changing environments or shifting paradigms? strategic ...the nineteenth century caused by polluted...

Simo Laakkonen and Sari Laurila

Changing Environments or Shifting Paradigms? Strategic Decision Making toward Water Protection in Helsinki, 1850-2000 The study examines the history of strategic decision- making concerning water protection in Helsinki, 1850- 2000. We identified five major strategic decisions that occurred during the study period. The results indicate that strategic decision-making evolves in long-term policy cycles that last on average 20-30 years. New policy cycles are caused by paradigm shifts. Paradigms are shared and predominant ways of understanding reality that help when groups must act to solve common and complex environmental problems. However the internal structure and external dynamics of paradigms are contradictory. Although paradigms serve initially as means to redefine problems and find creative solutions, as time goes by each paradigm seems to become also a barrier that restricts the introduction of new ways of thinking and acting. The power of paradigms lies in the fact that they can be defined as scientific but also social, political, or cultural agreements depending on the context.

INTRODUCTION The relation between different levels of environmental politics is often represented as a hierarchy in which the global level is the most important, and the local level is of least importance. In this article our aim is to examine history of local environmental decision-making. In the Baltic Sea region about 80% of the population is urban and hence local environmental policies have a direct impact on the life of the majority of the people.

An adequate understanding of current environmental problems requires a comprehensive knowledge of the long-term sociopolitical processes that lie behind them. Urban municipalities have the most experience with pollution control and over the longest period of time, and they still carry the main responsibility for enforcing environmental protection, while national and international environmental bureaucracies carry the main responsibility for the normative regulation of environmental protection. Naturally both levels are needed, and their development has been intertwined in the past. A historical study of the long-term development of environmental protection on the local level shows how fundamental changes have taken place in the society and the environment in the Baltic Sea region, and how past decisions are affecting policy making not only today but in the future as well.

Several authors have studied the history of the water protection policies and politics in the Baltic Sea area, but previous studies have focused on shorter periods and have covered different aspects than the ones in this study (1, 2). Cities in the area have applied different strategies in their environmental politics concerning water pollution because their physical environments, political systems, and administrative structures differ. For example some are located on open, rather deep shores (Copenhagen, Tallinn), some at the mouth of a larger river (Gdansk, St. Petersburg, Riga), while others are surrounded by shallow archipelago waters (Stockholm, Helsin-

ki). Political systems in the area have changed over time. Monarchies and plutocracies have given way to socialist and fascist regimes and eventually to democracies. During the same period, municipal administrations have been based on strong municipal autonomy (Nordic countries), central government (Imperial Russia, Third Reich, the USSR and socialist republics), or a federal system (Germany) (2).

Urban history has focused above all on major epidemics in the nineteenth century caused by polluted drinking water, whereas studies in urban environmental history have focused on the pollution of urban water bodies in the twentieth century (2, 3). Few studies, however, have attempted to take into consideration science, technology, and society in the context of the history of the protection and pollution of urban water bodies during the past two centuries (3). Our aim is to fill this gap by studying the environmental history of Helsinki. How have problems and solutions related to the pollution and protection of the sea area of the City of Helsinki been defined and redefined over the past 150 years?

Study Period and Area

Helsinki is located on the coast of the Gulf of Finland toward the eastern end of the Baltic Sea. The sea area of Helsinki consists of shallow bays surrounding, and even entering into, the downtown area. Today about four-fifths of the administrative area of the city consists of the sea, including about 240 islands. The study is limited to decision making concerning the sea area; other urban water bodies are not taken into account.

Since 1812 Helsinki has been the capital of Finland, which was an autonomous grand duchy in the Russian Empire until 1917. Prior to becoming an independent republic in 1917, Finland underwent industrialization and urbanization, signify- ing a rapid spatial concentration and increase in both production and the labor force. Because of the accelerated population growth, the administrative area of Helsinki increased, with the largest annexation occurring after World War II, when the area of the city expanded fivefold.

The legal and administrative context of municipal water protection politics has changed considerably over time. In the mid-nineteenth century, Helsinki was still governed by a council of town elders, which had few juridical limits or scientific guidelines in terms of water protection. Since the late nineteenth century, Finnish and other Nordic municipalities have had broad political, economic, and organizational autonomy, with democratically elected city councils and boards with citizen representatives. The Public Health Act, which went into effect in Finland in 1879, emphasized the autonomy of cities and led to the establishment of a board of health with extensive powers to carry out needed sanitary reforms (4). The autonomous municipal water protection regime lasted from 1879 until 1962, when the national Water Act led to bipolar city-state regime in terms of water protection policies and politics. International water protection politics started to affect municipal politics only recently when an agreement to protect the Baltic Sea was ratified in 1980, thus establishing a tripolar water protection

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|Direcbves Figure 1. The political context of

1974/80 (Helsinki Convention) traditional autonomous municipal Baltic Sea Cooperation water protection policy founded in

the late nineteenth century has | 1962 (WS'ater Act) w changed considerably since the 1962 (WaterAct) ~1960s because of the emergence

Bipolar City-State Regime of new political actors on the national, international, and continental level.

1879 (Public Health Act) Autonomous municipal water protection policy

1900 1950 2000

regime. Since Finland's access to European Union (EU) in 1995, continental environmental water protection policy has domi- nated, and local and national decision making is nowadays conducted in accordance with the EU directives (Fig. 1), as this case study of Helsinki will show.

