Chapter 6: Sub-Saharan Africa

The approximately forty developing countriesof this region form a much more diverse groupthan the poor countries of Asia intheireconomicstructure, income levels, policies, and perform-ance. Some, like Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, Mauri-tania, Nigeria, Zaire, and Zambia, have largereserves of minerals to support their economies;some, like Ivory Coast and Kenya, have suc-cessfully developed agricultural exports; others,such as Chad, Mali, and Upper Volta in theSahel region, are doubly disadvantaged by poorresources and a landlocked location whichmakes transport costs high. These physical dif-ferences are further accentuated by varied colo-nial and cultural heritages and post-colonialphilosophies of economic development.

Within this diversity, however, there areimportant common elements, many of whichdistinguish the developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa from those in other continents.

39. Sub-Saharan Africa: Selected Development Indicators(Median values)

Almost all of the countries in this region arepoor; many have levels of income per personabove those of South Asia, but with severe pov-erty among large parts of the population. In fewcountries in the region are the numbers in abso-lute poverty less than a third of the population,and in most of East Africa they run well overhalf. The figures on income per person in mostof the Middle Income countries of Sub-SaharanAfrica are deceptive, for with a few exceptionsthese are actually poor countries with a mineralenclave that employs only a small fraction ofthe work force. The indicators in the Table aboveshow that while the poorer African countriesshare characteristics typical of all Low Income

countries, the African Middle Income coun-tries clearly are poorer than most other coun-tries in that group, and at much earlier stagesof development.

Also common to the Sub-Saharan countriesis their predominantly rural character and theirlow level of industrial development. Most of thework force (60 to 90 percent) and around halfof output usually is in agriculture. These aremainly small, open economies with most of theirrural populations engaged in cultivating primaryagricultural exports (cocoa, coffee, cotton, oil-seeds, palm oil, sisal, and tea). Exports stillmainly consist of primary commodities forwhich demand grows slowly, and amount toover a fifth of GDP in the poorest countries,which have about half the Sub-Saharan popu-lation. A major problem for most countries istheir vulnerability to changes in the terms oftrade.

The economic growth rates in the region dur-ing 1960-75 averaged about 4 percent a year, orless than 2 percent per person with the increasein population. Agriculture did poorly in thisperiod with annual rates of increase averagingonly about 1.5 percent. The growth of agricul-ture was somewhat better in the 1960s but theentire region, especially the Sahel countries ofChad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, andUpper Volta, was afflicted by severe droughtwhich reduced agricultural growth during theearly 1970s. Economic growth rates varied con-siderably among countries. Apart from the min-eral exporters, the fast growing economies werethose where agriculture expanded rapidly.

47Low IncomeDeveloping Countries

Middle IncomeDeveloping Countries

Africa Other Africa OtherIncome per Person, 1976 (US dollars) 145 155 390 990Share of Agriculture in GDP, 1976 (percent) 41 47 28 18Share of Population in Urban Areas, 1975 (percent) 11 18 24 47Share of Manufactures in Exports, 1975 (percent) 5 14 5 24Life Expectancy at Birth, 1975 41 45 44 61Total Fertility Rate, 1975 6.3 6.2 6.5 5.8Percentage of Primary School AgeChildren Attending School, 1975 53 51 79 103

Adult Literacy Rate, 1974 23 22 15 72

Source: World Development Indicators.

The handicaps in development have been re-inforced by failures of economic policy, someof which have their roots in the colonial era. Inmost countries, agricultural development is hin-dered, as it has been for many decades, by theinadequacy of research and extension services(except those for tree crops), and insufficientincentives for agricultural investment. The dif-ficulty of making drastic changes in the colonialsalary structures in the transitional period hasled to severe rigidities and distortions in urbanlabor markets and excessive growth in bureau-cratic employment rather than industrial skills.Many countries have adopted a protective andinterventionist policy framework for industrythat dampens entrepreneurial initiative, or atleast diverts it away from industries and tech-nologies that would help to expand industrialemployment quickly.

