TableofContents

TitlePageCopyrightPageDedicationAcknowledgementsForewordIntroductionNavalAviation101

HandontheHelm:AnInterviewwithAdmiralJayJohnsonWingsofGold:ANavalAviator’sLifeBuildingtheBoatsToolsoftheTrade:BirdsandBombsCarrierBattleGroup:PuttingItAllTogetherFinalExamination:JTFEX97-3AircraftCarriersintheRealWorld

ConclusionGlossaryBibliography

NOVELSBYTOMCLANCY

TheHuntforRedOctoberRedStormRisingPatriotGames

TheCardinaloftheKremlinClearandPresentDangerTheSumofAllFearsWithoutRemorse

DebtofHonorExecutiveOrdersRainbowSix

TheBearandtheDragonRedRabbit

TheTeethoftheTiger

SSN:StrategiesofSubmarine

Warfare

NONFICTION

Submarine:AGuidedTourInsideaNuclearWarship

ArmoredCav:AGuidedTourofanArmoredCavalry

RegimentFighterWing:AGuidedTourofanAirForceCombatWingMarine:AGuidedTourofaMarineExpeditionaryUnit

Airborne:AGuidedTourofanAirborneTaskForce

Carrier:AGuidedTourofanAircraftCarrier

SpecialForces:AGuidedTourofU.S.ArmySpecial

Forces

IntotheStorm:AStudyin

Command(writtenwithGeneralFredFranks,Jr.,Ret.,andTony

Koltz)

EveryManaTiger(writtenwithGeneralCharlesHomer,Ret.,andTonyKoltz)ShadowWarriors:Insidethe

SpecialForces(writtenwithGeneralCarl

Stiner,Ret.,andTonyKoltz)BattleReady

(writtenwithGeneralTonyZinni,Ret.,andTonyKoltz)

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It’s hard when you losefriends.Especially thosewhowere close or important towhat you have been doing.This last year was especiallytough, because we lost fourpeople special to our efforts.Tothesemenwededicatethisbook:

Dr. JefferyEthell, Ph.D.An aviationhistorian,pilot,commentator,and friendwithunparalleledcredentials,who died inJune 1997while flying a

vintage P-38Lightning inOregon.Mr. RussellEggnor.Directorof theNavy StillPhoto Branchat thePentagon, helost a fight tocancer in June

1997. ThoughRuss did notwrite thewords in ourbooks, theoffice andorganizationthat he builtsuppliedimages andstories forevery volumeinthisseries.

LieutenantColonelHenry VanWinkle,USMC. TheExecutiveOfficer ofVMFA-251,he was aconstantsource of

wisdom andtruth in the“Dirty Shirt”mess aboardUSS GeorgeWashington(CVN-73).“Rip” VanWinklediedasa result of amidaircollisioninthePersian Gulfwhileflyingan

F/A-18Horneton February6th,1998.LieutenantGeneralDavid J.McCloud.Head of theAlaskan AirCommand andU.S. Forces in

Alaska, DaveMcCloud wasan old andtrusted friendof ours. Whenheandanotherflier died onJuly 26th,1998, in thecrash of asmallaerobaticaircraft, hisfriendsandthenation lost a

treasure,whichwill noteasily bereplaced. Wewill miss you,“Marshall.”

Acknowledgements

As we finish up the sixthbook in this series, it isonceagain time to give creditwhereit isdue.I’llstartwithmy longtime friend, partner,and researcher, John D.Gresham. Once again, Johnmet the people, took thepictures, spent nights aboard

ship, and did all the thingsthat make sure readers feellike they are there. We alsohaveagainbenefitedfromthewisdom, experience, andefforts of series editorProfessor Martin H. Green-berg, Larry Segriff, and allthe staff at Tekno Books.LauraDeNinno is here againwithherwonderfuldrawings,whichhaveaddedsomuchtothis book. As well, TonyKoltz and many others all

need to be recognized fortheir outstanding editorialsupport that was so criticalandtimely.Carrier required the

support of many senior seaservicepersonnelinanumberof sensitive positions. In thisregard, we have again beenblessed with all the supportthatweneededandmore.Atthe top were Admiral JayJohnson and our old friend

General Chuck Krulak. Bothoftheseofficersgaveustheirvaluable time and support,and we cannot repay theirtrust and friendship. Theirboss, Secretary of the NavyJohnDalton, gave us criticalsupport as well. Elsewherearound the WashingtonBeltway, we had the help ofother influential leaders.Folks like Rear AdmiralsDennis McGuinn and CarlosJohnson, and Captain Chuck

Nashmade it possible to getthe information that weneeded.Thisyear,ourhome-away-from-home was theships of the GeorgeWashingtonbattlegroup,andthey took us to some reallyexciting places. Led by RearAdmiral Mike Mullen, thisunitiskeytohelpingkeepussafe in a dangerous world.Running the GW was anextraordinary crew led byCaptains “Yank” Rutheford

and Mark Groothausen, aswell as Commander ChuckSmith. These men took usundertheirwings,andkeptuswarmandfed.ThanksalsotoCaptains Jim Deppe of USSNormandyandJimPhillipsofUSS Vella Gulf for sharinginsights and time and lettingusbreakbreadwiththem.Forthe thousands of otherunnamedmenandwomenoftheGW group who took thetime to show us the vital

things that theydo,we sayahearty“Thanks!”Another group that is

always vital to our effortsconsists of the members ofthe various military publicand media offices (PAOs)that handled our numerousrequestsforvisits,interviews,andinformation.Topsonourlist were Rear AdmiralsKendall Pease and TomJurkowskyinCHINFOatthe

Pentagon. Also at CHINFOwere our project officers,LieutenantsMerrittAllenandWendy Snyder, who did somuch to keep things going.Over in the office of theChief of Naval OperationswasCaptain JimKudla,whocoordinated our interviewrequests. Down with theAtlantic Fleet in Norfolk,Virginia, Commander JoeGradisher, LieutenantCommander Roxy Merritt,

andMikeMausablyassistedus.Thentherewerethefolksof the GW’s PAO shop, ledbytheoutstandingLieutenantJoeNavritril.AlongwithJoe,an excellent young crew ofmedia-relations specialiststook us on some memorableadventures. Finally, we wantto thank the special folks attheNavyStill PhotoBranch,who have serviced our needsfor so many years. Theyinclude Lieutenant Chris

Maddenandanincomparablestaffofphotographicexperts.We thank them for theirefforts as friends andprofessionals.Again, thanks are due to

our various industrialpartners, without whom allthe information on thevarious ships, aircraft,weapons, and systemswouldnever have come to light.Down at Newport News

Shipbuilding, we wereallowed a look that fewoutsiders have ever had.Thanks are owed to JerriFuller Dickseski, BillHatfield, Mike Peters, MikeShawcross,thefolksfromtheU.S. Navy SUSHIPS office,and literally thousands ofothers. At the aircraftmanufacturers, there wereBarbara Anderson and LonNordeen of Boeing, JoeStout, Karen Hagar, and Jeff

Rhodes of Lockheed Martin,andfinally,ouroldfriendBillTuttle of Boeing Sikorsky.We also made and renewedmany friendships at thevarious missile, armament,and system manufacturers,including: Tony Geishanuserand Vicki Fendalson atRaytheon Strike Systems,Larry Ernst at GeneralAtomics,CraigVanBieberatLockheed,and theeternalEdRodemsky of Trimble

Navigation.Wealsoreceivedan incredible amount of helpfromDave“HeyJoe”ParsonsandthefinefolksatWhitney,Bradley,&Brown,Inc.We owe thanks for all of

our friends in New York,especially Robert Gottlieb,Debra Goldstein, and MattBialer at William Morris, aswell as Robert Youdelmanand Tom Mallon, who tookcareofthelegaldetails.Over

atBerkleyBooks,ourhighestthanksgotoourserieseditor,Tom Colgan, as well asDavid Shanks, KimWaltemyer, and the staff ofBerkley Books. To oldfriendslikeMattCaffrey,JimStevenson, A. D. Baker,Norman Polmar, and BobDorr, thanks again for yourcontributions and wisdom.Thanks also to the late JeffEthellandRussEggnor,whogave so much of themselves

to us and the world. And toall the folkswho took us forrides, tours, shoots, andexercises, thanks again forteaching the ignorant howthingsreallywork.Asforourfriends, families, and lovedones,weagainthankyou.

Foreword

“Where are the carriers?”This has been the likely firstquestion asked by everyPresidentoftheUnitedStatessince World War II whenfaced with a developinginternational crisis thatinvolvesU.S.interests.Itwasprobably also asked by

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto(the Commander in Chief oftheJapaneseCombinedFleet)after the Japanese attack onPearlHarbor initiatingWorldWar II. This same questionwas always a top concern ofthe Soviet leadershipthroughout the Cold War. Itdrove an inordinate amountoftheirmilitaryexpenditures,as well as many of theiroperational planningdecisions.

Morerecently,inMarchof1996,twoU.S.aircraftcarrierbattle groups (CVBGs) weredispatched to the TaiwanStraits after the People’sRepublicofChinalaunchedaprogram of ballistic missileexercises close to Taiwan.The presence of the twoaircraft carrier groups soclose to the mainland ofChina defused the crisis, andprevented a Chineseescalation or miscalculation

ofourresolve.Thefollowingyearsawthe

latestinaseriesofcriseswithIraq over Saddam Hussein’srefusal to meet UnitedNations inspection criteriaover his weapons of massdestruction. This wasresponded to by sending twomore CVBGs to the PersianGulf, this time toprepare forpossible strikes on Iraqitargets had that been

necessary.Clearly, the flexibility,

mobility, and independenceof these versatile andforward-deployed assets willkeepthemcenterstageasournation leads theworld in thetransition to a free-marketsystemofdemocracies.Therapiddevelopmentand

growth of airpower as theprimary enabling capabilityfor military operations

represents one of the truemilitary revolutions of the20th century.At the close ofthis century, with mannedspace exploration and earth-orbiting satellitescommonplace, it is hard toconceive that just ninety-fiveyears ago, the Wrightbrothersmadetheirfirstflightat Kitty Hawk, NorthCarolina. That historic firsteffort traveled less distancethan the wingspan of a

modern jumbo jet. However,things began to rapidlyprogress with the coming oftheFirstWorldWar.Withthestart of the Great Warvisionaries around the worldrealized the potentialsignificance of aviationcapabilities on militaryoperations. By 1914, then-Secretary of the NavyJosephus Daniels hadannounced“thatthepointhasbeen reached where aircraft

mustformalargepartofournavalforcesforoffensiveanddefensive operations.” It wasaninsightfulthought.The ensuing twenty-five

years before our entry intoWorldWarIIsawtheUnitedStates developing the assetsandvisiontotakeairpowertosea in a way unmatched byany other nation. As amaritimenationdependentonthe sea lines of

communications for itseconomic and nationalsecurity interests, the UnitedStates would need the edgeprovidedbyNavalaviationtowin the greatest over-watermilitary campaigns everconducted.ThehistoryoftheSecond World War in thePacific documents the greatdebt of gratitude our nationowes to theearlypioneersofnaval aviation. These werelegendary men like Glenn

Curtis,EugeneEly,TheodoreEllyson, John Towers, JohnRogers, WashingtonChambers,HenryMustin,andmany more too numerous tomention.However, it was at Pearl

Harbor on December 7th,1941, with the war cry of“Tora ... Tora ... Tora!”andour own lax state ofreadiness, that Japan broughthometotheworldtheimpact

of carrier aviation.1 The factthatnoneofourthreePacific-basedaircraftcarrierswereinportthatfatefulmorningmayhave been the single mostsignificant factor in oureventual victory during theGreat Pacific War. At thetime of our entry intoWorldWar II, the U.S. Navy hadjust seven big-deck aircraftcarriers in commission:Saratoga,Lexington,Ranger,

Yorktown, Enterprise, Wasp,and Hornet. These “sevensisters”wouldtakethewartoourenemiesfromCasablancaand Malta to Midway andGuadalcanal.Clearly, Admiral

Yamamoto knew that Japanhad awakened a “sleepinggiant,” and he believed aprolonged war would go infavoroftheUnitedStates.Heknew the potential

productivity of Americanindustry and its people,something that he hadwitnessedpersonallywhileonnaval attaché duty inWashington.Thus itwas thatJapan, needing a quickdecisivevictoryovertheU.S.Navy in the Pacific, set inmotionthegreatseabattleoffMidwayIslandinmid-1942.2Yamamoto mustered anoverwhelming naval armada,

designedtotakeMidwayandhandtheU.S.Navyandtheircarrier groups a crushingdefeat. However, when theBattle of Midway was over,the tide had turned in thePacific, though not in thefavorofJapan.Thankstotheraw courage and aggressivetactics of the U.S. carrierpilots as well as superbintelligence, four Japanesecarriers and a cruiser weresunk. In the process, Japan’s

ability to project naval airpower throughout the vastPacificwascrippledforever.The U.S. carrier groups

and their courageousaviatorshad,onpaper,norighttowin.But win they did. The costwas not insignificant; fifteenoffifteenaircraftandtwenty-nine of thirty aircrew inTorpedo Squadron 8 alonewere lost. Alongwith scoresofAmericanaircraftandtheir

crews, the USN lost theYorktown and a destroyer.3However, finding a way towininthefaceofadversityisanavalaviationtradition.Today, U.S. carrier

aviationisinextricablytiedtothe concept of United Statesforward presence and powerprojection; the “From theSea” doctrine. Since the endof theEast/Westconflict, theUnited States military has

withdrawn from themajorityof its overseas bases.Consequently, America’sability to exercise a forwardmilitarypresenceandprovidemilitary forces depends on acombination of naval powerand power projection fromthecontinentalUnitedStates.This means that in thecomplex post-Cold Warworld,where themajority oftheworld’smajor populationcenters are within two

hundred miles of the openocean, naval forces areincreasingly relevant, andable to influence all mannerof events that shape regionalstability. The fact that thiscan be donewith little or noland-based support and withno host nation support is atremendousadvantageforournationalinterests.The independence,

sustainability, and staying

power of naval units oftenmakes them the forces ofchoice for our NationalCommand Authorities. Thisincludes protecting the sea-lanesforaglobalfree-marketeconomy, reinforcing andsupporting Americanembassies, and executingnon-combatantevacuationsofAmerican citizens overseas.These and many othermissionsare ideally suited toour forward-deployed naval

forces. This has beencontinuouslydemonstrated inplacesliketheTaiwanStraits,the Persian Gulf, Somalia,Albania, the Central AfricanRepublic, Liberia, Zaire, andSierra Leone. America is anislandnation,dependentuponthe seas for our economicprosperityandsecurity.Therewas good reason why ourfounding fathers determinedthe need for the nation tomaintain naval forces and

raise an army. We shouldoccasionally remindourselvesofthisreality,sinceit is the geopolitics, not thegeography of the world, thathaschangedovertime.Unfortunately, aircraft

carriers and naval forces ingeneral have often been seenas both provocative andvulnerable.Manycriticswhodonotunderstandthescienceof modern naval operations

haveclaimedthatadvancesinspace systems and missiletechnology make thecarrier/naval forcesexcessively vulnerable to airandmissileattacks.Certainlytechnology has increased thethreatfromthesesystems,butfar less so than that facedbyfixed land bases and groundforces from terrorism andballisticmissileattacks.For starters, there is the

challenge to any would-beenemywhowouldtrytofinda CVBG in the open ocean.Navalunitsarehighlymobileand theworld’s oceans are abig,dynamicplace.Tryingtocoordinate sophisti-catedlong-range targetingsolutions onto a target thatcan move thirty nauticalmiles in any direction in justone hour, or up to sevenhundred nautical miles in aday, is a tough business.

Clearly, a CVBG is not aneasy target. The inherentmobility, together withsophisticated CVBGelectronic-warfare-deceptionpackages (radar “blip”enhancers, target decoys,etc.), combined with the airdefenses provided by ourAegis-equipped escorts(Ticonderoga-class [CG-47]cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers [DDG-51])as well as the CVN’s own

organic aircraft, make thevulnerability quitemanageable.The threat of theater

ballisticandcruisemissilesisalso a matter of concern forthe CVBG, and work israpidly progressing toincrease our defenses againsttheseclassesofweapons.TheAegiscombatsystemisbeingimprovedandextended tobeable to provide theater-wide

defensefromthesea,forbothland and sea forces.Survivability from thesethreatswillalwaysbegreaterfrom amobile bastion at seathan a fixed base on land.Arriving alongwith this newcapability are new aircraft,ships, and even new carrierdesigns,whichwillhelpkeeptheCVBGcrediblelongafterthe last manned-aircraftdesignsare retired.However,onedoesnothavesuchnaval

forces for purely defensivepurposes.The real strength of

CVBGs is offensive, makingthem a threat to the verydespots and enemies thatmight themselves wish ill tothe carrier group. Able togenerate hundreds of air andmissileattacksortiesdayandnight,themodernCVBGisapowerfultoolthatrequiresnopermission of ally or foe to

do its job. Today, when thechallenge is to get the mostreturnforourlimiteddefensedollars, it is significant tonote that since the end ofWorld War II, we have notlost any carriers to enemyaction or geopoliticalchanges.This is hardly true in the

case of our overseas landbases. In such countries asIran,Libya,Vietnam,andthe

Philippines to name just afew, we not only lost theairfields that the U.S. paidfor, but also the costlyinfrastructure devoted tosupport, maintenance, andquality-of-life issues. Therealso is the fact thatwepayahigh monetary and oftenunacceptable political pricefor even restricted access toforeign military land and airbases. As recently as 1997,the U.S. was not allowed to

place the desired number ofUSAF aircraft in SaudiArabia, where the U.S.presence was alreadyestablished. From thisviewpoint,theaircraftcarrier,which has a forty-five-yearlife cycle and remains freefromsuchentanglements,isarelativebargainforourscarcedefensedollars.As a new crop of world

economic and potential

military superpowers emergeinthecomingyears,thevalueof aircraft carriers to U.S.foreign policy goals willdramatically increase.Oneofthe unchallenged realities ofmodern warfare is that youcannot be victorious in anyconflict on the ground or atsea without air/spacesuperiority. In an era ofsophisticated precisionweapons, including cruiseand ballistic missiles, this is

the medium that enables ourlandandseaforcestooperatewith acceptable risk. Airsuperiority is even moreessential for forward-deployed forces that areshaping the battlespace,trying to create stability andprevent conflict fromoccurring through their ownforward presence. In moreand more cases, this flexiblecombatpowerwillhavetobeprovided by forward-

deployed carrier andamphibious groups. This is areality since the world’ssurface is 70% covered bywater, and our free-marketeconomy depends on openaccess to the sea lines ofcommunication.Navalforcesaremorethan

just ships, planes, andweapons. What I hope thisbook conveys is the qualityand dedication of the people

it takes to provide the nationthe kind of flexibility andfighting punch packaged inour modem CVBGs. Thecarriers, Aegis cruisers, anddestroyers,togetherwiththeiraircraft and fast-attacksubmarines,wouldbenothingwithoutthepeoplewhomakethemwork.Operatingahigh-usageairportindayandnightoperations, while moving atthirtyknotsontheopenseas,is one thing. However, to

provide all the organicsupport to do this forextendedperiodsof timeatagreat distance from a homebase is another thing alltogether.A modern Nimitz-class

(CVN-68) carrier is theequivalent of a smallAmerican city packaged intojust four-and-a-half acres.Thiscitynotonlyoperatesanairport on its roof, but also

canmoveoversevenhundrednautical miles in any givenday. It also provides fullmedical support, machineshops, jet engine test cells,food service operations,computer support, electricalgeneration, and almosteverything else that you canimagine.Nowpicturethecarrierasa

business, a company that hasa net worth of six to seven

billion dollars and employsoversixthousandpeople.Theaverage age of the sixthousand employees is lessthantwenty-oneyears.Ontopof this, the Chairman of theBoard (Admiral and Staff),the President and ChiefOperating Officer (Captainand Air Wing Commander),all the Vice Presidents(Department Heads), andevery other employee rotatesoutofthecompanyeverytwo

tothreeyears.Commonsensewould dictate that you couldnevermakeaprofitwithanybusiness under thoseconditions.YettheU.S.Navyoperates successfully undertheseveryconditions,andtheprofit is freedom, andprotection of our nationalinterests.This dedication of young

Americans, the symphony oftheir teamwork, and the

indomitable spirit of theAmericansailormakethisallpossible. We owe them ourrespect and gratitude, andmustnevertaketheserviceorsacrifices they and theirfamiliesmake for granted. Itwas my privilege to be ashipmate with these greatAmericans for over thirty-seven years. For this I salutethe American Sailors,Marines, Soldiers, Airmen,and Coast Guards-men of

every generation who haveprotected our freedom athomeandaroundtheworld.

—LeonA.“Bud”EdneyAdmiral,USN(Retired)Former Commander, U.S.AtlanticCommand&NATO Supreme AlliedCommander,Atlantic

Introduction

Presence, influence, andoptions. In these threewordsare the basic rationale forwhy politicians want carrierbattle groups, and have beenwilling to spend over atrillion U.S. taxpayer dollarsbuilding a dozen forAmerican use. That was

hardly the original reason,though. Back in the yearsafter the Great War, navalpowers were trying to findloopholesinthefirstseriesofarms-control treaties (whichhad to dowith naval forces).Withthenumbersandsizeofbattleships and other vesselslimited by the agreements,various nations began toconsider what ships carryingaircraft might be able tocontribute to navies.At first,

the duties of these firstcarrier-borne aircraft werelimited to spotting the fall ofnaval shells and providing aprimitivefightercoverforthefleet. Within a few years,though, aircraft technologiesbegan to undergo arevolutionary series ofimprovements. Metal aircraftstructures, improved powerplants and fuels, as well asthe first of what we wouldcall avionics began to find

their way onto airplanes. BytheoutbreakofWorldWarII,some naval analysts andleaders even suspected thatcarriers and their embarkedaircraft might be capable ofsinking the same battleshipsand other surface ships thatthey had originally beendesignedtocover.

The Second World War

willberememberedbynaval

historians as a conflictdominated by two newclasses of ships: fast carriersand submarines. The diesel-electric submarines were ahighly efficient force able todeny navies and nations theuse of the sea-lanes forcommerce and warfare.Unfortunately,astheGermanKriegsmarine and GrandAdmiral Karl Donitz found,youdonotwinwars throughsimpledenialofabattlespace

like the Atlantic Ocean.Victory through seapowerrequirestheabilitytotaketheoffensive on terms and attimes of your choosing. Thismeansbeingabletodominatevast volumes of air, ocean,and even near-earth space.Without a balanced force toproject its power over theentire range of possibilitiesand situations, one-dimensional forces like theU-boat-dominated

Kriegsmarine wound upbeing crushed in the crucibleofwar.By contrast, the carriers

and their escorts of WorldWar II were able to projectoffensive power over theentire globe. From theNorthCape to the islands of theCentral Pacific, carrier-basedaircraft dominated thegreatest navalwar in history.Along the way, they helped

nullify the threat fromGermany’sU-boatsandotherenemysubmarines,aswellassweeping the seas of enemyships and aircraft. While theeventual Japanese surrendermayhavebeensignedaboardthe battleship Missouri inTokyoBay,itoccurredintheshadowofaskyblackenedbyhundreds of carrier aircraftflying overhead in review.Called “Halsey’s Folly,” theflyoverwasthefinalproofof

the real force that had endedthesecondglobalwarof thiscentury.DespitetheclaimsofAir Force leaders whopronounced navies worthlessin an era of nuclear-armedbombers, when the nextshooting conflict erupted inKorea, it was carrier aircraftthat covered the withdrawalto the Pusan Perimeter andthe amphibious landings atInchon. They then droppedintoarolethatwouldbecome

common in the next half-century, acting as mobile airbases to project combatpowerashore.Despite the best efforts of

the former Soviet Union todevelop a credible “blue-water” fleet during the ColdWar,theU.S.Navyneverlostcontrol of any ocean that itcared about. One of the bigreasons for this was theregular presence of carrier

battlegroups,whichtookanysort of “home-courtadvantage” away from apotential enemy.Armedwithaircraftthatwerethematchofanything flying from a landbase, and flown by the best-trained aviators in theworld,the American carriers andtheir escortswere the “eight-hundred-pound guerrillas” ofthe Cold War naval world.This is a position that theystill hold to this day.

However, their contributionshave taken on a deadly newrelevance in the post-ColdWarworld.One of the tragic truths

about America’s winning oftheColdWarwasthatwedidit with anyone who wouldhelp us. This meant that theU.S. frequently backed anylocal dictator with a well-placedairornavalbaseandawillingness to say that

Communism was bad. TheneedtocontaintheambitionsoftheSovietUnionandtheirallies took a front seat tocommon sense and humanrights.Theresultwasaseriesof alliances with despotsranging from FerdinandMarcos to Manuel Noriega.However, therewas awar towin and we did win it. Theprice, however, is what wearepaying today.Around theworld, Americans are being

asked topleasepackup theiraircraft, ships, and bases andplease take them home. Weshould not be offended; wedid it to ourselves. Thecontinuing legacy of squalorin places like Olongapo Cityin the Philippines and other“outside thegate” townswasmore than the emergingdemocraciesof thepost-ColdWar era could stand. Whenyou add in our continuedinterference in the internal

politics of the countries thathosted our bases, it is awonder that we have anyfriendsleftintheworldasthe20thcenturyends.Our poor foreign policy

record aside, the UnitedStatesandouralliesstillhavea number of responsibilitiesin the post-Cold War world.This means simply that towield military force in acrisis,wenowhavejustafew

options.One is to ask nicelyifafriendlyhostnationmightallow us to base personnel,aircraft, and equipment ontheir soil so that we canthreaten their neighbors withmilitary force. As might beimagined,thiscanbeatoughthing to do in thesemuddledtimes.GeorgeBushmanagedtodoitinthePersianGulfin1991, but Bill Clinton failedin the same task in1997and1998. Even with a dictator

like Saddam Hussein, mostregional neighbors wouldrather tolerate the bully thanriskthedeathanddestructionthat occurred in Kuwait in1990 and 1991. This leavesjust two other credibleoptions; to base militarypower at homeland bases oraboard sovereign flaggedshipsatsea.Thefirstoftheseoptions means that fleets oftransport ships and aircraftmust be maintained just to

movethemtotheplacewhereacrisisisbreakingout.Italsotakes time to move combataircraft and ground units totheplaceswheretroublemaybe brewing. This is whyhaving units forward-basedaboard ships is so incrediblyimportanttousthesedays.Time in a crisis is more

precious than gold.Asmuchas any other factor, the timedelay in responding to a

developing conflictdetermines whether it resultsinwar,peace,oradistastefulstandoff.Whilewemayneverknowforsure,thereisagoodchance that Saddam HusseinstoppedattheSaudiborderin1990 because of the rapidflood of U.S. and coalitionforces into the Kingdom.However,itwouldbeatoughacttoduplicatetoday.Oneofthe benefits of our militarybuildup in the late years of

theColdWarwas the abilityto do both of these thingswell. Along with lots ofcontinental-based forceswithexcellent transportcapabilities,weusuallyhadanumber of carrier andamphibious groups forward-based to respond to crises.However, these richcircumstances are now justhappymemories.Today the U.S. Navy

considers itself lucky tohaveretainedanevendozencarrierbattlegroups,alongwiththeirmatched amphibious readygroups.Bybeingabletokeepjust two or three of theseforward-deployed at anytime, the United States hasmanaged to maintain atoeholdinplaceswhereithasfew allies and no bases. TherecentconfrontationwithIraqoverUnitedNationsweaponsinspectors, had it led to war,

would have been prosecutedalmostentirelyfromapairofcarrier groups based in thePersian Gulf. With the1990/91 allied coalitionsplinteredovereachcountry’sregional interests, almostnobody would allow U.S.warplanes and ground forcesontotheirsoil.Thisisa180°change from 1990/91, whenthe majority of Alliedairpowerwasland-based.