Material and Methods

Our aim is to focus on the most important strategic decisions concerning water protection. Water protection is understood in this article as the conscious prevention or reduction of harmful flows of material entering the urban water bodies in this case, the sea area of Helsinki. By strategic decision making we mean decisions that have caused major positive long-term changes in the urban society, its infrastructure, and/or in the environment.

We have identified five major strategic decisions in the history of water protection politics in Helsinki during the past 150 years. The first was made in 1878, when the city council decided to build a sewer system but not to allow solid human waste, i.e., feces to flow into the sea. The second strategic decision was made in 1909 when biological wastewater treatment was chosen as the means to solve pollution problems of the inner bays. In 1928 a decision was made to purify all municipal wastewater with the activated sludge method. The decision in 1971 to treat wastewater chemically to remove phosphorus and to build a sea sewer was followed in 1995 by an agreement to remove nitrogen from wastewater.

We focus on three main actor groups of urban water protection politics, i.e., scientists, engineers, and municipal authorities (representing city council, city government, and municipal departments). Because of the length of the study period, we cannot take civil society into consideration as an actor in this study. We examine water protection policies as an outcome of policy negotiations between these three actors. Our aim is to examine whether any particular common way of thinking or acting lay behind each strategic decision. Thomas Kuhn's concept of a paradigm is a fruitful tool to study such a question (5). In our study the term "paradigm" refers to a set of concepts and practices that define water pollution and/or protection of a particular strategic decision.

The study is based on a cyclical theory of decision making (4). It is argued that because of the interdependency of scientists, engineers, and decision makers, interaction between them has evolved in a rather stable manner within all five cycles that have been examined. A cycle may be started by a change in the pollutant load transported by the urban water and sewerage infrastructure (here Polluter, P1). This load caused harmful changes in the urban watercourses that are defined by natural scientists (Pollution, P2). Final decisions concerning allocation of resources for different solutions are made by the politicians

(Politics, P3). The solutions may include normative, economic, or informative measures, but because technical solutions are regularly needed in an urban society, decisions also signify related changes in the urban infrastructure that diminish the load to the watercourses (Protection, P4). But when Protection changes the load discharged to the water bodies it becomes also a Polluter (P4/P1). When the consequences are estimated from a new perspective, a new policy cycle constituting P1, P2, P3, and P4 begins (Fig. 2).

Our study is based on qualitative historical research. The qualitative methods consist of a historical analysis of published and unpublished sources and semistructured interviews. We examined the annuals and minutes of the municipal administrative bodies concerning water protection. Unpublished research reports and archive material were found in the archives of the City of Helsinki, including archives of the Board of Health, the Laboratory of the Sanitary Studies, the Department

OLLUTER VkOTECTION) o ~ ~ ~ r1~inrastructure

Social impact

Figure 2. The cyclical theory of decision making is based on continuous socioecological interaction between different actors. The pollutant load transported by the urban water and sewerage infrastructure (here Polluter, P1) causes harmful changes in the urban watercourses that are defined by natural scientists (Pollution, P2); however, decisions concerning allocation of resources are made by the politicians (Politics, P3), and related changes in the urban infrastructure that diminishes the load to the watercourses often are created by engineers (Protection, P4). When Protection changes the load discharged to the water bodies, it becomes also a Polluter (P4/P1) and the socioecological consequences need to be estimated from a new perspective, a new policy cycle constituting P1, P2, P3, and P4 begins. Source: Laakkonen (4).

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of Public Works of the City of Helsinki, and Finnish Institute of Marine Research.

RECYCLING SOLID HUMAN WASTE (1878) In the 1850s Helsinki was a typical preindustrial town with low buildings, a small population (20,000 inhabitants), gardens, and domestic animals in the yards, thus resembling more a large rural settlement than an urban community. The townspeople obtained water from private and public wells. Wastewater and other household wastes were thrown into middens, and feces ended in privies, which were emptied irregularly. Even though water consumption was low, water shortages were common. Water was needed especially to fight the fires that threatened the wooden towns, which Helsinki at that time still was (6-8). Waterborne diseases were transmitted easily via contaminated drinking water because of leakage of latrines and mishandling of wastes. Cholera and typhoid became epidemic, and diarrhea was the main cause of the high infant mortality (9).

Because of the low level of water consumption, wastewater discharges into the sea were also low, and this source of pollution of the sea area remained relatively unimportant. Yet, dumping of wastes, especially animal carcasses against municipal orders in shore waters constituted a nuisance and brought health risks. At that time the prevailing medical thinking, based on miasmatic theory, considered the vapors from the bays to be dangerous, even poisonous; however, as the council of town elders noted, "the fumes endangered only the blocks of the poor living near the bay and hence there was no need for measures to be taken" (10). At that time political power was in the hands of the wealthier inhabitants; the poor people were completely excluded from municipal decision making.

The miasmatic theory was gradually discredited during the latter half of the nineteenth century because of the revolution in hygienic ideas and the establishment of modern bacteriology. Sanitation systems were to be improved by constructing water pipes and sewer systems. Decisive impetus to the launching of needed reforms was provided by the Senate of the Grand Duchy of Finland, in the Public Health Act of 1879. It required towns and cities to provide adequate amounts of clean drinking water and a healthy living environment for their inhabitants. Helsinki made the decisions to introduce water pipes and sewers in 1870s (8, 1 1). Gradually, both water and sewerage networks covered almost the whole town. As a result, water shortages were over for good, and mortality due to waterborne diseases decreased significantly (8).