The great heterogeneity within Sub-SaharanAfrica makes it difficult to discuss policy op-tions in general terms. While the analysis ofcommon problems can be helpful, each generalissue has its local variation, and policies mustbe adapted specifically to the needs of countriesthat are tremendously diverse in environment,resources, and economic performance. Through-out the region, however, development prospects

48 will depend crucially on agriculture. The laborforce is still predominantly rural, and even ifindustry and services grow more rapidly thanin the past, they will not be able to provide pro-ductive employment for more than a small pro-portion of the population in the near future.Poverty too is mainly a rural phenomenon. Thesuccess of efforts to raise incomes, to improvenutrition, to provide other basic services, and toachieve the widespread economic and socialmodernization required for self-sustainedgrowth and the eradication of poverty will beproblematic at best without a broadly basedagricultural development strategy.

The next two sections examine the structuraland policy environment for the development ofagriculture and industry. They are followed bya discussion of issues in international trade,and demographic trends. The last two sectionsoutline development priorities and some impor-tant ways in which external assistance is neededto help overcome the formidable constraints ondevelopment.

Development of AgricultureThere are many reasons for the generally

backward technology of cultivation in the re-gion: the high incidence of diseases (especiallytrypanosomiasis) that kill draft animals; the

poor soils and scanty and uncertain rainfall thathave discouraged land-intensive, settled agri-culture in many parts of the region; the abun-dance of land, that permitted shifting cultivationrelying on bush fallowing and slash-and-burntechniques to restore soil quality; the impor-tance of root crops and coarse grains in which,unlike wheat, rice, and maize, genetic researchhas not yet proceeded very far; and the highcost of irrigation because of the scarcity ofground water. The distinctive and varied agro-climatic and socioeconomic environments inAfrica make it difficult to introduce agriculturaltechnologies from elsewhere. This applies par-ticularly to the biological and chemical innova-tions that are needed to increase crop yields,by introducing intensive systems of continuouscultivation and replacing the bush fallow sys-tems with other and more productive ways tomaintain soil fertility. Innovations developedin one area may not be transferable on any broadscale, since there are drastic differences in rain-fall, soils, and other ecological factors, not tomention cultural diversities, which have pro-duced wide variations in the dominant and sec-ondary food crops of different areas. Hence,research to generate and test innovations inmaterials and practices must often be tailoredto specific locations.

There are also difficulties in identifying andintroducing simple, inexpensive mechanical in-novations adapted to the needs of African small-holders. For instance, the relative ease withwhich tractor-based technologies can be trans-ferred, and the weakness in the agriculturalextension services in transmitting informationon appropriate cultural practices, have encour-aged an inappropriate emphasis on capital-in-tensive equipment. There has been a neglectof mechanical innovations capable of raising theproductivity of small farmers who operate themajority of farms.

Adaptive research in agriculture has not re-ceived the allocation of money and manpowerthat is commensurate with the dominant posi-tion of agriculture in these economies, or withthe potential that exists for obtaining high re-turns from investments in research. Expendi-tures on agricultural research are low and theinstitutional base is weak. Strengthening na-tional and regional research capabilities toevolve an appropriate sequence of feasible andprofitable innovations in agriculture is espe-cially crucial to the long-term developmentprospects of the region.

A large part of Africa's land resources isin semi-permanent or permanent pastures, and

animal products account for an important partof the diet and economic livelihood of small-holders in Africa. Livestock activities are com-plementary to crop production. They allow idleland to be used productively and provide thedraft power for crop production, allowing landresources to be used more fully. The develop-ment of livestock (dairy and beef cattle, goats,sheep, and pigs) can play an important role inalleviating malnutrition and rural poverty and,in some cases, can be a source of foreign ex-change. The main drawbacks are disease, poorquality of stock, and traditional managementsystems that have kept animal yields low.

In addition to environmental and technolog-ical constraints on agricultural growth, gov-ernment policy has frequently had an adverseeffect. In most countries, colonial policies foragricultural research, transport, and producerand consumer pricing were designed to favorthe extraction of primary products for export,correspondingly neglecting the development offood crops. Official marketing boards, whichwere originally established to protect farmers'interests, were gradually transformed into in-struments of agricultural taxation. Much of thispolicy inclination has continued. In addition,policies concerning exchange rates, taxes, sub-sidies, and tariffs, along with controls affectingforeign and domestic trade, provided incentivesto industrial or commercial, rather than agricul-tural, activities.

