chapter 4 local ownership in ddr - gppac 4.pdfprocesses of national capacity - building,...

CASESTUDIESOFPEACEBUILDINGAPPROACHES 73

Chapter4LocalOwnershipinDDR

DDRcomplementsSSR/Dbydisarming,demobilizingandreintegratingarmedgroupsbackintosociety. DDR contributes to human security by reducing the number of weapons and armedgroups,reknittingsocialrelationshipsandhelpingcombatantstransitiontocivilianlivelihoods.The UN approach to DDR prioritises a peace process that uses negotiation, mediation orfacilitation of dialogue to address key issues driving armed opposition groups. The UNIntegrated DDR Standards45aims to support a war to peace transition so that combatantsbecomestakeholdersinthepeaceprocess.

The UN IDDRS Standards identify thatDDRshoulddothefollowing:

• PlanandcoordinateDDRwithintheframeworkofthepeaceprocess

• LinkDDRtobroadersecurityissues,suchasthereorganisationofthearmedforcesandothersecuritysectorreform(SSR)issues

• Takeacomprehensiveapproachtowardsdisarmament,andweaponscontrolandmanagement

• LinkDDRtothebroaderprocessesofnationalcapacity-building,reconstructionanddevelopmentinordertoachievethesustainablereintegrationofex-combatants

LocalownershipofDDRisoftenlacking.DDRrequirescoordinationbetweenmanystakeholdersincludingthenationalgovernment,militaryauthorities,localpolice,andlocalcivilsociety. Insomecases, international forcesorpeacekeepers, includingUNfunds,agenciesandprograms, may also be involved. In general, military forces direct disarmament anddemobilisation while civil society and civilian government agencies direct reintegration. Butcivil societyhas important roles inadvisingandoverseeingdisarmamentanddemobilisation,especially in reporting on weapons caches, and advocating for the reduction of weaponsavailabilityinsociety.Likewise,peacekeepingforces,militaryforcesandlocalpolicecanplayanimportantroleinensuringthesafetyofex-combatantswhoarereinsertedintoorreintegratingwithcivilsociety.OftenDDRlacksfunding,especiallyforthereintegrationphase.IncludingcivilsocietyinthedesignandimplementationofDDRmayhavefinancialandstrategicbenefits.Civilsociety efforts seem to cost less anddoabetter jobof addressingunderlyinggrievances thatmightreigniteconflict.

Disarmamentisthecollection,documentation,controlanddisposalofsmallarms,ammunition,explosivesandlightandheavyweaponsfromcombatantsandoftenfromthecivilianpopulation.Demobilizationistheformalandcontrolleddischargeofactivecombatantsfromarmedforcesandgroups,includingaphaseof“reinsertion”whichprovidesshort-termassistancetoex-combatantsforfood,shelter,training,employmentortools.Reinsertionistheassistanceofferedtoex-combatantsduringdemobilizationbutpriortothelonger-termprocessofreintegration.Reintegrationistheprocessbywhichex-combatantsacquirecivilianstatusandgainsustainableemploymentandincome.Itisapolitical,socialandeconomicprocesswithanopentimeframe,primarilytakingplaceincommunitiesatthelocallevel.

74 LOCALOWNERSHIPINSECURITY

UsingPeacebuildingProcessestoSupportDDRDDRdoesnot justcontribute topeacebuildingat thenational level.Oftenpeacebuildingskillsand processes can be used within DDR programmes to improve relationships between thesecurity sector and civil society. A “peacebuilding” approach to DDR prioritises dialogue,mediationandgrievanceresolutionprocessestoaddressthefundamentalrelationshipbetweenarmed opposition groups, community leaders and local and/or national governmentrepresentativesthatmakethemstakeholders inthepeaceprocess.Civilsocietypeacebuildingorganisations can play a significant role in designing and implementing peacebuildingapproaches to DDR. Theymay play a large role for in developing sustainable platforms andinfrastructure for the social, economic and political reintegration of armed groups back intociviliancommunities.Reintegrationprocessesfocusonsupportingtheentirecommunitythatisparticipating in reintegration, and not just the individual ex-combatants. DDR does not justcontributetopeacebuildingatthenationallevel.PeacebuildingskillsandprocessescanbeusedwithinDDRprograms.ThischapterdescribesfourcasestudieswherepeacebuildingskillsandprocessessupportmoreeffectiveDDR.