Sewers were built for wastewater only, not for solid wastes, which were regarded as economically important assets to be utilized as fertilizer in agriculture, not as worthless refuse to be dumped. Human waste was traditionally collected and transported to the countryside to be used in agriculture. However, new modern comforts were desired. Above all, the upper class called for the introduction of the water closet. The proponents of the water closet emphasized its hygienic advantages and regarded the self-purification capacity of the sea to be sufficient (4).

The authorities of the City of Helsinki had a different perspective on the issue. They believed that the loading of human wastes, especially excrement, into the urban sea areas ought to be avoided by all means. They therefore emphasized expanding the protective measures taken in 1878, and the protection of the sea area was to be considered actively, i.e., in advance by transporting solid human wastes in buckets for use in agriculture. The supporters of the bucket system included the board of health, political decision makers of the city, and key national figures of the public health movement. They had the

politically stronger position, and they won all the political debates between the water closet and the bucket system at the end of the nineteenth century (4). City authorities succeeded in delaying the introduction of the water closet system for about 30 years.

How did this preventive policy affect the sea area? A scientific study was made of the impact of wastewater on the sea and bottom in front of the sewer outlets. The director of the municipal laboratory of the board of health determined in 1888 that mainly horse manure that was transported from the streets via sewers was found in sediments of the harbor basins (12). Some complaints were made concerning the pollution of the urban shore waters, but not that due to human waste (13). Therefore it was claimed Helsinki's preventive water protection policy reduced the load to the urban sea areas considerably, and no major pollution problems existed in the urban sea area in the late nineteenth century.

This preventive water protection policy was a part of a sanitary reform that took place in numerous cities in the industrialized world in the late nineteenth century. In its background lay the development of the sanitary movement that emphasized the need for determined public regulation of the whole urban environment to improve living conditions. Cities were regarded as entities consisting of their inhabitants, infrastructure, and the surrounding air, soil, water, and organisms. Protection of these elements from pollution was a prerequisite for a healthy and comfortable city (4).

INTRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT (1909) The success of the hygienic movement in uprooting waterborne diseases from cities led to the gradual decline of the influence of the hygienic paradigm at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century. Because of the innovations of bacteriology, solid human excrement per se was not considered to be the main problem but rather the bacteria that they contained. Scientific authorities considered flushing of excrement to the water bodies to be harmless because sanitary reforms, above all construction of public waterworks, had removed the most dangerous pathogens that had caused pandemics. Also the growth in population increased the volume of human waste. Collection of waste became troublesome in new high stone buildings, and the transport distances to countryside became longer. In addition, the increasing amount of rubbish, glass, and cans decreased the value of the collected waste as fertilizer (14). Previously used as a fertilizer, human excrement came to be viewed as worthless waste to be dumped in urban water bodies. Although, the city authorities still attempted to resist the introduction of water closets by issuing new directives, a decision to permit water closets was made in 1904. The result of this measure was that by 1910 one-third of the buildings had water closets (4).

The consequences of the adoption of the water closet quickly became apparent in the urban sea area that city dwellers used for swimming, where fish chests were kept, and where all laundry was rinsed. The first studies of the water quality of the swimming and rinsing locations were made in 1904, and the first extensive hydrobiological study of the whole urban sea area was made in 1908. These studies that were initiated and conducted by the hygienic laboratory of the Department of Public Health showed that sewage water coming from the numerous sewer outlets surrounded the city and that especially the small inner bays were polluted. Massive blooms of blue-green algae in the inner bays also attracted attention. G.K. Bergman, a chemist from the municipal laboratory, concluded that organic matter of wastewater and nitrogen discharges from gas works provided nutrients for algae and caused blooms (15). Thus, pollution was


the main problem, but eutrophication was identified as a problem even though the term was not yet used.

Several alternatives to solve the pollution problem of the inner bays were discussed: filling the bays, dredging the bays, increasing the water flow in the bays, and wastewater treatment. The city council made a decision in 1909 to build wastewater treatment plants (4). But the selection of most suitable wastewater purification method was not a simple matter because biochemical and technical sanitary technology was under feverish research, and development and markets for wastewater technology were expanding rapidly around the world. Helsinki chose a British biological aeration method to remove bacteria and organic matter from wastewater. Two small biological treatment plants were constructed in Helsinki in 1910 and 1915.

These two small plants had little practical impact on water protection, but they signaled a major shift in Helsinki's water protection strategy. The decision to allow introduction of water closets in 1904 signified the end of the active and preventive water protection policy adopted in Helsinki in 1878. The decision to build wastewater treatment plants in 1909 was the beginning of reactive water protection policies that were based on scientific monitoring of water bodies and end-of-pipe technology in form of the wastewater treatment plant.

MASTER PLAN TO REMOVE ORGANIC MATTER (1928) The small biological wastewater plants proved to be inadequate, and comprehensive measures were demanded. Helsinki appointed a sewerage committee that developed a natural scientific and technical research program in 1915-1920 (16). Scientists used plankton species and shoreline vegetation as bioindicators to detect organic pollution, and the saprobic classification system was introduced to evaluate the state of the sea area. The results of these studies indicated that the impact area of wastewater discharges had expanded since 1908 (17) and the organic substances in sewage came to be considered the main problem to be solved. The sewerage committee presented several options to solve the problem: to extend sewer outlets, to construct a long sea outlet, or to purify all sewage in a biological treatment plant.

