnandgaon was as under:-

(Area in hectare)


110 | P a g e

Name of

watershe

d

program

me

Sanctione

d project

period

No. of

years

complete

d as on

March

2006

Target

of land

treatme

nt

Proportiona

te target

Achieveme

nt

Shortfa

ll

Percenta

ge of

shortfall

DPAP 6th

and 7th

batch

2001-06 05 97925 97925 62205 35720 36.5

DPAP 8th

batch

2002-07 04 34000 3060010 16208 14392 47.0

IWDP II

Phase

2001-06 05 49169 49169 32051 17118 34.8

Total 181094 177694 110464 67230 37.8

Thus, during the last five years, only 110464 ha (62.1 per cent) area, out of targeted

area 177694 ha were completed and the shortfall was between 34.8 per cent to 47 per

cent.

CEOs attributed poor physical achievements and slow progress of works to shortage

of funds. The reply was not acceptable as Rs.6.15 crore were lying unutilized with

ZPs (Durg Rs.1.74 crore, Jagdalpur Rs.1.01 crore, Korba Rs.6 lakh and

Rajnandgaon Rs.3.34 crore) in addition to balances of more than Rs.7.83 crore lying

with WCs and PIAs (Durg Rs.1.39 crore, Jagdalpur Rs.72 lakh, Korba Rs.85 lakh

and Rajnandgaon Rs.4.87 crore) during 2001-05.

3.3.7.4 Non-adoption of ridge to valley strategy

For conservation measures ridge to valley strategy was to be ensured. This implied

that in the first year, soil conservation was to be carried out in the higher reaches of

watersheds and in second and third years, water conservation works and other

activities were to be carried out in lower reaches.

In test checked districts it was noticed that ridge to valley strategy was not followed

and works were first executed in lower reaches. Some district wise illustrations are

mentioned below:-

Water conservation works were carried out in lower reaches ahead of soil

conservation works in upper reaches.

Name of Name of

watershed

Duration of Date of execution of works

district project treatment Upper reach (soil Lower reach

(water conservation conservation

works)

works)

Durg 6th Batch

Tengananala

2001-04 09.12.04 01.09.02

7th Batch

Sonarinala,

2003-04 04.12.04 28.03.03


111 | P a g e

Andodinala

8th batch

Kampanala

2005-06 No works carried

out

24.04.05

Korba 6th batch Podi

Uprora

2001-04 04-01.04 12.12.01

6th batch

Katghora

2001-04 22.12.03 26.11.01

Jagdalpur 6th batch

Jamawada

2001-02 16.06.03 05.12.01

9th batch

Soargaon

2002-04 09.07.04 25.11.03

Rajnandgaon 6th batch

Palukasanala

2002-06 20.02.06 08.02.02

9th batch

Kotrinala

2004-06 06.06.05 10.06.04

The unplanned execution was further corroborated by a compilation of the

expenditure incurred on the two main activities, during the first five years, for a

sample of 41 watersheds for which full information was provided to audit.

Only five per cent (Rs.4.31 lakh) of total expenditure (Rs.85.28 lakh in five years)

was incurred on soil conservation works in the first year and 30 per cent (Rs.25.92

lakh) incurred in second year, whereas, 24 per cent (Rs.64.17 lakh) of the total

expenditure on water conservation works was incurred in the first year of the project

which should have been taken up from the second year after completing soil

conservation works. Thus the maximum achievement would not have been achieved

due to maximum expenditure on water conservation.

3.3.7.5 Prioritization of sectoral activities

In 274 watershed projects under DPAP 6th, 7th and 8th batch and IWDP-II in Durg,

Jagdalpur, Korba and Rajnandgaon districts showed that activity wise cost ceiling for

development works was not adhered to as detailed below:-

(Rupees in crore)

High priority was given to water conservation works by diverting Rs. 9.31 crore

from other activities.

Sl.

No.

Activities with per cent Expenditure

as per norms

Actual

expenditure

Per cent Percentage of

excess/less over

norms 1. Soil conservation (30 per

cent)

13.33 13.30 29.92

2. Water conservation (40 per cent)

17.78 27.09 60.94 (+) 21

3. Afforestation (10 per

cent)

4.45 2.69 6.05 (-)4.1

4. Pasture development (10 per cent)

4.45 0.26 0.59 (-)9.4

5. Other activities (7.5 per

cent)

3.33 0.52 1.17 (-)6.3

6. Self Help Group (2.5 per 1.11 0.59 1.33 (-)1.2


112 | P a g e

cent)

Total 44.45 44.4511

Out of total expenditure of Rs.44.45 crore, Rs.27.09 crore (61 per cent) was incurred

on water conservation works viz. construction of percolation tanks, farm ponds,

dabri12

, deepening of ponds etc. by diverting Rs. 9.31 crore meant for soil

conservation, afforestation, pasture development and SHGs activities. Under soil

conservation works Durg (37 per cent) and Jagdalpur (35 per cent) had incurred

more than the prescribed norms whereas Korba (21 per cent) and Rajnandgaon (27

per cent) had incurred below the prescribed norms. The afforestation programme

aimed at increasing productivity of degraded land and providing fuel and fodder to

the local people. Against Rs. 4.45 crore (10 per cent) provided for afforestation an

expenditure of Rs. 2.69 crore (6 per cent) only was utilised. While Jagdalpur had

incurred (15 per cent) more than the prescribed norm Durg (2 per cent), Korba and

Rajnandgaon (4 per cent) had incurred much below the prescribed norm. Pasture

Development for providing fodder as well as preventing soil erosion and works under

other activities were either marginally covered or totally ignored in all the districts.

3.3.7.6 Sub-standard work of Cattle Proof Trench

Panchayat and Rural Development Department, prescribed (October 2001) the

standard size of Cattle Proof Trench (CPT) as top width 2.5 metre, bottom width

1.25 metre and depth 1.5 metre but they were constructed during 2001-06 with top

width 1.5 metre, bottom width 0.6 to 0.7 metre and depth 0.75 to 0.9 metre in 2

districts (Jagdalpur and Rajnandgaon). This resulted in sub-standard work to the

tune of Rs.1.04 crore. CEO, ZP Jagdalpur assured to adhere to standard size laid

down for CPT and CEO ZP, Rajnandgaon cited (July 2006) orders of Government

of M.P. from 1995. The reply was not tenable in view of subsequent orders of

October 2001.

3.3.7.7 Overspending on Cashew plantation

In 15 watershed projects of Jagdalpur 4.62 lakh cashew plants were planted during

2001-05 at a cost of Rs.23 lakh in 532.46 ha at an average of 868 plants per ha

against norms of 400 Cashew plants per hectare. This resulted in excess expenditure

of Rs.12 lakh on excess planting of 2.49 lakh cashew plants. CEO, ZP assured to

adhere to norms in future.

3.3.7.8 Loans to Self Help Groups (SHGs)

As per guidelines, a revolving fund not exceeding Rs.one1 lakh was to be created in

each PIA for providing seed money to SHGs at a rate not exceeding Rs.10000 per

SHG for undertaking income generating activities. This was to be recovered in 6

monthly instalments and given again to other SHGs.

Seed money of Rs.34.47 lakh provided to SHGs in 129 watershed projects in three


113 | P a g e

districts under DPAP Phase-I during 1997-98 to 2001-02 was not recovered from the

members of the SHGs in completed projects. Similarly, in 276 watershed projects

under DPAP 6th, 7th, 8th batches and IWDP Phase II and III, 1555 SHGs were

formed and seed money of Rs.18.25 lakh in 4 districts provided during 2001-06 were

not recovered from the members of the SHGs in on going projects. On this being

pointed out CEO, ZPs stated (May 2005 to July 2006) that loan money would be

recovered at the end of the project period. Reply was not tenable, as the seed money

was to be recovered in six months to ensure rotation.

3.3.7.9 Non-transfer of Assets

As per guidelines and Panchayat and Rural Development Department's order No.20

(March 1999) assets created in the completed watershed projects were to be handed

over to the watershed committees for their operation and maintenance with the help

of watershed funds.

Out of 168 completed projects test checked, 86 projects were not transferred to

watershed committees. This included 52 watershed projects completed in Korba in

2000-01 at a cost of Rs.3.63 crore and 34 watershed projects in four blocks of

Rajnandgaon completed at a cost of Rs.5.39 crore in 2004-05. CEO, ZP Korba and

Rajnandgaon intimated that transfer was under process. Thus due to non-transfer of

the assets to WCs, the maintenance of assets was not assured.

3.3.8 Achievements

The objective of improving the economic conditions of weaker sections through

watershed development was not assessable as this depended on diverse socio-

economic factors and these schemes would at best play a small contributory role. As

far as drought prevention was concerned, it was observed that 496 watershed projects

had been under taken in 26 blocks in the five test checked districts and during 2002-

04, 70 to 100 per cent of these blocks had been declared drought affected. It was

evident that watershed development programmes being executed for 10 years since

1995-96 and all other measures for drought prevention had met with little success.

It was observed that in Jagdalpur 59 watershed development projects were

sanctioned in year 1995-96 in first phase of DPAP for treatment of 38728 ha area at a

cost of Rs. 15.49 crore. They were reported as completed in February 2005 at a cost

of Rs. 11.59 crore covering area 30174.11 ha in 10 years against project period of

four years. The completion reports of these 59 watershed projects showed an increase

in agriculture land by 3360.136 ha, land under horticulture by 3686.042 ha and

decrease in cultivable wasteland by 1645.153 ha, fallow land by 3738.039 ha, grazing

land by 780.224 ha, barren land by 755.60 ha and forest land by 127.162 ha.

The records of the Superintendent Land Records, Jagdalpur were also checked for

classification in 2001 and 2004 of the land area in six DPAP blocks, where all these

projects were located. A comparison of status of classification of areas as per revenue


114 | P a g e

records and achievements reported under DPAP Phase-I to GOI showed opposite

trends as net sown area decreased by 837 ha in revenue records as against reported

increase of 3360.136 ha of agricultural land under watershed, total area of

wastelands/barren land increased by 2962 ha as per revenue records (current fallow

land 722 ha, old fallow land 310 ha, wasteland 1898 ha, barren land 32 ha) during

2001-04 while in completion report to GOI decrease of 6138.792 ha area (wasteland

1645.153 ha, fallow land 3738.039, barren land 755.600 ha) was shown. Thus the

achievements reported to GOI were not reflected in Land Revenue records.

CEO, ZP Jagdalpur intimated that instructions had been issued to POs to get the

changes registered in the Revenue records. It was necessary to reconcile the totally

divergent facts in the two sets of records.

3.3.9 Training

Diversion of training funds

In two PIA's (Durg and Rajnangdaon) it was noticed that expenditure of Rs.35 lakh

(Durg Rs.4 lakh and Rajnangdaon Rs.31 lakh) booked during 2001-06 as training

expenses were actually diverted and utilised on purchase of sign boards, vegetable

seeds, chemicals, fish food, fish seeds and smokeless chulhas etc.

3.3.10 Non-maintenance of Records.

As per guidelines watershed volunteers were responsible for the maintenance of

accounts records and measurement of works done. While measurement of works

were kept in 111 watershed projects, an expenditure of Rs.4.09 crore was incurred in

seven projects in Raipur and Jagdalpur through muster rolls without recording the

progress/measurement of work in part-II of muster rolls as prescribed. Consequently

the correctness of payments could not be ascertained in audit.

Government instructions (March 1996) provided for maintenance of registers at ZPs

(11 registers), PIAs (14 registers) and WCs (17 registers). In ZP, Raipur, Durg and

Korba and its PIAs and WCs the prescribed registers were either not maintained or

were incomplete at all levels. In the absence of essential details in the works registers,

the authenticity of the works executed could not be verified.

Similarly Watershed Development Fund (WDF) register detailing the contributions

made by the beneficiaries was not maintained to ascertain the amount contributed by

individual beneficiaries and user groups. CEOs, Durg and Korba assured for issuing

instructions to PIAs and WCs for maintaining/completing the records.

Though the deduction from the wages of labourers for watershed was commented

upon in the Report of the CAG of India for the year ended 200405 (Para no.4.4.1)

the practice was continuing in Rajnandgaon.

3.3.11 Monitoring and Supervision

The implementation of watershed development programmes was to be monitored at


115 | P a g e

the State level by a State Watershed Development Committee (SWDC) under the

Chairmanship of Development Commissioner and other representatives of line

departments. It was required to meet twice a year and was responsible for the over all

supervision, guidance and monitoring and evaluation of progress of implementation

of watershed development programmes. District Watershed Development

Committees (DWDC) for supervision of implementation of watershed development

programmes were to be constituted at district level. The State level supervising

committee was not constituted and in test checked districts the committee was found

functional only in Rajnandgaon district.

It was observed that 71 NWDPRA13

projects were being implemented parallelly in

29 DPAP blocks and 24 blocks where IWDP watershed programmes were in

operation. This indicated duplication in implementation due to inadequate

coordination between the Rural Development and the Agriculture Department.

3.3.12 Conclusion

The watershed projects were being implemented through inadequate project plans.

Project selection was faulty and some were selected in areas which did not qualify.

Components were not executed in prescribed sequence necessary for proper

development of watersheds. The programmes were being implemented with limited

scope, major emphasis was given to construction of structures under water

conservation measures and other components were either partially covered or totally

ignored. Many completed projects had not been handed over to WCs. Prescribed

records were not properly maintained. The limited effectiveness was borne out at a

macro level by the continuance of drought in many of the blocks covered by the

programmes.


116 | P a g e

Water Management by Panchayat Raj institutions in Alappuzha District

Highlights

In Kerala the important functions of PRIs in relation to water management include maintenance of

traditional drinking water sources, setting up of water supply schemes, implementation and

maintenance of minor irrigation and lift irrigation projects, development of ground water resources etc.

Audit Review revealed that the utilisation of funds for water supply schemes was much below the

requirement. The PRIs do not have any focussed programme for protection and conservation of

traditional drinking water sources and ponds.

Introduction

3.3.1 Water is one of the most important physical requirements of human beings.

Communities and individuals use water resources for drinking, sanitation, agriculture,

industry, transportation and several other purposes. It is not sufficient merely to have

access to water; the water also needs to be of adequate quality to support its intended

use. Alappuzha District in Kerala was identified as the worst hit district with no safe

source and with acute problem of safe drinking water. There were also reports that

tourist operators the world over had cautioned the prospective visitors to Alappuzha, not

to use pipe water. Further, the water in the wells, ponds and back waters was polluted by

the industrial wastes generated from the coir industry units, which were widespread in

Alappuzha. Thus, a provision for drinking water of good quality was imperative for the

health of the people of Alappuzha and for the economic future of the district.

Audit objectives

3.3.2 A review of the water management by Panchayat Raj Institutions in Alappuzha

District was conducted during the period April-August 2005 to assess the effectiveness of

the measures taken by them in:

• Maintenance of traditional drinking water sources.

• Preservation of ponds and tanks.

• Maintenance of waterways.

• Setting up of and maintenance of water supply schemes to ensure supply of potable water to

the rural population.

• Effective implementation of watershed management.

• Extending assistance to individual beneficiaries to augment their efforts to meet water

requirements and

• Ensuring quality of drinking water to prevent water borne diseases.

Audit coverage

3.3.3 For the Review on water management, 25 out of 73 Grama Panchayats in the District,

four out of 12 Block Panchayats, the District Panchayat, two Divisional offices of Kerala

Water Authority (KWA), Office of the Chief Engineer (Southern Region), Kerala Water


117 | P a g e

Authority (KWA) Thiruvananthapuram and Office of the District Medical Officer,

Alappuzha were taken up.

3.3.4 The profile and pattern of allotment of funds in respect of the 25 Grama Panchayats

during the period 2000-2005 are given in Appendix XIV & XV respectively. On an average

each Grama Panchayat was allotted Rs.68 lakh per annum as grants-in-aid from State

Government, Eleventh Finance Commission Grant and Rural Infrastructure Development

Fund.

Institutional structure for service delivery

3.3.5 The water management function assigned to each tier of Panchayat is given below:-

Government did not fix specific criteria for allotment of funds for water management

schemes, except during 2004-05.

Grama Panchayats Block Panchayats District Panchayats

• Maintenance of

traditional drinking

water sources

• Management of

water supply

schemes within a

Grama Panchayat

• Setting up of water • Implementation

supply schemes and taking over

within a Grama Water Supply

Panchayat. Schemes covering

more than one

Grama Panchayat.

• Preservation of

ponds and other

water tanks.

• Maintenance of

water ways.

• Maintenance and • Implementation and • Construction and

implementation of maintenance of all maintenance of

all minor/micro lift irrigation and minor irrigation

irrigation projects minor irrigation schemes covering

schemes covering more than one

more than one Block Panchayat.

Grama Panchayat.

• Development of

ground water

resources.


118 | P a g e

The functions of the three tiers of Panchayats are clearly delineated to avoid overlapping. None

of the Panchayats covered in the review owned or managed water supply schemes. The sources

of drinking water were open wells, bore wells and street taps and house connection maintained

by KWA for which water charges were paid to the KWA by the Panchayats and the consumers

respectively. Water from open wells, street taps and bore wells was used for drinking. The

requirements for sanitation and irrigation were met by water drawn from wells, ponds and

canals.

Water management by Grama Panchayats

Availability of funds - Poor allocation and under utilisation of funds

3.3.6 It was one of the statutory obligations of the Grama Panchayats to provide safe potable

water to the rural inhabitants. Government did not fix specific criteria for allotment of funds for

the purpose, except during 2004-05. Owing to lack of awareness of the importance of water

management, the Grama Panchayats did not allocate adequate funds to cover the entire rural

population as envisaged in the Ninth and Tenth Five Year Plans. Average utilisation of funds for

Water Supply Schemes by 25 Grama Panchayats in Alappuzha District during 2000-01 to 2004-

05 was only Rs.1.27 lakh per Panchayat and it was 1.94 per cent of the total plan fund (Appendix

XV & XVI) on an average as shown below.

Year Total Plan fund allotted to the Grama Panchayats (Rs in lakh)

Funds utilised for WSS (Rs in lakh)

Average utilisation by a Panchayat (Rs in lakh)

Percentage of funds utilised for WSS to the total plan fund allotted to GPs

2000-01 1364.03 22.60 0.90 1.66

2001-02 1148.27 19.37 0.77 1.69 2002-03 1819.48 12.39 0.50 0.68 2003-04 2468.28 71.65 2.87 2.90 2004-05 1429.05 33.35 1.33 2.33 Total 8229.11 159.36 1.27 1.94

Short fall in utilisation of funds for water management in Productive Sector

3.3.7 Government in March 2004, ordered that one-third of the funds allocated to the

productive sector∗ should be earmarked for Water Management Schemes during 2004-05.

But the actual utilisation of funds during 2004-05 (Appendix XVI) for the Water

Management Schemes in twenty five Grama panchayats was only 8.77 per cent as against

the required quantum of 33.33 per cent as shown below:

Plan Fund allotted for Productive Sector -Rs.380.16 lakh

Fund that should have been allotted and

utilised for Water Supply Schemes - Rs.126.71 lakh (33.33 per cent)

Fund actually utilised -Rs.33.35 lakh (8.77 per cent)

Failure in providing drinking water to the rural population


119 | P a g e

3.3.8 Out of 1,65,380 households in 25 Grama Panchayats, 38,601 households did not have

proper access to drinking water facilities such as open wells, piped water and bore wells

(Appendix XVII). Twenty three per cent of the families had to depend on community taps,

or wells of the neighbouring houses for drinking water. The Panchayats did not maintain

updated registers showing the location or the date of installation of street taps for which they

paid water charges to KWA. Consequently the panchayats paid water charges for street

taps, the number of which exceeded the number as per the register of the panchayats. Due

to non-implementation of protective measures to preserve surface water and due to

uncontrolled sand mining, many of these open wells ran dry during summer. Further, as the

houses of the BPL families were built in four or five cents of land, the latrines, cowsheds

etc., constructed adjacent to open wells, contributed to the pollution of under-ground water.

Water quality monitoring programme

3.3.9 Quality of under ground water in Alappuzha district was not safe due to high

concentration of chloride, fluoride and iron. Fluoride content was above the permissible

limit of 1 ppm (mg/1) in almost all wells as reported by Kerala Water Authority (KWA).

Because of the high fluoride content, Alappuzha was declared as an endemic area with

respect to fluoride. A recent study by a medical team revealed that 35.64 per cent of the

school children in Ambalapuzha taluk were affected by dental fluorosis and its prevalence

was 55.28 per cent in urban area. Possibility of defluorinating tube well water was found not

viable due to technical and financial limitations. It was found not prudent to depend on

ground water any more because of the increasing trend of salinity and depletion of ground

water table.

3.3.10 Mention was made in para 7.14.10 and 7.14.11 of the Report of Comptroller and

Auditor General of India for the year ended 31 March 2001 (Civil), Government of Kerala

regarding two Sub Mission projects sanctioned by Government of India during 1997-98 and

eight projects by the State government during 1998-2000 at a total estimated cost of

Rs.54.67 crore for controlling excess salinity and fluoride problem. But none of those

projects was implemented. A comprehensive project viz. „Augmentation of Rural Water

Supply Scheme‟ to six villages in Ambalapuzha Taluk, costing roughly Rs.126 crore was

formulated by Kerala Water Authority in 2004 to cover both the urban and rural areas. The

water source of the Scheme was Pampa river at Cyclemukku where 10 metre diameter

intake well cum pump house was also proposed. But due to paucity of funds these projects

had not been implemented (August 2005).

3.3.11 Though Alappuzha was identified as the worst hit district with no safe source (NSS)

in the Annual Report on Quality Monitoring programme 19992000, prepared by the Chief

Engineer Investigation, Planning and Design, Kochi, no safe source habitation could be

provided and no scheme for control of salinity, fluoride, iron content etc., was planned and

implemented by the PRIs so far.


120 | P a g e

Incidence of 3.3.12 A report from the District Medical Officer (June 2005) shown below

water borne revealed that incidence of water borne diseases continued, including causalities

in diseases the Alappuzha District.

continued Incidence of water borne diseases in Alappuzha district during 2002-05

S

l.

N

o

Name

of

Diseas

e

2002 2003 2004 2005A

(u

p

to

pr

il)

Cas

e

Dea

th

Cas

e

Dea

th

Cas

e

Dea

th

Cas

e

Dea

th

1

Acute

Water

Diarrh

oea

213

93 Nil

208

92 2

208

68 Nil 6722 Nil

2 Choler

a 35 Nil 3 Nil 1 Nil Nil Nil

3

Persista

nt

Diarrh

oea

129 Nil 95 Nil 52 Nil 5 Nil

4 Dysent

ery

160

8 Nil

126

7 Nil 988 Nil 199 Nil

5 Hepatit

is – A 93 Nil 58 3 152 1 163 2

3.3.13 Despite the incidence of water borne diseases due to water pollution and

unhygienic practices of the rural inhabitants, Government did not take any

comprehensive measures to co-ordinate with the PRIs, KWA, Ground Water

Department and Health Department to solve the acute problem of safe drinking water in

Alappuzha.

Delay in implementation of Water Supply Schemes through Kerala Water Authority

3.3.14 The plan fund deposited with KWA for implementing the water supply schemes was

to be utilised within the financial year. During the period 2000-01 to 2004-05, 73 Panchayats

in Alappuzha District entrusted 147 water supply schemes to KWA for execution as deposit

works. The Panchayats paid the estimated cost of the schemes as advance, out of which

Rs.1.81 crore remained unadjusted at the end of 2004-05. As at 31 March 2005, the work

relating to 114 schemes remained incomplete, leading to non-achievement of the social

objectives targeted. The details are given below:

3.3.15 The Panchayats failed to ensure the timely completion of water supply schemes by

KWA for which the Panchayats had deposited the estimated amount in advance. The

accountability obligation of the KWA towards legislature can be fulfilled only by executing

the works within the financial year and by presenting the accounts of the schemes to the


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panchayats. Since the panchayats do not have any control over KWA, Government have to

take suitable steps to ensure that the KWA execute the works in time and submit accounts

to the panchayats

Year No. of

Schemes

entrusted

with

KWA in

the

district

No.

remained

incomplete

of schemes which Advance

amount

pending with

KWA (in

Rupees)

2000-

01

13 7 25,21,560

2001-

02

14 - () 2,839

2002-

03

30 18 18,90,652

2003-

04

75 74 1,13,12,074

2004-

05

15 15 23,69,660

Total 147 114 1,80,91,107

Non-transfer of assets worth Rs.46.19 crore to PRIs

3.3.16 Government decided, in November 1998, to transfer all Water Supply Schemes within a

Panchayat maintained by KWA to the Grama Panchayat concerned. In Alappuzha district,

KWA listed for transfer 94 schemes belonging to 53 Grama Panchayats. The above schemes

included 12148 street taps and 31435 domestic and 2233 non-domestic connections. The water

charges payable by the Panchayats to KWA were Rs.2.13 crore per annum for the 12148 street

taps at the rate of Rs.1750 per tap. The Grama Panchayats could not take over the schemes due

to inadequacy of technical staff to maintain the schemes. The assets to be handed over

(including arrears of water charges from local bodies and charges for house connection till the

date of transfer) were valued at Rs. 46.19 crore. By taking over the assets worth Rs.46.19 crore,

the Grama Panchayats would have been in a position to deliver better service in accordance with

their expectations. Further, the domestic and non-domestic connections would have been a

potential source of revenue to the Grama Panchayats.


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Government did not transfer assets worth Rs46.19 crore to PRIs.

Non-preservation of ponds and other water tanks

3.3.17 Preservation of ponds and other water tanks is the function of the Grama Panchayats in

terms of the third schedule of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. Ponds were originally used

for domestic and irrigation purposes. But with the widespread digging of open wells and bore

wells, use of the water in ponds was restricted to non-domestic and irrigation purposes. Ponds

were filled with wastes generated from fish markets and other industrial discharges causing

environmental pollution. In the projects formulated by the selected 25 Grama Panchayats during

the period 2000-05, there was no provision for construction of retaining walls or for removal of

wastes from ponds. Non preservation of surface water prevented improved level of underground

water and supply of water for irrigation purposes.

Implementation of Minor Irrigation Schemes

3.3.18 Implementation of minor irrigation schemes is one of the important activities under water

management. Sixteen out of 25 Grama Panchayats test checked had not implemented any

minor irrigation scheme during the years 2000

-05. The number of schemes and expenditure incurred in each year by the remaining nine∗

Grama Panchayats were also very low as shown below:

Year No of

Panchayats

No. of

Schemes

Expenditure

incurred (Rs

in lakh)

2000-01 5@ 11 37.24

2001-02 5£ 9 6.87

2002-03 3# 3 3.75

2003-04 5$ 17 11.87

2004-05 6• 11 32.00

Total 51 91.73

3.3.19 The number of minor irrigation projects taken up by the nine Grama Panchayats during

the five years (2000 - 05) was only 51 and the expenditure incurred thereon was Rs.91.73 lakh.

The amount, spent by the nine Grama Panchayats over a period of five years for implementing

51 minor irrigation schemes was very negligible and the Grama Panchayats could not make any

achievement in irrigating the barren cultivable land.


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Large scale filling up of paddy fields mainly due to poor water management.

3.3.20 Majority of the villagers seek their livelihood through cultivation of paddy, coconut,

tapioca etc. But 1024.2 ha of cultivable paddy field in 11# Grama Panchayats (March 2005)

remained barren due to lack of irrigation and drainage facilities, scarcity of agriculture labourers,

low quality seeds, flood during rainy season etc. An area of 548.33 ha (March 2005) of paddy

field was also filled up for shifting to other cultivations or for construction of buildings. Poor

water management resulted in lack of irrigation and drainage facilities and consequent slow

down of agricultural activities.

Water management by Block Panchayats

Failure to implement Water shed Management Scheme

3.3.21 Water shed (Neerthadam) is an area lying on either side of a river or rivulet starting from

a hilly place down to an outlet point. Watersheds are categorised in five types namely micro,

small, simple, sub and large watersheds based on the area in hectare covered ie. 1 ha to 100 ha,

100 ha to 1000 ha, 1000 ha to 10,000 ha, 10,000 ha to 50,000 ha and 50,000 ha and above

respectively. The main objectives of watershed development are:

• conservation, upgradation and utilisation of environments like bird, water, plant, animal and

human resources in an integrated manner,

• improvement of environment and restoration of ecological balance through scientific

management of land and rain water

• generation of massive employment, and

• increase in irrigated areas.

3.3.22 Though the Tenth Five Year Plan was envisaged as „water shed oriented‟, after

identifying the water sheds in each Grama Panchayat, no action plan was discussed and

formulated in the Grama Sabhas. The Panchayat failed to evoke the interest of the people on

such core issues. District Planning Committee also did not point out the lapse. None of the 87

water sheds identified by the twenty five Grama Panchayats was developed. Thus, during Tenth

Five Year Plan the target of conservation and utilisation of natural resources based on water

sheds could not be achieved.


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Water management by District Panchayat

Idling of Funds with Ground Water Department consequent on noncompletion of

works.

3.3.23 Ground Water Department (GWD) was entrusted with the construction of tube

wells which were one of the sources of water supply schemes of the PRIs. In view of the

urgent nature of the drought relief works, pipe laying was also entrusted to GWD as a

special case. The District Panchayat, Alappuzha deposited Rs.71.66 lakh with the

GWD between 2003-04 and 2004-05 for digging bore wells and tube wells and extension

of pipe lines for drought relief works as detailed below.

(Rupees in lakh)

Year Amount

deposited

Amount

utilised

Balance

as on

2005

June

2003-04 32.39 3.66 28.73

2004-05 39.27 1.06 38.21

Total 71.66 4.72 66.94

1. 3.3.24 The GWD utilised only seven per cent of the amount and Rs.66.94

lakh remained idle (June, 2005). When there remained an unspent balance of

Rs.28.73 lakh at the end of 2003-04, there was no justification in further advancing

Rs.39.27 lakh to the same Department in 2004-05. The idling of funds and the

consequent non-attainment of social objectives was the result of non-monitoring of

the schemes by the District Panchayat and non-fulfilment of obligations by the

GWD. The District Panchayat and Government have to take necessary steps for the

speedy implementation of the above schemes.

.3.3.25 Conclusion

. • The Panchayats test checked were facing shortage of drinking water

and the quality of available drinking water was poor. The amount allocated and

expended for this core sector was very small compared to the total fund allotted to

the productive sector. None of the Panchayats had followed Government direction

regarding earmarking of funds for water management schemes.

. • The PRIs do not have any focused programme for protection and

conservation of traditional sources of drinking water and ponds.

. • Adequate attention was not paid to setting up and maintenance of

water supply schemes. They failed to closely monitor implementation of schemes for


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which money was advanced to KWA. Though KWA was prepared to transfer

certain water supply schemes to PRIs, they were not ready to take over and maintain

them

. • Ambitious project of water shed management could not take off due

to lack of interest of the PRIs. Filling up of paddy fields and ponds led to drying up

of wells resulting in shortage of availability of ground water.

. • Due to poor quality of drinking water, incidence of water borne

diseases were on the increase.

.

Performance Audit of Tsunami Relief and Reconstructions

Revenue (Relief and Rehabilitation) Department, Andhra Pradesh

.

Highlights

An earthquake induced tidal wave, called Tsunami, hit all the nine coastal districts in

Andhra Pradesh on 26 December 2004 causing a loss of 107 human lives with four

missing, besides loss and damages to houses, fishing boats and other infrastructural

facilities. A performance audit of “Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction” revealed that even

after 18 months of the disaster, rehabilitation of the affected fishermen and reconstruction

of infrastructure facilities had not been completed (June 2006). Replacement and repairs to

damaged boats had yet to be done in Krishna, East Godavari, Nellore and Prakasam

Districts. Rural water sources had not been fully repaired or damaged roads restored.

Unauthorised/inadmissible/ excess expenditure, etc. were also noticed in the six districts.

[Paragraphs 3.5.6.1, 3.5.6.2 and 3.5.7.1]

[Paragraph 3.5.9.8]

[Paragraph 3.5.9.2]

[Paragraphs 3.5.9.6 and 3.5.9.11]


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[Paragraph 3.5.9.7]

[Paragraph3.5.9.9]

3.5.1 Introduction

Tsunami is a series of waves with a longer wavelength and period (time between two

crests), generated by large, impulsive displacement of the seabed level mainly due to

earthquakes, which cause vertical movement of the sea floor. It is also triggered by

landslides under the water surface or impacts by volcanic activity and meteor. A

great shallow focus earthquake of a magnitude of 8.6 on the Richter Scale occurred

with its epicentre off the west coast of Northern Sumatra on 26 December 2004 at

06.29AM (IST). This earthquake generated massively destructive Tsunami waves

which hit the Coastal States and Union Territories of Pondicherry and Andaman

Nicobar Islands causing extensive loss of lives and property. In Andhra Pradesh, the

tidal waves entered villages along all the nine coastal districts inundating 301 villages

in 69 Mandals affecting a population of 2.12 lakh. As per the preliminary survey,

there were reports of 107 deaths, and four missing persons. While, damages were

reported to 481 houses, 10683 country boats, 180 mechanised boats and 1362

country boats were claimed as lost. 47370 Fishing nets belonging to marine

fishermen were also reported as lost/damaged due to Tsunami. The total estimated

loss (as per the initial assessment) was Rs 75.27 crore which was re-assessed at Rs

51.84 crore.

3.5.2 Organisational setup

A State Level High Power Standing Committee had been constituted (May 1978) to

deal with natural calamities including relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation under

the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary to Government. A State Level

Commissionerate for disaster management had been functioning under the

administrative control of Revenue Department for coordinating and rescue

operations.

The relief operations of the Tsunami disaster were being implemented by the

Commissioner, Disaster Management (Commissioner) with the assistance of various

departments56

. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Indira Kranthi Patham (IKP)

through Project Directors, IKP had assessed the loss of boats, nets of marine

fishermen at village level in the affected mandals in coordination with the Fisheries

Department. The other damages were assessed by Chief Engineer (CE) (R&B) –

Roads; CE (RWS) – Rural water supply sources; MD, Andhra Pradesh State

Housing Corporation (APSHC) – Housing; Commissioner of Agriculture –


127 | P a g e

Agriculture; Director of Animal Husbandry – Animal Husbandry; Principal Chief

Conservator of Forest – Forest respectively.


The audit objectives framed for the performance audit were to assess whether:

• there were any deficiencies in the assessment, release of funds and utilisation

thereof and the expenditure conformed to the norms

• the process of identification of beneficiaries and the need assessment of

affected areas/population was scientific

• the institutional mechanism for disaster management, mitigation, prevention

and preparedness was effective

• the steps taken for providing immediate assistance, procurement and delivery

of relief and rehabilitation and restoration of infrastructural services were

adequate and

• the system of monitoring of relief and rehabilitation operations was effective.


The criteria used for the Performance Audit were as under:

• Assessment report on the loss on account of Tsunami, allocation of funds

made by GOI, releases to executing agencies and their utilisation in

accordance with GOI guidelines

• System of identification of beneficiaries and policies formulated for

rehabilitation of affected people

• Guidelines issued by the GOI/Planning Commission for effective

implementation of Tsunami Rehabilitation Programme and the Coastal Zone

Regulation Act, Town Planning Act and Municipalities Act, etc.

• Coordination amongst various departments including NGOs involved in

Tsunami Relief operations and timeliness of delivery of relief and

rehabilitation and

• Monitoring system instituted by the State Government

3.5.5 Scope and Methodology of Audit

Performance audit of the relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation operations in the

aftermath of the Tsunami, covering the period December 2004 to June 2006 was

conducted (November 2005 – June 2006) by test-check of records of the


128 | P a g e

Commissioners – Disaster Management, Fisheries, Agriculture; Director, Town and

Country Planning; Managing Director, APSHC; CE (R&B); CE (RWS) and other

implementing departments/ agencies in the six57

out of nine affected districts. The

results of the review are presented in the succeeding paragraphs.

Discussions were held with the departmental officers in an entry conference held in

January 2006, wherein the objectives and scope of performance audit and the audit

criteria were discussed. Views of the Commissionerate of Disaster Management and

other departmental officers were considered while

arriving at the audit conclusions.

In the exit conference held (August 2006) with the departmental officers all the

points included in the draft report including the recommendations were discussed

with the entity.

Audit Findings


3.5.6.1 Funding pattern

All financial assistance to the States affected by natural calamities is provided under

Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) and National Calamity Contingency Fund (NCCF). In

case these funds are insufficient additional Central assistance is provided from

NCCF.

Based on the preliminary assessment reports received from the district authorities

(through teleconference), the State Government submitted (December 2004) to GOI,

a memorandum containing sector-wise damages requiring assistance of Rs 317 crore

besides 19500 MT rice (under Sampoorna Grameen Rojgar Yojana (SGRY)) – Food

Assurance Programme (FAP) to restore damages (Rs 75.27 crore) and also to

undertake mitigation measures. The funds for reconstruction of damages caused by

Tsunami were received from the following sources:

(Rupees in crore)

Source Purpose Amount received

GOI

NCCF Relief and

Rehabilitation

69.32

RGRP Housing 2.30

RGNDWM Rural Water Supply 3.00

CRF Housing 20.00

State


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CMRF Housing 20.00

Fishing crafts 0.90

Total 115.52

Note: In addition to the above, an NGO - Indian Red Cross Society had

contributed Rs 1.06 crore (Nellore: Rs 49 lakh (expenditure Rs 33.50 lakh);

Prakasam: Rs 57 lakh (expenditure Rs 52.05 lakh)) for procurement of boats

through respective District Collectors. Besides, some NGOs also assisted the

beneficiaries to meet the cost of construction of house, over and above Rs

40000 (Para 3.5.9.4 refers).

3.5.6.2 Sanctioned outlay and expenditure

As against Rs 115.52 crore sanctioned/received from various sources, only Rs 90.30

crore were released to the districts, CE(RWS), CE(R&B) and MD, APSHC under

„Relief and Reconstruction‟ (Rs 45.20 crore); Housing (Rs 42 crore); RWS (Rs 3.10

crore).

The Commissioner, Disaster Management had no information on the total

expenditure incurred on the „Relief and Rehabilitation' activities in the State. In the

six test-checked districts, an amount of Rs 4.49 crore (including the additional rice

supplied in Srikakulam and Visakhapatnam Districts) was incurred by the respective

District Collectors to provide immediate relief. The district-wise releases and the

expenditure as of June 2006 under the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation activity in

the six test-checked districts

(Rupees in crore)

Rs 40.18 crore

District Releases Drawn Expenditure

(Percentage)

East Godavari 9.17 7.13 4.85 (68)

Krishna 6.29 6.29 4.51 (72)

Nellore 15.34 14.95 12.94 (87)

Prakasam 9.20 9.20 6.13 (67)

Srikakulam 0.98 0.98 0.58 (59)


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Visakhapatnam 1.63 1.63 1.58 (97)

Total 42.61 40.18 30.59 (76)

Thus, in the six districts, only Rs 30.59 crore (72 per cent of the releases and 76 per

cent of the amount drawn) was spent, leaving Rs 9.58 crore59

unutilised. The sector-

wise details are given in Appendix 3.7.

Further, as against Rs 5.13 crore released to CE (RWS) for restoration of rural water

supply sources, Rs 3.10 crore was released to Superintending Engineers, RWS in the

six affected districts; the balance Rs 2.03 crore was still lying with the CE, (RWS)

(June 2006). The expenditure reported was only Rs 1.27 crore (25 per cent of the

releases) leaving Rs 1.83 crore lying unutilised (June 2006) with the PAOs.

In Prakasam District, the entire amount of Rs 3.10 crore released to the DM,

Housing in May 2005 had been lying unutilised (June 2006) in the form of Demand

Drafts (Rs 2 crore) and in a savings bank account (Rs 1.10 crore).

Full amounts could not be utilised in these districts mainly because the district

authorities had initially inflated the requirement of funds and that the rehabilitation

operations could be managed with less funds. Further, in the Fishing sector, of three

out of six sample districts, overstatement of losses also resulted in excess

sanctions/releases.

Besides, under-utilisation of funds amounting to Rs 9.58 crore was also noticed in

Fisheries (Rs 5.94 crore), Roads (Rs 1.20 crore), Housing (Rs 1.55 crore) and RWS

works (Rs 0.69 crore).

3.5.7 Identification of beneficiaries and need assessment

3.5.7.1 Improper initial assessment of damages/loss

Immediately after occurrence of Tsunami, the damages of property and loss of life

was assessed (December 2004) by the District Revenue authorities with the help of

Fisheries Department. Subsequently, another micro survey was conducted (July

2005) by the Project Directors, IKP in all the affected districts as per the orders of the

District Collectors and the victims of the calamity (mainly fishermen) were identified

by gramasabhas in the presence of officers of the Revenue and Fisheries Departments

and the Village elders. The resolutions were passed confirming the losses. The

subsequent assessment of damages to boats/nets, etc. were arrived at Rs 51.84 crore.

According to the assessment, the requirement of funds had come down in all the

districts (except in Viskhapatnam District), resulting in excess sanction/releases in

most cases as discussed below. Thus, it was evident that the initial assessment had

been unrealistic. The final assessment of damages has yet to be done by the


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Commissioner, Disaster Management (August 2006), even after 18 months of

occurrence of Tsunami.

3.5.7.2 Excess sanctions/releases due to improper survey

After the micro survey of the assessment of losses conducted in July 2005, the

requirement of funds came down. Therefore, although the State

Government/Commissioner had released amounts for the replacements/repairs to

boats, nets, etc. on the basis of the figures projected in the initial survey the supplies

were made on the basis of subsequent assessment. On verifying the releases towards

replacements/repairs of boats and nets in the six test-checked districts, unspent

balances amounting to Rs 4.12 crore were lying with the District Collectors,

PDs/IKP, PAOs and JD/Fisheries in three districts as follows:

* the reduction in expenditure was due to limiting of repairs to Rs 2000 on the

basis of extent of damages as against the ceiling of Rs 10000 per craft

In Prakasam District it was further observed that Rs 10.01 crore was sanctioned

(March 2005) for replacement of 8998 fishing nets based on the initial assessment.

Subsequently, as per micro assessment, the actual requirement was found to be 4312

nets only which cost Rs 2.66 crore. Instead of restricting the release and drawal to

this extent, the Commissioner in March 2005, had released Rs 5 crore as the first

instalment. However, the resultant unspent balance of Rs 2.34 crore instead of being

remitted back to Government, was placed (March 2006) at the disposal of the PD,

IKP. Moreover, the Commissioner further released Rs 72.54 lakh and the District

Collector authorised the Assistant Director, Fisheries to draw the amount even

without requirement. The entire amount of Rs 3.07 crore was thus kept

unutilised/unremitted by the PD, IKP as of June 2006.

3.5.7.3 Non–implementation of Marine Fishermen Regulation Act

As per Marine Fishermen Regulation Act, fishermen who acquire a boat of their

own for fishing purpose have to register the boats with the Fisheries Department. It

was observed that this practice was not being followed and no data on the number of

boats registered/ purchased were available with them. The Fisheries Department

therefore, was not in a position to assess the number of boats lost/damaged and had

to rely on the recommendations of gramsabhas to extend financial assistance. This

was indicative of poor planning and poor implementation of the provision of the Act,

by the Department.

3.5.8.1 Preventive measures not implemented

Guidelines on Tsunami Rehabilitation programmes with regard to Institutional and


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fund flow mechanism, norms, community participation and involvement of NGOs

and programme monitoring issued (February 2006) by the Planning

Commission/GOI after the Tsunami, have yet to be adopted and implemented by

the State Government. The Director, Town and Country Planning proposed

(December 2004) to the State Government, for amendments to Andhra Pradesh

Town Planning Act, 1920 and Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965 by

suggesting model amendments to Town and Country Planning, Land Use Zone

Regulations, Building Regulations for National Hazard Zone. He had also mapped

(December 2004), vulnerable coastal areas with reference to high tide line. No action

was, however, taken by the Government as of June 2006. In fact, the Coastal Zone

Regulations (1981) of GOI prohibiting all kinds of artificial development within 500

metres from the high tide mark, had not been adhered to while sanctioning houses to

the affected fishermen. The Marine Fishermen Regulation Act requiring the

registration of boats with Fisheries Department was also not implemented.

Training courses under National Programme for Capacity Building on earthquake

risk management, were being conducted regularly. The State level and district level

training programmes on disaster management were organised by APARD60

only for

two to five days for 2024 district/village level staff (State level: 456 participants;

District level: 1568 participants) during 2005-06 and 2006-07(as of July 2006).

Details of trainings imparted to Engineering and Medical staff were not furnished.

Thus, the State had not geared up sufficiently to meet the disasters like Tsunami.

3.5.9.1 Immediate Relief

District collectors of the nine affected coastal districts had quickly evacuated 34264

people into 67 relief camps, and provided food and drinking water and later 25 kg of

rice per family on their return home from relief camps. Where no relief camps were

organised, 10 kg of rice was provided to each family. A total number of 101

stationary, 72 mobile and 568 para-medical teams were speedily deployed to take up

healthcare and sanitation measures in the affected areas. Some 132470 houses and

8015 water sources were chlorinated and the affected villages sanitised to prevent the

outbreak of any epidemic. The Commissioner, however, had no information on the

relief provided to the Tsunami victims in the nine Coastal districts of the State as a

whole.

3.5.9.2 Delay in providing rehabilitation

Despite the availability of Central assistance in January 2005 itself, although 18

months had elapsed after the Tsunami, the delivery of assistance for reconstruction

in respect of supply of boats (in four test-checked districts) and for repairs to boats (in

three test-checked districts) was not completed (June 2006) as follows:


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There were huge shortages in supply of boats/repairs of boats

District East Godavari

Krishna Nellore Prakasam

SrikakulamVisakhapatnam

Sanctioned

for supply

107 215

756 518 -

5**

Number of

boats

Supplied

(Percentage)

Sanctioned

for repairs

64 (60) 1822

76 (35) 1742

535 (71)

3503 446

(86)* 2491 -

247 30 540

Repaired

(Percentage)

1822 (100)

1500 (86)

2367 (68)

1920 (77)

247 (100)

657 (100)

* Exclusive of 321 dinghies supplied

** In Visakhapatnam district, five boats were sanctioned based on the

initial assessment of Fisheries department in Urban area. Later the IKP

had assessed the loss in rural areas. Hence the excess in supply of boats

(Para 3.5.9.3 refers)

It will be seen that the extent of short supply of new boats was very high in Krishna

(65 per cent), East Godavari (40 per cent), Nellore (29 per cent) and Prakasam (14 per

cent). Also, 32 per cent and 23 per cent damaged boats were not repaired in Nellore and

Prakasam Districts respectively.

Delay in repairs and supply of new boats adversely affected the earnings and the

livelihood of the fishermen (42162 families).

3.5.9.3 Improper assessment of loss of boats in Visakhapatnam District

According to the preliminary report on loss of assets in Visakhapatnam District, only

five boats were lost and for which Government had released Rs 0.68 lakh for their

replacement. In a later assessment done as per the orders of District Collector, the

loss was reported as 93 boats (90 wooden boats and three Fiber Reinforced plastic

boats-FRP) and 108 mechanised boats needing repairs. It was however, seen that no

further funds had been released by the Government so far (June 2006) to cover all

these boats though asked for by the PD, IKP. In the meantime, the PD, IKP had

procured 30 boats (cost: Rs 3.37 lakh) and repaired all the 108 mechanised boats (Rs

5.21 lakh out of IKP funds) leaving a balance of 63 boats yet to be replaced due to

non-receipt of additional funds of Rs 19.02 lakh sought for by the District Collector

in November 2005. Non-provision of additional funds for this purpose, though funds

were lying unspent with the district level authorities, in all test-checked districts was


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indicative of lack of proper monitoring of expenditure at the Commissionerate level.