DRC:Peacebuilding-basedDDRFollowingtheDRC’sLusakapeaceagreementin1999,theWorldBankorganisedfundingforaMulti-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP). Beginning in 2004, aprogramme to demobilise, disarm and reintegrate 150,000 ex-combatants, mainly militiamembers,continuedto functionalongsideactivewarfare. InNorthKivu in theeasternpartofthe Democratic Republic of Congo, a small local Congolese NGO with fifteen years of localpeacebuildingexperiencebeganaDDRprogram.Drawing on peacebuilding skills, a DDR programmesrun by the Centre for Resolution of Conflicts (CRC)emphasised building an infrastructure of support forsustainablereintegration.46CRCviewedreintegrationasthe cornerstone of successful DDR, and as suchadvocatedcallingtheeffortsRDDtoemphasisetheneedtothinkaboutreintegrationfromtheverybeginningofanyDDRprogram.FromCRC’spointofview,thedonor-supportedDDRprogrammesneglectedtoconsiderhowex-combatants would cope with reintegration. Moneywas available for “sensitizing” armed groups on theneed to disarm and demobilise, but money was notavailable for reintegration or for considering how toprepare communities where they were to bereintegrated.DDRprogrammesassumedex-combatantswouldbe integratedintothestate’sarmedforces,eventhoughtheseunitsalsoweretobedemobilised.CRCdesignedaprogramme for reintegrationwhere itbecameanopportunity for communitydevelopment.CreatingapreventiveinfrastructuretohandlelandconflictswasakeycomponentoftheCRCapproach.Together,therewasacoherentplanforlivelihoodcreationthroughseedsandagriculturekit.Thispairedwiththedevelopmentofacommunity-basedconflictresolutionsystemthataddressedissuesofIDPsandcombatantsreturningandsettlingonland.Sixtaskforcesworkedonthereintegrationprocess,eachwithapproximately12peoplemadeupofcommunityandreligious leaders, formerchildsoldiers,andformermilitiacommanders.CRC trained the task forces on human rights and conflict resolution. The task forces play avarietyofrolesthroughCRCpartnershipswithotheragenciessuchasFAO,UNDP,UNHCRandSavetheChildren/UNICEF.

ThechallengeDDReffortsfocusedondisarmamentanddemobilization,butneglectedreintegration.Theoryofchange:Programstoprepareandsupportex-combatantsandthecommunitiesthatwillacceptthembyfocusingoncommunitydevelopmentwillenablesustainablehumansecurity.


First,CRCadvertisestheirDDRprogrammeinavarietyofways.Radioprogrammesencouragedcombatants to leave armed groups individually.Negotiationswithmilitia leaders encourageddemobilisationandreintegrationforentiremilitiagroups.MONUSCO(andbeforethatMONUC)dropped leaflets from helicopters inviting combatants to call the CRC director to discussreintegration.

Photo26:CommunityinDRC.PhotoCredit:FlickrCCMikeRosenbergCRCstaffwould then travelwithoutprotection into thebush–sometimeswaiting forseveraldays-tonegotiatewithmilitiacommanders,toreturnwithalloftheirmenortoreleasechildsoldiers.CRCprovidedaccompaniment for4,276ex-combatants (3532men,270women,and474children).Thisaccompanimentensuredthesafepassageofex-combatantstoMONUSCOorFARDcampswheretheyaredemobilisedbyremovingtheirweapons,military-styleclothingorother symbols of their combatant status and recording their names. CRC then accompaniedthem to the communities where they were reintegrated. This helped make sure that militiamembersmadeitallthewayintoCRCreintegrationprograms,whichCRCviewedaspivotaltosuccessfulDDR.Simultaneously with advertising the programme to militia members, CRC preparedcommunities for receiving militia members. CRC persuaded communities through incentivessuchasreparationprogrammeswheremilitiamemberswoulddocommunityservice,suchasbuilding roads. CRC also provided a range of livelihood options, some available to non-combatant communitymembers. For example, CRCbegan joint civilian and ex-combatant co-operatives for1334ex-combatants. Inclusionof civilians in the cooperativesensured thatex-combatantsalonedidnotreceivethebulkofassistance,sincethiswouldcreateanunfortunateincentive forothers to joinmilitias.Cooperativesbeginwith30membersandsmall grantsof$2000 as start up. Cooperatives often grewquickly, somewith200members, as they extendinclusion of others. Ex-combatants may provide community service by rehabilitating localinfrastructureofroadsandmarkets.Thisincreasestheiracceptancebylocalcommunitiesandenablesfurthercommunitydevelopment.CRC found that civilian communities provided a socializing model of civilian values andprovidedanewsocialnetworkformilitiamembersthataffirmedacceptablecivilianbehaviours.Inaddition,CRCsupportedthecreationofvoluntarysocialnetworkstoattendtoreintegratedmilitiamembers and the community. This includes community conflict resolution task forces


