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A Critical Look at Major Bus Improvements in Latin America and Asia: Case Study Metrobús, Corridor Insurgentes, México City, México

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CASE STUDY METROBÚS, CORRIDOR INSURGENTES, MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

DARIO HIDALGO PIERRE GRAFTIEAUX

SUMMARY

Metrobús, Corridor Insurgentes, is a BRT corridor with segregated bus lanes, enclosed stations with prepayment, large buses, electronic fare collection, advanced control systems and a distinctive image. The corridor is operated by a private company (CISA) 75% and a public company (RTP) 25%, under contracts negotiated directly with a new local entity (Metrobús). Metrobús initial corridor is a showcase project of the potential of low cost, fast implementation and environmentaly friendly transport solutions for México City. The corridor is 20 km long, has 2 terminals and 34 stations implemented from 2002 to 2005. It operates with 84 articulated buses serving 260,000 pax/day (April, 2006) and 8,000 passengers per hour per direction in the heaviest loaded section. Things done well • Planning and implementation took a very short time. • Project infrastructure costs were relatively low. • The objective of showing the potential of high capacity/better quality bus

operations was achieved. • Operations involve private operators formed out of existing concessionaries of

the corridor. This may help in transformation of the entrepreneurial capacity of these concessionaries, which now share revenues, risks and responsibilities in the corridor rather than compete with each other for riders.

• High performance: commercial speed of 19 km/hour; more than 3,000 pax/per bus per day; and 10 pax per km run. The service receives good ratings by the users.

Things that perhaps should have been done differently • The transit agency Metrobús was launched late in the process and was

initially underfinanced. • Implementation was schedule-driven and several details had to be adjusted

with the system under operation. Most problems were solved during the first weeks of operation, but chaotic start caused bad perception of the service for the population at large.

• Financial planning was too tight (little room for contingencies) and assumptions were on the non-conservative side. Key variables such as commercial speed, interest rates, cost per kilometer, management fees for fare collection, resulted different than expected causing operational deficit in


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the first year. Fare definition is contingent to political decision making and has not been adjusted according to final operational costs.

• A few infrastructure problems, such as the early destruction of the segregation devices, bad alignment of some stations, conflicting turning bays for general traffic, and interferences in Glorieta Insurgentes could have been avoided with better design and construction.

• Pavements were not initially re-built and were affected by heavy duty operations with large buses. Reconstruction of pavements was then initiated with the project under operation. .

• Fare collection implementation could have longer time-table to complete operational trials and stronger supervision to avoid functional problems exhibited during the first months of operation.

• Direct assignment of the bus operation contracts and fare collection administration resulted in higher costs than those obtained in competitive bidding processes elsewhere in Latin America.

• Fare definition remains a political decision, not the result of a technical analysis. It is advised to incorporate a commitment of the political authority to keep the system self sustainable. There is no fare integration with other services (regional buses to the State of México) and Metro.

• Bidding for design and implementation should have placed more emphasis on experience with Bus Rapid Transit implementation.

• Too short time for driver´s training caused initial scratches to buses. Critical positive enablers • Leadership of Secretary of Environment Claudia Sheinbaum, which

conformed of a planning and implementation team outside the existing institutions and championed the project through all the stages: from levering donations for project preparation, through convincing the Head of Government, and concluding the negotiation with existing operators timely.

• Pressure and timely technical assistance from environmental groups -NGOs, international development institutions, and the need to show results in sustainable transportation, helped the decision making process.

• Selection of a highly visible corridor with low technical and political requirements for initial implementation.

Critical barriers • Opposition from existing concessionaries which feared change. This barrier

was overcome by negotiating good conditions with all the concession holders and taking advantage of divisions in Ruta 2 syndicate.

• Schedule-driven implementation reduced the government’s bargaining capacity to negotiate a business model closer to market equilibrium.

• Low technical capacity and hands on experience of the implementation team and consultants. External help and technical oversight provided by the


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Sustainable Transport Center –CTS and EMBARQ, partially covered the gaps.

• Low target fare (USD 0.35) generated financial difficulties for the corridor to be self sustainable. This target fare proved insufficient to cover the system costs.

• Lack of institutional alignment toward project goals by agencies not directly involved in project planning required the intervention and leadership of the Head of Government.


