cases for separation of power

8/11/2019 Cases for Separation of Power

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURT, ET AL."

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

Before us are 1) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration of the Per Curiam Resolutionof this Court promulgated on March 12, 1987, finding him guilty of grave professional misconductand suspending him indefinitely from the practice of law; and 2) Eva Maravilla-Ilustre's Motion forReconsideration of the same Resolution holding her in contempt and ordering her to pay a fine ofP1,000.00.

Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without hearing violated his right tolife and due process of law and by reason thereof the Order is null and void; that the acts ofmisconduct imputed to him are without basis; that the charge against him that it was he who hadcirculated to the press copies of the Complaint filed before the Tanodbayan is unfounded such that,even in this Court's Resolution, his having distributed copies to the press is not stated positively; that

the banner headline which appeared In the Daily Express is regrettable but that he was notresponsible for such "misleading headline;" that he "did nothing of the sort" being fully conscious ofhis responsibilities as a law practitioner and officer of the Court; that as a former newspaperman, hewould not have been satisfied with merely circulating copies of the Complaint to the press inenvelopes where his name appears; "he himself would have written stories about the case in amanner that sells newspapers; even a series of juicy articles perhaps, something that would havefurther subjected the respondent justices to far worse publicity;" that, on the contrary, the pressconference scheduled by Ilustre was cancelled through his efforts in order to prevent any furtheradverse publicity resulting from the filing of the complaint before the Tanodbayan; that, as a matterof fact, it was this Court's Resolution that was serialized in the Bulletin Today, which newspaper alsomade him the subject of a scathing editorial but that he "understands the cooperation because afterall, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year;" that he consideredit "below his dignity to plead for the chance to present his side" with the Editor, Mr. Ben Rodriguez,

"a long-time personal friend" since he "can afford to be the sacrificial lamb if only to help theHonorable Court uphold its integrity;" that he was called by a reporter of DZRH and was asked tocomment on the case filed before the Tanodbayan but that his remarks were confined to the filing ofthe case by Ilustre herself, and that the judgment of the trial Court had attained its finality long ago;that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and did not prepare the complaint filed beforeit, his professional services having been terminated upon the final dismissal of Ilustre's case beforethis Court; that similarities in the language and phraseology used in the Ilustre letters, in pleadingsbefore this Court and before the Tanodbayan do not prove his authorship since other lawyers "evenof a mediocre caliber" could very easily have reproduced them; that the discussions on the merits in


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the Per Curiam Resolution are "more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, Justice Raul M.Gonzales being competent to deal with the case before him;" that he takes exception to theaccusation that he has manifested lack of respect for and exposed to public ridicule the two highestCourts of the land, all he did having been to call attention to errors or injustice committed in thepromulgation of judgments or orders; that he has "not authorized or assisted and/or abetted andcould not have prevented the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of Eva

Maravilla Ilustre who was no longer his client when these alleged acts were done; that "he is gratefulto this Court for the reminder on the first duty of a lawyer which is to the Court and not to his client, aduty that he has always impressed upon his law students;" and finally, that "for the record, he issorry for the adverse publicity generated by the filing of the complaint against the Justices before theTanodbayan."

In her own Motion for Reconsideration, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre also raises as her main ground thealleged deprivation of her constitutional right to due process. She maintains that as contemptproceedings are commonly treated as criminal in nature, the mode of procedure and rules ofevidence in criminal prosecution should be assimilated, as far as practicable, in this proceeding, andthat she should be given every opportunity to present her side. Additionally, she states that, withsome sympathetic lawyers, they made an "investigation" and learned that the Resolution of the FirstDivision was arrived at without any deliberation by its members; that Court personnel were "tight-lipped about the matter, which is shrouded mystery" thereby prompting her to pursue a course whichshe thought was legal and peaceful; that there is nothing wrong in making public the manner ofvoting by the Justices, and it was for that reason that she addressed Identical letters to AssociateJustices Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani Cruz and Florentino Feliciano; that "if thelawyers of my opponents were not a Solicitor General, and member of the Supreme Court and aDivision Chairman, respectively, the resolution of May 14, 1986 would not have aroused mysuspicion;" that instead of taking the law into her own hands or joining any violent movement, shetook the legitimate step of making a peaceful investigation into how her case was decided, andbrought her grievance to the Tanodbayan "in exasperation" against those whom she felt hadcommitted injustice against her "in an underhanded manner."

We deny reconsideration in both instances.

The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not impressed with merit. What dueprocess abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, et al., 110 SCRA438 [1981]). The word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trial-type" proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution of this Court, dated January 29, 1987, Atty. Laureta was given sufficientopportunity to inform this Court of the reasons why he should not be subjected to dispose action. His

Answer, wherein he prayed that the action against him be dismissed, contained twenty-two (22)pages, double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was also given a like opportunity to explain herstatements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/or the official actions of the Justicesconcerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the contempt proceeding against herbe dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages, double spaced. Both were afforded ample latitude toexplain matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied having authored the letters written by Ilustre, his being hercounsel before the Tanodbayan, his having circularized to the press copies of the complaint filedbefore said body, and his having committed acts unworthy of his profession. But the Court believedotherwise and found that those letters and the charges levelled against the Justices concerned, ofthemselves and by themselves, betray not only their malicious and contemptuous character, but alsothe lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a complete obliviousness to thefundamental principle of separation of powers, and a wanton disregard of the cardinal doctrine ofindependence of the Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur.Nothing more needed to have been said or proven.The necessity to conduct any further evidentially hearing was obviated (See People vs. Hon.Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. 63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135 SCRA 712).Atty. Laureta and Ilustre weregiven ample opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact, heard.


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(1)

In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in his Answer to the show-cause Resolution that his professional services were terminated by Ilustre after the dismissal of themain petition by this Court; that he had nothing to do with the contemptuous letters to the individualJustices; and that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan.

Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution dismissing Ilustre's Complaintwas furnished Atty. Laureta as "counsel for the complainant" at his address of record. Of note, too, isthe fact that it was he who was following up the Complaint before the Tanodbayan and, after itsdismissal, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of dismissal.

Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a process server of this Court, that after havingfailed to serve copy of the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 of this Court on Ilustrepersonally at her address of record, "101 F. Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City," having been informedthat she is 6 not a resident of the place," he proceeded to the residence of Atty. Laureta where thelatter's wife "voluntarily received the two copies of decision for her husband and for Ms. Maravina-Ilustre" (p. 670, Rollo, Vol. 11).

That Ilustre subsequently received copy of this Court's Resolution delivered to Mrs. Laureta is shownby the fact that she filed, as of March 27, 1987, a "Petition for Extension of Time to file Motion forReconsideration" and subsequently the Motion for Reconsideration. In that Petition Ilustreacknowledged receipt of the Resolution on March 12, 1987, the very same date Mrs. Lauretareceived copy thereof. If, indeed, the lawyer-client relationship between her husband and Ilustre hadbeen allegedly completely severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to return to the Sheriff the copyintended for Ilustre. As it was, however, service on Atty. Laureta proved to be service on Ilustre aswell. The close tie- up between the corespondents is heightened by the fact that three processservers of this Court failed to serve copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution on Ilustre personally.

Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one called by a "reporter"of DZRH to comment on the Ilustre charges before the Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had nothing to dowith the complaint, he would not have been pinpointed at all. And if his disclaimer were the truth, thelogical step for him to have taken was to refer the caller to the lawyer/s allegedly assisting Ilustre, atthe very least, out of elementary courtesy and propriety. But he did nothing of the sort. " He gave hiscomment with alacrity.

The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces when he asserts inhis Motion for Reconsideration that he "understands the cooperation" of the Bulletin Today asmanifested in the serialized publication of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court and his beingsubjected to a scathing editorial by the same newspaper "because after all, the Court rendered afavorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year." The malice lurking in that statement is mostunbecoming of an officer of the Court and is an added reason for denying reconsideration.

Further, Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in the Court's Per CuriamResolution are more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, forgetting, however, his own discourseon the merits in his Answer to this Court's Resolution dated January 29, 1987. He thus incorrigiblyinsists on subordinating the Judiciary to the executive notwithstanding the categoricalpronouncement in the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of the RevisedPenal Code has no application to the members of a collegiate Court; that a charge of violation of the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannotprosper; plus the clear and extended dissertation in the same Per Curiam Resolution on thefundamental principle of separation of powers and of checks and balances, pursuant to which it is


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this Court "entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justifiabledisputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declarethem 'unjust' upon controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice."

Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the dignity of this Courtare belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His apologetic stance for the "adverse

publicity" generated by the filing of the charges against the Justices concerned before theTanodbayan rings with insincerity. The complaint was calculated precisely to serve that verypurpose. The threat to bring the case to "another forum of justice" was implemented to the fun.Besides, he misses the heart of the matter. Exposure to the glare of publicity is an occupationalhazard. If he has been visited with disciplinary sanctions it is because by his conduct, acts andstatements, he has, overall, deliberately sought to destroy the "authenticity, integrity, andconclusiveness of collegiate acts," to "undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter ofall justifiable disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the integrity of the Courts and theJustices concerned, and in the orderly administration of justice.

In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration that would call for amodification, much less a reversal, of our finding that he is guilty of grave professional misconductthat renders him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to anattorney and officer of the Court.

(2)

Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has turned deaf ears to anyreason or clarification. She and her counsel have refused to accept the untenability of their case andthe inevitability of losing in Court. They have allowed suspicion alone to blind their actions and in sodoing degraded the administration of justice. "Investigation" was utterly uncalled for.All conclusionsand judgments of the Court, be they en bancor by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation.The fact that no dissent was indicated in the Minutes of the proceedings held on May 14, 1986showed that the members of the Division voted unanimously. Court personnel are not in a position toknow the voting in any case because all deliberations are held behind closed doors without any one

of them being present.No malicious inferences should have been drawn from their inability to furnishthe information Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired The personality of the Solicitor General never cameinto the picture. It was Justice Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was Chairman of the FirstDivision when the Resolution of May 14, 1986 denying the Petition was rendered. Thereafter JusticeYap inhibited himself from any participation. The fact that the Court en bancupheld the challengedResolutions of the First Division emphasizes the irrespective of Ilustre's case irrespective of thepersonalities involved.

Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our process servers the run-around. Three of them failed to serve on her personally her copy of this Court's Per CuriamResolution of March 12, 1987 at her address of record. Mrs. Laureta informed process serverLorenzo C. Bardel that Ilustre was residing at 17-D, Quezon St., Tondo, Manila. Romeo C. Regala,

another process server, went to that address to serve copy of the Resolution but he reported:

4. That inspite of diligent efforts to locate the address of ms.Eva Maravilla-Ilustre,said address could not be located;

5. That I even asked the occupants (Cerdan Family) of No. 17 Quezon Street,Tondo, Manila, and they informed that there is no such Ms. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre inthe neighborhood and/or in the vicinity; ... (p. 672, Rollo, Vol. 11).


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The third process server, Nelson C. Cabesuela, was also unable to serve copy of this Court'sResolution on Ilustre. He reported:

2. On March 17, 1987, at about 9:30 A.M., I arrived at the house in the addressfurnished at; the notice of judgment (101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City), andwas received by an elderly woman who admitted to be the owner of the house but

vehemently refused to be Identified, and told me that she does not know theaddressee Maravilla, and told me further that she always meets different personslooking for Miss Maravilla because the latter always gives the address of her house;

3. That, I was reminded of an incident that I also experienced in the same placetrying to serve a resolution to Miss Maravilla which was returned unserved becauseshe is not known in the place; ... (p. 674, Rollo, Vol. II).

And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for Reconsideration she persists ingiving that address at 101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City, where our process servers weretold that she was not a resident of and that she was unknown thereat. If for her contumaciouselusiveness and lack of candor alone, Ilustre deserves no further standing before this Court.

ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao G. Laureta for thesetting aside of the order suspending him from the practice of law, and of Eva Maravilla Ilustre forthe lifting of the penalty for contempt are DENIED, and this denial is FINAL. Eva Maravilla Ilustreshall pay the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on her within ten (10) days from notice, or, sufferimprisonment for ten (10) days upon failure to pay said fine within the stipulated period.

SO ORDERED.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987

DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P.,HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCARF. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E.REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M.MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S. ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners,vs.HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and VICTORMACALINGCAG in his capacity as the TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNAN, J.:

Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is theconstitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwiseknown as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."

Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of theNational Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties withgeneral interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interestsmay be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for" 1listed the grounds relied upon in thispetition as follows:

A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGESUPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFEROF PUBLIC MONEYS.

B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THECONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSESFOR WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.

C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THEPRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDUREPRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.

D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUEDELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE.

E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THEPRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGETMINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR INEXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION. 2


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Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution dated September 19, 1985, theSolicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who wereallegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversyfit for resolution or determination. He further contended that the provision under consideration wasenacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that at any rate,prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the

performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.

On February 27, 1986, the Court required the petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment. This, theydid, stating, among others, that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need tohold the resolution of the present case in abeyance "until developments arise to enable the parties toconcretize their respective stands." 3

Thereafter, We required public respondents to file a rejoinder. The Solicitor General filed a rejoinderwith a motion to dismiss, setting forth as grounds therefor the abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIIIof the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986, which has allegedlyrendered the instant petition moot and academic. He likewise cited the "seven pillars" enunciated byJustice Brandeis inAshwander v. TVA,297 U.S. 288 (1936) 4as basis for the petition's dismissal.