This brings us back to thethree words at the beginningofthisintroduction:presence,influence, andoptions.Navalforces generally providepresence. Carrier groups,though, dominate an area forhundredsofmiles/kilometersin every direction, includingnear-earth space. While afrigateordestroyerimpresseseveryone who sees it, acarrier group can change thebalance of military and

political power of an entireregion. A weak countrybacked by an Americancarrier group is going to bemuchtoughertooverthroworinvadefora localor regionalroguestateorwarlord.Thatisthedefinitionof internationalpresence these days. Finally,thereisthematterofoptions.In the deepest heart of

every politician, there is alove of options. Having

choicesinatoughsituationisevery politician’s greatestdesire, and carrier groupsgivethemthat.Itisoneoftheoddities of national politicsthat until they becomePresident or Prime Minister,politicians frequently andpublicly view large militaryunits like carrier groups as awaste of taxpayer money.However, let the politicianshit the top of a nation’spolitical foodchain,and they

sing another tune entirely. Itisalmostamatterofnationalfolklore that every ChiefExecutive will, at some timein theirPresidency,ask thosefour famous words: “Whereare the carriers?” It certainlyhas been the case sinceFranklin Roosevelt hauntedthehallsoftheWhiteHouse.Today, in fact, the use offorward-deployed forcesafloatmaybetheonlyoptionopentoanationalleader.

Understanding aircraftcarriers and their associatedaircraft and battle groupescorts is not an easy task.Focusing only on the flattopisliketunnelvision,sincethecarrier’s own weapons arepurely defensive and quiteshort-ranged. To fullyunderstand what effects acarrier group moving intoyour neighborhood is goingtohave,itisnecessarytolookbeyondthecarrier’sbulkand

dig deeper. You must lookinto the embarked air wingwith its wide variety ofaircraft andweapons, aswellas the escorts. These rangefrom Aegis-equipped missilecruisers and destroyers, todeadly nuclear-poweredattack submarines. Armedwith surface-to-air missilesand Tomahawk cruisemissiles,theynotonlyprotectthe carrier from attack, buthave their own mighty

offensive punch as well. Toseeitalltakesawider,deeperlook than you are likely tofindonthenightlynewsorinyour daily newspaper. To dothat requires that you spendtime with people. Lots ofpeople. These include theNavy’sleaders,whomakethepolicydecisionsandhavetheresponsibility of keeping ourNavy the best in the world.Youalsoneedtospendsometimewiththefolkswhobuild

the ships, aircraft, andweapons that make the forcecredible and dangerous.Finally,youhavetoknowthethousandsof peoplewho runthe battle groups and sailthemtotheplaceswheretheyareneededacrosstheglobe.I hope as you read this

bookthatyougetsomesenseof the people, because it istheythataretherealstrengthofthecarriergroups,andour

nation.While you and I stayhome safe and warm in thecompany of our families andloved ones, they go out formonthsat a time toput teethintoournationalpoliciesandbackboneintoourwords.Itistheywhomake the sacrificesand perhaps pay the ultimateprice. I hope you see that inthesepages,andyouthinkofthem as you get to know the“heavy metal” of the U.S.Navy up close. If you do, I

thinkthatyouwillgainarealperspective on their difficult,butvital,profession.—TomClancyJuly1998

NavalAviation101

“arethecarriers?”

EveryAmericanPresidentsinceFranklinDelanoRoosevelt

Aircraft carriers stretchperceptions. First of all,they’rebig—biggerthanmostskyscrapers—skyscrapersthatcanmove across the sea at abetter thanfairclip.Andyet,despite theirgreat size,whenyou watch flight operationson theflightdeck(usuallyas

busy as a medium-sizedmunicipal airport), you can’thelpbutwonderhowsomuchgets done in such a tinyspace. They not only stretchperceptions, they stretch thelimitsofthenation’sfinancesand industrial capacity; andthey stretch credibility. It’shard to find a weapon thatraisesmorecontroversy.Controversy has troubled

naval aviation from the early

days of the century, whenprimitive airplanes originallywenttosea.Atfirst,airpowerwas seen as a uselessdiversion of scarce fundsfrom more pressing navalrequirements like theconstruction of big-gunbattleships. Later, after navalaviation became a seriouscompetitor for sea power’sthrone,bitter infightingarosebetween gunnery andairpower advocates. Today,

as the acknowledged “bigstick”ofAmerica’sNavy,theaircraftcarrierisunderattackfromthosewhoclaimtohavebetterwaystoprojectmilitarypowerintoforwardareas.AirForce generals plug B-2Astealth bombers withprecision weapons (so-called“virtual presence”).Submariners and surfacenaval officers hawk theirplatforms carrying precisionstrike missiles. A good case

can bemade for all of these.Still, in a post-Cold Warworld that becomes moredangerous and uncertain bythe week, aircraft carriershaveaproventrackrecordofeffectiveness in crisissituations. Neither bombersnor“arsenalships”canmakethatclaim.

Question: What makesaircraftcarrierssoeffective?TheUSSGeorgeWashington(CVN- 73) operating herembarked carrier air wingOne (CVW-1). Battle groupsbased around aircraft carriersarethebackboneofAmericanseapower.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTO

Answer: Carriers and theiraccompanying battle groupscan move freely over theoceansoftheworld(theirfreemovementislegallyprotectedbytheprinciplesof“Freedomof Navigation”), and can doastheypleaseaslongastheystayoutsideofothernations’territorialwaters.

A nation’s warships arelegally sovereign territorieswherever they might befloating; and other nationshave no legal influence overtheir actions or personnel.Thus, an aircraft carrier canpark theequivalentofanAirForcefighterwingoffshoretoconduct sustained flightand/or combat operations. Inotherwords,ifacrisisbreaksout in some littoral (coastal)region, and a carrier battle

group(CVBG)is inthearea,then the nation controlling itcan influence theoutcomeofthecrisis.4AddtothisCVBGanAmphibiousReadyGroup(ARG) loadedwith aMarineExpeditionary Unit-SpecialOperations Capable (MEU(SOC)), and you have evenmore influence.5 This, in anut-shell, is the real value ofaircraftcarriers.Such influence does not

come without cost. EachCVBG represents a nationalinvestment approaching US$20 billion. And with overten thousand embarkedpersonnelthatneedtobefed,paid, and cared for, eachgroup costs in theneighborhood of a billiondollars to operate andmaintain annually. That’s alotofschoollunches.That’salot of schools! Add to thiscurrentUnitedStatesplansto

maintaintwelveCVBGs.Andthenaddthemassivecostsofthegovernment infrastructurethat backs these up (supplyships,ports,navalairstations,training organizations, etc.),as well as the vastcommercial interests(shipbuilders, aircraft andweapons manufacturers, etc.)necessary to keep the battlegroups modern and credible.Andthenconsiderthatnotalltwelve battle groups are

available at one time.Because the ships needperiodic yard service and thecrews and air crews need tobetrainedandqualified,onlytwo or three CVBGs arenormally forward-deployed.(There is usually a group inthe Mediterranean Sea,another in the WesternPacific Ocean, and anothersupporting operations in thePersianGulfregion.)

Is this handful of mobileairfields worth the cost? Theanswer depends on theresponses to several otherquestions. Such as: Howmuch influence does ourcountry want to have in theworld? What kind? Howmuch do we want to affectthe actions and behavior ofothercountries?Andsoon.Sure,it’snothardtoequate

the role of CVBGs with

“gunboatdiplomacy”policiesofthe19thcentury.Butdoingthat trivializes the true valueofthecarrierstoAmericaandherallies.Amongthelessonsthelastfewyearshavetaughtus is one that’s inescapable:TheUnited States has globalresponsibilities. These go farbeyond simply maintainingfreedom ofmaritime lines ofcommunications andsupportingourallies in timesof crisis. Whether we like it

or not, most of the world’snations look toAmerica as aleader. And these samenations(whethertheywanttosaysoofficiallyornot)seeusas the world’s policeman.When trouble breaks outsomewhere, who’re yougoingtocall?China?Russia?Japan?Notinthisdecade.Sure,it’snotalwaysinthe

best interest of the UnitedStates to give a positive

answer to every request forsupportandaid.Butwhentheanswerispositive,thereistheproblemofhowtodelivertheneeded response. Once upona time, our network ofoverseas bases allowed us toproject a forward presence.No longer.Over the last halfcentury, a poorly conceivedand ill-executed Americanforeignpolicyhasallowedustobeevictedfromsomethingover75%ofthesebases.Add

to this the limited resourcesavailablefollowingtherecentmilitary drawdowns, and theNational CommandAuthoritiesare leftwithveryfew options. Most of theseare resident in the CVBGsand ARGs that make up theforward-deployed forces oftheUnitedStatesNavy.At any given time, there

are usually two or threeCVBGs out there on six-

month cruises, doing theirday-in,day-outjoboflookingout for the interests ofAmerica and our allies, withadventure and danger only asatellite transmission away.Thanks to the support ofservice forces (fuel tankers,supply ships, etc.), a well-handled CVBG’s onlylimitations are the durabilityofmachinery and themoraleof the people aboard. Giventhewill of a strongnation to

back it, CVBGs can beparked off any coast in theworld,andsitouttherelikeabirdofprey.Thatisthetruemeaningof

“presence.”

Rationale:WhyAircraftCarriers?

So why does America reallyneed aircraft carriers?We’veseen the theoretical, “policy”answer to that question. Butwhat’s the practical, real-world answer? What valuedoes a ninety-year-oldmilitary concept have in anage of satellite surveillanceand ballistic missiles? Howdoes a relative handful ofaircraft based aboard Navalvessels actually effect eventson a regional scale? Finally,

whatdoesthiscapabilitygiveto a regional CinC or otheron-scene commander? All ofthese questions must beexplored if the real value ofcarriers and CVBGs is to befullyunderstood.

AircraftCarriers:AnOpenArchitecture

In less than a hundredyears,we’vepassed from the

first heavier-than-air testflights to deep-space probes.During that same time, afterover five centuries ofpreeminence, we have seenthedemiseofgunnery as themeasureofNavalpower.Thedeclineofnavalgunsandtherise of airpower were notinstantly obvious. In fact, intheearly1900’s,tosuggestitwould have invited astraitjacket. The first flyingmachines were toys for rich

adventurers and stuntmen,theirpayloadand rangewereextremely limited, and theirworth in military operationswas insignificant. Thetechnology of early mannedflightwasderivedfromkites,bicycles, and automobiles.Structures were flimsy andheavy,and theenginesbulkyandinefficient.Though the First World

War did much to improve

aircraft technologies, andmade many military leadersbelievers in the value ofairpower, the world powershad just made a staggeringinvestment in big-gundreadnought-type battleshipsthat Naval leaders had noappetite to replace. Thus,Naval airpower wound upbeinglimitedbyarmstreatiesor shuffled to the bottom ofthe funding priorities. Evenso, thoughfewsawthis then,

the future of Naval airpowerwas already a given. Therearetworeasonsforthis:

First—Aircraft soon provedthey could carry weaponsloads farther thangunscouldshoot, and with greaterflexibility.

Second—An aircraft carrier

canmoreeasilyaccommodateupgrades and improvementsthan an armored ship withfixed-boreguns.

Inorder to retrofit a larger

gun to deliver a larger shell,youhavetoreplacetheturretsandbarbettes.Andtodothat,you have to completelyrebuildabattleshiporcruiser.Bycomparison,foranaircraftcarrier tooperate anewkind

of aircraft, bomb, ormissile,you only need to make surethatthenewsystemfitsinsidethe hangars and elevators.You also need to make surethatit’snottooheavyfortheflight deck, and (if it’s anaircraft) that it can take offandlandonthedeck.Simplyput, as long as an aircraft orweaponsfitsaboardacarrier,it can probably be employedsuccessfully. In modernsystems terminology, the

carrier is an “openarchitecture” weaponssystem,withwell-understoodinterfaces and parameters.Much like a computer withbuilt-in capabilities forexpansion cards andnetworking, aircraft carriershave a vast capability toaccept new weapons andsystems. Thus, somebattleships built at thebeginning of the FirstWorldWarwere scrapped after less

thanfiveyearsservice,whilemodern supercarriers haveplanned lives measured indecades.Sure, gun-armed warships

can stillhurt aircraft carriers.And in fact, during WorldWarII,severalflattopsfoundthemselves on the losing endof duels with surface ships.Today, missile-armed shipsandsubmarinesposeanevengreater hazard to flattops, as

they do to all vessels.However, all things beingequal, the range of theiraircraft is going to givecarriersacriticaledge inanycombat. Carrier aircraft canhold an enemy ship or targetat a safe distance, and theneitherneutralizeordestroyit.The word for this advantageis “standoff.” By “standingoff” from an enemy andattacking him from over thehorizon, you greatly reduce

his ability to counterattackthe carrier force, makingdefensemuch easier. In fact,justfindingaCVBGisharderthan you might think, as theSoviet Union discovered toitsgreatchagrinonmorethanoneoccasionduringtheColdWar.If—asnowseemslikely—the next generation ofAmerican flattopsincorporates stealthtechnology,thenyoucanplanon aircraft carriers serving

wellintothenextcentury.

SomePropositionsaboutSea-BasedAirpower

The“real-world”effectsof“sea-based” naval aviation(that is, aircraftbasedaboardships at sea) and theprinciples by which battlegroup commanders ply theirintricate and difficult tradeare many, varied, and

complex; and learning thesetakes years. What follows isno substitute for those years.Still, knowledge of some ofthe basic propositions aboutsea-basedairpowerthatguidethe plans and actions of ourNaval leaders can’t help butbeuseful:

• Control of theTotal LittoralBattlespace IsImpossible

without Airpower—While it cannotrealistically win abattle,campaign,orwar by itself, novictory is possiblewithout airpower.Broadly defined asthe effectivemilitary use of theskies—airpower isvital to controllingthe“battlespace”ofthe littoral regions.

Oneonlyneedlookback at Britishoperations in theFalklands in 1982to see how muchcangowrongwhena fleet operateswithin range ofenemy land-basedaircraft withoutproperaircover.Asa result, theirvictory in that warwas “a very near

thing.”• Sea-BasedAirpower Involvesa Variety ofSystems—Navalforces bring avariety of systemsand sensors to thelittoral battlespace.To name a few:fighter jets andtransporthelicopters;submarine-hunting

helicopters andaircraft; surface-to-air (SAM) missilesdefending againstaircraftandballisticmissiles; and cruisemissiles. Thisfunctional diversitymeansthataCVBGcommander canbring any numberof systems andemploymentoptions to bear,

greatlycompounding thedefensive problemof an adversary.Properly utilizedand supported, sea-based airpower canprovide enablingforce and muscleforanynumberandtype of militaryoperations.

Examples of

this functionaldiversityinclude:deterring theuseof ballisticand cruisemissiles in aregionalconflict,supportingamphibiousand airborneoperations,providing

cover for anon-combatantpersonnelevacuation, orfiring land-attack missilesandcontrollingunmannedaerial vehiclesfromsubmarines.An F-14DTomcat taxies

throughcatapult steamon the deck ofthe USS CarlVinson (CVN-70). The four-and-a-half-acre flightdeck is one ofthebusiestandmostdangerousworkplaces inthe world. It

also is theplace wherecarriers provetheir worth intherealworld.OFFICIALU.S. NAVYPHOTO

• Sea-BasedAirpower IsInherentlyFlexible andMobile—Becausethey are basedaboard ships, sea-based aviationassets are highlymobile. ModemCVBGs can easilymove five hundrednautical miles in a

day, which meansthat they canredeploy almostanywhere in theworld in just a fewweeks. And with alittle warning, aforward-deployedforce can be in acrisis zone in days,sometimes even inhours.Becausetheyarenotdirectly tiedto a land-based

command structure,the personnel andunits embarkedaboardtheshipsareequipped andtrained to work ontheir own. Finally,because sea-basedair units pack a lotof power into verysmall packages,they have greatagility in anuncertain, fast-

moving crisis orcombatsituation.• Sea-BasedAirpower IsInherentlyOffensive—Whileairpower haspowerful defensivecapabilities, it isbest used inoffensiveoperations, thusallowing its fullpowertobefocused

and timed intoblows ofmaximumpower andefficiency. Theability to rapidlyshift position, forexample, allowssea-based units tochangetheiraxisofattack, and makesthe defensiveproblem of theenemy much moredifficult.Bysimply

moving into anarea, sea-basedaviation units fillthe skies with theirpresence, affectingboth the militarysituation and themind-set of apotential enemy.Should combatoperations beinitiated, sea-basedair units areprepared to launch

sustained strikesagainst enemytargets for as longasrequired.Evenifthe enemy forceschoose to strikeback at the navalforce, the mere actof the attackingfleet units degradesthe hostile air andnaval unitsinvolved.• Sea-Based

AirpowerProvidesInstant RegionalSituationalAwareness —Abattle groupentering an areaprovides a widevariety ofintelligence-collectioncapabilities for aregional CinC.Along with the airand shipborne

sensorsorganictoanavalforce,theunitcommandershaveanumber of regionaland national-levelintelligence-collectioncapabilitiesthatcanrapidly fuse thedataintoacoherentsituational analysis.This makes the jobof deciding uponfuture action and

committing follow-onforcesmuchlessuncertain. As afurther benefit, thestaying power ofthe naval forcemeans that minute-to-minute changesin the military andpoliticalsituationina crisis/combatzone can bewatched,andtrendsand developments

canbe trackedovertime, allowing adeeper and widerunderstanding ofthe regionalsituation.• Sea-BasedAirpower IsProtected from theEffects ofInternationalPolitics—Unlikeland-based air andgroundunits,which

can’t operatewithout theapproval of aregionalallyorhostcountry, navalforces(andairunitsin particular) arenotaffectedbysuchissues. They arealso less vulnerableto attack by enemyforces or acts ofterrorism. Shieldedby the international

laws coveringfreedom ofnavigation, sea-basedunits are freeto actindependently.Sinceeachshipandaircraft is thesovereign territoryof the owningcountry, any attackor intrusionbecomesapotentialact of war and a

violation ofinternational law.Since few nationshave the will toviolate theseaccords, thismakesnaval aviation aforce that does nothave to askpermissiontoact.• Sea-BasedAirpowerProvidesLong-TermPresence and

Power—Maritimenations have longmadeallowanceforresupply andsupport of theirforces at sea. Aslong as proper sealines ofcommunicationscan be maintained,and replacementships and aircraftcan be rotated,shipsandsea-based

air units can besustained almostindefinitely onstation,andmissiondurationsofmonthsor even years canbe supported. Thisisakeyattributeofgreat maritimenations, and theaddition of sea-based air units totheir force mixgreatly enhances

the power andpresence they cangenerate. Recentexamples of thiskind of forwardnaval presence arethe navalembargoes of Iraqand the Balkans,and the lead-up tothe1991GulfWar.• Sea-BasedAirpower CanConduct Multiple

Missions at theSame Time—Sincenaval forces aredesigned withrobust command-and-controlcapabilities, andsea-based aircraftare multi-mission-capable bynecessity,sea-basedairunitsarecapableof many types ofmissions, and can

conduct themsimultaneously.Thus,attackaircraftcan conductsuppressivemissions on enemyair defenses, whileother units areengaging inprecision cruise-missile strikes,armed helicoptersare securing thebattlespace around

thenavalforce,andSAM-equippedships areconductingdefensiveoperations againstenemy ballistic-and cruise-missilestrikes. Such flexi-bility gives navalleaders a criticaledge when fast-breaking, rapidlychanging crisis and

combat situationsareinplay.• Sea-BasedAirpower CanGenerate a WideVariety of Effects—A naval forcegenerates reactionsthat range fromcoercion to terror.Sea-based air unitsadd to this power,by adding a widevariety of weapon

andmissioneffects,ranging from theuse of surveillanceaircraft and thedelivery of specialoperationsforces tomore traditionalresults like theaerial delivery ofmunitions ontotargets. Yet evenhere, variety is thewatch-word.Because naval air

units are based atsea, there are norestrictions uponthe munitions theycan carry andemploy.Thismeansthat an enemy canexpect to faceeverything fromprecision-guidedpenetration bombstoclustermunitions—orevenanuclearstrike. Such threats

can often deliverthe most useful ofallweaponseffects,deterrence fromacting with hostileforce against aneighboringnation.• Sea-BasedAirpower KeepsThreatsFarAway—America’s Navyhas historicallydisplayed itsgreatest value by

keeping the threatof enemy militaryaction on the otherside of the world’soceans. In fact, nohostile militaryforce of any sizehas intruded uponour territory sincethe War of 1812.Today, our seaservices continuethis mission, andsea-based airpower

provides our navalforceswithmuchofthe muscle thatmakes it possible.By keeping theenemy threatsagainst ourhomeland at arm’slength, sea-basedairpower keeps ournation strong, andour people safe inan otherwiseuncertainworld.

The launch of a BGM-109Tomahawk cruise missilefrom the guided-missiledestroyer Laboon (DDG-58)during Operation DesertStrikein1996.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTO

Milestones:TheDevelopmentofaModernWeapon

It goes without saying thatinstitutions as large, diverse,and powerful as navalaviation do not just happenovernight. They evolve overtime, and are the product ofthe forces and personalitiesthat impact upon them. In

fact, naval aviation grew tomaturitysurprisinglyquickly,andmostofthecriticaleventsand trends that shaped ithappened in the roughly fivedecadesstretchingfrom1908through the mid-1950’s.During that time, the basicforms and functions thatdefine carriers and theiraircrafttodaywereconceivedand developed. Let’s take alook at a few of the mostcritical of these events and

trends. We’ll start with thefirst act in the birth of theworld’s most powerfulconventional weaponssystem.

EugeneEly’sStunt

Our journey begins in1908,justfiveyearsaftertheWright brothers’ first flight,whenGlennCurtiss, anearlyaerial pioneer, laid out a

bombing range in the shapeofabattleship,andsimulatedattacking it.Though theU.S.NavytooknoticeofCurtiss’stest run, it took no action.Severalyearslater,afterwordreachedAmericaofaGermanattempt to fly an airplanefrom the deck of a ship, theU.S. Navy decided to try asimilar experiment. Theybuiltawoodenplatformoverthe main deck of the lightcruiser Birmingham (CL-2)

and engaged Eugene Ely, astunt pilot working forCurtiss, to fly off it. At 3P.M. on the afternoon ofNovember 14th, 1910, whileBirminghamwasanchored inHampton Roads, Virginia,Elygunnedhisengine,rolleddown the wooden platform,and flewoff.He landed nearNorfolk several miles away.A few months later, Elyreversed the process andlanded on another platform

built on the stern of thearmoredcruiserPennsylvania(ACR-4), which was thenanchored in San FranciscoBay. Soon afterward,Congress began toappropriate money, the firstnaval aviators began to betrained, and planes began togotoseawiththefleet.Itwasa humble beginning, butEugene Ely’s barnstormingstunt had started somethingverymuchbiggerthanthat.

TheFirstFlattop:TheConversionoftheUSS

Langley(CV-1)

Stuntswere one thing, butmaking naval aviation acredible military force wassomething else entirely.During World War I, U.S.naval aviation was primarilyseaplanes used for gunneryspotting and antisubmarinepatrols. However, the Britishachieved some fascinating

results using normal(wheeled) pursuit aircraft(fighters) launched fromtowed barges, and later fromspeciallybuiltaircraftcarriersconverted from the hulls ofother ships. These aircraftattacked German Zeppelinhangars and other targets.6The benefits of taking high-performance aircraft to seaweresoobvioustotheBritishthat the Royal Navy rapidly

settoconvertingfurthershipsinto aircraft carriers. Thismovedidnotgounnoticedbyother Naval powers afterWorld War I. By 1919, theJapanese were alsoconstructing a purpose-builtcarrier, the Hosho.Meanwhile the Britishcontinued their program ofconverting hulls into aircraftcarriers, and began work ontheir own from-the-keel-upcarrier,theHermes.

Eugene Ely flies off of theUSSPennsylvania at 3 P.M.on November 14th, 1910.Thiswasthemomentofbirthfornavalaviation.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTO

These programs spurred

theGeneralBoardoftheU.S.Navy to start its ownaircraftcarrier program. In 1919, theboard allocated funds toconvert a surplus collier, theUSS Jupiter, into theNavy’sfirst aircraft carrier, the USSLangley (CV-1)—nicknamedthe“CoveredWagon”byher

crew. For the next twodecades, the little Langleyprovided the first generationof U.S. carrier aviators withtheir initial carrier training,and offered the fleet aplatform to experiment withthe combat use of aircraftcarriers.WhenWorldWar IIarrived, the slow little shipwasconvertedintoatransportformovingaircrafttoforwardbases, and was sunk duringthe fighting around the Java

barrierin1942.However,theLangley remains a belovedmemory for the men wholearned the naval aviationtradeaboardher.

TheWashingtonNavalTreaty:TheBirthoftheModernAircraftCarrier

While the Langley wasprimarily a test and trainingvessel,herinitialtrialsledthe

Navy leadership to buildlarger aircraft carriers thatcould actually servewith thebattle fleet.Theproblemwasfinding the money to buildthese new ships. The early1920’s were hardly the timeto request funds for a newand unproved navaltechnology, when the fleetwasdesperatelytryingtoholdonto the modern battleshipsconstructed during the FirstWorld War. The solution

came after the five greatnaval powers (the UnitedStates, Great Britain, Japan,France, and Italy) signed theworld’s first arms-controltreaty at the WashingtonNaval Conference of 1922.Though the treaty set quotasand limits on all sorts ofwarship classes, includingaircraft carriers, a bit of fineprint provided all thesignatories with theopportunitytoget“something

fornothing.”

TheUSSLangley(CV-1),theU.S. Navy’s first aircraftcarrier. She was convertedfrom the collier Jupiter. Sheserved as a floatinglaboratory for U.S. navalaviation into the 1930s, andwas subsequently sunk in1942during theBattleof theJavaSea.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTO FROM THECOLLECTION OF A. D.

BAKERAt the end of the war,

several countries wereconstructing heavybattleships and battlecruisers,7 which were stillunfinished in the early1920’s.Meanwhile, the 1922WashingtonNavalTreaty setlimits on the maximumallowable displacement andgun size of individual ships,as well as a total quota of

tonnage available to eachsignatory nation (the famous5:5:3 ratio).8 Even afterscrapping older dreadnought-era battleships, the nationswithin the agreement wereleftwithnoroomforbuildingnew battleships and battlecruisers (which were classedtogetherbecauseofgunsize).However, the treaty allowedthe signatories to convert apercentage of their allowable

carriertonnagefromthehullsof the uncompleted capitalships. What made thisespecially attractive was thatthe new carriers could bearmed with the same 8-in/203mmgunarmamentasaheavy cruiser. Thus, even ifthe aircraft carriersthemselves proved to beunsuccessful, those heavycruisergunswouldstillmaketheshipsuseful.

The British had alreadyconvertedtheirtonnagequotawith the Furious,Courageous, Glorious, andEagle, while the Japaneseconverted their new carriersfrom the uncompleted battlecruiser Akagi and thebattleship Kaga. TheAmerican vessels, however,were something special. TheU.S. Navy wanted its twonewcarrierstobethebiggest,fastest, and most capable in

theworld.Thestartingpointswere a pair of partiallycompletedbattlecruiserhulls.Already christened theLexingtonandSaratoga, theywereconvertedintotheshipsthat the fledgling naval airarm had always dreamed of.Whencommissionedin1927,the Lexington (CV-2) andSaratoga (CV-3) were notonly the largest (36,000-tonsdisplacement), fastest (thirty-five knots), most powerful

warships in the world, (mostimportant)theycouldoperateuptoninetyaircraft,twicethecapacity of the Japanese orBritish carriers.9 TheLexington and Saratoga alsofeatured a number of newdesign features (such as thenow-familiar “island”structures, which containedthe bridge, flight controlstations, and uptakes for theengineering exhausts), which

greatly improved theirefficiency and usefulness.The treaty-mandated gunturrets were placed in fourmounts fore and aft of theislandstructure.TheaircraftcarriersSaratoga(CV-3,intheforeground)andLexington (CV-2, in thebackground) together nearDiamond Head, Hawaii. Atthe time this was taken, thetwo converted battle cruisers

were the largest, fastest, andmost powerful warships intheworld.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTO FROM THECOLLECTION OF A. D.BAKER

Withthecommissioningofthe Lexington and Saratoga(and parallel rapid strides innaval aircraft design), theU.S. Navy took the worldlead in naval aviationdevelopment.Virtually all ofthe American leaders whocommanded carriers and airunits during the SecondWorldWarservedtheirearlytours of duty aboard the two

giantcarriers.Inaddition,theseries of fleet problems (wargames) involving theLexington and Saratoga ledto the tacticsAmericawouldtake into the coming PacificwarwithJapan.

