cerc
TRANSCRIPT
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A Staff Presentation Developing a Common Platform
for Electricity Trading
RAVINDERChief (Engineering)Central Electricity Regulatory Commission7th Floor, Core –3, SCOPE COMPLEX, Lodhi Road, New Delhi- 110003, INDIAPh. 91 11 24364960E mail: [email protected]
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All INDIA INSTALLED CAPACITY(MW)
RES (Excludes captive )
5%6191 MW
Nuclear3%
3360 MW
Hydro26%
32326 MW
Thermal66%
82410 MW
Thermal Hydro Nuclear RES
(As on 31.03.06)
TOTAL - 124287 MW
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ALL INDIA INSTALLED CAPACITY (MW) Sector Wise (As on 31-03-2006)
State 57%
70224 MWCentral
32%39924 MW
Private 11%
14139 MW
Private Central State
TOTAL - 124287 MW
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• Market Development is the responsibility of the Electricity Regulators (Sec 66, 178 IE Act, 2003).
• Sec 174: The ACT is overriding
• Preventing market domination is the responsibility of the Regulators (Sec 60, IE Act, 2003).
• Mandate for developing a Power Exchange given to CERC in the National Electricity Policy.
Statutory Provisions
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• Most of the supplies are tied up in long term PPAs: Mostly, regulated two-part tariff: Ideal for investment promotion as well as price security for Discoms
• Short term trading constitutes 2 to 3% of the total supply.
• Trading essentially between surplus & deficit distribution utilities.
• Trading is essential for resource optimisation and meeting short term peak demand and for disposing off surpluses which are inevitable as a utility has no direct control over consumer load .
Current Scenario
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ALL INDIA POWER SUPPLY SCENARIO
(April, 2005 - March, 2006) ENERGY
550
560
570
580
590
600
610
620
630
640
1
BU
632 B U
579 B U
Requirement Availability8.3% Deficit
PEAK DEMAND / PEAK MET
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
1
GW
Peak Demand Peak Met12.3% Deficit
93 GW
82 GW
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• Open Access Regulations have facilitated power trading in an orderly manner.
• Energy agreements and transmission clearance have to be arranged separately.
• Open Access charges are reasonable and simple to apply.
Current Scenario
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Short-term Trading Volume
Traded Volume in MU
1617
141881184711029
4178
0
4000
8000
12000
16000
FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY 06
*For FY-07: 15 BU Estimated
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• Suppliers call for bids from buyers/traders.
• Traders compete to win the supply bids.
• Buyers have no option but to buy from the trader having the supply contract.
• Due to deficit scenario, suppliers dominate.
• Prices of trades electricity have been going up.
• Most of the bilateral trading is inter-regional;
- ER, NER are suppliers
- NR, WR are buyers
Current Scenario
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Price trend of traded electricity
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• Need to curb sellers’ domination
• Need to put on end to profiteering
• Need to organize short term trading on a transparent, equitable and efficient platform
• Need to increase the supplies
• Need to bring surplus captive generation into the grid.
• Need to encourage peaking power plants and merchant generation.
• For optimum resource management, need to simultaneously clear energy contracts & transmission paths.
Current Scenario
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Adequate Inter-state transmission system, but needs strengthening
Established scheduling, dispatch and energy accounting procedures
UI accounting system for real time deviations from schedules
Established RLDCs, SLDCs
Current Scenario
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Market Structure Prior to Electricity Act, 2003 (Bundled)
CGS IPP
Govt Consent
Generation+
Transmission+
Distribution
Consumer
SEB
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Market Structure after Electricity Act, 2003
CGSSTATE GENCO
IPP
TraderTrader Discom
Consumer
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Road map for market development
Forward Physical Contracts (Long-term)- Established;
Moving from Regulated Cost-Plus PPAs to Tariff-bid based PPAs for new generating capacity
Forward Physical Contracts (Short-term)- Established; but non-standard contracts
Day ahead Spot Market thru’ PX? Real Time Market (Substituted by UI
mechanism)
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International Experience
Nord Pool PJMUK experienceCalifornia PXSouth Africa/ ESKOM
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Appropriate PX design for India National power exchange Vs many power
exchanges Mandatory Vs Voluntary participation Double side bidding Vs Supply side bidding Uniform pricing Vs Discriminatory pricing Day-ahead exchange Vs Same day exchange Time block for bidding (hourly/half-hourly etc) Congestion management Taking care of operational inflexibilities of
generating stations
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NLDC/RLDC Day ahead PX Clearing House
B B B SB SB SB
A/C
A/C
B: BiddersSB: Settlement BankA/C: Pledged Account & Collaterals of Clearing House Members in SB
1- Bidders send their bids to PX.2- NLDC informs transmission capacity to PX.3-. Clearing House confirms adequate collaterals of clearing agents.4- PX obtains NLDC concurrence before releasing day ahead Trade schedules.5 - RLDCs issues day ahead generation & dispatch schedules for PX participants.6 - PX issues day ahead trade schedules.7 - PX issues rolling collateral requirement.8 - After settlement period Clearing House issues Invoice/Credit Notes .9- Settlement Banks debit/credit the appropriate amounts.
2,4,53,6,7
1, 6 8
99 9
A/C
Function Diagram
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Expectations of a Portfolio Manager
Freedom to sell and buy at short notice through a single window
No cap at seller’s bids Reasonable cost of purchase Assured availability Assured delivery/take off Assured payments
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• Open Access charges for PX schedules would be socialized.
• Transmission losses to be applied on PX participants as applicable.
• Part inter- regional capacities would be assigned for PX.
• RLDC time line and IEGC would be complied.
• PX schedules would be firm.
Transmission and System Operation
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Chairman
Advisory Council
Governing Council
CEO
Executive Board
Operations
Settlement & Clearing
Information & Technology
Market Monitoring
PX - Organisation
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Does Px need Licence Membership to Grid connected entities only Whether to allow membership to traders Px- to be a profit or non profit organisation Role of CERC
Issues- General
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Issues- General
Do we really need a Day-ahead PX, now or in the near future?
What would be the right time? How to mandate a national PX by law? How to organize a national PX?
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Issues- Price Discovery and Bidding
Pricing principles Bid caps, to have them or not Can bid caps be effective Sale price in constrained Market Can we curb market power/abuse How can Run of River, Thermal,
Nuclear and Windmill Generators submit hourly day-ahead bids?
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Issues- Preventing Market Abuse
Common market abuses1. Bidding above the marginal cost2. Withholding Capacity3. Avoiding a platform with lower price caps
What would it feel like if most often the marginal bids for Market Clearing Price were of liquid fuel generators?
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Issues- Market Regulation
Defining the Rules of the Game Enforcing the Rules and Regulations Market Monitoring Ensuring Anonymity of Bids
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Issues- Congestion Management
To collect congestion revenue Or Not by charging the Buyers of congested
zone at the cost of PX purchase instead of the price offered by the Buyers?
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THANK YOU