Of course, there are exceptions. Some gov-ernments have supported agricultural develop-ment and created an environment in whichsmallholder cultivators have flourished. This isshown by the rapid growth and diversificationof agriculture in Ivory Coast (both for exportand domestic consumption) and the successfulspread of tea and hybrid maize cultivationamong smallholders in parts of Kenya. In cer-tain other countries, government efforts topromote development have emphasized largecapital-intensive schemes at the expense ofbroadly based smallholder development. Thisseems to have been the case, for example, withthe state farms in Ghana in the 1960s and thelarge irrigation schemes in Sudan which haveabsorbed much scarce capital and skilled man-power. The inefficiency of parastatals and state-sponsored cooperatives acting as marketingintermediaries for farmers has typically beenaccommodated by widening the transport andmarketing margins at the expense of the farmer.Other considerations adversely affecting farmprice incentives have been the perennial pres-sure for cheap food in urban centers, and

ambivalence about letting supply respond tochanges in international prices, for fear that thismight reinforce a pattern of export specializa-tion in agricultural raw materials, a conditionthat has been identified with colonialism.

IndustrializationAgricultural interests have often been sub-

ordinated in the course of widespread attemptsto force the pace of industrialization by provid-ing high levels of protection. However, the re-sults of protectionist policies so far, judgingfrom the employment created and the domesticresource costs of import saving, have generallybeen unsatisfactory. There is very little manu-facturing for export outside the region, exceptfor some processing of primary commodities,despite the fact that manufactured productsfrom many of the countries have had prefer-ential access to markets in Europe. Typically,three-quarters or more of industrial value addedis in import substitutes, principally in relativelyllnsophisticated goods such as processed foodsand beverages, textiles, garments, wood andleather products, cement, paper, and printing.In some countries, especially where the paceof industrialization has been pressed throughgovernment participation and intervention, in-dustrial programs have tended to include capi-tal-intensive projects in fertilizers, metal prod-ucts and processing, petroleum refining, andrubber, chemical, and electrical productssec-tors in which particularly acute transition dif-ficulties have tended to require high effectiveprotection.

The inefficiency of this industrial activity hasmany causes in addition to the usual "start-up"problems in developing countries. High andsustained levels of protection have removedcompetitive pressures to improve efficiency. Insome countries, the form and extent of govern-ment intervention has been an adverse influ-ence. Other disadvantages are high transportcosts in such landlocked countries as Mali,Niger, and Upper Volta, and in others whereinfrastructure is poor; and social pressures toexpand employment and share business earn-ings with members of the extended family ortribe.

A major handicap faced by African industryis the scarcity and high cost of suitably skilledlabor and management. In the colonial era, mod-ern industry was exclusively the preserve ofnon-Africans in East and Central Africa; andeven in West Africa, where crafts and simplemanufacturing flourished from pre-colo-nial times, large- and medium-scale enterprises

49

50

were dominated by non-Africans. The countrieswhere manufacturing has prospered best arealso those where expatriates have continued toplay a relatively larger role since independence.No doubt this is a temporary phenomenon andan increasing number of Africans now engagedin commercial activities may be expected tobecome industrial entrepreneurs, as has oc-curred in other countries that are further alongin the process of industrialization.

One of the most serious obstacles to earlyindustrialization in Africa is the high wage andsalary structure. The high salaries in govern-ment and in administrative positions generallywere derived from the colonial era, and havebeen sustained by the large role that expa-triates have maintained in manufacturing insome countries. These salary levels have fueleda strong demand for secondary education toqualify for such positions. Another effect ofthis salary and wage structure has been toraise governments' consumption expenditureand thus reduce budgetary savings.

For unskilled workers in industry, wages arehigh relative to their productivity. The resultinghigh production costs could only be accommo-dated by increased protection. This, in turn, hasdiluted competitive pressures for industrial effi-ciency. The trend toward high and protectedprices of manufactures has also tended to shiftthe domestic terms of trade against agriculture.

While high wages are available to only asmall proportion of the work force, they aremore regular and sufficiently above the realearnings of smallholder peasants to draw largenumbers to urban centers, where they are pre-pared to wait long periods for a chance at therelatively few well-paid regular jobs. This, incombination with the natural increase in theurban population, has increased urban unem-ployment and poverty both relatively newphenomena in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The allocation of labor has been even moredistorted in countries with widespread govern-ment ownership of industrial and commercialenterprises. Parastatal enterprises are underpressure to increase their employment and,together with the government, form a largeproportion of the "modern" sector. Their em-ployment policies, especially their wage levelsand entry requirements, have a dominant influ-ence on the aspirations of job seekers and onthe types of skills that are demanded of theeducational system.