In the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections and Arturo F. Pacificador, G.R. Nos.68379-81, September 22, 1986, We stated that:

The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office indispute between the petitioner and the private respondents both of whom havegone their separate ways could be a convenient justification for dismissing thecase. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and forall, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purposeis to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and ineffect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has becomemoot and academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also theconscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we mustalso give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when wecannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longerpossible according to the law. But there are also times when although the disputehas disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justicedemands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, thoughgone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted, as well as to avoid great disservice tonational interest that We take cognizance of this petition and thus deny public respondents' motion todismiss. Likewise noteworthy is the fact that the new Constitution, ratified by the Filipino people in

the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, carries verbatim section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973Constitution under Section 24[5], Article VI. And while Congress has not officially reconvened, Wesee no cogent reason for further delaying the resolution of the case at bar.

The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves scant consideration. The case of Pascualv. Secretary of Public Works, et al., 110 Phil. 331, is authority in support of petitioners' locus standi.Thus:


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Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by onewho will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there aremany decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for thedisbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds byan officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional actconstitutes a misapplication of such funds which may be enjoined at the request of a

taxpayer. Although there are some decisions to the contrary, the prevailing view inthe United States is stated in the American Jurisprudence as follows:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give therequisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, thegeneral rule is that not only persons individually affected, but alsotaxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegalexpenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may thereforequestion the constitutionality of statutes requiringexpenditure ofpublic moneys. [ 11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis supplied. ]

Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal,43 SCRA 677 and Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, We said thatas regards taxpayers' suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not.

The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5],Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Saidparagraph 1 of Section 44 provides:

The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for thedifferent departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department,which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project oractivity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations

Act or approved after its enactment.

On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:

Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of theSupreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commis ions may by law beauthorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respectiveoffices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical underthe 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government andthose of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds andresources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for thepurpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government

branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose andconditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for thepurpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings fromanother item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under saidSection 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of anydepartment, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its


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enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in theitem from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose ofaugmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard thestandards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislativepowers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render theprovision in question null and void.

"For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e.public funds, provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This,evidently, was foremost in the minds of the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing therules regarding the appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release of money from thetreasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; theprohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to another [See. 16(5) and the requirement ofspecifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all safeguards designed to forestall abuses in theexpenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts all these safeguards to naught. For, ascorrectly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon the President, "...Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations, results inuncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary performance andentrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well expand [sic] public money not on thebasis of development priorities but on political and personal expediency." 5The contention of publicrespondents that paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5) of

Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.

Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from one branch of thegovernment against a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter'ssphere of responsibility.

Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition, Little,Brown and Company, Boston, explained:

... The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, ofequal dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, andcannot directly or indirectly, while acting within the limits of its authority, be subjectedto the control or supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable assumption bythat other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. TheConstitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not make any one ofthe three departments subordinate to another, when exercising the trust committed toit. The courts may declare legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in somecases, but not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to thelegislative. Being required to declare what the law is in the cases which come beforethem, they must enforce the Constitution, as the paramount law, whenever alegislative enactment comes in conflict with it. But the courts sit, not to review orrevise the legislative action, but to enforce the legislative will, and it is only wherethey find that the legislature has failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that theyare at liberty to disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do what every privatecitizen may do in respect to the mandates of the courts when the judges assumed toact and to render judgments or decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this highauthority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators ofthe public will. If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not because the judgeshave any control over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by theConstitution, and because the will of the people, which is therein declared, isparamount to that of their representatives expressed in any law." [Lindsay v.


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Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332-334).

Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, thejudiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executiveacts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare

what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence ofjudicial power conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as maybe established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 ofthe 1987 Constitution] and which power this Court has exercised in many instances. *

Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a provision of law which We have earliermentioned to be constitutionally infirm. The general principle relied upon cannot therefore accordthem the protection sought as they are not acting within their "sphere of responsibility" but without it.

The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the economic destitution brought about bythe plundering of the Treasury by the deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision which allows

even the slightest possibility of a repetition of this sad experience cannot remain written in ourstatute books.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No.1177 is hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

SO ORDER RED.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 86540-41 November 6, 1989

MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, MAKATI AGRO-TRADING,INC., and LA FILIPINA UY GONGCO. CORP., respondents.

Antonio F. Navarrette and Francisco A. Lava, Jr. for petitioner.

J.N. Borrillo, Jr. Law Offices Co-counsel for petitioner.

Alejandro Z. Barin and Balgos & Perez for Makati Agro-Trading, Inc. and La Filipina Uy Gongco

Corp.

Ramon T. Garcia and Fiorello E. Azura for respondent Asset Privatization Trust.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

In this petition for review, Mantruste Systems, Inc. (or MSI seeks the annulment of the decisiondated September 29, 1988 and the resolution dated January 4, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in theconsolidated cases of "Makati Agro-Trading, Inc., et al. vs. Judge Job Madayag, et al."(CA-G.R. SPNo. 13929) and "Asset Privatization Trust vs. Judge Job Madayag, et al."(CA-G.R. SP No. 14535)

which set aside the writ of preliminary injunction that was issued on December 19, 1987 by JudgeMadayag in Civil Case No. 18319 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("Mantruste Systems, Inc. vs.Development Bank of the Philippines, Asset Privatization Trust, Makati Agro-Trading, Inc. and LaFilipina Uy Gongco Corporation"). Judge Madayag enjoined the defendants in. that case from doingthe acts stated in its temporary restraining order of November 13, 1987, namely:

... from approving the winning bid and awarding the BAYVIEW property, subjectmatter of this case, in favor of the winning bidders, the herein defendants, Makati

Agro-Trading, Inc. and La Filipina Uy-Gongco Corporation;

enjoining the Defendants DBP and APT from taking physical possession of theBAYVIEW property, or ejecting the plaintiff and its concessionaires, representatives

and agents, from the leased premises;

from terminating the Contract of Lease (Annex N); and

from disturbing and obstructing the plaintiff, through the defendants' designatedsecurity guards, in the pursuit of its business in the leased premises, until furtherorders from this Court. (p. 18, Rollo.)

The facts are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:


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... Herein private respondent Mantruste System, Inc. (MSI) entered into an 4 "interimlease agreement" dated August 26, 1986 with Page 139 the Development Bank ofthe Philippines owner of the Bayview Plaza Hotel wherein the former wouldoperate the hotel for "a minimum of three months or until such time that the saidproperties are sold to MSI or other third parties by DBP."

On December 8, 1986 the President issued Proclamation No. 50 entitled "Launchinga Program for the Expeditious Disposition or Privatization of Certain GovernmentCorporations and/or the (acquired) Assets thereof, and creating a Committee onPrivatization and the Asset Privatization Trust." The Bayview Hotel properties wereamong the government assets Identified for privatization and were consequentlytransferred from DBP to APT for disposition.