3.5.9.4 Non-utilisation of relief made available by NGOs

The Commissioner had no information with regard to the number of NGOs and

assistance rendered by them in the nine affected coastal districts. The district

administration did not also coordinate effectively with the NGOs in distribution of

relief to the affected families. In the three out of six test-checked districts, it was seen

that 20 NGOs (Krishna : three, Prakasam : 13, Nellore: four) were involved in the

Tsunami relief operations.

It was observed that Indian Red Cross Society (IRCS) had extended (July 2005)

financial assistance of Rs 49 lakh for supply (subsidy: Rs 75000, loan: Rs 20000 and

beneficiary contribution: Rs 5000) of 100 FRP boats in Nellore District. These funds

were kept at the disposal of the District Project Directors, IKP. As against the 100

boats sanctioned, only 79 were supplied as of June 2006 (part payment made: Rs

33.50 lakh). There was also delay on the part of the Fisheries Department and the

PD, IKP in identifying the beneficiaries for supply of FRP boats (instead of wooden

catamarans). Due to the delay, the beneficiaries were deprived of the boats in spite of

the funds being provided by the NGO way back in July 2005.

3.5.9.5 Doubtful utilisation of funds under Boat repairs

Government fixed (March 2005) the ceiling of Rs 10000 per boat for repairs. In

Prakasam District tenders were called for by the PD, IKP and rates obtained for units

of repairs and identified the firms for taking up the repair works. It was observed that

out of 2479 boats damaged (2491 as per initial assessment) in the district, the

maximum amount (Rs 10000) fixed by the State Government was allowed for all the

547 boats repaired (Rs 54.70 lakh) as of January 2006. For the remaining boats also

(boat-wise expenditure for another 1373 boats repaired as of June 2006 was not

furnished to Audit) a provision of Rs 10000 per boat was made, not adhering to the

approved rates for units of repairs. It was also seen that the extent of damages was

not indicated by the Fisheries Development Officers concerned in the damage

assessment reports. On a comparative study made by Audit in East Godavari and

Visakhapatnam Districts, it was found that the average expenditure incurred per boat

was only Rs 2000 and Rs 2570 respectively. Thus the expenditure incurred by the

PD, IKP, Prakasam District towards repairs of boats appears to be on the higher side

and hence doubtful. Government while accepting the audit point stated

(July 2006) that a Senior District Officer was being appointed to investigate into the

matter.

3.5.9.6 Non-utilisation of SGRY funds in Krishna District

In Krishna District, an amount of Rs 15.86 lakh in cash and 793 MTs of rice (Rs

63.44 lakh) was sanctioned under SGRY (Special Component) for 5285 Tsunami


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affected families for relief employment works for three months. It was, however, seen

that although the cash component of Rs 15.86 lakh was drawn by the District

Collector, Krishna in January 2005 and deposited in the PD Account, no

expenditure had been incurred so far (June 2006). The rice sanctioned under SGRY

(FAP) was, however, not drawn as no works were identified for the affected families

under SGRY in the district.

3.5.9.7 Non-execution of major repairs to road by R&B Department

Government had released (March 2005) Rs 1.20 crore for execution of repair works

to road in the Tsunami affected mandal (Kakinada Rural) of East Godavari District.

The CE (R&B – Roads) had drawn the amount and deposited (March 2005) it with

the Assistant Pay and Accounts Officer, Yeleru Reservoir Scheme, Kakinada. In

response to the tender call (October 2005), a single tender was received (November

2005). This was however, disqualified as the firm did not produce the certificate

showing experience in „gabion structure‟ or the Memorandum of Understanding

(MOU). Hence, re-tenders were called for in January 2006. The work could not be

taken up (June 2006) as there was no response to the tender calls. Government stated

(July 2006) that the proposal of work was now being modified with an alternative

workable design. This itself indicated the department‟s failure to formulate a suitable

design for execution of work at initial stage.

Thus, despite the funds being provided in March 2005, the envisaged repairs to road

works in the Tsunami affected mandal had not been undertaken even 18 months

after occurrence of Tsunami causing inconvenience to public.

3.5.9.8 Rural Water Supply scheme works not executed

Government had sanctioned and released Rs 3.10 crore (estimated cost: Rs 5.13

crore) in August 2005 for restoration of 55 drinking water sources61

affected due to

Tsunami in the six61

(out of nine) districts. As of April 2006, only 19 works61

had

been completed at an expenditure of Rs.1.27 crore in the five districts. It was also

observed that seven of the eight works sanctioned in Guntur District have not even

been taken up so far for want of revised administrative sanction by the Government

for the modified proposals submitted by the SE (RWS) in September 2005. The

remaining 29 works were at different stages of completion (June 2006). Thus a

crucial requirement of providing drinking water facility to the Tsunami affected

mandals was still pending. Based on the report submitted by the Commissioner, GOI

had sanctioned/released (January 2005) Rs 2.30 crore for construction of 500 houses

for reconstruction of the fully damaged houses along with land acquisition if required

under Rajiv Gandhi Rehabilitation Package (RGRP). Out of Rs 2.30 crore received

from GOI, the State Government had released Rs 2 crore to the MD, APSHC for

construction of 481 houses at Rs 40000 per house in the five (out of the nine coastal

districts) districts (including the three test-checked districts). The houses were to be

constructed on Self help Mutual help basis. Physical Progress of the construction of

houses as of July 2006 was as under:


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District East

Godavari Guntur

KrishnaNelloreWest

Godavari Total

Allocated

152 9 21

280 19

481

Taken-

up 152

9 21

280 19

481

Completed

Number of

Houses 3 3

Under

Construction

38-3 113 7

161

Not

started

111 9

18 167

12 317

Coastal Zone Regulations were violated in sanction of houses to fishermen

Thus, of the 481 houses proposed for which funds were released by GOI way back in

January 2005, only three houses had been completed, 161 houses were at different

stages of construction and 317 houses were not yet started due to non-availability of

land, delay in acquisition of land and resistance from the beneficiaries to move out of

Costal Regulatory Zone (CRZ). Government attributed (July 2006) the delay in

completion of houses inter alia to the slow progress in making availability of the land

since the houses were proposed in coastal areas outside CRZ. The fact remains that

the MD, APSHC/Government failed to provide shelter to the Tsunami affected

fishermen even 18 months after occurrence of Tsunami despite the availability of the

Central assistance.

3.5.9.10 Coastal Zone Regulations violated in providing housing to the affected

fishermen

The Coastal Zone Regulations (CZR) of GOI (1981) mandates keeping beaches free

from all kinds of artificial development at least 500 metres from the high tide mark.

The areas affected by Tsunami were falling mostly under CRZ Category I & II

representing areas lying between low tide line and high tide line and ecologically

sensitive area in which construction activities were not permissible. According to

CZR, clearance should only be given for construction of residential buildings and

infrastructure facilities in CRZ subject to norms specified under each category.

Government sanctioned (March 2005) 40000 houses to Tsunami affected fishermen.

Out of these, sanction was accorded (January 2006) by Government for construction

of 65 houses within CRZ in Prakasam62

District as a special case (based on the

circumstances stated by the District Collector) and in Visakhapatnam District,

construction of 504 houses was taken up within CRZ reportedly based on the verbal

orders of the District Collector on the request of the beneficiaries as they were

reluctant to move out of existing sites. The District Manager, Housing (DM) stated

(March 2006) that construction was ordered within CRZ as the sites were located at

elevated places. This was however, not in accordance with the CZR.

3.5.9.11 Extension of benefits to persons not affected by Tsunami

During test-check of records it was noticed that benefit of Tsunami relief was

irregularly extended to certain mandals, which were not affected by Tsunami to the

extent of Rs 1.40 crore in East Godavari (Rs 67.09 lakh) and Nellore District (Rs


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73.35 lakh) as detailed below:

.• In East Godavari District the benefits under SGRY were extended to 2088

families in two mandals63

. 334.74 MTs of rice (cost: Rs 26.78 lakh) and Rs

1. 13.45 lakhcash was distributed resulting in unwarranted expenditure of Rs

2. 40.23 lakh.

• In three more mandals64

of East Godavari, nets and one boat were supplied

besides undertaking repairs to 66 wooden catamarans (cost: Rs 26.86 lakh)

reportedly as per the decision of the District Collector.

• „Tada‟ mandal (Nellore District) was provided relief by way of cash and rice

components under SGRY (SC) for six months on par with affected 10 mandals of the

district. The unwarranted expenditure on this account worked out to Rs 73.35 lakh

(Cash component: Rs 14.67 lakh; Rice (738.5 MT) : Rs 58.68 lakh).

3.5.10 Monitoring and Evaluation

Except releasing the funds to various District Collectors and other implementing

authorities, the Commissioner did not monitor expenditure on the various activities

of Tsunami relief operations. The releases made to the district authorities were being

shown as expenditure by the Commissioner even without ascertaining the actual

expenditure incurred. Thus, monitoring at Commissionerate level was absent and as

a result, the Commissioner was not in the knowledge of State-wide (for nine affected

districts) position of the relief and rehabilitation provided to the fishermen, etc.

It was observed that though district level coordination meetings were being held to

assess the progress of relief and rehabilitation measures, interdepartmental co-

ordination meetings were not conducted regularly at State level even though several

departments were involved in the delivery of Tsunami relief and rehabilitation

operations. The relief and assistance rendered were not evaluated so far (June 2006).

3.5.11 Conclusions

The State Government had not anticipated a disaster of the magnitude of Tsunami

and had, therefore, not established effective institutional mechanism to meet it. The

assessment of damages was not realistic and the projections were exaggerated except

in Visakhapatnam District where the loss was underestimated. The final assessment

of damage caused by Tsunami has not been made so far. Large amounts are lying

with the various implementing authorities unutilised and un-refunded. Though

immediate relief was promptly provided to the Tsunami victims, rehabilitation of the

affected fishermen (42162 families) and reconstruction envisaged still remain to be

completed (June 2006) even 18 months after Tsunami. A large number of damaged

boats have yet to be replaced/repaired particularly in Prakasam, Nellore, Krishna


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and Visakhapatnam Districts. Further, the lessons of the disaster have not been

learnt as the Marine Fishermen Regulation Act has not been implemented as yet and

the CZR of GOI are not being observed while providing housing to affected

fishermen. Reconstruction of the damaged houses of fishermen was also neglected.

Monitoring at State level was poor.


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Government should consider disaster management as a vital and crucial issue

and develop and establish adequate forecast and warning systems to minimise loss of

lives and property in the event of future calamities.

Registration of fishermen‟s boats as stipulated in MFR Act, should be enforced

so that loss can be properly assessed, affected people adequately compensated and

fraudulent claims prevented.

Coordination amongst all the departments including NGOs who are involved in

relief and rehabilitation activities should be ensured for speedy and proper delivery

of relief and for optimum utilisation of resources.

Coastal Zone Regulations should be strictly adhered to while according

permissions for construction of houses so as to minimise loss of life and property in

the event of any natural disasters in future.

The audit observations were discussed with the Additional Commissioner, Disaster

Management, Joint Director (Fisheries), General Manager (Finance), APSHC in

the exit conference held in August 2006 and the audit points were accepted by

them. The recommendations made by Audit were also accepted.

Performance Audit of Arsenic Alleviation Programme in West Bengal .

HIGHLIGHTS.

The State Government took up measures to combat arsenic poisoning in potable ground

water since 1994-1995. However, the schemes for arsenic alleviation were not executed in a

mission mode as warranted by the situation and there was inadequate monitoring. Despite

11 years’ effort and expenditure of Rs 721.24 crore on arsenic alleviation measures, only 43

per cent of the at risk population was supplied with arsenic safe drinking water as of March

2005 against the capacity created to cover 56 per cent.

Remedial measures were formulated with Acceptable Maximum


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Contaminant level much higher (50 Microgram/Litre) than that

(10 Microgram/Litre) prescribed by the Government of India, World

Health Organisation and Bureau of Indian Standards. The State

Government did not ascertain the extent of actual contamination and

comprehensive mapping was also not done as of June 2005. Screening

results of 1.20 lakh out of 1.31 lakh tubewells in the eight affected districts

revealed that 27 per cent (0.32 lakh) of them were yielding water with

arsenic content even above 50 Microgram/Litre.

(Paragraphs 3.2.11)

Of 2252 Arsenic Treatment Units installed during 2000-2005, 989

remained non-functional while 135 were yielding water with arsenic

content more than permissible leaving 2.81 lakh people exposed to

contamination.

(Paragraphs 3.2.12)

Surface water supply schemes remained incomplete even after an expenditure of Rs

71.61 crore. Besides, no effective steps were taken to recharge the already depleted

ground water reserves despite concerns expressed by the State Government and

Government of India.

(Paragraphs 3.2.18 and 3.2.22)

Introduction

3.2.1 Arsenic contamination in ground water in the State was detected in the early

eighties through epidemiological1

studies. Ingestion of arsenic through drinking water

is responsible for various diseases like skin lesion, skin cancer, other internal cancers,


141 | P a g e

etc.

State Government constituted committees (1988, 1992) to study the nature, extent and

cause of arsenic pollution and formed a Task Force in April 1993 to co-ordinate

different activities to arrest arsenic contamination in the State. Public Health

Engineering Department (PHED) as the nodal department had been executing arsenic

mitigation measures/schemes from 1994-1995 in rural areas of the State with a

strategy for ensuring at least one safe source of drinking water for each habitation.

DISTRICTS OF WEST BENGAL

AFFECTED BY ARSENIC POLLUTION IN

considered arsenic content at 50µg /L in ground water as tolerable which was at par

with the limit fixed by GOI for cases where there were no alternative safe sources of

potable water in arsenic affected areas. Accordingly 83 blocks of eight districts2

of the

State were identified as affected by arsenic contamination in ground water as of March

2005. The risk population in these rural areas was 1.65 crore.

Organisational structure

3.2.2 Principal Secretary was in overall charge of the department

Districts affected : 1) Malda 2) Murshidabad 3) Nadia 4) North 24 Parganas 5)

South 24 Parganas 6) Howrah 7) Hooghly and 8) Bardhaman. Executive Engineers

(EE) for preparing, monitoring and executing arsenic alleviation projects/schemes in

addition to their normal duties of execution and maintenance of Piped Water Supply

Schemes (PWSS) in rural and urban areas of the State.

Audit objectives

3.2.3 Keeping in view the deleterious impact and serious risks associated with

increasing number of habitations becoming exposed to arsenic contaminated water,

the following audit objectives were set to assess whether :

⎯ the programmes and schemes to mitigate arsenic contamination problem in

groundwater were holistically designed and systematically planned to achieve the

intended purpose;

⎯ the available resources (manpower, financial and material) were sufficient and

were optimally utilised; ⎯ the programme and schemes were efficiently

implemented as per the guidelines; ⎯ the facilities created were effectively

functioning in accordance with the stipulated performance standard and ⎯ there

was adequate quality control mechanism.

Scope of Audit and Methodology

3.2.4 The performance audit with reference to the progressive status of arsenic

alleviation measures undertaken to mitigate arsenic contamination problem in ground

water of the rural areas of the State as of March 2005 was conducted by test check of


142 | P a g e

records of PHED during May and August 2005. The urban and municipal areas were

not covered as the PWSS in these areas were stated to be better organised in supply of

arsenic safe water from deeper aquifer alternative sources.

The methodology adopted by Audit in addition to scrutiny of records at various levels

was formulation and finalisation of audit objectives taking into account the views of

Directors of Central Ground Water Board (CGWB) and All India Institute of Hygiene

and Public Health (AIIH&PH) of GOI at a meeting held on 20 May 2005. Water

quality reports prepared by departmental laboratories and NGO-run laboratories were

studied besides holding discussions with Arsenic Task Force, Health and Family

Welfare Department, State Water Investigation Directorate (SWID) of the State

Government, CGWB and AIIH&PH.

Identification of nature, cause and extent of arsenic pollution

3.2.5 State Government considered the sources of arsenic in ground water to be

geogenic. Experts opined that withdrawal of ground water was responsible for leaching

of arsenic into the aquifer. Survey by the Expert Committee (1994) disclosed that the

intermediate aquifers (second aquifer 20-80 metre below ground level (m bgl)) of the

affected areas were polluted with arsenic. In some cases, arsenic was also found in the

third aquifer where there was no clay parting in between the second and third aquifer.

The lateral extent of contamination within the affected blocks were, however, not

continuous and uniform.

Sample habitation survey was conducted in 1992 and 2003 by the PHED, jointly with

SWID and CGWB to identify areas having arsenic content in water more than 50µg

/L. Tubewell-wise detail survey in the affected eight districts of the State taken up in

1999-2000 was not completed. The position till March 2005 was as under:

As of March 2005, out of a total 1.31 lakh tubewells in the affected districts,

1. 1.20 lakh tubewells were screened of which 0.32 lakh (27 per cent) were yielding

water with arsenic content above 50µg/L. Ground water of four3

more blocks was

detected as contaminated beyond 50µg/L by SWID, but these blocks were not

declared as arsenic affected. The Department stated (June 2005) that necessary action

would be taken after rechecking the chemical quality of ground water of these blocks.

2. An analysis of the habitation survey (1992 and 2003) and tubewell-wise detailed

survey (2004-2005) in audit revealed that survey on arsenic contamination in spot

sources was limited to the meander zone of Padma and Bhagirathi river only. No

study was at all undertaken to substantiate absence of arsenic contamination in the

ground water of the other parts of the State. The extent and severity of contamination

in the three western districts of Bhagirathi (Howrah, Hooghly and Bardhaman) were

also not adequately investigated. Further, anthropogenic reasons of arsenic pollution


143 | P a g e

caused by random use of pesticides, rodenticides, chemical fertilizer, disposal of

untreated human wastes, chemical and industrial wastes in the surface water bodies

and flows and on account of mining activities in coal belt areas, could not be ruled out.

The Department, however, did not undertake any investigation of the anthropogenic

causes of arsenic contamination nor started comprehensive mapping.

As a result, the Government was not able to ascertain the magnitude of the problem of

arsenic contamination in the entire State as yet (June 2005).

Acceptable limit of arsenic content in potable water

3.2.7 The Ministry of Urban Development and Bureau of Indian Standard prescribed

the Acceptable Maximum Contaminant Level (AMCL) of arsenic to be 10µg /L in

India at par with the World Health Organisation (WHO) guidelines. The GOI

Manual, however, specified that 50µg /L arsenic may be tolerated in the absence of

any alternative safe source of water.

Principal Secretary stated (October 2005) that it was not feasible to stick to the

acceptable limit of 10µg/L in all cases depending on the locational position. Scrutiny

in audit, however, revealed that Rs 306.80 crore were spent on arsenic alleviation

measures during this period. In reply, the Department stated that the balance amount

of Rs 414.44 crore were met out of funds available under PMGY, ARWSP and Rural

Water Supply which were, however, not identifiable as expenditure incurred on

arsenic alleviation measures out of these funds remained merged with normal

expenditure under the respective programmes.

3.2.10 PHED adopted short term, medium term and long term measures for execution

during 1994-1995 to ensure at least one safe source for each presently affected

habitation. These measures were primarily based on the recommendations of the 1994

Expert Committee, which recommended depth of tubewells to be 200 m bgl in

Murshidabad and Nadia, 150 to 300 m bgl in North and South 24-Parganas and 100 m

bgl in Bardhaman.

The Expert Committee also recommended that the tubewells should be sunk in arsenic

affected areas only after testing of chemical quality of ground water and to consider

environmental hazards in disposing off the used up media of ARPs and ATUs. The

Committee also observed that water of ringwells did not contain arsenic.

Short term measures included (i) new hand pump tubewells at alternative deep aquifer

and (ii) sanitary protected ringwells. The medium term measures comprised (i) Arsenic

Removal Plant (ARP) and Arsenic Treatment Unit (ATU) with existing PWSS and


144 | P a g e

hand pump fitted tubewells respectively

(ii) creation of deeper aquifer alternative spot sources for existing PWSS and

(iii) new ground water based PWSS. The long term measures included surface water

supply schemes.

Physical progress after 11 years as of March 2005 was that 56 per cent of the total risk

population (1.65 crore) in the affected districts were reported as covered under the

programme. The actual coverage was, however, found to be only 43 per cent (70.39

lakh) as of March 2005. The details are given in Appendix 3.4.

Scrutiny revealed that the Department did not set up any separate establishment to

deal exclusively with the arsenic alleviation schemes which were executed in addition

to normal work. Recommendations of the Expert Committee were ignored during

creation of a large number of spot sources and a considerable number of ATUs

remained inoperative due to non-maintenance or poor maintenance. As a result,

performance of the created facilities was poor and the desired quality of the yield was

not achieved.

Besides, there was unusual delay in completion of surface water supply schemes. Thus,

even after spending Rs 721.24 crore, 21.47 lakh people continued to remain exposed to

arsenic contamination above 50µg/L as discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

1.70 lakh population remained exposed to arsenic contamination

Short term measures were intended for immediate relief to people by installation of

hand pump tubewells/ring wells at alternative spot sources where the existing

tubewells were defunct.

3.2.11 PHED created 8203 alternative spot sources (tubewell : sunk 8037 against target

of 7911; ringwell : dug 166 against target of 288) during 1994-2005 under short term

measures in the affected eight districts in replacement of the existing contaminated

ones and stated that 20.50 lakh people were provided with safe drinking water upto

March 2005.

However, according to the latest water quality test reports, 543 tubewells were yielding

water with arsenic content more than 50µg /L. Of those, 475 tubewells were sunk in

the second aquifer between 20-90 m bgl ignoring the recommendations of the Expert

Committee. Chemical quality of ground water/Litholayers was also not tested before

lowering tubewell assemblies. As a result, 1.36 lakh people continued to remain

exposed to arsenic contaminated drinking water although Rs 2.44 crore were spent on

sinking of the new alternative spot sources.

Further, water of 139 sanitary protected ring wells dug at Rs 59.77 lakh in three

districts was not utilised by 0.34 lakh population due to misgivings regarding the

quality of the water. However, PHED took no steps to remove the misgivings


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regarding the safe quality of sanitary protected ring well water.

2.81 lakh people remained exposed to contamination beyond 50µg /L

Medium term measures consisted of installation of Arsenic Treatment Units (ATUs) in

existing hand pump fitted tubewells and installation of Arsenic Removal Plants

(ARPs) in the existing piped water supply schemes as well as new piped water supply

schemes.

Arsenic Treatment Units (ATUs)

3.2.12 PHED installed 23764

ATUs to the existing contaminated hand pump fitted

tubewells in five districts upto March 2005 and stated that 5.94 lakh people were

benefited in the process as of March 2005.

Scrutiny of latest water quality report of 2252 ATUs installed during 2000-2005

revealed that 989 ATUs remained non-working and 135 ATUs were yielding water

contaminated beyond 50µg /L due to use of defective adsorption media (35), non-

regeneration or non-replacement of adsorption media (982) and defects in ATUs (107).

Thus, 2.81 lakh people covered by these tubewells (cost Rs 4.78 crore5

) remained

exposed to contaminated drinking water as of March 2005. 4

In two districts 11

tubewells under 13 PWSS were yielding water with arsenic above 50µg/L

New PWSS under Arsenic Sub-Mission

3.2.13 PHED created 19 PWSS in five districts under Arsenic Sub-Mission (six in first

Phase Action Plan and 13 in second Phase Action Plan) and benefited population was

claimed to be 2.39 lakh. The Expert Committee recommended to tap aquifer 200 m

bgl in Nadia and Murshidabad districts.

The water quality test report of six PWSS (in four districts) created under first Phase

Action Plan was not made available to audit. Test-check of records of 13 PWSS under

second Phase Action in Nadia and Murshidabd district completed between 2000 and

2005 at Rs 14.10 crore revealed the following :

⎯ In Nadia, three out of eight PWSS commissioned during 2000-2005 at Rs 3.12

crore were yielding water with arsenic above 50µg/L (seven tubewells). The

tubewells of these PWSS were sunk between 58 to 153 m bgl against

recommended depth of 200 m bgl.

⎯ In Murshidabad district, four out of five PWSS commissioned during 2000-2003

at Rs 4.80 crore were yielding water above 50µg/L (four tubewells). All the

tubewells were sunk between 21 and 289 m bgl.

⎯ The arsenic content in different litholayers were required to be chemically

examined at boring stage, since if any arsenic content is found in the litholayers,

tubewells assemblies should not be lowered at the boreholes. However, ignoring


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all the technical criteria, tubewells assemblies were lowered in the arsenic

contaminated aquifer by the PHED. As a result, 0.95 lakh people covered under

the seven PWSS (cost Rs 7.92 crore) were still exposed to arsenic contamination

beyond 50µg/L.

PWSS under Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme

3.2.14 PHED stated that 198 new PWSS were commissioned as of March 2005 in the

affected districts to supply safe water to 37.76 lakh people.

Test check of the water quality report of 64 PWSS in two districts6

commissioned

during 1995-2005 revealed that yield of 25 PWSS was contaminated above 50µg/L.

Thus, 5.08 lakh beneficiaries of these PWSS were still exposed to arsenic contaminated

water.

The expenditure incurred on these 25 PWSS was Rs 18.70 crore. All the tubewells

assemblies were lowered in the arsenic contaminated aquifer and also without

conducting required test of water quality of the aquifer beforehand.

Nadia-Murshidabad Ground Water Project

3.2.15 Nadia-Murshidabad Ground Water Project was sanctioned (March 2003) at Rs

11.76 crore with target of three years for completion to supply arsenic safe water to

1.12 lakh people of two blocks (Karimpur-I & II) of Nadia district and one block

(Jalangi) of Murshidabad district. The estimate was sanctioned without examining the

scope of getting safe water at the proposed borehole spots for the tubewells. PHED

incurred Rs 3.76 crore for construction of the civil portion of the project. The work was

in progress as of March 2005.

Test check of 13 tubewells sunk in Karimpur-I and II blocks at Rs 0.42 crore revealed

that the tubewells were sunk between 72.6 and 132.46 m bgl as against

recommendation for 200 m bgl. Out of those, yield of three tubewells sunk in

Karimpur-I block was contaminated above 50µg/L.

Executive Engineer (EE), Nadia Division, PHED lowered the tubewell assemblies at

the borehole although the chemical test of the litholayers indicated presence of arsenic.

The EE stated that there was no deeper aquifer available in the borehole point. EE‟s

contention was not tenable as the existing two PWSS in Karimpur-I Block were

yielding safe water indicating the presence of a safe aquifer in the area.

Long term measures envisaged tapping surface water sources for delivering arsenic safe

water to the people.

Four surface water projects were taken up under Arsenic Sub-Mission at a total

estimated cost of Rs 588.21 crore with a target of 33.65 lakh beneficiaries. The


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expenditure as of March 2005 was Rs 492.31 crore. Two schemes (at South 24-

Parganas and Malda districts) were partially commissioned and two at North 24-

Parganas and Murshidabad districts were in progress as of March 2005.

South 24-Parganas Surface Water Supply Scheme

3.2.16 The scheme covering eight blocks was sanctioned in May 1997 at Rs 232.84

crore which was revised to Rs 325.37 crore in October 2003. Work in two arsenic

affected blocks (Bhangar-I and Joynagore-I) was not taken up under instruction of the

Department, reasons of which were not available on record. The scheme was

therefore, commissioned in six blocks in March 2003 at Rs 290.26 crore (March 2005).

Thus, 3.29 lakh arsenic affected people in the two blocks were not able to access safe

water.

The Department stated that 14.46 lakh people were provided with arsenic free surface

water as of March 2005 through 2550 street stand posts (existing and new

construction) and 8969 house connections under the scheme but did not furnish

evidence to substantiate the claim. Scrutiny, however, revealed that safe water through

2550 street stand posts and 8969 household connections was supplied to 6.92 lakh

beneficiaries at the rate of 250 beneficiaries per stand post and six per household.

Baruipur Municipality was supplied with

2.58 million litres of water daily which could cover a population of 0.65 lakh at 40

litres per capita per day. The actual coverage of population as of March 2005 was,

thus, only 7.56 lakh as against 14.46 lakh stated by PHED.

Only 7.56 lakh people were covered of

1. 14.46 lakh targeted

2. 3.68 lakh people were covered against

3. 8.90 lakh targeted

Malda Surface Water Supply Scheme

3.2.17 Malda Surface Water Supply Scheme was sanctioned in May 1995 at Rs 88.48

crore to supply safe surface water to the five7

arsenic affected blocks of Malda district.

The target population coverage was 8.90 lakh (2001) and projected population

coverage was 13.32 lakh (2021). The Northern Zone of the scheme was completed and

commissioned in February 2000 at Rs 88.01 crore and Southern Zone was partially

commissioned in March 2003 at Rs 42.43 crore.

A total of 1672 street stand posts were constructed and 515 household connections

provided as of March 2005 against target of 3588 and 61500 respectively. Under-


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performance in house connection was attributed by the Department to lack of

awareness among the people and their reluctance to take house connection on

payment. As regards shortfall in construction of street stand posts concerned EE

stated (June 2005) that to encourage house connection, more street stand posts were

not constructed as a matter of policy but did not furnish justification for the higher

provision in the estimate of the scheme.

PHED stated that 7.71 lakh people were provided with safe surface water as of March

2005. However, number of actual beneficiaries as confirmed by EE was 3.68 lakh.

Materials (pipes and specials) of Rs 3.29 crore procured for the scheme stood surplus

after taking into account, the actual requirement of materials for completion of the

balance work as well as for operation and maintenance of the scheme. Thus,

injudicious procurement of materials in excess of actual requirement led to blocking of

Rs 3.29 crore.

Incomplete surface water schemes

1. 3.2.18 North 24-Parganas Surface Water Supply Scheme was sanctioned in

March 2001 at Rs 124.82 crore for completion within three years to cover

2. 4.65 lakh people in four arsenic affected blocks. Frequent changes of command

area and water treatment plant sites due to inadequate initial survey and court cases

arising out of improper decision led to the work remaining incomplete even after lapse

of four years after incurring an expenditure of Rs 70.24 crore.

Mahyampur Surface Water based scheme in Murshidabad district was sanctioned at

Rs 6.54 crore in June 2003 for completion by June 2006 to cover

0.37 lakh arsenic affected people of Beldanga-I block. Within a period of two years

there was no physical progress of work at site due to lack of initiative except

procurement of materials valued Rs 1.37 crore as of May 2005.

Due to the schemes remaining incomplete, 5.02 lakh people were yet to get safe water.

Thus, despite an expenditure of Rs 71.61 crore the benefits could not be realised due to

non-completion of the schemes.

Non-adherence to the criteria of prioritisation fixed by PHED

3.2.19 Although the areas with arsenic content in ground water above 50µg/L were to

be given priority, test check revealed that, in Murshidabad, 122 habitations in 15

blocks with arsenic content above 50µg/L remained uncovered by any of the arsenic

alleviation measures, while 431 ATUs were installed on the tubewells with arsenic

contamination below 50µg/L. Similarly in Nadia, 199 habitations in 16 blocks with

arsenic contamination above 50µg/L in ground water remained uncovered whereas 30

hand pumps with arsenic content below 50µg/L were fitted with ATUs. Thus, priority


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fixed by PHED was not adhered to by these two executing divisions.

Inadequacy in exploration of cost effective alternative techniques

3.2.20 In Malda and Murshidabad, it was found that Ring wells dug under Arsenic Sub

Mission did not contain arsenic. Thus, surface water was arsenic safe. But a number of

shallow depth hand tubewells8

installed as substitute of ring well were yielding water

contaminated beyond 50µg/L.

A comparative study by audit indicated that the pond based schemes scored over

tubewell based ones in terms of life span (20 years for pond based schemes as

compared to 5 years for tubewells), population coverage (3550 as compared to 250),

economy (Rs 41 for per capita annual capital expenditure including maintenance as

compared to Rs 76) as well as sustainability. Further, unlike ATU fitted tubewells, the

pond based ones needed no community participation. In spite of such advantages,

PHED did not explore the feasibility of executing pond water based schemes elsewhere

although 10th

Plan envisaged exploring sustainable alternative source of natural water

bodies for drinking purposes.

Quality control system and Monitoring

3.2.21 PHED stated that water quality monitoring was done through departmental

laboratories and under Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) with United Nations International

Children Education Fund (UNICEF). UNICEF entered into a strategic alliance with

the State Government in 1999 through JPOA to develop a community based water

quality surveillance system. Chief Engineer stated (June 2005) that water quality of

1.31 lakh departmental tubewells in the 79 affected blocks was tested upto March

2005, of which 0.32 lakh tubewells contained arsenic above the tolerable limit of

50µg/L. Audit scrutiny revealed that some arsenic safe tubewells at a point of time

became contaminated beyond 50µg/L at a later period due to prolonged withdrawal of

ground water without adequate recharging. Thus, actual number of tubewells with

arsenic content beyond 50µg/L even in the affected areas remained unknown.

Department did not set up any separate cell exclusively to enforce testing of water

quality as per norms, cover the newly affected areas and to monitor timely

implementation of arsenic mitigation measures. PHED stated that water quality

management issues were looked after by one Chief Engineer as an additional charge to

his normal work of PWSS and Surface Water Supply Schemes and that support staff

was inadequate. Besides, there was no prescribed periodicity and time frame for

submission of quality control reports by the field offices to the monitoring cell. At the

divisional level also, EE failed to ensure the quality assurance measures particularly in

case of ground water based arsenic alleviation schemes as recommended by the Task


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Force.

Inadequate recharging of Ground Water Reserve

3.2.22 Ground water reserve is recharged from surface water bodies like lakes, ponds

and water sheds and surface water flows. The rate of recharging, however, depends

upon the perviousness of the bottom layers of the surface water bodies. Surface water

flows with sand and gravel beds are considered to be the best media for ground water

recharging.

CGWB observed that 120µg/L of arsenic concentration was reduced to 1µg/L within

90 days after artificial recharging on shallow aquifer. The studies conducted by CGWB

also revealed that there was decadal depletion (up to 7 m) of ground water reserves due

to huge extraction for drinking and irrigation purposes.

SWID observed that rate of recharge was inadequate compared to the rate of draft in

48 arsenic affected blocks of 69

districts. Thirty three of these arsenic affected blocks

were categorised as dark and 15 as grey category.

This indicated that ground water reserves were not sufficiently replenished by

recharging. The depletion of ground water could be restricted and arsenic content

minimised if a part of huge fresh water received from precipitation (rainfall) was

utilised for recharging the ground water reserve.

But rain water harvesting measures like construction of low height weirs across these

surface flows to retain rain water for recharging ground water reserve were yet to be

devised.

Incidence of arsenicosis not assessed

3.2.23 A detailed investigative study was not conducted in the eight affected districts of

the State to ascertain the prevalence of arsenicosis. According to some researchers10

the

number of patients suffering from arsenic related skin lesions alone was around three

lakh as of May 2002 and number of death due to arsenic related cancer was 1373

between 1984 and 1998. Health and Family Welfare Department (HFWD), however,

stated that 13028 cases of arsenic related disease were detected from 1992 to March

2005.

The report of HFWD was based on the reports received from School of Tropical

Medicine and Arsenic Clinic of SSKM Hospital in Kolkata. Primary Health Centres

(PHC) in the State being not properly equipped to detect arsenicosis, the suspected

patients were generally referred to the above School/Hospital. HFWD recorded 91

cases of arsenicosis from North 24 Parganas and South 24-Parganas (78), one from

Nadia and 12 from Malda from January to March 2005. No reports of arsenicosis from


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Murshidabad and Bardhaman districts were recorded, although media reported

(March 2005 to August 2005) 76 deaths in Bardhaman, 7 deaths in Murshidabad, 3

deaths from Malda and Nadia each.

Thus, the incidence of arsenicosis in the affected districts was not correctly assessed

nor was adequate machinery set up for the purpose.

Feasibility of in-situ solution in the areas not yet explored

3.2.24 Except for the mitigation measures already undertaken in the arsenic affected

areas, no in-situ solution was identified for arsenic alleviation in the contaminated

aquifers as of August 2005. Core Committee of Arsenic Task Force, however, was

coordinating one pilot study on in-situ arsenic remediation with Enviro Associates

International (USA) under USAEP Programme at Mohanpur, North 24-Parganas

district. The report was not submitted as of August 2005.

Environmental impact

3.2.25 The adsorption media used in ATUs/ARPs were required to be disposed of

scientifically after its capacity utilization. The Expert Committee recommended to

keep the used up media of the ATUs in a particular place under cowdung. Arsenic rich

sludges received from back washing of ATUs or received from ARPs were to be stored

in a concrete chamber and could be used for brick manufacturing or in cement

concrete casting.

But used up medias and arsenic rich sludges were not removed from at least 1667

ATUs and disposed of as recommended. This might cause serious environmental

hazards.

PHED admitted that safe disposal of arsenic laden sludge had not yet been fully

established.

Conclusion

3.2.26 Even after a decade of implementation of arsenic alleviation programme with an

expenditure of Rs 721.24 crore, only 43 per cent of targeted population (1.65 crore)

affected by arsenic contamination in drinking water could be covered, indicating

limited impact of the scheme. As of June 2005, no comprehensive mapping of arsenic

affected areas was done.

As of March 2005, screening of 1.20 lakh out of 1.31 lakh tubewells in the eight

affected districts of the State revealed that 0.32 lakh tubewells were yielding water with

arsenic content above 50µg/L.

Short term measures consisting of sinking of new tubewells (8037) and ringwells for


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bringing down the arsenic content in water to 50µg/L and below did not succeed as

the arsenic content was more than 50µg/L. Of these 475 tubewells were not sunk to

the recommended depth and no chemical quality of ground water/ litholayers was

tested depriving 1.36 lakh people.

Medium term measures also did not yield the desired result as out of 2252 arsenic

treatment units (ATUs) and 77 PWSS installed with Arsenic Removal Plants (ARPs),

135 ATUs and 32 PWSS were yielding water contaminated beyond 50µg/L while 989

ATUs remained non-functional due to use of defective adsorption media, non

regeneration and non replacement of adsorption media affecting 7.89 lakh people.

Of four surface water supply projects taken up under long term measures, work of two

were under progress and the remaining two (North 24 Parganas and Murshidabad)

were partially commissioned covering only 11.24 lakh people against 23.36 lakh

people targeted.

Deficient monitoring on the part of PHE Directorate and its functionaries led to non-

observance of water-quality assurance measures, as even the number of tubewells with

arsenic contamination in affected areas remained unknown. Arsenic rich sludges

generated in ATUs were also not disposed scientifically leaving substantial risks of

environmental hazards.

Recommendations

⎯ Comprehensive mapping should be done covering the entire State to identify the actual

extent of arsenic contamination.

⎯ Government should undertake creation of spot sources only after chemical testing of

sediments of the aquifer and create awareness among the people as regards the safety of

sanitary protected ring well water.

⎯ The non functional arsenic treatment units may be made functional and the surface water

supply projects may be completed expeditiously.

⎯ Government should organise periodical medical camps in the affected

areas with active involvement of the Primary Health Centres/Local

Bodies/NGOs to take health care of detected cases of arsenicosis.

⎯ Government should ensure proper disposal of arsenic rich sludges and used up adsorption

media to prevent environmental hazards.

⎯ Government should set up a separate cell exclusively for the management, execution and

monitoring of quality assurance measures.

The matter was referred to Government in September 2005. The reply was not

received (January 2006).


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Performance Audit of Flood Control Works in Himachal Pradesh .

Highlights

Despite serious threat of flood damages in the State, flood protection works provided were

insignificant. Minimal targets of coverage were fixed year after year due to non-mobilisation

of adequate financial resources. Non-preparation of a long term master plan resulted in

execution of protection works in an unintegrated and piecemeal manner which failed to

provide adequate protection to the areas prone to flood damages. The damaged protection

works were not restored and the completed works were not being maintained. Execution of

works was not monitored effectively. Some significant audit findings are given below:

(Paragraph 3.2.7)

(Paragraph 3.2.8)

(Paragraph 3.2.9)

** The works were taken up for execution in an unplanned and

piece-meal manner due to non-preparation of long term master plan.

Expenditure of Rs 3.06 crore incurred on five works was thus

rendered largely unfruitful as the entire area intended to be covered

was not protected.

(Paragraph 3.2.10)

(Paragraph 3.2.11)

** Failure to provide recommended foundation placed at risk flood


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3.2.21)

Introduction

3.2.1 Himachal Pradesh being predominantly a hilly state forms catchment of five

major rivers -Beas, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and Yamuna and their tributaries. These

rivers and the tributaries flow through steep slopes at high velocity causing erosion of

culturable land besides heavy loss of life and property during floods.

Out of 55.67 lakh hectares area of the State, an estimated 2.31 lakh hectares is prone

to floods. The Department of Irrigation and Public Health had identified and

assessed immediate need for providing flood protection works (FPWs) for habitation

and culturable areas situated on the banks of various rivers/khads at an approximate

cost of Rs 620 crore during the ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002). FPWs such as

embankments, spurs, etc., were being undertaken since 1984-85 to channelise various

rivers and khads to contain the floods. A total area of 12,169 hectares had been

covered by FPWs executed upto March 2005.

Scope of audit

3.2.2 Records pertaining to selection and execution of FPWs for the period from

2000-2001 to 2004-2005 were test-checked in ten1

out of 40 divisions entrusted with

the execution of the works covering seven2

out of 12 districts of the State. The sample

check in terms of divisions was thus 25 per cent and 58 per cent in terms of districts

which covered 74.34 per cent of expenditure. This was supplemented by information

obtained from Engineer-in-Chief (E-in-C) and Superintending Engineer (SE), Rohru

Circle in March-April 2005.

Audit objectives

3.2.3 The audit objective was to critically examine the aspects of efficiency and

effectiveness in planning and execution of various flood control works as per time

schedule and also the adequacy of the flood works in protecting the land and

property from frequent floods.

In addition, audit also tried to ascertain whether:

land and property prone to flood damages had been identified and a master plan

prepared for their protection.

estimates for providing flood protection works had been prepared after detailed

survey and investigation.

adequate funds had been provided for timely completion of flood protection works.

targets for protecting the land and property from floods had been fixed in order of

importance and works of emergent nature taken up first.

the works had been executed in accordance with the laid down specifications.


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flood protection works already provided were being maintained properly and

adequate funds had been arranged for maintenance.

effective internal control mechanism had been evolved to ensure periodical

inspection and monitoring of completed and ongoing works.

Audit criteria

► Identification of land and property prone to frequent flood damages and

preparation of master plan for providing flood protection works.

► Fixation of targets for flood protection works (FPWs).

► Arrangement of funds for providing and protecting FPWs.

► Mechanism evolved to inspect and monitor ongoing and completed works.

1 Chamba, Flood Protection Division, Gagret, Indora, Kullu-I, Kullu-II,

Nalagarh, Nerwa, Paonta Sahib, Rohru and Thural.

2 Chamba, Kangra, Kullu, Shimla, Sirmour, Solan and Una.

Audit methodology

3.2.4 Records relating to identification of land and property prone to damages

because of frequent floods, formulation of estimates, provision of funds and those

relating to actual execution and maintenance of various FPWs were scrutinised in

audit. Various reports and returns submitted by field formations to the higher

authorities and mechanism devised for monitoring the progress and effectiveness of

works were also seen. Audit conclusions were drawn after scrutiny of records,

analysis of available data by issuing audit memos and questionnaire and obtaining

the response of departmental functionaries at various levels.

Audit Findings

Financial Outlay and Expenditure

3.2.5 Expenditure on FPWs during 2000-2005 was met partly out of State funds (42

per cent) and partly from loans obtained from National Bank of Agriculture and Rural

Development (NABARD) (58 per cent). In addition, grant of Rs 100 lakh was also

received from Government of India during March 2005. Funds demanded, budget

allotment and expenditure thereagainst on flood control works during 2000-2005 was

as under:

Table: 3.3

(Rupees in crore)


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Year Funds

demanded

Funds Expenditure Variations Excess

(+) allotted incurred Saving (-)

2000-

2001

7.57 8.60 8.82 (+) 0.22

2001-

2002

6.32 6.71 7.45 (+) 0.74

2002-

2003

9.27 13.66 13.53 (-) 0.13

2003-

2004

13.05 15.62 15.87 (+) 0.25

2004-

2005

15.24 16.48 14.27 (-) 2.21

Total: 51.45 61.07 59.94 (-) 1.13

The Engineer-in-Chief attributed (August 2005) savings of Rs 2.21 crore during 2004-

2005 to non-approval of new schemes under NABARD.

Details of schemes financed out of State funds and NABARD loans have been given

in Appendix-XXII.

3.2.6 Test-check of records in the selected divisions revealed the following points:

-In Paonta Sahib division, Rs 21.92 lakh was spent on execution of FPWs during

2004-2005 by diverting funds meant for water supply and irrigation schemes.

-In Flood Protection Division (FPD), Gagret, Rs 30.58 lakh was spent on execution

of three FPWs between April and June 2004 out of NABARD loan funds meant for

execution of Swan River Channelisation Project (SRCP).

-In Chamba division, Rs 13.61 lakh was spent on FPWs upto September 2003

against the allotment of Rs six lakh resulting in excess expenditure of Rs 7.61 lakh. It

was noticed that the initial allotment of Rs 19 lakh had been reduced by the Tribal

Development Department without assigning any reasons.

-In Kullu division No. I, payments of Rs 28.83 lakh for execution of FPWs allotted

between 1998-99 and 2002-2003 had not been made to various contractors as of

December 2004 due to paucity of funds.

The above instances of diversion of funds and postponement of inevitable liabilities

were indicative of lack of control over expenditure and defective financial

management.


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-The Executive Engineer (EE), FPD, Gagret remitted (October 2000-November

2004) Rs 1.81 crore to various departments3

for carrying out activities related to them

on the reclaimed land under SRCP. It was noticed that utilisation certificates for Rs

79.50 lakh4

had only been received as of February 2005.

Planning and physical performance

Improper fixation of targets

3.2.7 Detailed survey to identify the land prone to frequent floods had not been

carried out by the State Government. However, according to an estimate made

during the Seventh Five Year Plan period, about 2.31 lakh hectares of area was

prone to floods in the State which required protection. Of this,

0.12 lakh hectares (State funds: 9,913 hectares and NABARD: 2,356 hectares) of

land had only been covered by FPWs as of March 2005 (Prior to April 2000: 9,171

hectares; 2000-2005: 2,998 hectares). Master plan for providing FPWs in a time

bound manner had also not been prepared. The works were thus being taken up for

execution in a selective manner except Swan River Channelisation Project in Una

district. Annual targets for coverage of 500-600 hectares were fixed during 2000-

2005. E-in-C admitted (April 2005) the facts. Considering the large number of works

required to be Agriculture: Rs 6.80 lakh; Fisheries: Rs 12.93 lakh; Forest: Rs 109.52

lakh; Horticulture: Rs 3.23 lakh; Krishi Vishav Vidyalaya, Palampur: Rs 2.00 lakh and

Medical: Rs 46.20 lakh. Agriculture: Rs 3.30 lakh; Forest: Rs 74.51 lakh and

Horticulture: Rs 1.69 lakh. executed to protect the remaining 2.19 lakh hectares area

the targets fixed were not adequate.

The E-in-C attributed low fixation of targets to paucity of funds. Thus, the

department failed to evolve suitable strategy and mobilise adequate financial

resources for executing the protection works in the affected areas.