that help to ease social tensions. The CRC set up an early warning system and providedmediation for localdisputes.The local conflict resolution task forceswere created towarnofimpendingconflictsoverland,forexample,asIDPsreturntoanarea.Thetaskforcessupportedmediationto takeplacebetweenkeystakeholderssothatanagreementcanbemadewithoutresorttoviolence.CRCsupported119communitiesinthereintegrationprocessbyhostingcall-inradioclubsfortwo-way dialogue onweekly CRC radio programs. Listeners could text or call into the radioshowwith theirconcernsor ideas.Somevillagesused theseradioclubsasawayof fosteringparticipatory planning and development on projects such as bicycle repair, hairdressing,hydroelectric power and propagating seedlings for reforestation. There is also a synergybetweentheseprograms.Theradioclubsfostertrustwithlocalcommunities,thatthenmakestheotherstagesofreintegrationworkmoresmoothly.PeaceDirect, the London-based funder of CRC, is carrying out on-going monitoring andevaluation of CRC’s DDR effort. Ex-combatants who went to communities with CRC’sintervention are compared bothwith ex-combatantswhowent through other, non-CRC DDRprograms,andwithex-combatantswhodidnotreceiveCRCorotherDDRsupport.Researchersalso interviewed CRC-assisted communities and non-CRC assisted communities to evaluatetheirviewof theprogram.Researchers foundthat81%ofex-combatantswhodidnotreceiveassistancewouldconsiderre-recruitingtoanarmedgroupcomparedto58%ofthosereceivingnon-CRCassistanceandonly10%ofthoseex-combatantsthatCRCdidassist.AnevaluationofCRC’swork found that its identityasa localorganisationwitha longhistoryofworkingwithlocalcommunitiesenablesittobecredibleandtrustworthyforarmedgroups,manyofwhomhavebecomewaryofFARDC,UNandMONUSCO.“CRC’slongtermcommitment,visibility,localknowledge, firsthandawarenessofthe impactsofconflictatapersonalandcommunity level,networks of contacts and strong staff commitment and work ethic have given CRC greatcredibilitywitharmedgroups,withcommunitiesandwithpartners.”47PeaceDirectalsocomparesthecostforCRC’sDDRprogram,asmallfractionofthecostsoflargescale,governmentorcontractor-runprograms.Forexample,thecostforthesetaskforceswas$1500 to start up eachTask Forcewith $500per year for travel funds. Task Forcemembersvolunteered 44000 hours of time per year. In contrast, some DDR programmes easily cost$1500perarmedindividual.


Mozambique:CivilSocietyRolesinDDRFrom1977-1992, a civilwar traumatised the country, as both sides, FRELIMOandRENAMO,relied on child soldiers and committed atrocities against civilians. Religious leaders from theChristianCouncilofMozambique(CCM), theAnglicanChurchand theRomanCatholicChurchanditsaffiliatesattheCatholicCommunityofSant'EgidiobasedinRomeencouragedRENAMOandFRELIMOtobringanendtothewarthroughdialogueina1992peaceagreement.TheUNoversawdemobilisationof100,000troopsandcollectedover200,000weaponsbetween1992-1994.48Attheendofthisprocess,thecountrystillsufferedfromviolentcrimeandawidespreadsenseoftrauma.Millionsofweaponsandcachesofammunition,landminesandexplosivesstilllittered the country, obstructing agriculture, and economic development. These local stasheswereasourceofinstability,asitremainedunclearwhetherthepeaceagreementwouldholdorwhethergroupswouldreturntofighting.