Pumping of untreated sewage out to the sea via long sewers had been proposed already at the end of the nineteenth century. This concept resurfaced in the proposal to collect all sewage in one collector and pump it into the sea via a long outlet 1 km in length (18). The director of the Finnish Marine Research Institute concluded that the best solution was to construct three shorter outlets into the main bays because the costs for building a longer sea sewer were still considered to be too high (17). Ruben Granqvist, a young engineer from the Department of Public Works of the City of Helsinki proposed efficient wastewater treatment with the active sludge method, which would make it possible to direct treated sewage into the bay areas without causing any harm. After evaluating a number of different alternatives, chemist K. G. Bergman and a Swedish engineer Walo von Greyerz proposed construction of a centralized wastewater treatment plant as the best and cheapest solution in the long run. However, in 1928 the city council decided that all wastewater should be treated biologically in six large activated sludge plants and one mechanical treatment plant, which were to be built around the city during the following three decades (19).

The grandiose investment program was started step by step by building two large activated sludge plants in the 1 930s, and by the end of the decade about half of the municipal wastewater was being treated in Helsinki. Pollution problems continued to

attract attention, especially the fish kills that were occurring in the inner bays. New studies revealed that large amounts of nutrients in the bottom sediments of the bays were aggravating the problem. Zoologists and botanists hired by the City of Helsinki noted that the bays needed recirculation of fresh seawater, and they recommended that no sewage should be directed into them (20). It was thought that a third activated sludge plant would finally solve the pollution problems of the inner bays. However, work on its construction came to be halted in 1939 with the beginning of World War 11 (21).

After the war, economic scarcity lack of cement, steel, work force, and foreign currency hindered continuation of the water protection investment program. In addition, because of the annexation of nearby communities, Helsinki's administrative area increased fivefold, and new residential areas with municipal infrastructure had to be built. Addressing the housing shortage demanded resources more urgently than constructing wastewater treatment plants, and the first new activated sludge plant was not completed until 1957. With the construction of several similar plants in the 1960s, all wastewater generated in the municipality was being treated by the early 1970s (8).

In the postwar period the existing wastewater treatment plants were heavily overloaded, and the badly polluted sea area expanded rapidly in the 1950s. All large bays surrounding the downtown area were polluted; whatever fish caught were likely to be inedible. Blooms of blue-green algae, depletion of oxygen, and new fish kills took place in the early 1960s in the large bays surrounding the city (22). Despite that the completion of the extensive program initiated in the late 1920s to treat all wastewater of the city, it was obvious that the treatment system was inadequate.

INTRODUCTION OF PHOSPHORUS REMOVAL (1971) In the early 1960s the city appointed another committee to plan future wastewater management and to study the state of the sea area and its pollution problems. The municipal laboratory of the Department of Public Works hired teams of young experts to undertake scientific and technical studies focusing above all on the role of nutrients. At that time nutrients were not generally recognized to be a serious problem. The older generation of limnologists and oceanographers still believed that nutrients had a positive impact on the sea because of their ability to increase fish production (23), and the marine scientists of the Finnish Marine Research Institute proposed that untreated wastewater should be pumped into the open sea off the Helsinki shore (24).

To resolve the controversy between old and new school of scientific thinking, the new committee conducted experiments on the impacts of phosphorus and nitrogen loads. These experiments showed that phosphorus was generally the limiting nutrient, except in the most badly polluted areas, where nitrogen was limiting factor. It was noted that some blue-green algae were fixing atmospheric nitrogen. Experiments on the removal of phosphorus by simultaneous chemical precipitation were made. The committee also studied the advantages of constructing a sea outlet 8 km offshore to discharge all wastewater into the open sea. However, the white paper published by the city government proposed that municipal wastewater should to be collected and treated only mechanically and biologically not chemically to remove phosphorus and then pumped out into the open sea. The city government pointed out that removal of nutrients in Helsinki alone did not prevent eutrophication of the Baltic Sea (23).

Experts in the laboratory of the Department of Public Works decided to act before the final decision was to be made by the city council in 1971. They prepared a paper on the importance

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of chemical removal of phosphorus in Helsinki that was mailed to all members of the city council (17). Having thus received information, the council approved the construction of a sea outlet on the condition that chemical removal of phosphorus was adopted and that the city should pay attention to the state of the Baltic Sea as a whole (25). Consequently, phosphorus removal by means of simultaneous precipitation method was gradually introduced in the 1970s, and when the sea outlet was completed in 1986 all sewage from the capital region was treated mechanically, biologically, and chemically, and phosphorus was reduced.

INTRODUCTION OF NITROGEN REMOVAL (1995) Generally speaking the state of the sea area of Helsinki was worst in the 1970s (26). Blue-green algal blooms were large and a regular nuisance, and swimming was often forbidden in the public beaches because of water pollution. However, the sea outlet and phosphorus removal started to improve the state of the sea area of Helsinki considerably in 1980s. The bays areas recovered gradually, and blue-green algal blooms were no longer a frequent occurrence in the urban sea area (27). In addition, Helsinki had made the decision to replace the old wastewater treatment plants by a central treatment plant with the capacity to treat the wastewater of one million people. The new central plant was put into operation in 1994, and its primary task was the removal of bacteria, organic matter, and phosphorus of wastewater generated by the metropolitan area.