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CITY CONTEXT

The Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA) is one of the largest urban agglomerations in the world. It covers over 1,500 square kilometers and is home for 18 million people, roughly 18% of the national population. The MCMA comprises the Federal District (DF), with 7 million inhabitants and the surrounding State of Mexico (EM), with 11 million inhabitants (CTS, 2005). The Federal District elects its own authorities for a 6 year term, with a very high degree of autonomy and a sizeable budget. Mexico City has been regarded as one of the most polluted cities in the world. Since the late 1980s, managing air quality in the region has been a top priority for local governments and the focus of much international interest and investment. Since then, trends in criteria pollutants decreased drastically due to several policies; nevertheless by 1999 Ozone and Particulate Mater were above standards (Molina and Molina, 2004). Improvement of transport is one important component of the Mexico Air Quality Program; strategies in this sector include organization of public transport at a metropolitan level, investment in capacity improvements and land use planning and control (Molina and Molina, 2004). Existing transport conditions are regarded as poor. Average daily time required for personal travel is estimated at 2.5 hours, costing USD 12 billion a year (National Institute of Ecology INE, reported by Centro de Transporte Sustentable CTS, 2005). The most serious challenge is motorization, which is increasing at around 6% annually (the current 3 million private automobiles are expected to double by 2020; INE reported by CTS, 2005). To cope with this challenge, enhancement of public transport systems is essential. Nevertheless, transport organization is weak, with only 15% of total trips being transported by a 200 km Metro Network and public transport companies (RTP, Transportes Eléctricos)1. Most transport (64%) is provided privately under a dispersed scheme (“one-man-one-bus” or “hombre-camión”). Permits and concessions granted to private operators are grouped in routes or syndicates, but each vehicle is run as an isolated economic unit. Low barriers to the introduction of new units, economic incentives for the syndicates to increase the bus fleet, and marginal costs of operations below user fares, have resulted in oversupply of units and very poor transport conditions (low speeds, low maintenance, risky driving practices, and poor labor conditions). The extensive use of low quality diesel buses and minibuses in public transport is also critical for air quality; these vehicles generate 70% of particulate air pollution in the metro area. Sixty percent of these vehicles are 10 years old or older, lack emissions control systems, and receive little to no maintenance (Schipper, 2006).

1 According to the Secretariat of Transport and Roads, modal split in México City in 2000 was 14% Metro, 1% Trolebus and Light Rail, 9% buses, 55% Minubuses, 5% Taxis and 16% Private Car (V.M Islas, S. Hernández and S. Blancas, 2004).


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The transport budget of the Federal Distirict for year 2006 is MXP 11.8 billion2 (USD 1.1 billion) is mostly used in road construction and maintenance and support to the publicly owned transport companies. Publicly owned transport companies include Metro –heavy rail; Transportes Eléctricos –trolley buses and light rail; Red de Transporte Público RTP –buses; and Metrobús –supervision of a high capacity bus corridor. The Federal District government still owns and operates road based transport companies to be able to complement other transport networks (Metro, Transportes Eléctricos), provide low cost services for transit users and free transport for the elderly, and balance transit provision. RTP was created in 2000 to replace Ruta 10, a publicly owned company that went bankrup due to high personnel and maintenance costs (Interviews, 2006). In the last 6 years there has been some expansion of the road network capacity (Segundo Piso Periférico), and important replacements of the metro rail cars and RTP buses. One important and innovative element has been the introduction of a 20 km BRT corridor in the emblematic Avenida Insurgentes.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

Metrobús - Corridor Insurgentes, started operations 19 June 2005. The corridor exhibits high-end BRT characteristics: 19.5 km longitudinally segregated median busway; 84 large capacity Euro III articulated buses; 34 level access stations with prepayment and two terminals; high frequency service, centralized control and a distinctive image (CTS, 2005). The corridor handles 260,000 pax/weekday (April, 2006), with high performance standards: 1.5 minutes peak hour interval, 19 km/h; 10 passengers per kilometer run; 3,095 passengers per bus per day; up to 8,000 pax/hour/direction in the heaviest loaded section (Data from interviews to Metrobús, RTP, CISA). Public acceptance of the operation is above 80%, with the main complaint being high occupation of the buses (Metrobús, 2006). Operations are mixed, with both a public company (RTP) and a private operator (CISA) owning and running the 84 articulated buses (20 RTP, 64 CISA); a private fare collector and trust fund manager (IMBURSA); and a public company for planning, supervision and control (Metrobús). The cost of the infrastructure (stations, terminals, segregation, improvement of pavements at selected sites) was USD 30 million, buses USD 21 million, and fare collection USD 3 million (Metrobús, 2006). Main milestons of project advancement are summarized as follows (CTS, 2005): 2 Transport and Urbanization Ecological Infrastructure, MXP 2.5 billion, Urban Transport Regulation MXP 9.3 billion, see www.finanzas.df.gob.mx


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• Early planning (to secure grants for project preparation) started in 2000. • Detailed transport and infrastructure planning was initiated in 2002. • Commitment of the head of government (Andrés Manuel López Obrador)

was announced August 2, 2004. • Negotiations with existing concessionaries progressed through 2004 and

2005. • Construction was initiated in December 2004. • Operations initiated 19 June 2005 (two weeks free of charge) • Paper-based fare collection system was introduced July 11th, 2005 • Electronic fare cards were introduced 21 July 2005 (both paper and

electronic used concurrently for 3 months, after which only electronic farecards were accepted)

Details of the system are presented in the Metrobús fact sheet. There are plans to extend the system to 9 additional corridors with two of them currently being under detailed design.

ASSESSMENT

Planning The project started as an environment (clean air) initiative and thus was led by the Secretary of Environment of the Federal District Government (Interviews, 2006). Improvements to public transport were central to the recommendations of the “Air Quality Improvement Program Proaire 1995-2000” and its follow up “Proaire 2002-1010”, prepared by multiple institutions (national and international) under the leadership of Doctor Mario Molina -Chemistry Nobel Prize (CTS, 2005). Funding planning and implementation of the transport projects was difficult. The Secretary of Environment expended a great deal of effort in securing international grants for studies, site visits, international expert visits and the formation of a local planning team (Interviews, 2006). Applications were successful with the Global Environment Fund, through the World Bank; Japan Human Resources Development Program; Word Resources Institute – Shell Foundation and Hewlett Foundation. Local counterpart funding was provided by the Federal District and the State of México. This took from the end of 2000 to mid 2002. The idea of improved bus services with cleaner technologies and high performance was part of the GEF (World Bank) project “Introduction of Environmentally Friendly Measures in the Transport Sector in the Mexico Valley Metropolitan Zone 2002” (CTS, 2005). This facility helped with initial transport and financial studies which were supervised by the Secretary of Environment, with the participation of other agencies. It was also instrumental in the creation of an interdisciplinary group in charge of project preparation (Interviews, 2006).