Protection works

3.2.8 Survey, investigation and evolution of model for channelisation of Bata river

(Sirmour district) was entrusted (May 1988) to Uttar Pradesh Irrigation Research

Institute (Institute). According to the model evolved by the Institute in April 1993,

Bata river was to be channelised in a length of 12,700 metres (RD 8,300 to 21,000) to

save land and property from frequent flood damages. The department had estimated

annual damages of about Rs 5.23 crore being caused by floods in the river.

Audit scrutiny of records of Paonta Sahib Division revealed (January 2005) that no

action on the Institute‟s recommendations had been taken by the department till June

1999. An estimate of Rs 30.11 crore sent (August 2001) by the division to the

Government had not been approved as of March 2005.

In the meantime, an estimate for Rs 89.29 lakh was approved (August 2001) for

providing protection works in 1,200 metres long prioritised reaches for protecting 168


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hectares of land in five villages5

. It was noticed in audit that embankments provided

on the left bank of the river between RDs 8,450 to 8,600 and 14,450 to 14,500

diverted the flood water towards right bank of the river thereby causing a threat to 96

hectares of land of Sainwala and Kundion villages. This necessitated construction of

additional 790 metres long embankment to protect the land of the aforesaid villages.

Thus, against the approved embankment of 1,200 metres, 1,990 metres long

embankment was actually provided as of March 2004 at a cost of Rs 1.42 crore. This

resulted in additional expenditure of Rs 52.42 lakh which had not been regularised as

of January 2005.

Failure of the department to visualise the impact of providing protection works in

isolated reaches resulted in additional expenditure of Rs 52.42 lakh. The remaining

10,710 metres long embankment still remained unprotected posing constant threat to

the land and property.

The EE admitted (January 2005) the facts and attributed non-execution of balance

protection works to paucity of funds. The plea is not tenable because adequate

attention for providing protection works to the land and property had not been paid

despite recurring losses sustained every year.

3.2.9 The department had identified 52 critical sites in Kullu district which sustained

extensive damages because of floods in Beas river during September 1995. A

proposal for construction of 44 kilometres long

5 Kheri Gunglon, Kiratpur Bhagwanpur, Kotri bias, Mazra and Puruwala.

embankment (estimated cost: Rs 53.47 crore) to protect these sites and 1,020 hectares

of land sent to Government in June 1998 was still to be approved as of December

2004.

In view of unprecedented floods caused by Ravi river during the rainy season in

1995, the State Technical Advisory Committee (STAC) decided (November 2000) to

consult Central Water and Power Research Station (CWPRS), Pune for designing

FPWs to protect Chamba town. Based on this Report (received in July 2002) an

estimate for providing FPWs at a cost of Rs 22.10 crore was sponsored (December

2002) by Chamba division. The Government had not approved the proposal as of

February 2005.

Unplanned execution of works

3.2.10 In the Ninth Five Year Plan period (1997-2002) need for providing immediate

FPWs was felt in eight6

river/khad basins at an estimated cost of Rs 620 crore.

Targets for protection/reclamation of 2,160 hectares of land were fixed under Swan

River Channelisation Project out of total targets of 2,500 hectares during the Tenth

Plan period (2002-2007) and only 340 hectares of land was proposed to be protected

in the remaining river basins during the plan. It was noticed in audit that no

integrated approach was adopted to carry out these works in any of the river basins

except Swan river channelisation. The works were executed in isolated reaches in


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other basins. A few instances of unplanned execution of works are discussed below:

-Release of surplus water of Beas river by Bhakra Beas Management Board from

Pandoh dam during rainy season was causing extensive damages to the land and

property of five villages7

of Kangra district located on the right bank of the river

between Jaisinghpur and Alampur. A proposal for construction of 840 metres long

embankment and 16 spurs was approved (June 1991) by STAC for providing flood

protection works to the land and property of these villages. Model study for

providing protection works was also entrusted (May 1998) to Central Water and

Power Research Station, Pune (CWPRS). On the basis of final report of CWPRS,

received in June 1999, the STAC approved (June 2000) revised proposal for

construction of 795 metres long embankment and 14 spurs. Against this, 360 metres

long embankment and five spurs had only been constructed between January 1998

and March 2004 at an expenditure of Rs 1.37 crore. Thus, due to non-construction

of the remaining 435 metres long embankment and nine spurs, as envisaged in the

revised proposal, intended protection to the land and property of the aforesaid

villages remained to be provided.

-To protect 649 hectares of land of Sudanwala village along Sudanwala khad

(Sirmour district), construction of 19 spurs was approved (March 1985) for Rs 10.34

lakh. The work, stipulated to be completed in one year was taken up for execution

during 1984-85 and 13 spurs were constructed upto the year Balh valley, (Mandi

district), Chakki river Project (Kangra district), Integrated Giri and Bata rivers

Project (Sirmour district), Pabbar khad, (Shimla district), Seer khad Project

(Hamirpur district), Sirsa Nadi Project (Solan district), Suketi khad Project (Mandi

district) and Swan khad Project (Una district). Chambi, Dalu, Haler, Khalta and

Thampal. 1992-1993 at a cost of Rs 12.06 lakh providing protection to an area of 551

hectares. The balance work of six spurs to protect the remaining area of 98 hectares

was not executed. Meanwhile, floods caused heavy damages to land and property

and balance work was taken up (January 2003) to cover 60 hectares area of the

village by construction of four spurs at an expenditure of Rs 30.58 lakh as of

December 2004. The remaining 38 hectares of land still remained unprotected.

-Pabbar river and its tributaries flowing through the area of Rohru tehsil of Shimla

district caused extensive flood damages to land and property lying along its banks

which necessitated provision of urgent protection works. Test-check of records of

Rohru division revealed (March 2005) that five works (estimated cost: Rs 94.92 lakh)

covering 45 hectares of land and property were taken up for execution between

March 2000 and July 2004 and the same were still in progress. 29 hectares of land

had been protected as of February 2005 after incurring expenditure of Rs 47.62 lakh.

The EE, Rohru division attributed (March 2005) slow pace of work to non-

availability of funds.

-To protect 19.75 hectares land of villages Samolipul (6.70 hectares) and Sandhour

(13.05 hectares) in Shimla district, an estimate of Rs 48.13 lakh was approved (July


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1997) with stipulated period of completion as three months. The work was taken up

for execution by Rohru division in March 2000. Expenditure of Rs 31.36 lakh was

incurred on part execution of the work covering 6.70 hectares area near Samolipul.

The remaining area of

13.05 hectares of village Sandhour was not covered for want of funds.

-To protect 50 hectares of land of Manpura and Kishanpura villages (Nalagarh tehsil)

from floods in Manpura khad and Sirsa river, Nalagarh division provided an

embankment of 550 metres between 1992 and January 2005 at a cost of Rs 47.16

lakh by covering 40 hectares of land against the proposed embankment of 850

metres. The remaining land of 10 hectares remained unprotected even after 13 years

from the date of start of work. The Executive Engineer attributed (March 2005) non-

completion of work to receipt of insufficient funds.

These instances were indicative of unplanned execution of FPWs as the land and

property of the people could not be fully protected despite substantial investment.

Avoidable/wasteful and infructuous expenditure on works

Protection work to Pekhubela farm

3.2.11 Agriculture Farm at Pekhubela (Una district) is located on the left bank of

Swan river. Damages were caused to the farm during the floods of 1995. To protect

the land and other property of the farm, 500 metres long embankment was provided

during 1995-1997 at a cost of Rs 25.54 lakh.

Test-check of records of FPD, Gagret revealed (June 2003 and February 2005) that

Project Report of Swan River Flood Management and Integrated Land Development

Project, Phase-I was prepared by the department in June 1997 and was approved

(April 2000) by the State Government for Rs 106.03 crore. The project intended to

provide permanent FPWs on both sides along the

16.67 kilometres length of the river from Jhalera bridge to Santokhgarh bridge. The

agriculture farm fell within the stretch of left side alignment of the proposed

embankment between kilometres nine and ten reckoned from Jhalera bridge point.

While the project proposal was under consideration of Government of India, an

estimate for providing permanent protection work to the farm was approved (August

1997) by the State Government for Rs 92.01 lakh. Accordingly, construction of two

wire-crated stone spurs of 75 metre each, was taken up by the division during April

1999 and completed in April 2002 at a cost of Rs 91.03 lakh. Both these spurs were

provided at a distance of about one kilometre from the approved alignment of the

embankment to be constructed along the left bank of the river. Hence these spurs

were not to form part of the protection works of the project which were taken up for

execution in April 2000. The embankment had already been constructed on both

banks of the river in a continuous stretch of seven kilometres reckoned from Jhalera


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bridge and the work in subsequent reaches between kilometres eight and ten was in

progress as of January 2005. Construction of separate protection work for the farm

during 2000-2002 thus proved unnecessary.

The EE stated (February 2005) that the spurs were constructed as an urgent

protection work to the farm pending approval of the project. The contention is not

tenable as urgent protection works had already been provided during 1995-1997 and

no flood damages had occurred to the farm thereafter. The river was also flowing at

a safe distance of over one kilometre from the farm.

Failure of the Government to take into consideration the provisions of the aforesaid

project and to visualise that the farm would be fully protected after implementation

of the project resulted in the unwarranted approval of the estimate of Rs 92.01 lakh

in August 1997. The expenditure of Rs 91.03 lakh incurred on protection works to

the farm had thus gone waste.

Infructuous expenditure on excavation work

3.2.12 To provide protection to half hectare of land and other property of village

Manikaran (Kullu district) lying along the banks of river Parvati, FPWs were

approved (November 1999) for Rs 40.48 lakh. The estimate, inter alia, provided

for construction of 4.5 metres high concrete wall between RDs 120 and 220 on the

right bank of the river. It was noticed in audit that excavation upto a depth of 3.5

metres below bed level was done upto March 2002 in a length of 100 metres for

preparing the foundation bed between RDs 145 to 245 at a cost of Rs 6.39 lakh.

Loose strata consisting of a mix of volcanic ash and sand was encountered during

the course of excavation, which was not considered suitable for laying the

foundation of the proposed protection works. The excavated portion also got

filled up with loose soil. Accordingly, advice of CWPRS, Pune was obtained who

suggested (May 2002) to fill up the excavated portion with big boulders and

provide stone crate work thereon. It would thus appear that thorough

investigation of the site had not been conducted before taking up the work in hand.

Expenditure of Rs 6.39 lakh incurred on excavation was, thus, rendered infructuous.

Held up and abandoned works

3.2.13 Expenditure of Rs 16.78 lakh incurred on the following held up/abandoned

works was rendered infructuous:

-In Kullu division No. II, two protection works8

intended to protect 18 hectares of

land from floods in Beas river and its tributaries were approved (November 1999 and

February 2001) for Rs 1.18 crore and were stipulated to be completed within three

years. The works were taken up for execution in March and May 2001 and

expenditure of Rs 11.30 lakh was incurred on them by diverting the funds from other

works as meagre allotment of Rs 1.53 lakh was received for the works during 2001-

2004. Further execution of these works was held up since August 2001 and March

2004 after execution to the extent of five and 25 per cent.


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The EE stated (January 2005) that the works were taken up for execution as they

were of urgent nature but their further execution was held up due to non-allotment of

funds.

-Similarly, for providing FPWs to Lower Valley, Gagret (Una district) to protect and

reclaim 260 hectares of land and other property, estimate of Rs 52.63 lakh was

approved in June 1995. The work was taken up for execution in April 1995 by FPD,

Gagret and expenditure of Rs 5.48 lakh was incurred upto January 1999 on part

execution of the work despite allotment of sizeable budget of Rs 55.30 lakh during

1995-1999.

The EE stated (February 2005) that after part execution, the land owners objected to

further execution of the work and no action to acquire the land in question was taken

for want of provision in the approved estimate. Thus, taking up the work for

execution without ensuring availability of the land had resulted in abandoning the

same resulting in wasteful expenditure of Rs 5.48 lakh.

Execution of works below specification

3.2.14 The approved estimate of Swan River Flood Management and Integrated

Land Development Project (Phase-I) provided for channelisation of the river by

construction of earthen embankment along both the banks in a length of 16.67

kilometres. As the soil over which the embankment and the wire-crated stone apron

were to be constructed was sandy, the same was required to be excavated upto a

depth of 0.25 metre and filled with compacted earth so as to provide a firm

foundation to the protection works. CWPRS, Pune had also recommended (March

2001) founding of the structures below ground level on firm soil.

Test-check of the records of FPD, Gagret revealed (February 2005) that the

excavation work to the extent of 13,257 cum only was executed against the stipulated

quantity of 38,576 cum for the protection works constructed between June 2002 and

May 2004 in a length of 4,050 metres in six reaches of the alignment of embankment

between RDs 14,160 and 18,610. The shortfall in the excavation work in these

reaches ranged between 42 and 98 per cent. The recommended firm foundation was

thus not provided in these cases. The FPWs costing Rs 4.39 crore constructed at the

sites were, thus, below specification.

The EE admitted the facts (February 2005).

According to the decision of STAC, GI wire crate, 5mm thick, corresponding to

grade SWG-6 of 15cm x 15 cm mesh was to be used in all wire crate works including

embankments and apron. Further, welded wire mesh was not to be used for FP

works as per instructions issued by E-in-C in January 2005.

Test-check of records of Indora, Rohru and FP Gagret divisions revealed that below

specification work costing Rs 65.06 lakh was executed by using materials other than

that approved as detailed in Appendix-XXIII.


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-Estimate for providing FPWs to 19.03 hectares of land and 70 buildings of village

Bahang (Kullu district) was approved (September 1996) for Rs 1.35 crore. The

estimate provided for construction of 1,485 metres long wire crated, stone-filled

embankment in three layers alongwith apron of equal length. Test-check of records

of Kullu division No. I revealed (December 2004) that the work was reported as

having been completed in 1998-1999 by the division at an expenditure of Rs 92.17

lakh. However, the work was not executed according to the provisions of the

estimate in as much as the bottom layer (first) of the embankment was constructed

for enhanced length of 1,619.25 metres whereas the second and third layers were laid

over lesser length of 1,425 and 391.30 metres only. Besides, the apron was provided

in a length of 1453.05 metres, which fell short of the length of the first layer of the

embankment.

The EE attributed (December 2004) the deviation to site conditions and paucity of

funds. The plea is not tenable because provision in the estimate was based on site

requirement as recommended by the expert committee. Besides, STAC in their

meeting held in June 2000 had decided to provide apron in the entire length of

embankment. The protection work was thus below specifications.

Failure to execute the work according to the provisions of the approved estimate and

decision of STAC could thus not ensure protection of land and buildings.

Cost overrun

3.2.15 Delay in completion of works has an inevitable impact on costs. In eight

divisions, 15 protection works (estimated cost: Rs 5.94 crore) detailed in

Appendix-XXIV, were taken up for execution between December 1987 and June

2001. The works, stipulated to be completed within periods ranging from six to 36

months, were completed between March 1999 and March 2004 at a cost of Rs 9.10

crore resulting in time overrun ranging between six and 174 months and cost overrun

of Rs 3.16 crore. The cost overrun in individual cases ranged between 15 and 445 per

cent.

The concerned EEs attributed the delay in execution of works to non-allotment of

adequate funds and increase in cost of works with the passage of time.

Irregular expenditure

Expenditure incurred in anticipation of sanctions

3.2.16 In respect of 24 works (completed: 20, ongoing: four) of nine divisions9

estimated to cost Rs 6.82 crore, the expenditure incurred had exceeded the provisions

of administrative approval and expenditure sanction by Rs 4.41 crore which was

awaiting regularisation. The excess in respect of the individual works ranged

between 15 and 445 per cent.

In eight divisions10

, 33 works (completed: 25, in-progress: eight) administratively

approved for Rs 11.64 crore were taken up for execution during 1987-2003 in


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anticipation of the required technical sanctions which were yet to be obtained.

Expenditure of Rs 12.46 crore incurred on these works was, thus, irregular.

Unauthorised splitting of a work

3.2.17 The CE (CZ), Mandi accorded technical sanction to the detailed estimate of

the work providing flood protection to village Manikaran (Kullu district) in

November 2000 for Rs 36.69 lakh. The work involved providing of plum concrete

walls along both banks of Parvati river between RDs 45 and 445. Test-check of

records of Kullu division No. II revealed (January 2005) that the EE had awarded

(January-February 2002) major portion of the work (estimated cost: Rs 32.56 lakh)

by splitting in five parts, to four contractors at a cost of Rs 1.45 crore at premia

between 270 and 369 per cent. Benefit of competitive rates was thus not derived by

floating single tender. Approval of the competent authority to split up the work had

also not been obtained.

The EE stated (January 2005) that the splitting was done to expedite the execution of

the work of an urgent nature. The reply is not factual as there was no urgency as the

works were still (January 2005) in progress.

Undue financial aid to contractors

3.2.18 The EE, FPD, Gagret awarded (2002-2004) 11 sub works of Swan River

Flood Management and Integrated Land Development

Project (Una district) for Rs 7.52 crore. The contractors neither completed the

respective works within the stipulated period of six months in any of the 11 cases nor

did they apply for extension of time. Action under the agreements to levy

compensation had also not been taken. This resulted in undue financial aid of Rs

75.19 lakh to the contractors.

While admitting the facts, the EE justified (March 2005) non-levy of compensation

to slow pace of execution of the works during rainy season. The contention is not

tenable as this fact should have been taken into account while stipulating the

completion period for the works.

-In Indora, Nalagarh and Rohru divisions, it was noticed that against 20,097 tonnes

of stone utilised by the contractors during 1999-2003 for execution of protection

works entrusted to them, certificates ('M' forms) for payment of royalty for 1,227

tonnes only were furnished. For the remaining quantity of 18,870 tonnes of stone,

neither the requisite certificates were obtained from the contractors nor royalty of Rs

1.89 lakh recovered from them. This resulted in giving of undue financial aid to the

contractors and loss of revenue to the Government. The facts were admitted by the

concerned EEs.

Non-restoration of damaged protection works

3.2.19 In five divisions11

, structures like embankments, aprons, etc., of 23 FPWs

constructed at a cost of Rs 9.06 crore to protect 2,270 hectares of land and other


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properties had sustained flood damages estimated at Rs 2.09 crore between July 2001

and August 2004. Circumstances under which the same could not withstand the

impact of floods had not been investigated. The damages had also not been restored

except in one case12

where temporary restoration was done in March 2003 at a cost of

Rs 6.50 lakh.

The EEs contended that the damages were not required to be investigated as

occurrence of flood damages was a natural phenomenon. Non-restoration of

damages was attributed to non-availability of funds. The replies are not tenable as

exact reasons for the damages could not be known without an independent

investigation with a view to devising appropriate remedial measures.

Inadequate maintenance of completed works

3.2.20 Maintenance of assets is an important activity. Failure to maintain the assets

is tantamount to an act of disinvestment for it implies the sacrifice of past

investment.

As per the approved estimates of FPWs, provision for maintenance of the works was

required to be made at the rate of four per cent of the cost of works. In December

2003, Government approved the norm of engagement of one beldar for each four

kilometres length of embankment and spurs constructed

11 Flood Protection Division, Gagret, Indora, Kullu-I, Kullu-II and Thural.

12 Flood Protection Work, Manikaran damaged in August 2002 to the extent of

Rs 15.50 lakh (Kullu-II division).

for FPWs with a view to safeguarding the existing structures, protection of plantation

and reporting regular damages to the structures.

Test-check of the records of eight divisions13

, however, revealed (December 2004 to

March 2005) that in respect of 38 works completed between 1995 and 2004 at a total

cost of Rs 11.75 crore, funds amounting to Rs 88.73 lakh were required for their

maintenance during 2000-2005. However, budget of Rs 19.70 lakh was demanded

for operation and maintenance (O&M) of the works against which funds of Rs 5.83

lakh were actually received. Except Nerwa and Thural Divisions, the remaining six

divisions had not even demanded funds for 2002-2005. Kullu division No. I had

utilised funds of Rs.2.50 lakh allotted during 2000-2001 on this account on Lift

Irrigation Scheme, Neoli Therman. Further, none of the divisions test-checked had

engaged labour for properly safeguarding and maintaining the structures despite

norms fixed by the Government.

The EEs attributed non-maintenance of the completed protection works to non-

allotment of adequate funds and non-damage of works due to non-occurrence of

heavy floods in the concerned rivers/khads. The replies are not tenable as funds for

O&M of the works were not demanded by the concerned divisions and labour was

not deployed as per norms for day-to-day maintenance and safeguard of the


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structures.

For 30 protection works constructed under FPD, Gagret upto March 2004 at a cost

of Rs 6.41 crore, funds amounting to Rs 62.96 lakh (at the rate of four per cent of the

capital cost per annum) were required for O&M for the period 2000-2005. Funds

amounting to Rs 1.14 crore were actually allotted for O&M of the schemes against

which expenditure of Rs 1.73 crore was incurred. It was noticed in audit that Rs 1.47

crore were spent on minor works of original nature, cost of which was not to be met

out of O&M funds. Thus Rs 25.90 lakh were actually spent on O&M. It would thus

appear that the works already executed are not being maintained properly.

The EE attributed (February-March 2005) the diversion of O&M funds to urgency of

the works to which diverted. The reply is not tenable as the funds were meant for

utilisation on O&M of works only which were, thus, neglected.

Internal controls

Inspection of works

3.2.21 To ensure quality and timely completion of the ongoing works, E-in-C issued

instructions in June 1994 and April 2000 for inspection of major and targeted

schemes at least once a month by the EE concerned and to record inspection notes

which were required to be sent, inter alia, to the E-in-C and the Secretary of the

department. No mechanism for inspection of completed works had, however, been

evolved.

Chamba, Indora, Kullu-I, Kullu-II, Nalagarh, Nerwa, Paonta Sahib and Thural.

Perusal of the inspection notes in the divisions test-checked revealed that in respect of

195 ongoing FPWs, 2,329 inspections of EEs were required to be conducted during

2000-2005 against which only 22 inspections14

were conducted. The shortfall in

inspections ranged between 90 and 100 per cent in individual cases. Six divisions15

did not produce any notes of inspection of the works conducted by the EEs during

the period.

The EEs stated (December 2004-March 2005) that the works were inspected from

time to time but inspection notes were not recorded due to rush of work and oral

instructions were issued at the sites. EE, Kullu division No. I contended that the

works were being executed according to prescribed specifications and procedure and

there was no need of issuing inspection notes. This was, however, contrary to the

instructions of the E-in-C.

Inventory of completed works not maintained

3.2.22 For exercising effective control over the assets created, CE (CZ) had required

(November 2003) maintenance of inventory of completed schemes. It was, however,

noticed that inventory of assets created by completion of protection works had not


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been maintained in any of the divisions test-checked. Physical verification of the

assets had also not been conducted. Thus, effective control over the completed works

was not exercised.

Monitoring and Evaluation

3.2.23 The Planning and Monitoring wing-II of the department had obtained

quarterly progress reports from the implementing units for the FPWs under

execution against NABARD loan funds which were also reviewed quarterly by a

high powered committee of the Government, headed by the Chief Secretary. The

works taken up for execution against the State funds had, however, not been

monitored resulting in unplanned execution of works as pointed out in various

paragraphs.

The E-in-C stated (April 2005) that since most of the protection works were executed

against NABARD funding, monitoring of these works only was done. The

contention is not tenable as several schemes were under execution against State

funds which should also have been monitored to expedite their completion as per the

prescribed time schedule.

Although the programme was under implementation since inception of the

department in 1984-85, evaluation studies, with a view to identifying the hindrances

in the smooth implementation of the programme and to devise suitable remedial

measures to remove the same, had not been done.

Conclusion

3.2.24 The coverage of 0.12 lakh hectares achieved upto March 2005 against the

overall target of 2.31 lakh hectares was minimal. Successive inadequate annual

budget allocations made and resultant fixation of low annual targets of coverage

were not likely to lead to achievement of the overall objective in the foreseeable

future. Non-preparation of a long term master plan and unplanned execution of

protection works had resulted in significant time and cost overruns on the one hand

and non-achievement of intended coverage by the individual schemes on the other.

Besides, the departmental failure to restore the damaged protection structures and to

maintain the completed works had made the capability of the same to protect the

intended areas from flood havoc doubtful. The contractors were extended undue

financial benefit. Inadequate inspection of works, non-maintenance of inventory of

structures constructed, no physical verification of the assets and improper monitoring

of the ongoing works were indicative of lack of effective internal control of the

department. Implementation of the programme was thus slow and ineffective.


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Recommendations

** A long term master plan indicating inter se priority of the proposed protection

works needs to be prepared and the works executed in an integrated and economical

manner.

** In view of the minimal area protected so far, adequate financial resources need to

be mobilised to provide effective flood protection to flood prone areas in a time bound

manner.

** Damages to the flood protection structures need to be investigated to ascertain the

reasons for the damages with a view to devising necessary remedial measures. The

damaged works also need to be restored promptly.

** Completed works need to be maintained properly so as to withstand flood havoc.

** System should be evolved to ensure adequate inspection of completed protection

works, to maintain inventory of the assets created and to ensure regular physical

verification of the same.

These points were referred to the Government in June 2005; their reply had not been

received (July 2005).

Performance Audit of Water Supply and Sanitation Programmes in Goa .

Highlights

The water supply demand in the State is met through seven regional water supply schemes

and sanitation in urban areas is provided through urban sewerage schemes being

implemented by the Public Health Engineering Wing of the State Public Works

Department (PWD). A review of the Regional Water Supply and Urban Sanitation

programmes revealed that against the present demand (March 2005) of 568 MLD (Million

Litres per Day) of water for the existing population, the Department could supply only 394

MLD leaving a gap of 174 MLD which adversely affected the public needs of sufficient

water supply.

It was seen that the augmentation of two regional water supply schemes out of the three

schemes taken up were not completed resulting in non-achievement of the intended benefit

of augmentation. Though 85 per cent areas of Panaji, 40 per cent of Margao and 80 per

cent of Vasco municipalities were provided with sewerage network, the percentage of

households connected to the sewerage network in Panaji capital area was 95 per cent,

whereas in the towns of Margao and Vasco in South Goa, the Department could provide

only seven and 19 per cent household connections respectively due to poor public response.

The salient highlights of the Review are:


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(Paragraph 3.1.7)

(Paragraph 3.1.11)

The work of Sewerage Treatment Plant in Panaji was awarded to a

single bidder for Rs.13.33 crore without competitive offers as the

Department had not finalised the technology while calling for the

financial bids.

(Paragraph 3.1.14) (Paragraph 3.1.17)

The revenue from water charges was not only stagnant over the

period 2002-05 but also showed a downward trend despite the

augmentation schemes. The arrears of revenue, which stood at Rs.22.82

crore as of March 2005 constituted 43 per cent of the revenue from water

charges.

(Paragraph 3.1.21)

3.1.1 Introduction

The water supply demand in the State is met through seven regional water supply

schemes1

with a total installed capacity of 394 MLD (million litres per day) against

the State‟s existing demand of 568 MLD. In order to improve the service level of

water supply in the villages and towns to meet the increasing industrial, commercial

as well as domestic demand, and in view of the shortage of water supply against

present demand and the envisaged increase in future demand, the Government took

up augmentation of three supply schemes. Similarly the urban sanitation schemes

were also taken up in three towns2

with a view to improving public hygiene and for

creating sanitary awareness among the public. The schemes were implemented by


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the Public Health Engineering Divisions of the Public Works Department under the

supervision of three circle officers and one Chief Engineer under the overall guidance

and supervision of the Principal Chief Engineer and the Secretary (PWD).


The review covered schemes taken up for augmentation of Regional Water Supply

and urban sewerage and the expenditure incurred there under for a period of three

years from 2002-03 to 2004-05. The review was conducted during July to September,

2005 by test checking the records of Chief Engineer I, two Circle Offices3

out of

three, Superintending Engineer (Monitoring & Evaluation) and six4

divisions out of

seven divisions.


The review was conducted to assess whether;

• The programmes for augmentation of Regional Water Supply Schemes and

the Urban Sewerage Schemes were properly planned;

• The schemes were implemented as planned, with due consideration to

economy and efficiency;

• The revenue of water and sewage charges were demanded correctly and

collected.


The following audit criteria for achievement of audit objectives were adopted.

• Project feasibility reports;

• Work estimates and tendering procedures;

• Economy in execution of schemes;

• Coordination amongst agencies for inter-related works; and

• Collection and accounting of water charges and sewage charges.


An entry conference was held with the Secretary (PWD), Principal Chief Engineer,

PWD alongwith other officers of the Department. Records relating to planning and

execution of the schemes covered under review maintained in the offices of Chief

Engineer, Superintending Engineers and Executive Engineers were examined and

data collected and analyzed with reference to Manuals, Codes, Act and Rules and

Government orders and instructions. Discussions/interactions were also held with


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the executing authorities during the course of the review and their views have been

taken into account while finalizing the review.


The details of the budget provisions and expenditure incurred on Regional Water

Supply and Urban Sewerage and Sanitation programmes for the period 2002-05 are

given below:

(Rupees in crore)

(Source: Appropriation Accounts of Govt. of Goa)

The savings in Sanitation Programme were mainly due to non-taking up of major

works, changes in scope of works on technical as well as administrative grounds and

envisaged share capital investment aggregating to rupees seven crore in Sewage and

Infrastructural Development Corporation not being made by the State Government.

In addition to the expenditure indicated above, the Department incurred an

expenditure of Rs.11.145

crore (March 2005) through Goa Coastal Zone

Management Authority (GCZMA), Department of Science Technology and

Environment (STE) for the Scheme of “Environmental upgradation of Panaji City,

Phase-I”, a joint project of the Government of India (GOI) and the State

Government, for which the State Government contributed Rs.5.81 crore and GOI

contributed Rs.7.56 crore upto April 2005. The scheme consisted of sewage

treatment plant of 12.50 MLD capacity, renovation and remodeling of existing 5.7

MLD STP at Tonca, laying of under-water effluent disposal pipeline in Mandovi

estuary, extension of sewerlines to Tambdi Matti, Patto Colony and other left out

areas of Panaji city.

3.1.7 Planning

The existing total capacity of the Water Supply schemes in the State in the year 2001

was 314 MLD (Million Litres per Day) as against the present demand of 568 MLD,

and a futuristic demand of 775 MLD for the year 2030. The Department planned for

augmentation of three schemes totalling 80 MLD only during the five year plan

period, and augmentation of four schemes by a total of 275 MLD is under various

stages of planning.

The fact that augmentation of 80 MLD only was taken up as against a shortfall of

254 MLD between the existing capacity (314 MLD) and present demand (568 MLD)


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shows that the planning itself has not been consistent with the demand in the State.

The planned augmentation of 275 MLD was to be achieved through seven6

water

supply schemes and out of these only in three schemes the work has

As of March 2005, thus the Department could achieve 394 MLD capacity by these

three commissioned augmentation schemes, still leaving a gap of 174 MLD of water

supply on the present demand. Even in these three schemes where the work have

been commenced, despite incurring an expenditure of Rs.138.10 crore the actual

augmentation that has been carried out as of September 2005 is only 50 MLD. Thus,

against existing demand of 568 MLD, the capacity that had been created as of

September 2005 is 364 MLD resulting in a gap of 204 MLD with reference to

demand. Further, the balance four7

augmentation schemes involving plant

augmentation of 275 MLD, no work has commenced and even Detailed Project

Reports (DPRs) for these

Delay in implementation of Centrally sponsored Accelerated Urban Water Supply

programme

schemes have not been finalized. Consequently, the chances of completion of these

schemes by the end of the X five year plan appears remote and therefore the planned

augmentation of 275 MLD would be difficult.

Further, under the Accelerated Urban Water Supply Programme an additional

provision for supply of 2.88 MLD was being planned. The progress of the work

under the AUWSP was also tardy as discussed below.

3.1.8 Accelerated Urban Water Supply Programme

The Centrally sponsored scheme "Accelerated Urban Water Supply Programme

(AUWSP)” was launched (1993-94) through the Ministry of Urban Development

(MOUD). The scheme envisaged providing safe and adequate water supply in

smaller towns with population of less than 2000, as per 1991 census. The programme

was to be funded by the Central Government and the State Government on 50:50

basis.

Selection of towns/Urban Agglomeration for implementation of the scheme was to

be done by the State Level Selection Committee constituted for the purpose by the

State Government as per guidelines of the programme, after considering the DPRs

proposed in respect of individual towns.

During 2001-05, out of four towns8

planned for augmentation of water supply,

schemes in Ponda and Pernem were taken up, and works were commenced only in

Pernem. The DPRs submitted for Cuncolim and Benaulim towns were returned

(June 2002) by the GOI for modification as per AUWSP guidelines which were not

resubmitted by the Department as of August 2005. The details of schemes taken up

were as below:


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(Rupees in lakh)

Thus, schemes sanctioned in 2001-02 and required to be completed by 200203 were

yet to be taken up/completed (September 2005). The delay in taking up the scheme

by the Department resulted in delay in extending the intended benefits of improved

water supply to the population of two towns of Ponda and Pernem, while as the

DPRs for Cuncolium and Benaulim towns not being approved, these two works have

not been sanctioned by GOI. Thus, the envisaged benefit on additional supply of

2.88 MLD through AUWSP could not be availed as works on these schemes have

been delayed.

3.1.9 Augmentation of Sanquelim Water Supply scheme -Extra expenditure to be

recovered from contractor

The work of laying of pipeline from Sanquelim Water Treatment Plant to Surla and

Usap Dumacem, a component work of Augmentation of Sanquelim Water Supply

scheme, was awarded in June 2001 to a contractor for Rs.1.42 crore to be completed

in January 2002. The agreement was terminated in May 2003 at the risk and cost of

the contractor due to undue delay on the part of the contractor, and the balance work

estimated to cost Rs.1.19 crore was awarded to another contractor in February 2004

for Rs.1.68 crore to be completed by August 2004. As the work was terminated at

the risk and cost of the original contractor, the extra expenditure was recoverable

from the original contractor. The extra expenditure recoverable from the first

contractor on the basis of the original tendered cost (Rs.142 lakh), the work

completed and paid (Rs.20 lakh) and the tendered cost of the balance work (Rs.168

lakh), amounted to Rs.44 lakh9

after adjusting the security deposit (Rs.2 lakh)

available. The Department has not claimed the above amount from the contractor so

far, though the balance work was tendered in February

2004, for which no reason was furnished.

3.1.10 Augmentation of Assonora Water Supply scheme

Though the laying of pipeline from Water Treatment Plant at Assonora to Porvorim

was completed by August 2003, and construction of Master Balancing Reservoir

(MBR) and Overhead Reservoir (OHR) at Porvorim was completed by March 2004,

however the works of rising main from MBR to OHR and pumping installations at

MBR were not completed.

Audit scrutiny revealed that though all the above works were inter related, and were

to be taken up simultaneously, tenders for the work of rising main from MBR to


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OHR and pumping installation were invited only in July 2004 and the works

(tendered cost Rs.65.26 lakh) commenced only in November 2004, seven months

after completion of MBR and OHR. The delay in taking up of these works resulted

in not achieving the intended benefit of augmentation of water supply in three

villages10

of Bardez Taluka and idling of the MBR and OHR constructed at a cost of

Rs.1.01 crore.

3.1.11 Augmentation of Opa Water Supply schemes

The major part of the scheme 40 MLD Water Treatment Plant at Curti, laying of

pipeline from Curti to Banastarim (16 KMs) have been completed by April 2003 and

October 2004 respectively and the total expenditure incurred on the scheme upto

May 2005 was Rs.44.82 crores. However, the laying of pipeline from Banastarim to

Altinho/Panaji (Ch. 16 to 33 KMs) was yet to be completed due to delays in land

acquisition, finalisation of alignment from Chimbel to Panaji, supply of pipes and

getting clearance for cutting of trees and roads, etc. As a result, though the scheme is

designed for augmentation by 40 MLD, augmentation of 10 MLD only could be

achieved (October 2004) so far, even after four years of commencement of the

scheme which was planned for completion within two years, and even after incurring

more than 50 percent of the sanctioned expenditure (Rs.44.82 out of 83.83 crores).

3.1.12 Extra expenditure recoverable from the contractor

Audit scrutiny revealed that the work of laying of pipeline from Curti to Kundaim,

under augmentation of Opa Water Supply Scheme, awarded to a contractor for

Rs.4.43 crore was terminated (May 2004) at the risk and cost of the contractor for

slow progress of work. The contractor was paid Rs.2.73 crore upto October 2003.

The balance work was tendered in July 2004 and awarded (October 2004) to another

contractor for Rs.3.34 crore, and the contractor was paid Rs.3.11 crore upto October

2005, and minor works such as construction of some chambers for sluice valves,

refilling trenches at some places etc. were yet to be completed. The approximate

extra expenditure recoverable from the original contractor was Rs.1.64 crore taking

into account the original tendered amount (Rs.4.43 crore), cost of work done by the

original agency (Rs.2.73 crore), and the tendered cost of the balance work (Rs.3.34

crore). The Department had not taken any action to recover the excess cost although

termination of the work of the original contractor was carried out with invocation of

risk and cost clause.

3.1.13 Environmental upgradation of Panaji city

In Panaji city 85 percent area was covered under the sewerage network, and 95

percent of the households of the sewered areas were connected to the network. As

the existing sewage system in Panaji city installed in 1967 was inadequate, the

Department proposed to augment the sewage treatment system by 12.50 MLD


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capacity. The proposed project included, additional sewage treatment plant of 12.50

MLD capacity, renovation and remodeling of existing

5.70 MLD Sewage Treatment Plant at Tonca, laying of under water effluent disposal

pipelines in Mandovi estuary, conditioning the secondary effluent for gardening,

extension of sewer lines to Tambdi matti, and Patto colony and other left out areas of

Panaji city. The project was proposed to be implemented during 2002-2005 out of

State Govt. funds (Rs.4.50 crore) and availing assistance (Rs.10.50 crore) from the

GOI.

The GOI sanctioned (May, 2002) the scheme of Environmental upgradation of

Panaji city, Phase-I, under National River Conservation Plan, for Rs.14.10 crore, on

cost sharing (70:30) basis and subject to completion by July, 2004.

The Executive Engineer, Division III invited (October, 2002) tenders in two sealed

cover system, namely technical and financial bids, for the main and ancillary

components of the scheme estimated to cost Rs.12.11 crore. The following

irregularities were noticed in awarding and execution of the work:

3.1.14 Acceptance of single tender

Though tenders were initially invited (October 2002), inter-alia, for

12.50 MLD Sewage Treatment Plant based on Activated Sludge Process specified in

the NIT, the concept of alternate offer was brought in (December 2002) before

submission of tenders and alternate designs were called from the bidders. The

Department deputed a technical committee (June 2003) to study the technologies

available in foreign countries (Germany and Austria) after receipt of tenders, and

accepted their recommendation to adopt the C-Tech process for which only one

agency M/s. H.N. Bhat & Co. had quoted (Rs.14.79 crore), thus vitiating the

tendering process. As the Department had not invited tenders for STP based on C-

Tech process, and M/s. H.N. Bhat & Co. only had quoted for the C-Tech Process,

the tender accepted was not competitive as it was a single tender. Besides, the rates

cannot be considered as reasonable as the Department did not prepare an estimate

for STP based on C-Tech process. On directions of the Goa State Works Board

(August 2003) negotiations were done by the Chief Engineer with M/s. H.N. Bhat

and the single tenderer was awarded the work for Rs.13.33 crore (October 2003). An

expenditure of Rs.11.14 crore was incurred upto March 2005.

3.1.15 Margao Sewerage Scheme

The project of underground drainage scheme to Margao town (revised estimated

cost: Rs.18.68 crore) was taken up in 1986. The scheme was broadly divided into

three drainage zones, namely North, Central and South Zone, covering 876 hectare

area to be sewered. Infrastructure comprising a network of 22 Kms. sewerline in


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North Zone, 23 Kms. sewerline in Central Zone, covering 40 percent area of

Margao, and a 7.5 MLD Sewage Treatment Plant at Navelim were completed and

commissioned in the year 2000 at a cost of Rs.18.30 crore as of July, 2005.

The infrastructure created had capacity to provide sewerage connections to 12900

households. However only 906 households (7 percent) were connected upto March

2004 due to lack of response from the public in taking domestic connections as they

had already invested in construction of septic tank and soak pits. The Government

introduced a pilot scheme to provide house connection Departmentally charging a

nominal fee of Rs.2000 for single house unit and Rs.1000 per flat in apartments. The

scheme to provide 100 house connection was sanctioned by the Government in

January 2004 and 53 connections involving 419 households were provided upto

March 2005, at a cost of Rs.21.86 lakh. Thus only 132511

households were

connected to the network as of March 2005 and 5008 households were yet to be

connected.

Considering the response to the pilot scheme, the Government decided (January

2005) to extend the benefits to all the residents of Margao, Vasco and Panaji

wherever sewerage network is covered, on a nominal charge between Rs.500 to

Rs.3000 per household12

, for which applications were accepted during April to 1

August, 2005.

The Department assessed the total cost of 1008 connections to individual houses and

4000 flats (assessed through a survey conducted by the Department) in Margao at Rs.

six crore out of which Rupees one crore will be recovered as connection charges from

the consumers and subsidy would be Rs. five crore.

A preliminary estimate of Rs.2.27 crore for subsidized sewerage connection for

North and Central Zone of Margao was approved by the Government (February

2005) and the work was divided into six parts, tendered and awarded (July 2005) to

six different agencies for Rs.1.92 crore. The work was in progress (August 2005).

The Department‟s belated attempts to convince the consumers as well as

Government‟s failure to enforce the powers available under the Health Act, for

providing individual household sewage connections compulsorily, resulted in

underutilization of the existing infrastructure created at a cost of Rs.18.30 crore.

3.1.16 Vasco Sewerage Scheme

Vasco Sewerage Scheme covering 240 hectares drainage area consisting of a 14

MLD Sewerage Treatment Plant, seven drainage zones, six sewage pumping stations

and 41 Kms. sewer lines was commissioned at a cost of Rs.5.09 crore, in 1985 in

Baina, Sada and Mangore areas and in 1992 in Vasco area covering 80 percent area

of Vasco city.


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The infrastructure created had a capacity to provide sewerage connections to

approximately 23000 households. However, 4414 households (19 percent) only were

connected to the sewerage network as of 31 January 2005, and major part of the

sewerage network remained unutilized and did not serve the purpose for which the

huge expenditure was incurred.

Though the Department has prepared (March 2005) an estimate of Rs.1.24 crore,

under the subsidized scheme for providing concessional house sewer connection to

583 households, further action to commence the work was yet to be taken (August

2005).

3.1.17 Unfruitful expenditure on Project Report

Audit scrutiny revealed that on directions of the Government the Department had

transferred (December 2001) the unexecuted work of sewerage system of South

Drainage Zone, Margao, to a newly created corporation, Sewerage and

Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (SIDC), Panaji for execution.

The Corporation had prepared (June 2002), a detailed project report (DPR) for the

work through MECON LTD, a Government of India Undertaking at a cost of Rs.

29.50 lakh. As directed (August 2002) by the Chief Secretary, the Department

obtained (September, 2002) the project proposal from the Corporation. On verifying

the DPR, the Department noticed that there was no detailed hydraulic design for

sewer network, the cost estimate was on a lump sum basis without indicating the

quantity and basis of rates adopted. Area-wise length and diameter of pipelines,

details of types of manholes at various locations were also not shown in the project

report. In the absence of these details, the project report was not considered useful

by the Department as mentioned above.

Government subsequently empanelled (November, 2004), 11 firms as consultants for

water supply, sewerage and sanitation projects, and sought (December 2004)

financial offers for providing consultancy for preparation of DPR for the above

mentioned project. The offers received were opened in February, 2005 and the S.E.

Circle VI, accepted (May, 2005) the lowest offer of M/s Ramky Enviro Engineers

Ltd. for Rs.10.28 lakh and awarded the consultancy for preparation of DPR to them.

The work order was issued in June 2005 with stipulation to complete it by October

2005. The work was commenced in June 2005 and was in progress (August 2005).

Thus another consultancy for the same project was awarded for Rs.10.28 lakhs,

rendering the expenditure of Rs.29.50 lakh incurred for preparation of the DPR to

MECON unfruitful.


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3.1.18 Revenue receipts

The Department fixes water tariff based on the classification of consumers as

domestic, Small hotels, Industries and Commercial categories. The current tariff

which was revised in April 2002 and modified in August 2003 was Rs.2.50 per

cu.mtr. for domestic, Rs.10 per cu.mtr. for small hotels and certain other

establishments, Rs.20 per cu.mtr. for Industries and Rs.30 per cu.mtr. for

commercial category consumers. The sewerage charge was 50 percent of the water

charges. The year-wise revenue collected from water supply and sewerage charges

was as under:-

(Rupees in crore)

Year

Budget estimates Actual receipts Excess(+)/Shortfall(-

)

Water

Supply Sanitation

Water

Supply Sanitation

Water

Supply Sanitation

2002-

03 69.19 0.81 55.20 0.51

(-)

13.99 (-) 0.30

2003-

04 69.11 0.89 50.41

4.2513 (-)

18.70 (+) 3.36

2004-

05 76.02 0.98 54.41 0.40

(-)

21.61 (-) 0.58

The shortfall of revenue from water supply against budget estimates ranged from 20

to 28 per cent during the period under review. The actual revenue from water supply

indicated a declining trend despite augmentation of water supply schemes, as well as

new consumers. The reasons for shortfall in water supply revenue with reference to

budget estimates as well as downward trend in revenue collections were awaited.

3.1.19 Arrears of Revenue

The arrears of revenue of water charges, pending recovery as of 31 March 2005 were

Rs.22.82 crore which was 43 per cent of the average annual revenue of the

Department from water supply and sanitation. It was noticed that though arrears

amounting to Rs.17.39 crore were more than a year old, only Rs.5.59 crore

pertaining to 1623 cases were referred to the Revenue Recovery Courts as on 31

March 2005, revealing severe slackness in actions against defaulters.

The mounting arrears and slow progress in its recovery was mainly due to timely


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action not taken against the defaulters, by disconnecting the water supply as required

under water supply bye-laws, laxity in referring the overdue cases to Revenue

Recovery Courts and its pursuance, and lack of proper internal control systems to

monitor all aspects of demand, collection and accounting of revenue including

prompt action for speedy recovery of revenue arrears, by the Chief Engineer‟s office.

3.1.20 Short billing against Raw water supply

As per Article-6 of the water supply bye-laws a minimum contract demand has to be

fixed for each consumer and water charges leviable should not be less than the

minimum contract demand, even when the meter is not working.

A consumer, M/s. Aparant Iron and Steel Ltd. has been drawing raw water since

July 2000 from Salaulim dam for industrial purpose, as per an agreement entered

into with the Government in July 1996, and further renewed in March 2001.

Though the demand of the consumer was supply of 4000 to 12000 cu.m. of water per

day, the Department did not indicate the minimum contract demand and the billing

has so far been done on actual consumption as per meter readings, which was less

than 1.20 lakh cu.m. per month.

Audit scrutiny revealed that though the Government had approved (Dec. 2001) a

proposal of the Department to fix minimum contract demand, the Department did

not fix such minimum contract demand. Thus, due to non-fixation of contract

demand at least at the minimum quantity of 4000 cu.m. per day as demanded by

consumer, and billing done on actual consumption basis, resulted in short billing of

Rs.43.06 lakh on the basis of minimum demand of 4000 cu.m. per day for the period

from April 2002 to July 2005.