To effect the disposition of the property, the DBP notified MSI that it was terminatingthe "interim lease agreement." In a certificate dated September 18, 1987 signed byErnesto S. Salgado, President and Chairman of the Board of herein privaterespondent (Annex D; Exh. 2-APT) the latter agreed to the termination with thefollowing terms:

1. Thirty days from today as of the signing of this Certification, I willconsider the Lease Contract between MANTRUSTE SYSTEM, INC.and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES terminated.

2. The Bayview Prince Hotel will be made available for inspection atall times by other bidders.

3. The Bayview Prince Hotel will be ready for delivery to any newowners thirty (30) days from signing of this Certification.

On October 7, 1987 the APT sent a letter to MSI through Mr. Salgado granting thelatter an extension of thirty days from October 18 "within which to effect the deliveryof the Bayview Prince Hotel to APT." The extension was given to "allow (MSI) to windup (its) affairs and to facilitate a smooth turn-over of the facilities to its new ownerswithout necessarily interrupting the hotel's regular operation." The signature of Mr.Salgado appears on the lower left hand of the letter under the word "CONFORME."

However, fifteen days later, or on October 22, 1987, MSI through its ExecutiveVice-President Rolando C. Cipriano informed APT of the following points:

xxx xxx xxx

MSI is of the opinion . . . since its lease on the hotel properties hasbeen for more than one year now, its lease status has taken the

character of a long term one. As such MSI as the lessee has acquiredcertain rights and privileges under law and equity.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . it is the company's firm contention that it has acquired a priorityright to the purchase of Bayview Hotel properties over and aboveother interested parties .. . (Annex F, petition, SP-14535).


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APT's response to this demand was equally firm. It informed MSI that APT has ". . .not found any stipulation tending to support your claim that Mantruste System, Inc.,as lessee, has acquired ... priority right to the purchase of Bayview Hotel . . ." TheTrust also pointed out that the "Pre-Bidding Conference" for the sale of the hotel hasalready been conducted such that for APT to favorably consider your (MSI's) requestwould not be in consonance with law, equity and fair play (Annex G, Idem)

On October 28, Salgado, speaking for MSI, wrote APT informing the latter of thealleged "legal lien" over the hotel to the amount of P10,000,000 (should beP12,000,000). Moreover, he demanded that the Trust consider MSI a "verypreferred" bidder. Nevertheless, on November 4, 1987 herein private respondentallegedly prepared to submit its bid to the APT for P95,000,000.00 in cash orP120,000,000 in installment terms.

On the same occasion, however, MSI asked the Trust for clarification on thefollowing points: (1) whether APT had a clean title over the property; (2) whether theTrust knew the hotel had back taxes; (3) who should pay the tax arrears; and (4)whether MSI'S advances made in behalf of DBP would be treated as part of the bidoffer.

From there, the versions of the MSI and the Trust differed. According to hereinprivate respondent, because of the questions it posed to the Trust, it was"immediately disqualified from the public bidding." The trust alleged on the otherhand that MSI voluntarily desisted from participating in the bidding. The propertyeventually was awarded to herein petitioners Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina UyGongco Corporation which submitted a bid for P83,000,000 (should beP85,000,000).

On November 13, 1981, herein private respondent filed a complaint with respondentlower court docketed as Civil Case No. 18319 praying among others for: (1) theissuance of a restraining order enjoining APT from approving the winning bid and

awarding the Bayview property to private petitioners, and from ejecting MSI from theproperty or from terminating the contract of lease; (2) the award of the Bayviewproperty in favor of MSI as the highest bidder. On December 15, 1937, the lowercourt, as already said, granted the writ of preliminary injunction. (pp. 247- 250, Rollo.)

The Court of Appeals nullified the lower court's writ of preliminary injunction for being violative ofSection 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A dated December 15,1986, which provides:

No court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining order or injunctionagainst the Trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assetstransferred to it . . . Nor shall such order or injunction be issued against anypurchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking

possession of any assets purchased by him.

The Court of Appeals rejected Judge Madayag's opinion that the above provision of ProclamationNo. 50-A is unconstitutional because: (1) it ceased to be operative in view of the 1987 Constitution;(2) it constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law; and (3) it impinges upon the

judicial power as defined in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The Court of Appealsheld that:


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(1) Proclamation No. 50-A continued to be operative after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, byvirtue of Section 3, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) providing that:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters ofinstructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitutionshall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.

(2) Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not deprive MSI of its property existent, and its beliefthat DBP had declared it to be the preferred buyer of the hotel is "illusory." Its only "property right"was its reimbursable advances allegedly amounting to P12 million (but denied by DBP in its answerto the complaint) which, it may sue to collect in a separate action.

(3) In view of Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction bythe lower court against the APT may not be justified as a valid exercise of power, i.e., the power tosettle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, for doesnot have a legally demandable and enforceable right of retention over the hotel. In any case, judicialpower is "not unqualified." It may be regulated and defined by the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987Constitution) and by law, and the law in this particular case (Sec. 31, Procl. No. 50-A) provides that

judicial power may not be exercised in the form of an injunction against the acts of the APT inpursuance of its mandate.

The seven grounds of this petition for certiorari may be compressed into the following propositions:

(1) that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in substituting its own discretion for that ofthe trial court on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction to preserve the status quoand to protect Mantruste's contractual right to retain possession of the Bayview Hotel until all itsadvances are paid; and

(2) that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in holding that Mantruste's property rights are non-existentexcept its right to the refund of its alleged advances; (b) in not declaring unconstitutional Section 31of Proclamation 50-A prohibiting the issuance of an injunction against the APT and (c) in finding thatMantruste is to blame for its failure to participate in the bidding for the Bayview Hotel

We find no merit in the petition.

While the well-known and basic purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo ofthe property subject of the action to protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting the same during thependency of the suit (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445, 452; Lasala vs. Fernandez, 5 SCRA 79; Riveravs. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643), and that generally, the exercise of sound judicial discretion by thelower court will not be interfered with (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225, 232), the Court of Appealshowever correctly found that, under the lease agreement between the DBP and Mantruste, thelatter's claim to a "patent contractual right to retain possession of the Bayview Hotel until all itsadvances are paid" is non-existent. As the right of retention does not exist, neither does the right to

the relief (injunction) demanded (Sec. 3, Rule 58, Rules of Court).

Furthermore, there is Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A to be reckoned with which explicitlyprohibits courts and administrative agencies from issuing "any restraining order or injunction againstthe Trust APT in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it, noragainst any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking possessionof any assets purchased by him." While the petitioner decries the "probable injustice" that it willsuffer if it is ousted from the hotel and possession of the property is delivered to the privaterespondents as the winning bidders/purchasers at the public auction sale, the greater prejudice and


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injustice to the latter who, after paying P85 million to purchase the hotel have been deprived of itspossession by the illegal issuance of the writ of injunction, may not be glossed over. On the otherhand, as indicated by the Appellate Court, the petitioner is not without adequate remedy to recoverits alleged P12 million advances on behalf of the DBP to make the hotel operational. It may sueeither the DBP, or its successor-in-interest, the APT for payment of the claim.