TradeFor the Sub-Saharan African countries, food,

beverages, and minerals constitute a muchgreater share of exports than for all developingcountries as a group, or even for the Low In-come countries in Asia. This influences the

40. Developing Countries: Product Compositionof Non-fuel Exports, 1975

(Percentages)

relative importance of the various internationaltrade issues in the African context. The smallshare of manufactures is primarily the resultof elements of economic structure and policythat have already been discussed: the highwages of unskilled workers in relation to theirproductivity; the scarcity of managers andskilled workers and reliance on expensive ex-patriate personnel, which adds significantly toproduction costs; the weak tradition of Africanentrepreneurship in manufacturing industry;the high costs of transportation due to theinadequacy of infrastructure and disadvantagesof location, especially in landlocked countries;and policy biases against export promotion andin favor of import substitution.

In the short run, it will be difficult for coun-tries in Sub-Saharan Africa to overcome theobstacles to expanding manufactured exports.Consequently, their preferential access to indus-trialized countries' markets, as made availableunder the Lomé Convention, is of particularimportance. While only limited progress hasbeen made so far, development of resource-based manufacturing exports through additionalprocessing of primary products offers potential.African countries are vulnerable to imp erfec-tions in primary commodity markets and theydepend heavily on commodities with unstablepricesa problem at which the Stabex schemeis specifically directed. In the case of six com-modities whose prices fluctuated most (seeTable 18), Sub-Saharan African countries sup-plied over a quarter of the total exports of de-veloping countries; for three of these unstablecommodities (cocoa, copper, and sisal), the re-gion's share of exports was over one-half. Forcountries whose exports are highly concen-trated in these commodities, the problem ofprice instability is even more acute. Copper, for

Foodand

Bever-ages

Non-foodAgri-

culture

Metalsand

Mm-erals

Manu-fac-

tures Total

Sub-SaharanAfrica 52 13 26 9 100

Low IncomeAsia 32 17 9 42 100All DevelopingCountries 36 9 12 43 100

example, accounted for over 90 percent ofZambia's exports and 69 percent of Zaire'sin 1973-75; cocoa represented 60 percent ofGhana's exports, and around one-fifth of theexports of Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and Togo.With concentrations such as these, a country'sbalance of payments is severely affected by theinternational market for specific commodities.

DemographyThe slow and uncertain patterns of agricul-

tural and industrial development in Sub-SaharanAfrica are made even more serious by the pros-pect of rising rates of population growth. Suchgrowth, although already high at over 2.5 per-cent a year, has been checked so far by high

mortality rates associated with the high in-cidence of communicable diseases, especiallygastric diseases, malnutrition, and poor tradi-tional midwifery and weaning practices. Ashealth conditions improve, population growthcan be expected to accelerate as mortalitydeclines and fertility increases. In addition, pro-natal feelings have traditionally been importantin Africa and there is no evidence as yet thatthey have diminished. Ultimately, as childmortality declines and families recognize thatthey cannot afford to educate large numbers ofchildren, they are likely to decide to reducetheir fertility. In the meantime, economic policymust contend with high rates of populationexpansion.

With the growing demographic pressures,

there is increasing reason to question the tradi-tional opinion that land is abundant in Sub-Saharan Africa. There are, of course, manyregions where considerable scope still exists forexpanding the area under cultivation. However,these usually require expensive roads and othertypes of infrastructure; and trypanosomiasisoften poses a difficult problem until populationand cultivation have expanded sufficiently toreduce the tree cover which provides a habitatfor the tsetse fly. There are already indicationsof pressure on the traditional farming systemsbecause of growth in population and extendedcultivation. Studies carried out in many local-ities report that fallow periods have beenreduced substantially, leading to a decline in

41. Demographic Indicators in Selected Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa

The assumptions underlying these projections are described in the Notes to Table 16 in World Development Indicotors.bMedian values for countries with populations over one million in 1976.eTotal for countries with populations over one million in 1976.Source: World Development Indicators, Tables 15 and 16.

soil fertility, more difficulty in controllingweeds, and consequently declining crop yields.With the rapid rate of population growth, it isnot surprising that an increasing number of ruralareas are beginning to feel population pressures.Land scarcity and lack of employment oppor-tunities in a number of Kenya's "high potential"agricultural areas are responsible for shifts ofpopulation to semi-arid areas where land is stillavailable, even though food production is haz-ardous because rainfall is limited and erratic.Similar evidence of population pressure hasbeen noted in other African countries, especiallyin East Africa but also in Ghana and Nigeria.