On this being observed by audit, the Executive Engineer replied (September 2005)

that action has since been initiated to issue revised bills for recovery of revenue on

the basis of minimum demand of 4000 cu.m. per day, and a report has been

submitted to Government for amending the agreement with the consumer to fix up

minimum contract demand.

3.1.21 Loss due to non-recovery of cost of water supplied through water

tankers

In order to supply drinking water to the areas such as Balli, Adnem, Fatorpa

Khananginim and ONGC Complex at Betul from Salaulim Water Supply Scheme,

the Department had commissioned a water supply scheme in 1998. The ONGC's

minimum demand of water per day was 100 cu.m.

Based on the complaints of ONGC on short supply of water during


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November/December 2001, and due to inadequate pressure at the tapping point of

the scheme, the Executive Engineer Division-XX, supplied water to ONGC from

April 2002 to March 2005 through water tanker by engaging a contractor, incurring

an expenditure of Rs.48.01 lakh.

Audit scrutiny (December 2004) revealed that against this expenditure of Rs. 48.01

lakh the Division had billed and collected water charges of Rs. 5.38 lakh only from

the ONGC during the period from April 2002 to March 2005. As the Department

had no obligation to supply water to ONGC through tanker at the cost of the

Department, the additional cost for supply of water through tanker exclusively

arranged for ONGC should have been recovered from them. The non-recovery of the

additional cost of water supply resulted in a loss of Rs. 42.63 lakh to the Department.

The Department stated that water supply through tanker was discontinued form

April 2005 and water supply position would improve after laying a pipeline from

Ambaulim to Bali for which work was in progress (July 2005).

3.1.22 Delay in installation of metering equipment

A water supply connection was released (February 2005) to M/s. Sesa Industries

Ltd. with supply of water to be made at the rate of Rs.20 per cubic metre and a

minimum contracted demand of 3000 cu.m. per month. As the billing was to be

made out on the basis of actual consumption it was important for the Department to

have ensured early installation of the metering equipment. It was however observed

that the meter was installed only after a delay of more than two months on 5 May

2005. Resultantly the billing for the period of March and April 2005 was made on the

minimum contracted demand in the absence of meters although consumption for the

subsequent months commencing from May (when the meter was installed) reflected

average monthly consumption of 31,155 cu.m. per month. Consequently due to non

timely installation of meters the Department had to forego an amount of Rs.11.26

lakh as the billing in the absence of meters was restricted to minimum contracted

demand while the actual as revealed from the scrutiny of bills of the subsequent

months reflects a much higher consumption.

3.1.23 Conclusion

As against the existing demand of 568 MLD of water, the Department could achieve

394 MLD capacity by the commissioned augmentation schemes, leaving a gap of

174 MLD of water supply. Although four augmentation projects were selected to be

completed by the end of X five year plan, no work has commenced as these projects

are in the planning stages only. The execution of schemes suffered from deficiencies

in implementation of the various terms of contract, absence of phased planning to

ensure co-ordinated completion of various components of work. The sewerage

treatment plants in the major towns were under utilized as individual sewage


181 | P a g e

connections have not been obtained by the residents. The system of collection of

revenue suffered from mounting arrears, losses on account of delays in installation of

meters, and defects in contract conditions.


• A comprehensive plan consistent with the forecasted demand should be made for phased

commencement and implementation of various augmentation schemes.

• Funds made available by GOI under Accelerated Urban Water Supply Schemes should

be utilized by expeditious action in preparation of DPRs and focused attention towards early

implementation of these schemes.

• The infrastructure created in terms of Sewerage Treatment Plant should be put to

optimum utilization by ensuring release of individual sewerage connections to the households.

• System to ensure liquidation of outstanding dues against water and sewerage charges

should be put in place.

• The clause pertaining to risk and cost as provided for in the contracts should be

invoked and enforced.


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Unfruitful expenditure on incomplete water supply schemes, Andhra Pradesh.

Out of 87 works relating to water supply schemes taken up during 1997-2001 by

the EE, RWS, Nagarkurnool (Mahboobnagar District), 68 works were left

incomplete rendering the expenditure of Rs 79.25 lakh unfruitful.

The Executive Engineer, RWS proposed to take up 87 works comprising spillover

works (21) of Protected Water Supply Scheme (PWSS), extension of pipelines,

construction of Over Head Storage Reservoir (OHSR) etc. with a view to providing

protected water supply to 15 mandals of Nagarkurnool Division (Mahboobnagar

District). All the 87 works were administratively sanctioned during June 1997-April

2000 at a total estimated cost of Rs 2.23 crore. Out of the 87 works, 80 works,

covering 107406 beneficiaries, were entrusted (May 1997 – July 2000) to contractors

on nomination basis with the stipulation to complete the works within three to nine

months from the date of entrustment. The remaining seven works were not

entrusted as of August 2005.

Audit observed that of the 80 works entrusted, only 12 works were completed (cost:

Rs 67.64 lakh) between July 1997 and March 2005. The remaining 68 works

(covering 87170 beneficiaries), which were due for completion between February

1998 and March 2001, were left incomplete (December 2003) at various stages after

incurring an expenditure (between July 1997 and December 2003) of Rs 79.25 lakh.

The work-wise details are given in Appendix 4.2. Even in respect of the completed

works, there were delays37

ranging from over three to five years (11 works).

The EE, RWS replied (January/June 2005) that the works could not be completed

due to paucity of funds and that the contractors had stopped the works due to non-

payment of bills to the extent of work done. They were not coming forward to

execute the remaining works at old rates due to escalation in costs over the period.

The EE also stated that action could not be taken against the contractors since the

payments were not made to them to the extent of work done and that the incomplete

works could not be taken up departmentally due to shortage of manpower. The EE

further stated that there were no proposals at present to finish the incomplete works

in the near future due to non-availability of funds under that grant.

Scrutiny also revealed that (i) the EE did not maintain proper record and that even

the measurement books could not be made available to Audit and (ii) he did not

organise the resources properly and the requirement of funds for each work was not

also assessed. Consequently, he could not segregate the drawals for each work

separately. Thus improper and inefficient planning of the EE, RWS in taking up a


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large number of petty works simultaneously without ensuring the availability of

sufficient funds as well as the manpower not only resulted in the expenditure of Rs

79.25 lakh remaining unfruitful for five to eight years but also deprived 0.87 lakh

beneficiaries of water supply facilities.

The matter was referred to Government in February 2005 and July 2005; reply had

not been received (December 2005).

Performance audit of Flood Control Measures Water Resources Department,

Water Resources Department, Bihar.

Highlights

Department has not paid adequate attention on expanding the flood protection infrastructure

viz. construction of new embankments, construction of all weather roads on embankments and

raising/strengthening of existing embankments. The Department has primarily relied on anti-

erosion works*

to protect existing embankments. During the last five years, there has been no

increase in flood protected areas and only a fraction of the Tenth Five Year (2002-2007) plan

targets have been achieved. Meanwhile the loss due to floods has increased from Rs 1559 crore

in 2000-2001 to Rs 2216 crore in 2004-05.

Curtailment of plan allocations in the State budget on construction of new

embankments, raising/strengthening of existing embankments and

construction of all weather roads on embankments have resulted in poor

achievements against the targets set for 2000-05.

Introduction

Bihar is one of the worst flood affected States in the country, 73 per cent

(68.80 lakh hectares) of the geographical area covering 30 out of 38 districts is flood

prone and 10 per cent (9.41 lakh hectare) is perpetually water logged. Destruction of

forests for reclaiming areas for occupation in the catchments and upper reaches of

the perennial rivers1

of the State, heavy intensity of rainfall during monsoon and rise

in river-bed-levels due to deposition of silt are some of the main reasons of floods.

The Water Resources Department (WRD) of the State Government is implementing

long and short term schemes for mitigating flood hazards which affect over two crore

population of the State.


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The Commissioner-cum-Secretary, WRD has overall responsibility for flood control

measures in the State. He is assisted by Engineer-in-Chief (North), Superintending

Engineer for Flood Control Planning and Monitoring Circle (FCPM) at the

Secretariat level and eight Zonal Chief Engineers, 19 Superintending Engineers and

48 Executive Engineers in the field formations.

Besides, the Department has three2

Technical Advisory Committees (TAC) all

headed by Engineer-in-Chief (Flood zone) and Scheme Review Committee (SRC) to

provide assistance regarding technical and financial aspects for finalisation of anti-

erosion works to be executed every year. Bihar State Flood Control Board (BSFCB)

headed by the Chief Minister is responsible for formulating policy, overseeing and

monitoring of the planning and implementation of flood control measures. Ganga

Flood Control Commission (GFCC), a Government of India (GOI) organisation is

entrusted with monitoring of the Centrally Sponsored Schemes in the State.


The specific audit objectives were to assess:

planning and physical progress of implementation of flood protection

schemes, both State and Centrally Sponsored, with reference to budgetary

allocation and the Tenth Five Year Plan;

whether flood protection works have been executed efficiently and effectively

and

the impact of flood protection works in minimising the damage to life and

property.


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Departmental norms for execution of works, quality assurance and creation of

Divisions.

Budget estimates and expenditure reports.

Examination of measurement books and works related records.

Comparative analysis of Tenth Five Year plan and departmental targets with

achievements.


Records of Engineer-in-Chief (North) and Superintending Engineer, Flood Control

Cell Planning and Monitoring in Secretariat, five Chief Engineers3

(out of eight), five

Superintending Engineers4

(out of 19) and 12 Divisional Offices5

(out of 48) along

with their Circle Offices in districts for the period 2000-2005 were test-checked

between August 2003 and March 2004 and April 2005 to June 2005.

The selection of auditee units for test check were made after taking into account

expenditure incurred and incidence of flood in the areas covered by them.

Exit conference was held with Secretary, WRD in September 2005 and the views of

the Department have been considered while finalising the reveiw.

Audit findings

1. 3.1.6 Under State plan for combating floods on a long term basis, the WRD

had three dam projects6

for construction of reservoirs in the upper reaches of these

rivers and their tributaries. But the Department did not take up any project during

2000-05. Primarily, anti-erosion works to protect existing embankments from floods

were taken up. During the period 2000-05, 1439 anti-erosion works valuing Rs

321.26 crore were executed whereas only Rs

2. 31.73 crore was spent on raising/strengthening of existing embankments,

construction of all weather roads on embankments and Rs 8.73 crore on drainage

works.

3.1.7 Financial management

The Budget provision and expenditure under plan and non plan head on the

establishment and schemes of the Department during 2000-2005 were as under:

(Rupees in crore)

Year Budget Provision Expenditure


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Works Establishment Grand

Total

Works

Establishment

Grand

Total

2000-

01 78.46 60.53 138.99 73.89

57.75 131.64

2001-

02 79.98 57.83 137.81 77.87

55.70 133.57

2002-

03 97.92 58.22 156.14 96.1

56.24 152.34

2003-

04 77.15 59.83 136.98 76.09

57.13 133.22

2004-

05

110.2 59.65 169.85 110.16 49.07 159.23

Total

443.71# 296.06 739.77 434.11*

275.89 710.00

(Source :- Information furnished by the Water Resources

Department) # Out of which Central grant was Rs 88.23

crore

* Out of which Central grant was Rs 86.69 crore

As per norms (Bihar Public Works Department Code), expenditure on establishment

should be 12 per cent of works expenditure (Rs 52.09 crore) whereas it was about five

times above the norms (Rs 275.89 crore). Department in their reply (May 2005)

stated that establishment cost is proposed to be reduced by an amount of one third in

the near future.

During 2000-2005, plan outlay and budget provision on different short term

measures were as under:

(Rupees in crore)

2000-

2005

Sl. Scheme Plan

outlay

Budget Expen- Saving

Percentage

No. 2000-

05

provision diture allotment

to


187 | P a g e

outlay

1 On going

embankment

14.76 1.50 1.50 NIL 10

2 Raising/strengthening

of

83.63 20.51 20.51 NIL 25

embankments

3 Anti-erosion works 245.53 326.75 321.26 5.49 133

4 Drainage works 77.25 10.13 8.73 1.40 13

5 All weather road on 83.02 9.86 9.72 0.14 14

embankments

Total 504.19 368.75 361.72 7.03

Allocative priorities The funds provided for anti-erosion works was 133 per cent of

the proposed anti-erosion works plan outlay. Thus,

curtailment of plan outlay in the budget of the Department in

respect of flood protection measures other than anti-erosion

works resulted in marginal achievement of target fixed by the

Department and the Tenth Five Year Plan, as shown below:

Embankments

schemes

Status

as

2000-01 to 2004-

05

Target

as

proposed

under

10th

Five

Year

Plan

(200207)

(In km)

on

March

2000

Target

for

addition

Status

as on

March

2005

Completed scheme 2873.37 Nil 2873.37


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km Km

On-Going scheme 557.10

km

36.00 557.10

Km

Total length of

embankments

3430.47

km

36.00

3430.47

Km

1880

Raising/Strengthening

of embankments

Nil 580 Km 123 Km 3082

Drainage works 1.50

lakh

0.61

lakh

0.15

lakh

4.591

lakh

hectare

hectare hectare hectare

All weather roads on

embankments

Nil 590.85 64.15 3300

The Department replied (May 2005) that due to financial constraints, available funds

were mainly utilised for the protection of existing embankments and flood fighting7

works. The Department again stated (October 2005) that anti-erosion works have

their own importance in a flood ravaged State of Bihar. It saves the lives and

properties of the affected areas and due to its emergent nature; it is given priority

over other schemes. The fact remains that during the last decade there has been no

increase in flood protected area of 29.16 lakh hectares. The flood protected area

covers only 42 per cent of the flood prone area (68.80 lakh hectare). Keeping in view

the fact that 30 districts of Bihar are flood prone, the flood protected area needs to be

increased by making investment in construction of embankments, drainage works

and roads on embankments.

Four Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) were implemented at a cost of Rs 86.69

crore out of which three CSS (Flood Protection Works: Rs 3.88 crore; Maintenance

of Flood Protection Works of Kosi: Rs 26.38 crore; and Flood Proofing Scheme: Rs

5.02 crore) valuing Rs 35.28 crore were examined.

Inadequate utilisation of Central funds Due to lack of initiative, schemes were not

sanctioned Platforms constructed in flood prone areas were not as per GOI

guidelines

3.1.8 Flood Protection Works


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Under Centrally sponsored schemes, raising/strengthening of the existing

embankment on four rivers (Lalbakeya, Bagmati, Kamla and Khando) were taken up

during 1998-99. However, State Government proposed the scheme on only three

rivers . The GOI sanctioned grant of Rs 8.68 crore (October 1999) only for two

schemes (Lalbekya and Bagmati) and released Rs 6.30 crore during 2001-03. Against

this, only Rs 3.88 crore was utilised and the scheme remained incomplete as of

March 2005. The Department replied (May 2005) that the remaining work of

Lalbekya embankment will be taken up this year and the proposal for Bagmati

embankment was under consideration of GFCC.

Flood protection schemes on Kamla river was not sanctioned by the GOI as of

March 2005 though GFCC had submitted its proposal in December 2001. The

Department in its reply said (May 2005) that for Kamla embankment, the scheme

has been submitted to the GFCC while viability/ necessity of the Khando scheme

will be decided after investigation.

Under the scheme of maintenance of flood protection works on Kosi, expenditure

initially incurred by the State Government was fully reimbursed by Central

Government as grant. Rupees 26.38 crore were spent on completion of 231 anti-

erosion works under the scheme taken up during 20002005. Against this, only Rs

22.84 crore were reimbursed by GOI which led to extra burden of Rs 3.54 crore on

State exchequer. The Department replied (May 2005) that the State Government is

pursuing (May 2005) the matter with the Central Government to reimburse the

balance amount.

3.1.9 Flood proofing schemes

The scheme aims to save lives of people from heavy floods by constructing earthen

brick soled platforms 0.6 meter above the flood level. Audit noticed that the

platforms constructed were not as per the GOI guidelines and also lacked civic

amenities. Besides, out of one hundred flood proofing schemes sanctioned at a cost

of Rs. 11.31 crore, due to non-availability of land only 69 schemes were taken up at

an estimated cost of Rs 8.82 crore against which expenditure of Rs 5.02 crore was

incurred by the State Government during March 1992 to March 2002. No further

funds after 2002 were released by the GOI due to non-submission of utilisation

certificate.

3.1.10 Anti-erosion works

Every year (after floods, from October) a high level committee headed by Zonal

Chief Engineers (CE) has to submit the proposals of anti-erosion works to the

Technical Advisory Committee which submits its report to the Scheme Review


190 | P a g e

Committee and finally to State Flood Control Board for approval.

However it was found that only 1542 (45 per cent) of anti-erosion works valued Rs

319.75 crore (12 per cent) of the estimated value during 2002-05 were approved by

the SFCB out of the proposals originally submitted by the Zonal Chief Engineers

(Refer Appendix-XXX).

There was nothing on record to show that proposals submitted by CE were arranged

in order of priority based on survey of vulnerable points.

In their reply the Department stated (October 2005) that anti-erosion works were

executed on the basis of techno-economic viability in view of the resources available

at the State level. However, no specific prioritisation of anti-erosion works which

were to be executed before every flood was found on the records of the Department.

During 2000-05 against provision of Rs 110.50 crore to 12 test checked Divisions for

execution of 324 anti-erosion works expenditure of Rs 98.54 crore was incurred out

of which 129 anti-erosion works (expenditure Rs 57.74 crore) were test checked. The

deficiencies noticed are discussed below:

1. 3.1.11 There was avoidable expenditure of Rs 6.26 crore in three Divisions8

due to delay in execution of works. In Champaran Embankment Division (Motihari)

failure to execute anti erosion works on the embankment resulted in expenditure of

Rs 3.79 crore instead of the original estimate of Rs 74.15 lakh. In Padrauna Division,

due to non-approval of raising the height of spur before 2003 floods by SRC the

estimated cost of work went up from Rs 31.14 lakh to Rs 2.10 crore. In Lalganj

Division during the flood season of 2001 the Bihar State Construction Corporation

failed to supply boulders in time and complete the work as per specifications for

which it received Rs 1.97 crore. As a result anti-erosion works had to be redone at a

cost of Rs 1.35 crore.

2. 3.1.12 Incomplete works

In three Divisions, there was infructuous expenditure of Rs 2.52 crore on four works

executed by these Divisions due to works remaining incomplete.

Incomplete scheme

Sl.

No.

Name of

Division

Name of

work and

year

Infructuous/

wasteful/

doubtful

expenditure

Remarks

(Rupees in

lakh)


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1 Western

Flood

Embankment

Division,

Kunauli

Restoration

work of nose

apron of spur

at 2.25 km of

WFE (2001-

02)

97.00 The work was

left incomplete

after spending

Rs 40.00 lakh

and flood

fighting works

of Rs 57 lakh

was also carried

out at the same

point during

2001-05.

Sl.

No.

Name of

Division

Name of work

and year

Infructuous/

wasteful/

doubtful

expenditure

Remarks

(Rupees in

lakh)

2 Flood

Control

Division,

Dalsingsarai

Anti-erosion

work between

1255 and 2025

metre of left

bank of river

Ganga

(February

2004)

55.51 The work was

left incomplete

after spending

Rs 2.11 crore

and flood

fighting works

of Rs 55.51

lakh were


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carried out by

the Division.

Further the

incomplete

work was

included in the

next year AE

work at a cost

of Rs 3.27

crore.

3 Champaran

Embankment

Division,

Motihari

Anti-erosion

works between

54 miles and

56 miles at

Nagdaha of

Champaran

Embankment

(April 2001)

29.77 The work was

left incomplete.

Anti-erosion

works between

54 miles and

56 miles at

Nagdaha of

Champaran

Embankment

(April 2004)

56.96 The work was

left incomplete

because non-

acquisition of

required land.

In their reply regarding Champaran Embankment Division, Motihari the

Department stated (October 2005) that the executed anti-erosion work (in 2000-01)

was damaged during flood and the payment beyond Rs 29.77 lakh for work done

was held up. The Department also clarified that land acquisition involves

cumbersome and lengthy procedure. Keeping these factors in view the Department

should not have initiated flood protection works in area where formalities for

acquisition of land had not been completed.

The Department also stated that due to changes in river courses and unpredictable

behavior regarding the intensity and angle of attack on critical points make it

necessary to supplement the executed AE works with flood fighting works. The

Department failed to reply to the point raised by audit that even after spending

substantial amount on AE, the works were left incomplete.


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3.1.13 Improper execution of work

Restoration of service road valuing Rs 50 lakh on West Kosi Main Canal (WKMC)

embankment from 0 to 4.23 km was allotted by the Head Works Division, Birpur on

March 2003, to a contractor who had no valid labour license on the date of

finalisation of tender. Further the contractor used substandard bricks (compressive

strength 70 kg/cm2

) worth Rs 15 lakh instead of 100A graded bricks (having

compressive strength 100 kg/cm2

) and delayed the work for almost one and half

years. However, payment of Rs 50 lakh was made (September 2004) to the

contractor.

3.1.14 Execution of work without model testing

Fifteen Spurs9

costing Rs 16 crore were constructed during 2000-2004 without

conducting any investigation and model testing though it was required as per the

recommendations of the KHLC (every year) and its project report (November 2001).

It was further noticed by audit that two spurs valuing Rs 2.25 crore (constructed by

FCD, Karhagola during 2001-02) were damaged during flood 2002 and in

restoration work of these two spurs, the Division incurred Rs 2.48 crore before the

flood of 2003.

Department replied (May 2005) that in emergencies, model test of spur in span of

two months was not possible. The reply is not tenable because as per the working

calendar of WRD, the work for next year's flood protection should commence from

16th October and should be completed by 14th June of the following year. Therefore

adequate time is available to plan and execute flood protection works.

3.1.15 Stores management

Deficiencies like misappropriation, extra cost in procurement of materials and non-

maintenance of records regarding stock noticed in 12 test-checked Divisions were as

under:

Western Flood Embankment (WFE) Division, Kunauli had paid Rs 22 lakh

(through proforma bill) to suppliers against the supply of 107 MT Black Annealed

Wire during 2001-05. But the Division had no records relating to the receipt and use

of these materials in the works executed by the Division.

The Division purchased 19371 m3

boulders (valuing Rs 1.24 crore) between July

2002 and April 2003. However only 17199 M3

boulders were used in 26 anti-erosion

and flood fighting works (out of 52 AE/ FF works) executed by the Division during

July 2002 to March 2005. As per the records of the Division only 574 m3

boulders

was balance in the stock instead of 2172 m3

. The shortage of 1598 m3

boulders


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valuing Rs 10.27 lakh could not be explained by the Division.

3.1.16 Impact analysis

During 2000-2005 expenditure on flood relief was Rs 178.58 crore (ranging from Rs

21.18 crore to Rs 62.71 crore each year) and the extent of total damages caused by

flood during 2000-2005 were as under :

(Rupees in crore)

Year Affected

population

(in lakh)

Total

damage

Relief paid

to public

2000-01 82.41 1558.92 21.44

2001-02 90.91 1005.80 42.26

2002-03 160.18 2813.44 62.71

2003-04 81.61 143.93 21.18

2004-05 212.51 2215.68 30.99

Total 627.62 7737.77 178.58

(Source: Relief and Rehabilitation Department, Government of Bihar)

The WRD failed to increase the length of its existing embankments and there was

marginal achievement on raising/strengthening of embankments (only 123 km) and

construction of all weather roads on embankments (only 64.15 km) during 2000-05.

Though Rs 710 crore (including establishment) were spent (2000-2005) on

maintenance of embankments and anti-erosion works, incidence of floods increased

considerably and loss due to floods had been increasing progressively from Rs 1559

crore in 2000-2001 to Rs 2216 crore in 2004-05.

3.1.17 Manpower management

As per the norms of the Government (1987) one works Division required six

Engineers and 67 others staff (including Junior Engineers) for maintenance of 720

Km of embankment and five Divisions was to be supervised by one circle office.

In the State total length of embankments is only 3430 Km (up to 2004-2005). For

maintenance of these embankments only five Divisions and one circle office was

required as per norms. Against this 48 Divisions and 19 circle offices were being

operated. This resulted in excess deployment of 330 Engineers and 342 subordinate

staff involving payment of Rs 223.80 crore on their pay and allowances during 2000-

05.


195 | P a g e

The Department replied (May 2005), that a proposal to abolish three Divisions and

reducing the total number of staff including Engineers to 46 in each Division has

been sent for the consent of the Finance Department.

3.1.18 Monitoring

The monitoring circle headed by a Superintending Engineer under Engineer-in-Chief

was responsible for co-ordination and monitoring of schemes with the assistance of

four Executive Engineers and five Assistant Engineers. BSFCB and GFCC were also

entrusted to monitor implementation of Centrally sponsored schemes. Though the

Department has an established mechanism for monitoring, execution of work

without model testing, delay in execution of work and use of substandard material

could not be avoided indicating lack of monitoring control.

3.1.19 Conclusions

The WRD mainly executed anti-erosion works and the plan allocations in the State

budget on construction of new embankments, raising/strengthening of existing

embankments and construction of all weather roads on embankments were curtailed

which resulted in only marginal achievement of targets set for 2000-05 in respect of

Raising and strengthening of embankments, Drainage works and embankments. The

physical progress in the implementation of short term measures like strengthening of

embankments and drainage has been far below the target fixed by the Department

and Tenth Five Year plan. The impact of flood protection works on containing the

damage to life and property was not felt as a sizable population continued to be

affected by floods and the incidence of damage to the property was also on the rise

during the period 2000-05.

Recommendations

Due to heavy reliance on anti-erosion schemes to protect the existing embankments, the

flood control infrastructure viz. construction of embankments and platforms, drainage

schemes have not been adequately funded during 2000-2005.

The Department needs to prioritise anti-erosion works to ensure that critical works

required to protect embankments do not get left out.

Execution of works should be completed within the working season (October to June).

The Department should rationalise its manpower as per norms.

The matter was referred to Government (July 2005); their reply (October 2005) has

been suitably incorporated.

PANCHAYAT RAJ AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT

Improper planning of drinking water scheme in Bibinagar, Andhra Pradesh.


196 | P a g e

Improper selection of water source for a comprehensive water supply scheme had

deprived the targeted habitations in Bibinagar area (Nalgonda District) of fluoride

free drinking water. This also rendered the entire outlay of Rs 24.80 crore on the

scheme unfruitful.

Government of India sanctioned (February 1998) a comprehensive protected water

supply scheme under the Centrally Sponsored Scheme 'Rajiv Gandhi National

Drinking Water Mission' to provide safe drinking water to 115 fluoride-affected

habitations in Bibinagar (Nalgonda District) at a cost of Rs 26.77 crore.

For this purpose, the Chief Engineer, Rural Water Supplies (CE-RWS) proposed

(November 1998) to draw water from two minor irrigation (MI) tanks at Bibinagar

and Bhongir, and Chinna Musi. When consulted by the Government (December

1998), the District Collector opined that this was possible only after increasing the

capacities30

of the two tanks and constructing storage reservoir across Chinna Musi.

State Government approved the water supply scheme in March 1999 reducing the

scope from 115 to 108 habitations31

in the revised proposal. Although the work was

completed (outlay: Rs 24.80 crore32

) in March 2002 except for some minor works

estimated to cost Rs 22.13 lakh, the scheme could not be commissioned due to non-

availability of water.

Scrutiny revealed that the CE (RWS), while selecting the water source, did not take

into consideration the actual water levels33

of the MI tanks during the preceding three

years, which were far below the full tank level (FTL). The actual ayacut in the

surrounding areas of the MI tanks was also far less than Since the MI tanks could not

be used as the water source for the project, the Superintending Engineer (RWS)

proposed (September 2002) to draw water from the ongoing Nalgonda Rural

Drinking Water Supply (NRDWS) project by extending its pipeline to the Bibinagar

scheme at an additional estimated cost of Rs 7 crore. The work was proposed to be

executed34

in phase IV of the NRDWS project, for which tenders were finalised (June

2005) and targeted for completion by March 2006. Meanwhile the water supply

network constructed with an expenditure of Rs 24.80 crore remained idle and the

objective of providing fluoride free water was not achieved.

Thus, due to improper planning by the ENC (PR) and the CE (RWS), the objective

of the scheme remains unfulfilled rendering the whole outlay of Rs 24.80 crore35

unfruitful.

The matter was referred to Government in December 2004 followed by a reminder in

July 2005; reply had not been received (December 2005)

Performance of the Villupuram district Administration in selected areas, School

education, Health & Family Welfare, Municipal Administration & Water supply

& Social welfare Department, Tamil Nadu.


197 | P a g e

Highlights

Villupuram District is one of the backward districts in the State and ranked 28th

among the

29 districts in the State in terms of human development index. As district head, District

Collector accords administrative sanction for the release of funds under various schemes

and the monitoring authority for them. Even three years after the issue of guidelines by the

State Planning Commission, neither District Development Plan nor the Annual Plans had

been prepared. Though the target for enrolment in respect of primary classes was 100 per

cent with no dropout under Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, 4116 children were not enrolled in

primary classes as of March 2004 and dropout rate was six per cent in 2003-04. The couple

protection rate in the district stood at 43 per cent in 2003 as against the State level

achievement of 50 per cent and Ninth Five Year Plan goal of 70 per cent. Government had

not considered upgradation of more number of Primary Health Centres on priority basis

despite the backwardness of the district in terms of health indicators. 68 per cent of the

rural habitations, 75 per cent of the TownPanchayats and all the Municipalities in the

district were not providing adequate quantity of safe water.

(Paragraphs 3.1.60 to 3.1.63)

Provision of safe drinking water

1. 3.1.54 Review of this sector revealed (a) 68 per cent of Rural Habitations, 75

per cent of Town Panchayats and all Municipalities in the district did not provide

required quantity of safe water and (b) no augmentation work was taken up to meet

the increasing demand due to rapid growth of population and diminishing yield of

water in the existing sources, as discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

2. 3.1.55 Ninth Five Year Plan envisaged provision of safe drinking water to

cover all habitations including all the water quality-affected habitations and to

monitor the water quality under surveillance system. According to the existing

national norms, all rural habitations, Town Panchayats and Municipalities were to

be provided with safe water at the rate of 40,70 and 90 litres per capita per day

(LPCD) respectively.

3. 3.1.56 The numbers of rural habitations in the district and availability of safe

drinking water therein, as of March 2004, were as follows:

4. 3.1.59 As seen from the above, 75 per cent Town Panchayats and

allMunicipalities did not provide the required quantity of safe drinking water

(September 2004). Government stated (January 2005) that water supply

improvement schemes are now under execution in urban areas and on their

completion all the towns in the district will be provided with the required quantity of

safe drinking water.


198 | P a g e

Chapter III – Performance Reviews

Provision of Safe Drinking Water in urban areas

1. 3.1.60 In Villupuram municipal area the quantity of water supply ranged

from 25 to 45 LPCD against the norm of 90 LPCD.

2. 3.1.61 A major augmentation work was carried out in 1968 at a cost of Rs

26.05 lakh in Villupuram municipal area. However, no major augmentation work

was taken up subsequently to meet the increasing demand due to rapid growth of

population and diminishing yield of water in the existing sources.

3. 3.1.62 Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage (TWAD) Board prepared a

project proposal (October 1997) at a cost of Rs 12.23 crore to augment water supply

by one crore litres per day without ascertaining the capability of the municipality to

bear the expenditure. The Municipal Council, which discussed the proposal (March

1998), resolved to approach Government for 100 per cent grant to implement the

scheme, as the Municipality did not have enough resources to meet the project cost

and the recurring expenditure towards maintenance and repayment of loans. The

proposal was dropped after four years and a new proposal with lower cost (Rs 6.84

crore) was prepared and approved by TWAD Board in August 2002. As the

Municipal Council didnot meet for more than two years, no decision was taken on

the above Scheme as of February 2004.

4. 3.1.63 Government stated (January 2005) that the matter is being perused to

ensure early implementation of the scheme.

Construction of Baby Friendly Toilets in Anganwadi Centres

1. 3.1.69 Government sanctioned (January 2002) construction of 1575 Baby

Friendly Toilets in 21 districts at an estimated cost of Rs 4500 per toilet. Seventy five

toilets had been proposed for construction in three blocks of Villupuram District at

the rate of 25 toilets per Block. The construction of toilets was to be completed

within two months from the date of release of funds. The execution of the work was

entrusted to the concerned Block Development Officers (BDOs). The Project Co-

ordinator WBA ICDS-III Project released (May 2002) to the District Collector,

Villupuram Rs 1.69 lakh as 50 per cent advance for construction of 75 toilets in the

above three Blocks and the amount was kept in Savings Bank Account. After a delay

of morethan a year, the amount was distributed (June 2003) equally (Rs 56250 each)

to the three Blocks by the Project Officer, District Rural Development Agency

(DRDA) for execution of works. The balance amount of Rs 1.69 lakh was released in


199 | P a g e

June 2004. Thus, delay in release of funds had led to delay in starting/completing the

works.

2. 3.1.70 Out of 75 toilets, 54 had been completed, 15 were under progress and

six were not commenced as of September 2004. Programme Officer, WBA ICDS-III

Project, Villupuram reported (September 2004) that out of 54 completed toilets, 14

toilets constructed in one block (Tiruvennainallur) have alone been taken over by

Anganwadi Centres and the balance 40 completed toilets had not been taken over

due to incomplete/defective construction (seven), non provision of water facilities

and not handed over by the BDO (14). Thus, the scheme sanctioned in January 2002

was yet to be completed fully (September 2004).

Defective execution of works for augmentation of the sewerage system and its

poor maintenance by the Tamil Nadu water supply and Drainage Board.

4.1.2 Unfruitful expenditure on a sewerage scheme

Defective execution of works for augmentation of the sewerage system and its

poor maintenance defeated the objective of prevention of pollution of Ooty

lake despite expenditure of Rs 12.45 crore. Besides, Rs 1.42 crore was spent for

cleaning the lake.

To prevent pollution to the lake at Udhagamandalam (Ooty) by leakages from the

existing sewerage system and raw sewage from the uncovered areas through

Kodappamund Channel, the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board


200 | P a g e

(Board) completed the work of Restricted Sewerage Scheme (RSS) in November

1998 at a cost of Rs 12.45 crore. The Municipality was reluctant to take over the

scheme for maintenance as there were defects in the planning and execution of the

scheme as detailed below:

The level of water closets in houses was below the level of sewerage lines laid.

Collapse of manholes.

� Hydraulic testing of the sewer system was not done and joints were not plugged

properly.

� Board had neither repaired nor relaid the existing old drainage system and

trunk sewers.

There was no main trunk sewer for linking drainage connection. However, the

Municipality had to take over (October 2000) the scheme on the directions of the

Government and spent Rs 13 lakh during 2001 to 2003 to carry out rectification

works such as inter-linking the sewers, laying parallel sewer along the existing

sewers to increase the capacity and construction of a weir to divert flow of the

Kodappamund Channel into a collection well for onward transmission to

treatment plant.

Scrutiny by Audit revealed the following:

(a) The Board had under RSS made provision for sewerage connections to only

3960 houses as assessed in April 1993. Due to omission of certain dwelling houses

and addition of new houses subsequently, 5000 house connections were not

covered by the Municipality. Consequently, against the designed sewage

collection of 8.32 million litres per day (mld) in 2001, the actual sewage collected

was only 2.96 mld. Thus, the system was not put to optimum use. The Board

decided to implement another underground drainage scheme and appointed a

consultant in December 2003 for preparation of detailed Project Report.

(b) Improper connections between houses and street sewers made by the

Municipality resulted in sullage from houses in some areas discharging directly

into the Channel.

(c) As the pipes laid by the Municipality to divert the flow from Kodappamund

Channel were at a higher level, they require be dismantling and rectifying.


201 | P a g e

(d) There was back flow of sewage into the lake as the pumps at the collection

well were not operated during night hours.

(e) As there was continuous flow of pollutants in the lake, Public Works

Department (PWD) was entrusted with the work of cleaning of the lake through

Bio-remediation technique. The PWD took up cleaning work and spent Rs 1.42

crore upto March 2004.

Government stated (October 2004) that the defects in the execution of the scheme

were rectified by the Municipality and construction of the weir across the

Kodappamund Channel prevented the entry of sullage water into the lake.

Government further contended that all the houses in the scheme area were given

sewerage connection and the sewage generated by the present population of 58000

in the scheme area was treated and pollution is completely prevented in the lake.

The contention of the Government is not tenable as:

(i) the PWD reported (December 2003) to the Municipality that the purpose

of construction of weir was defeated due to its defective execution,

(ii) the Secretary, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department after

his visit to Ooty in September 2003 directed the District Collector (December

2003) that the remaining 5000 houses‟ service connections should be given by

February 2004,

(iii) as against the sewage of 5.20 mld generated by the present population of

58000 and the sewage generated by the floating population, only three mld were

treated under the scheme and

(iv) the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board observed (April 2004) that unless the

flow of raw sewage through the Kodappamund Channel was stopped, the

pollution of the lake would continue.

Thus, due to defective execution of the sewerage system by the Board and poor

maintenance by the Municipality, the main objective of preventing pollution of

Ooty lake was not achieved even after spending Rs 12.45 crore.


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Performance Audit of Management of projects relating to utilisation and

conservation of soil and water undertaken by institutes of Indian Council of

Agricultural Research (2004) revealed that objectives of the projects undertaken

were not achieved, there was improper maintenance of national register of soil

series and there was non-documentation of traditional wisdom.

Unfruitful expenditure on a sanitary sewerage scheme, Development and

planning department, West Bengal.

Revision of the comprehensive drainage and sewerage scheme at Digha without

assessing the availability of funds and failure of the department in timely

execution of the project resulted in unfruitful expenditure of Rs 4.63 crore and the

objective of averting pollution of sea-water and environment remained

unfulfilled.

With a view to protecting a population size of 7000 to 17000 from pollution hazards

at Digha and preventing pollution of sea-water adjacent to the shore, a

comprehensive drainage and sewerage scheme, known as “sanitary sewerage

scheme” was sanctioned (September 1996) by the Development and Planning

Department at an estimated cost of Rs 4.09 crore. Executive Engineer (EE) Tamluk

Division of Public Health Engineering (PHE) Directorate, being the executive

agency, started execution of work in 1996-1997. The target date for commissioning

of the project was March 2003. After laying about 22 per cent of the sewer line, the

work was suspended in 1997 due to severe sand boiling and heavy seepage of water

in some locations. Consequently, after redesign of sewer line (July 1999) the work

was resumed in March 2000 and continued up to March 2003. An amount of Rs 4.09

crore, released by the Department between September 1996 and March 2003, was

spent besides incurring further liability of Rs 0.54 lakh. By that time, merely 20 per

cent of the total target area was covered by the sewerage line.

To complete the project as well as to cover a larger population, a revised project, to

be completed in three phases, was proposed (June 2003) by PHE Department and a

new estimate was drawn up for Rs 6.10 crore for first phase including Rs 4.09 crore

already spent and Rs 2.22 crore for second phase on the ground of price escalation

on account of labour and material, revision of sewer design, etc. The estimate for the

third phase was to be prepared later. The estimate was, however, not vetted or

administratively approved so far.

As there was hardly any scope for provisioning of further funds from Government,

the department proposed for taking up the matter with the Housing and Urban

Development Corporation (HUDCO) for financing the scheme. Till July 2004 no

further development towards either completion of the project or arrangement of


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funds was noticed and pollution hazards at Digha persisted due to non-

commissioning of the project.

Thus, the objective of averting pollution of sea-water was not achieved due to failure

of the department in timely execution and drawing up a revised project without

assessing fund availability. The expenditure of Rs 4.63 crore on the incomplete

project remained unfruitful affecting both tourism and environment.

Government stated (February 2005) that the sewerage scheme would be put to

use after the funds were available.

In Orissa, review of provision of safe drinking water in one district of (2004)

showed that urban areas received less water than required. Nearly 15 per cent rural

habitations did not have water supply system. Only 25 per cent population of the

habitations covered under water supply system had piped water supply, the

remaining 75 per cent depended on tube wells/sanitary wells where the safety

aspect of the water was not ensured.


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Implementation of Welfare Schemes in Ganjam District

Highlights

Ganjam district comprises three sub-divisions, 22 blocks and 3171 villages covering an area of

8200 square kilometer with 32 lakh population. Chatrapur is its headquarters and Berhampur, the

main commercial centre. The population with a male female ratio 1:1 has 63 per cent literacy rate

and 55 per cent of its population (3.02 lakh families) live below the poverty line (BPL) according

to a survey in 1997.

Review of implementation of various welfare programmes relating to poverty alleviation, launch

of primary education, drinking water facility and primary health care in the district for the period

1999-2004 revealed the following.

Since the progress made by the States in supply of safe drinking water was not satisfactory,

Government of India (GOI) re-introduced in 1997-98 the Accelerated Rural Water Supply

(ARWS) Programme to provide access to safe drinking water within 1.6 km of all rural

habitations. The habitations were planned to be covered under tube wells (TW) / Sanitary wells

(SW). This could be augmented by introduction of piped water supply (PWS) schemes in the

areas affected by water quality problems or having inadequate quantity of water from TW. The

GOI provides hundred per cent assistance in the form of grants.

Two Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (RWSS) divisions at Berhampur and Bhanjanagar under

the Chief Engineer, RWSS were responsible for rural water supply in Ganjam district. Besides,

the District Water and Sanitation Mission (DWSM) set up in October 2000 under the Sector

Reform Programme (SRP) also undertook the rural water supply. The responsibility for urban

water supply rested with two Public Health Divisions at Berhampur and Chatrapur under the

control of the Chief Engineer, Public Health. The working of all these units was reviewed in audit

to ascertain the availability of drinking water supply in the district.

The review revealed that the pace of coverage was slow, quality of water was not ensured and

quantity of water supply was inadequate as discussed below:

3.3.15 Insufficient coverage of habitations

The amount spent on the rural water supply schemes during 1999-2004 was Rs.25.80 crore

against the allotment of Rs.28.59 crore excluding the expenditure incurred under the SRP. Of the

above allocations, Rs.28.41 lakh remained parked (since 1999-2000) in Civil Deposit as of March

2004.

The ARWS programme envisaged supply of one spot source for every 250 people by sinking

TW/SW while PWS was to be the additional source. The table below provides the details of

coverage of habitations in Ganjam district.


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Fully covered habitations

Period 1 April

1999 31

March 2004

Total

number of

habitations

5354*

6329*

Covered by TW/SW

Covered by PWS

5255 88 5395 337

Covered

by both

TW and

PWS 88

337

Total

covered

5255

5395

Balance

99 934

Thus, 934 (15 per cent) of the 6329 rural habitations were without any source of drinking water.

It could also be seen from the above that only 140 habitations were covered during 1999-2004

averaging 28 habitations per year. Even at double the above rate of coverage, 934 habitations

would take more than 16 years to cover. A time bound action plan to provide drinking water to

these habitations at the earliest was required.

When a spot source was found defunct in a fully covered habitation, the habitation was classified

as Turned NIL (TN) or Turned Partial (TP). Of the 5395 fully covered habitations, 314 (5.82 per

cent) turned nil and 742 (13.75 per cent) were partial. Out of these, 250 TN and 333 TP were

repaired/replaced with new ones, leaving 64 TN and 409 TP unattended as of March 2004. No

specific time bound plan had been prepared to undertake repairs to these 473 defunct sources.

3.3.16 Quality of water not ensured

The ARWS programme envisaged a system of quality monitoring and surveillance to ensure the

potability of water. It was noticed that of the 15849 tube wells sunk in the district during 1993-

2004, analytical test of water samples of only 3403 tube wells (21 per cent) could be carried out

during the said period. The test results indicated that the water discharged from 470 tube wells,

intended for 1.18 lakh population, was not safe for drinking due to either excessive iron content

(in 435 TWs) or chloride content (in 35 TWs). Thus, 470 TWs constructed at Rs.1.86 crore (at the

rate of Rs.39500 per TW) could not provide safe drinking water. Though the affected people were

to be provided with safe drinking water under the “Sub-mission project25

”, only seven PWS were

taken up covering 0.38 lakh population of which three were completed as of March 2004

covering 0.18 lakh population. Thus, quality of water in respect of 12446 TWs meant for the rest

of the population remained untested as of March 2004. As is evident from above, the water

testing was grossly inadequate as it was done on the samples from only 21 per cent of tube wells

in a decade. The safety of water from 79 per cent of the tube wells was yet to be confirmed

although the water from these TWs were being consumed by the people.

3.3.17 Inadequate supply of drinking water

The requirement of water was 40 litres per day per individual. With normal output of 12 litres per

minute, one hand pump was to cater to 250 persons. Accordingly, habitations were identified for

supply of drinking water. The table below provides details of total TW/SW available in the


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district.

Period Tube Wells

(TWs)

Sanitary Wells

(SWs) Total

As on 1 April 1999 12621 115 12736

As on 31 March

2004 15849 251 16100

During the five years, 3364 new TW/SW were sunk but 1147 TW/SW meant for 2.87 lakh

population became defunct. Thus, there was a net addition of 2217 TW/SW. As pointed out in the

foregoing paragraphs, the TW/SW sunk so far did not cover 934 habitations. Besides, water

shortages were experienced due to depletion in water levels in summer leading to consumption of

contaminated water from ponds. Neither any statistics relating to habitation-wise actual water

shortage nor any plan for its elimination was available.

The table below provides the details of Piped Water Supply (PWS) projects in the district.

Period Number of Number of Population covered

as on completed

projects

habitations

covered

1 April 1999 36 PWS 88 1.60 lakh

31 March 2004 275 PWS 337 6.34 lakh

During the five year period, the coverage of population through PWS increased substantially from

1.60 lakh to 6.34 lakh people (nearly 25 per cent of rural population26

). An amount of Rs.31.16

crore (SRP: Rs.17.22 crore and RWSS Divisions: Rs.13.93 crore) was spent on 239 newly

completed PWS. Another 33 PWS projects intended to benefit 1.32 lakh people were at various

stages of completion as of March 2004.

It was further observed that nine fully completed PWS projects (Rs.1.20 crore) covering 0.31 lakh

population were not commissioned for a period ranging from two to 14 months as of March 2004

due to non-energisation of pump houses though the amounts were deposited with the electricity

distribution company.


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3.3.18 Sector Reform Programme (SRP)

The District Water and Sanitation Mission (DWSM), Ganjam was registered as an NGO under

the Societies Act in October 2000 to implement the SRP. The reforms under the SRP were

moving towards a decentralised, demandresponsive27

, cost-sharing and community-friendly

system.

Implementation of the project under SRP required the beneficiaries to share a part (at least 10 per

cent in case of general and five per cent in case of SC/ST habitation) of the capital cost. A sum of

Rs.25.44 crore (GOI grant: Rs.22.44 crore, beneficiaries’ share: Rs.2.40 crore and interest:

Rs.0.60 crore) was received by the DWSM between year 2001 and 2003 against which Rs.24.91

crore were spent on start up, IEC28

, human resources development, hardware (PWS/TW/SW) and

administration. As of April 2004, all the 184 piped Water Supply schemes taken up by DWSM

were completed covering a population of 2.52 lakh.

Audit team visited two villages where PWS schemes were implemented by the DWSM. The PWS

scheme at Balibagada was completed at a cost of Rs.7.94 lakh (community contribution: Rs.0.80

lakh) and another at Turum at a cost of Rs 15.07 lakh (community contribution: Rs.1.56 lakh).

The villagers were found satisfied with the drinking water facility made available to them under

the SRP. The SRP, being demand driven and based on community participation, ought to be a

promising solution to the water supply problem.