TheTarantoRaidandtheSinkingoftheBattleship

Bismarck

Always leaders in the

development of navalaviation technology andtactics, the British hadplanned for and assimilatedthe aircraft carrier into theirfleet long before the openingof the Second World War.This was not merelyinstitutional integration, forthere were also plans forpotential wartime carrieroperations. One of theseplans, devised in the 1930s,involved a surprise strike

against the Italianbattle fleetbased at Taranto harbor insouthernItaly:Acarrierforcewould approach at night,launch torpedo bombers, andsink the Italian battleships attheirmoorings.The opportunity to

implement the plan camesoon after the Italiandeclaration of war on GreatBritain (inJuneof1940)andthe fall of France (later that

summer). Despite the highlyaggressive efforts of theBritish Mediterranean Fleetunder their legendarycommander, Fleet AdmiralSirAndrewCunningham, thefleetwas in trouble from thestart.Itwasoutnumberedandsplit by Fascist Italy, sincethe Italian peninsulamore orless bisects theMediterranean.By the fallof1940, Italy had six modernbattleships, while

Cunningham onlycommanded a pair. His onlyreal advantages were a fewshipsequippedwithradar,theBritish intelligence ability toread Axis cryptographic(codeandcipher) traffic, andapairofaircraftcarriers—theoldEagle and the brand-newarmored deck flattop HMSIllustrious. Doing what hecould tomake theoddsmoreeven, Cunningham orderedhis staff to plan a carrier

aircraft strike on the ItalianfleetbaseatTaranto.Thoughthey had no real-worldexperiencetoworkfrom,andonly sketchy data from oldfleet exercises about how toproceed, with typical Britishaplomb they began trainingaircrews andmodifying theiraerial torpedoes so theywouldrunsuccessfullyintheshallow water of TarantoHarbor.Meanwhile,aspecialflight of Martin Maryland

bombers began regularreconnaissanceofItalianfleetanchorages.ByNovemberof1940, they were ready to gowithOperationJudgment.Though the original

Operation Judgment plancalled for almost thirtySwordfish torpedo bombersfrom both Eagle andIllustrious, engine problemswithEagle and a hangar fireonIllustriouscutthatnumber

considerably.Intheend,onlyIllustrious, along with anescort force of battleships,cruisers, and destroyers, setout toconduct theattack.Onthe night of November 11th,Illustrious and severalescorting cruisers broke offfrom the main force, andmade a run north into theGulf of Taranto. Later thatnight, Illustrious launched apair of airstrikes usingtwenty-one Swordfish

torpedo bombers (only adozen of which carried themodified shallow-watertorpedoes). The two strikessank three of the six Italianbattleships then in port anddamaged several smallerships and some shorefacilities.10 In just a fewhours,thebrilliantlyexecutedstrike had cut the Italianbattleship fleet in half, andchanged thebalanceofnaval

powerintheMediterranean.Whilemost of theworld’s

attention was focused at thetimeon theBattleofBritain,theeyesofnavalleaderswereturned on OperationJudgment. Even before theItalians began salvageoperations, naval observersfromaround theworldbeganto pour into Taranto to viewthe wreckage, and writereports back to their home

countries. Most of thesereportswerequietly readandfiled away,or elsewere readanddiscounted(suchwasstillthe potency of the battleshipmyth). In Tokyo, however,the report of the Japanesenaval attaché was read withinterest. This reporteventually became theblueprint for an even moredevastating carrier raid thefollowing year, when over360 aircraft launched from

six big carriers would makethe strike. The target wouldbeentireU.S.PacificFleetatPearlHarbor.Outof the tinystrikeonTarantoemergedthedecisivenavalweaponof theSecondWorldWar.Less than sixmonths after

the Taranto raid, battleshipenthusiasts got a shockingdose of reality with the seachase and sinking of theGerman battleship Bismarck,

one of the most powerfulwarships in the world. AftertheBismarckbrokeoutoftheBaltic Sea into the NorthAtlantic, she sank theBritishbattle cruiser HMS Hood.Outraged at this defeat (andhumiliation), Prime MinisterWinston Churchill orderedtheBismarcktobesunkatallcosts. Though she wasdamaged enough during herfight with theHood to needrepairsinport,andherBritish

enemies were in hot pursuit,Bismarck was still adangerous foe, and was ableto slip away from herpursuers and make for aFrenchport.She might well have

escaped,butfortheeffortsoftwoBritishaircraftcarriers.Astrike by Swordfish torpedobombers from the carrierVictorious slowed down theGerman monster, while

anotherstrikefromthecarrierArk Royal crippled her. Thefollowingday,Bismarck wasfinallysunkbyshellfirefromthe British battleships KingGeorgeVandRodney. In thecelebration that followed, thecontributions of theSwordfish crews fromVictorious and Ark Royalgenerally went unnoticed—again. However, navalobserverstooknoteandwrotetheirreportshome;andnaval

professionals around theworld began to wonder ifaircraftfromcarriersmightdomore than just hit ships inharbor. One of the mostmodernandpowerfulshipsinthe world had been crippledby a single torpedo droppedby a nearly obsolete, fabric-covered biplane in the openocean.Before the end of 1941,

further proof that the age of

battleships had passed camewith the Japanese attack onPearlHarbor and the sinkingafewdayslateroftheBritishbattleship Prince of WalesandthebattlecruiserRepulseby land-based aircraft.Whilebattleshipswouldcontinue toplay an important part inWorld War II, it was navalaircraft flying from carriersthat would win the comingnaval war. The strike onTaranto and the crippling of

theBismarckhadseentothat.

TaskForce34/58:TheUltimateNavalForce

Now that the newweaponwasproven, thenextstageinitsevolutionwastoworkoutits most effective use. Thiscame during 1943.That yearsawaperiodofrebuildingforboth the United States andJapan. After the vast carrier-

verses-carrier battles (CoralSea, Midway, EasternSolomons, and Santa Cruz)that had dominated theprevious year’s fighting, thetwo navies had reachedsomething like stalemate andexhausted their fleets ofprewar carriers. Meanwhile,in the Solomons, on NewGuinea, and in the MarshallIslandsintheCentralPacific,Allied ground forces wereconducting their first

amphibious invasions on theroadtoTokyo.On January 1st, 1943, the

first of a new generation ofAmerican fleet carriers, theEssex-class (CV-9), wascommissioned.Over thenexttwo years, almost two dozenoftheseincomparablevesselscame off the builder’s ways.Utilizing all the lessonslearned from earlier U.S.carriers, the Essex-class

vessels were big, fast, andbuilt to take the kinds ofpunishment that modernnaval combat sometimesdishesout.Theirdesignsalsogave them huge margins formodifications and systemsgrowth. So adaptable wereEssex-class ships that a fewwere still in service in the1970’s, flyingsupersonic jetsarmedwithnuclearweapons!The ships of the Essex-

classwere just the tip of theAmerica carrier productioniceberg in 1943, for theU.S.Navy also approved theconversion of nine cruiserhulls into light carriers (witha complement of thirty-fiveaircraft). Though small andcramped, they were fastenough(thirty-threeknots) tokeepupwiththeirEssex-classsiblings. Known as theIndependence class (CVL-22), they served well

throughout the remainder ofthewar.Along with the fast fleet

carriers, the United Statesalso produced almost ahundred smaller escort, or“jeep,”carriers.Builtonhullsdesigned for merchantvessels, they could makeabout twentyknotsandcarryaround two dozen aircraft.While their crews jokedwryly that their ships were

“combustible,vulnerable,andexpendable” (from theirdesignator: CVE), the escortcarriers fulfilled a variety ofnecessary tasks. Theseincluded antisubmarinewarfare (ASW), aircrafttransportation, amphibioussupport, close air support(CAS), etc. This had theeffectof freeing thebig fleetcarriers for their comingduels with the ImperialJapaneseNavy.

As the new fleet carriersheadedwest into the Pacific,they would stop at PearlHarbor for training andintegrationintocarrierforces.Together with a steady flowof fast, new battleships,cruisers,destroyers,andothersupport ships, theywould beformedintowhatwerecalled“task groups.” Experiencegained during raids onvarious Japanese islandoutposts in1943showed that

the optimum size for suchgroups was three or fourcarriers (additional carrierstended to make the groupsunwieldy), a pair of fastbattleships, four cruisers, andbetween twelve and sixteendestroyers.On those occasions when

larger forceswere called for,twoormoretaskgroupswerejoined into a “task force.”These were commanded by

senior Naval aviators, andwere assigned joint strikemissions, refuelingassignments, and evenindependent raids. Though ittook time to pull this hugeorganizationtogetherandfindthemencapableofleadingit,by the winter of 1943/1944,what became known as TaskForce 34/58 was ready foraction.11 Task Force 34/58,themostpowerfulnavalforce

in history, put the lid on theJapanese Navy’s coffin, andnaileditshut.The ships of the fast carrierforceatUlithiAtollin1944.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTO FROM THECOLLECTION OF A. D.BAKER

In February of 1944, nowcomposedoffourtaskgroupswithtwelvefastcarriers,TaskForce58,underViceAdmiralMarc Mitscher, raided theJapanese fleet anchorage atTruk, wrecking the base anddrivingtheImperialFleetoutof the Central Pacific.Mitscher, a crusty pioneernaval aviator, aided by hislegendary chief of staff

Captain Arleigh Burke, ranTask Force 58 like a well-oiledmachine.By theendofMay, preparations had beencompleted for an invasion ofthe Marianas Island group,just1,500nm/2,800kmfromTokyo (thus within range ofthe new B-29 heavybombers).Sincetheseislandswere essential to the defenseof the home islands, theJapanese had to fight forthem. The largest carrier-

versus-carrierfightofthewarresulted.As soon as the invasion

forcesofAdmiralSpruance’s5th Fleet hit the beaches ofSaipan in early June, theentire Japanese battle fleetsortied from their base innorthern Borneo tocounterattack. When theyarrivedonJune19th,theninecarriers of the revitalizedJapanese carrier force (three

large, three medium, andthree light fleet carriers) gotin the first strike, launchingtheir planes against TaskForce 58 (now with sevenlarge and eight light fleetcarriers).Thatwas their finalhurrah;fortheJapanesestrikesimply fell apart against theradar-directed fighters andantiaircraft fire of theAmericantaskgroups.Ofthe326Japaneseplaneslaunchedagainst the American fleet,

220 were shot down. Not asingleU.S. shipwas sunk orseriouslydamaged.Thenextday,theU.S.fleet

found the Japanese carrierforce and launched acounterstrike. Blastingthrough the survivingJapanese planes, they sankthe carrier Hiyo and severalvitalfleetoilers,anddamagednumerous other ships beforereturning toTaskForce58.12

The next day, the decisivelybeaten Japanese forcewithdrew to Japan. So greatwere the losses to Japaneseair crews that their carrierswouldneveragainsortieasacredibleforce.WhentheU.S.3rd Fleet invaded thePhilippines in October of1944, the four Japanesecarriers that took part in theBattle of Leyte Gulf wereused purely as decoys, andsunkbyairattacksfromTask

Force34.

TheRevoltoftheAdmirals,theUSSUnitedStates(CV-58),andtheKoreanWar

WhenJapansurrenderedinSeptember of 1945, theUnited States had over ahundred carriers incommission or being built.Withinmonths,theNavyhadbeen slashed to a fraction of

its wartime peak. Only thenewest and most capablecarriers and other warshipswere retained in the tinyNavy that remained. Part ofthis massive force reductionwas a consequence of thesimple fact that the war hadended and the naval threatfrom the Axis nations hadbeeneliminated.Butthatwasnot the only rationale forcutting the fleet and otherconventionalforces.

The major reason for thecut was the development ofthe atomic bomb.Specifically,theleadershipofthe new United States AirForce(USAF)hadconvincedthe Truman Administrationthat their force of heavybombersarmedwith thenewnuclear weapons couldenforcethepeace,protect theinterestsoftheUnitedStates,and do it without largeconventional ground and

naval forces. This was adebatablepoint,whicheventswere soon to prove hugelywrong. But the immediateresultwasamassofhostilitythat broke out between theNavy and USAF in the lastyearsofthe1940’s.The hostility did not start

then,however.Ithaditsrootsin the 1920’s in the battlesover airpower between theNavy and Brigadier General

Billy Mitchell. Mitchell, anairpower zealot andvisionary, was not an easyman to like. He had alreadyfought a losing battle toconvinceArmyleadersofthevirtues of airpower.Meanwhile, the small corpsof Army aviators saw thedeveloping strength ofNavalaviation,whichsomeofthemsaw as taking funds andsupportthatshouldhavebeentheirs. To set right this

(perceived) imbalance,Mitchell and his fliers(against orders) sank thecaptured German battleshipOstfriesland, an act that didnotsitwellwiththeNavy.In1925, fed up withMitchell’sstingsandbarbs,hissuperiorsbrought him up before acourt-martial,whereMitchell,ever unrepentant, stated thatairpower made the navies ofthe world both obsolete andunnecessary. Not

surprisingly, the Navy (andothers) publicly defendedthemselves against thesecharges, and they did it soeffectively that Mitchell’sprofessional career wasfinished. Mitchell’ssupporters never forgot orforgavethat.Theresultwasamulti-decadebloodfeud.The Navy/Air Force war

reached its peak during the1949 fight for new weapons

appropriations. Then as now,new weapons systems wereexpensive.Then, as now, theNavyandtheAirForcesawitas a zero-sum game: Youwin/I lose (or vice versa).Practicallyspeaking,thefightwasoverwhetherthenation’sdefense would be builtaround the new B-36 long-range bomber (armed withthe H-bomb), or a new fleetof large aircraft carriers(called supercarriers) armed

with a new series of navalaircraft that could carryatomic weapons. There wasonly enough money in thedefense budget for one ofthese systems, and the Navylost. The first supercarrier,the USSUnited States (CV-58), was canceled bySecretary of Defense LouisJohnson just days after herkeelhadbeenlaidatNewportNews,Virginia.

Outraged, the Navy’sleadershipmadetheircaseforNaval aviation in a series ofheated (some would sayfiery) congressional hearingsthat called into question thecapabilities of the B-36 andthehandlingof thematterbySecretaryJohnsonandtheAirForce.Johnsondidnotacceptthis“RevoltoftheAdmirals”patiently; the Navy’sleadership suffered for theirrebellion against him. Many

top admirals were forciblyretired, and the Navy paid ahigh price in personnel andappropriations.13 However, itdid manage to win somefiscal support formodernization of older fleetcarriers and development ofnewjetaircraft.This turned out to be a

godsend, for the fiscalfrugality of the TrumanAdministration came to a

crashing halt with theoutbreak of the Korean Warin 1950, which caught theU.S.andtheworldwiththeirmilitary pants down. Exceptfor some Air Force units inJapan and a few of thesurvivingaircraftcarriersandtheir escorts, there was littleto stop the North Koreanforces from overwhelmingthe South. Built around theUSS Valley Forge (CV-45)and the British light carrier

Triumph, Task Force 77wassentbytheUnitedNationstointerdict the flow of NorthKorean supplies and men.Eventually, Task Force 77grew to four Essex-classcarriers,andwouldbecomeapermanent fixture not onlyduring the Korean Conflict,but also throughout the ColdWar.For the next three years,

carrier-based fighter-bombers

rained destruction on theforces of North Korea and(after they entered theconflict) the People’sRepublicofChina.Koreawasnotaglamorouswar.For thepilots and crews of thecarriers and their escorts, itwas a long, cold, drudgery-laden, never-ending fight inwhichvictoryalwaysseemeddistant.Whatglorytherewaswent to the“jet-jocks”flyingtheir USAF F-86 Saber jets

up into “MiGAlley” to duelwith the Korean, Chinese,and Russian pilots in theirMiG- 15’s.But for theNavyand Marine pilots on thecarriers,Koreameantblastingthe same bridges andrailroads they had hit lastweek, and would hit againnext week. Still, Koreaanswered any question ofAmerica’s need for Navalaviation to protect its far-flung interests during the

ColdWar.WiththeendoftheKorean

Conflict,andtheinaugurationof a new President, theanswertookphysicalshapeinthecompletionof theaircraftcarrier development cycle.Within just a few years, thefirst of four new Forrestal-class (CV-59) supercarrierswould be built, setting amodel for every newAmerican carrier built ever

since. Despite improvementsin every system imaginable(fromnuclearpowerplantstoradar-guided SAM systems),the Forrestals have definedtheshapeofU.S.carriers foralmost forty years.Meanwhile, the developmentof aircraft like the F-4Phantom II, E-1 Tracer, S-2Tracker,andothers,ledtothepresent-day structure ofAmerican carrier air wings.And at the same time, the

rolesandmissionsofcarriersand theirbattlegroups—theirmoves as pieces on theColdWar chessboard—were fixedinthemindsofthepoliticiansthat would use them. Themodel set by the Forrestaland her jet-powered airwingwasanalmostperfectmixforthe Cold War. With someimprovements in Navalarchitecture and aircraftdesign, it has stayed on anddoneagreatjob.

CriticalTechnologies:

GettingOnandOfftheBoat

What things make carrier-based Naval aviationpossible? Actually, asurprisingly few criticaltechnologies set carrier andcarrier-capableaircraftdesign

apart from conventional shipand land-based aircraftdesigns.Mosthavetodowithgettingonandoffoftheship,andbeingtoughenoughtodoitoveraperiodofdecades.

TheNeedforSpeed:ChasingtheWind

Other than being a lot offun, speed is essential foraircraft carriers ... for two

reasons:• High speedgenerates artificialwindovertheflightdecktoassistinthelaunching andlandingofaircraft.• High sustainedspeed allowscarriers to rapidlytransit from onepartoftheworldtoanother.

Windoverthedeckallows

some influence over anaircraft’s “stall speed”—thatis, the minimum speed atwhich an aircraft can still becontrolledwithout fallingoutof the sky. The lower anaircraft’s stall speed, theeasieritwillbetolaunchandland (a consideration that’sespecially important on the

pitching deck of an aircraftcarrier). You get wind overthe deck, first of all, simplybysteeringthecarrierintothewind. Every knot of windoverthebowactsasaknotofairspeedforanaircraft tryingto take off or land, which iswhy carriers always comeinto the wind to conductflight operations. You getevenmorewindoverthedeckby cranking up the speed ofthecarrier.Thus, ifyouhave

afifteen-knotwindandsteaminto it at twenty-five knots,you can effectively launchand land aircraft at fortyknotsundertheirnormalstallspeed. Putting wind over thedeck also maximizes aircraftpayload and return weightand reduces stress on theflightdeck.Allofthismeansthat carriers will be usingtheir maximum speed moreoftenthanotherships.

Carriers need more thanjust a high maximum speed(forlaunchingandrecoveringaircraft); they need tomaintain a high transit speedsoCVBGscanmovequicklyacross theoceans.Thewholepoint of forward presence isto have it available now.Building a high, sustainedspeed intoa ship isnoteasy.While many ships may becapableof“dashing”forshorttimesathighspeeds,theyare

normallydesignedtocruiseatmore sane and economicalrates. The twelve-knotcruising speed of youraveragemerchantshipisfinefor transporting cars orathletic shoes, but it justwon’tdoifyouwanttomoveaCVBG in a few days fromtheSouthChinaSea (say) tothePersianGulf.Thatmeanscarrier power plants have tobedurableenoughtocruiseathighspeedsfordaysorweeks

at a time, without having toputinforrepairsoroverhaul.This is one of the reasonswhynuclearpowerplantsandtheir highly reliablemachineryhavebeenthegoldstandardforcarriersforgoingon three decades. Just howfast is fast enough? Mostnaval analysts believe thatcarriers require minimumbattle/flank speeds of thirty-three knots/ sixty-one kph tooperate aircraft in the widest

possible wind and weatherconditions, and sustainedspeeds of at least twentyknots/thirty-seven kph toallow for rapid transits tocrisisareas.A prototype F/A-18E SuperHornet prepares for a testlaunchfromacatapultaboardtheUSSJohnStennis (CVN-74). The plane handler isguiding the pilot to thecatapult shuttle, which will

launchtheaircraft.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTO

CatapultsandWires:GettingOnandOffthe

Boat

Thoughaircraftcarriersarevery big, there is still verylittle roomon the flightdeckto support takeoffs andlandings. Since a carrieroperatesasmanyaircraftasasmall regional airport on justa few acres of flat space(about4.5 acreson aNimitz-class (CVN-68) ship), it

makes sense to takeadvantage of somemechanical muscle to assistthe aircraft on and off theflight deck. To this end,carrier designers have formany years depended uponthe tried-and-truetechnologies of catapults (togiveaircraftthespeedtotakeoff) and arresting wires (togivethedragtoland).The current generation of

carrier catapults are basicallynothing but steam-poweredpistons ... steam-poweredpistons that can throw aCadillac half a mile (onekilometer). That’s a lot ofpower! But when you’retrying to fling a fully loadedaircraft like an F-14 Tomcator E-2C Hawkeye off acarrier deck, you need thatmuch power. This is how itworks. Simply described, thecatapult is a pair of several-

hundred-foot-long tubes builtinto the deck, with an openslot along the top (at decklevel) that’s sealed by a pairof overlapping syntheticrubber flanges. A “shuttle”running above the deck isattached(throughtheflanges)to pistons at the rear of thetubes; and the nosewheeltowbar of the aircraft isattachedtotheshuttlewhenitis launched. To accomplishthe launch, high-pressure

steam, drawn from thecarrier’s propulsion plantpressurizes the tubes behindthe pistons.When the properpressure is reached, a lock isreleased, a small, disposablefastener called a “holdback”(itholdsthenosewheeltotheshuttle)breaks loose, and thepistons (and attached shuttle)fling the aircraft down thedeck.At the end of the deckthe towbar releases from theshuttle, and the aircraft is

airborne. The piston andshuttle assemblies are thenrunaft(backtotherearofthetubes) inorder toprepare forthenextlaunch.Catapults are high-

maintenance, complex, high-risk pieces of equipment thathave theuglyhabitof failingor breaking if they are nottreatedwithlovingcare.Thisis one of the reasons whysome nations have chosen to

forgo them in their carriersand employ insteadvertical/short takeoff andlanding (V/STOL) aircraft(like the Harrier/Sea Harrierjump jet), which do notrequire catapults to operatefrom ships. Though thetechnology behind a carriercatapult is relatively simple,the size of the tubes and themagnitude of the forcesinvolvedmakedesigningandbuilding them hugely

difficult. Very few nationshave either the technical orindustrialskillstobuildthem.Thus, the very proud andcompetitive French (whodon’t like to admit to beingsecond in anything military)arebuyingAmericancatapultunits for their newsupercarrier, Charles deGaulle. The Soviets, after agenerationoftrying,failedtodeviseareliablecatapultunitfor their carrier, the

Kuznetzov.While taking off from a

carrier isdifficult, landingonone is almost appalling!Setting down a CTOL(Conventional Take Off andLanding)aircraftlikeanF/A-18 Hornet strike fighter, forexample, has been comparedtotakingaswandiveoutofasecond-floor window andhittingapostagestampontheground with your tongue.

During the Vietnam War,scientistsmadeastudytofindoutwhennavalaviatorswereunder their greatest stressduring a mission. Theircardiac monitors told thescientists that getting shot atin a bomb run was not evenclose to the stress of a nightcarrier landing in heavyweather. In order to makecarrier landings easier andless fearsome, the Navy hasdeveloped a series of

automatic and assistedlanding aides to help pilotsget their aircraft onto theheaving, pitching deck. Butonce you’re there, how doyou stop thirty or forty tonsof aircraft that have justslammed down at somethingoverahundredknots?Well,youattachahook to

the tail of your aircraft (thefamous“tailhook”)and“trap”itononeofaseriesofcables

set across the deck. Thesecables are woven from high-tensile steel wire, which arestretched across the afterportion of the ship. Usuallyfour of these cables are laidout along the deck. The firstis placed at the very rear ofthecarrier(calledthe“ramp”bynavalaviators);thesecondafewhundredfeetforwardofthat;andsoon.Thelastgoesjust behind the angle thatleadsofftheport(left)sideof

the ship. This creates a boxintowhich the pilotmust flythe aircraft and plant histailhookontothedeck.A prototype F/A-18E SuperHornet about to “trap” alanding wire during trialsaboard the carrier JohnStennis(CVN-74).BOEING MILITARYAIRCRAFT

What happens if a pilot

misses the wires? Well, thatis another issue entirely.CTOL carrier landing decksareangledtoport(left),about14°offthecenterline.Thisisso that if an aircraft fails to“trap” a wire, then it is notheadedforwardintoamassofparked aircraft. Instead, the

aircraft is now headedforward to port. This is thereasonwhyoneverylanding,as soon as they feel theirwheels hit the deck, pilotsslam the engine throttles tofull power. Thus, if they donot feel the reassuring tugofthe wire catching the hook(more of a forward slamactually),theycanjustflyoffthe forward deck (a “touchandgo”)andgetbackintothepatternforanothertry.Thisis

known as a “bolter,” andmost naval aviators make alotoftheseintheircareers.Generally, hitting the

rearmost (or “number one”)wireisconsidereddangerous,since by doing that you’reriskingcomingintoolowandpossibly hitting the stem(fantail)of thecarrier (whichisknownasa“rampstrike”).Sotooiscatchingthelastone(“number four”). Because

youdon’thavemuchroomtoregainairspeedintheeventofa“bolter,”youriskastallandpossiblecrashwhiletryingtoclimb back into the pattern.Catching the number-twowire is acceptable. Butcatching the number-threewire (called an “OK Three”bytheaircrews)isoptimum,for it allowsmaximum roomfrom the fantail andmaximum rolling distance toregain speed and energy in

the event of a bolter.Catching the “number three”is evidence of greatprofessionalism and skill. Infact,ifthereisnotashootingwar around to test yourabilities and courage, then aconsistent string of “OKThree”trapsisconsideredthebest path to promotion andsuccessforacarrierpilot.So what comes next? You

havehitan“OKThree”trap,

your aircraft’s tailhook hassuccessfully caught a wire,yet you are still hurtlingforward at a breathtakingspeed and may fly off theforward deck edge of the“angle” at anymoment if alldoesn’t go well. In otherwords, the excitement isn’tover. Each end of thearresting wire runs though amechanismin thedeckdownto a series of hydraulic rambuffers, which act to hold

tensiononthewire.Whentheaircraft’s tailhook hits thewire, the buffers dampen theenergy from the aircraft,yanking it to a rapid halt.Once the aircraft stops, thepilotretracts thehook,andisrapidly taxied out of thelanding zone guided by aplane handler. While this ishappening, the wires areretracted to their “readylanding” position, so thatanotheraircraftcanbelanded

as quickly as possible.Whenit is done properly, moderncarriers can land an aircraftevery twenty to thirtyseconds.