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External technical assistance was provided by the “Centro de Transporte Sustentable (CTS)” (Sustainable Transport Center), a project of the “Centro Interdisciplinario de Biodiversidad y Ambiente” (Interdisciplinary Center for Biodiversity and Enviroment, and independent NGO). CTS was created in May 2002 under a Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Mexico DF, EMBARQ and CEIBA. Funding was provided by the US Based NGO Word Resources Institute (WRI) through Embarq - its branch for sustainable transport and environment (CTS, 2006), and, later on, by the Hewlett Foundation. Having the technical assistant of an independent NGO was important to bring international expertise into the project to support the young and relatively inexperienced planning and implantation team. A complex structure with the participation of several government agencies in the Federal District and the State of Mexico was necessary for decision making. According to the description of the decision process by CTS (2005), initial agreements were first achieved for the implementation of high capacity corridors in Coacalco-Ciudad Azteca (State of Mexico) and Tláhuac-Taxqueña (DF). The State of Mexico then decided to postpone its project due to difficulties to fund capital investments and to obtain endorsement from the Federal Government to increase its debt. On the other side, the Federal District Government made a joint assessment through the Secretaries of Environment, Urban Development and Transport of the Federal District, and found that the implementation of the Tláhuac-Taxqueña corridor could cause human settlements in protected areas as a result of increased accessibility. This corridor was then postponed and there was a need to select a different corridor. The combination of factors that determined the final selection of the Insurgentes BRT Corridor as the first BRT corridor in Mexico relative to the other potential alternative corridors were: i) its less perceived difficulty to negotiate with private transit operators; ii) its higher visibility; iii) its lower budget requirements; iv) its justifiable passenger demand; and, v) its facility of physical implementation3. Planning for the corridor continued under the “Project Implementation Unit” under the Secretary of Environment. A small group of 15 interdisciplinary professionals prepared terms of reference for technical studies (transport, physical engineering, traffic) and performed internal financial analysis (Interviews, 2006). External help, such as technical advice and invitation of experts, was provided by CTS. Planning during the 2002-2004 period suffered from several drawbacks, mainly resulting from (Interviews, 2006):

3 Source: Ramón Muñoz-Raskin, included in an internal report for WRI-Embarq (2005).


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• Lack of technical knowledge or experience of project participants and consultants on specific issues regarding legal aspects, financial issues, transport engineering and bus operations (mitigated through technical visits to existing bus systems and invitation to experienced professionals).

• Lack of funding for detailed engineering and financial analysis (mitigated through the commitment of international donors and commitment of the head of Government in 2004).

• Low quality of existing data for transport planning (origin-destination matrices were outdated and had difficulties in accounting for short length trips due to zone sizes; this was mitigated through extensive data collection on existing operations).

• Interference from non project participants within the government (mitigated with the commitment of the head of Government). Existing agencies are usually reluctant to change.

• Difficulties with the leaders of the existing concessionaires in the corridor, which opposed project implementation (mitigated through a well crafted negotiation process that assured their participation).

• Delayed decision making as no experience with the high capacity bus operations, advanced fare collection systems and infrastructure was locally available (mitigated through the external support of international agencies).

• Discussions with international donors on terms of reference, short lists of consultants and invitation of experts (mitigated through direct and permanent communications).

Once the commitment of the head of government was obtained the project accelerated its pace and some aspects were not thoroughly assessed, including infrastructure details (geometric alignment at some stations and critical points; plastic dividers for segregation of the busway from the general traffic); pavement rehabilitation needs); fare collection requirements (technical characteristics, implementation protocols, performance evaluation and penalties for non-compliance); enhancing the managing abilities of the private operator; risks in financial self-sustainability. Nevertheless, the additional time needed for these detailed studies and actions in these and other aspects, would have create the risk of missing the window of opportunity for project implementation closing. Emphasis was placed on project implementation, and most of the aspects have been solved, or are being solved under operation. Finally, regarding planning, public participation was non-existent. Decisions were taken by public officials without public consultation and this helped in accelerating the process. Small efforts in public outreach came from external sources, for example through efforts by non profit organizations, to educate journalists, neighbors and pedestrians. According to A. Villegas (Interview, 2006), this was aimed to help improve the project for the users and to provide exposure of the environmental benefits for the community at large.