Mantruste's right to reimbursement for those advances (the exact amount of which remains to bedetermined) may not be denied. However, its claim to a right of retention over the hotel pending suchreimbursement, is, as was correctly found by the Court of Appeals, "illusory" and "non-existent."Amere lessee, like Mantruste, is not a builder in good faith, hence, the right of retention given to apossessor in good faith under Article 546 of the Civil Code, pending reimbursement of his advancesfor necessary repairs and useful improvements on another's property is not available to a lesseewhose possession is not that of an owner.

A lessee is not entitled to retain possession of the premises leased until he isreimbursed for alleged improvements thereon, for a lessee cannot pretend to act ingood faith in making improvements.

A lessee, in order to be entitled to one half the value of the improvements introducedby him in the leased premises, or to remove them should lessor refuse to reimbursethe half value thereof, must show that the same were introduced in good faith; areuseful; suitable to the use for which the lease is intended without altering the formand substance of the premises. (Imperial Insurance, Inc. vs. Simon, 14 SCRA 855.)

Petitioner's contention that he is a builder in good faith for which reason he may nothe evicted unless he is indemnified for the cost of his improvements on the leasedpremises, has no merit. Knowing that his right to occupy the premises wastemporary, he is deemed to have built his house at his own risk. (Lopez, Inc. vs. Phil.& Eastern Trading Co., Inc., 98 Phil. 348.)

It is a settled rule that lessees are not possessors in good faith, because they knowthat their occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the lease,hence they cannot, as a matter of right, recover the value of their improvements fromthe lessor, much less retain the premises until they are reimbursed therefor.(Bacaling vs. Laguna, et al., 54 SCRA 243.)

Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does notimpair the inherent power of courts "to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable andenforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amountingto lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government" (Sec.1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of thevarious courts belongs to the legislature, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its

jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987

Constitution).

The President, in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution, issuedProclamation No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from issuing restraining orders and writs of injunctionagainst the APT and the purchasers of any assets sold by it, to prevent courts from interfering in thedischarge, by this instrumentality of the executive branch of the Government, of its task of carryingout "the expeditious disposition and privatization of certain government corporations and/or theassets thereof' (Proc. No. 50), absent any grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of

jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation, not being inconsistent with the Constitution and not having


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been repealed or revoked by Congress, has remained operative (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987Constitution).

While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under the system of separationof powers set up in the Constitution, the power of the courts over the other branches andinstrumentalities of the Government is limited only to the determination of "whether or not there has

been a grave abuse of discretion (by them) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in theexercise of their authority and in the performance of Page 145 their assigned tasks (Sec. 1, Art. VIII,1987 Constitution). Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by aninjunction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection withthe acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.

There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency,except when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, oracts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that paragraph 2 of the Contract of Lease which provides:

2. The term of the lease is a minimum of three (3) months or until such time that saidproperties are sold to MSI or other third parties by DBP (p. 1, Annex N of Annex Ahereof; Exh. I.)

does not give Mantruste preferred standing or "a right of first refusal" as a prospective buyer of theBayview Hotel. That provision of the lease contract gives it only the right, equally with others, to bidfor the property.

In any event, assuming that Mantruste did have that preferred status (for it was assured by EstelaLadrido, DBP's officer-in-charge of the Bayview Hotel, that "all things equal (sic) DBP would be moreinclined to sell the Bayview property to MSI Mantruste lost that preferential right by failing toparticipate in the bidding for the property. Its allegation that it would have submitted a higher bid thanthe winning bidders, is futile, for the fact is that it did not submit a bid. Its excuses for failing to do soare unconvincing. The real reason is difficult to fathom but the following statement in its petition

Considering that Mantruste has made capital expenditures of more than P12 million,then this would mean an uninterrupted, peaceful and continued possession byMantruste of Bayview for more than twenty (20) years in order to complete theoffsetting process. (p. 44, Petition.)

may provide a clue. Mantruste may have banked on its alleged advance of P12 million to keep it inpossession of the hotel for 20 years, without having to buy it at the APT's auction.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition forreview is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.


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INS v. Chadha

APPEALFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALSFORTHENINTHCIRCUIT

No. 80-1832 Argued: February 22, 1982 --- Decided: June 23, 1983 [*]

Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act)authorizes either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate thedecision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority delegated byCongress to the Attorney General, to allow a particular deportablealien to remain in the United States. Appellee-respondent Chadha, analien who had been lawfully admitted to the United States on anonimmigrant student visa, remained in the United States after hisvisa had expired and was ordered by the Immigration andNaturalization Service (INS) to show cause why he should not be

deported. He then applied for suspension of the deportation, and,after a hearing, an Immigration Judge, acting pursuant to 244(a)(1)of the Act, which authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion,to suspend deportation, ordered the suspension, and reported thesuspension to Congress as required by 244(c)(1). Thereafter, theHouse of Representatives passed a resolution pursuant to 244(c)(2)vetoing the suspension, and the Immigration Judge reopened thedeportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate theproceedings on the ground that 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional, butthe judge held that he had no authority to rule on itsconstitutionality, and ordered Chadha deported pursuant to theHouse Resolution. Chadha's appeal to the Board of Immigration

Appeals was dismissed, the Board also holding that it had no power todeclare 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. Chadha then filed a petition forreview of the deportation order in the Court of Appeals, and the INSjoined him in arguing that 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Courtof Appeals held that 244(c)(2) violates the constitutional doctrineof separation of powers, and accordingly directed the AttorneyGeneral to cease taking any steps to deport Chadha based upon theHouse Resolution. [p920]

Held:

1. This Court has jurisdiction to entertain the INS's appeal in No. 80-1832 under28 U.S.C. 1252 which provides that "[a]ny party" mayappeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of "any court of theUnited States" holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in "anycivil action, suit, or proceeding" to which the United States or any ofits agencies is a party. A court of appeals is "a court of the UnitedStates" for purposes of 1252, the proceeding below was a "civilaction, suit, or proceeding," the INS is an agency of the United Statesand was a party to the proceeding below, and the judgment belowheld an Act of Congress unconstitutional. Moreover, for purposes ofdeciding whether the INS was "any party" within the grant of
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appellate jurisdiction in 1252, the INS was sufficiently aggrieved bythe Court of Appeals' decision prohibiting it from taking action itwould otherwise take. An agency's status as an aggrieved party under 1252 is not altered by the fact that the Executive may agree withthe holding that the statute in question is unconstitutional. Pp. 929-931.

2. Section 244(c)(2) is severable from the remainder of 244. Section406 of the Act provides that, if any particular provision of the Act isheld invalid, the remainder of the Act shall not be affected. Thisgives rise to a presumption that Congress did not intend the validityof the Act as a whole, or any part thereof, to depend upon whetherthe veto clause of 244(c)(2) was invalid. This presumption issupported by 244's legislative history. Moreover, a provision isfurther presumed severable if what remains after severance is fullyoperative as a law. Here, 244 can survive as a "fully operative" andworkable administrative mechanism without the one-House veto. Pp.931-935.