AircraftStructures:ControlledCrashes

Any combat aircraft issubjected to extraordinarystressesandstrains.However,compared with your average

Boeing737runningbetween,say, Baltimore andPittsburgh, carrier-capableaircraft have the addedstresses of catapult launchesandwire-caughtlandingsthatare actually “controlledcrashes.” That means youraverage carrier-capablefighter or support aircraft isgoing to lug around a bitmore muscle in its airframesthan, say, a USAF F-16operating from a land base

with a nice, long, wide,concrete runway. This addedrobustness of carrier aircraft(compared with their land-basedcounterparts) isagoodthing when surface-to-airmissiles and antiaircraft gunsarepumpingordnanceintheirdirection. But it also meansthat carrier aircraft, becauseof their greater structuralweight, have always paid apenalty in performance,payload,andrangecompared

with similar land-basedaircraft.This structural penalty,

however, may well bebecomingathingof thepast.Today, aircraft designers arearmedwithagrowingfamilyof non-metallic structuralmaterials (composites,carbon-carbon, etc.), as wellas new design tools, such ascomputer-aideddesign/computer-aided

manufacturing (CAD/CAM)equipment. They have beenfinding ways to make themost recent generation ofcarrier aircraft light andstrong,whilegivingthemtheperformance to keep upwiththe best land-based aircraft.This is why carrier-capableaircraft like the F/A-18Hornet have done well inexport sales (Australia,Finland, and Switzerlandhave bought them). The

Hornet gives up nothing inperformance to itscompetitors from LockheedMartin, Dassault-Breguet,Saab, MiG, and Sukhoi. Infact, the new generation ofU.S.tacticalaircraft,theJSF,may not pay any “structural”penalty at all. Current planshaveall threeversions (land-based, carrier-capable, andV/STOL) using the samebasic structural components,which means that all three

should have similarperformance characteristics.Notbadfora flyingmachinethat has to lug around thehundreds of pounds of extrastructure and equipment thatallowittooperateoffaircraftcarriers.All of these technologies

have brought carrier aircraftto their current state of theart. However, plan on seeingimportantchangesinthenext

few years. For example,developments in enginetechnologymaymeanaircraftwith steerable nozzles thatwill allow for takeoffs andlandings independent ofcatapults and arrestingwires.Whatever happens in thetechnology arena, count onnaval aircraft designers totakeadvantageofevery trickthatwillbuythemapoundofpayload,oraknotofspeedorrange. That’s because it’s a

mean, cruel world out therethesedays!

HandontheHelm:AnInterviewwith

AdmiralJayJohnson

GuidingPrincipals:OperationalPrimacy,Leadership,Teamwork,andPride.

AdmiralJayJohnson,SteerbytheStars

DuringthelonghistoryoftheU.S. Navy, there have beenmany inspirational examplesof individuals coming out ofnowhere at the time of needto lead ships, planes, andfleets on to victory. During

the American Civil War, forexample, a bearded,bespectacled gnome of anofficer named LieutenantJohnWordentookanewanduntried little ship named theMonitor into battle. WhenWorden faced the mightyConfederate ironclad ramVirginiaatHamptonRoadsin1862, his actions with theMonitor saved the UnionfrigateMinnesota, the Unionblockade fleet, and General

George McClellan’s armyfrom destruction.14 Moreimportantly, his inspired useof the little turreted ironcladforeverchangedthecourseofnaval design technology, andmade the wooden shipobsolete forever. There areotherexamples.A mere half century ago,

theUnitedStatesPacificFleetwas nearly destroyed by theJapanese at Pearl Harbor.

Within days of the raid thatbroughttheUnitedStatesintoWorld War II, a gravelly-voiced, leather-faced Texannamed Chester Nimitz waspicked to lead what was leftof the Pacific Fleet againstthe powerful forces ofImperial Japan. Nimitz’searly Naval service (mostlyspent quietly in the “pigboats” that the U.S. Navypassed off as submarines inthose days) gave no

indication that he was theman for the job. Nor did hislater career in virtuallyinvisible jobs at obscure (toordinaryfolks)placesliketheBureau of Navigation addmuch to that aura. When hewas made CINCPAC(Commander in Chief of thePacific), few Americansoutside of his friends in theNavy even knew the man’sname. With fleet moraleshattered by the events at

Pearl Harbor, he hardlyseemedaninspiringchoice.That opinion began to

change almost immediately,when Nimitz retained manyofthestaffofficerspresentatPearl Harbor, rather thancashiering them and bringingin his own people. The menresponded with total loyalty,and many were instrumentalin the subsequent Alliedvictory in the Pacific. His

action in retaining theseofficers, even though somecommanders would havegotten rid of them for theirperceived“responsibility”forthedisaster, proved tobe thefirstofanunbrokenstringofbrilliant personnel, planning,and operational decisions.These eventually broughtNimitztothedeckoftheUSSMissouri (BB-63) in 1945 asthe Navy’s representative toaccept the Japanese

surrender.ThoughtheNavyhasbeen

blessed with many fineleaders in its illustrioushistory, all the successes ofthe past are meaninglessunlessitcanserveeffectivelytoday and in the future. Thelate 1980s and early 1990shave tested the faith of eventhe most fervent U.S. Navysupporters. Following whatsome felt was a mediocre

performance during DesertStorm in 1991, the Navysuffered a string of publicrelations “black eyes” thatincluded the infamous 1991Tailhook scandal. There wasworse to come. In the springof1996,afteramediafrenzyand an intense round ofpubliccriticismoverbothhishandlingofpersonnelmattersand his own character, thepopular Chief of NavalOperations (CNO), Admiral

MikeBoorda, died of a self-inflictedgunshotwound.Thesuicide of thismuch-admiredsailor cast a pall over theentire fleet; andmany in andout of the Navy began toquestion the quality of Navyleadership. Clearly, it wastimeforatop-notchleadertostep up and take the helm.ThemanselectedtotakeoverasChiefofNavalOperationswas actually much closer athand than some would have

thought—in fact, just a fewdoors away in the office ofthe Vice Chief of NavalOperations. Admiral JayJohnsonwould soonstart theNavy back on the road toexcellence.Johnson, a career naval

aviator and fighter pilot, hasquietlyservedhiscountryandhisNavy formore than threedecades. A slim and trimofficer who looks years

youngerthanhisage,Johnsonis aquiet and sometimes shyman.But thequiet demeanoris something of a smokescreen.Thisman isa“doer,”who has chosen to make thehard decisions that will givetheU.S.Navyarealfutureinthe21stcentury.Johnsonisapassionate man, one whocares deeply about hiscountry, his Navy, and thesailorswho serve under him.He channels all that emotion

into one goal: to build theU.S. Navy into a superbfighting machine, anorganization that is onceagain the envy of militaryofficers everywhere in theworld.Jay L. Johnson came into

the world in Great Falls,Montana, on June 5th, 1946.The son of a soldier in theArmyAirCorps,hespentthebulk of his youth in West

Salem, Wisconsin. Let’s lethim tell the story of hisjourneyintonavalservice:

AdmiralJayL.Johnson,USNOFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTOTom Clancy: Could youplease tell us a little aboutyour background and Navycareer?

Admiral Johnson: I wasborninMontana.Mydadwas

serving there at the time. Ididn’t stay there long—onlyabout a year. I spent the restofmyyouthinWisconsin,ina little townwitha lakenearit, not far from theheadwatersoftheMississippiRiver. That’s the totalexposure to water that I hadinmyearlyyears.

Tom Clancy: What madeyou choose the Navy as a

career?

Admiral Johnson: I’d beenintrigued by the militaryservice academies as I wasgrowing up. I had a distantrelative who had gone toWestPoint,andwasthinkingabout applying there myself.Then I went to a Boy ScoutNational Jamboree out inColorado Springs, Colorado,in what is now the Black

Forest, just down the roadfromtheAirForceAcademy.It was in 1960, I believe,about a year after the AirForce Academy had comeinto being. As part of ourstay,wewereinvitedtoatourthere. We also got to see ashow by the Thunderbirds[theAirForceprecision-flightdemonstration team]. As Iwatched that performance,andlookedatthatacademy,Isaid to myself, “I can do

this!”WhenIreturnedhome,IdecidedthatI’dapplytotheAirForceAcademy.BeforeIdid so, I found that I had anoption to go to the NavalAcademy at Annapolis. Ilookedintoit,foundoutabitabout carrier aviation, anddecided that was what Iwanted. I took thatopportunity,andhereIam.Admiral Jay Johnson, in hisPentagon office with the

author.JOHND.GHESHAM

Tom Clancy: Did you haveany particular “defining”experiences while at theAcademy?

AdmiralJohnson:Well ... Igot towatchRoger Staubach[the great Naval Academyand Dallas Cowboys starquarterback] play football.On a more serious note, the

most striking thing Iremember about my timethere is how close mycompanymatesandIbecame.To this day, we’reinseparable.Alotofthemarestill in the Navy today.Admiral Willie Moore, whois the USS Independence[CV-62] battle groupcommander, was a companymate of mine. My formerroommate is the Navalattaché to India. Rear

AdmiralPaulGaffney,whoistheChief ofNavalResearch,was also in my company.These are just a few of thepeople Imetat theAcademywho are special to mepersonally.

Tom Clancy: Were thereothernotablemembersoftheAcademy classes while youwerethere?

AdmiralJohnson:GuyslikeOllie North and Jim Webb[the former Secretary of theNavy]—and of course RogerStaubach from the class of‘65. I have always admiredhim.Eventhen,hewasamanof great integrity, courage,and superbphysicalprowess.What I see of Roger todaymatches exactly what I sawthen. It’s nice to see a guy

who is that solid early in hislife, remain so through ahighly visible career,retirement,andnewcareer.

TomClancy:Yougraduatedduring the depths of theVietnam conflict [1968].Were you immediately sentout to flight school and intothe Replacement Air Group

[RAG]?Admiral Johnson:Well, theydidmoveusthroughatanicepace, though I don’tremember it being any kindof“rush”job.Iwent throughflight training inprettymuchanormaltimeframe.Igotmywings in October of 1969.From there I headed out toSanDiegoandNASMiramarto learn to fly the F-8Crusader.

TomClancy:Youmusthavebeen there with some livinglegends,men like“HotDog”Brown and Jim “Ruff”Ruffelson,right?

AdmiralJohnson:Yes, theywere there. Being one of theF-8 “MiG Killers” was kindof theunusual foranewguyback then. It was the time

when a lot of the guys freshout of the Academy weregetting orders to F-4’s[PhantomIIs],andmostofuswere lined up to get into thePhantom community becausetheywerenewandtheywerehot! More than a few of uswound up flying F-8’sthough, and in retrospect itwas the best thing that everhappenedtome.TheF-8wasanawesomeairplane.And,asgoodas theairplanewas, the

community of people whoflew and supported it waseven better. We’re all stillpretty tight. We have F-8Crusaderreunionseveryyear.

TomClancy: Could you tellus a little about yourexperiencesintheCrusader?

Admiral Johnson: I hadaboutathousandhoursintheCrusader. I did two combatcruisestoVietnaminVF-191aboard the USS Oriskany[CVA-34],in1970and1972.AsIrecall,wewentoutforalong cruise, came back for ashort time, and then did anevenlongercruise.Inallthattime,Ionlyhadonebackseatride in a Phantom. I think Imaybeoneof the fewnavalaviators of my generation

whohas never flown anF-4.From the Crusader I wentstraightintotheF-14Tomcat.

Tom Clancy: From yourrecord,itlookslikeyouspentthemajorityofyourcareerintheTomcatcommunity.

Admiral Johnson: That’sright. I did my department

head tour and my squadroncommand tour in Tomcats.However, when I went tobecome an air wingcommander, I tried to flymost of the air wingairplanes. The planes I flewback then included the A-7Corsair, which is like astubby-nosedcousintotheF-8 without an afterburner. Ialso flew the A-6 Intruder.Later, on my second CAG[Commander, Air Group—

the traditional nickname foran Air Wing Commanderdatingbacktothebeginningsof carrier aviation], on mybattlegroupcommand tour, Iwound up flying the F/A-18Hornet. I still rememberflying the F-8, though. Yourfirst jet assignment is likeyour first love. It’s whereeverythingisdefinedforyou.

TomClancy:Followingyour

time in F-8’s, you seem tohavespentmostofyourtimeintheEastCoastunits.Isthatcorrect?

Admiral Johnson: It’scorrect, but it reallywasn’t aconscious decision on mypart. I guess it just workedoutthatway.Initially,whenIlearned to fly the Tomcat, Iheaded back out to theWestCoast and went through the

F-14RAG [ReplacementAirGroup], VF-124. Then I wasmoved back to the EastCoast, where I have prettymuchstayedeversince.

TomClancy:Obviously,youspent an eventful couple ofdecades with the fleet in the1970’sand80’s.Canyoutellus a few of the things thatstandoutinyourmind?

Admiral Johnson: TheVietnam experience standsout,ofcourse.TheoperationsagainstLibyainthe80’swereinteresting—OperationsPrairie Fire and EldoradoCanyon [the bombing ofLibyainApril1986].Iwasinandoutofthereseveraltimesduring that period. I alsoremember the day thatCommander Hank Kleeman

andtheguysfromVF-41[theBlack Aces] “splashed” twoLibyan Sukhois back in[August] 1981. I was sittingin flightdeckcontrol [on theUSS Nimitz [CVN-68],getting ready to man up andrecycleoneof thecombatairpatrol [CAP] stations. TheplanwastolandthefirstpairofF-14Tomcats.ThenIwasgoingtobepartofthesecond“go” of the day. It wasannouncedoverthe1MC[the

master public address systemon board the ship] thatsomething “big” had justhappened. When the two F-14’s that had shot down thetwo Libyan fighter-bombersgot back aboard, everyonewanted to look at the planesandseewhathadhappened.

TomClancy:Youcame intothis job [as Chief of NavalOperations, or CNO] at a

time of great crisis andturmoilfortheNavy.Amongother issues, AdmiralBoorda’s death was a greatblowtotheNavy.Whatwerethe important things that youhadtodowhenyouarrived?

Admiral Johnson: It wasimportanttometomakesure,becauseofAdmiralBoorda’sreputation as a sailor in thefleet, that the officers and

sailors in the fleet knew thatthings were going to be“O.K.” I sent out an “allhands”messagetothateffect,and spent the next eight orninemonths travelingaroundtheworld to get themessageouttothepeopleinthefleet.

TomClancy: As CNO, you

seem to have a uniqueworking partnership withSecretary of the Navy JohnDalton,and theCommandantoftheMarineCorps,GeneralCharles“Chuck”Krulak.Canyou tell us about thatrelationship?

AdmiralJayJohnsoneatinga1997 holiday meal withsailors aboard ship in thePersianGulf.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTOAdmiral Johnson: As youknow, before I got here,Secretary Dalton made thedecision to relocate theCommandant of the MarineCorps and most of his stafffrom theoldNavyAnnexup

the hill to the E-Ring of thePentagon. So now SecretaryDalton’s office is bracketedby the Commandant’s officeon one side, and the CNO’son the other. He’s got us instereo!Thedecision tomovethe Marine CorpsCommandantwasapowerfulone, in my opinion. Therelationship betweenSecretary Dalton and ChuckKrulak was already in placeevenbeforeIarrived.WhenI

got here as Vice CNO, andparticularly as I made thetransition to CNO, bothmenwere very understanding,supportive, and helpful. Icould not have asked for abetterwelcome.

Tom Clancy: It sounds likethethreeofyouhaveforgedaspecial working relationship

on this end of the E-Ringcorridor.Isthattrue?

AdmiralJohnson:Theshortanswer is yes! Theserelationships work very welldue to a number of factors.Firstofall,ChuckKrulakandI are friends. He and I areclose personally, as are ourwives.That’sagoodstarttoaprofessional relationship, butthere’s more to it than that.

We share some importantcommon goals. For example,we are both making aconcerted effort to lead oursailors and marines to workwell together in this age ofcooperation and coordinationbetween thevariousbranchesof the military. I mean, howthe hell are you going to dothat, if the top sailor andmarinecan’tgetalong?

The

relevance ofthe seaservices, boththe Navy andthe MarineCorps, is thatwe’re theforwardpresence forour country invirtually anymilitaryoperation.We’re there

first,andwe’reout last. It’sessential thatwe coordinateour forces todo the job aswell as it canbe done.We’re proudofourmission,proud of ourpeople, andproud of ourability to do

the jobtogether.That’s thestrength thatwe give to thecountry.Now, just

because we’retrying to worktogether onour variousmissions doesnot mean that

the job ofcoordinatingthe Navy andthe MarineCorps is aneasy one,either forChuckandme,orfortheotherofficers andenlistedsoldiersonourstaffs. Wework with

some verychallengingissues, and wearen’t alwaysable to agreecompletely oneverypointwediscuss. As inany workingrelationship,there areoccasionalconflicts.

Admiral JayJohnsonrelaxing in hisPentagonoffice duringhis interviewwith theauthor.JOHN D.GRESHAM

But we’re

committed toworkingthrough themandformulatingsolutions. Theprinciples thatunderlie ourworkingpartnership

and thefriendshipbetweenChuck andmegirds it all andmakes itpossible for usto workthrough thoseharddecisions.This benefitsboth services.Both Chuckand I have the

support andguidance ofSecretaryDaltonaswell.I think wehave a prettygoodteam.

Tom Clancy: As we allknow,it’sbeenachallengingdecade for the Navy. Inaddition to issues likeTailhook and Admiral

Boorda’s death, there werereal problems that had beenbuilding for over twodecades.Youwere placed inchargeofaNavywhoseshipshadbeen runhardduring theColdWaryears.Canyoutellusabitaboutthestateofthefleettoday?

Admiral Johnson: Despitethe many challenges we’rehad to endure, the Navy has

carriedonwonderfully,inmyview, in terms of reacting tothe requirements that havebeen levied upon it. Ourmission as the nation’sforward-deployed forcemeanswehavetobepreparedtorespondatall timestoanysituation in which we areneeded.Therelevanceofthatmissionwillnotchangeaswego into the 21 st century. Ibelieve we are ready. That’swhat we do, seven days a

week,365daysayear.Ithinkthat one of the greatestchallengesthatwefaceintheNavy is reassuring theAmericanpeopleof the levelof our commitment to themission to serve and protectthem. This is important,because for a lot of people,whatwedo is sortof “offoftheradarscope.”

Tom Clancy: Given what

youhavejustsaid,howisthefleet bearing up under thisextremely high OperationsTempo[Optempo]?

Admiral Johnson: That’s aquestion that requires ananswer on more than onelevel. There is no denyingthat our sailors, by the verynature of their work, spendtime away from their homesand families. Some of the

things thatwe are looking atarewaystomakesurethatwedon’toverstretchourselves.

Right nowwe have apolicy thatsays that shipswill have nomore than sixmonthsforward-deployed atsea, from

portal toportal. We’realsomaintaining aratio of two-to-onefortimeathomeporttodeployed time,and no morethan fiftypercentoftimeout of homeportwhen youare off

deployment.We are

adhering tothat policy,and I am theonly one whocan waive itforanyreason.In fact,whether weare standingby that policyis one of my

own measuresof whether weare “stretchingthe rubberband tootight,” wherepeople areconcerned. Soright now,we’reOKwiththat situation.Now, we havehad a coupleof exceptions

tothisrulelastyear becauseof problemswith shipmaintenanceina yard thatclosed down.The result isthatintermsofreadiness andexecution, thefleet is“answering onall bells.” I

want to makesure as youwalk backfrom lookingat deploymentissues, thateveryone isgettingenoughtraining to getready, but notso much thattheir homelives suffer.We also want

to make surethat the rightequipment isavailableduringtraining, sothat the fleetfightswith thesame gear ittrainswith.

Tom Clancy: How isretentionofpersonnelholding

up?

AdmiralJohnson:Retentionright now is good, thoughthere are pockets of concernin that situation. If you look,forinstance,atpilotretentionnumbers, the aggregatenumbers, they’re great.They’re not even worthtalking about today. There isnoproblemthere.Withinthatcommunity, though, if you

“peel that onion” back alayer,we’re beginning to seethatweneed topayattentionto the attrition rates of somekindsofaircrews.

Inmyview,thesesituations arenotdevelopingjust becausetheairlinesarehiring. Theairlines are

always hiring,and willcontinue tohire. That’s areality that wecan’t change.But I do thinkthatpartofthissoftness incommunityretention isbaseduponthe“turnaround”and non-

deployed sideof a Navalcareer.In

particular, weneed to makesurethatwe’renot keepingpeople too farfromhome fortoomuch timedoingtemporary

kinds ofassignments.We need tomake sure thatwe don’t havebacklogs inaircraft andequipmentdepotmaintenance,so that ourcrews haveenoughairplanestofly

duringturnaroundsand workups.We also haveto payattentiontothematter offundingenough flyinghours to keepour peoplesharp. Let’sface it, juniorofficers [JOs]

never getenough flighthours. I knowthatIdidn’tasa youngaviator, and Idon’t knowanyone whodid. We’vestill got somework to do inthatarea.These“soft”

communityareas are notjust limited tonaval aviation.We’ve gotsome yeargroups in thesubmarinecommunitythat we’rewatchingcarefully, aswell as somein the surface

warfareprofessionals.Overall,though, we’reOK. On theenlisted sidethe numbersare excellent,and mostsignificantly,the highquality ofpersonnel isthere.

These days,we’re havingto work veryhardtogetthatquality, andit’s a realchallenge. Thegoal of ourrecruiting is tohave ninety-five-percenthigh schoolgraduates,with sixty-five

percent ofthose recruitsin the topmental groupin theirclasses. Whenwe achievethat, it’s goodfor the fleet,and we’recommitted toachievingthat.However,

thecompetitionforthatpartofthe labormarket isreally intenseout there.Given thepressures of ahealthyeconomy, Ithink that it’sgoing to bemoreandmore

ofachallenge.The reallygood youngmen andwomen outthere—theones who arereally smartand talented—everybodywants them.Frankly, whileI can offerthem a lot,

there are otherfolks who canoffer themmoreof thingslike money.Still, there arewonderful andpatrioticyoungfolkswho takeup thechallenge, andwe work hardto find themandkeep them

inthefleet.Trust me

whenIsaythatthe recruitingchallengeswillnot go away.Remember,back in theCold War wehad to bringaround100,000 newrecruits a year

intothefleettofill our needs.Today,evenina time ofrelative peace,we still needbetween45,000 andfifty thousandnew bsailorsevery year tokeep our forcehealthy andrunning.

Tom Clancy: You justmentioned the end of theCold War. Can you tell ussomething about thechallenges that you and thefleethavefacedinlightoftheendoftheEast/Westconflict?

Admiral Johnson: I thinkthat one of the biggestchallenges that the Navy hasis to make sure that ournation still has anappreciation for the value ofthe sea services, especiallywithin the citizenry and theCongress. I thinkweneed toeducate the public tounderstand that while wehave a great Navy now, ittakes a lot of effort andmoney to keep it that way.

Another challenge the Navyhasbeenfacedwithinthelastfew years has beenovercoming the publicperceptions left by Tailhook.I believe that we’ve madegreatstridessincethen.

Tom Clancy: Do you feelthat the challenges that theNavy had to face as a resultof Tailhook and otherincidentshavehelped thesea

services deal better with theissuesofwomenintheforce?

AdmiralJohnson:Yes,Ido.Sincewewerethefirstoftheservices forced to confrontthe gender-related issues thattheothermilitarydepartmentsface right now, I hope andtruly believe that we havelearned from those hard

experiencesandarebetterforthem. We needed to changetheways thatwewere doingbusiness in many respects,andIthinkthatwehave,andI’m proud of that. I believethat we have a much betterandstrongerforcetodaythanwedidbeforeTailhook.

Tom Clancy: Let’s talk alittlemoreabouttherolesandmissions that the Navy is

undertaking in the post-ColdWar world. For example,with the decline of theRussian fleet,what have yougot the submarine forcedoing?

Admiral Johnson: Weactually have some excitingthings coming up for thesubmarine force. The NewAttack Submarine [NSSN]program is underway, and

Seawolf [SSN-21] has beencommissioned. As far as thesubmarine mission isconcerned, it is much morediverse than during the ColdWar. Their main mission isstill undersea warfare andantisubmarine warfare[ASW].Todaythatmissionisless predictable than it wasduring the Cold War, butchallengingnonetheless.

The “big

water” ASWmission is stilla part of ourlives,butthesedays littoral[inshore]ASWis an evenbigger andemergingpiece of thatmission. Imight add thatinshoreoperations

bring withthem a wholenew set ofchallenges.Oursubmarineforce is todayinvolved instrike warfare,reconnaissance,specialoperations,and lots ofother things.The

community isbeingreshapedtoreflectallofthese newmissions, andremains avaluable andviable part ofthe fleet. Andeven thoughtoday’sRussiansubmarineforceisnotthe

Soviet fleet ofthe Cold Warera, I feelstrongly thatwe mustmaintainsufficientcapability todeal with it.Withallofthatfactored in,our force ofsubmarines isstill going to

shrink. Wehave aroundseventy SSNstoday, andwe’ll probablydrop toaroundfifty-five inthe next fewyears.

Tom Clancy: The doctrinalmove of the sea services tospecialize on the littoral

regionshasbeengoingonforsome timenowand theforceseems to have adapted well.Can you please tell us yourviews on how the transitionfroma “bluewater”Navy toaninshorefocushasgone?

Admiral Johnson: Thetransitionhasgoneextremelywell, though the Navy hasalways concentrated on thatmission to somedegree.You

have to remember that themajority of the world’scapitals and much of itspopulationresideclosetotheshoresof theworld’soceans.Becauseofthat,theNavyhasalwaysbeentaskedforlittoralwarfare. We kept the littoralmissions at the forefront ofour planning and preparationthroughoutthiscentury.

During theCold War

years thatmission wassomewhatovershadowedby open oceanmissions.Withthe demise ofthe SovietUnion, whatwe call“bluewater”missions havedeclined inimportance

somewhat.Overall, Ithink we’reideally taskedto meet thechallenges ofthe newcentury withthe force thatwe have todayand the forcethat we’rebuilding fortomorrow.

This includessystems likethe land attackdestroyervariant of theSC-21 escortdesign thatwe’recurrentlydesigning.

Tom Clancy: So does thismean that themission of the

U.S. Navy in the 21 stcentury is going to be likethatoftheRoyalNavyinthe19thcentury?Inotherwords,showingtheflag,keepingthepeace, and letting the localsknowthatwe’rethere?

Admiral Johnson: There’scertainly a lot of that in ourfuture plans. I think that the

way that we would describeour mission in the Navy isthat we plan to shape theenvironment or battle space.We will do that throughforward presence. I mightalso add thatwewill do thatwhile carrying the fullspectrum of weapons,sensors, and other tools thatwe need, so that the nationalleadership does not have towait for the action to bejoined. That is critical

because,asIliketosay,thereis no substitute for beingthere.

The Navyhastobethereand ready totriggerwhatever kindof responsemight berequired by arapidlydeveloping

situation. Thatresponsemightbe little, itmight be big.In one contextwe’re theenabling forcefor follow-onunits, and inanother we’rethe strikingpower all byourselves forwhatever

mightbegoingon in aparticulararea.Ourmission isalwayssituational.There aretimes whenwe’ll do portvisitsandpaintschoolhouses.That’s a partofourjob.Butwe are also

ready to kicksomebody’sass if that’srequired.Sotothat degree,your RoyalNavy analogyisquitevalid.

Tom Clancy: One majorchangeinhowthemilitaryisdoing business todaycompared to the past is that,

unlike the CNOs of just adecade ago, you don’tactually command ships andplanes anymore. UnderGoldwater-Nichols, thevarious branches of themilitary and their assets arecombined into organization“package”forces for regionalcommanders inchief [CinCs]to use as required by theNational CommandAuthorities. Under the newsystem that came into effect

in the late 1980’s, the worldhasbeendividedintoregionsand warfare specialties, witha joint unified command andacommanderinchief[CinC]assigned to each. The CinCspackageforcesintojoint taskforces [JTFs], which are thebasic working unit of jointwarfare. Could you tell us alittle about how that processworks?