In the meanwhile, however, a discussion of the role of nitrogen in marine eutrophication had emerged, mainly because the ongoing eutrophication of the Baltic Sea and cyanobacterial blooms in the open sea had attracted attention (28, 29). These phenomena and their linkage to nutrient loadings of wastewater discharges were discussed mainly by the younger generation of scientists (28, 30). Consequently, in 1991 the regional Water Rights Court ruled that the nearby city of Espoo had to raise the level of its nitrogen removal to 65% (31). However, in the early 1990s many leading scientists disagreed about the need to remove nitrogen. It was again pointed out that some algae species were able to fix nitrogen from the atmosphere and that nitrogen had a different role in lakes, rivers, certain coastal zones, and in the pelagic sea area. On this basis it was argued that it was unreasonable to remove nitrogen from all wastewater; instead a flexible removal policy should be applied, and more scientific evidence was required (31, 32).

The pressure for nitrogen removal originated clearly from national and international actors. Other Nordic countries, for example, Denmark and Sweden, had already set targets for nitrogen removal in 1987 and 1990. The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) also recommended that its member states remove nitrogen by 1998. The European Community required its members to remove 70%-80% of nitrogen by 1998 and this resolution was adopted by Finland as well.

Because Helsinki had been a leading actor in developing water protection in Finland, it did not appreciate demands for nitrogen removal set by outsiders. Helsinki pointed out that the overwhelming majority of the nitrogen load originated from agriculture, not from cities, which had taken care of their responsibilities in terms of water protection. It also questioned which of the several available alternative technologies was best suited. The municipal authorities also declared openly in the media that costs for improved nitrogen removal to be paid by municipal tax payers would came to "hundreds of millions of marks" without any guarantee that the state of the sea would be improved (31-34). Helsinki chose to delay the decision-making process by making new appeals to the Water Rights Court.

It may also be argued that Helsinki had good reasons for this policy. Scientific evidence concerning of the role of nitrogen in coastal eutrophication was not solid, and additional experiments were required to find the most cost-effective technical solution for nitrogen removal. The opportunities for traditional autonomous municipal water protection policies had, however, diminished considerably. In 1995 the Water Rights Court ordered the City of Helsinki to remove 50% of nitrogen by 1997 and 65% by the year 2000 (35). Additional pressure came, for example, from HELCOM, which placed Helsinki in the list of "hot spots"; it was declared one of the biggest polluters in the Baltic Sea region because of the city's low nitrogen removal level. Nitrogen removal was introduced in Helsinki in late 1990s, and because of improved removal efficiency Helsinki was removed from the hot spot list in 2004.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION The case study shows the essential role of local, i.e., municipal, processes in the development of water protection in particular and environmental protection in general. The cities have, however, adopted different policies. It is obvious that the cities in the Baltic Sea region have different physical environments. Because Helsinki is surrounded by shallow bays, the risk of pollution of the urban sea area was noted early. Doing nothing was not a viable solution in this situation, and conscious water protection started on the local level in the 1878. The relationship between water pollution and water protection has been a contested issue since the late nineteenth century. Already at that time, above all, municipal authorities were well aware of the pollution problems that wastewater, especially water containing feces, could cause in the watercourses.

Because of a lack of space we have focused here on strategic decision making and identified five decisions that have caused major positive changes in the political thinking, technical infrastructure, and/or state of the environment in matters concerning the urban sea area of Helsinki. Even though each of these five decisions has had a different thematic focus- recycling of human waste, biological wastewater treatment, construction of activated sludge plants, phosphorus removal, and the impact of nitrogen-we found that they nevertheless have common patterns.

Long-Term Policy Cycle and Institutional Delay

We argue that strategic decision making evolved in Helsinki in long-term policy making cycles consisting of political processes related to defining problems and solutions concerning the pollution of the urban sea area. The time when a cycle starts or ends could be defined in various ways, but for the sake of clarity we have chosen the year when strategic decisions were made. Proceeding on this basis, the first cycle started in 1878 and lasted for about 30 years. The years 1909, 1928, and 1971 mark the starting points of the following three cycles. The fifth cycle started in 1995 and is continuing. These policy cycles have lasted on the average between 20 and 30 years, with the third cycle having been longer than the others because of the devastating impact of World War II and the postwar scarcity. The length of the policy cycles indicates that while the environment is in constant change, our concepts of the environment change at a much slower pace; about four times in a century (see Fig. 3).

The concept of institutional delay may serve to conceptualize the apparently long time spans that seem to have been needed to define and redefine water pollution problems and their respective solutions. Crises such as wars and economic depressions are examples of external factors that have hindered the development of water protection. An important internal


Future

Nitrogen

P2 1995 P3

Phosporus 1

P2 1971 P3

Organic matter P1/P4 P2

1928 P3

Bacteria /4 P2

1909 P3

Human waste 14

1878 P3C

gr~mas~Mas P,

P2 Figure 3. The development of water protection in Helsinki since late nineteenth century up until today can be described as an ongoing cyclical process that consists of five policy cycles. The six keywords in the figures represent main paradigms that have been used to define and redefine water pollution and elaborate solutions.

factor of institutional delay is the complexity of environmental questions caused by several sources of pollution, fragmentary characteristics of the sea area off Helsinki, and a large number of actors. However, all the main strategic decisions in Helsinki concerning water protection were preceded by a search for the best available scientific knowledge (by establishing municipal laboratories and cooperating with prestigious scientists), the best available technology (by testing several alternatives and cooperating with a technical university), and political choices (by means of public discussion) that best served the overall interests of the city and its inhabitants.