ReligiousorganisationsandNGOsinMozambiqueledanation-wideDDRprogrammefollowingtheendoftheUN’sprogram.TheChristianCouncilofMozambique’s(CCM)pivotalroleinthepeace process gave it trust and respect to also play roles in disarmament. CCM noted in its2002-2204reportthat“MozambiqueisthefirstCountryintheworldwithagovernmentwhoaccepted in 1995 to give the civil society, (Christian Council ofMozambique) completely theresponsibilityforcollection,massivedestructionofsmallarmsandlightweaponsaswellasallsecurity process of these complex and political verysensibleissue.”49

In addition, over a dozenMozambican youths, some ofwhom were former child soldiers from both theRENAMOandFRELIMOforces,cametogetherin1995todiscuss effective ways for community participation inpeacekeepingandsecurityprocesses.InitiallynamedtheCommunity Intelligence Force (Força de InteligênciaComunitária,orFIC)thegroupeventuallychangedtheirname to FOMICRES (Mozambican Force for CrimeInvestigation and Social Insertion). FIC joined togetherwith the CCM in a “transformation of swords intoploughshares’ or “TAE” disarmament project. 50 Earlyeffortsincludedhelpingcommunitymembersbuildtrustwith one another, establishing a culture of peace, andfostering understanding of the need for reconciliationand weapons collection. FIC trained communitymembersontechniquestogainintelligenceforpubliccollectionanddestructionofsmallarmsandlightweaponsthatwerestillinillicithands.Thesixelementsoftheprojectincluded:

• Weaponscollection• Exchangeofweaponsfortools• Destructionofweapons• Civiceducationinthecommunity• Transformationofthedestroyedweaponsintoartpieces• Post-exchangefollow-upwithbeneficiaries

FIC staff worked with communities, former combatants and leaders on both sides to gatherinformation on the location of weapons stashes. Individuals and communities would shareinformationaboutweaponsbasedonpromisesthat theywouldreceivetoolssuchasbicycles,sewingmachines, zinc roof sheetingor agricultural tools in exchange.General criteria for theexchange allowed for standardizing negotiations depending on the type and condition of theweapons.

ThechallengeAftertheUN’sDDRprogrammewasover,therewerestillmanyweaponsobstructinghumansecurity.Theoryofchange:Programstoincreasetrustbetweencommunitiesbybuildingrelationshipstoidentifyweapons’cachesandtofosteralternativelivelihoodstosupporthumansecurity.


For example, for 1 operational weapon, 12non-operational weapons, or 520 units ofammunition, an informant could expect toreceive10zincsheets(oftenusedforroofing)or1bicycle.51Technicalstaff fromthecapitalMaputo would then travel to these areas toverify the informationandarrangeaprocesswith the communities to collect and destroytheweapons.

InthecapitalcityMaputo,artiststransformedsome of the weapons and ordinance intoobjects of art for sale such as the chairpictured here. The artists helped to attractattention to the project, reinforcing publicvalues in a culture of peace. The art alsoattracted donor’s attention and sponsorshipofFOMICRESotherwork.

FOMICRES also worked with MozambicangovernmentauthoritiesandtheSouthAfricanpoliceinaprojectcalled“OperationRachel;”across-border weapons collection anddestruction initiative. This partnershipbrought together government-scale logisticsand technical support, together withFOMICRES’trustwithcommunities,neededinorder to enter communities and then locateandcollectweapons.

FOMICRES expanded its programming to begin work on other security issues, such as theshortageofpolice.InMozambique,morepolicemendieofAIDSthancanbetrainedtoreplacethem.According toFOMICRES reports, nearly amillion community volunteersnowassist thepolice. With new funding from the German Government via Peace Direct, FOMICRES is nowrefining the selection of policing volunteers and offering training course for communityvolunteers,hopingthatthiscanbringdownratesofviolentcrime.

Evaluations of the work of the TAE project indicate a variety of outcomes. First, the projectcollectedthousandsofweaponsandhundredsofthousandsofpiecesofordinance.WhilethisisasmallamountcomparedwiththeUNmissions’DDRefforts, it isaconsiderablecontributionforaCSOwithoutthescaleofresourcesandlogisticsasgovernment.Evaluatorsnote“collectingand destroying illegal weapons is not very meaningful unless it is part of a wider effort toimprovesecurityandmaintainpeace.InthecaseofTAE,itisanattempttopromoteacultureofpeace,advocatealifewithoutguns,helpex-combatantstogainapeacefullivelihoodandreducethesuspicionbetweenformerenemies.Muchof thiscostsmoney,which iswhyaprogrammelikeTAEcannotbeascheapasastraightforwardgunbuy-backprogram.”52TAEassertsthattherealvalueofitsworkistofosterpublicawarenessofacultureofpeace.

