case study universal form clamp co. explosion-bellwood, il
TRANSCRIPT
Szu-ying Huang
Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center
2010.08.03 Steering Committee Meeting
CASE STUDY Universal Form Clamp Co. Explosion-
Bellwood, IL, 2006
Outline
Background
Incident Description
Investigation
Lessons Learned and Conclusion
Reference
Acknowledgement
2
Background--Company Profile
--Product of the incident
3
Background
4
Company Profile
Universal Form Clamp Co. /Don De Cristo union
Now: Universal Building Product Inc.
450 employees at 11 locations
Manufacturer of steel concrete construction products
Chemical mixing area started from 2002-2003
Bellwood was the only facility mixing and heating flammable liquids.
Background
5
Chemical Mixing Product
“Super Clean and Tilt”
A solvent based, VOC compliant formula composed of
chemically reactive non-membrane forming materials that
functions as a bond breaker for tilt-up construction
It yields a panel surface ready to receive paint or other
treatments.
Step 2 of Universal's HTS Slab Therapy System.
moisture retention supply
Chemical neutral
bondbreaker
binding with free lime & calcium
carbonate
Incident Description--Procedure of the incident
--Consequence
6
Incident Description
7
Vapor Spilling Started – 9:00
am, June 14,2006
Operation: mixing and heating
a flammable mixture of
heptanes and mineral spirits
(~2:1 ratio) in a 2,200-gallon
open top tank.
A “dense fog” was observed
accumulating on the floor
below the tank.
CSB incident report of mixing and heating flammable liquid in an open top tank,
UFC. 2006
Incident Description
8
CSB incident report of mixing and heating flammable liquid in an open top tank, UFC.
2006
Vapor Cloud Explosion
Vapor cloud* spread throughout the mixing area and workspaces, filling most of the spaces in 10 minutes.
The spill formed a significant region of vapor cloud, being ignited after ~14 minutes of developing.
Pressure created by explosion blew the doors open to an adjacent area. Also smoke, ashes, and fire continued to spread.
Consequence
9
One fatality
A contracted delivery driver passed worker who were evacuating from the
area. Explosion happened right after his entering and took his life.
Two injuries
A temporary worker in adjacent area was critically suffered from burns and
another employee suffered a injury in arms.
Bellwood Fire Department battled the fire confined to a bagged resin storage
area for about 3.5 hours.
Resulted in damage to structure and interrupted operation for one month.
CSB incident figure gallery of mixing and heating flammable liquid in an open top tank, UFC. 2006 10
Investigation--System design problems
--OSHA Review
11
System Failure and Physical Evidence
12
Mixing Tank Temperature Control and Measurement
consisted of a liquid-filled temperature-sensing bulb and a pneumatic control unit
regulated the tank temperature by opening and closing the tank heating coil steam valves
Failures
The temperature-sensing bulb and thermowell did not conform to the manufacturer specifications.
There was a restrictive bend in the liquid-filled capillary tube connecting the sensing bulb to the temperature controller. It may cause the controller to perform sluggishly or to malfunction.
Tank was not equipped with a temperature display or high temperature alarm, and there was no backup shutoff device.
13 CSB incident figure gallery of mixing and heating flammable liquid in an open top tank, UFC. 2006
CSB incident figure gallery of mixing and heating flammable liquid in an open top tank, UFC. 2006 14
System Failure and Physical Evidence
15
Ventilation System
The local exhaust system included two exhaust fans connected to a main
duct.
The area ventilation system included one supply and two exhaust fans
mounted at ceiling level.
Failures
Both exhaust fan drive belts were broken before the incident.
It was not designed to capture and remove a high volume of vapors from an
open top tank.
There were no floor level exhaust registers (floor sweeps) to remove heavy
vapors that accumulated on the floor.
System Failure and Physical Evidence
16
Elimination of Ignition Source
Hazardous (Classified) Locations (29 CFR 1910.307) standard covers
the requirements for electric equipment and wiring safety in locations
where flammables and combustibles are used.
Failures
The adjacent area where the vapor cloud migrated and likely ignited
since it is not built with 1910.307.
OSHA Reviews
17
Flammable and Combustible Liquids (29 CFR 1910.106)
Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (29
CFR 1910.119)
Emergency Action Plans (29 CFR 1910.38)
29 CFR 1910.119 Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous
Chemicals
1910 CFR 1910.120 Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency
Response
1910.157 Portable Fire Extinguishers
Afterwards -- Similar Incident
18
CAI/Arnel Inc. Confined Vapor Cloud Explosion
(Danver, MA, Nov.22 2006)
The CAI process also involved adding a solid resin to a solvent. This time
it is the mixture of heptane and alcohol.
The CAI tank was also not equipped with an automatic shutdown system
or over-temperature alarm, and the ventilation was not working the day
of the incident.
CAI incident also led to findings about flammable liquids storage
deficiencies from facts to standards.
Lessons Learned and Conclusions
19
Conclusions
20
UFC operated the mixing and heating of flammable liquids without
adequate safety controls.
During its permit application review, the Village of Bellwood did not
ensure such compliance, and did not require UFC to utilize a
registered design professional.
UFC had no emergency action plan, employees had not received any
emergency action training or conducted an evacuation drill, and the
facility was not equipped with an employee alarm system.
Lessons Learned
21
What can be done to avoid history repeating itself?
A design professional should manage the design and construction of a
facility that uses flammable liquids.
An experienced code reviewer should thoroughly review facility design
plans submitted to the Village.
Facilities handling flammable and combustible liquids should implement
an EAP and practice evacuation drills more frequently to keep
employees prepared.
Recommendation
22
2007-08-I-IL-R1
Amend 1910.106 Flammable and Combustible Liquids to require facilities that handle flammable and combustible liquids to implement the requirements of 1910.38 Emergency Action Plans.
2007-08-I-IL-R2
Amend 1910.38 Emergency Action Plans to require employers to conduct practice evacuation drills at least annually, but more frequently if necessary to ensure employees are prepared for emergencies.
NFPA 400 Hazardous Materials Code 2010
Permissible Storage and Use Locations; Emergency Planning, Fire Risk Control, and Chemical Hazard Requirements for Industrial Processes
Reference
23
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board - complete
incident investigation reports: Universal Form Clamp Co. (No.
2006-08-I-IL)
CAI, Inc. and ARNEL Co., Inc. (No.2007-03-I-MA)
Product Catalog: UFC “Super Clean Tilt”
Acknowledgement
24
Dr. Sam Mannan
Dr. Maria Molnarne
Dr. Xiaodan Gao
MKOPSC Members
25