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Decision process One interesting aspect of this project is that it was not a priority for the head of government. Decision and commitment of the Head of Government Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador only came after many months of persuasion by Secretary of Environment Claudia Sheinbaum. The involvement of international organizations, the academia, some professional associations and local environmental groups helped in creating conditions for acceptance of the project at the highest level (Interviews, 2006). Pressure came in meetings, seminars and other events, but very especially through the media. One vocal supporter of the project was Council Member Marta Delgado, president of an environmental coalition, which at the same time was very critical of the construction of the Ring Road “Second Floor”4. Champion for the project was Dr. Claudia Sheimbaum. She understood the importance of transport in the clean air agenda, with transversal effects in transport and urban quality. She also recognized the opportunity to show results in the short term and at relatively low cost. She also realized that the main difficulty was not technical but political: getting all the existing concessionaries of the corridor on board. The main decisions in the process were: which corridor, with which operators, how the system would be planned and controlled, technical elements (infrastructure, buses, operations), financial aspects (fare and remuneration to the operators), and fare collection system (technology, implementation). These decisions are commented on below. Corridor selection The selection of the corridor Insurgentes came after alternatives analysis and rejection of the initially selected corridor Tláhuac-Taxqueña. Insurgentes is an emblematic, very visible, mixed activity road, crossing north to south the entire city, including the Central Business District. As indicated in the previous section, implementation in this corridor was perceived easier than in other corridors both technically and politically. It exhibits different characteristics along its length, with non grade intersections over 7 km in the north and grade intersections there after. The cross section is over 30 m in the narrowest segment. Operators The incumbent operators were assigned the operation. Operators of the corridor were RTP (public), and Ruta 2 (a group of individual concessionaires, with 200 concessions in the corridor under the one-man-one-bus or “hombre-camión” structure). Replacing existing concessionaries, or calling a bidding process was 4 The “Second Floor” is an elevated expressway built on the alignment of the city’s ring road.


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evaluated, but rejected for legal and political reasons. The existing concessions are regarded as patrimonial rights according to the Mexican Law, and suits were very likely if the government recalled these concessions even with compensation (Interviews, 2006). Additionally, public protests by operators were not acceptable. This made the implementation of the corridor easier as RTP is under the local government structure, and Ruta 2 is a single syndicate. Nevertheless, the government decided to make profound changes in the business structure by replacing the dispersed concessions by one single concession for the whole fleet. One fortunate aspect was the openness of some of the concessionaries to improve their operations and turn into a company. Despite the initial rejection of the proposed change, under the leadership of Jesús Padilla, the 200 concessionaries were eventually convinced to create a private company to operate the Corridor (CISA) and to negotiate terms of a new joint concession. CISA representatives report that internal discussions were even more difficult than the conversations with the government (Interviews, 2006). They reported holding 46 assemblies within a year. Currently the structure of CISA is closer to a cooperative, but there is an opportunity and a desire to become a company with a long term vision (Interviews, 2006). Planning, control and supervision System planning, control and supervision were assigned to a new autonomous agency created under the Secretary of Transport and Mobility. Metrobús was created in March 16th, 2006 and then mainly staffed with members of the implementation team and professionals from RTP. Control is centralized, using automatic vehicle location. Operational planning is performed with advanced tools. The operation of the corridor is simple with only two circuits (one long 40 km circuit and one short 20 km circuit in the northern section). There seems to be little interest for experimentation with flexible operations to increase capacity and level of service without necessarily increasing the bus fleet (Interviews, 2006). Technical aspects were discussed thoughtfully: type of busway, stations, buses; level of demand, required supply; technical details of the busway; pavement structure, and physical design of stations and terminals. The retained consultants and the implementation team were, however, not very experienced in high capacity bus operations (Interviews, 2006). Decision making was eased with the participation of internationally experienced professionals that provided technical advice (from Brazil and Colombia). Some details still need improvement (see following sections), but the key elements are in place to provide high capacity operations. Financial Aspects


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Financial aspects were more difficult than technical details. The decision was to operate at the existing fare for buses (flat fare MXP 3.5, equivalent to USD 0.35). This relatively low fare was difficult to achieve, and non conservative estimations were applied to some design elements: for example, a commercial speed of 23 Km/h was set to define fleet size -even though it is possible to achieve such speed level, the large number of intersections make it difficult as many of them become blocked even with the permanent presence of policemen (actual speed has been under 20 Km/h). The bus costs and interest rates were also under-estimated, as were the fare collection system costs. The little room left for contingencies was surpassed and the first year had an operational deficit. One possible solution is to raise the fare to at least MXP 4.5 (USD 0.42), however the fare is set by the political authority and 2006 is an elections year. The cost of operations and maintenance was calculated with the best available local costs provided by RTP, which themselves probably provide opportunities for improvement. The remuneration to operators is fixed per kilometer run. It was negotiated at MXP 24.90/km (USD 2.3/km). The fixed payment per kilometer is likely to be higher than efficient cost levels (comparative competitive bidding is in the range of USD1.5 -2.0/Km in Colombia and Brazil). Implementation approach Mexico chose to implement a phased approach with Metrobús Insurgentes being a demonstrative showcase project. The vision was to prove a new way of expanding public transport capacity, with large transport and environmental benefits at a relatively low cost. Physical changes in the corridor are minor: segregation of the median lane with small dividers and construction of light structures for the stations and terminals. There is only one elevated ramp to access Terminal Indios Verdes, but no other mayor road interventions. There was no need for land acquisition (only one plot for bus parking near the south terminal). No major institutional or legal changes were required. The creation of Metrobús (in March, 2005) is important, as the public administrator of the corridor and its expected expansions. Metrobús is in charge of planning, control and supervision, as well as coordination with other agencies. The project was implemented outside the existing institutional structure and, probably, it is one of the success factors, as the implementation team was focused on the project achievement and not concerned with the day to day traditional dealings of the existing agencies. Operations are mixed: public and private. This combination has been interesting as it both provides yardstick competition5 and makes use of the experience in large scale public transport provision that resides in the public company.