A dramatic symptom of the growing popula-tion pressures in the region is the emergence oflarge food deficits in some of the more populous

51

Crude BirthRate perthousand

Crude DeathRate perthousand

TotalFertility

RatePopulation(millions)

1975 1975 1975 1976 2OOO

Ethiopia 49 25 6.7 29 54

Ghana 49 21 6.7 10 20

Ivory Coast 45 20 6.2 7 14

Kenya 50 15 7.6 14 31

Mali 50 25 6.7 6 11

Nigeria 49 22 6.7 77 154

Senegal 47 22 6.3 5 9

Sudan 49 17 7.0 16 30

Tanzania 47 19 6.7 15 32

Upper Volta 49 25 6.5 6 9

Zaire 44 20 5.9 25 47

All Sub-SaharanAfrica 21b 63h 313C 604C

countries. Production of food in Africa has notonly failed to keep pace with population growthbut has also lagged behind that in other regions.While some of the decline in output is due to theunfavorable weather of recent years, it is clearthat the traditional farming systems have beenunable to respond adequately to the demandsresulting from rapid population growth.

42. Indexes of Food Production per Person,1966-70 and 1971-76

(1961-65 = 100)

Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.

The food prospects for Sub-Saharan Africawould be gloomy if the past semi-stagnanttrends in food production were to continue.Assuming only a small improvement in foodconsumption per person, the International FoodPolicy Research Institute (IFPRIJ has estimatedthat the food deficits of the Sub-Saharan deficit

52 countries would rise from 2 million tons in 1975to about 24 million tons in 1990. Nearly two-thirds of the estimated 1990 deficit would be inNigeria. IFPRI's estimates are based on theassumption that Nigeria's agriculture will con-tinue to stagnate, as it did between 1960 and1975 when food production rose by only 0.5percent annually. This performance could beimproved, and the deficits reduced. In any case,the estimates dramatically demonstrate the needfor a much more rapid increase in agriculturalproduction in Sub-Saharan Africa in the future.

Strategic Development PrioritiesEven more than in Asia, accelerating growth

and alleviating poverty in Sub-Saharan Africawill depend primarily on the provision of addi-tional impetus to agriculture, particularly thesmaliholder sector, and secondarily on the paceof employment creation in industry and directaction to improve the supply of essential publicservices.

The experience of several countries in theregion testifies that smallholder incomes inagriculture could be raised quite rapidly if pro-ducers were given more incentives1 and better

1The various sources of bias against agriculture in the systemof incentives are discussed at greater length in the nextchapter.

support in the form of physical infrastructure,extension services, credit, and market integra-tion. With the emerging demographic pressures,however, it is becoming clear that growth infarm productivity and output cannot be sus-tained for very long without a large expansionin the use of technologies adapted to Africanconditions and increased reliance by farmers onproductive and appropriate purchased inputs.

There is as yet little of the specific knowledgeand guidance necessary to make the transitionfrom a traditional land-intensive system of agri-culture to one which uses scientific informationto increase yields. The necessary local orienta-tion of research and extension will require moreactive leadership from governments, but it willalso need strong financial and technical supportfrom abroad. The research required to increaseagricultural productivity in dry farming condi-tions should be a major international priority.The development of a new and reliable highyielding millet can contribute as much to raisingthe living standards of millions of poor peopleas the changes in structure and policy that arealso necessary. Aside from research at interna-tional research centers, more emphasis is neededon local adaptive research and on the systematicstudy of the characteristics of existing farmingsystems. Research is also required on equip-ment and tillage techniques for conserving mois-ture and soil, to replace the still predominanthoe cultivation, and on the means to improvethe conditions for rearing livestock. In thelonger run, irrigation will have a significant roleand collection of the necessary hydrologicaldata for this purpose should be accelerated. But,for the near future, in most parts of the regionexcluding the Sahel, there is still a large unusedpotential in rainfed cultivation which should betapped before major commitments need to bemade to expensive and technically demandingirrigation works.

The research base for a modernized agricul-ture must be accompanied by development ofan institutional structure, at present quite weakin most of Africa, to disseminate improvedmethods and to deliver the necessary suppliesand services. Furthermore, the benefits from theadoption of more modern practices must seemattractive enough to induce farmers to pay forthese additional supplies and services.