Photo27:ArtisticchairmadefromgunsgatheredinDDRprocesses.PhotoCredit:CC/Flickr


Afghanistan:Mediation-basedDDRInternationalprioritiesoncounterterrorismdelayedandcontortedAfghanistan’sDDRprogram.The2001BonnAgreementaftertheTalibanfelldidnotincludeDDR.DDRbeganinAfghanistanin 2003 to address anti-Talibanmilitias. The first DDR programme offered individual formermilitia commanders political appointments as an incentive to go through DDR. This had thenegativesideeffectofsettingintoplacepoliticalappointeeswhothepublicaccusedofhumanrights abuses and corruption.53Rewarding these militia leaders with political appointmentcreatedasensethatcounterterrorismwasmoreimportantthanhumanrightsortheruleoflaw.ItentrenchedpublicdistrustintheAfghangovernmentandinturnalsocontributedtoTalibanrecruitment.Without setting upDDR encampments to enticewholemilitia units to go through DDR together, donorgovernmentschannelledlowerlevelformermilitiawentthrough an individual DDR process. Beginning withsoldiers giving up their weapons in a parade andattending a demobilisation workshop in which theypromised not to take up arms again, the programmesoffered demobilised individuals a package of food andclothing.However,withoutapeaceagreement inplace,DDRdidnotstick.Somedemobilisedcombatantsturnedback to militia groups and some went to the drugtrade.54AtbestDDRwasawasteoftimeandmoney.Atworse, thecontentiouspoliticalappointments resultingfrom these efforts entrenched public distrust of theAfghangovernmentandincreasedTalibanrecruitment.A new generation of DDR programmes imagined that local Taliban commanders and theirgroupscoulddisarmtogetherthroughamediatedprocessthatwouldaddresslocalgrievances.A story from Helmand Province inspired this new model. An armed opposition group hadagreed to stop fighting the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), reject out of areafighters, remove or show the location of planted IEDs (improvised explosive devices), allowfreedom of movement to patrols, and accept Afghan National Security Force checkpoints. Inreturn, theAfghangovernmentagreed to increaseAfghansecurity forces toensure that thereare Afghans partnered in all home search and patrols with international forces to addresswidespread complaints of international forces searching Afghan homes. The Afghangovernment also promised to begin short-term cash for work and long-term economicdevelopmentopportunitiesforex-combatants.Afghan civil societywas the only stakeholder in Afghanistanwith the capacity to design andcarry out amediation-basedDDRmodel.Afghan civil society organisations (CSOs) havebeencarryingoutpeacebuildingprogrammesinAfghanistansincetheearly1990stomediatewaterand landdisputes, domestic violence and family issues aswell as conflictswithin communitydevelopment councils over setting development priorities. One Afghan CSO55 designed aprogramme to harness Afghan peacebuilding capacity to this new generation of DDR. TheAfghan CSO facilitated a pilot DDR programme based onmediation and grievance resolutionfrom October 2010 through January 2011 in 3 provinces and 16 communities including thefollowingcomponents.Rapid Response Team: The Afghan government identified emerging reintegrationopportunities.Government staffprovidedpermission letters to theAfghanCSO’s field staff toconductan independentassessmentofeconomic, ideological,politicalandsecuritygrievancesamong the reintegrees and the communities towhich theywould return. This step providedinformation about the core grievances driving the insurgency. Those interviewed included

ThechallengeThelackofapeaceagreementmadeitdifficulttoachievesustainableDDR.Theoryofchange:UsemediationtoaddressgrievancesatthelocalandprovinciallevelstoenablesustainableDDRandhumansecurity.


commanders,reintegreesandmembersofcommunitiesrangingfromhouseholdstoeldersandreligious leaders, labourers, traders, and district level political leadership. This assessmenthelped identify potential “internally-generated” incentives for DDR including face-savingmechanismsforreintegrating,localsecurityguarantees,andpromotinglocalcoexistencesoastofostersuccessfulreintegrationratherthanrelyingon“externally-generated”incentivessuchasfinancialpayments.