5 Performance indicators, such as the number of drivers per vehicle; number of kilometers per bus per day, compliance with planned schedules, number of breakdowns per kilometer, and so on, can be compared between the operators to improve performance.


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Implementation The implementation was fast once the commitment of the Head of Government was public. Three processes were required for project implementation: construction of stations, terminals and segregation of the median lanes; negotiation of the conditions with the existing concessionaries; and implementation of the fare collection system and its operations. The construction of the infrastructure was contracted through FIMEVIC (“Fideicomiso para el Mejoramiento de las Vías de Comunicación del Distrito Federal”) a special purpose trust fund created in 2001 to build and develop the second floor of the ring road (“Segundo Piso Anillo Periférico”) and, afterwards, in charged of several other civil works projects (FIMEVIC, 2006). The construction projects included reviews of preliminary designs. The project was divided into different units and a total of 10 contracts (supervision and civil works) initiated in October and November 2004 (bidding processes, Metrobús, 2006). Another 5 mitigation contracts (rehabilitation of a monument at Indios Verdes and restitution of trees) were initiated in may 2005 (FIMEVIC, 2006). Negotiation with existing concessionaries in the corridor was carried out by the implementation team headed by Secretary Sheimbaum. Internal politics in Ruta 2 helped the process. The nominated leader of the 2,500 concessionaries of Ruta 2 syndicate was not trusted enough by the group operating Insurgentes. This group created a commission that started working with the Secretary of the Environment in May 2004. The key to success of the process success was the confidence and openness of Secretary Sheimbaum. The first phase of interaction was informative, and then all the terms of the new agreement were discussed over a period of 9 months. The main issue of the negotiations was the net income of the concessionaries. An agreement was achieved close to system opening (Interviews, 2006). It is important to indicate that the launching date was announced by the Head of Government without having finalized the negotiations with the operators, giving more bargainaning power to the incumbent operators6. The implementation of the fare collection system included the acquisition of fare collection equipment (directly by Metrobús) and the selection of the fare collection operator. The equipment was purchased to Ascom, and included turnstiles with fare validation and ticket vending machines. Inbursa, a local bank, was selected in January 2005 as fare collection operator, in charged of providing fare cards, collecting the money and maintaining fare collection equipment. Contract with the fare collection manager was negotiated close to system implementation. To complete the implementation picture it is important to mention that operation was free of charge the first two weeks and the circulation of other buses or 6 Source: Ramón Muñoz-Raskin, personal communication 2007.


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minibuses in the corridor was banned. The combination of effects caused several problems: congestion, delays, frustration, initial political disruption, fare evasion, accidents. Most of the problems were solved during the first weeks of operation. The implementation problems are divided into infrastructure, operations, fare collection, and user education issues. Infrastructure Stations were completed to around 80% at inauguration (ceilings and signs missing). The alignment of some of them (e.g. Glorieta Insurgentes) was incorrect and caused scratches on buses. Three pedestrian bridges were incomplete; there was no other access to the stations (Potrero, Euzkaro, 18 de Marzo). Some pedestrian crossings were not properly signalized. All these elements were completed within 1 month after commissioning (Interviews, 2006). Operations Training of the drivers was incomplete at system opening. Alignment of the buses with the stations was poor at the beginning and approach speeds very low (causing increased cycle time and bunching). Operational tables were not prepared for the first days due to lack of confidence in the demand figures. Actual commercial speed was far from expected; this caused large voids (waiting times). Driver training and bus programming was gradually solved over the first weeks of operation. RTP (public operator) was instrumental in helping CISA (private operator) and Metrobús (public oversight), being an experienced operator. Fare Collection The bank in charge of fare collection was not experienced in mass transit operations and had to adapt and learn under actual operation. Some stations lacked turnstiles when commercial operation started. Electronic fare collection was not ready at system commissioning (June, 2006), and operations started with paper based fare collection. Electronic fare collection was gradually introduced starting end of July, 2006, with mixed operation. Full electronic fare collection started in October, 2006. Problems with the fare collection equipment (failures, coin deposit full), caused some users to receive free access. User education Even though there were some educational campaigns along the corridor for potential users, change was difficult for most of them. Many users were not aware that minibuses and normal buses were removed from the corridor, and waited for them unsuccessfully. Many were not aware of the new system characteristics: the need to walk to stations, wait inside stations, and use heavily occupied buses. Many others just used the new system as a novelty, increasing