The contention that traditional smaliholdersare indifferent to price incentives is not sup-ported by a number of empirical studies in Sub-Saharan Africa on such crops as cocoa, coffee,cotton, groundnuts, maize, palm oil, rubber,sisal, and tobacco, which all show that supply

Africa1966-70 1971-76

99 96North and

Central America 105 110South America 104 104Asia 104 107

Average Average

responds positively. Failure to recognize thishas been one of the serious shortcomings of pastagricultural policy in Sub-Saharan countries.There have been many examples of how defi-cient price incentives have kept productionbelow its potentialamong Tanzania's exportcrops, except tobacco, in the late 1960s and early1970s; in Ghana with inadequate planting andmaintenance of cocoa; in Senegal with reducedgroundnut production; and in Guinea with theextensive diversion of farm products fromofficial channels into smuggling and black mar-kets because of price controls. Ivory Coast isone of the few countries to have maintainedattractive producer prices, and these have con-tributed to fairly vigorous agricultural expan-sion. Several African countries are now show-ing an increasing awareness of the supply re-sponses that may be expected from generousagricultural incentives and are shifting theirpolicies accordingly.

Another issue of crucial importance is thechoice between a development strategy concen-trating on small farmers, which would seekagricultural modernization for the mass of thefarm population, and an exclusively production-oriented strategy that confined resources andrapid growth of output to large and relativelycapital-intensive farm units within a dualisticagricultural structure.

Even if large-scale and highly commercializedfarms were more efficient, which is not alwaysthe case, there are reasons for preferring astrategy that emphasizes the growth of small-holder agriculture. First, the large farms tend tobe highly mechanized. Tractor technologies areattractive because they can be transferred fromthe industrialized countries with relative easeand tractors tend to be looked upon as symbolsof modern agriculture. But while some mechani-zation of agriculture (not necessarily includingthe use of tractors) may well be desirable,agriculture for the next decade must be theprincipal source of employment and incomes forthe majority of the population. Second, largecommercial farms could capture a large share ofthe urban market, diminishing the extent towhich smallholders can sell their produce forthe cash necessary to purchase inputs and up-grade their farming technology. The growth ofthe cash incomes of small farmers is importantin expanding the markets for urban industrialproducts and promotes a healthy interactionbetween agriculture and manufacturing.

The argument against letting large-scale farmspreempt markets is less applicable for exportsthan domestic sales, and probably less appli-

cable in countries which are big importers offoodgrains. In the short run, a country mightgain foreign exchange by a policy that maxi-mizes agricultural production, even if on largefarms. But the resulting dualism could welldelay the broadly based improvement in agri-cultural productivity that is required for sus-tained development and better rural incomedistribution.

One of the requirements for efficient growthof manufacturing in the region will be to bringurban wages in the modern sector more closelyinto line with workers' skills and productivity.The complex set of factors responsible for thepresent imbalance have been noted. Correctiveaction will be needed on a wide front, encom-passing educational structure, curriculum, andfinancing; government salaries; industrialwages; and industrial incentive policies. A bet-ter adjustment between productivity and wageswill be necessary if exports of manufactures areto be competitive in international markets.

Some countries have attempted to disregardinternationally competitive efficiency by em-phasizing production for the domestic market,but their experience has not been encouraging.Obviously some domestic-oriented manufactur-ing can be efficient, but the range of industriesthat can be efficient is likely to be limited byeconomies of scale and by vocational, technical,and managerial skills and infrastructure. Ghanaand Tanzania, for example, have attempted toforce the pace of industrialization beyond theseeconomic limits. While failing to accelerate in-dustrial growth significantly, such policies havenurtured inefficient enterprises that make itmore difficult to reorient industrial incentivestoward competitive efficiency, and thus inhibitfuture growth. In contrast, countries whose pol-icies did not give primary emphasis to indus-trialization actually attained relatively rapidindustrial growth rates. The share of manufac-turing in GDP rose from 7 percent in 1960 to 14

percent in 1974 in Ivory Coast, whereas it stag-nated around 10 percent in Ghana.