3. Chadha has standing to challenge the constitutionality of 244(c)(2), since he has demonstrated "injury in fact and asubstantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will preventor redress the claimed injury." Duke Power Co. v. CarolinaEnvironmental Study Group, Inc.,438 U.S. 59,79. Pp. 935-936.

4. The fact that Chadha may have other statutory relief available tohim does not preclude him from challenging the constitutionality of 244(c)(2), especially where the other avenues of relief are at mostspeculative. Pp. 936-937.

5. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under 106(a) of the Act,which provides that a petition for review in a court of appeals "shallbe the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all finalorders of deportation . . . made against aliens within the UnitedStates pursuant to administrative proceedings" under 242(b) of theAct. Section 106(a) includes all matters on which the finaldeportation order is contingent, rather than only thosedeterminations made at the deportation [p921] hearing. Here,Chadha's deportation stands or falls on the validity of the challengedveto, the final deportation order having been entered only toimplement that veto. Pp. 937-939.

6. A case or controversy is presented by these cases. From the time

of the House's formal intervention, there was concrete adverseness,and prior to such intervention, there was adequate Art. IIIadverseness even though the only parties were the INS and Chadha.The INS's agreement with Chadha's position does not alter the factthat the INS would have deported him absent the Court of Appeals'judgment. Moreover, Congress is the proper party to defend thevalidity of a statute when a Government agency, as a defendantcharged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that thestatute is unconstitutional. Pp. 939-940.
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7. These cases do not present a nonjusticiable political question onthe asserted ground that Chadha is merely challenging Congress'authority under the Naturalization and Necessary and Proper Clausesof the Constitution. The presence of constitutional issues withsignificant political overtones does not automatically invoke thepolitical question doctrine. Resolution of litigation challenging the

constitutional authority of one of the three branches cannot beevaded by the courts simply because the issues have politicalimplications. Pp. 940-943.

8. The congressional veto provision in 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional.Pp. 944-959.

(a) The prescription for legislative action in Art. I, 1 -- requiring alllegislative powers to be vested in a Congress consisting of a Senateand a House of Representatives -- and 7 -- requiring every billpassed by the House and Senate, before becoming law, to bepresented to the President, and, if he disapproves, to be repassed by

two-thirds of the Senate and House -- represents the Framers'decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government beexercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustivelyconsidered procedure. This procedure is an integral part of theconstitutional design for the separation of powers. Pp. 944-951.

(b) Here, the action taken by the House pursuant to 244(c)(2) wasessentially legislative in purpose and effect, and thus was subject tothe procedural requirements of Art. I, 7, for legislative action:passage by a majority of both Houses and presentation to thePresident. The one-House veto operated to overrule the AttorneyGeneral and mandate Chadha's deportation. The veto's legislativecharacter is confirmed by the character of the congressional action it

supplants; i.e.,absent the veto provision of 244(c)(2), neither theHouse nor the Senate, or both acting together, could effectivelyrequire the Attorney General to deport an alien once the AttorneyGeneral, in the exercise of legislatively [p922] delegated authority,had determined that the alien should remain in the United States.Without the veto provision, this could have been achieved only bylegislation requiring deportation. A veto by one House under 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an attempt at amending thestandards set out in 244(a)(1), or as a repeal of 244 as applied toChadha. The nature of the decision implemented by the one-Houseveto further manifests its legislative character. Congress must abideby its delegation of authority to the Attorney General until that

delegation is legislatively altered or revoked. Finally, the veto'slegislative character is confirmed by the fact that, when the Framersintended to authorize either House of Congress to act alone andoutside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly andprecisely defined the procedure for such action in the Constitution.Pp. 951-959.

634 F.2d 408, affirmed.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 127882 January 27, 2004

LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Chairman F'LONGMIGUEL M. LUMAYONG, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, PONCIANO BENNAGEN, JAIME TADEO,RENATO R. CONSTANTINO, JR., F'LONG AGUSTIN M. DABIE, ROBERTO P. AMLOY, RAQIML. DABIE, SIMEON H. DOLOJO, IMELDA M. GANDON, LENY B. GUSANAN, MARCELO L.GUSANAN, QUINTOL A. LABUAYAN, LOMINGGES D. LAWAY, BENITA P. TACUAYAN, minorsJOLY L. BUGOY, represented by his father UNDERO D. BUGOY, ROGER M. DADING,represented by his father ANTONIO L. DADING, ROMY M. LAGARO, represented by his fatherTOTING A. LAGARO, MIKENY JONG B. LUMAYONG, represented by his father MIGUEL M.LUMAYONG, RENE T. MIGUEL, represented by his mother EDITHA T. MIGUEL, ALDEMAR L.SAL, represented by his father DANNY M. SAL, DAISY RECARSE, represented by her mother

LYDIA S. SANTOS, EDWARD M. EMUY, ALAN P. MAMPARAIR, MARIO L. MANGCAL, ALDENS. TUSAN, AMPARO S. YAP, VIRGILIO CULAR, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, JULIA REGINACULAR, GIAN CARLO CULAR, VIRGILIO CULAR, JR., represented by their father VIRGILIOCULAR, PAUL ANTONIO P. VILLAMOR, represented by his parents JOSE VILLAMOR andELIZABETH PUA-VILLAMOR, ANA GININA R. TALJA, represented by her father MARIO JOSEB. TALJA, SHARMAINE R. CUNANAN, represented by her father ALFREDO M. CUNANAN,ANTONIO JOSE A. VITUG III, represented by his mother ANNALIZA A. VITUG, LEAN D.NARVADEZ, represented by his father MANUEL E. NARVADEZ, JR., ROSERIO MARALAGLINGATING, represented by her father RIO OLIMPIO A. LINGATING, MARIO JOSE B. TALJA,DAVID E. DE VERA, MARIA MILAGROS L. SAN JOSE, SR., SUSAN O. BOLANIO, OND, LOLITAG. DEMONTEVERDE, BENJIE L. NEQUINTO,1ROSE LILIA S. ROMANO, ROBERTO S.VERZOLA, EDUARDO AURELIO C. REYES, LEAN LOUEL A. PERIA, represented by his fatherELPIDIO V. PERIA,2GREEN FORUM PHILIPPINES, GREEN FORUM WESTERN VISAYAS, (GF-

WV), ENVIRONMETAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTER (ELAC), PHILIPPINE KAISAHAN TUNGOSA KAUNLARAN NG KANAYUNAN AT REPORMANG PANSAKAHAN (KAISAHAN),3KAISAHAN TUNGO SA KAUNLARAN NG KANAYUNAN AT REPORMANG PANSAKAHAN(KAISAHAN), PARTNERSHIP FOR AGRARIAN REFORM and RURAL DEVELOPMENTSERVICES, INC. (PARRDS), PHILIPPINE PART`NERSHIP FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OFHUMAN RESOURCES IN THE RURAL AREAS, INC. (PHILDHRRA), WOMEN'S LEGAL BUREAU(WLB), CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, INC. (CADI), UPLANDDEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (UDI), KINAIYAHAN FOUNDATION, INC., SENTRO NGALTERNATIBONG LINGAP PANLIGAL (SALIGAN), LEGAL RIGHTS AND NATURALRESOURCES CENTER, INC. (LRC),petitioners,vs.VICTOR O. RAMOS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURALRESOURCES (DENR), HORACIO RAMOS, DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU(MGB-DENR), RUBEN TORRES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, and WMC (PHILIPPINES), INC.4respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:


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The present petition for mandamus and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No.7942,5otherwise known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along with the ImplementingRules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources(DENR) Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement(FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the Philippines and WMC (Philippines),Inc. (WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws.