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initial congestion. Initial implementation was chaotic: long waiting times, low speeds, incomplete infrastructure, and lack of information. This caused user frustration and a bad image to be portrayed in the media. The local authorities mitigated problems with the assignment of guides coming from several agencies to provide information to the system users and help with the organization of people in stations and terminals. Overall, most implementation problems were the result of premature commissioning and were solved in the first weeks of operation. Issues during Operation In June 2006 the corridor completed the first year of operation. Expected demand has been surpassed by 4% and user satisfaction with the system performance is above 80% (Interviews, 2006). The corridor is operating well, with high occupation and performance (10 passengers per kilometer). Nevertheless, there are some complaints about the high occupation of vehicles and there is a gap between costs and revenues, currently filled by RTP7. There are several issues that have been improved over the first months and others that deserve attention. Issues during operations are divided into institutional, financial, infrastructure, bus operations, fare collection and user friendliness: Institutional Issues The Mexico City arrangement with mixed operators (public, private) and public oversight is very challenging, bringing opportunities and risks. The participation of a large public company with operational “know-how” has been helpful, as it has helped the newly created CISA with training and a point of comparison (Interviews, 2006). It has also provided operational experience to Metrobús, with key staff coming from RTP. Nevertheless, being of distinct type may cause differential treatment between the two operators. Moreover, both companies (RTP and Metrobús) are part of the government structure of the Federal District and both hierarchically depend of the Head of Government. The private operator CISA is a mixed entity. It works as a cooperative, where the shareholders distribute revenues from the system on a month-by-month basis, and not yet as company, where shareholders distribute net revenues after a whole year. They are in the process of organizing themselves with the purpose of becoming operators of other corridors (some shareholders have concessions on other routes), or at least, provide advise and know-how to other operators.

7 The public operator RTP did not received payment of the kilometers served during the first months of 2006. As RTP operation in the corridor is only a fraction of the total service provided by this company, losses are currently carried without much problem. Moreover, RTP receives a subsidy by default, as its expenses are higher than its regular income, and losses are covered by the Federal District Government.


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Financial Issues As May 2006 the system has not broken even, despite surpassing expected demand. Operational and financial costs are higher than anticipated and the user fare has not been adjusted. Bus payment is fixed at MXP 24.90/Km (USD 2.31/Km), resulting from the direct negotiation of the payment between CISA and the Implementation Team. Fare collection administration (without payment of turnstiles and vending machines that were purchased directly by Metrobús) was negotiated at 8% of total income. The interest rate negotiated with the bank for the loan for bus acqusition was 14%. All these figures are higher than anticipated, bringing the system into deficit, since the fare was fixed at MXP 3.5/trip (USD 0.32/trip). As a result, as of April 2006, there were outstanding payments for the public operator RTP, and Metrobús was working with transfers from the central government. The deficit could be easily solved with a fare increase, however, this is a political decision and one that is very sensitive in an election year. Additionally, the incentives set up in the existing contracts may be perverse. The contract with the private operator CISA states that the fixed payment per kilometer can be revised yearly. As a result, Metrobús could be under permanent pressure to change remuneration. This condition, however, has not changed the usual process of fare increases being negotiated with the political authority. Additionally, a flat fare per kilometer, regardless of system demand, might result in a pressure to increase kilometers (non-peak) and further fare increments. On the other hand, payment to the public operator RTP could be higher than required as RTP buses are paid with public funds. This can generate an incentive for inefficient operations on this side. Nevertheless, operations on the corridor are only a very small part of RTP service (1.5% of the fleet), and RTP already receives a subsidy of around 40% of its total expenses. In the first semester of 2006 subsidy of RTP buses in the Insurgentes Corridor was 100%. Fare Collection No supervision of fare collection is included in the contract. Supervision is provided by city hired auxiliary police in each station (around 160 people). This person is in charge of controlling access (fare evasion, station security and granting access for handicapped and elderly –who receive free access to the system). There seems to be an opportunity of fare evasion as control at the barriers is weak, especially the door assigned to the handicapped. Electronic cards are charged to the user at around USD 1.00. This amount can be reimbursed to the client at his request. This charge seems not to affect the majority of users. More than 900,000 fare cards have been sold, for 260,000


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daily users, which is an indication that selling the farecards does not limit system usage. Infrastructure The achievements of the system are remarkable as compared with the assigned funding (USD 30 million, USD 1.5 million/Km, or USD 0.08/pax). There are some aspects to improve, but they are non-critical:

• Reinforcement of pavements, especially at stations. There are plans to assign budget to solve critical points and gradually replace the pavement structure to support large bus operations.

• Improvement of the segregation devices. The segregation element was too weak and exhibited early deterioration. A different plastic element (stronger) was designed and is being gradually installed.

• Alignment of stations. There are some critical points, such as Glorieta Insurgentes and Curva El Chopo that were improved, but still generate problems. Probably they need a replacement or changes in operations (e.g. closure of Glorieta for general traffic).

• Left turns. Most left turns are banned but there remain a few that generate conflict with the median busway.

Bus Operations Bus operations are currently smooth, with only two outstanding issues: high occupation and grade intersection management. High occupation in the peak hours is the mayor user and public image concern. System has reached 8,000 passengers per hour per direction, a figure close to capacity for a single lane, single platform bus system (required headways 1.2 minutes). To improve service there are some possibilities, for example:

• Introduce operational modifications, such as shorter cycles for a portion of the bus fleet. This will make operational planning more complex (currently it is extremely simple, with only two services). It will also require clear identification of returns and some civil works. Short cycles might increase transfers and need user education and clear signage.

• Incorporate additional buses, which is a limited option at existing fare level. There is also a limitation on platform occupation with headways close or below 1 minute.

• Operate trains of buses, which might require modification of stations (provision of an additional platform in each direction).

• Introduce larger buses (e.g. bi-articulated buses), might also require changes at stations (25 m platforms).