The complexity of environmental questions causes another internal factor of the institutional delay, that is, complexity of public politics that has been aggravated over the recent decades by the notable increase in the number of actors in water protection politics on national and international levels as well (see Fig. 1). Scientists had an important role in the policy cycles in legitimizing claims made on behalf of the society by defining pollution problems. However, the sciences did not possess the practical means to solve the problems that they identified. Hence environmental engineers proved to be necessary to provide concrete solutions for water pollution problems in cities and also to estimate the economic costs of different technical alternatives. Despite the notable influence of engineers and natural scientists, formal political power in municipal water protection remained in the hands of laymen, the elected members of the boards of the municipal departments and city council that control Helsinki's economic resources. Decision

makers have been, however, in turn dependent on the ability of engineers to realize the plans that have been accepted and of the ability of scientists to monitor the environmental consequences of the measures taken. As a result each successive cycle in principle has similar participants and similar internal division of work. The extent of political influence, however, fluctuates because of the activity of individuals and the capacity of institutions. Nevertheless, the division of tasks and complementary interaction between the different actor groups can be described as a rather stable policy cycle consisting of polluters, pollution, politics, and protection (See Fig. 2).

The third internal factor of the institutional delay is the special features of public decision making. Because environment quality is a public good, most decisions concerning environmental issues are made in the public sector, where certain bureaucratic procedures and political principles of democracy must be followed: Most official political proposals should be presented, argued, justified in advance, and discussed often in public and in the mass media. Consequently elements of institutional delay in public environmental decision making may even have had catastrophic consequences for the environment. But institutional delay is an inevitable consequence of democratic decision making and hence it is also a prerequisite for socially sustainable decisions based on wide participation in the society. It should be kept in mind that water protection has advanced much more rapidly in the public sector than in the other sectors of the society. We argue that in spite of obvious delays municipal water protection has advanced exceptionally rapidly thanks to public participation and democratic decision making.

Paradigm Shifts

How do strategic decisions emerge and initiate new long-term policy cycles? We argue that each examined decision and related cycle was caused by a notable paradigm shift, a change in the way the most relevant actors thought at a given time (5).

Our case study shows that science has had a crucial role in initiating new paradigms. According to the miasmatic paradigm, humidity and smelly fumes were the major indicator of pollution and source of epidemics in the mid-nineteenth century. The sanitary paradigm that emerged in the 1 870s declared feces, solid human waste, as the main cause of water pollution and proposed preventing water pollution in advance by using human waste as fertilizer in agriculture. The early twentieth century saw the advent of the paradigm, which we might call the bacteriological paradigm, arguing that the ability of hygienists to remove pathogens by means of purification of drinking water justified the flushing of excrements into urban water bodies and that end-of-pipe solutions in the form of wastewater treatment plants were adequate solutions. In the interwar period the new organic paradigm defined organic material as the main cause of water pollution. The logical solution was removal of organic matter, at first by biological methods and later by activated sludge treatment. In the 1960s phosphorus was identified as the main cause of eutrophication of the sea, and recently the role of nitrogen has been emphasized. In both cases the problem has been dealt by reduction of respective substances (Fig. 3).

It is obvious that all policy cycles are characterized by different definitionis of problems and solutions that collectively then became components of the cumulative and complementary development of municipal water protection over the past 150 years. But the phasing in and out of these various solutions has led also to controversies in the different phases of the policy cycle. New concepts and ideas have had to compete with previous, more established ones and with other new emerging


ideas, and still only a few of the proposed concepts are accepted by the scientific, technical, and/or political community. When a new concept is accepted to the extent that it gains a dominant position in the scientific world and becomes a common way of conceptualizing the world, it may establish a paradigm, a shared and predominant way of understanding reality.

But as we have seen, new paradigms affect and, in the end, replace the previous ones. The inherent predominance of a paradigm causes several problems. After a while the new prevailing way of understanding reality may become self- evident and taken for granted. This, in turn, leads to a situation where one certain "truth" rules out alternative descriptions and explanations of the environment. In the end, shifting paradigms-rather than actual changes in the environments may define the conceptions we have of the physical or nonphysical environment under scrutiny.

Negative or Positive Paradigms?

But why do paradigms exist, why do they last so long, and why are new paradigms created one after another, despite obvious difficulties and costs? Paradigms may basically be related to the human need to make sense of the world. Contemporary science is no exception to this rule. Paradigms are needed to make sense of the increasing, chaotic mass of information. The presence of different schools of thought does not remove our need as individuals to follow some specific way of thinking as the main tool to understand the world.

Human beings have an obvious need to belong to some specific group even though they may act alone. Science is a social activity, and paradigms create normative structures and hierarchies that provide stability and meaning to social behavior (36). Without paradigms it is difficult to form the social structures and activities that define our own relationship with other people. Paradigms help us to understand ourselves and other scholars and create social order among scientists, scientific institutions, and scientific traditions as well.