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-ownedcorporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financialassistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, uponappropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreignproponent. In entering into such proposals, the President shall consider the real contributions to theeconomic growth and general welfare of the country that will be realized, as well as the developmentand use of local scientific and technical resources that will be promoted by the proposed contract oragreement. Until Congress shall determine otherwise, large-scale mining, for purpose of thisSection, shall mean those proposals for contracts or agreements for mineral resources exploration,development, and utilization involving a committed capital investment in a single mining unit projectof at least Fifty Million Dollars in United States Currency (US $50,000,000.00).7

On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern theexploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources."8R.A. No. 7942defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations,9outlines the procedure for theirfiling and approval,10assignment/transfer11and withdrawal,12and fixes their terms.13Similarprovisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements.14

The law prescribes the qualifications of contractors15and grants them certain rights, includingtimber,16water17and easement18rights, and the right to possess explosives.19Surface owners,occupants, or concessionaires are forbidden from preventing holders of mining rights from enteringprivate lands and concession areas.20A procedure for the settlement of conflicts is likewise providedfor.21

The Act restricts the conditions for exploration,22quarry23and other24permits. It regulates thetransport, sale and processing of minerals,25and promotes the development of mining communities,science and mining technology,26and safety and environmental protection.27

The government's share in the agreements is spelled out and allocated,28taxes and fees areimposed,29incentives granted.30Aside from penalizing certain acts,31the law likewise specifiesgrounds for the cancellation, revocation and termination of agreements and permits.32

On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times,two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect.33Shortly before the effectivity ofR.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP

covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and NorthCotabato.34

On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order(DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20,1996.


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On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding thatthe DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, 35giving the DENR fifteendays from receipt36to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners'letter.37

Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a

temporary restraining order. They allege that at the time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAAapplications had already been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares, 3864 of whichapplications are by fully foreign-owned corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and atleast one by a fully foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.39

Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction:

I

x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic ActNo. 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that it allows fully foreign owned corporations toexplore, develop, utilize and exploit mineral resources in a manner contrary to Section 2, paragraph

4, Article XII of the Constitution;

II

x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic ActNo. 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that it allows the taking of private property without thedetermination of public use and for just compensation;

III

x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic ActNo. 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that it violates Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution;

IV

x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic ActNo. 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that it allows enjoyment by foreign citizens as well asfully foreign owned corporations of the nation's marine wealth contrary to Section 2, paragraph 2 of

Article XII of the Constitution;

V

x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic ActNo. 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that it allows priority to foreign and fully foreign owned

corporations in the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources contrary to ArticleXII of the Constitution;

VI

x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic ActNo. 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that it allows the inequitable sharing of wealth contraryto Sections [sic] 1, paragraph 1, and Section 2, paragraph 4[,] [Article XII] of the Constitution;


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VII

x x x in recommending approval of and implementing the Financial and Technical AssistanceAgreement between the President of the Republic of the Philippines and Western MiningCorporation Philippines Inc. because the same is illegal and unconstitutional.40

They pray that the Court issue an order:

(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial orTechnical Assistance Agreements;

(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 asunconstitutional and null and void;

(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Actcontained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similaradministrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and

(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to WesternMining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.41

Impleaded as public respondents are Ruben Torres, the then Executive Secretary, Victor O. Ramos,the then DENR Secretary, and Horacio Ramos, Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau ofthe DENR. Also impleaded is private respondent WMCP, which entered into the assailed FTAA withthe Philippine Government. WMCP is owned by WMC Resources International Pty., Ltd. (WMC), "awholly owned subsidiary of Western Mining Corporation Holdings Limited, a publicly listed major

Australian mining and exploration company."42By WMCP's information, "it is a 100% ownedsubsidiary of WMC LIMITED."43

Respondents, aside from meeting petitioners' contentions, argue that the requisites for judicial

inquiry have not been met and that the petition does not comply with the criteria for prohibition andmandamus. Additionally, respondent WMCP argues that there has been a violation of the rule onhierarchy of courts.

After petitioners filed their reply, this Court granted due course to the petition. The parties have sincefiled their respective memoranda.

WMCP subsequently filed a Manifestation dated September 25, 2002 alleging that on January 23,2001, WMC sold all its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (Sagittarius), a corporationorganized under Philippine laws.44WMCP was subsequently renamed "Tampakan MineralResources Corporation."45WMCP claims that at least 60% of the equity of Sagittarius is owned byFilipinos and/or Filipino-owned corporations while about 40% is owned by Indophil Resources NL, an

Australian company.46It further claims that by such sale and transfer of shares, "WMCP has ceasedto be connected in any way with WMC."47

By virtue of such sale and transfer, the DENR Secretary, by Order of December 18, 2001,48approved the transfer and registration of the subject FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius. Said Order,however, was appealed by Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. (Lepanto) to the Office of the Presidentwhich upheld it by Decision of July 23, 2002.49Its motion for reconsideration having been denied bythe Office of the President by Resolution of November 12, 2002,50Lepanto filed a petition forreview51before the Court of Appeals. Incidentally, two other petitions for review related to the


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approval of the transfer and registration of the FTAA to Sagittarius were recently resolved by thisCourt.52

It bears stressing that this case has not been rendered moot either by the transfer and registration ofthe FTAA to a Filipino-owned corporation or by the non-issuance of a temporary restraining order ora preliminary injunction to stay the above-said July 23, 2002 decision of the Office of the President. 53

The validity of the transfer remains in dispute and awaits final judicial determination. This assumes,of course, that such transfer cures the FTAA's alleged unconstitutionality, on which question

judgment is reserved.