3.3.19 Urban water supply

Urban area in Ganjam district comprised one municipality and 17 notified area councils with

approximate population of 6.10 lakh as of March 2004. The responsibility for water supply to

urban areas rested with the two Public Health Engineering Divisions at Berhampur and

Chatrapur. The divisions incurred an expenditure of Rs 42.14 crore on urban water supply during

19992004. The drinking water in 18 ULB areas was supplied through PWS schemes (household

water connections and public stand-posts) and TW. The number of stand-posts had gone up from

2817 in April 1999 to 3062 in March 2004. The corresponding figures for TW stood at 1424 and

2088 respectively.

It was observed that out of 18 ULBs in Ganjam district, 14 ULBs with a total population of 5.8

lakh were not supplied with minimum water as per the norms of GoI. Against the minimum

requirement of 742 lakh litres of water per day, these 14 ULBs29

were provided with 466 lakh

litres (nearly 63 per cent of the requirement) of water. The divisions attributed (June 2004) the

shortfall to inadequate water source and infrastructure. The Chatrapur division had taken up

(2001-02) augmentation work of water supply in three out of 14 ULBs (Hinjilicut, Khallikote and

Rambha) at a cost of Rs.2.94 crore. However, no such steps were taken under the Berhampur

division. Adequate action had not been initiated to recover arrears of water tax of Rs.94 lakh from

water connection holders in the urban areas.


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3.3.20 Conclusions

The supply of drinking water still remained a problem area in the district. Urban areas received

less water than required. Nearly 15 per cent rural habitations did not have water supply system.

Only 25 per cent population of the habitations covered under water supply system had PWS, the

remaining 75 per cent depended on TW/SW where the safety aspect of the water was not ensured.

Recommendations

• Drinking water supply to the new habitations needs to be speeded up. Testing of water quality

of the tube wells needed to be ensured before water consumption started.

The matter was demi-officially referred (July 2004) to the Principal Secretaries/Secretaries

of the concerned departments. Reply had not been received (November 2004) except from

the Planning and Co-ordination Department.


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Review of the availability of safe drinking water in Jharkhand .

Government of India (GOI) introduced in 1997-98 the Accelerated Rural Water Supply

(ARWS) to provide access to safe drinking water within 1.6 km. of all rural habitation. The

habitations were planned to be covered under tube wells (TW)/sanitary wells (SW). Piped

water supply schemes were also introduced in the area affected by water quality problem.

The Executive Engineer, Drinking Water and Sanitation (Civil) Division and Drinking

Water and Sanitation (Mechanical) Division, Dumka under the control of Chief Engineer,

Drinking Water and Sanitation are responsible for providing safe drinking water to the

people of Dumka district.

The review revealed that quality of water was not assured and quantity of water supply was

inadequate.

3.5.42 Quality of water not ensured

The ARWS programme envisaged a system of quality monitoring and surveillance to ensure

the potability of water. It was noticed that analytical test of water samples was not carried

out during 2001-2004, although a sum of Rs 0.43 lakh was allotted (September 2003) for

conducting bacteriological test but the entire amount was surrendered in 2003-04. The

Divisional Officer stated (July 2004) that due to non-posting of laboratory assistant, funds

allotted could not be utilised. Thus quality of water in respect of 14393 tube wells remained

untested as of July 2004.

Departmental inspection by the Superintending Engineer, Drinking water and Sanitation

Circle, Dumka (October 2003) revealed that Hijla Water filtration plant was in a poor

condition and the water supplied was dirty. It was however, stated by the Executive

Engineer-in charge that no impurity was found in the water. Reply is not acceptable in view

of the findings of Superintending Engineer.

Failure of Kerala Water Authority to monitor the execution of work relating Rural

Water Supply Scheme by Fisheries and water resources, Kerela..

Highlights

Kollam, an old sea port town on the Arabian coast is a land of backwaters. A review of the

Government Departments engaged in the activities of the district viz., availability of safe drinking

water, primary health care and fishing sector revealed several deficiencies such as non-utilisation of

funds, delay in implementation of schemes, shortage of manpower, idling of equipment, etc.

Availability of safe drinking water

3.2.8 The requirements of drinking water in the district were met mainly from open wells,


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tube wells and piped water supply. The Kerala Water Authority (KWA), an autonomous

body, was the agency entrusted with the execution and maintenance of piped water supply

schemes. KWA also executes the water supply schemes sanctioned by the DC for the

benefit of the SC/ST population and that of local bodies as deposit works and maintains

them. In addition, District Panchayats implemented water supply schemes under „Sector

Reforms Project‟ in the district which were maintained by the beneficiary groups of each

scheme.

3.2.9 The implementation of the water supply schemes was reviewed by a test check of the

records in the office of both the KWA divisions, District Collectorate and District

Panchayat. The results of the review are discussed below:

3.2.10 The review revealed that the schemes were not commenced due to non-availability of

land, diversion of loan amount specifically obtained for water supply schemes, unfruitful

expenditure, diversion of funds, failure to ensure quality of drinking water, etc., as described

below:

Schemes executed by Kerala Water Authority

3.2.11 Fourteen water supply schemes were under execution and the expenditure on these

schemes as of March 2004 was Rs 19.22 crore as shown in Appendix XXX. However, only

three schemes were commissioned during the last five years. Of these, the scheme for World

Bank aided Water Supply Scheme to Chithara and adjoining Panchayats commenced in

1986 was completed only in 1999, thus delaying the project by about 10 years. The two

schemes sanctioned in 1991 and 1997 were under various stages of implementation. Work

in respect of remaining nine schemes sanctioned between 1993 and 1999 could not be

started due to non-availability of land.

Non-execution of schemes after availing of loans

3.2.12 KWA raised loans from financial institutions like Life Insurance Corporation of

India (LIC), HUDCO♠

, etc., for the implementation of various ongoing as well as new

schemes. Government accorded sanction between 1995 and 1999 to implement six rural

water supply schemes♦

with loan assistance from LIC in areas where the existing ground

water source was of poor quality. The population to be benefited was 2.06 lakh in the six

villages of the district. The estimated cost of the schemes and the eligible amount of loan

were Rs 49.54 crore and Rs 22.81 crore respectively. Loans released from LIC for these

schemes upto March 2004 amounted to Rs 9.49 crore.

3.2.13 In Rural Water Supply Scheme (RWSS) to Ochira and Karunagappally the original

source and site of treatment plant were changed due to non-availability of land and the new

site for the treatment plant was identified but not taken possession of. But pipes worth Rs

2.21 crore were purchased between March 1998 and October 1999 by KWA though the


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required land was not acquired. Thus the expenditure of Rs 2.21 crore remained idle for

more than four years.

3.2.14 The source of the remaining four RWSS (Chavara, Panmana, Thevalakkara and

Thekkumbhagam) was the existing well of Quilon Water Supply Scheme. The land

required for other common components (water treatment plant, balancing reservoir and 800

mm CI pumping main) was in possession of KWA. However, KWA did not commence the

execution of common components due to non-acquisition of land by KWA for the overhead

tanks for two of the schemes at Chavara and Thevalakkara.

3.2.15 The sanctioning of projects and obtaining loan for its implementation without

ensuring the availability of land for various components was irregular. Out of the loan of Rs

9.49 crore raised at interest rate of 13 per cent, Rs 6.99 crore availed specifically for these six

projects were used as resources for other activities of KWA and the works could not be

started as of June 2004.

Unfruitful Expenditure

3.2.16 The local bodies (beneficiary Panchayats) were to provide land required for the

construction of well-cum-pump house, treatment plant, overhead tank, in respect of cent per

cent centrally sponsored Accelerated Rural Water Supply Schemes (ARWSS). The

following two schemes could not be completed even eight years after the targeted date of

completion due to lack of appropriate and timely action by the Panchayats and KWA and

the expenditure on these projects became unfruitful.

3.2.17 ARWSS to Kulathupuzha and adjoining villages with an estimated cost of Rs 4.18

crore was sanctioned in October 1993. The scheme, targeted to be completed in October

1996, was to benefit four villages of Kulathupuzha, Eroor, Alayamon and Ittiva. The

scheme was taken up as the project area experienced acute scarcity of drinking water and

the villages were identified as problem villages as per criteria fixed by Government of India

(GOI). But the Forest department did not permit any construction in the forest land

identified for the construction of treatment plant, reservoir, etc. An alternative site (1.325

acre) was handed over by the Panchayat in November 2002. The change in site resulted in

deviation from the original plan. But the deviation proposal was not approved by KWA as

of March 2004. The expenditure incurred so far (March 2004) was Rs 1.14 crore for

purchase of pipes (Rs 0.98 crore) and preliminary expenses (Rs 0.16 crore).

3.2.18 Similarly, ARWSS to Pathanapuram and adjoining villages estimated to cost Rs 3.78

crore was sanctioned in October 1993. The scheme, targetted to be completed in October

1996 was to benefit a population of 1.40 lakh in the five villages of Pathanapuram,

Piravanthoor, Pidavoor, Thalavoor and Mylam. The construction of well-cum-pump house

was started in April 1996. While digging the well rock formation was struck. There was no


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provision in the accepted schedule of contract for rock blasting. Hence the work was

stopped in November 1997. The revised estimate was pending approval of the Chief

Engineer. The total expenditure incurred upto March 2004 was Rs 1.14 crore.

3.2.19 The ARWSS to Kottarakkara and adjoining villages was intended to serve a

population of 1.14 lakh in the four Panchayats of Kottarakkara, Melila, Vettikavala and

Vilakkudy. The source was the treated water from “Bilaterally Aided Water Supply Scheme

to Kundara”. Works on the other components were commenced in April 1991 and trial run

started in December 2000. However, the scheme could not be commissioned owing to

insufficient water from the Kundara scheme. As no benefit could be derived the

expenditure of Rs 4.23 crore became nugatory.

3.2.20 KWA may investigate the reasons for the undue delay in implementing these

schemes and action taken against the persons responsible.

Non-implementation of drinking water schemes

3.2.21 Government sanctioned (October 2002) a project on „Basic Sanitation and Drinking

Water Supply Facilities‟, with Special Central Assistance in nine districts including Kollam.

Special Central Assistance of Rs 50 lakh was received (February 2003) for two drinking

water schemes (Rs 40 lakh) and for construction of 10 common sanitation facilities (Rs 10

lakh). This amount was deposited with the Harbour Engineering Department in February

2003. As the LSGIs could not identify the land required for the schemes, the funds

remained unutilised.

3.2.22 The department just passed on the funds meant for the schemes to the Harbour

Engineering Department and the matter was not pursued thereafter. The failure of the

department to ensure providing of required land by the LSGIs and convene beneficiary

committees were also the reasons for non-implementation of the scheme despite availability

of funds.

Delay in implementation of schemes for SC/ST

3.2.23 According to norms, 25 per cent and 10 per cent of the ARWSS funds were to be

utilised for undertaking original water supply schemes for Scheduled Castes (SC) and

Scheduled Tribes (ST) respectively. KWA released Rs 2.11 crore to the DC during the

period from 1 April 1999 to 31 March 2004 for implementation of the SC/ST components

of the scheme. But there was delay upto 18 months in encashing the cheques received from

KWA due to treasury restrictions imposed by Government. The inordinate delay in

implementation of the schemes financed by GOI resulted in non-provision of drinking water

to the SC and ST population.

Diversion of funds meant for the benefit of SC/ST

3.2.24 The repair and maintenance of commissioned water supply schemes was to be met

from the funds of KWA. However, thirty five schemes with an estimated cost of Rs 1.07

crore sanctioned in March 2003 by the DC was for the repair, maintenance and extension


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works. One scheme sanctioned in March 2003 at an estimated cost of Rs 11.80 lakh was

not for SC/ST population which was a violation of the guidelines. The action of DC in

utilising Rs 1.19 crore for purposes not envisaged in the scheme resulted in diversion of

funds.

Poor quality of water

3.2.25 The Quality Control District Laboratory, Kollam was responsible for collection and

analysis of samples from the piped water schemes periodically and send reports of the result

to the implementing divisions of KWA for remedial action. During 1999-2004 the

laboratory collected and analysed 5944 samples and found that 2399 samples (varying from

33 to 46 per cent) contained high bacteriological, chemical and physical impurities indicating

that the water was not potable. This showed that the corrective measures like periodical

washing of tank, chlorination, leak rectification work, etc., were not adequate and therefore

the piped water supplied was not safe drinking water. The action taken on the findings of

the laboratory was, however, not furnished by the DC.

Hospital Waste Management

3.2.39 Bio-medical waste management rules require that every bit of infectious waste to be

properly treated and disposed off. In a study on Bio-waste Management in the district

conducted by the Indian Medical Association (IMA), it was estimated that about 7.3 lakh kg

of infectious wastes were produced in a year in the health care facilities, including private

institutions of Kollam District.

3.2.40 Government Victoria Hospital, Kollam, the only hospital in the district dedicated

exclusively to women and children with bed strength of 273 generated about 17900 kg of

bio-wastes a year. However, the hospital had not yet adopted a scientific way of disposal of

bio-waste and the primitive method of burning the waste in a pit was being followed.

Kerala State Pollution Control Board in its study reported that this could lead to spread of

contagious diseases and other health hazards and therefore the need for a properly planned

project for the management and disposal of hazardous waste is brought to notice. In fact,

none of the institutions other than the district hospital has installed an incinerator.


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Conclusions

3.2.53 KWA conceived and sanctioned schemes without ensuring availability of land for

various components like water source, water treatment plant, reservoirs, etc., and resulted in

non-commencement of execution and delay in completion of schemes. Thus KWA failed in

providing safe drinking water to 82 per cent of the targeted population though finance was

available. There were diversions of funds on schemes implemented through DC and under

utilisation of funds allotted to District Panchayats. Nearly 40 per cent of the water supplied

was found to be below the prescribed standards.

3.2.55 Drinking water and sanitation schemes were not implemented though funds were

available.


The land required for implementation of components of water supply schemes should be

ensured before sanctioning the scheme and raising loans.

Quality of drinking water supplied should be ensured by proper upkeep of facilities.

A properly planned project for the management and disposal of hazardous waste needs to be

implemented.

Provision of safe drinking water scheme in Madhya Pradesh, 2004

Highlights

Betul district, situated in the central southern part of the state covered an area of 10043 sq. km. of

which more than 53 per cent was arable land. Of 13.95 lakh population, more than 81 per cent was

rural and 50 per cent belonged to SC and ST. Most of the villages in the district did not have easy

access to medical facilities. Shortage of doctors and paramedical staff further added to already

insufficient medical facilities available in district. Supply of potable drinking water remained a dream

to the inhabitants of 665 villages of the district as these villages were not covered under any of the

drinking water supply schemes launched by the Government of India and the State Government.


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Government could not provide the minimum employment of 100 mandays per year per family as

envisaged under any of the Employment Generation Programmes.

3.3.9 Safe drinking water

Inadequate planning for supply of drinking water to the towns

GOI launched (1993) the Centrally sponsored “Accelerated urban water supply programme” for

towns with population less than 20000 (1991 census). Towns with supply of water of less than 70

litre Per Capita Daily (LPCD) were to be given priority. The towns with population in excess of

20000 with supply of less than 135 LPCD were to be taken up under the Urban Water Supply

Schemes by the State Government. According to 1991 census, there were five towns (excluding

Sarni where drinking water supply was maintained by Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board

(MPSEB) and the Western Coal Fields Limited) in the district with population ranging between

9605 and 63694 with availability of drinking water between 25 LPCD to 42.50 LPCD as shown

in Appendix-XXXV. The availability of potable water in all the towns during 2004 ranged

between 21 and 68 LPCD. Drinking water supply schemes (costing Rs.7.70 crore) were taken up

at Multai (Rs.5.75 crore) and Bhainsdehi (Rs.1.95 crore) in 1995 and 1997 respectively. It was

observed that Rs.1.35 crore (Multai Rs.0.90 crore and Bhainsdehi Rs.0.45 crore) were spent up

to March 2004 mainly on procurement of materials and advance payment. The physical progress

of both the schemes was nil even after lapse of about 8 to 10 years. Thus defective planning and

execution by the department had deprived 1.60 lakh urban population of adequate potable

water.

Non-prioritization of

villages for potable water

GOI launched (February 1986) the National Drinking Water Supply Mission to cover the

ongoing Centrally sponsored scheme of Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP)

to provide safe and potable water of 40 LPCD to all villages and habitations. Though 1528

villages were covered during 1996-2004, 1422 remained to be covered as of March 2004.

Information was not made available to show the names of villages and habitations already

covered, to be covered, and new additions. Thus, 1422 villages and habitations with 7,38,380

population (census 2001) including 665 in the category of not covered were still awaiting facility

of 40 LPCD potable water due to defective implementation of the schemes.

Non testing and non

closure of water sources having unsafe water

The progress report (June 2004) revealed that testing of 7812 water sources out of 7868 was done

during July 1990 to June 2004 in the District of Betul. The balance of 56 sources were not tested.

Further, of 1274 sources of water found unsafe for drinking in the tests in the departmental

laboratory, only 18 sources were closed. The inhabitants were consuming contaminated water

from 1256 sources of water which was hazardous to health. Executive Engineer, PHE, Betul

stated (July 2004) that the water sources would be closed after alternate arrangements are made.


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3.3.13 Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP)

Watersheds of approximately of 500 hectares each in every village was to be identified and

developed. These were to be taken up in a phased manner and batches over a period which

should not ordinarily exceed four years. According to the prescribed funding pattern, funds were

to be released in instalments in the first year (25 per cent), the second year (40 per cent), the third

year (25 per cent) and one instalment in the fourth year (10 per cent). Funds provided under the

project were divided amongst the project components of watershed treatment/development (80

per cent), community organisation (5 per cent), training (5 per cent) and administrative

overheads (10 per cent). Out of allotted fund of Rs.20.61 crore during 1999-2004, expenditure of

Rs.19.44 crore was incurred under the programme. Audit observed:

Non completion of work and release of funds against norms

Eight watershed projects (area : 3830 ha) sanctioned during November-December 1997 (Rs.1.27

crore) could not be completed even in five years. The CEO intimated that these watersheds

could not be completed due to general elections. The reply was not tenable as these projects were

to be completed in four years. It was further observed that Rs.7.49 crore were released to Project

Implementation Agencies and watershed committees during 2001-04 in one instalment for

executing of works selected for six to eight batches against the norm of release of funds in

instalments. The CEO intimated that releases were made due to availability of sufficient funds.

The reply was not tenable as it was in disregard of the norms laid down by GOI.

Non refund of unspent amounts and excess expenditure

Against sanctioned project cost of Rs.11.53 crore for watershed development under phase I, total

expenditure incurred was Rs.10.87 crore. Thus there was a saving of Rs.0.66 crore which was to

be refunded to ZP but the same was not done (September 2004). Further it was also observed

that against permissible limit of Rs.9.22 crore for watershed treatment activities, expenditure

incurred was Rs.10.51 crore i.e. excess was of Rs.1.29 crore while the area treated was 36623 ha

i.e. 1486 ha less than the target of 38109 ha. No reasons for non refund and less coverage of area

were advanced.

3.3.14 Conclusion

Neither urban nor rural population of the district could be provided safe drinking water as per

norms. Towns with supply of less than 70 litre per capita water daily were not given priority

under the Accelerated Urban Water Supply Programme.


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Alternative

arrangement for supply of drinking water needs to be made so that the existing unsafe

drinking water sources could be closed at the earliest.

Under various

drinking water supply scheme launched by Government of India and State Government,

priority needs to be given to the villages/ habitations still awaiting facility of minimum

potable water.

Performance audit of measures to control pollution in the river Yamuna in Delhi.

This performance audit is the third in the series of reviews carried out by audit on

issues relating to sewage management and treatment aimed at controlling water

pollution in the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi. The earlier two reviews

printed in the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India relating to the

Government of NCT of Delhi presented to the Legislature during 2000 and 2004

highlighted inter alia the slow progress of construction of sewage treatment plants

(STPs) and sewage pumping stations (SPSs), rehabilitation of sewer lines, tardy

progress of construction and utilisation of common effluent treatment plants

(CETPs) to treat industrial effluents and continuing flow of large quantities of

domestic and industrial sewage into the Yamuna without treatment resulting in

pollution of the river water during its passage through the NCT of Delhi. Highlights

of each of the earlier reviews are at Annex I.

In view of the significant environmental risks associated with underperformance of

sewage treatment projects, this performance audit was carried out with a view to

assessing the cumulative status of the performance of STPs, SPSs and the connecting

sewer lines as well as the actual treatment of domestic and industrial sewage, the

quality of treatment and finally the impact on control of pollution in the river

Yamuna as at the end of March 2004.

Highlights

Domestic and industrial sewage generated within the NCT of Delhi is the main

source of pollution of the river Yamuna during its passage through the NCT.

Despite over ten years of efforts and expenditure of Rs. 872 crore since 19941

on

establishment of sewage treatment infrastructure for treatment of domestic and

industrial sewage before its release into the river, the quality of water at the point

where the river leaves Delhi has deteriorated drastically with large amounts of

untreated sewage still falling into the river.


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The water quality of the river at the point of its entry into Delhi at Palla is

adequate to sustain aquatic life and conforms to water quality of “bathing”

standards in terms of Dissolved Oxygen (DO) and Bio-chemical Oxygen Demand

(BOD). However, at the point of its exit from Delhi at Okhla, the water quality of

the river is unfit for any purpose with the BOD being 40 mg per litre against the

norm of not more than 3 mg per litre while the DO deteriorates to almost nil

against the norm of not less than 5 mg per litre. The coli form pollution which is

already sub-standard at 217 times the norm when the river enters Delhi also

deteriorates further to 1.39 lakh times the norm at the time of its exit from the

NCT.

Against the estimated domestic sewage generation of 719 Million Gallons per

Day (MGD) in Delhi, the Government has created capacity for treatment of only

5122

MGD until March 2004. Even the created capacities of the STPs are not

utilised optimally on account of construction of STPs in areas without adequate

sewage load and non-synchronisation of construction of trunk sewer lines and

sewage pumping stations. The progress of rehabilitation of the 28 trunk sewers of

total length of 130 kms which is crucial for conveyance of the sewage has been

tardy.

Only 335 MGD out of the estimated domestic sewage of 719 MGD is being

treated before discharge into the river. The balance 384 MGD outfalls into the

river untreated. Even the figures for actual treatment of sewage are arrived at

through normative calculation on the basis of rated capacity of the STPs rather

than through a robust system of measurement of the inflows and outflows.

The quality of treated effluent did not meet the stipulated specifications implying

that even the treated effluent is contributing to the deterioration in water quality.

Of the 15 CETPs required for treatment of 42 MGD industrial sewage, only 10

are complete at an expenditure of Rs. 123 crore of which only four were

commissioned as of March 2004. The utilisation of even the commissioned plants

is questionable. The construction and maintenance of the CETPs are plagued by

various constraints; viz. under-estimation of the cost leading to shortage of funds,

cost escalation due to delay, delay in construction of conveyance systems, delay in

formation of CETP societies, etc. Consequently, almost the entire industrial

sewage was out falling into the river without treatment.

The untreated sewage from the unsewered areas continues to fall into the river

through open drains and nallahs in the absence of trapping of the sewage from

such areas for treatment. This further contributed to the pollution load in the

river.

While the physical progress of construction of sewage treatment and disposal


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works indicated under-performance, the Delhi Jal Board, which is entrusted with

execution of such works, failed to utilise Rs. 159 crore out of Rs. 599 crore

provided for the purpose by the Government during 1999-2004.

List of recommendations

• Government of Delhi and the executing agency may put in place a system of efficient

project management and utilisation of funds with CPM/PERT chart of all measurable

activities which can be foreseen. The systems and procedures for formulation of plans and

processing of tenders need to be streamlined so as to ensure optimum utilisation of funds placed

at the disposal of DJB.

• Institutional mechanisms need to be established for timely coordination with other

concerned civic and land owning agencies so as to minimize delay and hindrances in execution

of works.

• Proposals for creation of treatment capacity must be based and prioritized with reference

to the estimated sewage generation in the relevant catchment areas which should be estimated

after taking all factors into account including population trends and availability/supply of

water.

• Government of Delhi and DJB should put in place a system to ensure simultaneous

execution and completion of all related infrastructure

and establish reporting and accountability systems for underperformance. They should

also monitor completion of all conveyance and other inter-dependent work and establish

accountability for failure to complete them within the prescribed time.

• DJB should ensure the optimum functioning of every component of a STP so as to

obviate the possibility of release of harmful gases into the atmosphere. It should also explore the

possibility of utilizing the gases generated by the STPs for generating electricity to meet their

own requirement of power which would significantly offset operating costs.

• Systems and procedures need to be strengthened to ensure accurate measurement of both

the quantity of treated sewage being discharged as well as its quality with reference to the

prescribed parameters.

• The Government of Delhi should resolve outstanding issues related to the payment of

share by the Government of India and the CETP societies.

. • Government and DSIDC should ensure completion of the remaining CETPs in

a time bound manner ensuring compliance with the stipulated environmental standards.

• Government of Delhi should pay prompt attention to trapping and treatment of all

sewage presently flowing through these drains/nallahs in line with its assurances given to the

Supreme Court in December 1993 and prepare a comprehensive plan to complete the works in a

time bound manner.


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Yamuna is one of the major rivers of India and has social, economic and religious

significance for vast sections of the population. The total length of the Yamuna from

its origin in the Yamunotri Glacier in the Himalayan ranges of Uttaranchal to its

confluence with the river Ganga at Allahabad in Uttar Pradesh is 1376 kms of which

22 kms pass through the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi. It enters Delhi

at Palla near Wazirabad Barrage and leaves Delhi at the Okhla Barrage.

Water quality of a river is assessed and categorised with reference to its use, viz: (a)

raw water fit for drinking purposes, (b) raw water fit for bathing purposes, and (c)

raw water fit for agricultural use. The categorisation of water for its different uses is

based primarily on parameters of Dissolved Oxygen (DO), Bio-Chemical Oxygen

Demand (BOD) and Total Coli form (TC).The water quality of river Yamuna at the

point of its entry into Delhi is adequate to sustain aquatic life and conforms to water

quality of bathing standards.

Figure-1: River Yamuna at Wazirabad Barrage (up stream)

The main source of pollution of water in Yamuna in Delhi is domestic sewage which

constitutes 94 percent of the total sewage generated in the NCT of Delhi while the

balance is contributed by industrial sewage. The Union Ministry of Environment and

Forests released a white paper in December 1997 along with a broad action plan on

“Pollution in Delhi” which aimed inter alia at achieving water quality of “bathing

standards” in Yamuna. The parameters prescribed to achieve this standard were as

follows:

Figure-2: Parameter of water quality for bathing standard

Parameter Prescribed standard

Dissolved Oxygen (DO) Not less than 5 mg per

litre

Bio Chemical Oxygen

Demand

Not more than 3 mg per

litre

(BOD)

Total Coli form (TC) Not more than 500 per

100 ml


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The action plan envisaged a strategy for conservation of water, full utilisation of

sewage treatment plants and regular maintenance of sewers and pumps by the Delhi

Government and its executing agencies.

The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, provides for the

prevention and control of water pollution and the maintenance or restoration of the

wholesomeness of water. For this purpose, the Act provides for the establishment of

Boards and conferring them with suitable powers for prevention and control of water

pollution. Under the provisions of this Act, the Central Government constituted the

Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) while each State Government was to

constitute similar State Pollution Control Boards to implement the provisions of the

Act. In so far as Union Territories are concerned, the CPCB delegated its functions

to the Governments of the Union Territory. In pursuance of the above provisions,

Government of Delhi constituted the Delhi Pollution Control Committee (DPCC) to

monitor and control pollution in Delhi in terms of the provisions and objectives of

the Act.

The Delhi Jal Board (DJB) is the executing agency entrusted with the construction

and maintenance of sewage treatment plants, sewage pumping stations and trunk

sewers and for treatment of domestic sewage in the NCT of Delhi. The Board

functions under the administrative control of the Department of Urban Development

of the Government of Delhi. It also provides sewerage facilities in areas under the

jurisdiction of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD). The New Delhi

Municipal Council (NDMC), the Delhi Cantonment Board (DCB) and the Delhi

Development Authority (DDA) are responsible for construction of branch sewers

and out fall into trunk sewers in the areas under their respective jurisdictions. The

Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation (DSIDC) is entrusted with the task

of constructing CETPs in identified industrial estates. Monitoring of pollution and

enforcement of pollution standards is the responsibility of the DPCC along with the

CPCB.

The DJB has 30 STPs at 17 locations in the NCT of Delhi along with SPSs. The

sewerage network comprises of 5600 kms of sewerage lines including trunk sewers

and branch sewers (peripheral/internal sewers). This includes 28 main trunk sewers

of a total length of 130 kms. For sewage management, Delhi is divided into five

drainage zones of Okhla, Keshopur, Rithala-Rohini, Coronation and Shahdara. In


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addition, there are newly sewered areas of Pappan Kalan (Dwarka), Vasant Kunj,

Sarita Vihar and Narela.


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The performance audit of measures to control water pollution in Yamuna was

conducted with a view to assessing whether:

• the programmes and schemes for control of pollution were being holistically

conceived and systematically planned so as to effectively control water pollution;

• the funds available for control of water pollution were being optimally

utilised;

• the projects and structures involved in effective sewage disposal i.e. trapping,

conveying and treatment of waste water were properly matched and co-ordinated so

as to achieve the intended purpose;

• the facilities created were effectively functioning in accordance with the

stipulated performance standards;

• there was effective monitoring of the water quality of the river so as to enable

timely corrective action; and

• the measures undertaken had an impact in terms of improving the quality of

the river water to “bathing” standards as envisaged in the White paper issued by the

Union Ministry of Environment & Forests.

The fundamental criteria used for assessment was whether the pollution control

schemes and projects undertaken had resulted in reduction in the pollution levels and

improvement in the quality of the river water and whether the infrastructure created

was functioning optimally. This was sub-defined as follows:

• projects should be based on a proper assessment of the quantum of sewage

generation taking into account area-wise trends of population growth;

• optimal utilisation of allocated funds for pollution control measures;

• existence of systems and procedures for efficient implementation of pollution

control projects and for monitoring of pollution levels;

• coordinated construction and performance of projects for sewage treatment;

• performance of the system to the designed/stipulated capacity and specified

quality of output;

• adverse side effects in terms of air pollution, soil pollution, etc.; and

• the ultimate objective of release of treated sewage in the river so as to improve

the quality of river water in terms of the parameters of dissolved oxygen, bio-

chemical oxygen demand and total coli form content.

.The performance audit with reference to the progressive status of the measures taken


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to control pollution of Yamuna as at the end of March 2004 was conducted by test

check of records of the DJB, DSIDC and DPCC. The audit team made field visits to

16 STPs located at five sites along with the connected sewage pumping stations and

to the CETPs in the Wazirpur and Mayapuri industrial estates. The methodology

adopted was:

• formulation and finalisation of the audit objectives taking into account the

views of the Chief Executive Officer of DJB and Managing Director of DSIDC and

their officers at a meeting held in December 2003.

• scrutiny and check of records of DJB, DSIDC and DPCC alongwith study of

their five year plans/annual plans;

• scrutiny and test check of the plant records maintained at the STPs/CETPs

and their physical inspection in association with the concerned officials of

DJB/DSIDC; and

• study of assessment reports of outside agencies like Indian Agricultural

Research Institute and CPCB to assess the overall impact of the measures undertaken

for treatment of domestic and industrial sewage/effluent.

The Department of Urban Development, Government of NCT of Delhi, provides

loans/grants to the DJB for implementation of the scheme for controlling pollution

in Yamuna. It was brought out in the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General

relating to the Government of Delhi for the year ended March 1999 that

Government had spent Rs. 284.98 crore during 1994-99 on creation of sewage

treatment facilities. During April 1999 to February 2004, the Government released

Rs. 598.84 crore of which DJB utilised only Rs. 439.60 crore as under:

Figure-4: Year-wise budget allocation and actual expenditure (Rupees in

crore)

Year Release by

Government to

DJB

Actual

expenditure by

DJB

Unspent

amount/excess (-

/+)

1999-

00 68.80 64.29 (-) 4.51

2000-

01 115.12 78.27 (-) 36.85


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2001-

02 130.60 108.03 (-) 22.57

2002-

03 132.72 87.05 (-) 45.67

2003-

04 151.60* 101.96* (-) 49.64*

Total 598.84 439.60 (-) 159.24

While DJB did not utilise 27 percent of allotted funds during the five years under

review, there were also unspent balances in each of the five years ranging from 6.56

to 34.41 percent. There were also unspent balances under each of the separate

schemes ranging from eight percent to 43 percent as depicted in Annex-II.

DJB attributed the under-utilisation in July 2004 to delays due to nonfinalisation of

tenders for construction of pumping stations and treatment plants, change in

effluent standards prescribed by the DPCC in January 2001 and lack of technical

expertise for rehabilitation of trunk sewers. Government added in October 2004

that in addition to the above factors, under-utilisation of resources was also

attributable to the multiplicity of agencies from which permissions were required

for execution of works, unforeseen hindrances due to the service plans of other

underground utilities and introduction of new technologies.

The reasons advanced are not tenable as the requirement of permission from other

agencies, the time required for the tender processes and requisite technical expertise

are foreseeable factors common to all such works, which should have been planned

and catered for while change of standard was a one time matter. Further, trunk

sewers, under which Rs. 68 crore remained unspent out of the total provision of Rs.

157.88 crore, had been lying silted for periods ranging from one to 15 years and the

reasons advanced for nonutilisation of the funds are not applicable to rehabilitation

of trunk sewers.

At the beginning of the IX five year Plan (1997-2002), the DJB had existing total

sewage treatment capacity of 280 Million Gallons per day. DJB assessed the total

sewage generation as 7563

MGD by the end of the IX Plan. Of this, DJB planned to

tackle 601 MGD of sewage generated from the sewered areas. Against these

projections, DJB could create additional sewage treatment capacity of only 202

MGD during the IX Plan period taking the cumulative treatment capacity to 482

MGD.


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For the X five year Plan (2002-2007), DJB revised the estimated total domestic

sewage generation by March 2007 to 720 MGD and targeted creation of additional

treatment capacity of 263 MGD by the end of the X Plan period increasing the total

sewage treatment capacity to 745 MGD. In addition, to tackle sewage from the

unsewered areas, DJB planned to trap the drains which were carrying sewage of

these areas and convey it to the STPs.

Against these projections, DJB created additional sewage treatment capacity of only

30 MGD during the first two years (2002-04) of the X Plan resulting in total

treatment capacity of only 512 MGD of which an STP of 12 MGD capacity was

non-functional since 1999.

9.1 Analysis of achievements

Analysis of the projections made in the five year Plans and the achievements

revealed the following:

• DJB had not created treatment capacity to match the actual sewage

generation in the NCT of Delhi. The IX five year Plan did not incorporate any

provision to trap the sewage from the unsewered areas covering about 40 percent of

the population. Even during the first two years of the X Plan, no action had been

initiated in this regard.

• The total treatment capacity set up by the end of the IX Plan (March 2002)

was only 482 MGD which was 274 MGD short of the estimated sewage of 756

MGD.

• An STP of 12 MGD capacity at Keshopur remained non-functional for about

five years as of March 2004.

• The planning and actual construction of STPs during the first three years of

the X Plan fails to inspire confidence about achievement of the target at the end of

the plan period. While during the first two years additional capacity of only 30 MGD

was added, the work in hand is of 70 MGD capacity.

9.2 Under performance in execution of specific projects

There were also shortfalls in execution of specific projects. During 19992004, DJB

identified 51, 26 and one work of construction of pumping stations, construction of

new rising mains and rehabilitation of an existing rising main respectively for

execution. However, DJB could execute only 29 of these 78 works though there was

unspent allotment during each of these years. Similarly, DJB projected 65 works of

construction/rehabilitation/de-silting of trunk sewers during 1999-2004 of which

only five were completed.

Audit examination further disclosed that there was no evidence to suggest whether

any prioritisation was done in planning and construction of the systems linking with


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the growth of the city. Moreover, proposals for construction of a particular STP did

not include details/status of the supporting pumping stations and trunk sewers etc.

Consequently, the works were not synchronised and the intended objective could not

be achieved as brought out in subsequent paragraphs. Further, DJB did not prepare

detailed project reports or pre-feasibility study reports except for the two STPs which

were executed under the Ganga Action Plan.

Government stated in October 2004 that DJB relied on the projections of population

and city development made by the Delhi Development Authority in the Master Plan

and the availability of water for its planning and strategy. Due to migration of large

population from other States, the actual population growth in the city exceeded the

projections made. It added that due to multiple agencies involved in the clearance

and the execution of the projects, the progress was slow.

The reply relating to population projections going wrong is not relevant in the

context of under performance with reference to the projects planned for execution.

Recommendations

• Government of Delhi and the executing agency may put in place a system of efficient

project management and utilisation of funds with CPM/PERT chart of all measurable

activities which can be foreseen. The systems and procedures for formulation of plans and

processing of tenders need to be streamlined so as to ensure optimum utilisation of funds placed

at the disposal of DJB.

• Institutional mechanisms need to be established for timely coordination with other

concerned civic and land owning agencies so as to minimize delay and hindrances in execution

of works.

One of the consequences of inadequate planning and prioritisation was mismatch

between the treatment capacity created and the actual sewage generated in the

relevant catchment areas resulting in untreated sewage continuing to outfall into the

Yamuna. DJB spent large amounts in creating treatment capacity in sparsely

populated areas while it failed to create necessary treatment facilities and conveyance

systems in areas where sewage was presently being generated.

10.1 Sewage treatment capacity significantly below sewage generation

In the following cases, the treatment capacity created was significantly less than the

sewage actually generated:


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Figure-5: Sewage treatment capacity and actual generation

[Figures are in

MGD]

KeshopurZone Okhla

Zone

Shahdara

Zone

Total

Effective capacity 60* 140 65 265

Estimated sewage

generation

145 220 126 491

Sewage actually

treated

59 132 41 232

Sewage being

bypassed

86 88 85 259

Thus, the total sewage treatment capacity created in the three zones was 277

MGD against the estimated sewage generation of 491 MGD. Sewage of 259

MGD was out falling untreated into the river. Scrutiny revealed the following:

• Rehabilitation work of the trunk sewers in Okhla zone was in progress at a cost

of Rs. 88.76 crore and was expected to be completed by June 2005. Rs.33.46

crore had been spent as of March 2004. Once completed, these trunk sewers were

expected to convey the entire sewage of 220 MGD generated in the catchment

areas to the STPs. However, since the STPs had a treatment capacity of only 140

MGD, untreated sewage of 80 MGD would continue to outfall into the river.

• In Shahdara zone, DJB had created sewage treatment capacity of 65 MGD.

However, a High Powered Committee constituted by the Supreme Court and the

CPCB assessed the sewage generation in the relevant catchment areas as 110 and

126 MGD in 1998 and 1999 respectively. In pursuance of the recommendations

of the High Powered Committee, DJB prepared an action plan to enhance the

total treatment capacity to 110 MGD by March 2000. In September 2003, DJB

further revised its action plan for treatment of 135 MGD sewage by March 2005.

However, DJB stated in January 2004 that total treatment capacity of 65 MGD

was adequate for the targeted catchment area. The difference in the estimated

quantity of sewage between the DJB and CPCB has not yet been resolved.

10.2 Construction of treatment plants in low sewage load areas


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DJB incurred an expenditure of Rs. 51.34 crore on creation of sewage treatment

facilities in areas where sewage generation was low as under:

Figure-7: STPs in low sewage load areas

Ghitorni Rohini Narela Pappankalan Total

Treatment

capacity created

5 15 10 20 50

[MGD]

Sewage actually Nil 0.5 –

0.7

0.5 12 13.10

generated/treated

[MGD]

Unutilised

treatment

capacity

5 14.03 9.5 8 36.53

[MGD]

Capital cost of

STPs

6.28 14.15 13.67 17.24 51.34

(Rupees in crore)

The treatment capacity of 36.53 MGD remained unutilised while the Board

continued to incur a recurring expenditure on maintenance, operation and watch and

ward of the treatment plants at places where hardly any sewage was generated.

Examination of documents further disclosed the following:

• The plant at Ghitorni was lying idle for over seven years from the time of its

completion in 1997 till July 2004. In addition to the expenditure on operation and

maintenance, DJB spent Rs. 38.54 lakh towards watch and ward up to March 2001

and upkeep of equipment. In addition, DJB was liable to pay an amount of Rs. 6.48

lakh as of March 2004 to the contractor for watch and ward @ Rs. 18,000 per month

from April 2001 to March 2004 as well as the actual expenditure which would be

incurred for making electrical and mechanical equipment operational at the time of

commissioning of the plant.


230 | P a g e

• Though DJB reported sewage treatment of 0.5 to 0.7 MGD at the Rohini

STP commissioned in October 2002, a CPCB report of January 2004 indicated that

the plant was actually not in operation.

• The capacity utilisation of the plant at Narela commissioned in May

2001 was only five per cent. 14

• Sewage to the plant at Pappan Kalan commissioned in April 2002 was being

conveyed by trapping of a nearby nallah/drain and not through the conveyance

system.

Disposal of sewage involves its collection through branch sewers and trunk sewers by

gravity which is then pumped by the various pumping stations to the treatment

plants for treatment as depicted in Figure 8 below:

Figure-8: Flow of Sewage for Treatment

The objective of treatment of sewage generated is not achieved if any of the above

components or links is missing or not functioning to its intended capacity. DJB did

not ensure synchronisation and co-ordination in execution of the various works

which resulted in under-utilisation of the created treatment capacity. Out of total

treatment capacity of 512 MGD for domestic sewage, only 335 MGD of domestic

sewage was actually being treated.

11.1 Failure to rehabilitate sewage conveyance systems to match sewage

treatment capacities

There were a total of 28 trunk sewers of 130 kms length in the NCT of Delhi. DJB

identified 18 trunk sewers of 91 kms length in January 2000 that needed immediate

rehabilitation or de-silting. This work was to be completed by March 2002. Although

DJB revised the target date of completion of the work first to December 2003 and

again to June 2004, it could complete rehabilitation/de-silting work of only 20 kms

as of July 2004.

Twenty three trunk sewers of 106 kms length required rehabilitation/de-silting as of

March 2004. Analysis of sewage treatment for catchments of nine of these 23 these

trunk sewers disclosed that 165 MGD domestic sewage out of the estimated 258

MGD domestic sewage was falling into the river untreated due mainly to the blocked

and collapsed conveyance system.


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Audit scrutiny further disclosed that:

• six treatment plants of total capacity of 85 MGD at Coronation Pillar and

Kondli were actually treating sewage of only 60 MGD representing 71 percent

capacity utilisation. Due to partially operating conveyance system, two trunk sewers

of plants at Coronation Pillar and six trunk sewers of plants at Kondli were not

conveying adequate quantity of sewage for periods ranging from one and half year to

seven years as they had either collapsed or silted up and required rehabilitation/de-

silting.

• sewage of only 46.65 MGD was being treated at Rithala STP against a

treatment capacity of 80 MGD. A new 40 MGD plant was constructed at Rithala in

2001 at a cost of Rs. 42.21 crore in addition to the existing STP of equal capacity.

However, though DJB was aware of the status of the trunk sewers leading to under-

utilisation of the plants, it did not take action to rehabilitate the trunk sewers to

ensure capacity utilisation of the second plant. Consequently, both the plants were

under-utilised and untreated sewage of 39 MGD was being discharged into the river.

• four trunk sewers in Keshopur zone had settled or silted up and were not

carrying the entire sewage being generated in the relevant catchment areas. No

action had been taken for rehabilitation of these trunk sewers.

• four trunk sewers in Okhla zone, viz. at Ring Road, Pragati Vihar, Indian

Express and Sita Ram Bazar were not functioning optimally due to siltation and

settlement. As against an estimated sewage generation of 138 MGD from the

catchment area of these trunk sewers, only 50 MGD of sewage was actually being

conveyed to the STPs.

Government stated in October 2004 that the delay in re-furbishing of the entire trunk

system was due to lack of expertise and experience amongst the contractors who

could be entrusted with such work, congestion in the areas and heavy traffic

conditions.

11.2 Under-utilisation due to non-synchronisation of works

The quantum of actual sewage treated at five STPs was only 12 MGD against the

total treatment capacity of 70 MGD due to failure of DJB to synchronise the works

as under:

Figure-9: Details of under-utilisation of plants

Sl.

No.

Name of

the Plant

Capacity Year of

Commissionin

g

Actual

Treatment

Percent

Capacity

utilisation


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1. Yamuna 10 MGD 1999

7.00

MGD 35

Vihar

10 MGD 2003

2. Najafgarh 5 MGD 2002 0.20

MGD 4

3. Nilothi 40 MGD 2002 4.94

MGD 12

4. Mehrauli 5 MGD 2003 Nil Nil

Total

70

MGD

12.14

MGD

• A 10 MGD plant commissioned in Yamuna Vihar in 1999 at a cost of Rs.

8.58 crore remained under utilised from the very beginning with only 2.45

MGD sewage being treated. However, without ensuring optimum utilisation

of the plant by providing an effective and matching conveyance system, DJB

constructed another plant of equal capacity in 2003 at a cost of Rs. 11.44

crore to cater to the same catchment area. The second STP required one main

pumping station with two intermediate pumping stations for its optimal

functioning. While the main SPS at Ghonda-II was commissioned in 2002 at

a cost of Rs. 6.02 crore, one of the intermediate SPS at Ghonda–I was not

completed even as of March 2004 despite an expenditure of Rs. 4.76 crore.

Due to non-commissioning of the SPS, its trunk sewer which was laid at a

cost of Rs. 65.64 lakh in June 1999 could not also be commissioned.

Consequently, sewage generated from the catchment area of SPS Ghonda-I

was still out falling in the river without treatment. DJB also failed to provide

internal sewers in many of the unauthorised-regularised colonies in the

catchment area of the STP. Thus, in spite of expenditure of Rs. 31.46 crore in

creating infrastructure (STP/SPS/ trunk sewers), the intended objective of

treatment of sewage generated in the area remained substantially unachieved.


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Figure-10: A view of sludge treatment at a sewage treatment plant

• A five MGD treatment plant and a 12.5 MGD pumping station were

commissioned in Najafgarh in June 2001 and July 2002 respectively at a total cost of

Rs. 11.51 crore. The work of its connected trunk sewers was subsequently completed

in April 2003 at a cost of Rs. 4.40 crore. However as of December 2003, the actual

sewage treatment was of only 0.2 MGD as the conveyance system had not been

commissioned. The Executive Engineer stated in May 2004 that notification

regarding connections to individual dwellers was under process. Thus, failure to

synchronise the commissioning of the conveyance system with the construction of

the STP resulted in untreated sewage from the catchment area being discharged into

Yamuna.

• A 40 MGD treatment plant was commissioned in 2002 at Nilothi at a cost of

Rs. 58.65 crore. However, sewage of only 5 MGD being trapped at Kirari drain by

temporary installation of a pump house was actually being treated at the plant. The

under-utilisation was attributable to the failure of the Board to implement/execute

the allied works of rising main and connected SPS.

• A five MGD STP along with a 12.5 MGD pumping station was

commissioned in May 2003 at Mehrauli at a total cost of Rs. 10.19 crore. To make it

functional, 1.5 MGD sewage was shown as treated by trapping a nallah. However,

no sewage was being treated at the plant as of December 2003 as sewage could not

be conveyed to the STP.