Science is not only part of a world of ideas, but also political activity, part of a world of power. Scientists constitute an important minority actor group in political forums. In politics paradigms are needed to relate the thinking of scientists to that in technology and medicine, and other groups of people working in civil society, in the private sector, and in a variety of public power structures. In this political context a paradigm signifies providing a workable compromise, the lowest common denominator, which provides a common normative agreement or strategic master plan. In this way it may be possible to give all stakeholders a sense of common purpose that enables cooperation between numerous worldviews, institutions, individuals, and their interests. In this perspective a paradigm signifies not only internal scientific agreement but also, or perhaps rather, an external political agreement, consensus that enables extensive cooperation between different actors in the society in terms of community, hierarchy, or markets.

Paradigms can be defined as scientific, social, political, or cultural agreements depending on the context. But these different definitions can also be linked and seen as an expanding political process where a paradigm is, at the beginning, a new scientific approach that is then transformed to a social activity, to a tool of political power, and finally to an established, axiomatic part of prevailing cultural practices. This evolution- ary process of a paradigm to be formulated, negotiated, accepted, and adopted in the society at large requires time, i.e., a long-term policy cycle. Therefore a paradigm may become an integral part of the common experiences of a certain generation and become in the end an important part of the history, perhaps even the identity of a given generation. Our

case study supports this generational hypothesis because its paradigms last on the average for two or three decades. This may explain to a certain extent why paradigms are so deeply rooted in the power structures of societies and why a new critical generation is often needed to replace an established worldview and its caretakers by establishing a new paradigm.

According to Thomas Kuhn a scientific paradigm refers to the set of practices that define a scientific discipline during a particular period (5). Our study suggests that the scientific paradigms of some scientific disciplines, for example, environmental studies, are shaped and even determined by political, social, and cultural factors. For this reason, a scientific paradigm can have powerful positive and negative characteristics and impacts. Accordingly, although a paradigm might serve initially as means to define and redefine environmental problems and to find creative solutions, as time goes by it comes to act as a barrier that restricts the introduction of new ways of thinking and acting, not only in scientific communities, but also in whole societies. Therefore, active public science policy is needed to guarantee the continuation of independent basic research and support different schools of thinking that may elaborate alternative paradigms for future environmental policy making.

References and Notes

1. Laakkonen, S. and Laurila, S. (eds). 2001. The sea and the cities. Ambio 30, 263-326. The Sea and the Cities. (http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/projects/)

2. Juuti, P. and Katko, T. (eds). 2005. Water, Time and European Cities. History Matters for the Futures. Tampere University Press, ePublications. (http://tampub.uta.fi/tup/ 95 1-44-6250-5.pdf)

3. For previous studies in this field see articles published in Laakkonen and Laurila (1) and the introduction in the article written by Riisinen T. and Laakkonen S. published in this special issue of Ambio.

4. Laakkonen, S. 2001. Vesiensuojelun synty. Helsinginja sen merialueen ympdrist6historiaa 1878-1928. Gaudeamus, 309 pp. (In Finnish, summary in English).

5. Kuhn, T. 1966 (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London, 172 pp.

6. Laakkonen, S. and Lehtonen, P. 1999. A quantitative analysis of discharges into the Helsinki urban sea area in 1850-1995. Europ. Wat. Manage. 2, 30-39.

7. Katko, T. 1997. Water!-Evolution of Water Supply and Sanitation in Finlandfrom the Mid-1800s to 2000. Finnish Water and Waste Water Works Association, Helsinki, 102 PP.

8. Herranen, T. 2001. Vettd ja eldmdd. Helsingin vesihuollon historiaa 1876-2001 (Water and life. The history of water supply of Helsinki in 1876-2001). Helsinigin Vesi, Edita, Helsinki, 238 pp. (In Finnish and English).

9. Carpelan, A. 1998. Yleiset kaivot Helsingissi 1800-luvulla (Public wells in Helsinki in the 19th century). Helsingin kaupunginmuseon tutkimuksia ja raportteja 1/1998, 123 pp. (In Finnish).

10. Statement of town elders. Department of Economy of the Senate of Finland. KD 20/ 399-1845. National Archives.

11. Nygard, H. 2004. Bara ett ringa obehag? Avfall och renhallning i de finlindska stidernas profylakiska strategier 1830-1930. Abo, Abo Adademi University Press, 204 pp. (In Finnish).

12. Aschan, 0. 1888. Huru bor renhallningsvasendet, hvad betraffar fakaliernas bortskaf- fande, anordnas i Helsingfors. Tekniska Fdrening i Finland Forhandlingar (In Swedish).

13. For observations concerning pollution of shore water in late nineteenth century see newspapers: e.g., Hufvudstadsbladet 5 October 1879, 25 January 1889, Helsingfors Dagbladet 100/1887.

14. Nygard, H. 1999. Sopsortering 1910-1928. En forutseende losning eller mislyckad id& In: Nokea ja pilvenhattaroita. Helsinkildisten ympdristo 1900-luvun vaihteessa. Laakko- nen, S., Laurila, S. and Rahikainen, M. (eds). Helsingin kaupunginmuseo, pp. 215-246 (In Swedish).