Provincial and Local CommunityMediation and Grievance Resolution:Governmentauthoritiesidentifiedamixofdiverse provincial leaders to joinProvincial Peace and ReintegrationCommittees. The Afghan CSO trainedprovincial and local mediation andgrievance resolution teams composed oftwo representatives from each group:government representatives, members ofnon-state armed opposition groups, andcommunityrepresentatives including localvillage elders, local mullahs, andcommunitymembers.In some communities, local peacecommittees already existed as part of thenation-wide network of existing

Community Development Councils.Where there were no peace committees, the Afghan CSOhelpedtosetthemup.Themediation process included three phases. First, the process identified each stakeholder’skeyissuesorgrievancesnecessarytoreachaDDRagreement.Second,themediationexploredoptionsforresolvingeachoftheissues.Third,themediationdevelopedasignedagreementthatmet all stakeholders’ interests. By the end of January 2011, the Afghan CSO had trained 400people in three provinces to help the reintegrees and communities cope with reintegration,leveraging both formal and informal justice systems. The programme also improved localcapacityforaddressinglongertermconflictsdirectlyrelatedtothereintegreesaswellasotherissues suchas localdisputesover land,water,debts,domesticviolenceandother communityissues.

Figure16:ComponentsofGrievance-basedDDRProgramme

Monitoring and Assessment Team: Afghan CSO research teams of four to six membersmonitored the roll out of the DDR programme in three provinces. The research teams alsoconducted focus groups to identify the effects of reintegration on the community, and trackoverallhumansecurityatthevillageanddistrictlevel.Todothis,theCSOdevelopedaresearchtoolbasedon locally identifiedhuman security indicatorsmeasuringpeople’s ability tomovearound, provide for their families and access governance systems and service. The humansecurityindicatortoolmeasuredtheaccuracyofperceptionsbycountingactualevents,suchasthe number of visits made to specific districts by local, provincial and national government

RapidResponseTeams

MediationandReintegrationTraining

PeaceandReintegrationCouncils

Figure15:StructureofMediationTeams


representatives and the number of police interaction with the community. The researchmonitoredtrendsandchangesofboththeformercombatantsandthecommunitiesintowhichtheywere reintegrating in terms of physical security, freedom ofmovement, economicwell-being and access to governance and justice. The methodology provided direct comparisonacross provinces, including both qualitative and quantitative information delivered on amonthlyandquarterlybasis.TheAfghanCSOthenwrotepolicyrecommendationsforsecuritypolicymakersbasedonthehumansecurityresearch.Future DDR in Afghanistan: Political opposition to this approach eventually made itimpossible forthisprogrammetocontinue.Someof the formermilitia leaderscumprovincialleaderswhohadbenefitedfrompoliticalappointmentsduringthefirstroundofDDRmayhaveobstructedamediation-basedDDReffortthatwouldbringanewsetofpoliticalrivalsfromthebattleground. However, a negotiated end to the war in Afghanistan will create anunprecedentedurgencyforDDR.56ThelessonsfromthispeacebuildingapproachtoDDRwillbeessential toavoid the failuresofpastDDRprocessessuchas technical fixesandshortsightedpolitical appointments that undermine human security. DDR must address underlyinggrievancesandneeds,andreknitsocialrelationships.BurundiTwo separate Burundian civil society organisations took part in DDR activities. Réseaud’Actions Paisibles des Anciens Combattants pour le Développement Intégré de Tous auBurundi(RAPACODIBU)isanorganisationfoundedbyagroupofex-combatantstoemphasisethe need for small arms control and DDR. The Training Centre for the Development of Ex-Combatants(CEDAC) isanorganisationthatassistsandadvocates forveteransandvictimsofconflict.57 CEDAC undertook public campaigning to encourage the population to voluntarilyhandoverfirearms.CEDACalsomonitoredex-combatants’owninitiativesandprovidedtrainingin conflict prevention and management. Finally, they organised peacebuilding activities forfemale ex-combatants, including psychosocial support to address trauma. According to itsrecords,CEDACsupportedthesocio-economicreintegrationof25,000ex-combatantsandwithfinancial support from theUNDPandUNIFEM.

Photo28:DestroyingweaponsinBurundi.PhotoCredit:CCFlickrUNPhoto:MartinePerret

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