Admiral Jay Johnsonmakinga point during his interviewwiththeauthor.JOHND.GRESHAM

AdmiralJohnson: As far asthe Navy goes, I’m the“organize, train, and equipguy.” I get the forces ready

bymakingsurethattheNavyis well staffed, that ourpersonnel knowwhat they’redoing,andthatthemachinerytosupportthemisoftherightkind and in good workingorder. At the appropriatetime, I turnover these forcesto the warfighting CinCs.Whilethoseshipsandaircraftare assigned to numberedfleets and squadrons, weoftenhavetopackagetheminsome rather unique ways,

depending upon the situationandtherequirements.

TomClancy:BythatdoyoumeancontingencieslikeHaitiback in 1994? I recall thatyou stripped two big-deckaircraft carriers of their airwings, and replaced themwith a couple of aviationbrigadeswithhelicopters andtroops from XVIII AirborneCorps.

Admiral Johnson: Well,since I was the Deputy JointTask Force [JTF]Commander and navalcomponent commander ofthat operation, let me giveyoumy two cents’ worth onhow that all worked out. Itwas really interesting and, Imight add, the right thing todoforthatsituation.Iwasthecommander of the Second

Fleet at the time, and waslooking at new ways to usecarriers. I took some abusefrom some of my Navalaviationpalsatthetime,whosaid, “Well, there you go,Johnson. You’ve sold navalaviationdowntheriver.Nextthing you know you’ll beputting army helicopters onaircraftcarriers.”

The truth ofthe situation is

that I was notthreatened bythat at all. Ifyou look atwhat theNavyand our jointservicepartners wereasked to do inHaiti, and youput it into thecontext of thatparticularplace, at that

time, againstthatthreat,andthat totalscenario, whatwe did wasdamned nearperfect. Itreally was.Almost asclose toperfect as youcan get. Now,the next time,in a different

place andsituation,doingsomething likethat may bethe dumbestidea in theworld. ForHaiti, though,converting thecarrierswasas“right on” asanyone couldhaveasked.

TomClancy: Once the needfor the helicopters duringOperation RestoreDemocracy was finished,howlongdidittaketogettheregular air groups back onboard and operatingnormally?

Admiral Johnson: Well, letme squareyouon thiswholeprocess. The Eisenhower[CVN-69] had the aviationbrigade from the 10thMountain Division, and theAmerica [CV-66] had thefolks from theArmy’s 160thSpecial Operations AviationRegiment at Fort Campbell.When we were ready tochangebacktonormal,here’swhat happened. First thehelicopters and their

personnel cleared off to theHaitian mainland, andEisenhower turned away. Iwas there, and watched thiswith my own eyes. ThecarrierbattlegroupsleftPort-au-Princeharbor,motoredoutpast the island of Guni, andbeforetheylefttheoperationsarea,bothhad“trapped”theirTomcats, theirA-6 Intruders,and their E-2C Hawkeyesupport aircraft. By the timethat they headed north, both

carriers had fullyreconstituted air groups, andmade the transit homemission-ready. Itwas a greatuseofcarriers,inmyview.

TomClancy: So would yousay that one of the realchallenges of this post-ColdWar transition has beentryingtoadaptthemindsandthinking of people in theNavy to new ideas and

concepts?Makingpeoplesay“Why not?” as opposed to“Areyououtofyourmind?”

Admiral Johnson:Absolutely.It’shardtoadjustto change. And we’re allguilty of resisting itsometimes, as it turns out.I’masbadastherestofthem,even though I like to thinkthat I’m open-minded. I amopen-minded, until you start

messing with one of myships....

TomClancy:Coulditnotbesaid that your willingness tobe“adaptive”with those twocarriersmayverywellhelptojustify continued aircraftcarrier development andprocurement?

Admiral Johnson: It couldindeed. I can tell you for afact that the Navy gained awhole lot of new friends intheU.S.Army as a result ofthat exercise. Especiallywhen their troops found outthat they did not have to eatMREs [Meals,Ready toEat]during the mission. In fact,here’s an interesting piece oftrivia from the commandingofficers [COs] of those twocarriers.Itturnedoutthatthe

soldiers from the two Armyaviation units liked Navychow so much, and ate somuch of it, that we had toretool the resupply schedule.The soldiers were justshoveling down all this foodon board the ships. Navychowisgood!

TomClancy:TakingtheHaitiexample a bit further, it isfairlyclear thatsince theend

of the Cold War, the Navyhas been used for a widevariety of roles andmissions—everything from blockadesand strike warfare [PersianGulf] to rescues andhumanitarian relief [BalkansandSomalia].Giventhatyoualready do such a widevariety of things so well,what else do you want theNavy to be capable of doinginthe21stcentury?

Admiral Johnson: You’reright, the Navy’s prettyflexible!Inthefuture,Ithinkthat you’re going to see usdoing some new things withthe Marine Corps. We’refindingnewwaystoorganizeand structure our forces toaccommodate new roles andmissions. One specific areathat I know we’ll bedeveloping is Theater

Ballistic-Missile Defense[TBMD], using our Aegiscruisers and destroyers.That’snewandexcitingstuffthat ten years from nowwillbeeverydaybusiness, thoughtoday it’s all leading-edgetechnology.

Tom Clancy: Especially intheabsenceofa“bluewater”threat, has the Navy gottendown to developing a real

doctrine togowith themovetolittoralwarfare?

Admiral Johnson: Theanswer is yes, but I qualifythat answer by saying thatwe’rejustattheleadingedgeof getting it done. At theNaval Warfare DoctrineCommand, they’re lookingathow we can take the earlier

“blue-water” doctrine of theColdWar, and embed it in avery solid way into this newreality of littoral warfare.We’re trying hard to buildnewlinkageswithourvariousNaval academic institutionslike the War College [inNewport, Rhode Island], thePostgraduate School [inMonterey, California], andeven the Naval Academy [inAnnapolis, Maryland], aswell as in the tactical and

operationalsidesofthefleet.

Tom Clancy: Once upon atime, not so long ago, theNavywasseenasnotbeingagood partner in the jointwarfare arena. Can you tellus, from the Navy point ofview, how you view yourcorporation and participationinjointwarfarethesedays?

AdmiralJohnson:Frankly,Idon’tseeanyfrictiontoday.Ithink that’s old news.As farasI’mconcerned,theNavyison the leading edge in thejoint warfare business thesedays. In fact, we’recommitted to it at all levels.Here’sacase inpoint.Whenwedoourcarrierbattlegroup[CVBG] and amphibiousreadygroup[ARG]workups,that’salljoint.Whatweusedto call a FLEETEX [Fleet

Exercise] in the old days isnow the JTFEX [Joint TaskForce Exercise]. Of course,we still work within ourfundamental core sea service[Navy and Marine Corps]competenciesduringtraining.But once we get into theJTFEX,it’sunitslikethe2ndFleet CVBG, the II MEF[MarineExpeditionaryForce]MEU [SOC], the XVIIIAirborne Corps, the 8th AirForce, and our allies all

together.Soweareabsolutelycommitted to the jointwarfare arena, right down totraining within the JointTraining Matrix. This is nottheway itwasduringDesertStorm where the Navy wasstill“fightingthefeeling.”

That doesnot mean thatwe havesolved all ofourchallenges.

Full utilizationofCTAPS[thejoint theaterair planningtool] anddistribution ofthe ATO [AirTaskingOrder] is stillgiving usproblems, butby and large,we’reonboardin the joint

arena. I mightadd that we’reproud to bepart of it,because that’sthe way thatwe’re going tobe fighting inthe future as anation.

Tom Clancy: One of themostinterestingjointtrainingexercises that has been runrecentlyisOperationTandemThrust, down in Australia.Canyoutellusaboutit?

AdmiralJohnson:Youhaveto remember that we have a“special” relationship withAustralia, one that has beencritical to both countries inthis century. Tandem Thrust

is just another classicexample of that relationship.We just came back fromOperation Tandem Thrust. Itwas huge, involving over22,000 U.S. Army, Navy,MarineCorps, andAirForcepersonnel. We accomplishedour objectives and I thinkeverybody learned a greatdeal.

When youare running a

large militaryexercise, oneof the biggestconsiderationsisthematteroffinding newrange spacesfor the jointforces toexercise andtrain in. Ifyoutalk withChuck Krulak,he’ll tell you

about hisinterest inusing some ofthe rangefacilities inAustralia.They arebeautiful! Andthe RoyalAustralianNavy and therest of theirforces are justsuperbtowork

with.They arewonderfulallies.Australia is anamazingcountry—justeighteenmillion peopleonalandmassthe size of thecontinentalUnited States.You see thatwhen you fly

over theplace.You just flyfor hours andhours and seenothing butopenspace.

Tom Clancy: Talk a littlemore about modernization ifyou will. Every couple ofgenerations,thereseemstobe

a CNO who, because oftiming and circumstances,defines the U.S. Navy for aperiod of decades. ElmoZumwaltfilledthatroleinthe1970’s, since so much ofwhattheNavyusestodaywasdefined, designed, or builtduring his tenure. You seemto be in a similar situationtoday in the 1990’s. Giventhis notion, what kinds ofthingsdoyouwantthisNavytodo?

Admiral Johnson: I thinkthatwhatwe’retryingtocastfortomorrowandthefutureisto be able to say five, ten,twenty, even twenty-fiveyears from now, that thisNavy is really relevant. WeneedtoknowthattheNavyisgivingthecountryapresenceforce that can still respondacross the full spectrum ofcrisesorrequirementsthatthe

countryasksthemtorespondto. We don’t even know forsure what kinds of criseswe’llbefacinginthatdistantfuture. But the decisions wemaketodaywillhaveadirectimpact on our readinesstomorrow.

In generalterms, weknow exactlywhere we’regoing. The

newequipmentwe’re buildingand the newshaping of theforce that weare currentlygoing throughare veryimportant tous, as is theway we pushourselves intothe next

century. It’svery exciting,thoughsomewhatdaunting,tobein this jobatatime when theinfrastructureis underdevelopmentto this degree,but I thinkwe’re buildinga marvelous

future for theNavy. In myopinion, thefuture Navywill still beanchored inthe carrierbattle groupwith its airwing, in theamphibiousready groupand theembarked

MarineExpeditionaryUnit. Theseare the twocoreassetsthatthe seaservices giveto the country.I want that tobe clearlyconveyed aswe moveforward intothe next

century.

Tom Clancy: Let’s talk alittlemoreaboutthatissueof“forward presence.” Severalyears ago when weinterviewed General Krulak[the current Commandant ofthe Marine Corps], hedescribeditas:“Anativeinacanoeisabletoreachoutandtouchthegray-paintedhullofan American warship in his

territory.” How does thatmatchupwithyourvisionforAmerican presence in the21stcentury?

Admiral Johnson: Thestrength of our forwardpresence is exactly that. Therecent Quadrennial DefenseReview provided for astrategic vision that carriedwith it the three elements orphasesofmilitarypower that

ournationrequires.Theseareshaping, responding, andpreparing.We’ve talkeda lotin this interview aboutrespondingandpreparing.Solet’s take a little time to talkabout shaping the world’smilitarysituation.

That’s whatwe do everyday. That’swhy we have350 ships

afloat in theworld’soceansright now.That’s the guyin the canoewho touchesthesideofourgray-hulledships. Webelievethat’satremendouslypowerfulmission, bothfor our Navy

and thecountry,because ofwhat it meansto the rest oftheworld.Youknow, even ifthatmaninthecanoe can’ttouchourship,but can onlysee it andwatch it comeand go as it

pleases, thenthat sends amessage ofgreat strengthto him and toall the otherpeople whosee what wecan do.Because we’reout there, theworld ischanged everyday.

Tom Clancy: Let’s talk alittle about the material sideof the Navy these days. Allthe ships, aircraft, and otherthings that were boughtduring the ReaganAdministration are nowalmost fifteen years old.Military spending has beensignificantly reduced inrecent years.Are you havingproblems modernizing and

reconstituting the Navy forthe21stcentury?

Admiral Johnson: I wouldnot categorize the Navy’sneeds at this stage asproblems. I think of them asopportunities, and I wouldsay that the future lookspromising.I’mjustsorrythatI’m not going to be a JO[junior officer] to takeadvantage of all the things

we’re going to be getting inthefuture.

If you lookat theprograms thatwe’ve got onthe boards forthe nextdecade, it’s alonglist.Thereare the DDG-51-class Aegisdestroyers,

which we arecontinuing tobuild at a rateof betweenthree and foura year. We’regetting thoseships atbetween $800and $900millionacopy,dependingupon whosenumbers you

use, which isquite abargain. Iknow thatsounds like alot of moneyfor a tin can[the traditionalnickname fordestroyers],butit’saprettyimpressive tincan!

After theAegis,thenextclass ofsurfacecombatantwillbe the SurfaceCombatant-21[SC-21],which we’rejust coming toclarityonrightnow. The firstphase of thatprogram will

give us whatwecalla“landattack”destroyer or“DD-21.”Downstreamfrom that willprobably be agroup of thoseships that willbegin toreplace theearly units oftheAegisfleet.

We can besure of onething—SC—21 is going tohave to bemuch moreaffordablethantheDDG-51’s.That’s thebottom-linechallenge inall this. That’swhy we’reinvested in

somethingcalled “SmartShip” [theUSSYorktown[CG-48],which is beingoutfitted]. Wewant to seewhat we canlearn aboutmaking theseships not onlyless expensive

to buy, but tooperate andmaintain aswell.But they’ll

never becheap. Youhave toremember thatNavycombatantsarenot cruiseships. They

need to havecombatcapability allthe time. Howyou make thedifferenttrade-offs for crewsize,displacement,engineeringplants,weapons,sensors, andother things is

very, veryimportant.Oneday, livesmaydepend onhow well wemake ourdecisionsnow.

Tom Clancy: What othernew classes of warships doyou have on the horizon? Iknow that the first of thenew-generation ships will bethe San Antonio-class [LPD-17] amphibious ships, whichare under construction rightnow.

Admiral Johnson: The SanAntonio-class [LPD-17]amphibiousshipreplacesfour

different classes of olderships in just onehull. It’s animportantshiptome,aswellas to Chuck Krulak [theCommandant of the MarineCorps]. As you know, theARG [Amphibious ReadyGroup]of the21stcentury isgoingtobeathree-shipforce.There will be a big deckaviation/amphibious ship likea Tarawa [LHA-1] or Wasp[LHD-1],oneoftheWhidbeyIsland [LSD-41] or Harpers

Ferry-class [LSD-49] dockships, and a San Antonio.That San Antonio-class shipis going to be the inshorefighter,whichwilllaunchthenew AAAV amphibioustractors, as well as air-cushioned landing craft andhelicopters.

The designandmixoftheARG andthese new

shipswill giveus the abilitytofightbothinthe littoralsand in the“blue water”of the openoceans. It’sgoing to be anawesomeplatform. Thatship is comingalong well, aswell as CVN-

77, which wesee as atransitioncarrier to takeus to sometechnologicaldevelopmentson our way tothe nextgeneration ofcarrier, theCVX.

Tom Clancy: Tell us somemore about the CVN-77, ifyouwould.

Admiral Johnson: Some ofthe improvements wecontemplate for it are notunlikewhatwe’redoingwiththe Aegis cruiser Yorktown,whichwe’readdinganumberof different automation

systems to for things likeassistance on the bridge,damage control monitoring,and a fiber-optic local areanetwork [LAN] backbone.These improvements aredesigned to reduce themanning of the Aegisplatforms, if it provespractical. We want to seewhattechnologycandoforusasapracticalmatteronfuturecombatants.Oncewe’vebeentoschoolonthat,thenwewill

do the same kinds of thingswithCVN-77.

We thinktechnologicalimprovementswill help us alotontheroadto our futurecarrierdesigns,especiallywithregards tothings like

size, shape,and manning,which aresome of thecritical designfactors thatdetermine thecosts of newships. So theplan right nowis that CVN-77 will indeedbe a transitionship to takeus

to CVX. Wefeel that it isthe right thingto do. We’regoing to makeitjustdifferentenoughthrough a“SmartShip/SmartBuy” concept.What we’retrying to do isto leverage

technology todo thingsdifferently andwith fewerpeople,and lettechnologymake theNavalplatforms ofthe nextcentury evensmarter andbetter than theones we have

rightnow.

Tom Clancy: If you weregoing to sit here today anddescribe what CVX willbecome,whatwouldbeyourvision of that carrierwhen itarrives sometime in the 21stcentury?

Admiral Johnson: Letme dothis based upon my ownexperience. I started on theOrisknay [CV-34, amodernizedWorldWarII-eraEssex-class (CV-9/SCB-27C)carrier], and I’ve flown onand off of everything fromtheMidway [CVA-41] to anumber of the Nimitz-class[CVN-68] nuclear carriers. Iwould tell you that what I

want CVX to provide is thesame kind of flexibility asyou can get out of aNimitz-classcarrier.Ialsowantit tobeabletodelivermanyofthesame kinds of services andbenefits that we already getfrom carriers right now. Iespecially want it to be ableto move around the sameway.

This shiphas

implicationsfrom thestrategic levelall the waydown totacticalimplications—like whether Ican crank upenough windover the deckto be able tolandanaircraftwith the flaps

stuck in the“up” position.So we needtremendousflexibility outof thisplatform,includingareaslike berthing,data networks,sensors, andtacticalsystems.

The CVXwill also needtobean“openarchitecture”ship, so thatwecan“net”itinto the newkinds of“networkcentric” battleforces that wewant to buildin the 21stcentury. We

will want tohavedistributedsensor andfirepowercapabilitiesspreadthroughout thebattle group inways thatallow us tohavesituationalawareness on

everyplatform, bothships andaircraft, andnot just thecarrier. Thecarrier is stillgoingtobethecore ship ofthe CVBG.Therefore, itwill still needto haveflexibility on

theflightdeck,in the systemsthat it carries,and inhabitability, toensure adecent qualityof life for thecrew that willman it. Ibelieve thatthe Navy inthe 21stcentury will

continue to bea forward-deployedforce, andgiven thatreality, thisship is ablanksheet of paperineveryway.

TomClancy:Doesthatmeanthat you see every feature ofthe CVX as being open for

newideas?

AdmiralJohnson: As far asI’m concerned, yes.Propulsion, sensors, catapultsystems—theyareallopentonew and innovative ideas,should they be offered orpresented. Now, when wetalk about a CVX-typecarrier,we’re talking about aship thatwillarriveata timewherethedominantaircraftit

will carry will be the newJointStrikeFighter[JSF],theF/A-18E/FSuperHornet,andsomething we call theCommon Support Aircraft[CSA].Sothisshipwillhavetobeoptimized toourvisionfor operating those futureaircraft, none of which areoperationaltoday.

Tom Clancy: I’ve heardsome of the people involved

in the design anddevelopmentofCVXcallthisthe first non-Navy or“CinC‘s” [regionalcommander in chief’s]carrier. Given your own useof carriers during Haiti in1994,wouldyouconcurwiththisview?

Admiral Johnson: We’resaying the same thing. As Imentioned earlier, we’re

looking for open architectureandconnectivitytobeabletodeal with operations ashore,as well as the Joint TaskForce [JTF] commanders inthe field, and to handlewhateverothercircumstancesmay arise. When you’retrying to shape thebattlespace and respond toemerging situations, then abattle group commander isgoing to have to beresponsible for a full

spectrum of crises. Whetherit’s a little bitty event or thebiggest situation, acommander needs a carrierthat can respondon the spot.That’s what we need toembedintheCVXdesign.

It will bevery excitingto see thekindsofthingsthat we’ll becoming out

with in areaslike catapultand arrestinggeartechnology,combatsystemsupgrades, andother newsystems.We’llbe looking atthe proper airwing aircraftmix, including

V/STOL[vertical/shorttakeoff andlanding] orSTOL [shorttakeoff andlanding] kindsof airplanes,for this newplatform.Everything iswide openrightnow.

TomClancy: While I knowthatyourfirstpassionisnavalaviation and carriers, I alsoknow thatyouarepassionateabout modernizing thesubmarine forceaswell.Tellus,ifyouwould,alittleaboutSeawolf b[SSN-21] and theNew Attack Submarine[NSSN]programs?

AdmiralJohnson: I recentlytookarideonSeawolf,anditis awesome. The bestsubmarine thathaseverbeenbuiltintheworld,period.TheSeawolf is truly, truly amagnificent submarine—andremember, I’mafighterpilotsaying this! I took somesubmariners with me on theSeawolf, and watched theirreactions, listened to theircomments,andmademyownobservations. All of that

convinced me that this is anawesome platform. I can’twaittogetitintothefleet,aswell as the two others thatcomebehindit.

After theSeawolf, wemove intoNSSN, wherewe’re going touse a specialteamingarrangement

betweenGeneralDynamicsElectric BoatDivision andNewportNewsShipbuilding.The idea is totryandget thecost down sowe can affordtobuytheminthe numbersthat we’ll be

needing toreplacetheLosAngeles-class[SSN-688]boats whentheyretire.

Tom Clancy: Let’s talkabout aircraft procurement.It’s been a really toughdecade for the Navy with

regards to new aircraftprocurement. There hasn’tbeen a single new tacticalaircraftfortheseaservicesinmore than two decades. Areyou comfortable with thecurrent Navy aircraftdevelopment andprocurementstrategy?

Admiral Johnson: Yes.We’ve made some workableplans to upgradeour aircraft.

Though Imustpoint out thatif you were to look at agraphic depiction of the lasttwenty years, it would tellyouthatwe’recomingoutofsomething that looks like abathtub with regards to newaircraftdeliveries.Iknowthatwe need to buy newairplanes, the plans are inplace to begin to acquirethem, and I think that wehave the platforms andprogramsthatcandeliverina

way that makes sense forNavalaviation.

The currentplancoverstheV-22 Ospreyfor theMarines, thestrike fighterswe’ve alreadytalked about,T-45 trainersfor ourundergraduate

trainingprograms, andH-60airframesfor ASW andfleetreplenishment.I know thatsounds like alot of aircraft,but we’reworking ourway out of aperiod whenwewere lucky

to buy morethan just acouple ofairplanes ayear.

TomClancy:Sincemoneyisgoing to be the determiningfactor in making theseprocurement plans intoreality,onewondershowwellthe Congress is receivingyourmessageaboutthevalue

of naval aviation. Just howwell are you getting thatmessageacross?

Admiral Johnson: You’dhave to ask them how wellwe’re doing. But from myperspective,whenIgotalkortestifytoCongress,Iseealotofsupport.

Tom Clancy: If you don’tmind, let’s run down thoseaircraft programs one at atime and get a comment oneachfromyou.

Admiral Johnson: F/A-18E/FSuperHornet—Frommystandpoint,thisisamodelprogram. The aircraft ismeeting or exceeding every

milestone and specificationthatwe’veputoutthere.It’sawonderful airplane. I’veflown it, and though it’sbigger than the F/A-18C/DHornet, it flies “smaller.” Isay this publicly and I meanit. This plane is the corner-stone of our future Navy airwing. Over the next twodecades, they will firstreplace our fleet of F-14Tomcats, and eventually ourolderF/A-18’s.Bytheendof

thenextdecade,wewillhavethree squadrons [with twelveaircraftpersquadron]oftheseaboardeverycarrier.

Joint StrikeFighter (JSF)—This birdwilleventuallyreplace thenewest of ourF/A-18CHornets andMarineAV-8B

Harrier IIs,which we arebuying rightnow. Initially,eachcarrierairwing [CVW]will have asinglesquadron ofJSFs, withfourteenaircraft persquadron.WhenCVX-78

arrives, thiswill give it atotal of 36F/A-18E/Fsand 14 JSFs.We expect theconceptdemonstrationand fly-offbetweenLockheedMartin andBoeing tohappen in

2001.V-22 Osprey—Eventhoughthis istechnically aMarine Corpsairplane withMarine Corpspainted on theside if it, it’spart of ourbudget, and apart of the

Navy/MarineCorpsforward-presenceforce.So it’s asimportanttousas it is toChuck Krulak.Whether it hasa role in theU.S. Navy,I’m franklynot smartenough to

answer that atthis time. If Ihad to giveyouananswer,I’d probablyhave to sayyes. Rightnow, though,those V-22derivatives arenot what I’mfocusing on.That’s onlybecause the

total focus ofour effort forV-22 must beto get theminto service toreplace thoseH-46’sthatareolder than themen andwomen whoare flyingthem.Helicopter

Programs—We’re neckingdown into justthe H-60series. The H-60R airframeis going to bewhat we usefor everythingwithin thebattle groups,from ASW[with the SH-60R] to

logistics andverticalreplenishment[VERTREPwith the CH-60R].

Tom Clancy: Could yousummarizethemajorfocusofthe Naval aircraftprocurement for thenext fewyears?

Admiral Johnson: Rightnow, our focus and effortwithin Naval aviation isclearlywiththeSuperHornetandwhatthattakesustowithJSF. Those are the twomaintacticalaircraftprograms.TheEA-6B Prowler and E-2CHawkeye are also importanttous.TheF-14’s arevital toussurely,butweareanxioustoget theSuperHornets into

the fleet to replace theTomcats in an orderly flowand fashion. Over the nextfifteen years or so, ifeverything goes as planned,what you will see is SuperHornet replacing Tomcats aswell as some of the oldestregular F/A-18Hornets; thenJSFwillcome inandreplacethe rest of theF/A-18Cs.So,by around 2015, the combat“punch” on carrier flightdecksisgoingtobefillingup

withSuperHornetsandJSFs.That’s the vision that wehave.

TomClancy:Doesthismeanthat you are going to beleveraging the remaining lifein existing airframes like theF-14 Tomcat, EA-6BProwler, and S-3 Viking, tobuy time to get those newairframesintoservice?

Admiral Johnson: Yes. TheS-3’s are integral to theCVWs right now, and theirreplacement is part of theCSA program that wediscussed earlier. The S-3’s,the ES-3’s, and EA-6B’s areall part of that effort. TheProwlers are of particularvalue to us, since they arenownationalassets,duetoanunderstanding with the

Marine Corps and AirForce.15 We’re completingthebuyofProwlersrightnowat 125 aircraft. When we’refinishedfillingoutthatforce,they will be well employeduntil we decide exactly whattheProwlerfollow-onwillbe.If you had to ask me todaywhat that will be, I’d havesome expectation of a two-seat variant of the SuperHornet with an automated

jamming system. The WildWeaselsmayriseagain.

Tom Clancy: Over the lastfifty years, one of the mostimportant parts of Navalaviation has been themedium-attack squadrons,which used to fly the A-6.Withtheretirementofthelastof the Intruders, has thatcommunity more or lessdied?

Admiral Johnson: Well, IguessbecausetheA-6isgonethatyoucansaythat,buttheirpeople and missions havebeen integrated into othercom-munities.Places like theHornet and Tomcatcommunitiesaswell asotherplaces. Even the EA-6BProwler and S-3B Vikingsquadrons are gaining theexperienceofformerIntruder

crews and personnel. Thenamepersemaybegone,butthe people and mission liveon.

I might addthat the newSuper Hornetis going to betakingona lotofthejobsthatthe Intruderused to do forus. In fact, not

too long agothe test crewsat NASPatuxentRiver[the Navy’stest facility inMaryland]launched aSuper Hornetloaded up atover 65,000pounds, whichis a thousandpounds more

than theIntruder usedto fly at. TheSuper Hornetflieswithafullkitofprecisionguidedmunitions[PGMs],including thenew GBU-29/30/32/32JDAMS,AGM-154

JSOW, andAGM-88ESLAMER.

TomClancy:Youjusttalkedabout the kinds of weaponsthat you’re going to becarrying and dropping fromtheSuperHornet and JSF. Isit a safe statement to makethat if a target is valuable

enough for a carrier-basedaircraft to hit it, then thataircraftwillusesomekindofprecision or other tailoredmunitionstodothejob?

Admiral Johnson: I guessmy answer to that would bethat it would depend on thetargetset.Generally, Iwouldsay yes, that’s a fair thing tosay. The new things thatwe’re developing in JDAMS

andJSOWarereallygoingtohelp us with our combatpunch.