15. Bergman, G.K. 1908. Tutkimuksia Helsingin laskuveden vaikutuksesta vesiin kaupungin ympdrilli kesilli 1908. Terveydenhoitolautakunnan vuosikertomus vuodelta 1907 (In Finnish).

16. Helsingin kaupunginvaltuusto 1924. Komitean inietint6 Helsingin kaupungin viemdriolo- jen jdrjestdmiseksi, No. 4. (In Finnish).

17. Witting, R. 1923. Helsinkid ymparoivat vedet veden vaihtoa ja likaantumista silmalla pitien. Merentutkimuslaitoksen julkaisu 11, 115 pp. (In Finnish).

18. Bergman, K.G. and von Greyerz, W. 1928. Helsingin viemirit. Lausunto kaupungin rakennuskonttorin elokuun 15 p:ni 1927 jatttmasta viemiriolojen jirjestimisehdotuk- sesta. Helsingin kaupunginvaltuusto no. 6, (In Finnish).

19. Piatos Kylisaaren puhdistamon rakentamisesta tehtiin joulukuussa 1930. (Kaupungin- valtuuston esityslista No. 20, asia No. 27). Helsingin Kaupunginvaltuusto 12/1932 (In Finnish).

20. Valikangas, I. 1936. Tutkimuksia puhtaustilanteesta erdissd Helsingin satama-alueen osissa kesdlld 1936. Archives of the Finnish Institute of Marine Research (In Finnish).

21. Laakkonen, S. and Lehtonen, P. 2001. Mikrobit palveluksessa. Jitevedenpuhdistuksen kehitys Helsingissa. In: Laakkonen, S., Laurila, S., Kansanen, P. and Schulman, H. (eds). Ndkokulmia Helsingin ympdristdhistoriaan, pp. 226-239 (In Finnish).

22. Cajander, H. 1965. Ranta-ja merivesitutkimuksia Helsingissd vuosina 1947-62. Helsingin kaupungin rakennusvirasto (In Finnish).

23. Helsingin kaupunginhallituksen mietinto 1/1970 (In Finnish). 24. For example, Hbl 1961. (Newspaper article, in Swedish). 25. Kaupunginvaltuuston piatos 1971. Archives of the City of Helsinki. 26. Pesonen, L. (ed). 1988. Helsingin ja Espoon edustan merialueiden velvoitetarkkailu

vuosina 1970-1986 (Monitoring of the sea area off Helsinki and Espoo in 1970-1986). Reports of the Water Conservation Laboratory 3 (In Finnish with English summary).

27. Pesonen, L., Norha, T., Rinne, I. and Viljamaa, H. 1995. Helsingin ja Espoon merialueiden velvoitetarkkailu vuosina 1987-1994 (Monitoring of the sea area off


Helsinki and Espoo in 1986-1994). Helsingin kaupungin ympdristdkeskuksen moniste 1 (In Finnish).

28. Tamminen, T. 1990. Eutrophication and the Baltic Sea. Studies on Phytoplankton, Bacterioplankton, and Pelagic Nutrient Cycles. Ph. D. Thesis, Department of Environmental Conservation, University of Helsinki, 22 pp.

29. Anonymous. Nitrogen Removal in Municipal Wastewater Treatment Plants. Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, Report 3928/1991.

30. Sipponen, M. (ed). 1981. Tarvitaanko typen poistoa jdtevesistd? Vesi- ja kalatalousmiehet ry:n taydennyskoulutuspaivat Vaiksyssi 26-27.11.1980. Helsinki, Vesi- ia kalatalousmiehet ry. 182 pp.

31. Lansi-Suomen vesioikeuden piatos nro 25/1995/1. 32. Seppanen, H. 1992. Typenpoiston tarpeellisuudesta. Vesitalous 1/1992, pp. 6-11 (In

Finnish). 33. Valve, M. (ed). 1995. Nitrogen removal from municipal wastewater. Tema.Nord. 1995,

580. 261 pp. 34. Helsingin Sanomat 1994. Helsinki haluaa lykata typenpoiston tehostamista Viikinmaen

puhdistamolla. Helsingin Sanomat, 7 February 1994 (Newspaper article, in Finnish). 35. Lansi-Suomen vesioikeuden paatos no. 25/1995/l.Vesiylioikeuden paatos 25/1996. 36. Scott, W. 2000. Institutions and Organisations. 2nd ed., Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 280

pp. 37. This study has been supported by the BIREME programme coordinated by the

Academy of Finland. The authors wish to thank Ilkka Viitasalo for providing archive material on the nitrogen issue, Salla Jokela for the illustrations, and Henry Fullenwider for reviewing the English of this and a number of our previous manuscripts.

Simo Laakkonen has a Ph.D. in environmental history. He has directed a research project funded by the Academy of Finland (BIREME) focusing on the environmental history of the Baltic Sea. Now he directs an international research network supported by the Maj and Tor Nessling Foundation, which studies the development of water protection and pollution in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea. His address: Department of Social Science History, P.O. Box 54, FIN-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland. E-mail: simo.laakkonen @ helsinki.fi

Sari Laurila is a researcher in the Department of Social Science History at the University of Helsinki. She is a biologist whose main research theme has been the history of hydrobiological water pollution studies in the Baltic Sea region. Her address: Department of Social Science History, P.O. Box 54, FIN-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland. E-mail: [email protected]


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