• Rampura SPS of three MGD capacity was constructed in July 2002 at a cost

of Rs. 1.85 crore but the DJB did not provide rising main through which sewage was

required to be pumped to Bharat Nagar SPS for onward pumping to the Rithala STP.

The work of rising main was yet to be approved by the competent authority as of

May 2004. Thus, an amount of Rs. 1.85 crore spent on the SPS was not only

unfruitful but untreated sewage from the catchment area continued to outfall into the

Yamuna.

Thus, despite an expenditure of Rs. 118.06 crore on creation of infrastructure for

treatment of sewage, the intended objective of treatment of sewage remained

unachieved due to non-synchronisation in execution and completion of various

works.

The process of treatment of sewage in a treatment plant is depicted in the flow chart

in Figure-11 below:


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Figure-11: Treatment of sewage

Treated Effluent

The main function of a sludge digester is to digest the sludge in the absence of

oxygen. During this process, poisonous gases like methane, hydrogen sulphide and

carbon dioxide are produced which are collected in the dome of the sludge digester

and thereafter transferred to gas holders for onward disposal.

About 15,572 cubic meters of harmful gases produced at Kondli and Keshopur STPs

were escaping into the atmosphere every day due to malfunctioning of sludge

digesters and gas holders.

At Kondli, the functions of seven sludge digesters, a gas holder, two gas burners and

two filter pumps in two of the three STPs were impaired due to leakage in its dome.

Resultantly, gases produced during the process of sewage treatment escaped into the

atmosphere and the gas holders and gas burners could not be put to use. In addition,

40 drying beds for sludge had not been commissioned till now.

At Keshopur, none of the 14 sludge digesters were functioning properly since 1989.

Further, one gas holder out of the two was dismantled in 1987-88. Thus, the sludge

digesters instead of curing the sludge were merely working as tanks/store. As the gas

holders, burners etc. were not put to use, the gases were escaping into the

atmosphere.

In addition to release of harmful gases into the atmosphere, improper digestion of the

sludge produced poor quality of manure which might affect the porosity of soil.

Figure-12: A view of the gas chamber and sewage settling plant

Recommendation

• DJB should ensure the optimum functioning of each of its components so as to stop the

release of harmful gases into the atmosphere and establish a system of ensuring designed

utilisation of all facilities set up for sewage treatment. It should also explore the

possibility of utilizing the gases generated by the STPs for generating electricity to meet

their own requirement of power which would significantly offset operating costs.

The STPs lacked not only a reliable mechanism to measure the quantity of the

effluents being discharged into the river but they also failed to ensure adherence to

the stipulated quality parameters.


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13.1 Measurement of quantity of sewage

Just as the sewage generated was estimated on the basis of population in the

catchment area rather than on the basis of water supplied or used or any other

reliable method, the sewage shown as treated was not verifiable as the flow meters

meant to measure the incoming raw sewage and outgoing treated effluent were either

non-functional or non-existent at the plants test checked in audit except in the STP at

Rithala Phase-II. The quantum of sewage being depicted as treated at the STPs was

based on the design capacity of the pumps with reference to the number of hours it

actually ran. Thus, the quantum of sewage being depicted as treated was a normative

assessment rather than by actual measurement with proper calibration.

13.2 Quality of treated sewage

Most of the treatment plants were equipped with in-house laboratories to analyse the

samples of effluent collected from different units of the STP to ensure their

conformity with the standards prescribed by the DPCC under the provisions of the

Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974:

Figure-13: Prescribed standards of treated sewage

Sl.

No. Parameters Prescribed limit

1. pH 5.5-9.00

2. Total suspended solids

(TSS)

Not to exceed 50

mg/litre

3. Oil and grease Not to exceed 10

mg/litre

4. BOD Not to exceed 30

mg/litre

5. COD* Not to exceed 250

mg/litre

*Chemical Oxygen Demand

CPCB also conducts analysis of dissolved oxygen, total coli form and faecal coli

form while monitoring the water quality of river Yamuna and the treated sewage

being discharged from the STPs.

DPCC revised the standards of BOD and TSS to 10 mg/l and 15 mg/l from 30 mg/l

and 50 mg/l respectively in January 2000 and asked DJB to address the problem of


236 | P a g e

coli form pollution. DJB requested the Environment Pollution (Prevention and

Control) Authority in August 2003 to retain the earlier standards because of difficulty

in obtaining the technology required to meet the revised standards as well as its

prohibitive cost. DJB assured that its treatment plants would be fully utilised to

ensure adherence to the stipulated standards and that no untreated sewage would

find its way into the river through open drains/nallahs. However, DJB failed to live

up to its assurances. Test check of the records for the period from April 2003 to

December 2003 revealed as under:

• As per the tests conducted by DJB, treated effluent from three STPs of total

capacity 90 MGD did not meet even the earlier prescribed standards. Further, as per

the report of DPCC and CPCB during July to

December 2003, another four STPs with total treatment capacity of 61 MGD were

also not meeting the prescribed standards. The details of the STPs and quality of

treated effluent are depicted in Annex-III.

• DJB had no arrangement to analyse the standard of total coli form and faecal

coli form at any of its plants except at the Okhla STP where it was started in May

2003. DJB attributed this to lack of bacteriologists who are required to conduct the

analysis.

• While the STPs were functional round the clock, tests conducted by DJB

were limited to only eight hours. Moreover, the extant instructions stipulate that test

samples should be taken at regular intervals during the course of a day and the

average test results then arrived at so as to depict a true picture of the quality of the

treated sewage. However, DJB was basing its results on only one sample collected

once every day. Hence, the tests conducted by DJB do not provide a credible

assurance of the quality of the treated sewage throughout the day. DJB stated in

January 2004 that regular tests could not be conducted due to inadequate manpower.

Recommendation

• Systems and procedures need to be strengthened to ensure accurate measurement of both

the quantity of treated sewage being discharged as well as its quality with reference to

the prescribed parameters.

As per the Delhi Master Plan 2001, there are 28 approved industrial estates in Delhi.

The Supreme Court directed the Government of Delhi in February 1996 to construct

CETPs in these industrial estates to treat industrial sewage and reuse the noxious

effluents to reduce the toxic effect on the river. In pursuance of these directions,

DPCC appointed the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute

(NEERI) in March 1996 to prepare detailed project reports including design and


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specification of the CETPs. Under the Delhi Common Effluent Treatment Plants Act

2000, CETP societies were to be formed which were to be entrusted with the

maintenance and operation of the plants after their construction. DSIDC was to

undertake construction of the CETPs as per technical know how provided by

NEERI. The project cost was to be apportioned between the Government of India,

the Government of Delhi and the CETP societies in the ratio of 25:25:50. NEERI

recommended construction of 15 CETPs in 21 industrial estates with a total

treatment capacity of 191.4 Million Litres Per day (MLD) i.e. 42 MGD at a total cost

of Rs. 90 crore. The remaining seven industrial estates had either non-polluting

industries or their own treatment arrangements.

All the 15 CETPs were to be completed by 1998. DSIDC could take up construction

of only 12 CETPs during October 1999 to July 2002. Only 10 CETPs were

completed as of March 2004 at a total expenditure of Rs. 123.12 crore. The work of

one CETP at Naraina industrial area was in progress while the local residents had

stopped the work of another CETP at Najafgarh Road. Construction of the

remaining three CEPTs was yet to be taken up due to paucity of funds, non-approval

by the Plant Level Committee, etc. Even out of the 10 CETPs which were

completed, only four were commissioned. The remaining six CETPs were yet to be

commissioned though they had been completed 11 to 15 months ago as reflected in

Annex – IV.

Against the total commissioned capacity of 12 MGD in the four operational CETPs,

the actual sewage being treated was only five MGD.

Audit scrutiny of the records relating to the construction of the CETPs by DSIDC

revealed mismanagement which delayed their construction as well as subsequent

operation as summarized below:

• The detailed project report failed to take into account essential aspects like

cost of land, development of site, construction of boundary wall, revamping of

conveyance system, electric sub-stations/HT cables, etc. Consequently, the total

project cost was grossly under-estimated and it had to be enhanced from Rs. 90 crore

in June 1996 to Rs. 256.40 crore (excluding cost escalation of Rs. 20.14 crore

attributable to delay) in March 2004. This resulted in shortage of funds which had

not been initially planned for. Government of India and the CETP societies released

only Rs. 22.5 crore and Rs. 28.77 crore respectively to the Government of Delhi

against their revised matching contribution of Rs. 59.47 crore and Rs. 101.99 crore

respectively. This hampered the progress of construction of the CETPs.

• Incorrect assessment of actual quantum of sewage generation resulted in

creation of excess treatment capacity by two and half times in Mayapuri industrial

estate. Against actual sewage generation of one MGD, a CETP of three MGD

capacity was constructed at a cost of Rs. 13.88 crore.


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• Deficiencies in the design parameters relating primarily to the use of

chemicals required for treatment of toxic sewage required installation of additional

units and improvement of designs involving both delays as well as additional costs.

• Delay in implementation/completion of the project resulted in cost escalation of

Rs. 20.14 crore. The delay was attributable to delay in handing over the land by the

DDA (26 months), delay in obtaining permission from the Railways (six months) for

laying rising mains and paucity of funds.

• Poor coordination between DJB and DSIDC resulted in non-commissioning

of a sewage conveyance system in the industrial estates at Wazirpur and Philomel.

Consequently, the CETPs constructed in these industrial estates remained under-

utilised.

• The CETP societies were to take over the operation and maintenance of the

plants after a trial run to ensure that the discharge met the standards prescribed by

law duly certified by the DPCC. Lack of certification of standards of the discharge

coupled with increase in the costs resulted in the CETP societies declining to take

over the operation of the completed plants.

The Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control) Authority for the NCT

of Delhi and the National Capital Region conducted a surprise visit of the including

the four commissioned plants in December 2003. It found.

that most of the plants

were non-functional. In case of the CETP at Mayapuri, the waste received by the

plants was being discharged into the drains without any treatment while the waste

was simply bypassed directly into the drains in Mangolpuri and Wazirpur CETPs.

The Authority observed that not only was there a complete and total waste of public

funds but the purpose for which

these plants had been ordered by the Supreme Court had also been negated.

• The Government of Delhi should resolve outstanding issues related to the

payment of share by the Government of India and the CETP societies.

• Government and DSIDC should ensure completion of the remaining CETPs in a time

bound manner ensuring compliance with the stipulated environmental standards.

• Government of Delhi should ensure the proper operation and maintenance of all the

completed CETPs and the monitoring of the quantity and quality of treated effluent.


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Due to ineffective conveyance system coupled with inadequate sewage treatment

capacity, untreated sewage from sewered areas was flowing into the 18

drains/nallahs along with sewage from the unsewered areas. These drains/nallahs

were meant to carry only storm water and outfall directly into Yamuna. A study

conducted by RITES had highlighted in January 2004 that 711 MGD of sewage on

an average was out falling in the river through these drains as detailed in Annex - V.

In terms of quantum of sewage, Najafgarh drain was carrying the maximum

discharge followed by Shahadara drain and Barapulla nallah.

Free ammonia and heavy metals like lead, copper, nickel, zinc, etc. were present in

the sewage flowing through the open drains much above the standards prescribed in

the Environment Protection Act as detailed in Annex-VI. The trend in pollution load

contribution of the sewage flowing through the open drains/nallahs from 1982 to

2003 in terms of BOD load is presented in Figure-15 below:

The BOD load contributed to the river by the sewage from open drains/nallahs

out falling into the river increased from 117.3 tonnes/day in 1982 to 207.98

tonnes/day in 2003. No steps had been initiated to effectively trap and treat the

pollutants being discharged through the drains.

Recommendation

• Government of Delhi should pay prompt attention to trapping and treatment of all

sewage presently flowing through these drains/nallahs in line with its assurances

given to the Supreme Court in December 1993 and prepare a comprehensive plan to

complete the works in a time bound manner.

16.1 Quantity of domestic sewage treated

Against an estimated sewage generation of 719 MGD by March 2004, Government

of Delhi provided sewage treatment capacity of only 512 MGD including the 12

MGD STP which was non-functional) while actual sewage being treated was only


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335 MGD which represented only 47 per cent of the total estimated sewage

generation. The treatment capacity created and growth in waste water generation

during the last four decades is presented in Figure-16.


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Figure-16: Increased discharge of untreated sewage

1961 1971 1981 1991 1999 2003

The water quality of Yamuna instead of improving deteriorated over the

period 1999-04 despite expenditure of Rs. 871.67 crore since 1994

(Rs. 284.98 crore until 1998-99 and Rs. 586.69 crore during 1999-2004

Rs. 439.60 by DJB and Rs. 147.09 crore by DSIDC). The BOD and DO

parameters indicated a sharp deterioration in the position at the point of the

river leaving Delhi as is depicted in Figures 17 and 18. While BOD at Palla

when the river enters Delhi was within the norms, the load of untreated

sewage of Delhi polluted the river to the extent that bio-chemical oxygen

demand reached 13 times in excess of the norm at Okhla. The presence of

dissolved oxygen deteriorated from an acceptable one and a half times above the

stipulated minimum norm at Palla to almost nil at Okhla. Coli form count also

deteriorated exponentially from about 217 times at Palla to about 1.39 lakh times

above the stipulated norm at Okhla.

Figure-17 : BOD Trends Year wise at Palla and Okhla in River Yamuna (Delhi

Stretch)

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003


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Figure-18: DO Trends Year wise at Palla and Okhla in River Yamuna (Delhi

Stretch)

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003

Note: Lower levels of DO suggest higher pollution/ poorer water quality.

The position of total coli form also indicated a sharp increase as depicted in table

below:

Figure-19: Trend of Total coli form at Palla and Okhla Barrage

Locatio

n

Bathing

Standar

ds

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003

Palla Not

more

than-

500/ 100

ml

950.00 8,967.00 5,199.00 7,500.00 1,08,666.66

Okhla

Barrage

-do- 5,72,500.0

0

32,9,312.0

0

2,57,667.0

0

92,33,333.

00

693,33,333.

00

RITES in its report of January 2004 had reported that:

• Dissolved Oxygen (DO) which is the most important parameter for sustaining

a healthy riverine eco-system was not present in the Delhi stretch of the river during

any part of the year;

• free ammonia which is toxic to fish and micro-organisms was present far

above the acceptable levels; in the range of 1.47 mg/l to 6.73 mg/l as against the

acceptable level of 0.02 mg/l;

• there was concentration of heavy metals like copper, lead, nickel, zinc and

mercury far in excess of the limits prescribed by the Environment Pollution Act. Zinc

particularly was present in very high concentrations in the river;

Figure-20: Water quality of Yamuna at Wazirabad Barrage (down stream)


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The adverse impacts of untreated sewage were as under:

• While the water at Palla conforms to the bathing standards in terms of DO

and BOD, by the time Yammuna leaves Delhi at Okhla, the water deteriorates to far

below the `bathing standards` and is, in fact,unfit for any use.

• The capacity of the soil to retain oxygen required for biological

decomposition of partially decomposed or un-decomposed organic matter contained

in sewage is reduced hindering decomposition of organic matter resulting in

“sickness of soil.”

• Sewage is a potential carrier of various pathogenic fungi, bacteria and

parasites which pose serious community health hazards like cholera, typhoid,

jaundice, etc. The health hazards from water contaminated with sewage arise from

both consumption of sewage grown plant products without cooking or processing as

well as from direct contact with sewage. According to a study conducted by the

Environmental Sciences Division of the Indian Agriculture and Research Institute

New Delhi in 2002, vegetables grown in areas like Yamuna Pushta,

Okhla, Najafgarh, Alipur and Ballabgarh were found to have a significantly higher

level of contamination of zinc, lead and cadmium.

The audit findings as well as the recommendations were discussed with the Principal

Secretary (Urban Development) and the Chief Executive Officer of the DJB on 15

September 2004. Their views as expressed at the meeting as well as formally

communicated subsequently in October 2004 have been taken into account and

reflected in the review.

Performance Audit of sewerage and sanitation schemes including Yamuna Action

Plan in Haryana.

Objectives of Sewerage and Sanitation Schemes including Yamuna Action Plan (YAP),

implemented by Public Health Department, were to provide hygienic sanitation facilities to the

public and to reduce water pollution in rivers/canals, etc. While the department already had 25

ongoing sewerage and sanitation schemes in hand as of March 1999, 60 new schemes were also

taken up during 1999-2004, but none of these had been completed. Time schedule for

completion of works was not fixed and funds were not released by Government, which resulted

in non-completion of sewerage schemes. This led to spread of unhygienic conditions due to

discharge of untreated sewage in the open. Audit noticed non-functional and underutilised

sewerage schemes, which led to unfruitful expenditure while sewerage facilities were provided to


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only ten per cent of the population of Ambala City. Scrutiny of records relating to YAP

revealed lack of planning for sewage treatment, partial completion/underutilisation of sewage

treatment plants (STP), non-maintenance of prescribed standards in treatment of effluent, non-

laying of internal sewer lines/drains to link interception and diversion sewers, construction of

oxidation ponds without ensuring disposal of treated effluent, underutilisation of structures,

construction of toilet units in unidentified areas, etc. All these factors led to non-achievement of

goals of reducing water pollution in rivers/canals and providing hygienic sanitary conditions.

(Paragraph 3.2.20)

(Paragraph 3.2.10) (Paragraph 3.2.24)

(Paragraph 3.2.27)

(Paragraph 3.2.25)

(Paragraph 3.2.11)

(Paragraph 3.2.15)

• Rs 13.74 crore were outstanding against Haryana Urban

Development Authority on account of proportionate maintenance

charges of STPs.

(Paragraph 3.2.9)

3.2.1 Safe water supply and hygienic sanitation facilities are basic essential

amenities required for a community for healthy living. About 80 per cent of water

used by the community comes out of houses in the form of waste water which,

unless properly collected, conveyed, treated and safely disposed off, may

eventually pollute the precious water resources and cause environmental

degradation. Out of 68 towns in Haryana, 22 towns did not have any sewerage

facility; and even in the remaining 46 towns, the percentage area covered with


245 | P a g e

sewerage systems ranged from 15 to 60. With the augmentation of drinking water

supply schemes in rural areas, the generation of waste water had increased manifold

which created insanitary conditions resulting thereby in growth of diseases. State

Government had approved rural drainage/sewerage programme in selected villages.

In order to reduce pollution load in river Yamuna, six towns in the State, which were

directly or indirectly discharging their effluents into river Yamuna, were covered

under Yamuna Action Plan (YAP) as a part of Phase-II (started from May 1994) of

Ganga Action Plan for sewage treatment facilities. Six more towns were included

from February 1996 in the scheme as per the direction of the Supreme Court.

To provide hygienic sanitation facilities, the State Government had sanctioned 60

new sewerage schemes during 1999-2004 at an estimated cost of Rs 107.69 crore in

addition to 25 ongoing schemes. None of these 85 schemes had been completed so

far (March 2004).

To reduce pollution load in Yamuna river, a project at an estimated cost of Rs 232.20

crore was under execution for providing 18 sewage treatment plants (STPs) in 12

towns identified under the scheme. As of March 2004 of the 749.15 mld1

sewage

generated in 83 towns of the State, 494.65 mld sewage was left untreated. Capacity

of 17 STPs for treating 322 mld sewage was not fully utilized as only 254.5 mld

sewage could be treated as indicated in the graph below:

Generation and treatment of sewage in the State

Mld: Million litres per day.

3.2.2 Objective of Sewerage and Sanitation Schemes was to provide hygienic

sanitation facilities to the public by providing sewerage system in various towns.

Yamuna Action Plan was a Centrally sponsored scheme, aimed at reducing pollution

load in Yamuna river, which is the main source of water supply in Delhi and some

parts of Haryana, by providing sewage treatment plants in twelve towns identified

under the scheme.

1. 3.2.3 For the formulation of policies/schemes relating to sewerage and

sanitation and for monitoring their implementation, the State Government

constituted (1967) Haryana State Sanitary Board (HSSB), which was comprised of

19 members with the Public Health Minister as its President. Financial

Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Haryana, Public Health Department

was administrative head at Government level and was responsible for


246 | P a g e

implementation of policy decisions, programmes and schemes, etc. The Engineer-in-

Chief (EIC), Public Works Department, Public Health Branch, Panchkula was over

all incharge of the schemes and was assisted by 12 Superintending Engineers (SEs)

and 43 Executive Engineers (EEs) in the field for execution of works. One SE and

four EEs were exclusively dealing with the works relating to YAP.

.3.2.4 Main objective of the audit review was to evaluate the performance in

providing hygienic sanitation facilities through the schemes implemented. Audit also

assessed the achievement in reduction of water pollution levels in river Yamuna, a

source of irrigation/drinking water for large population. For this purpose, following

parameters were adopted in audit:

. • Achievement of targets for completion of works relating to sewerage;

. • Execution of works within a time frame;

. • Proper functioning of sewerage system laid under various schemes;

. • Reduction in pollution level in Yamuna river caused through domestic

waste and industrial effluents; and

. • Functioning of sewage treatment plants under YAP.

3.2.5 Records relating to sewerage and sanitation schemes and YAP works for the

period from 1999-2004 in the offices of the HSSB, EIC, Public Works Department,

Public Health Branch and 132

Public Health Divisions (out of 43) were test checked

during October 2003 to May 2004..

3.2.10 For providing hygienic sanitation facilities and ensuring safe supply of

drinking water, the State Government and HSSB took up several sewerage and

sanitation schemes. During 1999-2004, 60 new schemes were taken up besides 25

ongoing schemes, which were already under implementation prior to April 1999.

None of these schemes had been completed till date (March 2004). Rupees 12.92

crore had been spent on 25 schemes, which were more than 5 years old.

A review in audit revealed absence of any time limit for completion of each scheme

in the administrative approvals and non-release of funds by the Government; this

resulted in non-completion of schemes. The review also brought out improper

planning, non-completion of sewerage schemes, avoidable/extra expenditure,

spread of unhygienic conditions due to discharge of untreated sewage water in

open, non-functioning/under utilization of sewerage schemes, non-providing of

sewage facilities in Ambala City and execution of works without obtaining

technical sanctions to cost estimates. Such irregularities were being repeated time


247 | P a g e

and again by the department. These points are discussed in the following

paragraphs:

Non-completion of sewerage schemes

3.2.11 The HSSB approved four schemes for providing sewerage facilities in

Narnaund, Bawani Khera, Loharu and Siwani towns during August 1997 to July

1999. The schemes provided laying of sewer line, construction of screening

chamber, collection tanks, pump chamber, etc. for disposal works. As provided in

GOI‟s Sewage and Sewerage Manual, the sewerage work should begin from the

final disposal points going backwards. Contrary to this, in several cases, the works

relating to sewer lines were being completed first and the works for disposal of

sewage were being either completed later or left incomplete. Almost all the

divisions were repeating this practice. Details of four such schemes where sewer

lines were laid but disposal works were not completed were as under:

Sr. Name of

scheme

Estimated Date

of

Date of Quantum Upto date Remarks

No. cost/date

of

start completion of

sewage

expenditure

on

sanction of sewer

lines

(MLD) completion

(Rs in

lakh)

(Rs in lakh)

1. Sewerage

scheme

65.00 May

2000

December 1.13 39.41 Due to

non-

at

Narnaund

July 1999 2002 availability

of

land.

2. Sewerage

scheme

85.00 June

1998

December 1.35 35.94 Due to

change in

at Bawani

Khera

January

1998

2002 the site of


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disposal

works.

3. Surface

drain with

intercepting

outfall

sewer at

Loharu

60.50

August

1997

July

1999

March

2001

1.36 32.57 Due to

non-

availability

of funds.

4. Surface

drain with 70.00 March December 1.31 58.97

Due to

non-

intercepting

outfall

January

1999

1999 2002 availability

of

sewer at

Siwani.

funds.

Total 280.50 5.15 166.89

Thus taking up of works of sewer lines without ensuring availability of land and

funds for disposal works, Rs 1.67 crore spent on laying of surface drains and sewer

lines were rendered unfruitful.

Avoidable expenditure due to injudicious planning

3.2.12 At Hisar, RCC sewer pipeline of 24” dia laid in Patel Nagar area along

Kaimri Road was damaged during 1989. For pumping of sewer water, the Public

Health Division set up a temporary pumping station in October 1989. In November

1998, another 16”dia RCC pipe was also damaged at different stretches and therefore

another temporary pumping station was set up for pumping the water. To replace

the existing damaged sewer of 16” dia with 24”dia, HSSB approved (May 2000) an

estimate for Rs 1.18 crore, which included Rs 72.45 lakh for laying new parallel

pipeline of 24” dia in the damaged portion. The work for replacing only damaged

sewer was awarded as late as in December 2002 to an agency at an estimated cost of

Rs 4.65 lakh

i.e after 2 years and 7 months of Board‟s approval. Balance work for laying new

parallel pipeline of 24” dia had not yet been awarded.

However, the division incurred an expenditure of Rs.65.60 lakh from October 1989


249 | P a g e

and November 1998 to October 2003 on running of temporary pump houses whereas

approximately Rs 6 lakh only were required to repair the damaged portion.

Thus due to injudicious planning in fixing priorities for execution of works, the

division had incurred an avoidable expenditure of Rs 65.60 lakh on running

temporary pump houses. The concerned EE stated (November 2003) that due to

tight position of funds it was not possible to take up the project. The reply was not

tenable, as Rupees six lakh approximately were required to replace the damaged

RCC pipeline.

Extra expenditure due to improper planning

3.2.13 To provide storm water sewer in Sirsa Town, State Government approved an

estimate for Rs 3 crore in February 1996. The work was started in 1996 and after

incurring an expenditure of Rs 1.34 crore upto 1998-99, it came to notice that the

newly designed sewer and the existing sewer crossed each other at two places

because of which, it was not possible to lay the sewer any further as the levels did not

permit. It was proposed to change the alignment of the new sewer by constructing

an additional 2050 ft. 54” dia brick circular storm water sewer, to make the already

laid/being laid sewer functional. The additional storm water sewer was got

constructed (May 2003) by spending Rs 51.21 lakh.

During audit it was noticed that position/location of existing sewer already laid was

on record of the department but the same was not taken into account while obtaining

approval of the storm water sewer scheme.

Thus, due to non-assessing the levels and position of existing sewer, an extra

expenditure of Rs 51.21 lakh had to be incurred.

Spread of unhygienic conditions due to discharge of untreated sewage in open

3.2.14 Design standards to be adopted for drainage/sewerage systems issued by

Chief Engineer, PWD, Public Health Branch provided inter-alia that method of

treatment or disposal of sewage should be decided at the stage of preparing the

project instead of after the completion of the scheme and the sullage carrier should be

so designed as to command sufficient area of land required for broad irrigation. In

Bhiwani, the untreated sewage of the town was discharged into Halluwas Minor

from where it flows into open fields of the village causing extensive damage to the

standing crops over 265 acre land besides contaminating the drinking water and

death of livestock. The EE, Bhiwani intimated (August 2004) that farmers had

submitted simple application for compensation (no amount indicated) to Deputy

Commissioner, Bhiwani. The Department, however, sent a case (May 2004) to the

State Government for a claim of Rs 1.07 lakh to which decision was awaited (August

2004).


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Agricultural land at village Halluwas rendered uncultivable as a result of sewage

discharge in open fields

Polluted drinking water of a well unfit for human consumption due to mixing of

sewage water in village Halluwas

The EE further stated (August 2004) that a proposal for acquiring 101 acres land for

discharging sewage water was sent to the Government which was not approved due

to paucity of funds.

Thus failure of the department in making proper arrangements for disposal of

untreated sewage had resulted in damage of crops, pollution of drinking water and

death of livestock in the village.

3.2.15 Public Health Division-1, Hisar completed (March 1997 to March 1998)

schemes for providing sewerage facilities in 3 villages (Sadal Pur, Siswal and Arya

Nagar) in Hisar district at a cost of Rs 1.09 crore. The scheme envisaged that water

supply level in these villages would be raised to 110 LPCD4

for proper working of

sewerage system.

However, no villager had come forward to obtain sewerage connection till date

(October 2003) because of pre-condition of security deposit of Rs 1,000 and

thereafter recurring charges of Rs 5 per month per connection. The village Sarpanch,

Sadalpur also pointed out (July 2002) to the concerned division that sewerage lines

had got damaged or choked. Further, water supply level in these villages had not

been raised to 110 LPCD, as projected in the schemes.

Thus, sewerage schemes had been non-functional, as the sewerage lines had got

damaged. The failure of the department to carry out survey to identify the

prospective beneficiaries, motivating the villagers to derive the benefits of the scheme

and in raising water supply level had resulted in unfruitful expenditure of Rs 1.09

crore.

3.2.16 An underground sewerage system in Rania town (District Sirsa) was

completed in March 2003 at a cost of Rs 77.07 lakh. The scheme was designed for

population of 37,000, projected upto 2020. The population of the town was 20,938

as per 2001 census.

It was noticed that only 14 sewer connections were released up to December 2003

and target of releasing one more connection was fixed for the year 200304. Thus the

benefit of the scheme was derived by about 985

persons only, resulting in under

utilization of the facility for which the department had not intimated the reasons.


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3.2.17 To provide sewerage facilities to about 1.69 lakh population of Ambala City,

HSSB approved (June 1984) a scheme for laying of sewer lines, intercepting sewer,

construction of disposal works, rising main and pumping machinery with cost

estimate for Rs 3.43 crore, which was revised to Rs 5.26 crore in May 1987 due to

cost escalation.

However, Public Health Division, Ambala Cantt. after spending Rs 28.12 lakh

stopped the work in March 1998 because of considerable rise in water table in the

area causing slushy conditions. The sewer lines could not be laid so far (March

2004).

Though this situation came to the notice of the department in December 1989, no

alternate strategy was adopted to provide sewerage facilities. However, in September

2002, EE, PH Division, Ambala submitted a different detailed project report to EIC,

Public Health, for providing sewerage facilities, which included provision for

dewatering, plugging, pumping, etc. which had not yet been approved (April 2004).

The Department could provide sewerage facilities to only about ten per cent of

population of the city and for the remaining population, these facilities had not been

provided even after 20 years of approval of initial estimates.

3.2.18 Public Works Department Code lays down that no work shall commence

unless a properly detailed design and estimate is sanctioned by the competent

authority. The department undertook execution of 28 works in 10 (out of 13) test

checked divisions involving an expenditure of Rs 11.51 crore during 1999-2004 after

these were administratively approved by the State Sanitary Board. However,

technical sanctions to the detailed cost estimates for these works were not obtained

from EIC/SE.


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3.2.19 To reduce pollution load in Yamuna river, which is the main source of water

supply to Delhi and some parts in Haryana, Yamuna Action Plan (YAP) was started

as part of Phase II of Centrally sponsored Ganga Action Plan started from May

1994. The scheme covered 126

towns of the State as shown in the map below:

Location of 12 towns under YAP

A project at an estimated cost of Rs 232.20 crore was under execution for providing

18 Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) in 127

towns in Haryana, besides works of laying

internal and trunk sewer to enable disposal of sewage and waste water, interception

and diversion of sewage water, low cost sanitation, construction of electric

crematorium and river-front development.

Scrutiny of records revealed lack of planning for sewage treatment, partial

completion/under-utilisation of STPs, non-maintenance of prescribed standards in

treatment of effluent, non-laying of internal sewer lines/drains to link interception

and diversion sewers, construction of oxidation ponds without ensuring disposal of

treated effluent, under-utilisation of mechanical structures, construction of toilet

units in unidentified areas, etc. as brought out in the following paragraphs:

3.2.20 Sewage Treatment Plants of 322 MLD capacity were constructed under YAP

in 12 towns against which quantum of sewage received was 254.50 MLD, whereas

the level of sewage in these towns was 419 MLD as of 2002-03. Thus, 164.50 MLD

sewage was going untreated into the Yamuna river as shown below:

Sr.

No.

Name of town Present

level of

sewage

generated

Capacity

created

Sewage

received

in the

STPs

Quantum

of

untreated

sewage

(MLD)

1 Yamunanagar/

Jagadhari (2)

40 35 29 11

2 Karnal (2) 50 48 38 12

3 Faridabad (3) 205 115 76 129

4 Panipat (2) 45 45 45 -

5 Sonipat 30 30 30 -


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6 Gurgaon 30 30 30 -

7 Chhachhrauli 1 1 - 1

8 Radaur 1 1 - 1

9 Indri 1.50 1.50 - 1.50

10 Gharaunda 3 3 3 -

11 Palwal 9 9 - 9

12 Gohana (2) 3.50 3.50 3.50 -

Total 419 322 254.50 164.50

Note:- Figures within bracket indicate the number of STPs in the town.

Besides this, 91.50 MLD sewage of 10 other towns (not covered under YAP) was

going untreated into Yamuna system for which no remedial measures were initiated

by the department except in two towns (where STPs were under construction) as

shown under:

Sr.No. Name of towns Sewage generated

(MLD)

Remarks

1 Samalkha 4.00

2 Shahbad 6.00

3 Hodel 4.50

4 Jhajjar 5.00 STP under

construction

5 Ganaur 3.50

6 Ladwa 4.00

7 Nilokheri 3.00

8 Taravari 3.00

9 Bahadurgarh 8.50 STP under


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construction

10 Rohtak 50.00

Total 91.50

Besides, Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA) at Panchkula was

maintaining a sewage treatment plant. Panchkula town generated 54 MLD sewage

but the details of treated sewage were not intimated by HUDA.

The department replied that pre-feasibility reports of these 10 towns were submitted

to NRCD for approval, which was awaited.

In the remaining 59 towns in the State, 184.65 MLD sewage was generated but no

sewage treatment system existed as no scheme had been approved for the purpose so

far. Untreated sewage of these towns was being disposed off into fields/open drains

causing environmental hazards.

Thus, in the State, of 749.15 MLD sewage generated as of March 2004, 494.65 MLD

of sewage had been going untreated in open areas/drains.

Underutilisation of Sewage Treatment Plants

3.2.21 In Haryana, Yamuna Action Plan covers various towns including Faridabad.

The waste water from Faridabad town was discharged into nalas, drains, (which

ultimately reach river Yamuna) becoming the main cause of water pollution in the

river. In order to prevent pollution of river in Faridabad area, GOI administratively

approved (November 1993) a scheme, estimating the quantum of total sewage as

108.5 MLD, for construction of three STPs of 20 MLD, 45 MLD and 50 MLD

capacity. The work of these STPs was completed between August 1998 and March

1999 at a cost of Rs 51.27 crore. However, 50 to 65 MLD sewage going untreated

into Yamuna River through Movai Drain, Buria Nala and storm drains escaped the

estimates and were not included while preparing detailed project reports.

Effluent treated in STPs was not within prescribed standards

Movai drain meeting points of Box and RCC Circular Sewer carrying raw

sewage which remained to be diverted to STP

It was noticed that all the three STPs never ran to their installed capacity due to

less flow of sewage. Zone wise position of inflow of sewage as on December 2003


255 | P a g e

was as under:

Sr. No. Installed

capacity

Sewage

received

Shortage Percentage

capacity

of

Zone 1 20 MLD 16 MLD 4 MLD 80

Zone II 45 MLD 25 MLD 20 MLD 56

Zone

III 50 MLD 35 MLD 15 MLD 70

Total 115 MLD 76 MLD 39 66

Thus, the STPs were running below their installed capacity. The reasons for receipt

of less sewage were large number of sewers getting chocked and outfall sewer of

many colonies and HUDA not being connected with the main system. Thus STPs

remained underutilized and defeated the very purpose of the scheme as the raw

sewage was still being discharged into drains, which ultimately polluted river

Yamuna. It was also noticed that no sewage from the initially planned area was

going to STP for Zone – I. To utilise the STP of Zone – I, the discharge from Buria

Nala and Movai Drain was temporarily diverted to STP – I and thus the STP – I was

receiving 16 MLD sewage.

The EE stated (March 2004) that Municipal Corporation, Faridabad had connected

the blocked sewers with these drains. The fact remained that the department failed

to get the choked sewers cleared/repaired for running the system successfully.

Discharge standards in Sewage Treatment Plants not maintained

3.2.22 The discharge standards for the treated effluent were biochemical oxygen

demand (BOD) 30 mg/l and Total Suspended Solids (TSS) 50 mg/l as per YAP

standards. Test reports of Central Pollution Control Board revealed that the

working of 50 MLD, STP, Zone III at Faridabad and 30 MLD, STP at Gurgaon

was not upto the YAP standards as BOD and TSS levels exceeded the desirable limit

as depicted below:

Name of STP Levels of treated effluent

January

2003

June

2003

November

2003

December

2003

January

2004


256 | P a g e

(Mg/l)

50 MLD

Faridabad

BOD 128 28 58 88 87

TSS 168 80 71 222 51

30MLD

Gurgaon

BOD 114 48 62 73 114

TSS 53 140 59 62 62

The concerned division, however, had not devised any system to check the BOD and

TSS level by testing samples of treated effluents.

Mixing of treated and untreated effluent

3.2.23 The treated effluent from STPs was discharged into various drains, which also

carried untreated domestic and industrial waste at Yamunanagar and Panipat to

river Yamuna and Western Jamuna Canal (WJC). As the treated effluent got mixed

with the untreated one, the pollution level increased which ultimately polluted river

Yamuna/WJC as detailed below:

Sr.

No.

Name of

towns Capacity

(MLD)

Pollution level

after

treatment

Pollution level after

mixing with untreated

effluent

BOD TSS BOD TSS

1. Yamunanagar 25 28 45 94 61

10 29 55 74 76

2. Panipat 35 27 50 148 74

Treated effluent from 25 MLD, STP at Camp area Yamunanagar coming out

through effluent channel and falling into a Nallah running near the STP which

flows into WJC

Treated effluent from 35 MLD, STP at Panipat coming out through effluent

channel and falling into Panipat drain STP which flows into Yamuna River


257 | P a g e

Thus, appropriate planning was not done to save river Yamuna /WJC water from

pollution.

Unfruitful expenditure due to improper planning

3.2.24 To check pollution caused by sewage of some colonies in Gurgaon flowing

into drain number 8 and river Yamuna, GOI approved a scheme to provide

„Interception and Diversion (I&D)‟ sewer in Avadhpuri, Rajinder park and

adjoining colonies across railway line for Rs 2.65 crore after an assurance from the

EE, PH Division, Gurgaon that open drains would be constructed in the area to

carry the discharge of streets into the main I&D sewer. This work was to be

completed by December 2001. Though the work of main I&D sewer was

completed in February 2002 at a cost of Rs 2.64 crore, drains/internal sewer were

not constructed to link with I&D sewer. Thus, laying of I & D sewer without

constructing the internal sewer had rendered the huge expenditure of Rs 2.64 crore

as unfruitful as the I & D sewer was underutilized.

Executive Engineer stated (February 2004) that the work for laying branch sewer

was in progress and considerable discharge of the area was going into the I&D

sewer through branch line/open drains. The reply was not tenable as revised

technical approval for laying sewer in the town was sanctioned only in February

2004 and funds were not allotted as of March 2004.

Construction of oxidation ponds without ensuring disposal of treated effluent

3.2.25 To treat the sewage water of Karnal, 8 MLD oxidation pond was constructed

(completed in December 1999) under YAP at a cost of Rs 1.06 crore. As there was

no appropriate arrangement for discharge of effluent, the low lying area near the

plant was filled. The Forest Department as well as the farmers objected to the water

being released on their land. The proposal for construction of effluent channel from

sewage treatment plant to Barota Drain was not accepted by Engineer-in-Chief, as

the scope of work was not covered in the detailed project report of the scheme and

also in view of GOI‟s instructions that arrangements for conveying the treated

effluent from STPs to final disposal were to be made by State Government. Another

proposal for discharging the treated effluent into the irrigation channel was also not

accepted by the Irrigation Department.

Executive Engineer stated (April 2004) that permission to construct the effluent

channel had been received from Irrigation Department and the work had been

started. The reply was not tenable, as Irrigation Department had asked for a

certificate that there would be no death of any human and cattle by drinking effluent


258 | P a g e

discharged from the STP. Also, permission of Forest Department on whose land

effluent channel was to be constructed had not been obtained. Moreover, due to

absence of tackling the colliform load of sewage water in oxidation ponds, the

chances of contamination of potable water and occurrence of diseases could not be

ruled out.

Thus, the oxidation ponds were constructed without making arrangement for

disposal of treated effluent.

Non-completion of pollution abatement scheme

3.2.26 With the growing emphasis on abatement of pollution in river Yamuna, GOI

(August 1997) approved a scheme for I&D sewers at Palwal, to be completed by

August 1998. The work was partially completed in April 2001 at a cost of Rs 1.69

crore. Thereafter, no action to complete the sewer lines in the remaining areas and

also to link the already laid sewer lines was taken.

Government of India separately sanctioned (August, 2001) the construction of STP

and Main Pumping Station at Palwal at an estimated cost of Rs 3.64 crore with the

condition to complete the same by June 2003. The work was still (January 2004)

incomplete after spending Rs 1.67 crore. Thus delay in construction of I&D sewer

and STP had resulted in nugatory expenditure of Rs 1.69 crore incurred on laying of

partial sewer lines besides delay in controlling the pollution level in Yamuna. EE,

YAP, PH Division, Faridabad stated (March 2004) that revised proposal for laying

of I&D sewer in Palwal town was submitted to GOI in 1998, approval to which was

still awaited (May 2004).

Thus, the fact remained that the activities were taken up without any proper

synchronisation and planning, as I&D sewers were partially laid and revised

proposal for laying complete I&D sewer in Palwal town was not yet approved by

GOI despite its submission six years back.

Absence of disposal system for treated effluent

3.2.27 According to DPRs for construction of 25 MLD Upflow Anaerobic Sludge

Blanket (UASB) sewage treatment plant at Yamunanagar (Camp area), the treated

effluent from the STP was to fall into adjoining drain, which, ultimately was to join

WJC. However, PH Department did not obtain prior permission of the Irrigation

Department for discharging the treated effluent into WJC. PH Division 1,

Yamunanagar took up the work in May 1996 and completed the construction in

January 2003 at a cost of Rs 9.02 crore. The plant was, however, partially

commissioned in September 2000 as only one of the two reactors could be completed

by that time. Thus the work was completed without ensuring the method and

location of release of the treated effluent.

In 1996, the irrigation authorities did not allow the discharge of treated effluent into


259 | P a g e

WJC, because the canal water was utilized for drinking purposes also. The

Chairman, Delhi Jal Board also stressed upon the Irrigation Department time and

again to stop discharge of treated/untreated sewage in WJC as the water was utilised

for drinking purpose in Delhi also.

For discharge of treated effluent the department submitted (December 1997) a

proposal to GOI for construction of effluent channel at an estimated cost of Rs 3.83

crore. GOI refused to finance the project and asked the State Government to arrange

funds from their own resources. The matter remained undecided till May 2003

when, Haryana State Pollution Control Board (HSPCB) took a decision to construct

a ditch drain along WJC at a cost of Rs

7.94 crore of which Rs 3.08 crore and Rs 4.86 crore were to be borne by the Public

Health Department and by the industries (who were discharging their effluent into

WJC) respectively. No action in the matter had been taken so far (May 2004). Thus,

the plant was conceived ignoring the provisions of the Haryana Canal and Drainage

Act, 1974, (as amended in July 2001), which did not permit the discharge of

treated/untreated sewage into canals. No action had been taken so far though the

discharged effluent was being released in WJC against the codal provisions and

against the instruction of Irrigation Department.

Unutilised sewerage structures

3.2.28 Government of India approved (June 1996) a pollution abatement scheme

under YAPs phase II in Indri, Chhachhrauli and Radaur towns at a cost of Rs 4.30

crore. The works included laying of I&D sewer, construction of STPs and other

ancillary works. As no sewerage facilities existed in these towns, it was proposed to

complete sewerage works by 2001. Work on laying of I&D sewer was started in

1998 and completed during 2001 at a cost of Rs

1.47 crore. Work on construction of STPs was under progress and a total expenditure

of Rs 3.83 crore had been incurred upto March 2004.

No provision for internal sewer lines was made and thus no internal sewer had

been laid in any of these towns due to which I&D sewer laid at a cost of Rs 1.47

crore in these towns remained non-functional thereby defeating the very purpose

of the pollution abatement.


Under utilization of structures resulting in recurring expenditure on running of

Sewage Treatment Plant

3.2.29 Under YAP, the department constructed, 10 upflow anaerobic sludge blanket

(UASB) plants in six8

towns. The domestic waste water treated in a UASB reactor

was suitable for discharging in river water; and the biogas generated through process

could also be utilized for generating electricity for running the plant. In order to

utilize the energy generated from biogas, various structures and equipments were

provided and electricity generating system installed at all the UASB Plants at a cost

of Rs.2.27 crore.

It was noticed that against capacity of generating electricity for 6-8 hours daily,

electricity was generated for 2 hours per day on an average in all the STPs (except

STP at Faridabad). This was much less than what was projected during the

preparation of detailed project report on the basis of the design of UASB technology.

For the remaining time electricity was arranged from external sources to run the

STPs and its auxiliary pumps. Had the electricity been fully produced from the

biogas as envisaged in the detailed project reports and design of UASB technology,

the department would have saved Rs 77,000 per month as energy charges (at the rate

of Rs 11,000 per month per STP).

Failure of the department in not generating enough energy sufficient to run the plant

had resulted in unfruitful expenditure of Rs 2.27 crore incurred on infrastructures

raised for generating electricity.

The EE, Panipat stated (November 2003) that cost of electricity produced from the

biogas was equal to the electricity used from external source. The fact remains that

since the equipments have been installed for generation of electricity, the same

should have been utilized to optimum capacity to save upon electricity that had to be

sourced externally particularly in view of electricity being a scarce resource.


3.2.30 In several towns of the State, there were large number of dry latrines, which

were environmentally/aesthetically unsuitable and created unhygienic conditions. In

these towns, there were certain identified slum areas where people did not have latrines

in their houses or nearby. So in order to have better sanitation facilities, it was decided

to construct community toilets/complexes in six9

towns. However, instead of

constructing the community toilets in identified slum areas, the department constructed

33 units at a cost of Rs. 2.95 crore at places like bus stands, administrative complexes,

etc. where such facilities were already existing.

Executive Engineers, YAP Division, Yamunanagar and Panipat stated (November

2003) that as per allotment letter, the site was to be selected in consultation with the

Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) keeping in view the viability of these units.

The reply was not tenable as the purpose of construction of these toilets was to reduce

pollution level in slum areas where no such facilities existed. Besides, the reply was

silent about the diversion of funds for sites other than slum areas. Thus, the

expenditure was not justified under the scheme.

3.2.31 A large number of industries are located in the catchments of WJC at

Yamunanagar/Jagadhari and Yamuna river at Panipat, some of which were

generating heavy organic pollution. At Jagadhari/Yamunanagar, 96.13 MLD of

treated, untreated or partially treated industrial and domestic effluent was discharged

into the WJC. Central Pollution Control Board in a survey conducted during February

2003 measured high concentration of Total Suspended Solids (TSS) (158mg/l), Bio-

chemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) (190 mg/l) and Ammonia Nitrogen (30.5 mg/l).

Similarly, 92.81 MLD untreated or partially treated industrial and domestic effluent

including treated effluent from Panipat town was discharged into Yamuna river

through drain number 2. Details of major industries discharging heavy pollution load

in these towns were as under:

Sr.No. Name of

town

Name of industries BOD TSS

1

Yamunanagar Haryana Distillery 292 661

2 Sonipat Sterling Agro 68 59

3 Kundli Industrial area of Kundli

town 2407 1272

4 Sonipat Bharat leather 393 223

5 Sonipat Sugra leather Akbarpur 61 566

6 Samalkha Haryana organics 139 127


Haryana State Pollution Control Board had not initiated any action against these

polluting units to take remedial measures.