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• Provision of passing lanes for the introduction of express services, which might require strong political will, as general traffic lanes are already congested.

The management of grade intersections is a continuous challenge. Traffic police are provided at all intersections to facilitate bus operations (prevent blockage by crossing traffic). The existing administration of the city supports the project, but there is a risk that traffic police at intersections get assigned to other duties. Continuous support of the traffic police is required. Coordination with other transport initiatives Corredor Insurgentes is physically integrated with the Metro system at 5 stations. Terminals also provide access to bus routes coming from Estado de México at Indios Verdes (north) and southern communities at Doctor Galvez. Fare integration with Metro is difficult due to limitations of existing fare (USD 0.19/trip, 43% lower than Metrobús) and fare collection system (non yet compatible with the electronic cards at Metrobús). Fare integration with bus routes in the outskirts is limited due to disperse organization of these operators (one bus-one man, or “hombre-camión”), and the need to coordinate with other authorities (Estado México in the north). There is no provision for bike or automobile parking at stations. The demonstration objective of the system has been achieved. It is very likely that introduction of other corridors will follow promptly. The main limitation will be the ability to negotiate with the existing concessionaries in each corridor RECOMMENDED IMPROVEMENTS Most potential improvements have been already identified when outlining problems. They can be summarized as follows:

• Introduce a mechanism to adjust the fare without political interference, for example with an up-front commitment to externally subsidize the system if income does not cover its own expenses.

• Support the change process of the private operators to become an actual enterprise, through capacity building and incentives, such as direct technical assistance and training. Capacity building may include training courses for managers, operational personnel, drivers, mechanics and support staff, as well as the introduction of quality assurance procedures (e.g. ISO certification). Incentives may include performance based penalties and bonuses built in the contracts.

• Keep studying and implementing ways of improving service, not necessarily through bus acquisition. Buses are intrinsically flexible, and there are many ways to take advantage of such flexibility.


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• Invest in infrastructure and assign resources for timely maintenance. Attention to pavements and segregation devices appear to be the main priorities, as well as solution of some critical points (Glorieta Insurgentes).

• Provide fare integration with other services, for example feeder services in the north -which might require agreement with the authorities of Estado de México.

• Integrate bicycles and park-and-ride facilities. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study has been produced with the financial assistance of a grant from TRISP, a partnership between the UK Department for International Development and the World Bank, for learning and sharing of knowledge in the fields of transport and rural infrastructure services. Special thanks to Jules Flynn and Ramón Muñoz, that commented draft versions, and Adriana Ortegón that provided assistance. Thanks also to the officials, project operators and consultants that contributed time and information through interviews. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank or the people interviewed. INTERVIEWS IN MEXICO CITY • Ing. Guillermo Calderón Aguilera – Director General Metrobús, Gobierno del

Distrito Federal. (Abril 17, 2006) • Lic. Jesús Padilla Zenteno – Director General Corredor Insurgentes S.A. de

C.V. CISA. Empresa Operadora Privada (Abril 18, 2006) • Sr. Eduardo Oriz Soria – Secretario del Concejo de Administración CISA.

Empresa Operadora Privada (Abril 18, 2006) • Ing. Alejandro Villegas – Program Officer – México, The William and Flora

Hewlett Foundation, NGO (Abril 17, 2006) • Lic. Luz Helena González Chaves– Directora General Red de Transporte

Público del Distrito Federal – RTP, Gobierno del Distrito Federal, Empresa Operadora Pública (Abril 18, 2006)

• Lic. Edmundo Valencia – Director Desarrollo Tecnológico y Mantenimiento RTP, Gobierno del Distrito Federal, Empresa Operadora Pública (Abril 18, 2006)

• Claudia Lorena Galindo RTP, Gobierno del Distrito Federal, Empresa Operadora Pública (Abril 18, 2006)

• Lic. Carlos Oropeza Bailey – Gerente de Mantenimiento RTP, Gobierno del Distrito Federal, Empresa Operadora Pública (Abril 18, 2006)

• Ing. Adriana Lobo – Directora Centro de Transporte Sustentable CTS, Organización No Gubernamental (Abril 17, 2006)

• Ing. Diana V. Noriega Navarrete – Coordinadora de Tecnología Ambiental Centro de Transporte Sustentable CTS, Organización No Gubernamental (Abril 17, 2006)


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REFERENCES • www.metrobus.df.gob.mx. Metrobús official web site. Visited April 2006. • http://www.fimevic.df.gob.mx Fimevic official web site. Visited April 2006. • www.finanzas.df.gob.mex Secretary of Finance official web site. Visited May

2006. • Centro de Transporte Sustentable CTS (2005) “Metrobús; Bienvenidos A

Bordo” in “Movilidad Amable”. México September 2005. • Menckhoff Gerhard (2005), LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH BUS

RAPID TRANSIT. WORLD BANK. Annual meeting- Institute of Transportation Engineers.

• International Energy Agency IEA. (2002) BUS SYSTEMS FOR THE FUTURE. Achieving Sustainable Transport Worldwide

• Molina, Mario and Molina, Luisa (2004) “The México City Air Quality Case Study” Presentation in IUAPPA-IPURGAP “Reducing the Impact of Vehicles on Air and Environmental Quality in Cities”, México, January 22-23, 2004

• Shipper, Lee (2006) “Transforming Transportation: Cleaning Up the Buses in Mexico City”, presented in 2006 TRB Annual Meeting, Washington DC, January 2006.