TomClancy: You also havestrike weapons that aren’tlaunched from aircraft, likeTomahawkandafutureseriesofstandoffbattlefieldsupportmunitions on the horizon.Couldyoutellusmoreaboutthem?

Admiral Johnson: We’regoing to embed some quiteremarkable combat power inthe CVBG of tomorrow. Forexample,lookatournewSC-21 escort design, which wementioned earlier. The firstvariantofthatisaland-attackdestroyer that will havevertically loading guns andvertical missile launchersloaded with all of the new

and improved land-attackmissilesthatyoumentioned.

TomClancy: Isn’t theNavyabout to deploy the firstTBMD [Theater BallisticMissile Defense] systemaboard theAegis ships, evenahead of the Army and AirForce?

Admiral Johnson: Yes, butkeepinmindthatIamreallyincompetitionwithtime. I’mnot in competition with theArmyandAirForce.IfirmlybelievethatthefleetofAegiscruisers and destroyers thatwe have out there isabsolutely theoptimumplaceto embed that capability,because of the mobility andflexibility that it gives to theNational CommandAuthorities. So we’re full

speed ahead on our area-wide, lower-tier system, aswell as the theater-wide,upper-tier system. It’s goingtobeanawesomecapability.

As youknow, the toppriority of theDepartment ofDefense[DoD]istogetthe variousarea systems

on line asquickly aspossible.Those are theArmy PatriotPAC-3andtheNavy AegisArea systems.It’s lookinggood rightnow, andwe’replanningto have itshipborne in

just a fewyears. That’sreally a lot ofwhat we’retrying to doNavy-widethese days.Doing things“leaner,” butmoreeffectively.That’s whatwe need to doto “punch

through” intothe 21stcentury.

TomClancy:Would it be afair statement, based uponwhat you just said, thatyou’re trying togetmoreoutof existing systems andpeople, rather than start fromscratchonnewsystems?

Admiral Johnson: Yes. Wewanttoharnessandfocusthetechnologies that are outthere, and embed them inthese new systems in waysthat give us maximumcombat power and flexibilityinnewandexcitingways.Wealso want to have the shipsandsystemsmannedbyfewerpeople. I believe that, withthe right equipment, we cando thatandstillmaintainoureffectiveness.

We have to

becarefulhowwe flow intoall that. Butyou knowabout our“Smart Ship”program,which isteaching us alot about howto do these

things. We’relearning a lot,really focusingonwhatmakessenseforusona combatplatform interms ofdownsizingthenumber ofpeople weneed aboard.For instance,the “mark on

the wall” thatwe have forthe SC-21land-attackdestroyer isthat we wantthat ship to bemanned byninety-fivepeople or less.That’s a shipthe size of anArleighBurke-class [DDG-

51] guided-missiledestroyer, butwith a crewabout one-third the size.That’s wherewearegoing.

TomClancy:Wetalkedalotabout the ships, aircraft, andthingsthatyouhavetobuytogive the Navy power. But

people make those thingswork.Obviously,justliketherest of the services, you’vehadtodrawdownthesizeofyour personnel pool. You’resaying that in the future youwant to be able toman yourshipswithfewerpeople,eachof whom will have to domore.Tellusabouttheyoungpeopleyouwant in theNavyof the future, and what youexpectfromthem?

Admiral Johnson: PeopleareourNavy.ButtheNavyisgoing to have to becomeleanerandmorecapable.TheNavyhasveryhighrecruitingstandards. As we mentionedearlier,we have a “crossbar”of ninety-five percent highschool graduates and sixty-five percent in the uppermental group as recruitingstandards. We believe that

gives us the quality of sailorthat we need to operate ournewsystemsandtakeusintothe next century. I don’t seethatchanging.Admiral Jay Johnsonspeaking to officers in theMiddleEast.OFFICIAL. U.S. NAVYPHOTO

But thecompetitionfor thoseyoung menand women isvery intense.It’s the samecorner of thepersonnelmarket thatprivateindustry, myJoint Chiefsbrethren, and

everyone elseis going forthese days. Sofar, we’vebeen holdingourownintherecruitingprocess. Wewillbuildfromthat pool ofgreat youngmen andwomenaNavythat is

reshaped intothepropersizeand structurefor the future.We will givethem the besttools for theirjobs and thequality of lifethat theydeserve.We accept

the reality that

says the Navymust getsmaller. Thecaution in allof that is thatif the Navygets smallerand ourrequirementsdon’t change,weruntheriskof having toaskour peopleto do more

with less. I’vetold my Navythatrightnow,we’re out ofthe “do morewith less”business. Wedon’t do thatanymore.What we’regoing to do isreshapeourselves insuch a way

that we’ll besized fortomorrow, andthen do themissions thatwe are calledto do whilemaintaining aproperoptempo, sowe don’toperate on thebacks of oursailors.

Let me tellyou, that’s avery toughthing to do.That’s what Itellmysailors.It’s a mucheasier thing tosaythantodo.Our policy ofsix monthsdeploymentportal toportal, two-to-

oneturnaroundratio,andfifty-percentminimum in-port time overa five-yearperiod, givesus a set ofstandards andpolicies that IthinktheNavycan live with.The CNO isthe only one

whocanwaivethat policy,and we’veonly done it atotal of fivetimes in thelast year. Imight add thatfour of thosefive waiverswere writtenfor ships inout-of-home-port

maintenance.So we’reholdingwelltothatpolicy.

Tom Clancy: You’ve beensaying all along that you’regoing to be trying to manyournewgenerationof shipswithfewersailorsdoingmorejobs than on older vessels.This means that you’reprobably going to have to

raise the crossbar when itcomes to getting new sailorstrained. Chuck Krulak hasmuch the same plans for hisMarines, and has institutedtheCrucible program tohelpformandtoughenhisrecruits.Are you going to dosomething similar for Navyrecruits?

Admiral Johnson: It’s awork in progress. We have

upped our own crossbar. Letme give you a couple ofquick examples. I talkedearlier about the young menand women who come intotheNavyfromtheupperpartsof the demographic profile.These are really smart, well-schooled young folks. Whatwedowiththemthenissendthem into a recruit trainingexperience that is a verydifferent, very positive, andverychallengingexperience.

Now, I’mnot too proudto admit thatwe have likedwhat we haveseen of theprograms thatyou havementionedfrom GeneralKrulak,including theCrucible. Wenow have a

“final battleproblem”exerciseevaluationinstituted atGreat LakesTrainingCenter.This isaNavyversionof a Crucible-like evolution.We call it“BattleStations,” and

it’s a veryarduous,physicallydemandingfourteen-hourdamage-controlproblem/scenariorequiringstamina,ingenuity, andteamworkfrom therecruits to

pass.We just

came backfrom GreatLakes, wherewe observedpieces of thepilot version.We think thatthis is anextremelygood andpowerful

program. Theway that wetreat ourrecruits andthe things thatweindoctrinatethem with—heritage, corevalues,tradition, andpride—lets usgroom theminto very

strong sailorswhen theyleave GreatLakes.Then we

have what wecall the BasicMilitaryTrainingContinuum,which takesthem into thefleet and

buildsonwhatthey havelearnedinbootcamp.Wealsohaveembeddedthroughout theNavysomething wecall theLeadershipTrainingContinuum.Now,I’monly

theimplementerof thisprogram, notthe inventor.The programwas AdmiralFrank Kelso’sidea. Kelsowas CNObeforeAdmiralBoorda, whoalso worked

onit.It’s

powerful! Itconsists offour two-weektrainingblocksfor officersand enlistedpersonnel, andprovidesformalizedleadershiptraining

throughouttheir careers.That’s thebasicframework,andwe’llbuildonthatlater.Right now

I’m interestedin gettingthese fourbasic blocksinstituted

throughout theNavy. Andmark mywords: If youplan on beingin theNavyasa career andwant toadvance, youwill take thesetrainingblocks! TheNavy hasmade an

institutionalinvestment informalizedleadershiptraining. I’mconvinced,based on justthe earlyfeedbacktraining andwhat I’ve seenthus far, thatwhen you and1 are gone

from thisworld, thisNavywillbeastronger at alllevels becauseofit.

TomClancy:Obviously, theNavy has had a rough androckytimeintegratingwomeninto the force. Yet, one getsthe feeling that the Navy isfarther through the process

than perhaps the otherservicesand thatyou’vepaida high price to reach thatgoal. Is it your opinion thatthe first-stage initiatives forfully integrating women intothe combat force have beensuccessfullycompleted?

Admiral Johnson:Absolutely. We’re throughthat.As a good example, theCVWs and carriers are

already fully integrated.CVW-11 just came back offdeployment on the KittyHawk [CV-63] fullyintegrated, and it was amarvelous deployment forthem.Our surface combatantintegration program is goingwell, though the pacing itemisthatwewanttheshipstobeproperly built ormodified sothat thehabitabilitystandardswe have established for theWomen at Sea Program are

followed. In addition, thecrewmustbeshapedtherightway, so that the propercritical mass and makeup offemale personnel ismaintained. There’s a rightway and a wrong way to dothat, and we’ve learned howtodothat.We’realittleoverhalfway through thatinitiative right now, and it’sgoingwell.

Keep in

mind thoughthatWomenatSea issues arenot the onlythings thatdrive ouroverhauls.Environmental“Green”upgrades, aswell asimprovementsto combat,habitability,

and othersystems arejust asimportant.Ourship overhaulsare theultimate fiftythousand-milecheckup, andhappen everyfive years thatashipisinthefleet.

TomClancy:Asyougooutinto the fleet today, are thesailorshavingfundoingtheirjobs?

Admiral Johnson: I thinkthat, overall, the forward-deployed forces are havingfun. They’re working hard,making a contribution;they’reat the tipof thespear

executing theirmissions, andthey’re doing the things thatthey came into the Navy todo.Onthenon-deployedside,we’re doing pretty well, butwe’ve got some work to do,sometakingcareofbusiness.We owe those personnel areasonablepacewhenthey’renot deployed and we owethemshipsandairplanes thatare properly maintained.Thoseare thechallenges thatI’m working on right now.

The “tip of the spear” isdoing great. The non-deployed part of the force isdoing well too, but I thinkthat I owe them a bit morethan they’re getting rightnow.

TomClancy:Obviously, thelast ten years have been aroller-coaster ride for seniorleadersintheservices.Couldyou look into your crystal

ball, and tell us what newroles and missions that yousee the Navy taking on as itmovesintothe21stcentury?

Admiral Johnson: Well, tostartwith,Idon’twanttoloseanyof thecoreskills thatwehave right now. I think thatwe would be veryshortsighted to lose any ofthose capabilities. ASW is aclassic example. A lot of

people think that you can“takeyourpackoff”nowandnot worry about it. I do notconcur! We’re putting greatfocusandeffortintounderseawarfare and specificallyASW.We’retheonlyonesinthe world who can do that.That’s Navy stuff! That getsback to my operationalprimacy guidestar: “We cannevertakeoureyesoffofthatball.”Thetruthof it is, thosecore combat skills are things

that we need to maintain.You’ve askedwhat is new. Igive you one word: TBMD.That’s somethingfundamentally new anddifferent from what we aredoing now. It’s a brand-newcapability that will reside inourfleet.

TomClancy:Towrapthingsup, I’d like to give you theopportunity to speak your

mind about your vision forthe Navy. What would youliketosaytothereaders,sir?

Admiral Johnson: I thinkthatwe’vetouchedonthebigthings already in thisinterview. One point that Iwould hope to make is thatthe capability that CVBGsand theNavy ingeneralgiveto the country and the worldis vital. We’ve talked a lot

abouttheequipment,andthatisvital.ButIthinkmorethananything,we’ve got to reallyrepresentallthepeopleintheNavy.That’sthestory.Whenyougoout and“tieon”withone of those groups, you’llsee thatpeopleare themagicthatmakesitallhappen.

I’d also liketo say that weneed to makethe American

people see theneed formaintainingthe greatestNavy in theworld. Therestill is a need.The lessons ofhistory tell usthat. So ourcommitmenttothemisthatwewill never“take our

packs off.”Operationalprimacy willstay as one ofour guidingstars as wehead into thenew century,andwe’lldoitwithleadership,teamwork, andpride.

Forthefirsttimeinalmost

a decade, theNavy seems tobeonasteadycourse,withaplan, and with stableleadershiptoguideitthroughthe uncertainwaters betweenthe 20th and 21st centuries.Like the early mariners whonavigated from star to star,AdmiralJohnsonhasfoundaconstellation for the Navy tofollow to the future. Along

the way, he has provenhimself a quiet but effectivewarrior. In a time when theNavyneededachampionandhero for the wars on thebanks of the Potomac River,they seem to have found awinner—asteadyhandonthehelm, to guide theNavy intoanewmillennium.

WingsofGold:ANavalAviator’sLife

“WhyisAmericaluckyenoughtohavesuchmen?They

leavethistinyshipandflyagainsttheenemy.Thentheymustseektheship,lostsomewhereonthe

sea.Andwhentheyfindit,theyhavetolandonitspitchingdeck.Wheredowegetsuch

men?”

TheBridgesatToko-Ri(JamesA.Michener,1953)

When James A. Michenerwrote these words almostforty-five years ago, carrierdeckswerestraightandmadeof wood, and the first

generation of jet navalaviatorswerestill learning tofly off them. Carriers, jets,and piloting have changedgreatly since then, yet thewords ring as true today astheydidthen.Naval aviators are a

national treasure. They are,first of all, America’s front-line combat aviators. Muchlike their Marine Corpsbrethren, when there is

troubleout there, theyexpecttobe the first called.Thoughthis is anattractivechallengefor some people, there ismore to the naval aviationprofession than just beingfirst in line to be shot at.Flying for the sea servicesrequires unique dedicationand skills (such asexceptional eyesight andhand-eye coordination understress), and demandssacrifices that other military

pilots don’t even have toimagine—all of which hasendowed naval aviation witha (mostly) well-justifiedmystique.Flying on and off aircraft

carriers is a big part of thatmystique. There is an oldsaying among pilots thatflying is not inherentlydangerous, just veryunforgiving.Thoughtherearenotruerwords,therearealso

notable exceptions—“trapping”aboarda rollingand pitching aircraft carrierdeck on a stormy night, forinstance. It is this skill—landing aboard a movingflight deck in all sorts ofconditions—thatmost clearlydifferentiates naval aviatorsfromallotherpilots.Thereissimply no way to compareflying from a runway on aland basewith the stress andresponsibility thatseaservice

pilots have to contend witheverytimetheylaunch.Everytime you take off from acarrier, you leave knowingthat youmight not find yourwaybackontothe“boat”andwill have to eject into ahostile ocean. Clearly, thereis more at stake than just a$50 million airplane (and acareer). Mastering the stressand responsibility of suchflying requiresa specialkindofflier.

FortunatelyforNavyfliers,achieving thatmastery is notlaidsolelyontheirshoulders.They don’t have to do italone.Sincenavalaviation isonly a fraction of the size oftheU.S.Air Force, everyoneknows everyone else—andpays attention to everyoneelse. It’sa lot likebeingpartof a college fraternity (forgoodandforbad).Or—toputit more precisely—U.S.Navalaviation isacollection

of small communities (F-14,F/A-18, EA-6B, etc.) inwhich an aviator spends hisorherlifeforupwardsoftwodecades.Thegoodnewshereisthatthere’slotsofsupport.Thebadnewsis thataviatorsarehugelycompetitive.Yourpeers are always keepingscore.Such a world creates

larger-than-life personalities—powerfully evolved human

beings at the top of the foodchain.Tosucceedyouneedacast-iron ego, a lightningintellect, an excess ofambition, and fluent socialskills. And the mostsuccessful have the ability tospread all this to others intheirprofession.

A Navy pilot(in legend, at

any rate)beganshouting, “I’vegotaMiGatzero!AMiGat zero!”—meaningthatithadmaneuvered inbehind himand waslocked in onhis tail. Anirritated voice

cut in andsaid, “Shut upanddielikeanaviator.” Onehad to be aNavy pilot toappreciate thefinalnuance.Agood Navypilot was areal aviator;in the AirForce theymerely had

pilots and notprecisely theproperstuff.TheRightStuff(Tom Wolfe,1979)

TheNavy likes to train its

air crews hard. Frankly, theytrain the hell out of them.While other services

emphasize providing officerswitha“well-rounded”career,naval aviators in front-lineunits focus on getting readyfor battle. This is not to saythat Navy fliers are liberatedfrom down-to-earth duties.They do paperwork likeanybody else. Rather, theforward-deployed focus ofthe Navy requires moreemphasis on combat trainingthan usually is provided forthe “garrison” units of the

ArmyandUSAF.Anaveragenavalaviatorwillspendfullyhalfofhis timegettingreadyto fight and stayingproficient. While navalaviators fly about the samenumberofhourseverymonthas their USAF counterparts,how and when they fly isvastlydifferent.Moreoftheirflying is focused on actualcombat and tactical training.Andthereisanalmostmanicdevotion to flight safety,

requiring extraordinaryamounts of study andpractice.When a carrier air wing

(CVW) is preparing todeploy, the air crews spendfully sixmonths training andqualifying to prove theirreadiness for the job. This isconcentrated training, withtheentireCVWdeploying toa special air warfare trainingcenter at Naval Air Station

(NAS) Fallon, Nevada, forseveral weeks to learncompositestrikewarfare.Justbeforetheirdeployment,theyfly in a series of joint wargames, which normally havehigher operations tempos(Optempos) than actualwarfare. Thus, by the time anavalaviatorheadsouttothecarriertobeginhissix-monthoverseas deployment, he isone of the best-preparedcombataviators in theworld.

That is not bragging.Consider,forinstance,thatnoU.S. naval aviator has beenshot down in air-to-aircombat since 1972, and thatin a generation of combatfrom Vietnam to DesertStorm, naval aviators haveaccumulated an average kill-lossratiointheneighborhoodof17:1.Along with the dangerous

flying, the life of a naval

aviator brings with it theexpectation of long overseasdeployments, usually lastingsix months or more. A“normal” twenty-year careermightsendanofficeroneightor ten of these “cruises.”Once a carrier group isforward-deployed, even inrelatively “friendly” waterslikethewesternPacificortheMediterranean, the aircraftalways (even when training)flywithliveordnanceloaded.

Thismeansthatwhenyouareoncruise, theonlydifferencebetween peacetime andcombat flying is the positionof theMasterArmswitchonthe control panel in front ofyou. As a result, nationalleaders have to put a lot oftrust in individual navalaviators. With only thejudgment of a young pilotbetween the President and apotential act ofwar, you canunderstand why they are

trained so hard, and held tosuchexactingstandards.

NavalAviationCulture

Though I’ve met fighterpilots that enjoy getting shotat and being missed (theylove living at that high pitchof excitement), by any true

measure, no war is a goodwar.Waris innoway“fun.”Still, for theyoungmenwhoserved in it, World War IIwas the best of wars. Theyhad good airplanes to fly,enemies to fight who werereal enemies, and a justvictory to win. Americanindustry produced splendidaircraft(liketheF-6FHellcatand TBF/TBM Avenger) inwhich a young man with acoupleofyearsofcollegeand

five hundred hours of flighttraining could expect to flysafely into combat, return tobase,andgouptofightagain.Allkindsofyoungmen flewintocombatoffcarrierdecks,from movie actors andKansas farm boys to futureU.S.Presidents.Thestringofvictoriesthattheyachieved—Midway, Coral Sea, LeyteGulf, and many others—testifies to the Navy’s skillandwisdomindeployingand

fightingnavalaviation.Thekeytothissuccesswas

the vast array of trainingbases,whichturnedoutnavalaviatorsandcrewsbythetensofthousands.Bycomparison,as the war went more andmore against them, theJapaneseandGermansturnedoutaircrewswitheverfewerand fewer flying hours oftraining. American navalaviation leaders considered it

a crime to let a young“nugget”16 into thefleetwithless than five hundred hoursof flight time. Instead ofleaving combat veterans inthe fight until they died, asthe Axis nations did,American naval aviators(often against their wishes)were sent home after acombat tour to rest and trainnewpilotsbeforereturningtocombat. In that way, the

veterans got a chance torecharge their batterieswhilethe rookiesgot thebenefitoftheirexperience.Thismeant practically that

lateinthewar(theBattlesofthe Philippine Sea and LeyteGulf in 1944, for example),American carrier air groupswere being led by second-and third-tour commanders(O-5’s). The Japanese unitswere lucky to have

lieutenants(O-2’s)withafewhundred flying hours. Theresults were predictable. Inrepeated one-sided victories,the Americans shot theiropponents out of the air at aratioofover ten toone.17Soeffective was the Americanjuggernaut that the Japanesehad to resort to Kamikazesuicide planes to try to stopthe onslaught. But this toofailed. Naval aviation had

won the Great Pacific War,makingtheislandassaultsbyMarine and Army unitspossible, as well as helpingsweep the seas of enemynaval units. When surrenderfinally came, following theatomic bombs on Hiroshimaand Nagasaki, the bombswere more an excuse than areason.How, you might ask, did

thewarimpactontheculture

ofnavalaviationintheU.S.?It gave it a tradition ofsuccess and confidence—success and confidence builton intense training. Thistraditionwouldhold, even inthedarkdaysofVietnamandthe years following thathorror.

Corrosion:TheVietnamYears

Evenbefore theendof theKoreanWar,newcarriershadbeen laid down, and a newgeneration of supersonic jetsbegan to appear on theirdecks. Every month seemedtobringanewcarrieraircraft,weapon, or innovation. Thiswas a very good time forNaval aviation. Out of itcame, for example, many ofthe astronauts who wouldtake America into space andto the moon. There was a

downside,however.Thenewjets were unreliable—theirnew engines being bothunderpowered and prone tofires and explosions. Thepractical consequence: Navalaviation, always a dangerousprofession, became trulydeadly. Naval aviators,always high-spirited anddaring both in the air andtheir personal lives, began totake on a fatalistic attitudeabout their chances of

reaching retirement age. Theresult was a “live for today”mentality, which they tookwiththemintothe1960’sandVietnam.This fatalism grew

exponentiallywiththestartofthe Vietnam conflict, whenlosses to naval aviators whoflewmissions over SoutheastAsiawere staggering (due toenemy ground fire, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and

MiG interceptors), and thechances of surviving atwenty-year Navy flyingcareer became almost nil.Desperate for combat-readyaircrews,andunabletosendveteran Naval aviators onmore than two “war” cruisesbecauseofpersonnelpolicies,the Navy suffered a severepilot “crunch” during theconflict. Worse than just ashortage of fliers were thecorrosive effects of the

conflict itself on the cultureofthecommunityasawhole.Atlantic Fleet air crews,whose carriers rarely rotatedto Southeast Asia, becamealmost second-class citizensnext to the combat-hardenedveterans from the PacificFleet. Even worse was theeffect on the morale andmorals of the aviators whowent to Vietnam and camehome.

I doubt thatMisterMcNamaraand his crewhave a moralesettingontheircomputers.Rear AdmiralDaniel V.Gallery,1965

Vietnamwasawinlesswar

for naval aviators. They losttheir first comrades monthsprior to the Gulf of TonkinIncident in 1964, and werethe lastAmericans“feetdry”during the evacuation fromSaigon in 1975. During theinterveningdozenorsoyears,the Navy kept two or threeaircraft carriers continuallyon “Yankee Station” (the

U.S.codenameforthecarrieroperatingareainthenorthernTonkin Gulf) as part of thebombing campaigns againstNorth Vietnamese forces. ItwasanewkindofwarfortheAiredales,18mostofwhohadgrownupinthe“Doomsday”mentality of the Cold War.Now they were saddled byabsurd ROE (“rules ofengagement”), guidance ontargets, tactics, and weapons

use. The brilliant butultimately wrongheadedSecretary ofDefense, RobertS. McNamara, and his crewof “whiz kids” devised thisabsurdsituation.Inoneofthegreatestmilitaryblundersinacentury full of militarymisfortune, they failed tolisten to on-scenecommanders about how theair war should be fought.Instead, they tried to “micro-manage” the war from afar,

and turned it into one of theworst military fiascos inAmerica’shistory.Denied the means to

victory, the pilots on thecarriers flew daily fromYankee Station, getting shotdown,captured,andkilled innumbers that still numbmodern-day historians.19Their mission: not to takeeffective military action thatcould lead to victory, but to

delivertoanenemy“politicalmessages” from leaders inWashington who did notunderstandthattheenemydidnot care to listen to thosemessages. To say that aircrewssufferedagreatdealofjob-related stress is anunderstatement.

A fighter pilotsoon found hewanted to

associate onlywith otherfighter pilots.Who elsecouldunderstand thenature of thelittleproposition(rightstuff/death)they were alldealing with?And what

other subjectcouldcomparewith it? Itwasriveting!TheRightStuff(Tom Wolfe,1979)

Inanygroupthatregularly

undergoesstress,tragedy,andthe insanity of a “limited”

war, the survivors bond inunique ways. Thus it waswith Vietnam-era navalaviators. They had faced offwith death, and won (neverforget that fighter pilots areincrediblycompetitive).Theywere the possessors of “theRight Stuff,” the keepers ofthe magic combination ofcourage, ego, and skills thatallowed them to accomplishwith fiendish precisionactionsthatnomachinecould

reliably repeat day after day.Theywere truewarriorswho—aftertheday’sfightingwasover—could imagine nothingbetterthantospendtheiroff-duty time only with eachother.Soon, the entire naval

aviation community hadisolated itself, not only fromAmerican society in general,but even from the Navy thattook them into battle. The

result was a subculture thatlived in the air wing spacesaboard ship and in theofficers’ clubs of the libertyports (like Cubi Point in thePhilippines) and homebases.Quite simply, naval aviatorsfresh from combat werepermitted almost anybehavior short of murder.Thisincludeddrinkingpartiesin the air wing berthingspacesonYankeeStationandwild sexual antics back at

base, as long as they couldget up the next day and flyagain. Ships’ captains andsquadron commanders werenotsimplyturningablindeyeonthismadnessofyouth.Thewild behavior of navalaviators was actuallysanctioned and tolerated bysenior Navy leaders all thewayup to thePentagon.Therationale was that the uglynature of the Vietnam warentitled naval aviators to

“blow off steam” in anequally ugly fashion. Thefallout was a dozen years ofdrunken antics, womanizing,andwildpartyinganytimetheair crews were not actuallyflyingorincombat.

A law ofnature holdsthat alcoholfuels all wars.Andtheladsat

Cubi neversuffered a fuelcrisis. Theygot knee-walking,commode-hugging drunkthefirstcoupleof days, thenrecuperatedwith golf,swimming, ordeepbreathing.

On YankeeStation(CommanderJohn B.NicholsandBarrettTillman,1987)

TheeffectsoftheVietnam-inspireddebaucheryremainedan integral part of navalaviation culture for ageneration. Even though the

end of the war restored amodicum of peacetimedecorum to life aboard ship(alcoholunderwaybecameamajorno-no!),itleftalastingmark on the souls of navalaviators. They now sawthemselvesasthekeepersofaspecialtribalknowledge—thedeep and esoteric knowledgeonlytheypossessed, that toldthem how wartime carrieroperations had to be run. Astribalelders,theysawitasan

imperative of their calling topasstheirtribalknowledgeonto the next generation ofnaval aviation leaders. Thus,when the junior officerswhocame of age during Vietnambecame squadroncommanders and carriercaptains, they passed on tothe new aviators theycommanded the hard-drinking, hard-living,womanizing, daredevilculture that they grew up

with. It would become atickingtimebomb.Theremainingyearsofthe

ColdWar sawnavalaviationand its personnel safelyinsulated from the greatsocial changes that weretaking place in Americansociety. While the air crewswent out on their regularrotations and cruises, thanksto the protection of theirseniorleaders,theylivedina

virtual stasis, immune tooutside forces, totallydisconnected from thecivilian culture. A disasterwas waiting to happen. Thestorm hit in 1991 at the LasVegasHilton.