One of the limitations on African industrialgrowth has been the relatively small size of themarket for industrial products in individualcountries. Recognition of this difficulty hasspurred numerous schemes for regional eco-nomic integration. One scheme, the East AfricanCommon Market, comprising Kenya, Tanzania,and Uganda, ran into political and economic dif-ficulties and has since been disbanded. Severalschemes now exist in West and Central Africa.Two of these are confined to Francophone coun-tries: the West African Economic Community

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(CEAO) of Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,Senegal, and Upper Volta, and the Central Afri-can Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC)comprising Cameroon, the Central African Em-pire, the People's Republic of Congo, and Gabon.The new sixteen-member Economic Communityof West African States (ECOWAS) comprisesthe members of CEAO plus Benin, Cape Verde,Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Togo, making it themost ambitious effort at regional integration inWest Africa.

All these schemes aim at establishing commonmarkets with particular emphasis on industrialdevelopment. Their members are diverse in theirresources and levels of economic development,with comparatively rich coastal countries along-side the landlocked and very poor countries.Each treaty provides for fair sharing in the ben-efits of regional development, with mechanismsto compensate for losses in revenues due tochanges in trade shares as well as developmentfunds to assist the poorer member countries inparticular. It is still too early to assess the con-tribution these schemes could make towardexploiting economies of scale through marketintegration.

International AssistanceThis review of development problems in agri-

culture and industry in Sub-Saharan Africancountries has outlined the immense difficultiesthey face in accelerating their growth. Interna-tional assistance can speed their developmentin a variety of ways.

Perhaps most important is financial and tech-nical assistance to increase both the amount ofagricultural research and its relevance to theneeds of small farmers under various agrocli-matic conditions. The international agriculturalresearch centers, such as the International In-stitute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), the Inter-national Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), and the Interna-tional Maize and Wheat Improvement Center(CIMMYT), are an important response to boththose needs. They can provide plant material,ideas, technical assistance, and training facili-ties to strengthen food crop research programsin individual countries; and IITA and ICRISATare emphasizing research to guide the evolutionof more productive farming systems.

More research with a bearing on livestockdevelopment, including livestock diseases, isalso needed. In addition assistance is neededto strengthen national research programs, and

to bridge the gap between the work of the inter-national centers and the location-specific re-search required to identify and test innovationssuitable for farmers of particular localities. In-ternational support for research covering eco-logical zones common to many countries willbe particularly valuable. There is much to belearned from experience with existing regionalprograms, such as those undertaken with theassistance of the French Government's organi-zation to support research on vegetable oils(IRHO), and the West African Rice Develop-ment Association (WARDA).

The requirements for concessional capitalassistance in Sub-Saharan Africa will continueto be high. Many of the countries are too poorto finance their needs at commercial terms. Con-cessional capital may also be increasingly nec-essary for the Middle Income African countrieswhose export growth is likely to be modestsince it depends heavily on a few primary prod-ucts, but which still have to undertake largeinvestments in infrastructurefor transportand health services, for examplethat arevital to their development. In the emphasis onalleviating poverty, there could be a danger thatexternal financing agencies would neglect theseneeds in search of projects that "directly"benefit the rural poor. Investment in infrastruc-ture often is an integral part of a poverty-oriented strategy, and in many African coun-tries is a precondition to effective programs forthe poor.

The importance to African countries of prob-lems affecting primary commodities has beendiscussed earlier. In addition to mechanisms forstabilizing prices and earnings from exports,international action can stimulate the growthof earnings from primary commodities by as-sisting in the expansion of output and marketshares. While more investment, improved tech-nology, and better incentives are required toincrease supply from Africa, parallel actionmight be needed to prevent global oversupplyof some of the commodities. In several casesbauxite, phosphates, and timber, for example--

-

international import demand is expected to growquite rapidly, and a fairly rapid increase inAfrican output could probably be absorbedwithout disturbing the market and affectingprices. But in other cases, preeminent examplesof which are tea and coffee, rapid growth ofAfrican output and exports cannot be accom-modated unless other nations reduce their sharesof the market. This has been happening to someextent. Brazil's share of world coffee exportshas fallen from 38 percent to 26 percent between

1961 and 1976, with Africa's share rising fromabout 19 percent to 27 percent in the same pe-riod. The share of India and Sri Lanka in teaexports declined from 73 percent in 1961-63 to52 percent in 1972-74, while Africa's share rosefrom 6 percent to 15 percent, the main exportersbeing Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Thesetrends can be accelerated, to the benefit of thepoorer African countries, if assistance can be

provided to other major exporters, which havealternative investment opportunities, for di-versification into alternative crops. Where di-versification appears advantageous, additionalfinance and other international assistance forprojects that would employ displaced workerswould benefit both the present exporters andthe African countries that could increase theirproduction of these commodities.

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