3.2.32 SPCB was required to inspect sewage/trade effluents works, plants for the

treatment of sewage and trade effluents and review plans, specifications or other data

relating to these activities. However, except in six towns, which were covered under

YAP, the Board did not monitor the quality of water and pollution load in the

towns/cities where 349.15 MLD untreated sewage was being discharged into open

fields/drains.

Besides, the execution/completion of works was required to be effectively monitored

by the EIC, with a view to ensure that for each work, targets relating to time, cost,

services, etc. were achieved. However, no monitoring cell was created to watch the

progress of works. The periodical progress reports (physical & financial) received by

the EIC from the field officers were neither scrutinized properly nor effective follow up

action taken. The reports did not indicate time frame fixed for completion of schemes.

As a result 60 sewerage schemes undertaken by the divisions during 1999-2004 and 25

schemes more than five year old remained incomplete. Funds were not earmarked for

completing the left out works resulting in non-commissioning of schemes.

The works under YAP were monitored in YAP wing functioning in the office of the

EIC, Public Health and the quality of water was monitored by the HSPCB. The State

Government was to constitute Citizen Monitoring Committee (CMC) for each town,

as per directive of the National River Conservation Directorate, Ministry of

Environment and forest, GOI issued in March 1995, to monitor the progress of

execution and timely completion of schemes, their operation and maintenance and to

facilitate public awareness / participation. The CMCs were to meet once in a month.

However, CMCs were constituted in only 6 out of 12 towns and in these towns also no

meeting was held. Thus, CMCs were not functional.

3.2.33 The department had not completed any of the 85 sewerage and sanitation

schemes (25 ongoing schemes prior to March 1999). Sewerage schemes were non-

functional because treated effluents disposal works were not completed as was required

according to the procedure laid by GOI. Due to non-consideration of already laid

sewer, Rs 51.21 lakh were spent on additional work at Sirsa town. Sewerage facilities

were provided to only 10 per cent of the population of Ambala City even after 20 years

of the approval of sewerage scheme. Under YAP, treated effluent was being

discharged in a drain carrying untreated effluent in Yamuna System. STPs constructed

at Faridabad at a cost of Rs 51.27 crore remained underutilised. STPs failed to

maintain prescribed level of pollutants in treated effluents in Faridabad and Gurgaon.

Main Interception and Diversion sewers in five towns could not be made functional

due to non-construction of internal sewer lines for carrying the sewage into main I&D

sewer. Pollution Control Board failed to take effective action against large number of

industrial units, which discharged untreated effluents into Yamuna system. All these

factors led to non-achievement of goals of reducing water pollution and improving


sanitary conditions.

3.2.34 Government should ensure that sewerage schemes are formulated in such a

way that sewerage works are started from the final disposal points going backwards

as laid down in the GOI‟s Sewage and Sewerage Manual;

Works should be completed within prescribed time frame to make the sewerage

system effective;

Sewerage system should be provided for towns where this facility does not exist to

achieve the objective of providing hygienic sanitary conditions;

Government should ensure that capacity of STPs is utilised to the optimum level in

order to treat the maximum sewage of concerned towns;

Effective controls should be put in place to ensure that industrial units treat the

effluents before releasing into drains; and

It should be ensured that pollutants in treated effluents are brought down to the

level of YAP standards.

These points were referred to the Government (June 2004); reply had not been received

(August 2004).

Performance Audit of Implementation of Neeru – Meeru

PANCHAYAT RAJ AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

DEPARTMENT, Andhra Pradesh.

3.7.1 Introduction

State Government launched the Neeru-Meeru in May 2000. The objectives inter

alia are

. • to promote water conservation by recharging ground water,

. • to make concrete efforts on the conservation and utilisation of water,

. • to ensure promotion of suitable cost effective and sustainable measures

for water conservation,

. • to avoid contractors and to ensure participation of people, and

. • to create awareness amongst people for ensuring their participation.

The works61

were to be executed through Self Help Groups (SHGs), Water User’s

Associations and Vana Samrakshana Samithies. Neeru-Meeru is implemented through

District Water Management Agencies (DWMA), and several line departments: Forest,


Panchayat Raj (RWS62

), Municipal Administration, Irrigation and Command Area

Development, and Endowments Departments. The implementation is monitored by the

Project Directors (PDs), DPAP, under the control of District Collectors and overall

supervision is by the Commissioner of Rural Development (Commissioner). Eight phases63

of the programme were implemented64

during the period April 2000 - May 2004.

Implementation of Neeru-Meeru was reviewed in audit by test-check of the records for

the period 2000-04 in the offices of the Commissioner and the Project Directors, DPAP

of Adilabad, Kadapa, Mahboobnagar, Medak, Prakasam and Vizianagaram Districts.

Important findings are discussed below.

3.7.2 Financial performance

Budget allotment of Rs 50 crore was made for the programme for the first time in 2003-

04. In the earlier years namely 2000-03, line departments were asked to divert funds

from various ongoing schemes viz., Drought Funds, EAS65

, NABARD66

, and

MPLADS67

and Agricultural Market Committee funds. Between April 2000 and May

2004, expenditure of Rs 2533.89 crore were incurred on Neeru-Meeru. The

expenditure incurred by each department was as follows:

The expenditure incurred on various types of works is given in Appendix 3.4. In the six

sample districts, total expenditure was Rs 759.87 crore (30 per cent). The

Commissioner had no information about the funds received and expenditure incurred

from each of various sources.

Physical performance

3.7.3 Targets and achievements

The total target68

for the entire State in the eight phases was 52.51 lakh number of

works during the period April 2000 to May 2004; the achievement was 42.04 lakh

works leaving a shortfall of 10.47 lakh works (25 per cent).

The position in the sample districts was as follows:

The Commissioner attributed (June 2004) the shortfall to inadequacy of funds, taking

up of bigger structures depending on the site conditions, and to delay in formation of

DWMA offices.

Neeru-Meeru was loaded with 42.04 lakh works, the majority being low cost petty

works such as rock fill dams, rain water harvesting pits spread over a large number of

mandals. The Commissioner, Rural Development failed to evolve a suitable

mechanism to ensure proper monitoring of such a large number of works. In the

absence of monitoring, other works/services such as supply of water through tankers,

repairs to pipelines, lift irrigation works, raising of nurseries and their maintenance,

afforestation works, repairs to borewells, formation of roads and inspection paths,

construction of drainage lines and manholes, bunding works, jungle clearance works,

taken up at a cost of Rs 245.36 crore were debited to „Neeru-Meeru‟, though not related

to it.


Audit observed during joint physical verification that check measurement of works was

not conducted by DFOs. Most of the structures (rockfill dams, water harvesting

structures and trenches) executed under „Neeru-Meeru‟ were either not in existence or

were in poor condition, mainly due to heavy silt formation, damage caused to

structures and pilferage of stones. This was attributable to poor maintenance of the

structures by the concerned departments. As a result, there was poor recharge of

ground water, defeating the primary objective of the programme. Amount involved in

deficient execution of works could not be quantified since there were a huge number of

petty works, some with cost as low as Rs 400.

3.7.4 Desilting of tanks at a cost of Rs 156.27 crore remained ineffective in

recharging ground water

Member69

, Water Conservation Mission (Neeru-Meeru), constituted to advise on the

technical aspects of watershed in the State observed (January 2003) that desilting of

tanks taken up on a large-scale would be less effective compared to other methods,

such as Continuous Contour Trenches and percolation tanks, in increasing recharge of

ground water. Despite this, the Commissioner did not initiate corrective steps to restrict

the desilting of tanks. It was noticed that 34696 tanks70

were desilted (from January

2003 to December 2003) in all the 23 districts at a total cost of Rs 156.27 crore, which

could not have helped in increasing the ground water level.

Deficiencies noticed in sample districts

Test-check of execution of works under Neeru-Meeru in the six sample districts

revealed selection of unsuitable sites, execution of works not effective to recharge

ground water, inflation of achievements, ineligible works, award of works to

contractors, absence of quality control checks, unauthorised retention of money for

long periods by the departmental officers and unfruitful expenditure as discussed

below.

3.7.5 Incorrect reporting of achievements

Municipality, Ongole took up (June-December 2003) construction of a summer

storage tank to cater to the drinking water needs of the residents. It was noticed

that an expenditure of Rs 5.50 crore towards the cost of earth excavation,

though not related to Neeru-Meeru, was incorrectly shown as achievements

under Neeru-Meeru as if the excavation was for a percolation tank

3.7.6 Execution of works not contemplated under Neeru-Meeru

The objective of the programme was to take up works which would

help recharge

ground water. The executing agencies, however, tookup (Phases I to III) the following

works valued Rs 88.42 lakh though

not related to Neeru-Meeru, which indicated

diversion of scheme funds.

Name and item of work

and Works Name of the executing Expenditure


phase No. sanctioned by agency (Rs in lakh)

Formation of Roads (Phase

II)

District

Collector PD; DPAP, Chittoor 51.03

Developing landscape

garden in Commissioner, Commissioner of 19.36

front of the choultry at

Srisailam

Endowments Endowments, Sri

Bramaramba

and conveyance of earth for Mallikarjuna swamy

temple,

landscape (Phase III) Srisailam

Formation of roads,

providing Municipal

Municipal

Commissioner, 18.03

street slabs and

construction of

Commissioner Anantapur

Meeting Hall (Phase I)

Total 88.42

3.7.7 No quality control of works

The quality control wing of Panchayat Raj Department were to conduct quality control

inspection during execution of Neeru-Meeru works. However, no such inspection was

conducted in respect of the works in Anantapur and Warangal Districts executed at a

cost of Rs 19.67 crore71

. The EEs PR, Warangal and Anantapur replied (September

2004) to Audit that the requirement could not be adhered to due to shortage of quality

control staff.

3.7.8 Works executed without people’s participation

With a view to eliminating contractors, Government ordered (February 2001) that the

works under „Neeru-Meeru‟ should be awarded on nomination to the Self Help

Groups, Water Users Associations and Vana Samrakshana Samithies. Contrary to

these orders, Forest Officers and Executive Engineers awarded (May to September

2001) works valued Rs 100.89 lakh72

to contractors.

The District Collector, Prakasam diverted Rs 1.26 crore from Calamity Relief Fund

(CRF) for Neeru-Meeru and got executed the works with machinery, contrary to the


guidelines for Neeru-Meeru. Similarly, PD, Desert Development Programme,

Anantapur incurred Rs 85.46 lakh on CCT works, without people‟s participation, using

machinery for the purposes.

3.7.9 Unfruitful expenditure on a lift irrigation scheme

District Collector, Medak accorded administrative sanction (July 2000) to a lift

irrigation scheme in Kudavalli river at Pothireddipeta village of Dubbak Mandal for Rs

40 lakh. The work was got executed by the APSCRIC73

(Rs 23.02 lakh) and by

Executive Engineer, Rural Water Supply, Siddipet (Rs 26.07 lakh), after calling for

tenders, through five different contractors74

. The purpose of the scheme was to lift

water from the river to the nearby village tank to augment irrigation potential. Though

such works were outside the scope of the Neeru-Meeru, expenditure Rs 49.09 lakh was

shown under Neeru-Meeru. It was observed that no benefit could be derived from the

completed work as there was no perennial water flow in the river. In case of good rains

both the river and the tank would receive water, and there was no necessity to lift water

into the tank. The department failed to assess the feasibility of the scheme and thus

outlay of Rs 49.09 lakh remained unfruitful (September 2004).

3.7.10 Joint inspection by Audit and departmental engineers

Joint inspection of selected works in the six sample districts, conducted by Audit and

the Departmental Engineers, revealed that proper care was not taken to select the sites

or to identify works suitable to the terrain, as shown below:

Name of the work Expenditure Name of the Deficiencies noticed

inspected involved executing

(Rupees in Agency

lakh)

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Construction of

Check Dam in

Mudigonda village of

Kothapatnam

Mandal (Prakasam

District)

16.00 PD; DPAP,

Ongole

As per the guidelines, Check Dams

were to be constructed only in the

recharge areas. It was however

observed that the Check Dam was

constructed (May 2001) in black

clayey soils not suitable for

recharge of ground water. The

structure was useful only for

storage purpose.

Construction of rain

water

7.49* Municipalities, Works were taken up without

consulting


harvesting structures

–

Tadipatri, Ground Water Department. The

structures

Municipality -

Tadipatri

Hindupur were constructed (Phase I) in soils

not

and Hindupur suitable for recharge of ground

water.

Expenditure proved to be wasteful.

Excavation of

Continuous

Peripheral Contour

3.43 DFO, Forest

Department,

The CPCTs were excavated (under

Phase II) in areas where the

gradient was less

Trenches (CPCTs) in

Chittoor District

Chittoor than 10 per cent ignoring the

concept of „Ridge to valley‟. As a

result, the purpose of arresting the

velocity of water and consequently

erosion of soil, was not

achieved.

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Excavation of

Continuous Contour

Trenches(CCTs)

Phase VII

2.03 DFO, Forest

Department,

Adilabad

No „septas75‟ were provided in the

trenches to retain water for

percolation. In the absence of septas

water will escape from the trenches

without the purpose being served.

This resulted in wasteful

expenditure.

Construction of

Check

1.10 EE (RWS), The structures were constructed in

Dams and Percolation Panchayat

Raj,

unsuitable soils i.e., black clayey

soils not

tanks in Adilabad

District

Adilabad suitable for percolation of water.

Expenditure proved to be wasteful.

* Municipality, Tadipatri (Rs 3.31 lakh) and Municipality, Hindupur (Rs 4.18 lakh)


3.7.11 Unauthorised retention of Government money by the departmental officers

Executive Engineer, Irrigation Division, Khammam advanced (July 2001 – July 2002)

Rs 1.65 crore to the Sub-Divisional Officers, Assistant Executive Engineers and

Assistant Engineers for execution of works under Neeru-Meeru. Of this Rs 1.08 crore

remained unutilised with them as of June 2004. Retention of Government money by

the officials for a period of over two years amounts to temporary misappropriation.

3.7.12 Fall in ground water levels

A comparative study of ground water levels as on 31 March 2003 and 31 March 2004

revealed that though there was some increase (ranging from 1.96 metres to 2.26 metres)

in ground water levels in Khammam, Medak, Visakhapatnam, a fall in ground water

table ranging from 0.13 metres to 3.04 metres was noticed in the following districts

(including the two sample districts) even after executing „Neeru-Meeru‟ works.

The fall in water table was attributable to poor recharge of ground water which was

mainly due to the failure of the line departments to select suitable structures and sites

that help recharge ground water.

3.7.13 House committee to enquire into irregularities in implementation of

Neeru-Meeru

Government have announced (July 2004) on the floor of Legislative Assembly

appointment of House Committee to enquire into the alleged irregularities in

implementation of Neeru-Meeru. The results of the enquiry were awaited (October

2004).

3.7.14 Conclusions

Implementation of Neeru-Meeru was marred by injudicious selection of sites,

unscientific selection of works, overloading with large number of petty works,

execution of works not effective for recharge of water, award of works to contractors,

inflated reporting of achievements, absence of quality control checks coupled with lack

of monitoring during execution of works and poor maintenance after completion.

Physical verification revealed that most of the structures executed under Neeru-Meeru

were either missing or were in poor condition, due to various reasons. The primary

objective to recharge ground water was not achieved; the ground water levels actually

fell during 2003-04 in eight districts.


Selection of works should be done scientifically, in consultation with the Ground

Water Department.

The ban on engagement of contractors for Neeru-Meeru works

should be effectively enforced, so as to enhance people‟s


participation.

Steps need to be taken to sensitise the people about the benefits of water

conservation.

Quality control checks should be conducted on all works.

The above points were referred to Government in July 2004; reply had not been

received (October 2004)

IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENT ACTS RELATING TO WATER

POLLUTION

The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act was enacted in 1974 to address

the issue of water pollution and to create and to create appropriate regulatory mechanism.

Audit reviewed the implementation of the Act in several States and found that the objective

of prevention and control of pollution of water bodies was not achieved mainly due to poor

compliance with various provisions of the Act and the Rules made there under. The State

Pollution Control Boards in several States did not complete the process of identification of

polluting industries and most industrial units were functioning without consent from State

Boards. A major such area was failure of State Pollution Control Boards to regulate and

control the discharge of industrial effluents and domestic sewage into water bodies. The

State Boards also failed to take effective action against defaulting industries.There

was significant shortfall in inspection of polluting industries even with reference to the

targets fixed for such inspection, which were already very low. Local bodies in the

States discharged untreated domestic waste into the water bodies due to inadequate

sewerage system and sewage treatment plants. Consequently, the water quality of the

rivers continued to deteriorate in terms of Bio-Chemical Oxygen Demand and total

coliforms. The drinking water supplied to big towns in various States did not

conform to the parameters fixed. In summary, due to poor implementation of the Act, the

objective of controlling water pollution was not achieved even to a modest degree.

Highlights

The State pollution Control Boards of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh,

Jammu &n Kashmir, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Rajasthan did not

complete the process of identification of polluting units.

Most of the industrial units in the States functioned without obtaining consent from


State Boards in Absence of a proper control mechanism.

Failure of the State Boards to take effective action against the industries, which either

did not install the pollution control devices or did not operate these facilities, resulted

in discharge of untreated effluents into water bodies and onto land.

The State Boards did not regularly conduct inspection of the polluting units as

directed by the Ministry of Environment and Forests. There was considerable

shortfall in actual inspection against the targets fixed for inspection.

The drinking water being supplied to big towns in the States did not conform to the

parameters fixed for drinking water.

Inadequate sewerage system and sewage treatment plants with the local bodies in

the States led to discharge of untreated domestic waste into the water bodies and

onto land.

Inadequate resources with Municipal Corporation to tackle sewage, led to discharge

of domestic sewage and industrial effluents into rivers resulting in deterioration of

water quality in terms of Bio-Chemical Oxygen Demand and total coliforms.

1. Introduction

The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, is the first specific and

comprehensive legislation to address the issue of water pollution. It also

simultaneously created the regulatory agencies for controlling water pollution.

The Pollution Control Board at the Center and State Pollution Control Boards in the

States, which are the regulatory authorities, came into being in terms of this Act.

The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act 1977 was enacted in order

to conserve this vital natural resources and to augment the finances of these

regulatory agencies.

2. Main provisions of the Water Act

The act is intended to provide for the prevention and control of water pollution and

the maintaining or restoring of wholesomeness of water; for establishment of Boards

for preventing and control of water pollution; for conferring on and assigning to such

Boards Power and functions relating to prevention and control of water pollution and

for matters connected therewith.


Under Section 3 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 the

Central Government consulting the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), which

functions under the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF).

Similarly, under Section 4 of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974,

the State Governments constituted State Pollution Control Boards (SPCB‟s) in order

to perform the functions assigned to the Board under the Act.

Section 18 of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, stipulates

that where the Central Government is of the opinion that the State Board has

defaulted in complying with the directions given by the Central Board, it may direct

the Central Board to perform any of the functions of the State Board.

3. Main functions of the Central/State Boards under the Water Act

The following are the main functions of the Central/State Boards under the Water

Act:

(i) Planning comprehensive programmes for prevention, control or

abatement of pollution of streams and wells in the State and the execution

thereof,

(ii) Collection and dissemination of information relating to water pollution

and the prevention, control or abatement thereof,

(iii) Inspection of sewage/trade effluents plants for the treatment of sewage

(iv) Laying down standards for treatment of sewage and trade effluents

and evolving efficient methods for their disposal.

4. Audit Coverage

The principal aim of audit was to assess the degree of compliance shown in the

enforcement of the law, rules and regulation governing pollution control. A test

check of records in 20 States relating to survey, water quality and schemes

undertaken for treating the water along with Central and State Schemes implemented

for prevention, control or abatement of water pollution covering the period from

1995-96 to 1999-2000 was conducted in audit during 2000-2001.

Audit also assessed the mechanism of funding and monitoring and the linkages

between the Center and the States in implementing the schemes for abatement and

control water pollution.


5. Organizational Setup

MoEF headed by a Secretary is the nodal agency for the prevention and control of

pollution in the country. CPCB constituted by the Ministry has a full time Chairman,

a Member Secretary, five members each representing the Central Government and

nominated from among the members of the State Boards. Three non-official

members represent the fields of Agriculture, Fisheries, Industries and two members

represent Companies owned/controlled by Central Government.

In the States, Department of Environment, (in some states along with Forest, Science

and Technology) headed by a Secretary is responsible for control of environment

pollution. State Government have constituted SPCB‟s for the enforcement of

environment legislation.

6. Finance

A. Central Funding

MoEF has been funding CPCB for its Plan and Non-Plan activities. The Ministry

also provides funds to the State Government for implementation of Centrally

Sponsored River Action Plans for abatement of pollution and conservation of water

quality of the rivers. Funds are also released to SPCB, Research Institution,

Universities, NGOs and Industrial Units for specific projects/schemes.

i) Assistance to Pollution Control Boards in the States for Specific

projects/schemes.

Financial assistance is provided to State Pollution Control Boards and Union

Territory Pollution Control Committees (UTPCCs) for specific Projects/Studies.

The project/ studies proposed by SPCB‟s/UTPC‟s are examined in the Ministry in

consultation with CPCB. Financial assistance is then provided to

SPCBs/UTPCC‟s in installments. The subsequent installments are released only

after verification of utilization certificates and expenditure statements received from

them in respect of earlier installments. Against the provision of Rs. 12.75 crore in the

IX Five Year Plan towards assistance for abatement of pollution, only Rs. 3 crore

was utilized up to March 2001.

MoEF also provides assistances to the Pollution Control Boards in the States of

Gujarat, Maharashtra., Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu to cover the procurement of

equipment with the objective of strengthening the monitoring and enforcement

abilities of Pollution Control Boards in these States.


ii) Funding for River Action Plans

Prior to 1 April 1997, funds for the implementation of River Action Plans viz.

Ganga Action Plan Phase I and II and National River Conservation Plan were

shared equally between Central and State Government. However, Cabinet

Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) in 1998 approved 100 per cent

funding of these schemes from 1 April

1997. The Action Plan involves interception and diversion schemes,

construction of sewage treatment plants, construction of bathing ghats, electric

crematoria, community toilets and other miscellaneous schemes. The Detailed

Project Reports(DPRs) submitted by the implementing agencies through State

Government are examined by the experts at National River Conservation

Directorate (NRCD) and MoEF and

thereafter, administrative approval and expenditure sanction in accorded.

The total provision made, expenditure and unspent provisions for river action

plans was as under:-

Rs in Crore

Action Plan Year Total

Provision

Actual

Expenditure

Unspent

Provision Ganga Action

Plan, Phase-I

1997-98

1998-99

1999-2000

5.30

8.73

2.00

3.30

2.50

-

2.00

6.23

2.00 Ganga Action

Plan, Phase-II

1997-98

1998-99

1999-2000

86.00

165.00

120.00

82.30

87.43

90.38

3.70

77.57

29.62 National River

Action Plan

1997-98

1998-99

1999-2000

14.00

14.00

70.00

10.74

14.00

62.05

3.26

-

7.95

The progress of the schemes was slow and utilization of funds was not

satisfactory.

iii) Assistance for setting up Common Effluent Treatment Plant

a company or society constitute specifically to own, operate and maintain common

facilities for treatment and disposal of solid, liquid and gaseous waste generated by

small and medium scale units located in clusters is eligible for assistance under

the scheme. The Government of India finances 25 per cent of project cost 25 per

cent is to be financed by concerned State Government and 20 per cent is to be

contributed by the promoter, and remaining 30 per cent may be obtained as loan


from financial Institutions. The consent of SPCB is sufficient for a company to

approach financial institutions for obtaining the loan component. The Central

Government releases its matching share based on release by State Government.

As of March 2000, 89 Common Effluent Treatment Plants (CETPs) has been

approved for providing financial assistance. The details of CETPs sanctioned are

given below:-

Status of CETPs

S.No.

Name of the

State/UT

GOI subsidy disbursed

(Rs in lakhs)

No. of CETPs

1. Andhra Pradesh 132.00 3

2. Delhi 2300.00 15

3. Gujarat 735.42 7

4. Himachal Pradesh 12.60 4

5. Haryana 11.89 1

6. Karnataka 98.84 3

7. Madhya Pradesh 96.00 3

8. Maharashtra 267.43 9

9. Punjab 19.95 4

10. Rajasthan 100.00 2

11. Tamil Nadu 1934.08 36

12. Uttar Pradesh 95.75 2

Total 5803.96 89

B. State Funding

As per Section 35 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution 1974, the State

Government may, after due appropriate as decided by the State Legislature make in

each financial year such contribution to the State Boards as it may think necessary

to enable that Board to perform its functions.

C. StateBoard‟s own receipts

The other main sources of income of State Board is its own receipts from share of


Water consent fee, sample testing fee and sale proceeds of application forms,

financial assistance from CPCB. The total amount released as central share of

water cess was Rs. 43.32 crore during 2000-2001. It was observed in audit that

though more than two-thirds of the total expenditure of the State Boards was on Staff

& administration, most weak in proper discharge of their assigned duties.

Failure of various State Government in formulating the policies and programmes for

meeting the statutory requirement regarding prevention of pollution resulting in

non- utilization of funds from time to time.

Funds aggregating Rs 145.95 crore were lying unspent in 9 States as on 1 April

2000 as given below: -

Rs in Crore

Name of States Unspent

Amount Andhra Pradesh 34.32

Gujarat 19.95

Harayana 16.27

Jammu & Kashmir 0.71

Punjab 28.94

Rajasthan 10.50

Tripura 1.80

Uttar Pradesh 27.52

West Bengal 5.94

Total 145.95

7. Monitoring of the Schemes Projects

In the Ministry, the pollution abatement schemes are reviewed and monitored

through internal evaluation and also through the CPCB and SPCBs.

The implementation of various rivers action plans viz. Ganga Action Plan Phase-

I & Phase_II and National River Conservation Plan is monitored by an apex body,

and National River Conservation Authority (NRCA) headed by Prime Minister,

which was to meet at least once every year. NRCA, however met only twice during

the period 1994 to Marc 2000. The implementation of the various schemes is also

monitored by a Steering Committee headed by Secretary, MoEF with members from


all concerned States, CPCB and also research organization. The meeting of the

Steering Committee are held once every three months. In addition, NRCD,

MoEF also undertake field visits and review meetings with the implementation

agencies. NRCD has also developed a format in which the physical progress of the

various schemes is obtained from the implementing every month.

As per provision of Section 8 of Water Act, CPCB is required to meet at least once in

every three months to monitor and review its own activities regarding laying of

standards for streams and other water bodies, fixing emission standards for pollution

from various sources and plan schemes for prevention, control or abatement of water

pollution.

8. Surveys for Identification of Polluting Industries

Section 25 of the Water Act as amended in 1988, stipulates that no person shall,

without the previous consent of the SPCB:-

a) Establishing or take any step to establish any industry, operation or process,

or any treatment and disposal system or an extension or addition thereto,

which is likely to discharge sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well or

sewer or on land; or

b) Bring in to use any new or altered outlets for the discharge of sewage.

Boards are to identify the polluting units and monitor them closely. Up-to-

date information regarding the industries operating in the State was required to

identify polluting units and to take remedial measures.

However, a large number of States were found wanting in carrying out adequate

surveys for identification of polluting units. In Tripura, the information

collected during the survey was at wide variance with the information available in

the records of the Director of Industries and Commerce reportedly due to incomplete

survey. It was, therefore, not possible for the Boards in these States to identify cases

where licenses were issued to new industries by industries Department without

obtaining clearance from the Boards.

9. Municipal Bodies/Industries functioning without statutory consent

According to Section 25(1) of the Water Act 1974, no municipal Body/industry shall,

without the previous consent of the SPCBs, discharge sewage or trade effluent into a

stream/well or on land. The consent so granted has to be renewed after a period of

two years on prescribed fees. The Pollution Control

Board (PCB) could refuse consent already granted if the unit has not applied for

renewal. The PCB could prosecute defaulting industrial units in

terms of Section 25(5) of the Water Act 1974. The Supreme Court had also directed

in 1997 that the CPCB and all SPCBs should ensure compliance with the provisions

of the Water Act 1974 by everyone including the municipal bodies and the

industries. Text check in various States revealed that there was no mechanism in

most States to ensure that the units were functioning only after obtaining valid

consent. Details of non-compliance of the said provisions in some of the States were

as under:-

Gujarat

In 1380 cases consent was not given by the Board. The Board had no mechanism

to check whether units were operating even after rejecting of applications/non-

renewal of consent and to initiate action for closure/penalty for such units

discharging effluent. 30 textile mills and dye-manufacturing units were in operation

without consent for six month to 16 years.

Haryana

Out of 2867 polluting units by the Board, 611 units were operating without applying

for grant of consent.

Himachal Pradesh

Of the 58 Municipal Committees/Notified Area Committees, consent had been

granted to only one Municipal Committee. In addition, there were 122 Government

hospitals and public health center but in none of the cases had the consent been

applied for or granted. Two industrial units in Kangra district were operating for the

last 10 and 16 years respectively without obtaining any consent from the Board.

Jammu & Kashmir

The Board granted consent to 357 out of 489 industrial units who had applied

for it during 1995-2000. The consents were granted arbitrarily without

conducting any analysis of trade effluents discharged by these units. Further test

check revealed that 6 highly polluting industrial units and 4 distilleries in Jammu

were operating without the consent of the Board.

Karnataka

Out of 9012 industries in the State, 6891 operating industries were identified as those

requiring consent. However, 2169 industries out of these were found to be

operating without the consent of the Board.

Maharashtra

Out of 15 Municipality Corporation and 219 Municipal Councils, 13 Municipal

Corporations and 218 Municipal Councils did not hold even applied for the consent.

Except for issuing notices to the Municipal Bodies, the Board had not initiated any

other action.

Meghalaya

77 industries had not applied as of March 2000 for renewal of consent although

validity of last annual consent had expired between September 1989 and February

1999.

The local bodies viz. 2 Municipalities at Shillong and Tura town committees in

other urban areas had not obtained the consent from the Board as of March 2000.

The Board had not ascertained the level of effluent discharge by these local bodies.

Orissa

As of March 1999 there were 102 urban local bodies in Orissa. But none of these

had been granted consent by the State Board under Water Act.

Punjab

Out of 5745 industries, the Board identified 3317 as polluting as of March 2000, of

which consent was granted to only 930 units during this period. Out of

4 Municipal Corporations, (Amritsar, Jalandhar, Ludhiana and Patiala)

discharging the highest quantity of sewage and 125 Municipal Committees, only

32 had applied for consent during 1994-99. Only six were granted conditional

consent.

The State Board did not take action the local bodies that failed to apply for consent.

Through renewal of consent was due in 773 cases, only 642 units applied for

renewal. No action was initiated by the State Board against 131 units who did nor

apply for renewal.

Rajas than

As against the identified 1670 highly polluting units, 1317 units are operating without

consent. In case of other polluting units, 1326 units were running without consent.

The Board had taken no action to bring these units under the consent mechanism.

Tamil Nadu

Out of 20532 units identified by the Board, 18229 units had applied for

renewal of consent and as of March 2000, the consent had been issued to 15425

units. Consents for

198 large-scale highly polluting industries had not been renewed, even much after it

was due for renewal. The industries continue to operate without consent.

Tripura

Out of 2422 industrial units identified by the Board, consent were given in

respect of

1137 units and renewal was permitted in respect of 547 units during 1988-

2000.

Consequent to issue of audit review to MoEF in July 2001, CPCB in August

2001 directed all SPCBs and Pollution Control Committees (PCCs) to identify

industries operating without valid consent and to take appropriate legal action

against all such industries including immediate closure of the units wherever

necessary.

10. Industries without Effluent Treatment Plants (ETPs)

Under Section 24 of Water Act no person shall knowingly cause or permit any

poisonous or polluting matter to enter (whether directly or indirectly) into any stream

or well or sewer or on land.

In pursuance of the action plan formulated by MoEF, CPCB identified 1551 large

and medium major polluting industries, which came into operation on or

before 31st December 1991 in 17 categories. In term of a notification issued in

February 1992 by Government of India, highly polluting industries were to install

ETPs by June 1994. the progress was reviewed by SPCBs/PCCs and data was

complied by CPCB and sent to MoEF. As of 30 June 2001, 1348 units had

adequate pollution control facilities to comply with the standards, 176 units has

been closed and 27 units were defaulters. The inventorisation of large and medium

industries, which came into operation on and after 1

January 1992, has been initiated. In pursuance of a decision taken by NRCA,

CPCB at the instance of MoEF issued directed to all SPCB/PCCs in July 1997

requiring them to direct the defaulting industries (discharging their effluents into

rivers and lakes) to take necessary action for effluent treatment within three months

failing which closure notice shall be issued. As of 30 June 2001, 608 industries has

provided the requisite treatment facilities, 236 units had been closed and in 7 units

that had defaulted, action for closure was in progress.

In most of the states the Effluent Treatment Plants/Common Effluent Treatment

Plants (ETPs/CETPs) were either not installed or the number installed was

inadequate. The status of installation of ETPs in various states as revealed in test

check was as under:

Andhra Pradesh

Government of India/Board has identified (September 2000) 237 highly polluting

industries and 75 grossly polluting industries. However, no effective action had been

initiated by the Board against any of these industries so far.

Forty highly polluting industries in Katedan Industrial Estate (Hyderabad) had been

operating without ETPs. The effluents generated by these industries were

being discharged either into the land within their premises or in open areas

contaminating the surroundings. Apart from issuing slow cause notices for non-

compliance, no effective measures were taken by the state board to control the

pollution caused by these industries.

There are 240 industries granted conditional consent to industries which did not

comply with the statutory standards prescribed under the Act.

Thermal, Steel, Leather plants and various distilleries either had no ETPs or had

installed ETP were not capable of treating the effluents discharges, thereby polluting

the rivers and other bodies.

Gujarat

As against 170 developed and operational industrial estates, only 10 CETPs were in

operation in the state. The Board had prescribed norms for both inlet and outlet

effluent quality of CETP. Test-check of records revealed that the performance of

CETPs in term of treatment of industrial effluents was poor. The characteristics of

inlet effluents at all CETPs were more than those prescribed by the Board indicating

that individual members were not carrying out effective primary treatment before

discharging the effluents into CETPs. None of the CETPs discharged the treatment

effluents as per the norms of the Boards. However, no penal action, except issue of

show cause notices, was taken by the Board.

Haryana

Although 1535 polluting industrial units were operating in the State as on 31

March 2000, ETPs has been installed only in 996 units. The remaining 539 units had

either no treatment facility or had inadequate facilities. The Board launched

prosecution against 7 units, issued closure orders against 100 units and issued show

cause notices to remaining 432 units.

However to avoid industrial slow down and also unemployment in the State it was

decided(May 1998) by the Board that no industry, even if polluting and unresponsive

would be closed. Thus the powers of the Board to close down the non-complying

units were used sparingly.

Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC) responsible for setting

up of Industrial estates in the State constructed the CETP at Kundli with a

capacity to treat 11.08-lakh liter of effluent per day. This was inadequate as

additional 9-lakh liter of effluent per day was still being released untreated by

various units in the estate. The Environment Department released Rs 21.64 lakh

during 1997-98 to HSIDC as subsidy for construction of CETPs at Jind and

Murthal for treatment of 4.63 lakh liters trade effluent per day. However, only first

part of CETP at Jind was complete and no CETP at Murthal was constructed so far.

Himachal

Pradesh

The Board had not identified total number of polluting industries, which required

ETPs but had granted consent to 1401 industrial units as of March 1999.

Records in the regional offices at Baddi, Jassur, Parwanoo and Una revealed that

ETPs provided in four large-scale units in Solan districts were not working

satisfactorily thereby polluting the water bodies. No ETP had been provided by the

Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation in its seven workshops falling

under the jurisdiction of Jassur and Una Regional offices. No penal action had

been taken against the defaulting units so far.

Karnataka

As of March 1999, of the 6891 operating industries 6120 (89 per cent) had

installed ETPs. Out of 120 industries identified by the Board as highly polluting, 99

had installed ETPs as of March 1999. The Board had closely down 14 defaulting

units during 1994- 99. Work on ETPs in the remaining 7 industries had not been

completed even six years after expiry of the time limit prescribed by Government

of India. Subsequently, the Board had closed down three of these industries.

Kerala

Six industries, which were granted (1991-98) consent on condition of commissioning

the ETPs by specific dates between May 1991 and June 2000, did not install ETPs

till April 2000. All these units have been discharging untreated effluents into water

bodies.

In respect of 15 units ETPs installed were not working properly. The 11 units, where

ETPs were found inadequate, did not implement the directions of the Boards to

augment the ETPs as of March 2000.

Meghalaya

The data available with the Board revealed that 12 industries had not taken any

action for construction of ETP as of March 2000. The Board, however, had not

initiated any action against these 12 industries although a considerable period of 7 to

38 months from the date of serving notice on them had already elapsed as of March

2000.

Madhya Pradesh

77 industries had not installed the (ETPs) at the end of 1998-99. During 1994-

95 to 1999-2000, no proposal for establishing of CETPs was prepared. The Board

stated (May 2000) that due to slow pace of industrialization the industrialists were

not taken interest in setting up of CETPs.

Maharashtra

Out of 14 CETPs with an aggregate capacity of 78700 cubic meter per day in

Maharashtra, only 6 plants with capacity of 25500 cubic meter per day could be

commissioned as on March 1999. Even out of these 6 plants, the capacity of 3 plants

could not be utilized fully due to non-laying of pipeline for collection of effluents

from member industries.

Punjab

The Board had not maintained any data regarding installation of ETPs by the

industrial units during 1994-98. Water pollution persisted even after installation of

ETPs. Further, out of 3407 ETPs required to be installed during 1998-99, only 1951

(57 per cent) could be installed and only 1440 plants (42 per cent) inspected. The

purpose of monitoring the installation of ETPs to check water pollution was thus

largely defeated.

Tamil Nadu

Of the 6639 large and medium scale industrial units in the State as of March 2000,

1335 units had not installed ETPs so far.

The Board stated in November 2000 that it had ordered closure of 1199 units as per

the directives of High Court. The remaining 136 units, which were at various stages

of constructing the ETPs, had been addressed to expedite the construction.

Out of 939 tanneries, 132 had provided individual ETPs. Out of 26 CETPs required

to be provided for 772 tanneries, 12 CETPs for 620 tanneries had been provided and

were in operation. The remaining 14 CETPs at Tiruchirappali and Vellore were

under process of installation.

Similarly, out of 4173 textile bleaching and dyeing industries which were regarded as

major polluting industries which were regarded as major polluting industries, CETPs

has been provided in 537 units and the installation of CETP was under progress in

905 industries. Closure orders had been issued to 821 units, which had neither

applied for consent of the board nor had provided ETPs. Particulars for the

remaining 1910 units were not available.

Tripura

Through the Board accorded consent to establish/operate 1137 units as of 31 March

2000, setting up of ETPS was not ensured before granting consent. Resultantly only

4 units had installed ETPs. The Board had not identified the total number of

polluting industrial units that required installation of ETPs. The Board stated in

April 2000 that due to lack of technical manpower, it was not possible to identify the

actual number of polluting industrial units that required ETPs.

Uttar Pradesh

Government (Environment Department) had not identified the industrial units which

had not installed the required treatment plants. According to the Board

there were seven grossly polluting big industrial units, which had not installed

treatment plants. Test- check, however revealed that there were many other big

industrial units, which had not installed any treatment plants. At Mirzapur, there

were 14 grossly polluting industries, of which 4 units had not installed proper ETPs.

West Bengal

In West Bengal, none of 31 industrial estates/growth centers with 1203 Ssi units had

any CETP. The Board, however, did not initiate any action for construction of

CETP.

11. Inspection under Water Act

Section 23 of the Water Act lays down that any person empowered by State Board in

this behalf shall have a right at any time to enter, as he considers necessary, any

place:-

a) for the purpose of performing any of the function of the Board entrusted to

him

b) for the purpose of determining whether and if so in what manner, any such

functions are to be performed or whether any provisions of this Act of the

rules made there under of any notice, order, direction or authorization served,

made given or granted under this Act is being or has been complied with.

Officers of the Board are required to visit industries/factories regularly and ascertain

that the programmes for abatement of pollution are being implemented

satisfactorily. MoEF, in September 1998 stipulated that all the consented industries

should be categorized into red, (highly polluting) orange (moderately polluting)

and green (least polluting) depending on pollution potential and should be

inspected at monthly/six monthly/annual intervals. The Surveillance Squads of

SPCBs and CPCB are also conduct the surprise inspection of the polluting

industries. However, the number of such visits

by SPCBs/PCCs was inadequate. The visits of CPCB squads revealed that the

industries either did not have requisite facilities to comply the standards or did not

operate the facilities.

The inspection carried out by State Boards was far from satisfactory. There were

wide variation between the inspections targeted and the inspections actually

conducted. The position as revealed in various States is as under:-

Andhra Pradesh

No norms and targets of inspection were fixed by the State Board. The Board did

not maintained any record of inspections conducted by the field staff. Therefore, it

had no reliable information, based on physical check, whether the pollution

abatement programmes were being followed by the industries.

Gujarat

Test-check of inspections carried out revealed that out of 1985 red category units,

1321 were planned for inspection and only 880 (67 per cent) were actually

inspected. Similarly inadequate inspection was also noticed in greed and orange

category industries. Reasons for shortfall in inspection were not furnished.

Himachal Pradesh

Audit scrutiny revealed that based on the units presently identified and frequency for

inspections fixed, 5450 inspections were required to be conducted against which

only 3735 inspections were carried out by the Board during 1994-1999.

Kerala

The schedule fixed by the Board in 1994 provided for inspection for large, medium

and small units at monthly, quarterly and annual intervals respectively. A test

check of records relating to 418 industries units for the period 1997-2000 in four

regional offices and three district offices however, revealed that only 239 units were

inspected by the Board. 79 to 82 per cent of the remaining 179 industries were not

inspected at all.

Orissa

An evaluation report by NORCONSULT International A.S. regarding the progress

of the project on “Strengthening of Orissa State

Pollution Control Board” in 1994

recommended that the frequency of inspections be increased in respect of

highly polluting industries to at least 12 times a year. As of March 1999, there

were 92 large and highly polluting industries and 106 highly polluting mines in the

State. As per these recommendations, Board should have conducted at least 2376

inspections against which only 1370 inspections were conducted during 1998-

1999 resulting in shortfall in frequency of inspections to the extent of 1006 (45 per

cent) during the year.

Pondicherry

The Pondicherry Pollution Control Committee categorized (December 1998) 623

industries units (red-213, orange-172 and green-238) to be monitored every year, once

in two years and once in three years respectively. However, only 99 units were

monitored during 1999.

Punjab

The Punjab Pollution Control Board decided to inspect the large and medium highly

polluting industries once in 6 months and small highly polluting industries once in a

year. As against the required visits of 2500 in case of large and medium industries the

actual visits were 815. As against the required visits of 17079 in case of small

industries, the actual visits were 4224 during the year 1997-99. It indicates a shortfall

of 67 per cent and 75 per cent respectively.

Tamil Nadu

There was a significant shortfall in inspection of large polluting industries in

the 7 District Offices checked by the Audit. The shortfall ranged from 6 to 92

per cent in respect of red category and from 28 to 100 per cent in respect of orange

category industries during 1995-1999.

West Bengal

The Board identified 2300 red, 4200 orange and 2500 green category industries.

While the red category industries were inspected once a year, the Board fixed no

periodicity for inspection of orange and green category industries. As against the

required 10215 inspections in respect of red categories, the Board conducted only

8637 inspections.

12. Drinking Water

Potable water should be clear, odorless, neither very hard nor too soft and free from

bacteria.

The drinking water being supplied in the various small and big town of the states was

in most cases polluted as detailed below:

Andhra Pradesh

Results of analysis reports of drinking water samples of Hyderabad and

Secunderabad collected analyses by Institute of Preventive Medicine during the

period 1994-2000 revealed that the water supplied was chemically unsatisfactory due

to hardness and high fluoride content. The underground pipes laid long ago had

developed fissures and the drain water had been entering the water supply pipes.

Due to deficiencies in the quality if water supplied by Hyderabad Metropolitan Water

Supply and Sewerage Board, the residents of the twin cities were exposed to

unwholesome water with consequential health hazards. Analysis of

bacteriological quality of water supplied in hotels revealed an alarming high

incidence of 65-75 per cent contamination in the quality of water.

Bihar

State Government or the Bihar SPCB did not fix any desirable

range/parameter of drinking water. Status of potable water in Ranchi, Patna and

Purnea towns revealed that chemical and bacteriological parametric values of

drinking water exceeded the desirable range and also the uppermost limits in many

cases.Over 50 per cent of total urban population in Patna was being supplied

bacteriologically polluted water through water supply system since 1998.

Gujarat

Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board (GWSSB) was to develop reliable source

for drinking water and provide potable water to the communities in rural areas

where drinking water was a problem. Records of GWSSB revealed that number of

identified problem villages for total Dissolved Solids increased from 567 to 960, for

high nitrates from 171 to 386 and for high increased fluoride content from 803 to

1304 from 1997-98 to 1999-2000. Further, in the same water sources salinity, nitrates

and fluorides showed increasing trend.

GWSSB did not furnish information regarding remedial action taken by it to address

the issue.

Punjab

The survey of underground water conducted by SPCB in 1993-94 at Ludhiana,

Jalandhar, Amritsar, Ropar and Nangal revealed that ground water of these cities

was contaminated in nearly all the areas and abandonment of these sources was

recommended.As no effective action to supply potable water in these towns was

taken by the Sewerage Board/MCs, the people of these towns were compelled to use

and drink contaminated underground water.

Sikkim

The PH value of drinking water of certain area of Gangtok like Lalmarket, Old

market and Baluwakhani localities showed variation from the prescribed standard

because of contamination taking place through leakages. The water at Deorali

was found to be acidic. Ammonia was found in the drinking water in Gangtok,

which indicated lack of proper and sealed pipeline network.

Tamil Nadu

Out of the water sources in the state about 9 per cent were not potable due to

excessive fluoride, about 10 per cent due to excessive nitrate, about 7 per cent due to

excessive iron and about 28 per cent to excessive total dissolved solids.

As per the details furnished (February 2000) by the Director of Public health and

Preventive Medicine, there were 1903 reported deaths from Cholera and acute

Diarrhoea and other disease during the period 1994-1999 due to major infection

caused by leakage of pipeline, bore well, improper maintenance of overhead thanks

and contamination of water sources like wells, streams and rivers.

Tripura

Dissolved iron ranged between 1.21 and 8.12 in the ground water of the state as

against the permissible limit of 0.3 mg. Per liter. The high concentration of iron

in water not only contributes to incidence of amoebiasis but also is directly

responsible for the high incidence of gall stone disease in the State. But no initiative

was taken by the SPCB to reduce the dissolved iron in ground water to maintain the

mandatory standard of drinking water quality.

West Bengal

School of Environmental Studies, Jadavpur University conducted studies on the

bacteriological and physio-chemical quality of drinking water of 100 municipal wards

supplied by Calcutta Municipal Corporation during 1993 to 1998. Test result of

water samples indicated that calcium and Sodium contents in water were much

higher than the permissible limit of 24.04 per cent and 13.06 per cent cases

respectively. Besides 27.37 per cent of samples indicated presence of residual

chlorine, which is highly toxin being beyond the permissible limit. Further, water

in 32 wards was found bacteriologically contaminated due to leakages in pipelines.