DryRot:TheEndoftheColdWar

During the two decadesfollowing Vietnam, the civil

rights and women’smovements transformedAmerican society. Duringthose same two decades,those revolutions barelytouched the military ingeneral, the sea services inparticular, and naval aviationleast of all. In spite ofreformers likeAdmiral ElmoZumwalt (Chief of NavalOperations in the early1970’s), the culture of navalaviation remained

unchanged.20As ever, itwasa professional haven formiddle-class white males,withstrongsecond-andthird-generation familyassociations. But a funnythinghappenedonthewaytoDesert Storm:Naval aviationfound itself—slowly,reluctantly—settingoffonthesameroadtherestofAmericawastraveling.The desegregation of the

militarybeganas farbackasthe late 1940s, whenPresident Harry S. Trumanissued an executive order tothateffect.Howevertheorderhad very little immediateeffect on Naval aviation, forfewAmericansofcolorchoseto make that a profession.Still, a tiny cadre of braveyoung men took the plunge;and the first of these, JesseBrown, gave his life incombat while flying during

the Korean War. Sacrificeslike Brown’s and others’went a long way towardvalidating minority navalaviators. The admission ofwomen into naval aviationtook much longer. Un-fortunately,their acceptancethere,with anything like realequality, remains to beachieved. All the same, thefeminist revolution changedtheU.S.military—evennavalaviation—forever.

Broader questions stillremain: Does humankindneed women to be warriors?Does human nature demandit?Doequalrightsbeforethelawdemandit?I’mnotgoingto hazard an answer to thesequestions.Butthere’samucheasier one I can safely field:Willwomen serve in combatin United States militaryservices? The answer to thatone,ofcourse,is“yes.”Theyalready have and do. In

principle,at least, there isnocombat action that qualifiedwomen cannot handle.Meanwhile, fueled by thenew all-volunteer military ofthe1970s, themilitarybeganto recruit large numbers ofwomen into the ranks.Initially they were limited tonon-combatant and supportjobs. But before long, theunderstanding of “non-combatant” and “support”began to change, and with

those changes came anexpansion of women’s roles.Bytheearly1980s,theywereflying transport aircraft andhelicopters, as well astrainingandsupportaircraft.But female naval aviators

stillremainedlandlocked,dueto restrictions on womenserving aboard ships. Theserestrictions, I should pointout, were legal, not naval.That is to say, the legislation

that restricted the role ofwomen aboard ships—andstill restricts the roles ofwomen in combat—iscontained in Title 10 of theU.S. Federal Code, whichmust be amended andapproved by Congress.Professional military officersmay have opinions about therights and wrongs of theserestrictions (which they areobligated to keep tothemselves), but the ultimate

responsibility for them goeshigher up the ladder ofgovernment than the rungstheyoccupy.In any case, the lot of

women in naval aviationduring the late stages of theCold War was anything butpleasant. Since they wereeffectivelybarredfromfront-line fighter, support, andattackunits,theywouldneverhave the command and

promotion opportunities oftheir male counterparts,which went to “combat” aircrews, thus making womensecond-class citizens in themilitary.TheendoftheColdWarin1989changedallthat.TwiceduringtheBushyears,American forces werecommitted to combat, inOperations Just Cause(Panama) and DesertShield/Storm (Persian Gulf).During both operations

(notwithstandingTitle10andother limitations), womenwereprominentlyinvolvedincombat operations. Severalwomen commanded units inactual combat, though in“support” roles (militarypolice,PatriotSAMbatteries,transport helicopters, etc.).Some became prisoners ofwar(POWs),andafewdied.After women performed inboth conflicts withprofessionalism and bravery,

Americans back home couldnot help but question therestrictionsthatkeptthemoutofcombatunits.Soon after the Gulf War,

Congress rapidly amendedTitle 10, and opened up towomen a variety of combatpositions that had previouslybeen reserved for malepersonnel.Womencouldnowfillcombataircrewslotsandserveaboardwarships.Bythe

fall of 1997, only groundcombat units (infantry,artillery, armor, etc.), specialoperations, and submarinesremain barred to women. Infact,lessthantwoyearsafterthe end of Desert Storm, theservices were racing eachother to put the first womeninto the cockpits of combataircraft. Unfortunately, thechange did not comesmoothly.

The Air Force’s firstfemale bomber pilot, forexample,wasforcedtoresignover an adultery charge, allplayed before a noisy mediacircus. The Navy’s firstfemale fighter pilot diedtrying to eject from an F-14Tomcat during a failedapproach to the USSAbraham Lincoln (CVN-74).These lapses and failures,whatever you care to callthem, didn’tmake life easier

for other women flying inpotential combat slots. Butthegreaterfailureremainedinthe cultural bias againstfemale aviators. Also, malepilots had a legitimate beef.For in the force drawdownfollowing the Cold War,many male naval aviatorswere “laid off” and forciblysent into the civilian jobmarket. Longtime navalaviators couldn’t help butresenttheinvasionofwomen

(in the name of perceived“political correctness”) toreplace their longtime malebuddies. The cultural bias ofthese men, dating back toVietnam, condemned such“socialengineering”changes.So, predictably, early femalenaval aviators sufferedharassmentandhostilityfromthemalestheyflewwith.Butthen,ontheLaborDay

weekend of 1991, some very

ugly events happened at theLas Vegas Hilton Hotel,which blew up into thescandal called the “TailhookIncident.” Tailhook soonturned into an internationalindictment of the seaservices’treatmentofwomenin uniform. A yearlyconvention of naval aviatorsand their supporters in LasVegas,Nevada,Tailhookhadlong had a reputation for

drinkingandwildbehavior.21ButTailhook1991wentoverthe top,when several femalenaval officers and otherwomen were allegedlymolested by drunk and out-of-control naval aviators.After one woman officerreported what had happenedto her commanding officerandhe refused to take action(other officers then and laterlied about and tried to cover

up the Tailhook events), shewent to the Navy’s criminalinvestigators. An officialinvestigationwasstarted,andthescandalhitthemedia.Meanwhile, the Navy so

badly botched theinvestigation that noconvictions were obtainedagainst the officers accusedof assaulting women. AndthenNavyleaderslostcontrolof the situation, resulting in

the forced resignations ofseveral high-ranking civilianand military leaders. In theprocess, thousands of navalofficers,most ofwhomwerenot even there, had theircareers harmed by thepolitical fallout. Yet thebotched investigationand theNavy’s political folly werehardly the problem. Muchlesswas it thatnavalofficershad gotten drunk, molestedwomen,andthenliedaboutit

(thoughthiswasbadenough).The problem was the hard-drinking, hard-living,womanizing, daredevil,isolatedtribalcultureofnavalaviation. Naval aviators, abastion of male exclusivity,had made it painfully clearthattheydidnotwantwomenin their combat flying units,and they had made theirdispleasure widely known.There would be furtherproblems. But—slowly—

progresswascoming.

Naval aviators finishing aday’s flying in the “DirtyShirt” pilot’s wardroomaboard the USS GeorgeWashington(CVN-73).Navalaviators treasure suchmoments, and thecomradeship that goes alongwiththem.JOHND.GRESHAM

NavalAviatorsinthePost-TailhookEra

Thoughithascomeatahighprice,andwithmanyfitsandstarts, much has changed inthe culture of Navy flyingsince “Tailhook.” Women inever-greater numbers areserving aboard combatvessels. Every carrier groupthatdeploystodayhasfemaleair crews, along with agrowing population of

women aboard the ships thatthey fly from. Fromhelicopterpilotsflyingofftheback of escort vessels tofighterpilotsflyingpatrolsinno-fly zones, women havearrived and are in to stay. Inthe process, many longtimeNavytraditionshavegonebythe wayside. Some of thechanges have been as simpleas the new rule that everypersonaboardshipsleepwith(at least) a T-shirt and

underwear on, to avoid“exposures” in a passagewayat night; and sailors havelearnedtoknockandwaitforpermission to enter femalequarters. More substantially,ships have been rebuilt withseparate berthing areas andheads (sleeping and showerareas). The result has beenthe greatest single change inNavyculturesincethearrivalof the all-volunteer force inthe mid-1970’s. Along the

way, the Navy has learnedimportant lessons about theeffective integration ofwomenintounitsandculturesthat theypreviouslyhavenotbeenpartof.Theseinclude:

• Critical Mass—Human beings arenot built to handledifficult jobs alone.Without like-mindedcompanionsto share problems

and solutions,emotionsand trials,an individual cantoo easily give up,or bend underpressure. Thuswomen on boardships need otherwomen to sharetheir experienceswith (just as menhave other men).Armed with thatrealization, the

Navy no longerdrops women ontheir own into asquadron or wing,but puts a fewwomen together—aconcept the Navycalls “criticalmass.” Now thatwomen have otherwomenforsupport,thestressesofbeing“new” and“different” in the

male-dominatedworld of navalaviation can bebetter managed. Sonow you’ll findthree or fourwomen in eachflying squadronwhere there arewomen, or none atall. This “criticalmass” allows ayoung female“nugget” to survive

theemotionalrigorsof her first fleetassignment.•Recruiting—While“critical mass”helps integratewomen intoparticular units,finding enoughwomen to do thejob is anothermatter. Recruitingqualified women isnot easy. Because

corporate Americais already workinghard to hire thosefew women (andminority) collegegraduates whomaster “hard”subjects like math,sciences,engineering, andcomputers,thepoolavailabletojointhemilitary is quitelimited. Many of

the womenattracted to themilitary choose tojoin the Army andAir Force, wherethe culture is lessdifficultforthemtoadapt to. Quitesimply, the seaservices have doneapoorjobofsellingthemselves towomen (andminority)

candidates,andwillneed to do a betterjobinthefuture.• Standards—Sinceflying isunforgiving, strictstandards ofperformance andproficiency amongallaviatorsmustbeobserved, a lessonthe Navy haslearned painfully.Cutting corners

only producesfailure, the loss of$50millionaircraft,and grievingfamilies. Thefemale navalaviators that aremakingitintoday’ssquadrons are notcutting corners, norhave corners beencut in order to putthem in a cockpit.They are doing it

right! This meansthat they are doingeverythingthattheirmale counterpartsare expected to doin the cockpit, tothesame standards;and this,more thananything else, hasbrought theacceptance offemale navalaviators at the unitlevel.

• Training—Oursocietydoeslittletoprepare men andwomen for livingand working in thekinds of conditionsthatamodernNavyimposes uponpersonnel.Afterthefailuresexemplifiedby “Tailhook” andthe tribal culture ofnaval aviation, theNavy has started a

seriesofmandatoryleadership seminarsfor officers spacedat various points intheircareers.Atthesametime,allNavypersonnel havebeen givensensitivity trainingto improve theirunderstanding ofhow professionalrelationshipsbetween officers

and sailors of theopposite sex aresupposedtoworkinthe modernmilitary. TheNavy’s justificationfor theseeducational effortsis not “politicalcorrectness.”Rather, sincefamilies andschools train everfeweryoungpeople

today in civics,manners,andsocialskills, the seaservices feel that itis up to them tomake sure theirpeople know theseskills and can actaccordingly.Mannersdocount!

Alloftheseinitiativeshave

started to “level” the navalaviation playing field forwomen, and allowed them togain a foothold in fleetaviation units. Still, somethingscannotbemandatedortrained into professionalwarriors. You can’t teach ayoung “nugget” how tobecome “one of the boys” inhis or her first squadron, forinstance. Doing that isespecially tough, even if youare equipped with a “Y”

chromosome. All navalaviators,nomatterwhattheirsex, must be “bonded” intotheir squadron if they are tosurvive the emotional andcharacter-buildingstrainsthatthey will face on their firstreal “cruise.”First-tournavalaviators are traditionally“pushed” by themembers oftheirsquadrons,andforgoodreason. The pressure dishedout in the ready rooms isdesigned to separate the

winnersfromthe“also-rans.”Lotsofmalenavalaviators

fail to survive their firstsquadron assignments due tothe pressure, and so havemanyofthewomenwhohavetried. Frankly, some of thesewomenhaveshowneverybitasmuch personal courage ascivil rights pioneers likeJames Meredith and RosaParks.Theyhavegonewhereno other women have been

before, and the survivors arefrequently among the best intheir class groups upongraduation.Theyhavetobe.Meanwhile, future

squadron and air wingcommanders will have toshow greater sensitivity andleadership to the conditionsof all “nugget” aviators,women included. This mayhelp theentirenavalaviationcommunity, since keeping

more junior officers aftertheir first tours means fewerpersonnel will have to betrained. At over a milliondollars per trainee, thatquickly adds up to realmoney.

RawMaterial:Recruiting

How exactly does one goabout becoming a navalaviator? Let’s take a quicktour of a hypothetical navalaviation career. Though thismay seem like a bit of egopuffery, it’s not: Youngpeople choose to try out fornaval aviation because theywanttobeamongthe“bestofthe best.” If you can launchand land a modern aircraftfrom the flight deck of anaircraft carrier, cruiser,

destroyer, frigate, oramphibious ship, you willnever have to justify yourflying skills to anyone.Nobody else—not theIsraelis,British,notevenourown U.S. Air Force—makespilots better than the USN.Much like Marine Corpsbasic training, whichproduces the world’s finestcombat riflemen, the Navytrains flierswith basic flyingand combat skills that are

unsurpassed. Of course theUSAF and others trainexcellent combat aviators.That goes without saying.However, when you wantsuperbcombatskills,and theability to fly off of a rollingandpitching deck at night inrough weather, you’d betterplan on calling the Navy fortheaircrews.What kind of person does

the Navy want to fly its

airplanes? For starters, he orshe has to be a collegegraduate from an accreditedfour-year university. 22 Priorto World War II, the NavalAcademy supplied themajority of naval aviationcadets. But when the wardemanded a vastly expandedpool of air crews, therequirements for navalaviation cadetswere loweredto completion of just two

years of college. Today, thesea services feel that theresponsibility for flying afifty-million-dollar aircraft(with more computing andsensor power than a wholefleet just a generation ago)shouldgo to someonewith auniversity education. For amodernpilotwillhavetobeasystems operator, tactician,andathlete,aswellasanavalofficerwithdutiestoleadandmanage.

Onceyouhave thecollegedegree, and assuming thatyouwanttoflyoverthewaterfor your country, that youreyesight and physicalcondition are good, and thatyou can pass the requiredbatteries of mental andcoordination tests, what elsedoyouneed?First,youneedto be an officer in the U.S.NavyorU.S.MarineCorps.23If you are a graduate of the

Naval Academy (or, for thatmatter, West Point orColorado Springs), then youhave automatically earned areserve officer’s commissionas an ensign or 2ndlieutenant.24Thesameistrueif you have completed anaccredited Reserve OfficersTraining Corps (ROTC)program at a university.However, ifyouareasimplecollege graduate with an

ambition to fly for the seaservices, then there areseveral Officer CandidateSchools(OCSs)thatcangiveyouthebasicskillsasaNavyor Marine Corps officer, aswell as the commission.Though there were once anumber of these schoolsaround the country, todaythere are just two, one atQuantico, Virginia, for theMarines,andtheNavyschoolat Pensacola, Florida.

However you get thecommission to ensign/2ndlieutenant (O-1), the path tothe cockpit of an aircraft inthe sea services starts atNaval Air Station (NAS)Pensacola.

NASPensacola:CradleofNaval

Aviation

NASPensacola,on the shoreof the bay whose name itborrows, was originallyfounded as a NavalAeronauticalStation in1914.But the region’s relationshipwith the Navy goes backmuch further. The bay itself,discovered in the 16thcentury by the Spanishexplorer Don Tristan deLuna, attracted official U.S.Navy interest in the early1800s because of its

proximity to high-qualitytimber reserves, a staple ofl9th century shipbuilding.Starting in 1825, the Navybuilt yard facilities near thesite of the present-day NAS.FromthisNavalstationcamepatrols that suppressed theslave trade and piracy in themid-1800s. Destroyed byretreating Confederate forcesduringtheCivilWar,thebasewas rebuilt shortly after theendof that conflict. Severely

damaged again by hurricaneand tidal events in 1906, theexcellent location andfacilities proved too valuableto surrender to the elements,and the base was not onlyrebuilt,butalsoexpanded.

The Flightline at Naval AirStation Pensacola, Florida.Every Navy, Marine Corps,and Coast Guard aviatorstartshisorhercareerat thisbase.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTOPensacola’s association

with naval aviation began in1913,whenrecommendationswere made to establish anaviation training station in a

location with a year-roundclimate thatwas favorable tothe needs of early aviators.Opened in 1914, it was thehome to a rapidly expandingaviationforcethatbytheendof World War I includedfixed-wing aircraft,seaplanes, dirigibles, andeven kites and balloons! Butthe lean years following thewar meant that only about ahundred new aviators peryearwerebeingtrained.That

timeended in the1930swiththe creation of NavalAviation Cadet TrainingProgram,whichwasdesignedto expand the air crewpopulation in anticipation ofthe coming world war. Tosupport the growth in thetraining program, severalother training bases wereconstructed, including NASCorpus Christi, Texas, andNAS Jacksonville, Florida.Eventually, the combined

U.S. naval flight trainingfacilities were turning outover1,100newnavalaviatorsa month, though this wasreduced following the end ofWorld War II. On average,during the Korean andVietnam Wars, about twothousand naval aviators ayear were trained to meetwartime requirements, whilemorepeaceful timessawthatnumberdroptoaround1,500.Today,NASPensacola is the

home of a still-robust navalaircrewtrainingcapability.

Training:IntothePipeline

Soon after an aviation cadetarrivesatPensacola,heorshehastomakeamajordecision:whether to train to become aNavalAviator(NA—pilot)or

NavalFlightOfficer (NFO—airborne systems operator).Or rather, just abouteverybody starts out wantingto be pilots, but then thedecision about which way togo is often made for themwhen the vision test resultscome in.Eyesight is the firstgreat pass/fail point amongfliers.Ingeneral,theserviceslookforgooddistancevision,though excellent night visionisalsodesired.Manyofthose

whowindup asNFOsdo sobecause they fail the initialeyesight cut for pilots. As ithappens, though, life as anNFO very rarely provesdisappointing. More oftenthan you might believe,squadron and air wingcommandsarewonbyNFOs,many of whom have beennoted for their superiorleadership and managementskills.

Whichever career pathbeckons the incomingcadets,they all start training in thesameclassroom.Specifically,there’s a six-week courseknown as Aviation PreflightIndoctrination (API), whichcomprisesasyllabusdesignedto bring all of the StudentNaval Aviators (SNAs) andStudentNavalFlightOfficers(SNFOs) up to a commonknowledge and skill base.API covers aerodynamics,

engineering, navigation, andphysiology. Along with theclassroomwork, the studentsreceive physical training inwater survival, physicalconditioning, and emergencyescape procedures. API“levels” the skill base of thecadets, and provides afighting chance to thosewhodid not (for example) studyphysics or computer sciencein college. When API iscompleted, the training

pipeline splits into twoseparate conduits. One ofthese is the Primary FlightTraining (PFT) pipeline forSNFOs,whiletheotherisforSNAswanting topilotNavalaircraft.

PilotTraining:TheSNAPipeline

SNA PFT is designed toteach pretty much the same

basic flight skills that acivilianwouldneed toobtaina private pilot’s license. Itconsists of some sixty-sixhours of flight training, aswell as a syllabus of groundclassroom and simulatortraining. The actual flighttraining includes basicaerobatics, formation flying,and military flightprocedures. This is quitesimilar to that of the ArmyandUSAF.However,theway

that trainingisconductedhasrecentlychangedagreatdealfor all U.S. military airpersonnel. These changeshave resulted from the 1986Goldwater-Nichols defensereform legislation.Specifically, Goldwater-Nichols encouraged theNavy,AirForce, andMarineCorps to find ways tocombine common tasks into“joint” (i.e., multi-service)programs and units. The

consequenceforpilottraininghas been to combineprimary/undergraduate flighttraining, as well as trainingfor a number of differentmissions and airframes. Tothat end, the services haveestablished joint trainingsquadrons around thecountry. They have furtherteamed up to build a newcommonprimary/undergraduatetrainer, the T-6A Texan II,

which will enter service in1999. Based upon the SwissPilatus PC-9 turboproptrainer, itwillprovidea trulyeconomical joint trainingsolution forprimary/undergraduate flighttraining.Thus a young SNA going

through PFT in 1997 mightbe foundatVanceAFBnearEnid,Oklahoma.Assigned tothe 8th Flying Training

Squadron(FTS),hewillhavedone his PFT flight trainingin an Air Force T-37B, in ajoint unit commanded by anaval officer, CommanderMark S. Laughton. SimilarsquadronsarelocatedatNASPensacola, Randolph AFBand NAS Corpus Christi inTexas,aswellasotherbases.Since the joint trainingsquadrons have provedsuccessful, plans are underway to provide joint training

at theairframe levelwhere itis appropriate. For example,since all the services withfixed-wing aircraft flyvariants of the venerable C-130Hercules, therewillsoonbe a single C-130 pipelineunitfortrainingtheaircrews.At the end of the PFT

phaseof training, cadets findout what “community” theywill be headed for at thecompletion of their training.

Though just a fraction thesize of the USAF, the airforcesof the sea services areeven more diverse in theirrolesandmissions.Therefore,following the basic phase ofPFT,cadetsmoveontooneoffive training pipelines (all ofwhich have intermediate andadvanced phases). Theseinclude:

• Strike (TacticalJets)—This course

of trainingprovidesstudent trainees forthe F-14 Tomcat,F/A-18 Hornet,AV-8B Harrier II,EA-6B Prowler, S-3Viking, andES-3Shadow aircraft.Normally, strikepipelineSNAstrainat the same basewheretheydidtheirPFT work. Alongwith further

classroom work inaerodynamics,engineering,meteorology,communications,and navigation,thereisflying.Alotof flying! All told,the intermediateand advancedphases of the strikepipeline PFTprovide for around150 flight hours,

covering a greatrange of requiredskills andknowledge. Theseinclude flightinstructioninvisualand instrumentflying, precisionaerobatics,gunnery/weaponsdelivery, high- andlow-altitude flight,air combatmaneuvering

(ACM), andformation flying.Night flying is alsotaught, along withflying in a varietyof weatherconditions, andradarapproaches/landings.During this timealso comes thedreaded carrierqualification,wherethe SNA meets up

with thedeckofanactual aircraftcarrier for the firsttime. To help thestudents along,extensive use ismade of part-tasktrainers based uponpersonal computers(PCs), as well ashigh-end full-motion simulators.However, noamount of

simulation andpreparation caninsure thateveryonecompletestheroughlysixteen-monthcourse.

For years,this phase oftraining hadthe SNAsflying eitherthe T-2CBuckeye or

TA-4JSkyhawk,bothclassic two-seat trainingaircraft. But along-overduereplacement isfinally cominginto serviceafter a seriesof problemsand delays.Known as theT-45Goshawk

trainingsystem, it isbased upon aheavilymodifiedBritishAerospaceHawk trainer,and isdesigned toprovide abeginning-to-end trainingfor the Strike

pipeline. Thismeans that thecontractor(Boeing,through theacquisition ofMcDonnellDouglas)provideseverythingrequired—simulators,computer-based-trainers,

the T-45trainingaircraft,andallthemaintenancepersonnel. Inorder to makethe trainingsystem workfor PFTstudents, thesea servicesonly need toprovide

personnel(instructorsand students),a base, andfuel. Thenewestversion, theT-45C,incorporates afullyfunctional“glass”cockpit,similar to the

F/A-18’s andthat of othermoderntacticalaircraftthat thestudents willeventuallyfly.25 The T-45C can beused for amuch morevariedcurriculum

than the twoaircraft itreplaces ; andthanks to afuel-efficientengine and allthe newavionicssystems,theT-45 trainingsystem willactually notonly savemoney, but

also improvethequalityandfidelity of thevarioustrainingcurriculums.A flight ofBoeing T-45Goshawktrainers. Basedon the BritishAerospaceHawk-series

trainers, theyprovide theNavy with aneconomical jettrainer that isreplacing theaging T-2Buckeye andTA-4Skyhawk.BOEINGMILTTARYAIRCRAFT

• E-2/C2—Thistraining coursesupplies air crewsto fly the E-2CHawkeye airborneearly-warningaircraft and itstransport cousin,theC-2Greyhound,both of which arepowered by twin-engine turboprops.Because the

airframes that itsupplies air crewsfor are among themostheavilyloadedand difficult to flyon and off carriers,the E-2/C-2pipeline is unique.Thus, for example,the E-2/C-2pipeline deletessome of thecombat/weapons-orientedportionsof

the Strike PFTcourse work.UtilizingtheT-44APegasus(essentiallya twin-engineRaytheon/BeechKing Air), theintermediatetraining is carriedout by NavalTraining Squadron31 (VT-31), and isrun atNASCorpusChristi, Texas. The

advanced phase ishandledbyVT-4atNAS Pensacola,Florida, flying T-45’s.•Maritime—Sincethe sea services flyseveral types offour-engineturboprop aircraft(theP-3/EP-3Orionand C-130/KC-130/HC-130Hercules), a

separate pipeline(Maritime)supportsthese communities.The Maritimesyllabus beginswith six additionalweeks of flying atthe primary PFTbase. For theremaining twentyweeksofthecourse(intermediate andadvanced), thestudents fly the T-

44A Pegasus withVT-31 at NASCorpus Christi foran additionaleighty-four flighthoursofinstruction.Since these aircraftnever land oncarriers, thesyllabusconcentrates onmulti-engineaircraft operatingprocedures,

especially inemergency and all-weatheroperations.• E-6—One of themore chillingmissions flown bynaval aviators (amission unique tothe Navy) involvesflying the E-6Mercury—theTACMO (TakeCharge and MoveOut) aircraft.

TACMO wasoriginally thecontrol function forthe Navy’s TridentFleet BallisticMissile (FBM)submarines, but itsmission has grown.Based on a Boeing707airframe,theE-6 Mercury ispacked with securecommunicationsand battle-

managementequipment. Alongwith the gear forthe TACMOmission, the E-6carries a fullyequipped battlestaff from the U.S.StrategicCommand(STRATCOM—BASED at OffutAFB near Omaha,Nebraska). Thisallows the E-6’s to

control the launchand weaponsrelease of all U.S.nuclear forces(bombers, land-based missiles, andsub-launchedmissiles) from a(relatively !) secureairborne commandpost (this job waspreviously handledby the USAF fleetofEC-135Looking

Glass aircraft). Inthe event that anuclear strike wereto destroy theNational CommandAuthorities inWashington, D.C.,and other land-based locations, theTACMO aircraftwould still be ableto order acounterstrike.

To supportthis highlyspecializedmission, theNavy has aspecificpipeline tosupply aircrews for thissingle type ofairframe.Whilegenerally likethe Maritime

pipeline, themulti-engine-trainer time iscarried out onthe new T-1AJayhawkTanker/TransportTrainerSystem (TTTS—basedontheRaytheon/Beech400A businessjet). Like theT-45 training

system, theJayhawktrainingcurriculummakesextensive useofcomputerizedtask trainersandsimulators.Overall,theE-6 pipelineemphasizes

all-weatherflighttechniquesandcockpitresourcemanagement.

• Helicopter—Since about half ofsea service aircraftare helicopters, therotorcraft course ofstudy is secondonly to the strike

pipelineinnumbersof aviators trained.The Helicopterintermediate-phasePFTiscomposedofsix additionalweeks at theprimary trainingbase, with anemphasis oninstrument flying.This is followedbythe twenty-one-week advanced

phase of theHelicopter pipeline,which is composedof 116 hours offlighttrainingintheTH-57B/C SeaRanger helicopter(the Navy’s trainerversion of thefamous Bell JetRangerbusiness/utilityhelicopter). Alongwith the flying, the

classroom workincludes helicopteraerodynamics andengineering, nightand cross-countryflying, as well ascombat search-and-rescue techniques.Finally, theHelicopter pipelineSNAs actually takeoff and land fromthe HelicopterLanding Trainer

(HLT), a speciallyconfigured barge atNASPensacola.