• Islas Rivera, Víctor Manuel; Hernández García, Salvador y Blancas Ramírez Silvia. EL TRANSPORTE EN LA REGIÓN CENTRO DE MÉXICO VOL. 1, DIAGNÓSTICO GENERAL, Publicación Técnica No. 232, Instituto Mexicano del Transporte, Sanfandila, Qro, 2004 http://www.imt.mx/Espanol/Publicaciones/pubtec/pt232.pdf


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MEXICO D.F. Main Sources

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS The Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA) is one of the largest urban agglomerations in the world. Mexico City, the capital of Mexico, is one of the world’s most polluted cities. Since the late 1980s, managing air quality in the region has been a top priority for local governments and the focus of much international interest and investment.

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Population 22,800,000 million (Including Nezahualcóyotl, Ecatepec, Naucalpan) 1

Location 2240 meters above sea level 19

Area 5480 km2 27

Density 4160 persons per km2 GOVERNMENT Elected Head of Government for 5 year term, with a very high degree of independence from the National and other State Governemnts

ECONOMY 2005 country GNI/capita ($)

6,770

2

TRANSPORTATION DEMAND AND CHARACTERISTICS BEFORE BRT IMPLEMENTATION

CITY CONTEXT

Public Transit Trips

14% Metro, 1% Trolebus and Light Rail, 9% buses, 55% Minubuses, 5% Taxis and 16% Private Car


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METROBÚS (Corredor Insurgentes) M.S

GENERAL DESCRIPTION In 2005 the District government implemented the first BRT corridor, a median busway along a corridor which crosses the city from north to south. For the coming years the District government intends to implement additional BRT lines among the city and outside the city limits

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DESIGN FEATURES/ TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Running ways • Median busway along the 20 km “Insurgentes” corridor. The busway has physical segregation (except on the intersections).

3

Stations

• 2 terminals one at the beginning and one at the end of the trunk line in which passengers can transfer to other routes.

• 34 intermediate stations with an average separation distance of 550 m. • Central stations with platform and access on both sides to serve the buses coming

from both directions. • Station with high-level platforms ( height 1 meter above street level)

3 17

Operations/ Service plan

• Two routes A1 y A2 • Headways in peak hour: 2 min in the north and less than 3 min in the south.

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Trunk Line Vehicles

• High level platform • Doors on the left • 80 articulated Euro III vehicles with 4 doors. Capacity of 160 passenger (113 standing

and 47 seated) • Other 9 buses. 5 repaired and incorporated by RTP and 4 new acquired by CISA.

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Feeder services Connection provided in north and south terminals, but no physical or fare integration

ITS Automatic Vehicle Location and Telematics

Fare Collection • Fare collection off-board • Contact-less, rechargeable electronic card available in automatic machines located at

the stations.

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FARES

DESCRIPTION O

F THE PROJE

CT

• Flat fare for one trip of 0.32 USD 3


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METROBÚS (Corredor Insurgentes) M.S

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE Speed • Average commercial speed: 18-19 kph (expected 23 kph) 3

17 DEMAND

Total Riders • Expected 250.000 riders per day • An average of 260.000 pax/weekday (total annual not available), a 60% on Saturdays

and 40% on Sundays.

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Peak-Hour Riders • 5.600 passengers in the pphpd 17

IMPLEMENTATION BENEFITS AND IMPACTS • Environmental benefits are expected to occur as a consequence of the use of less polluting technologies,

switching of transportation mode, reduction of travel times, reduction of the number of vehicles circulating on the corridor and the maximization of the use of the buses fleet.

• Displaced units: Ruta 2=175 buses and 87 micro buses, RTP= 90 buses. • 260 private buses (about 189 owners) and 100 public buses were replaced by 67 private buses (owned by

one company CISA) and 25 public buses.

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INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS • The public decentralized body Metrobús is responsible for the planning, administration and control of the

Corridor System of Passenger Public Transport of the Federal District. • The transport companies Corredor Insurgentes S.A de CV formed by the old concesionaries of Route 2 in

the insurgents corridor and Red de Transporte de Pasajeros del Distrito Federal. One private and one public company will operate the 84 articulated buses in a proportion of 75% and 25%, respectively.

• One company specialized in the operation and maintenance of the payment systems (Imbursa). • One private fiduciary for the administration, investment and distribution of the resources generated by the

Insurgentes Corridor.

3 17 18

COST AND FINANCE • Estimated total cost 2.3 million USD per km • Infrastructure cost 1.5 million USD per km • Average price per bus 265.000 USD

3 17


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Exhibit 1 Corridor Map

Source: http://www.metrobus.df.gob.mx visited June 2006


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Exhibit 2

Typical Profile Insurgentes Corridor

Photo: D. Hidalgo, April 2006

Exhibit 3

Station Access Insurgentes Corridor



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Exhibit 4 Indios Verdes Terminal – Pedestrian Access


Exhibit 5 Indios Verdes Terminal – Sorrounding Environment



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Exhibit 6 Automatic Farecard Machines (Recharge-Sale)


Exhibit 7 Terminal Interior (Indios Verdes)



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Exhibit 8 Typical Station


Exhibit 9 Glorieta Insurgentes (Traffic Conflict)


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