WMCP also points out that the original claimowners of the major mineralized areas included in theWMCP FTAA, namely, Sagittarius, Tampakan Mining Corporation, and Southcot Mining Corporation,are all Filipino-owned corporations,54each of which was a holder of an approved Mineral ProductionSharing Agreement awarded in 1994, albeit their respective mineral claims were subsumed in theWMCP FTAA;55and that these three companies are the same companies that consolidated theirinterests in Sagittarius to whom WMC sold its 100% equity in WMCP.56WMCP concludes that in theevent that the FTAA is invalidated, the MPSAs of the three corporations would be revived and themineral claims would revert to their original claimants.57

These circumstances, while informative, are hardly significant in the resolution of this case, itinvolving the validity of the FTAA, not the possible consequences of its invalidation.

Of the above-enumerated seven grounds cited by petitioners, as will be shown later, only the firstand the last need be delved into; in the latter, the discussion shall dwell only insofar as it questionsthe effectivity of E. O. No. 279 by virtue of which order the questioned FTAA was forged.

I

Before going into the substantive issues, the procedural questions posed by respondents shall firstbe tackled.

REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

When an issue of constitutionality is raised, this Court can exercise its power of judicial review only ifthe following requisites are present:

(1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case;

(2) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;

(3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and

(4) The constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.58

Respondents claim that the first three requisites are not present.

Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that "(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts ofjustice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."The power of judicial review, therefore, is limited to the determination of actual cases andcontroversies.59


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An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe fordetermination, not conjectural or anticipatory,60lest the decision of the court would amount to anadvisory opinion.61The power does not extend to hypothetical questions62since any attempt atabstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusionsunrelated to actualities.63

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the casesuch that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act thatis being challenged,64alleging more than a generalized grievance.65The gist of the question ofstanding is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as toassure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the courtdepends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."66Unless a person is injuriously affectedin any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.67

Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among them are La Bugal B'laan Tribal Association,Inc., a farmers and indigenous people's cooperative organized under Philippine laws representing acommunity actually affected by the mining activities of WMCP, members of said cooperative,68aswell as other residents of areas also affected by the mining activities of WMCP.69These petitionershave standing to raise the constitutionality of the questioned FTAA as they allege a personal andsubstantial injury. They claim that they would suffer "irremediable displacement"70as a result of theimplementation of the FTAA allowing WMCP to conduct mining activities in their area of residence.They thus meet the appropriate case requirement as they assert an interest adverse to that ofrespondents who, on the other hand, insist on the FTAA's validity.

In view of the alleged impending injury, petitioners also have standing to assail the validity of E.O.No. 279, by authority of which the FTAA was executed.

Public respondents maintain that petitioners, being strangers to the FTAA, cannot sue either or bothcontracting parties to annul it.71In other words, they contend that petitioners are not real parties ininterest in an action for the annulment of contract.

Public respondents' contention fails. The present action is not merely one for annulment of contractbut for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioners allege that public respondents acted without or inexcess of jurisdiction in implementing the FTAA, which they submit is unconstitutional. As the caseinvolves constitutional questions, this Court is not concerned with whether petitioners are real partiesin interest, but with whether they have legal standing. As held in Kilosbayan v. Morato:72

x x x. "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policyunderpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the realparty in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towardsensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partialconsideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the

judiciary in certain areas.["] (FRIEDENTHAL, KANE AND MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 328 [1985])

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not byparties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but byconcerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence, the questionin standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of thecontroversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues uponwhich the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." (Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L.Ed.2d 633 [1962].)


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As earlier stated, petitioners meet this requirement.

The challenge against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40 likewise fulfills therequisites of justiciability. Although these laws were not in force when the subject FTAA was enteredinto, the question as to their validity is ripe for adjudication.

The WMCP FTAA provides:

14.3 Future Legislation

Any term and condition more favourable to Financial &Technical Assistance Agreement contractorsresulting from repeal or amendment of any existing law or regulation or from the enactment of a law,regulation or administrative order shall be considered a part of this Agreement.

It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40 contain provisions that are more favorable toWMCP, hence, these laws, to the extent that they are favorable to WMCP, govern the FTAA.

In addition, R.A. No. 7942 explicitly makes certain provisions apply to pre-existing agreements.

SEC. 112. Non-impairment of Existing Mining/Quarrying Rights.x x x That the provisions ofChapter XIV on government share in mineral production-sharing agreement and of Chapter XVI onincentives of this Act shall immediately govern and apply to a mining lessee or contractor unless themining lessee or contractor indicates his intention to the secretary, in writing, not to avail of saidprovisions x x x Provided, finally, That such leases, production-sharing agreements, financial ortechnical assistance agreements shall comply with the applicable provisions of this Act and itsimplementing rules and regulations.

As there is no suggestion that WMCP has indicated its intention not to avail of the provisions ofChapter XVI of R.A. No. 7942, it can safely be presumed that they apply to the WMCP FTAA.

Misconstruing the application of the third requisite for judicial review that the exercise of the reviewis pleaded at the earliest opportunityWMCP points out that the petition was filed only almost twoyears after the execution of the FTAA, hence, not raised at the earliest opportunity.

The third requisite should not be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality must be raisedimmediately after the execution of the state action complained of. That the question ofconstitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raisedlater.73A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional, would lapse intoconstitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the same.

PROPRIETY OF PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

Before the effectivity in July 1997 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 65 read:

SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition.When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, orperson, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verifiedpetition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be renderedcommanding the defendant to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specifiedtherein.


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Prohibition is a preventive remedy.74It seeks a judgment ordering the defendant to desist fromcontinuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. 75

The petition for prohibition at bar is thus an appropriate remedy. While the execution of the contractitself may be fait accompli, its implementation is not. Public respondents, in behalf of theGovernment, have obligations to fulfill under said contract. Petitioners seek to prevent them from

fulfilling such obligations on the theory that the contract is unconstitutional and, therefore, void.

The propriety of a petition for prohibition being upheld, discussion of the propriety of the mandamusaspect of the petition is rendered unnecessary.

HIERARCHY OF COURTS

The contention that the filing of this petition violated the rule on hierarchy of courts does not likewiselie. The rule has been explained thus:

Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that should initially passupon the issues of a case. That way, as a particular case goes through the hierarchy of courts, it is

shorn of all but the important legal issues or those of first impression, which are the proper subject ofattention of the appellate court. This is a procedural rule borne of experience and adopted toimprove the administration of justice.

This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts. Although this Courthas concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue writs ofcertiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrencedoes not give a party unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The resort to this Court's primary

jurisdiction to issue said writs shall be allowed only where the redress desired cannot be obtained inthe appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify such invocation.We held in People v. Cuaresma that:

A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance ofextraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court'soriginal jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only where there are special and importantreasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is apolicy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are betterdevoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of theCourt's docket x x x.76[Emphasis supplied.]

The repercussions of the issues in this case on the Philippine mining industry, if not the nationaleconomy, as well as the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and compelling circumstances to

justify resort to this Court in the first instance.

In all events, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy therequirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. 77Whenthe issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, this Court may brush asidetechnicalities of procedure.78

II


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Petitioners contend that E.

cases for separation of power

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