13. Pollution due to domestic sewage from urban areas

Domestic sewage is a major source of urban water pollution. In order to maintain

the wholesomeness of water and to control and prevent natural water from being

polluted, the Boards are required under the Water Act (i) to inspect sewage or trade

effluents, works and plants for their treatment and disposal, (ii) to lay down effluent

standards for the sewage and trade effluents and (iii) to evolve efficient methods of

disposal of sewage and trade effluents on land or into any stream taking into account

the minimum fair weather dilution available in that stream. Local bodies in towns

were required to install STPs for controlling pollution caused by domestic sewage.

Most urban local bodies did not have adequate sewerage system and STPs and were

discharging untreated domestic waste either into water bodies or onto land. Test

check of records in various states revealed the following shortcoming.

Andhra Pradesh

Out of 109 municipalities and 7 municipal corporations, only the municipal

corporations of Hyderabad and Vijayawada had established STPs for treating

domestic sewage. The other local bodies were discharging untreated domestic waste

into water bodies.

Bihar

Five STPs were established between December 1993 and December 1999 under

Ganga Action Plan to treat 115 million liters of sewage per day. However, only

50 mld of sewage was treated in these STPs due to shortage of electricity and lack of

maintenance. Thus, 79 mld sewage was being discharge into the Ganga untreated

along with several other direct discharges through other sources.

Gujarat

(a) While the State has 6 municipal corporations and 110 other local bodies,

only 27 local bodies had a drainage system.

(b) While five corporation and six local bodies had STPs, only three

were operational.

(c) None of the effluent samples from any STP were as per the norms.

(d) Further, both Pirana and Vasna STPs of Ahmedabad Municipality

Corporation had an unauthorized bypass, which was used for discharging

effluent treatment.

Haryana

82 local bodies in various towns of State were causing 65 per cent of pollution. Of

these, 12 towns identifies under Ganga action Plan were being covered for

construction of STPs whereas there was no plan to construct STPs in the remaining

70 local bodies.

Himachal Pradesh

Municipal waste of 227 tones per day gets accumulated in the 8 principal towns of

Himachal Pradesh and is dumped in various streams, rivers and hill slopes etc.

thereby polluting water.

The existing sewerage system in Shimla laid down in1880 consists of simple

detention tanks where only sedimentation process takes place. It is incapable

of handling the present load of sewage, the excess effluent of which is being

discharged into natural watercourses without any treatment.

Jammu & Kashmir

The city of Jammu had no proper for disposal of solid wastes, municipal garbage and

hospital wastes, which were generally dumped, along riverbeds.

Kerala

In Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala Water Authority has been maintaining a sewage

system covering only 30-40 per cent of the present population. About 50 per cent of

the sewage of the town overflow and was directly discharged into the river Killy,

Parvathy and Puthana. The water on the riverbanks used by public for drinking

purpose disclosed high concentration of fecal coliforms.

Madhya Pradesh

No municipal committee/corporation had set up any full-fledged sewerage system

and STPs.

Maharashtra

The domestic effluents generated in Mumbai were 2562 mld, of which 929 mld. (36

per cent) was adequately treated and 1633 mld. (64 per cent) remained untreated as

of March 2000. The untreated municipal wastes along with industrial effluents

were being discharged into the Arabian Sea.

Most Untreated effluents in 14 Municipal Corporations as of March 2000 including

Pune, Thane, Nashik and Kolhapur was discharged into the river bodies/creeks

without treatment.

The Board did not maintain data on the effluents discharged by the 231

Municipal Council in the State.

Meghalaya

There was no STP set up for treatment of domestic sewage even in Shillong. Orissa

There was practically no complete sewage system in any of the urban settlement in

the State barring a few industrial townships as of March 1999. As a result, raw

sewage from these local bodies was being discharged into the valleys of Daya

River, which in turn joins Chilka Lake. The untreated sewage discharged from

Bhubaneshwar city and other urban bodies significantly contributed to the pollution

load of Chilka Lake.

In Rourkela and Cuttack the untreated sewage flows in open drains leading to

contamination of ground water. In Cuttack the drainage system installed long

back to cover smaller population was not functioning well and the untreated sewage

was being discharged into the Mahanadi River.

Pondicherry

Out of 50 mld. Of wastewater produced in urban areas, only 8 mld. Was treated and

the balance was discharged into sea by means of open channel.

Punjab

Except the municipal committee of Naya Nangal, none of the 131 municipal

corporations/committees had installed the STP as of June 2000.

Rajasthan

Out of 183 Municipal bodies, none except Jaipur had installed a STP as of May

2000.

Sikkim

The waste and garbage of Gangtok town till December 1998 was being disposed of

through „disperse and dilute‟ method in nearby streams. In January 1999 the

Board permitted the garbage of Gangtok town to be thrown at Marchak, a riverbed,

on an experimental basis for one month by using the abatement (chemical)

techniques. However, the waste and garbage continued to be dumped at Marchak

since then notwithstanding the complaints of the local people. The garbage

of other towns in Sikkim was being disposed of in the hill slopes. In rainy seasons

it entered the streams, which joins the Teesta River resulting in water pollution.

Tamil Nadu

Only 7 of the 6 Municipal 10X Corporations and 102 Municipalities in the State

had STPs to treat the effluents.

Tripur-1Xa

At Agartala, the average quantity of garbage generated was 80 tones per day. Of this,

60 tones was disposed of daily by the Agartala Municipal Council (Amc) at the site

for Municipal solid waste processing and disposal, resulting in accumulation of

undisposed garbage of 20 tones daily at various road-side garbage collection

centers. The contaminated the ground water of these localities through the process

of leaching. In spite of directions issued by the Board in November 1997 to the

AMC to take any measures. No action had been taken by the Board against AMC.

Uttar Pradesh

Out of 58 towns situated by the side of rivers, Ganga, Yamuna and Gomti, treatment

of sewage of only 17 towns was taken up by UP Jai Nigam by June 2000.

West Bengal

Domestic and public sewage of different towns including Calcutta and Howrah on

both banks of the Ganga are major sources of pollution of the river. The estimated

sewage generation in 37 towns on both banks of the river covered under Ganga

Action Plan (GAP) was 733.68 mld. The 15 towns under phase-I of the GAP were

generating 527.50 mld of sewage and capacity created for interception and diversion

was only 371.60 mld (70.5 per cent). However, sewage actually diverted was only

215.98 mld (58 per cent) while that actually treated was only 181.98 mld allowing 75

per cent of estimated sewage to flow back into the Ganga. None of 125 local bodies

in the State obtained consent from Board for discharging sewage into the rivers.

The position of dissolving oxygen, bio-chemical oxygen demand and total

coliforms count in water samples taken during March every year from 1996 to 2000

showed that water quality did not improve even after execution of the Ganga Action

Plan Schemes.

The Sewerage systems in most pf the towns were designed more than half a century

back for a limited population and were unable to cope with the growth in the towns

in terms of area and the population.

14. Water Quality Management

According to Section 16 (g) of the Water Act, CPCB lays down, modifies or annuls,

in consultation with the State Government concerned, the standard for a stream or

well. Zoning and classification of water bodies was to be done through regular

monitoring of water quality under the centrally sponsored projects of Global

Environmental Monitoring system (GEMS) and Monitoring of India National

Aquatic Resources (MINAR).

The CPCB has been monitoring water quality in collaboration with SPCBs in

order to plan pollution control strategies to assess the nature and extent of

pollution control needed in different water bodies and to evaluate the water quality

trend over a period of time. The water quality monitoring is conducted at 507

stations. The monitoring is done for 22 physico chemical and bacteriological

parameters. The data collected by SPCBs is sent for analysis bacteriological

parameters. The data collected by SPCBs is sent for analysis to CPCB. Analysis

of data for Bio-chemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) and pathogenic bacteria (total

and fecal coliforms) indicated that organic and bacterial contamination continued to

be critical pollutants in India aquatic resources.

Studies carried out by CPCB revealed that the municipal corporation at large had

inadequate resources for ever-increasing load of municipal sewage. A large part of the

municipal sewage was still flowing into the aquatic environment without treatment,

thereby increasing the oxygen demand in shrinking water bodies and increasing the

bacterial load of water, the main cause of water borne diseases.

The Ministry, on the basis of the studies carried out by COCB, identified the polluted

stretches for taking up pollution abatement programmes under National River

Conservation Plan. The study on grossly polluted stretches in all major national

rivers revealed that the critical parameters – BOD, DO and total coliforms have been

violated and hence those stretches had not reached the desired class level. The

Yamuna River was the most polluted river in the country having high BOD and

coliforms in the stretch of about 500 km, between Delhi and Etawah. Other several

polluted rivers were Sabarmati at Ahmedabad, Gomti at Lucknow, Kali, Adyar,

Cooum (either stretches), Vegal at Madhurai, Musi down stream of Hyderabad.

Similarly river stretches of Ganga, down stream of Kanauj, Kanpur, Allahabad,

Varanasi and Trighat; downstream of Srirangapatna KRS Dam,

Satyamangalam Bridge; Krishna between Mahabaleshwar and sangli; Tapti between

Nepanager and baranpur; Mahanadi downstream of Cuttack, Mahi between

Badanvar and Vasad, Brahamani downstream of Rourkels, Talcher and

Dharamshala, also showed high BOD and coliforms for a considerable time during

1998- 99.

A mention was made in the Report of the Comptroller and Audit of General of India

for the year ended March 2000- Ganga Action Plan (Report No.5A of 2000) that

Ganga Action Plan was launched in 1985 with the objective of bringing water quality

of river Ganga and its tributaries to bathing levels by treating domestic sewage. 110

towns were selected for pollution abatement along the banks of river Ganga and its

tributaries. Phase

I of the Plan (in 25 cities) was not completed even after delay of over 10 years. Phase

ii (in 85 towns) was also far behind its schedule. There were big shortfalls in

the achievement of targets of creation of assets and facilities under the Plan. Only

13.7 per cent of the targeted sewage treatment capacity has been created till March

2000.

Assets created in the scheme suffered impairment and closure because of technical

design flaws, mismatch of the schemes and their components and lack of adequate

maintenance. Sewage Treatment Plants could not adequately address the problem of

reducing bacterial load in the river to the desired level. During the problem 1999,

in river Ganga BOD exceeded the permissible limit at 10 out of 27 sampling station

as against only at one sampling station in 1993. The water quality of river Yamuna

also did improve over the period 1996-99. The coliforms level exceeded in 17 out

of 60 stations sampled during

1999.

The significant observation about the Water Quality profiles in major rivers of the

States are given below:

A. River Water Pollution

Andhra Pradesh

In River Godhavari levels of DO & Total Coliforms were almost meeting the

desired class in the entire stretch between up stream of Gangapur Dam and down

stream of Rajahmundry.

Gujarat

Test-check of sample analysis done by the Board revealed that, five rivers

(Damanganga, Khari, Kolak, Par and Sabarmati) were polluted mainly due to

discharge of effluent from industrial estates.

The Board had not been able to reverse the trend for these highly polluted water

bodies. The Board stated that monitoring of pollution in water bodies was done by

CPCB and it was only responsible for collection and analysis of samples from

specified stations. This was not tenable as control and abatement of pollution is the

prime responsibility of the State Board.

Haryana

During 1996-99 average BOD at Agra canal at Madanpur Khandar ranged

between 4.9mg/litre to 20 mg/liter, which was higher than the acceptable BOD level

of 3mg/litre. The objective of cleaning the polluted water of River Yamuna was not

achieved as of March 1999 as the river was continuously fed

by untreated sewage and domestic/industrial waste.

Quarterly sampling of water of River Ghaggar revealed that BOD value of

water increased from 4.5mg/litre to 28 mg/liter during September 1998 to December

1999.

Himachal Pradesh

Three stretches on the bank of River Beas at Mandi, Kullu and Manali had

been identified as polluted.The quality of the water of the river at these

stretches had deteriorated in respect of all the parameters i.e. total coliforms, faecal

and BOD. Direct flow of sewage, trade effluents and garbage etc. in the

river were responsible for deterioration in the water quality.

Jammu & Kashmir

The drains of Jammu city had their outfall in River Tawi. The river water had

shown increase of BOD from 2 mg./liter to 74 mg/litter making it unsuitable for

drinking and bathing purposes.

Kerala

The Board conducted water quality studies in respect of 12 out of the 44 rivers in

the State that revealed high concentration of faecal and total coliforms bacteria in

different stretches of all the rivers. In respect of remaining 32 rivers, even a

water quality assessment was not undertaken as of April 2000.

Madhya Pradesh

Scrutiny of test of water samples collected during 1994-1999 showed that the water of

rivers and major water bodies fell below the normal standards. Water of Rivers

Tapti, Narmada, Chambal, Khan and Kshipra at 6 points were highly

polluted. In river Narmada total coliforms were higher at the

bathing places throughout the river viz. Sethanighat up steam, Hoshangabad up

stream, Hoshangabad down stram and Garudeshwar during the year. The

Board stated in May 2000 that pollution was increasing due to non-availability

of suitable arrangement for sewage treatment with the local bodies.

Orissa

There were about 15 urban settlements on the basin of River Brahmani discharging

approximately 74460.4 KL per day of untreated wastewater. Beside, the Talcher

Power Plant, NALCO and chromite mines of Sukinda Valley discharged effluents

and water waste beyond tolerance limits. Further, they‟re being practically no

sewerage system except at Rourkela steel city, domestic wastewater were drained

into the river basin.

River Mahanadi basin had 10 coalmines which discharge about 33065 Kilolitre per

day (KLD) of waste water during monsoon and pose a serious environmental

threat due to eavy metal and sulphur compounds. Besides there were about 34

urban settlements in the Mahanadi bain discharging 266332 KLD of wastewater

without any treatment.

Rajasthan

The average value of BOD in Chambal river increased during the years 1996 and

1997.

151 industries involved in dying and printing established at Pali during 1971 to 1994

and operating without the consent of the Board, were also discharging their untreated

wastewater into Bandi River.

The Sujan Ganga canal that flows through Bharatpur city was gradually converted

into a large septic tank after 1970 due to choking of underground drains in the

town and the flow of dirty water and sullage into it.

Uttar Pradesh

In River Ganga, BOD exceeded the desired water quality criteria limits at down

stram Kanpur, down stream Varanasi and Trighat. Total Coliforms were

higher than the criteria limit in the river stretch up to Rajmahal and thereafter it was

well within the criteria limit of the desired class. However, DO level meets the

desired level at all the locations except at Varanasi down steam.

B. Lake Water Pollution

Lakes are natural homes for a large variety of flora and fauna besides providing food

and habitant to migrating birds. Besides adding to the scenic beauty, they

constitute an important element of ecological balance. They are also sources of

water for drinking, bathing and other purposes.

Andhra Pradesh

Kolleru Lake is one of the largest fresh water and wetlands in India located on the

east coast with a total catchments area of 4763 km stretching over the Krishna and

West Godhavari districts. The quality of water in this lake had deteriorated due to

the inflows of untreated urban sewage, industrial effluents from sugar factories,

distilleries and pesticides plants and residues from fertilizers and pesticides used in

aquaculture and agriculture. Apart from these, the Vijayawada Municipal

Corporation and municipalities of Gudivada and Eluru were also discharging

untreated domestic sewage into the lake.

The quality of water had deteriorated significantly as its dissolved oxygen content

was as low as 2.6 mg/liter in February 1999 and September, 1999 as against the

prescribed standard of 4 mg/liter etc. Total coliforms too exceeded the normal limit

by 5 times.

Kerala

The Board monitored, during June 1993 to March 1995, the water quality of the fresh

water lake at Sasthamcotta, which is the source of drinking water in Kollam

town. It found the presence of coliforms bacteria in the range of 130 to 16000/100 ml

of water as against the acceptable level of 50 Maximum Permissible

Number/100ml. Though the Committee on Environment of the Kerala Legislature

made several recommendations regarding prohibition of discharge of pollutants into

the lake and also identified polluting agencies such as local bodies, Kerala Water

Authority, hospitals etc., no action was initiated by the Board as of September 2000.

Orissa

Chilka Lake is one of the largest wetlands in India spread over and area of 1080 sq.

kms. It is administratively controlled by the Chilka Development Authority, an

autonomous body registered under the Socities Act. The water quality of Chilka is

brackish. The principal activities that pollute the waters of Chilka are (i) silt from

degraded catchments and (ii) waste water generated from domestic and agriculture

sources in the catchments area. State Board had not so far prepared any action plan

to protect this unique wetland from pollution.

Rajasthan

Kewaldeo Ghana and Sambhar lakes in Rajasthan had been designated as wetlands

under the Ramsar Convention on Wetland of International Important. The possible

threats to these lakes were from extraction of clay from the bed of main lake,

construction of check dams in the catchments areas of the lake affecting inflow of

water into the lakes and drawal of excessive water for salt production and for other

purposes in the summer. The Government had not formulated any programme for

protection and conservation of these lakes.

The pollution of water in the lakes of Udaipur city had been increasing due to

discharge of untreated sewage by municipal council, hotels and guest houses, Public

Health & Engineering Department filter plants and also residential colonies situated

around the lakes.

Uttar Pradesh

A 700-meter by 350-metre pond called Chanderi pond is situated at

Kanpur.The household waste of neighboring areas flows into it without any

treatment. Water of this pond is contaminated with DO being reduced to

zero. The water of this pond subsequently flows into River Ganga contributing

towards its pollution.

C. Ground Water

Andhra Pradesh

In its action plan for 1998-1999, the State Board proposed to monitor ground

water quality at the inlet, flanks and downstream side of three tanks in and around

Hyderabad and 500 meters on either side of the Musi River for a distance of about 20

Kms.

As per the preliminary report of a study conducted by the State Board and Ground

Water Department during 1998-2000, the ground water in the areas contained 24 to

3352 mg/liter. Total Dissolved Salts (TDS) much higher than the permissible

limit of 1000 mg/liter. The State Government stated in July 2000 that final report

from the Ground Water department was yet to be received.

Thus, the work of ground water quality monitoring taken up in 1998-99 was yet to be

completed (July 2000).

Kerala

Ground Water Monitoring studies conducted (1994) in seven stations in Greater

Cochin area disclosed that PH, and concentration of coliforms bacteria, BOD,

chloride etc, were beyond tolerance limits in six stations. In two stations (Eloor

and Mattanchery) well water was unfit for drinking and irrigation. In respect of

the remaining four stations water could be used for drinking and irrigation only after

disinfections and addition of lime. However the Board had not forwarded this

significant information to the State Government of concerned local bodies.

Resultantly the population continued to be exposed to the hazards of drinking

unpotable water.

Orissa

Survey of quality of ground water of dug wells and tube wells used as a source

of drinking conducted (1997-98) by SPCB in Cuttack and Rourkela revealed that

there was lower value of potential hydrogen and heavy iron content in the water

obtained from tube wells of Bhubneswar. In Rourkela, presence of lead and

copper was found to be in excess of the permissible limit. This rendered the

potability of the water obtained from the tube wells of the above cities questionable.

Pondicherry

The quality of ground water in the industrial estate at Mettupalayam had turn unfit

for human consumption fur to depositing of acids and waste material by chemical

factories in the open yard.

D. Sea Water

Maharashtra

In a coastal segment marine water is subjected to several types of uses and activities.

Depending on the types of uses and activities, saline water is classified into

various classes according to the quality of the water. The seawater in Mumbai at all

the 11 monitoring stations falls under SW-II class (designated use-bathing, water

sports and commercial fishing). During the period 1994-99 analysis reports of

all the samples drawn from all the monitoring stations showed BOD to be in excess

of the prescribed limit. The DO level was also less than the prescribed standards in

45 per cent samples at 8 monitoring stations. This makes the water unfit for its

designated use and dangerous to aquatic life. It was due to the flow of sullage and

sewage from the slums and neighboring hutment into the sea.

15. CONCLUSION

The main objective of the SPCBs was to prevent and control pollution of water

bodies in accordance with the provisions of the Water Act. The objective was not

achieved in any of the states mainly due to failure of the Boards to regulate and

control the discharge of industrial effluents and domestic sewage into the water

bodies and to ensure the installation of pollution control devices by the industrial

units and local bodies. The role of various states Government in implementing the

provisions of the Water Act and the rules was not adequately visible as there was no

proper monitoring at the government level.

The matter was referred to the Ministry in July 2001, who has not replied as of

October 2001. .

3.1 Sewage treatment schemes in Calcutta Metropolitan area(under Ganga Action

Plan)

Urban development department

Kolkatta Metropolitan Development Authority

Highlights:

Implementation of the Ganga Action Plan to control the pollution of Ganga

suffered from faulty planning and delay in execution. Towns were selected on

the basis of unrealistic assessment of sewage and as a result pollution load

draining into the Ganga was not adequately covered in the scheme. Progress

of work was hampered due to absence of monitoring, delay in finalization of

tenders and in arranging land. Before execution of work soil investigation was

not done and encroachment were not removed which resulted in wasteful and

unfruitful expenditure.

Sewage treatment schemes were prepared and executed on the basis on

population of the area instead of actual quantity of sewage polluting

the river. Estimation of sewage was accordingly defective and unrealistic.

(Paragraph 3.1.3 (i) )

Priority of towns for STP works were based on “ water quality “ in place

of “pollution concentration”. Thus least priority was given to towns

polluting the most and implementation of GAP on that basis had little

impact on cleaning the Ganga River.

(Paragraph 3.1.3 (ii))

The Bio-chemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) of the river Ganga exceeded the

tolerable limit of 3 mg per litre as of March 2000 at all six sampling

stations in the Calcutta metropolitan Area proving that the water

quality had deteriorated drastically compared to March 1996.

(Paragraph.3.1.4(ii))

(Paragraph 3.1.4 (i))

ID work in Tolly’s Nullah were executed without clearing encroachment

on both banks polluting the Canal resulting in unfruitful expenditure of

Rs.3.74 crore. Though the lifted silt was the contractor’s property he was

paid for carriage and dumping of the same. This led to undue financial

aid of Rs 61.01 lakh to him.

(Paragraph 3.1.5 (ii) A (i))

Estimate for ID work of Tolly’s Nullah was based on higher rates and

higher premiums were allowed to contractor lending to extra

expenditure of Rs.31.83 lakh.

(Paragraph 3.1.5(ii)

A(ii)) Delay in handing over land, and defective design in construction of a

lifting station at Howrah by CMWSA resulted in infructuous

expenditure of Rs. 38.50 lakh on rectification work besides extra

expenditure of Rs. 21.27 lakh on price escalation.

(Paragraph 3.1.5 (ii) A (iii))

Sewage Treatment Plant (STPs) were constructed at a cost of Rs. 26.46

crore out of GAP funds for Cossipore-Chitpur and Baranagar-

Kamarhati areas for discharge of the treated effluents from the STPs into

Bagjola canal not connected with the Ganga.

(Paragraph 3.1.5 (ii) B (i))

Due to delay in construction of the STP at south suburban east

the interception and diversion schemes costing Rs. 15.51 crore was

rendered unfruitful.

(Paragraph 3.1.5 (ii) B (ii))

Out of Rs. 112.69 acres land procured for GAP project, 61.69 acres

costing Rs. 24.64 lakh became surplus and was encroached by local people.

(Paragraph 3.1.5 (ii) C (i))

A testing laboratory attached to the STP constructed at a cost of Rs. 11.16

lakh in December 1995 remained unutilized while all testing works

were done through outside agencies.

(Paragraph 3.1.5 (ii) C (iii))

Interest of Rs. 66.40 lakh earned from investment made out of GAP fund

was not accounted for. Diversion of GAP fund for Rs. 1.52 crore by

CMWSA led to loss of interest of Rs. 69.61 lakh

(Paragraph 3.1.6)

Late formation of monitoring committees rendered the monitoring

mechanism ineffective. (Paragraph 3.1.7)

3.1.1 Introduction :

The main source of pollution of the river Ganga is inflow of raw and

untreated domestic sewage and effluents from industries in different towns

and urban areas on its banks. The extent of pollution is much higher in

Calcutta metropolitan area (CMA) compared to other areas in the State.

Ganga Action Plan (GAP) was launched by the Government of India (GOI)

during 1985-86 and was to be completed in two phases by December 2001.

Its main aim was to abate pollution of the river to bring the quality of water

to bathing level (Bio-chemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) contents not to

exceed 3 mg per/litre). Though an important source of pollution in the

Ganga are industrial wastes, GAP envisaged to tackle domestic sewage only.

This was to be achieved by construction of interceptors with diversion

sewer lines (ID), Sewage Treatment Plants (STP) as well as

renovation of existing sewage system, low cost sanitation, electric crematoria

and river front development. This review deals with two major components of

GAP viz., ID and STP schemes in view of their significance and cost

implications.

GAP is a Central programme and is implemented and monitored by

National River Conservation Directorate (NRCD). In west Bengal, CMDA is

the nodal agency and the Urban Development Department (UD Deptt.) is

accountable for proper co-ordination monitoring and overall implementation

of the programme. Other agencies such as CMWSA, CMC, PHED and I

&WD implement

GA

P schemes along with CMDA. Projects reports of various schemes prepared

by the implementing agencies were approved by the NRCD.

During the period 1985-86 and 1999-2000,Rs. 157.69 crore was spent on

sewage treatment schemes. Test Reports of river water, however, indicated

that as of March 2000 the quality of water has not improved and reached even

the targeted bathing level. On the other hand, it deteriorated below the

pollution level, which prevailed when the schemes were started.

3.1.2 Audit coverage

Records of the implementing agencies for the period April 1994 to March

2000 were test checked between March 1998 and April 2000 to assess the

status of implementation of the GAP schemes. Against total available fund of

Rs. 52.52 crore from the GOI (Rs. 32.49 crore) and State Government

(Rs.20.03 crore)during April 1994 and March 2000,Rs 26.26 crore was spent

as of March 2000 in phases-I and II.

3.1.3 Planning deficiencies

(i) Selection of towns on unrealistic

basis

NRCD did not fixed any norm of pollution load for identification of towns to

be taken up for pollution abatement works. Out of 49 towns in the state

draining sewage into the ganga, 15 towns were selected under Phase I by

NRCD on the basis of population and per capita consumption of water

without considering and measuring the sewage flowing into the Ganga from

these towns. This yard stick was unrealistic and faulty since a substantial

quantity of sewage are not flowing into the Ganga but diverted to the east

Calcutta wetlands for natural treatment.

Under Phase II State Government selected 26 towns including 14 towns

(selected under orders of Supreme Court) by adopting the norm of pollution

concentration in the sewage. As a result, 8 towns, generating 34.33-mld5

sewage were left out For example, Uluberia town generating 10.85 mld

sewage with BOD level of 43.07 mg per litre was not included while towns

like Jangipur, Raniganj; Andal generating 0.37 to 2.18 mld sewage with

BOD level of 34 to 37.1 mg per litre were covered

Generation of sewage was also not correctly estimated for each town. In

Calcutta, against actual generation of 1362 mld (as per CMC), sewage

generation was estimated to be Rs. 316.24 mld (23 per cent) of which

183.24 mld was targeted for interception and diversion. Out of the

remaining 1178.76 mld (77 per cent), 752 mld flows to the Bidyadhari River

not connected with the Ganga and 426.76 mld into the Ganga and Bagjola

canal

Due to such unrealistic assessment of load of sewage generation, GAP did

not have any appreciable impact on control of pollution of the Ganga.

(ii) Lopsided priority of towns under Phase II

Towns under Phase II were classified in four groups of priority, which

was decided on the basis of water quality data of the river downstream of the

towns in disregard of pollution concentration in sewage. As a result, smaller

towns with lesser pollution were given priority over large towns contributing

maximum pollution. For example, Tolly‟s Nullah in Calcutta draining the

largest quantity of BOD (9272 kg/day) into Ganga was included in the

priority-IV while Maheshtala and Gayeshpur draining negligible quantities of

BOD (667 kg/day and 18 kg/day respectively) were given priority III and

priority I for execution respectively.

GOI approved GAP Phase II in October 1996 for completion by December

2001

.Before execution of schemes, State Government was to prepare and submit

Detailed project Reports (DPRs) of individual schemes to NRCD for

approval. NRCD did not prescribe any time frame for submission of DPRs. In

August 1996 however, the steering committee constitutal by the Government

of India fixed 3 months for submission of DRSs by the State Government.

NRCD also made commitment before the supreme court (in response to

public interest litigation) that the State Government would submit complete

DPRs by April 1997 and execute all the schemes by July 2000.But till March

2000, State Government submitted only 31 DPRs (63 percent) out of the

target of 49 DPRs for ID and STP schemes for the 16 towns in CMA under

Phase II.State Government submitted composite DPRs though separate DPR

for each scheme was required.

The DPRs were deficient in technical and cast estimate aspects. As a result,

even after revision at the instance of NRCD, the DRPs were not found fit for

approval by NRCD. As the State Government/nodal agency delay

in responding to NRCD‟s comments, NRCD approved only 10 DRPs (16

per cent) as of March

2000 and work for one scheme only commenced (January 1999). Thus, due

to failure of the Government and nodal agency to prepare complete Project

Reports in time, commencement of Phase II works was delayed by more than

2 years.

3.1.4 Target and achievements

(i) Shortfall in achievement

The unrealistic estimate and targets based on such estimates covered only 73

percent of the estimated quantity of sewage falling in Ganga. The West Bengal

Pollution Control Board (WSPCB) surveyed major outfalls discharging into

the river in the greater Calcutta area between the stretch from Dakshineswar

to Pujali during 1997-98 which revealed that raw sewage from the area had

still been flowing into the Ganga through 32 outfall drains GAP has no

scheme to tackle this raw sewage in future. As a result, even after treatment of

42 per cent of targeted sewage during 13 years, quality of Ganga water did not

improve.

WBPCB monitors water quality of the Ganga by taking water samples from

different locations for testing in its laboratory, test result as of March 1999

revealed that the BOD content of the river water exceeded the tolerable limit

of 3 mg per litre at all six stations in the Calcutta metropolitan area

indicating that water quality had drastically deteriorated as compared to 1996.

As against the permissible limit of 3 mg per litre, water samples taken during

March each year from 1996 to 2000 indicated (Appendix 16) that BOD levels

of the Ganga river water in Calcutta Metropolitan Area in March 2000

ranged between 2.7 and 6.0 mg per litre, compared to 1.6 to 2.4 mg per litre

in march 1996. The TCC count at Palta and garden reach was also 5 to 10

times higher than the permissible limit (10000 per 100 ml). This indicated high

sewage contamination at Calcutta‟s drinking water source of the Ganga and

10 times beyond the limit at Dakshineshwar, a pilgrim-bathing site. Thus,

domestic and industrial pollution control measures in the Calcutta

Metropolitan Area (Palta to Uluberia) were ineffective and infact pollution

levels increased despite investment of Rs.157.69 crore (up to March 2000) in

CMA under GAP.

Targets for interception, diversion and treatment of sewage and achievements

are indicated below:

Sewage target for

the

year 1998 to 2000/ Sewage

actually

Name of

city/town

Sewage

estimated

Interception

&

Diversio

n

Treatment Intercepted

&

Diverte

d

Treated % Of

shortfall

in

relation

to target

Calcutta 316.24 183.24 183.24 78.49 48.49 74

Other than

Calcutta (12

towns in

metropolita

n area)

264.5 241.60 241.60 129.61 129.61 46

Total 580.74 424.84 424.84 208.10 178.10 58

Figures obtained from CMDA‟s records

(ii) Poor progress of work:

Pollution abatement schemes under Phase I commenced during 1985-86

were to be completed by March 1990.However, one scheme (STP at

South Suburban East) of Phase I still remains incomplete though there was no

fund constraint. Schemes under Phase II were targeted to be completed by

December 2001 but till March 2000 only one scheme (ID at Tolly‟s Nullah,

out of a total of 144 targeted) was taken up for execution as indicated in paras

3.1.3(ii) and 3.1.5(ii) A (i).

3.1.5 Deficient execution:

(i) Delayed execution of work

Till March 2000,against 91 schemes (Phase I:

42,Phase II: 49) to be prepared for ID (53 schemes) and STP (38

schemes) under GAP in CMA, 46 Schemes (Phase I: 42, Phase II: 4)

were sanctioned of which 41 schemes were completed by CMDA (20

schemes), CMWSA (20 schemes) and PHED (1 schemes) under

Phase I by march 1999 (Appendix 17). Two schemes taken up during

January 1994 and January 1999 remained incomplete as of march

2000. The delay in execution ranged from 21 to 108 months and

CMDA attributed it to the land acquisition problem, court cases,

shifting of different public utility lines, etc. The delay in completion

of the schemes resulted in cost overrun of 56 to 70 per cent for 41

schemes as indicated below:

Name of

Scheme

No. Of

Scheme

Original

sanctione

d cost

Revised

sanctioned

Cost (Rs. In)

Expenditure

Incurred

(Crore)

Cost

increase

ID 29 48.76 80.31 82.70 33.94(70

percent) STP 12 42.72 68.09 66.60 23.88 (56

Percent) Total 41 91.48 148.40 149.30 57.82 (63

Percent)

Test check of 16 ID and 9 STP schemes revealed that completion of

most of the schemes were delayed mainly due to deficient

monitoring and slow progress by the contractors besides

(a) Delay in land acquisition : 3 ID schemes 1

STP scheme

(b) Technical deficiency: 1 ID scheme-- (c)

Adverse soil condition not : 6 ID schemes

--

Detection earlier (d) Delay in awarding the : 3 ID schemes 3 STP

schemes

Work

(e) Increase in scope of : -- 3 STP

schemes work

(f) Delay in payment of : -- 2 STP

schemes land compensation

(g) Slow progress by the : 9 ID schemes 5 STP schemes

Contractors

(i) A few cases of major irregularities in the execution of schemes

are discussed below:

A. Construction of ID schemes

(i) Work of ID of 27 outfalls

Tolly‟s nullah (canal) having direct link with the river Ganga and flowing on

the southern fringe of Calcutta is a dumping ground of garbage by the

encroachers with massive siltation since decades. To prevent pollution of the

Nullah in the stretch between boat canal at Chetla to Ganga at Hastings (5

km), the scheme for ID of 27 outfalls carrying 61.24 mld sewage was approved

(November 1998) by the GOI for Rs. 27.63 crore. GOI while releasing Rs.4

crore (November 1998) for this work stipulated that works should be taken up

only after the State Government removed the encroachment.CMDA entrusted

the work to CMC and CMWSA but encroachment was not removed and the

inhabitants of encroached area continued to deposit garbage. Pollution

remains unabated and the Nullah continues to pollute the Ganga as before

even though work-valuing Rs.3.74 crore was executed as of March 2000.

I & WD took up (January 1999) remodeling and desiltation of the Nullah

from Garia Rail Bridge to Hastings-15.5 Km) by mechanical dredging (5

Km) and manual excavation (10.5 Km) at an estimated cost of Rs.

6.01 crore for completion be July 2000. Scrutiny revealed that 5 per

cent of mechanical dredging work and 7 percent of manual excavation work

were completed as of January 2000.the poor progress was attributable to non-

removal of encroachment. The contract provided for carriage and dumping of

the lifted silt at land to be arranged by the contractor at a lead of 210 meter

outside Government land along the Nullah at a cost of Rs. 61.01 lakh (at the

rate of Rs. 20.80 per cum for an estimated quantity of 3.31 lakh cum silt). As

the contractor was to pay royalty (at the rate of Rs. 7.06 per cum) for the

excavated silt, he was to arrange its disposal after lifting from the Nullah.The

contractual provision was, therefore unjustified and led to undue financial aid

to the contractor.

(ii) Extra expenditure due to adoption of higher rates:

CMC and CMWSA took up (January 1999) Id works at tolly‟s Nullah. There

was no co-ordination between CMC and CMWSA in preparation of estimates

.CMC prepared estimates based on its own Schedule of Rates (SOR) of 1994-

95 while CMWSA prepared estimates as per SOR of CMDA-1994-95 and that

of Public Works (Roads) Department for the year 1995-96.Total cost of works

awarded by CMC was Rs. 2.32 crore (estimated cost: Rs.1.64 crore) at rates

varying between 39.50 per cent and 45.30 per cent above the estimated cost

while CMWSA awarded the works at a total cost of Rs. 90.39 lakh

(estimated cost : Rs. 82.05 lakh) at rates ranging between 9.50 percent and

9.99 percent above the estimated cost. The rates in CMC‟s SOR were also

higher than those of CMDA for identical items. The works had almost been

completed and the contractors had been paid Rs. 2.13 crore as of December

1999

Thus due to lack of co-ordination and pursuance of economy, ID works were

executed at higher rates by CMC involving an extra expenditure of Rs.31.83

lakh

(iii) Extra expenditure due to defective design

CMWSA awarded the work of construction of a lifting station at Howrah to a

contractor in July 1990 on turnkey basis at the tender cost of Rs. 51.93 lakh for

completion by July 1991.Kolkatta PORT Trust, however made the site

available only in September 1992.without conducting soil test, the

contractor prepared design and adopted well sinking method with bottom

plugging of the well. CMWSA approved the design. After completion of the

bottom plugging work (October 1994), huge leakages were found with

underground water coming through bottom plugging. CMWSA attributed the

leakage to sand boiling character of the soil, which was not detected by the

contractor. As the contractor declined to rectify the defect on the ground of

delay in handing over land to him, CMWSA terminated the contract (October

1995) after paying Rs. 25.85 lakh for value of work done. The balance work

along with rectification of defects were completed through another contractor

(March 1997) at a cost of Rs. 85.04 lakh (rectification: Rs 38.50 lakh and price

escalation: Rs. 21.27 lakh) thus by approving defective design, CMWSA

incurred infructous expenditure of Rs. 38.50 lakh and extra expenditure of Rs.

21.27 lakh. Government furnished no specific reply for the extra

expenditure.

(iv) Loss due to inadequate custody and installation of pumping equipment without

test of sumps

The contractor engaged (December 1988) for construction

of three pumping stations (PS) including supply and installation of pumping

equipment at Cossipore-Chitpur area completed the work of PS-II and left

the work site (December 1992) due to non-availability of land for PS-I and III.

He supplied pumping equipment worth Rs 68.32 lakh for all the three PSs

and kept the equipment of other two PSs at the site of PS-II under lock and

key. Inspite of contractor‟s request, CMDA did not take over the equipment.

The contractor moved (September 1993) the high court for settlement of

disputed claims. On an application (April; 1996) to the high court, CMDA

received back (February 1997) the equipment and found some of them

missing. It procured the same at a cost of Rs. 12.75 lakh

CMDA had permitted the contractor to install (November 1990) the

equipment in PS-II without test of water tightness and leakage of the walls of

sumps. As a result of continued percolation of water through the leakages

of walls, the installed pump motors were damaged. CMDA spent Rs.6.15

lakh towards dismantling, repair and reinstallation before commissioning of

PS-II

Thus, advance procurement of equipment, subsequent failure of CMDA to

take possession of the same before the contractor left the site and installation

of equipment of PS-II without water tightness test involved and extra

expenditure of Rs.18.90 lakh.

Government stated (January 2000) that left over equipment were not taken

back due to non-finalisation of balance work and then legal action would be

taken against the contractor to realize the repairing cost. The reply is not

acceptable as CMDA could have shifted the leftover equipment to one of its

stores and no legal action was taken against the contractor till March 2000.

Construction of STP

(i) Expenditure on STPs unconnected with GAP:

GAP envisaged interception and diversion of raw sewage falling

directly into the Ganga, their treatment in STPs and discharging back into the

Ganga.In Cossipore-Chitpur and Baranagar-Kamarhati areas, the inflow of

the sewage through outfall drains was prevented by usual interception

and diversion. However, though the diverted sewage is flowing into the

bagjola khal (canal), which is not connected to the Ganga, CMDA

constructed two STPs at a cost of Rs. 26.46 crore (one at Bangur for

Cossipore-Chitpur valuing Rs.12.31 crore in December 1998 and the other

at Matkal for Baranagar-Kamarhati valuing Rs. 14.15 crore in March

1994).As seen from the map the Bagjola Khal is not connected to the Ganga.

Moreover, only a small quantity of sewage (45 mld and 40 mld respectively)

was diverted for treatment in the STPs and the treated sewage allowed to mix

with the raw sewage in the Bagjola Khal . The Bagjola Khal which carries the

bulk of raw sewage and spoils of Calcutta and the adjoining municipalities

flows eastwards into the Bidyadhari river which empties into the Bay of

Bengal. Since the treated effluents from both the STPs are being discharged

into a canal carrying raw sewage which flows away from the Ganga,

construction of the two STPs did not help control the pollution of the

Ganga and was thus beyond the scope of the GAP. Rupees 26.46 crore

spent on the STPs was thus infructuous.

Scrutiny revealed that NRCD had approved the construction of the STPs

based on CMDA‟s statement that Bagjola Khal is connected to the Ganga.

The matter calls for investigation.

(ii) Unfruitful expenditure on ID works as STP was not completed

A 30 mld low cost STP (stabilization pond) for treatment of sewage

of Tollygunge-Jadavpur area (16 mld) and south suburban (East) area (14

mld) on 64.637 acres of land was to be constructed at a tendered cost of Rs.

48.12 lakh by July 1994. The STP was to be fed through two ID schemes.

After award of work it was seen that full quantity of land was not available

and the owners opposed works due to non-payment of compensation.

CMDA terminated the contract in August 1996. Works valuing Rs. 31.74

lakh was by then executed and the balance work of Rs. 21.31 lakh was

entrusted to the concerned Gram Panchayat and other contractors at a total

cost of Rs. 39.99 lakh in February 1997. This resulted in delay of 3 years

at award stage and total extra liability of Rs 23.62 lakh. The work was not

completed as of March 2000.

To feed the STP, ID schemes for the two areas were completed by March

1997 at a total cost of Rs. 15.51 crore and commissioned during May 1992

and March 1997.As the STP was not completed, the sewage (30 mld) diverted

through the ID schemes was not treated and flowed back into the Ganga.thus

the ID schemes costing Rs. 15.51 crore did not serve intended purpose even

after 3 to 7 years of commissioning

(iii) Extra expenditure due to delay in acceptance of tender

For construction of the 40 mld STP at Baranagar-Kamarhati on turnkey

basis, CMDA received price bids in September 1989 with validity of 4 months.

The deputy director (North), GAP sector of CMDA awarded the work in

November 1990, 10 months after the expiry of validity period the work was to

be completed at a cost of Rs. 4.80 crore.price escalation was payable to

the contractor from the second year of submission of the tender. On

completion of the work (December 1995) CMDA paid escalation of Rs.

38.10 lakh of which Rs. 8.47 lakh accrued for the period of delay of 10

months in award of the work.

Government stated (August 1999) that after receipt of price bids in

September 1989, CMDA issued clearance in February 1990 and approached

(March 1990) NRCD, which accorded approval in October 1990. Thus

CMDA was mainly responsible for the delay by taking 6 months just to

approach NRCD for approval.

3.1.7 Monitoring:

(i) Blocking of funds due to retention of surplus land

Out of 200 acres of land at Mouza

Paharpur acquired for a water supply scheme at Garden Reach, CMDA

transferred (June 1990) 112.69 acres of land to the GAP Project (under

implementation by CMDA) at Rs. 45 lakh for construction of STP and

MPS.Of this, only 50.997 acres were utilized in construction of GAP work.

Under phase II no scheme under GAP works was envisaged to be

implemented in the surplus land (61.693 acres). CMDA thus, blocked

GAP fund of Rs. 24.64 lakh. Again, for lack of proper vigilance on the part of

CMDA, the entire unutilized land had been encroached. Government stated

(January 2000) that the surplus land might be utilized in some other work.

The reply is not specific, and thus, use of the land is uncertain.

(ii) Staff quarters lying vacant

GAP envisaged maintenance of STPs by departmental staff and

accordingly GAP Sector, CMDA constructed 31 staff quarters within STP

premises at Baranagar-Kamarhati, Garden Reach and Chandannagar at a cost

of Rs. 38.66 lakhs between March 1987 and September 1994. However, the

O & M of the STPs was entrusted to private agencies. As a result, the staff

quarters remained vacant for 6 years till March 1999. Till March 1999, Rs.

2.41 lakh was also spent on maintaining the vacant buildings.

3.1.7 Monitoring:

(iii) Idle investment on construction of STP laboratory

A laboratory together with the administrative building constructed in

December

1995 at a cost of Rs. 17.93 lakh for evaluation of performance of the STP was

not put to any use as the Deputy Director (South), GAP entrusted the testing

work to All India Institute of Hygiene &Public Health (AIIHPH). The

laboratory costing Rs 11.16 lakh including test equipment valued Rs. 8.28 lakh

remained unutilized since inspection.

Government stated (January 2000) that since chemist and qualified assistants

were posted the testing of samples is done by the outside agencies who use the

installed equipment of the plant laboratory. The reply is not tenable as

AIIHPH is testing the samples in its own laboratory at a fixed cost.

3.1.6 Diversion and mismanagement of fund:

In the utilization of funds following irregularities were noticed:

3.1.7 Monitoring:

(a) CMWSA diverted an amount of Rs. 1.52 crore meant for Gap works

during1991-95 to meet its own expenses and refunded Rs. 1.37 crore during

1992-99.it did not pay back the balance amount to GAP fund till March

1999. Had the fund not been diverted, it could have earned interest of

Rs.69.61 lakh at the rate of 10 per cent per annum from investment in short-

term deposit.

(b) CMDA did not report to NRCD interest of Rs. 66.40 lakh earned by them

during 1991 and 1997 from investment of GAP fund in short-term deposit

schemes.

(c) GAP envisaged to keep GAP funds in interest bearing Personal Ledger

Account with bank. But CMDA kept the funds in non-interest bearing

current accounts. As a result, it did not earn any interest on the balance lying

in the current accounts.

The State Government did not monitor the implementation of GAP since its

start (1985-86). At the instance of NRCD, State Government constituted

(March 1996) 3 Citizens Monitoring Committees (CMC) for Calcutta

Municipal Corporation area and towns on the East bank as well as West bank

of the river Ganga. Though each CMC was to meet monthly, onc met five

times and the other two three times each as of August 1999. In May

1998,State Government formed a High ower committee (HPC) in pursuance

of NRCD‟s advice (September 1997) for periodical review of progress of

implementation. Till October 1999, the HPC met only once in January 1999.

Action proposed in the meeting were reviewed since then.

Absence of monitoring for a decade affected the progress of GAP works. Till

the scheduled completion date (March 1990), physical progress of ID and STP

schemes of Phase-I was 26 per cent and nil. During the next 5 years, progress

was 55 percent and 80 percent (12 STPs) respectively. Things did not improve

even after formation of CMCs and HPC.Remaining six ID schemes and 2

STPs out of 3 of Phase-I were completed during April 1995 and March

1999. The land problem for the incomplete STP at South Suburban (east)

was not solved as of March 2000. The electric crematoria at baidyabati,

lying non-functional since 1997 was not revived as of December 1999.

3.1.7 Monitoring:

3.1.8 Recommendation:

Based on audit observations the following suggestions are made for consideration

of Government:

(i) STP should be constructed in such cases where the treated sewage

is discharged back into the Ganga.

(ii) Work of ID and STP should be taken up after acquisition of required

land.

(iii) Accountability for lapses, delay and failure of any scheme

should be enforced by close follow up action.

(iv) Various aspects of implementation of the schemes and co-

ordination among the agencies should be ensured.

The Matter was referred to government in June 2000; reply had not been

received (March 2001).

chapter iii audit reports on water issues -...

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