The decision about where

anindividualgoesisbasedonseveral factors, mostimportantly where he or shefinishes in the first part oftheir PFT class. Normally,high-scoring students arefunneled into the “glamor”Naval aviation assignments,

like the fighter/attackcommunities. Since air wingand carrier skippers havetraditionally come from the“fast movers,” assignment toone of these communitiescarries great weight, status,and self-esteem. Still, morethan a few young aviatorschooseotherspecialties,suchas helicopters or supportaircraft.Thoughonereasonisthat the skills of flyingtransport and cargo aircraft

have greater value in thecivilian job market,sometimes trainees just wantto fly a particular kind ofaircraft,oraspecificmission.Whatever community thetrainees want, the personneldetailers do their best tomatch these desires with theneedsoftheNavyandMarineCorps.While every SNA

undergoesa rigorous training

regime, those in the StrikeandE-2/C-2pipelines clearlyhavethetoughestchallenge—learning to make arrestedlandings aboard aircraftcarriers. You cannotoveremphasize how this oneskill, more than any other,setsNavalaviatorsapartfromtheir land-basedcounterparts.Landingon amoving ship atseaisinsanelydifficult,anditmust be done with absoluteprecision every time. In fact,

no other phase of SNAtraining “washes out” somany young fliers. Thedefining moment for everynaval aviator occurs whenthey come out of the breakandlineupintothe“groove”for their first carrierqualification. Terrifying.Heart-stopping. Insane.That’s what they all thinkwhen they first look downandoutatacarrierandrealizethey’llhavetolandonthatin

justaboutfifteenseconds!Tosurviveyourfirstsetof

carrier qualifications (navalaviators have to requalifiyliterally dozens of times inthe course of a career), thekey is to make “good”landings as early as possibleduring qualifications. This isbecauseyourfinalscoreisanaverage of all your landingattempts. If you start outpoorly, then you’ve dug

yourselfahole that isalmostimpossible togetoutof.TheNavy likes SNAs who are“comfortable” and “natural”with the carrier landingprocess (as if this is everpossible!), and pilots whohave to “learn” or “force” itare considered potentiallydangerous, andnot suited forthetrade.

NFOTraining:TheGuysin

Back

PilotsandNFOsneedeachotherjusttosurvive.Andit’snot just part of the job. Themen andwomenwho fly fortheseaserviceshaveaspecialbond; they look out for eachother in the air and on theground. This comradeship,added to the many otherrewarding aspects of Navyflying, helps keep navalaviators coming back to

reenlist. Just as with pilots,thepathtobecominganNFObegins at NAS Pensacola,with the same six-week APIcourse taken by SNAs. Butthen the SNFOs are assignedtotheirownPFT,runbyVT-10.Here they spend fourteenweeks learning basicairmanship,includingtwenty-twohoursof flying time inaPFT trainer. Though theyspend eight of these in thepilot’s seat, they are not

allowed to solo. The SNFOsthen undergo an extensivePC-based training course inaircraft systems, whichincludestrainingonradioandnavigation procedures, andclassroom work inaerodynamics, emergencyprocedures, flight rules andregulations, and cockpitresource management. Oncethe basic PFT course iscompleted, the SNFOscontinue onto their

intermediate PFT courses viaone of two pipelines:Navigator and TacticalNavigator IntermediateTraining:

• Navigator—TheNavigator pipelinesupplies personnelfortheP-3andEP-3 Orion; C-130,KC-130, and HC-130 Hercules; andE-6 Mercury

TACMOcommunities.Twenty-two weekslong, the NavigatorcourseisrunbytheAir Force’s 562ndFTS at RandolphAFB,Texas.There,SNFOs in theNavigator pipelinecomplete eightyhours of airborneflighttrainingintheT-43A trainer (a

modified Boeing737), learning thedifficult trade oflong-range andover-waternavigation. Theseinclude use ofcelestial, radio, andsatellite navigationequipment, as wellas securevoice anddata transmissionsystems.• Tactical

NavigatorIntermediateTraining—EverySNFO who is notassigned to theNavigator course atRandolph AFBgoes into theTactical NavigatorIntermediateTraining (TNIT)pipeline. Thiscourse is designedto provide NFOs

forallthe“tactical”(i.e., combat)aircraftcommunities in thesea services—suchastheF-14Tomcat,the S-3B Viking,theE-2CHawkeye,and the EA-6BProwler. The TNITSNFOs take theirtrainingwithVT-10at NAS Pensacola,andthecourselasts

fourteen weeks.The flight trainingfor TNIT SNFOsprimarily providesexperience in low-level navigationand air-traffic-control proceduresand is currentlyaccomplished incontractor-operatedT-39Ns (modifiedSabreliner businessjets); but this will

change shortly, asthe services begintransitioning overto jointly operatedT-1A Jayhawks.Already, the T-1Asare augmenting theT-39Ns fornavigationaltraininghops.Uponcompletion ofTNIT, SNFOs arethen assigned toone of three

advanced trainingcourses:

•StrikeSNFO:TheStrikeSNFOcourseprovidesadvancedtrainingfor

NFOsheadingintotheS-3Viking,ES-3Shadow,andEA-6Bcommunities.

ThiscourseisrunbyVT-86atNASPensacola.FlyingintheT-

2C(soontobereplacedbytheT-45),T-39N,andT-1A.

StrikepipelineSNFOsspendsixtyflighthoursovereighteenweekslearningover-waterand

low-levelnavigationalprocedures.Thekeycourseobjectiveistobuildcrewcoordinationskills,

sothatintheheatofacombatoremergencysituation,theywillbe

readytoacttosurviveandcompletetheirassignedmissions.Oncetheycompletethe

Strikecourse,theSNFOsdestinedfortheEA-6BandES-3communitiesgo

toaspecialelectronicwarfarecourseatCorryStationonNASPensacola.S-3

SNFOsgostraightintotheS-3communityoncetheyfinishtheirtraining.•

Strike/FighterSNFO:TheStrike/FighterSNFOpipelineprovidesNFOsforthesmallcommunityoftwo-

seatstrikefightersinserviceintheNavy(F-14Tomcats)andMarineCorps

(F/A-18DHornets).WhilesimilartotheStrikesyllabus,theStrike/FighterSNFOcourseis

longer(twenty-fiveweeks)toallowtheteachingofairborneinterceptandradarskills,

aircombatmaneuvering,andair-to-groundweaponsdeliveries.

•AviationTacticalData System(ATDS) SNFO:The ATDS SNFO

course providesairborne controllersfor the E-2CHawkeyecommunity. Thispipeline is uniquein that it is run byan actual fleet unit,Carrier AirborneEarly WarningSquadron 120(VAW-120) atNAS Norfolk,Virginia. The

thirty-two hours ofATDS flighttraining (spreadover twenty-twoweeks) take placeaboard actual fleetE-2C aircraft (alsounique in SNFOtraining).

Now the new aviators can

savor their achievements.They have reached the

crowningmomentwhen theyare issued their naval aviatornumber and their “Wings ofGold.”Sincetheearliestdaysof naval aviation, this smallpin has been the symbol thathassetthemapartfromotherofficersintheseaservices.Itis now time for them to jointhe communities and aircraftthat will be at the center oftheir naval careers for thenexttwodecades.

Butbeforetheyheadouttotheir first fleet assignment,there is one more school forsome of the new navalaviators.ThisisthenotoriousSERE (Survival, Evasion,Resistance, and Escape)training course, one of thetoughest courses anymilitaryofficer can take. Though itsexact details are classified, Idoknowthatitisdesignedtotake“at risk”pilotswhowillbe entrusted with “special”

knowledgeorresponsibilities,and place them into a “real-world” prisoner-of-war(POW) situation. SEREtrainingfacesthestudentwithphysical and mental stressessimilar to those they mightexpect to experience if theyare captured by one of ourmore unpleasant enemies(NorthKorea,Iran,Iraq,etc.).Asof1996,therewasasinglejointSEREschool, locatedatFairchildAFBnearSpokane,

Washington. Normally astudent attends prior toarriving at his first squadronassignment.

IntotheFleet

Bynow,officersintendingtofly for the sea services havebeen in the military forsomethingovertwoyearsand

are ready to pass the finalhurdle before they begin torepay the million-dollarinvestmentthetaxpayershaveso far put into their careers.Thisistheirfinalcertificationin a Fleet ReadinessSquadron (FRS), whichteaches the specific skillsnecessary to operate eachtypeofNavyorMarineCorpsaircraft. During the FRSrotation the Navy teaches itsNaval aviation professionals

theskillsthatwillmakethemdangerous out in fleet units.Under the supervision of theFRS instructor pilots (IPs),thenewNAsandNFOslearnthe tacticallycorrectmethodsfor employing the weapons,systems, and sensors of theircommunity’saircraft.TheIPsthemselves, normally veryskilled airmen who havecompleted a tour or two atsea, are the final qualitycheck that determines

whether a new aviator isallowed to go out to sea. Ingeneral,theFRSisthevesselwhere a particularcommunity’s “tribalknowledge” is kept to bepassed along to thenextgeneration of air crews.And at FRSs, many of thenew concepts for weaponsandsystemsareborn.26

Themomentof truth.AU.S.naval aviator prepares tolaunch in anF/A-18Con thedeck of the USS GeorgeWashington(CVN-73).OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTOForthenewNAsorNFOs,

theFRSphaseof theircareercan go quickly, or last awhile. Exactly how longdepends on how fast theylearntooperateafleetaircraft

to the exacting standards ofthe FRS IPs and how soonjobsbecomeavailable inoneof the fleet squadrons. ThemoredifficultaircraftliketheF-14 Tomcat or EA-6BProwler might require ayoungaviatortobeheldbackso that certain skills can bereinforced; and some are“washed out” of one aircrafttype and moved to anotherthat’slessdemanding.

SecondHome—SquadronLife

Once the FRS IPs haveconcluded that a “nugget”(rookie aviator) is ready, acall goes out to the detailingoffice to look for a spot inone of the fleet squadrons.Squadrons are the basicfighting unit and buildingblock of CVWs (and of all

naval aviation); and for thenexttenyearsorso,squadronlife will dominate the newnugget’s career. But beforewe get to that, let’s take aquick look at some Navyjargon and designations.ThoughtheNavyisnotoriousfor its clumsy and awkward-sounding acronyms andconjunctive designations,these batches of alphabetsoup do actually serve apurpose. Consider the

followingtable:Naval SquadronDesignations

If you understand thesquadron designation, andadd the squadron’s numberbehind it, you know whatkind of unit you are talkingabout.Forexample,VF-14isafightersquadron,whichjusthappenstoflyF-14Tomcats.They are known as the“Tophatters,” and theirheritage dates back to the1920s, when they were

originally designated VF-2,flying aboard the oldLexington (CV-2). Thesystem is actually quitelogical and simple, if youtakethetimetounderstandit.Other facts about Navy

squadrons are not quite soobvious; the number ofaircraft and personnel withina particular kind of unit, forexample. An F/A-18 Hornetsquadron usually deploys

with a dozen aircraft,eighteen air crew, and asupport/maintenance base ofseveral hundred personnel.Conversely, each EA-6BProwler squadron has onlyfour airplanes, but more aircrew (about two dozen) andmaintenance personnel thanthe Hornet unit. For eachProwler carries four air crew(comparedwith the F/A-18’ssinglepilot),andthejammingaircraft require much more

maintenance than theHornets. The squadronsthemselves are structuredpretty much alike. A fullcommander (O-5) generallycommands, with a lieutenantcommander as the executiveofficer. Backing them up aredepartment heads formaintenance, intelligence,training,operations,andevenpublic affairs.Watchingoverthe enlisted troops will be amaster chief petty officer,

who is the senior enlistedadvisor to the commander.Under normal peacetimeconditions, the squadronpersonnel will spend aboutthreetofouryearsintheunit,about enough time for twooverseasdeployments.The new nuggets,

meanwhile, are getting readyfor their first overseasdeployment. But before thathappens, they are assigned a

“callsign”(frequently“hung”on the new aviator during asquadronmeeting).Callsignsare nicknames used aroundthe squadron to differentiateall the Toms, Dicks, Jacks,and Harrys that clutter up aready room and makeidentificationover a crowdedradio circuit difficult. Mostcall signs get “hung” on apilotbecauseofsomeuniquecharacteristic. Sometimesthey are inevitable. Thus,

every pilot named Rhodes isgoing to be named “Dusty,”just as anyDavidsonwill be“Harley.” Others are moreunique.One F-4RIO (RadarIntercept Officer) who lostseveral fingers during anejection over North Vietnambecame “Fingers.” Anotherpilotbecame“Hoser”becauseofhistendencytorapidlyfire20mm cannon ammunitionlikewater out of a fire hose.Most call signs last for life,

and become a part of eachnavalaviator’spersonality.New pilots and NFOs

normallyarriveinasquadronduring the first few monthsafter it comes home from itslast deployment. There theywill be expected to get up tospeed in the squadron’saircraft, weapons, and othersystems, as well as in theproper tactics for employingallofthese.Thusbythetime

the squadron deploys, it ishoped the nuggets will bemoredangeroustoapotentialenemy than to themselves ortheirsquadronmates.Tohelpthemgetstarted,newaviatorsare usually teamed with anolder and more experiencedmemberof the squadron.Forexample, in F-14 squadronsyou normally see a nuggetpilot teamed with a senior(second or third tour) RIO,who is probably a lieutenant

commander. If the squadronflies single-seat aircraft likethe F/A-18 Hornet, then thenuggetpilotwillbemadethewingman to a more seniorsection leader. The final sixmonths prior to the nugget’sfirst deployment are spent“workingup”withtherestofthe squadron, air wing, andcarrier as they mold into aworkingteam.During the cruise, nuggets

areexpectedtoflytheirshareof missions in the flightrotation, stand watches asduty officers, and generallyavoid killing themselves oranyone else withoutpermission.Ifthenuggetdoesthesetaskswellonhisorherfirst overseas cruise(normallylastingsixmonths),it is likely he or she has afuture in the Naval aviationtrade. It is further hoped thatthe rookie will have become

proficient in flying all thevarious missions assigned tothesquadron,andqualifiedtoleadflightsof thesquadron’saircraft. When the squadronreturns from the cruise, thenuggetswill (hopefully)haveenough experience andenthusiasm todo it again thefollowingyear.Most naval aviators have

bythistimebeenpromotedtolieutenant (O-3), and have

been entrusted with minorsquadron jobs like publicaffairs, welfare, or moraleduty. It is also the time thatthe Navy begins to noticethose young officers whohave promise. One signyou’ve been noticed is to besent to school. If you are agood “stick” in an F-14 orF/A-18 squadron, forexample, you may get achance to headwest to NASFallonnearReno,Nevada, to

attend what the service callsthe Naval Fighter WeaponsSchool, which you probablyknow better as Topgun).Topgun is a deadly seriouspost-graduate-level schooldesigned to create squadron-level experts on tactics andweaponsemployment.TheE-2C community also has itsown school co-resident atNASFallon,calledTopdome,after the large rotating radardomes on their aircraft.

Graduates of these schoolshave an automatic “leg up”on other aviators at theirlevel, and will likely getchoice assignments if theycontinue to shine.More thanafewTopgungraduateshavegone on to the Navy’s TestPilot School at PatuxtentsRiver, Maryland, or even toflytheSpaceShuttle.All too soon however, the

secondcruisearrives.Though

second-cruise aviators areexpected to show someleadership and help the newnugget air crews with theirfirst cruises, most of whattheydoisfly.Theyflyalot!Now is the time whentaxpayers begin to get backthe million-dollar-plusinvestments made in theseyoung officers. Most navalaviators find lifegoodat thisstage. With a cruise ofseniority over the nuggets,

and none of the commandresponsibilities that willburden them later in theircareer,itisanicetimetobeanavalaviationprofessional.

TheGoodYears—TheSecondandThirdTours

The Navy, wisely, is wellaware that after two cruises,young naval aviators tend tobeburnedoutandneedshoreduty to recharge theirbatteries. During this firstshore tour (which lasts aboutthree years), a youngmanorwoman can earn a master’sdegree(anecessityforhigherpromotionthesedays),startafamily, and perhaps build a“real”home.

An officer who showsspecial promise for highercommand may also beoffered graduatework at oneof the service universities(such as the Naval Post-Graduate School, the NavalWar College, the NationalWarCollege atFortMcNair,in Washington, D.C., or theAir University at MaxwellAFB,Alabama).Staffschoolslike these are designed toteach officers the skills

needed for high-level jobslike running a squadron,planning for an air wing orbattlegroupstaff,orworkingfor a regional commander inchief. There may also be anopportunity for the youngofficertogetsometimeasanIP at one of the FRSs. Theymightalsoserveinastaffjobforanadmiralorothermajorcommander.By the end of this three-

year period, they willprobablybereadytogobackto a flying unit at sea. Ouraviator is by now aroundthirty years old, with overeight years of service in theNavy, meaning that thisflying tour represents ahalfway point in his or herflying career. Here they willdo some of their mostdemandingwork.Thesecondsea tour (of three to fouryears)puts theaviatorouton

a carrier for another twocruises—either as a memberof a squadron, or perhaps asan officer on an air wingstaff. Whatever the case, theaviatorwillgetanotherheavydose of flying, though thistime there’ll be a great dealmore responsibility. For it isduring this time that officerenterstheNavyequivalentofmiddle management.Specifically, this means thatofficers now have to provide

more flight and strikeleadership on missions, aswell as expertise in thevarious planning cells thatsupportflightoperations.Once this tour is

completed, the aviator isalmostguaranteeda two-yearshoretourasanIPateitheratraining squadron or a FRS.Therewillalsoprobablybeasignificant raise inpay, sincepromotion to lieutenant

commander (O-4) normallyoccursduringthistime.Afterthe IP shore tour comes adepartment head tour, whichis the start of their rise tocommand.

Command—TheTopoftheHeap

Fornavalaviators,thepathto

combatcommandstartswhenthey arrive at their squadronfor their third flying tour(another three-to-four-year,two-cruise sea tour) and areassigned a major squadrondepartment (maintenance,training, operations, safety,supply,etc.)torun.Howwellthey do here will ultimatelydetermine how far they willgo in the Navy. After thedepartmentheadtour,officerswho prove to be “only”

average will go back toanother shore tour, perhapson a staff or to a projectoffice at the Naval AirSystems Command, and willprobably be allowed to servetheir twenty years and retire.But if the Navy feels anofficer has commandpotential,thenthingsbegintohappen quickly, startingwitha two-year “joint” staff tour,which is designed to “roundout” the officer’s career and

provide the “vision” forworking effectively withofficers and personnel fromother services and countries.Following this, the officerheads back to what willprobably be his or her finalflying tour, as the executiveofficer(XO)ofasquadron.Ifthe first cruise as XO goeswell,thesecondcruisecomeswith a bonus—promotion tofullcommander(O-5)andthejob of commanding officer

(CO) of a squadron of navalaircraft.

It also is the beginning of

the end of the officer’ssquadron life. In less thaneighteen months, our aviatorwill be handing overcommandoftheunittohisorherXO,andthecyclemoveson. From here on, aviatorstake one of two paths. Theycan take another staff tour,

followed by “fleeting up” totake over their own air wing(withapromotion tocaptain,O-6).Theotheroptionisthatthey can take the path tocommand of an aircraftcarrier.This includes nuclearpower school, an O-6promotion, and a two-yeartour as a carrier XO.Following this comes acommand tour of a “deepdraft” ship (like a tanker,amphibiousorlogisticsship),

and eventually command oftheirowncarrier.Beyondthatcomes possible promotion torear admiral and highercommand.However, it is the“flying” years that make anaval aviator’s career worththe effort. Years later whentheyhaveretiredormovedontootherpursuits, theaviatorswill likely look back andthinkaboutthe“goodyears,”when they were young andfree toburnholes in thesky,

before heading back to the“boat.”Captain Lindell “Yank”Rutheford, commandingofficer of the aircraft carrierUSS George Washington(CVN-73). Rutheford is alongtime F-14 Tomcat pilotwhohasrisentothetopofhisprofession.JOHND.GRESHAM

BuildingtheBoats

Officially,theNavycallsita“CV” or “CVN.” Sailors onthe escorts call it a “birdfarm.” Submariners wrylycall it a target. But navalaviators call it—withsomething like reverenceandreligious awe—“the boat.” Itis the central icon of their

naval careers. In addition tobeingtheirhomeandairbase,aircraft carriers hold analmost mystical place in theworld of naval aviators. Aswe’ve already seen, youngnaval aviators’ skills (andfuture chances of promotion)are judged mainly on theirability to take off and landsafelyon“theboat.”Later,asthey gain seniority, they’llstrivetocommandoneofthegiantsupercarriers.Finally,at

the sunset of their navalcareers,theywillbeexpectedto lead the fight to obtainauthorizationand funding forconstruction of the newcarriersthatwillserveseveralfuture generations of navalaviators.Why this community

obsession about “the boat”?The answers are both simpleand complex. In the firstchapter,Ipointedoutsomeof

the reasons why sea-basedaviationisavaluablenationalasset.However, for theNavythere is a practical,institutional answer aimed atpreservingnavalaviationasacommunity: “If you build it,they will come!” That is tosay, as long as America iscommitted to building moreaircraft carriers, the nationwill also continue to designand build new aircraft andweapons to launch from

them, and train air crews toman the planes. In otherwords, the operation ofaircraft carriers and thebuilding of new onesrepresent a commitment bytheNavyandthenationtoallof the other areas of navalaviation. New carriers meanthat the profession has afuture, and that young menand women have a rationalefor making naval aviation acareer. The continued

designing and building ofnewcarriersgives thebrand-new “nugget” pilot or NavalFlight Officer (NFO), a startosteer for—agoal to justifya twenty-year career ofdanger, family separation,and sometimes thanklesswork.This is fine, as far as it

goes. And yet, as we headtowardtheendofacenturyinwhich aircraft carriers have

been the dominant navalweapon, it isworthassessingtheir value for the centuryahead. More than a fewserious naval analysts haveasked whether the kind ofcarriers being built todayhaveafuture,whileeveryonefrom Air Force generals toNavysubmarinerswould likethe funds spent on carrierconstruction to bereprogrammed for their petweapons systems. Two hard

facts remain. First, big-deckaircraft carriers are still themost flexible and efficientway to deploy sea-basedairpower, andwill remain sofor the foreseeable future.Second, sea-based airpowergives national leadersunequaled options in a timeofinternationalcrisis.TheUSSGeorgeWashingtonintheAtlanticduringJTFEX97-3 in 1997. Once “worked

up,” carrier groups are the“big sticks” of Americanforeignpolicy.JOHND.GRESHAM

With this in mind, let’stake a quick tour of the“boats” that America hasbeenbuildingforthepasthalfcentury. In that way, you’llget an idea not only of thedesign, development, andbuilding of aircraft carriers,but also of the size, scope,and sophistication of theindustrialeffortallthattakes.

AmericanSupercarriers:A

History

TheatomicbombsthatforcedJapan to capitulate in 1945almost sank the U.S. Navy’sforceofcarriers.Withtheendof the war, as a cost-savingmeasure, most U.S. carrierswere either scrapped ormothballed.Andby1947,the

wartime fleet of over onehundred carriers had shrunkto less than two dozenvessels.Meanwhile,PresidentHarrySTrumanhaddecreeda moratorium on newweaponsdevelopment,exceptfor nuclear weapons andbombers to carry them. TheNavy,desperateforamissionin the atomic age, began todesign a carrier and aircraftthat could deliver the new

weapons.27 The USS UnitedStates (CVA-58—the “A”stood for “Atomic” combat),would have been the biggestcarrier ever built from thekeel up (65,000 tonsdisplacement). The Navyargued that immobileoverseas Air Force baseswere vulnerable to politicalpressure and Sovietpreemptive attack, whilecarriers, secure in the vast

spacesoftheNorwegianSea,the Barents Sea, or theMediterranean, could launchnuclear strikes on SovietNaval bases or deep into theRussianheartland.Claiming that the newly

createdAirForcecouldbetterdeliver the new atomicweaponswiththeirhugenewB-36 bombers, Air Forceleaders like General Carl“Tooey” Spaatz lobbied

intensively to kill the newcarrier program. Bypersuading the TrumanAdministration that theycould deliver nuclearweapons more cheaply thanthe Navy, the Air Forcesucceeded in having theUnited States broken up onthe building ways just daysafterherkeelwas laid (April23rd, 1949). Soon afterward,the Secretary of the Navy,John L. Sullivan, resigned in

protest,leadingtothe“Revoltof the Admirals” (discussedin the first chapter), whichallowed the Navy to make apublic case for conventionalnaval forces. Once theTruman Administrationrealized the political cost ofkilling theUnited States, thecuts in naval forces werestopped. It was just in time,as events turned out. For thecarriers recently judgedobsolete in an age of atomic

warfare held the line in theconventionalwarthateruptedin Korea on the morning ofJune25th,1950.

The USSForrestal (CV-59),the first of America’ssupercarriers. She is cruisinghere in the Gulf of Tonkinduring combat operations in1967.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTO FROM THECOLLECTION OF A. D.BAKEREvenbefore theendof the

Korean War, the TrumanAdministration recognizedthe need for new, bigger,moremodernaircraftcarriers.Thoughhewasneverafriendof the Navy, PresidentTruman neverthelessbelatedly authorizedconstructionofanewclassof“supercarriers” similar to theUnited States, canceled justthree years earlier. The firstof the new flattopswasUSSForrestal (CVA-59—the“A”

now reflecting the new“Attack” carrier designation),whichwas followed by threesister ships: Saratoga (CVA-60), Ranger (CVA-61), andIndependence (CVA-62).These were huge vessels, at1,039 feet/316 meters inlength and almost sixtythousand tons displacement.The Forrestal classincorporated a number ofinnovations, almost all ofBritish origin. A 14° angled

deck enabled planes to landsafely on the angled section,while other planes werecatapulting off the bow.Steam catapults allowedlargeraircrafttobelaunched.Also, a stabilized landinglight system guided pilotsaboardmorereliablythantheoldsystemofhandheldsignalpaddles.Alongwith the newcarriers came the first-generation naval jet aircraft.Meanwhile, the Navy

initiated a huge FleetRebuilding andModernization (FRAM)programforoldercarriersandotherships,bothtogivethemanother twentyyearsorsoofservice life and to delay theneed to buy so manyexpensive new ships likeForrestal.The USS Enterprise (CVN-65), theworld’sfirstnuclear-poweredaircraftcarrier.Here

she is cruising in theMediterranean Sea with thenuclear cruisers Long Beach(CGN-9) and Bainbridge(CGN-26) during OperationSeaOrbitin1964.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTO FROM THECOLLECTION OF A. D.BAKER

The first Cold Warconfrontation in whichaircraft carriers played amajor role was the SuezCrisis in1956;carriergroupsassigned to the U.S. SixthFleet spent the next yearsupportingoperationsbyU.S.Marines and other forcestrying to restore stability inLebanon following theArab-Israeli war. In 1958, TaskForce77gotaworkoutintheFar East when it interposed

betweentheforcesofTaiwanandCommunistChinaduringthe crisis over the islands ofQuemoy and Matsu.Meanwhile, two new follow-onsupercarrierswereordered—Kitty Hawk (CVA-63) in1956 and Constellation(CVA-64) in 1957.Essentially improved andenlarged Forrestal-classvessels, they approached theupper limits of size andcapability for oil-fueled

carriers. The time had comeforabreakwith fossil-fueledpower plants, and the carrierthat followed was trulyrevolutionary.The successful

development of nuclearreactors topropelsubmarinesencouraged the Navy to puttheminsurfaceships.Backedby the mercurial Director ofNaval Reactors, ViceAdmiralHymanRickover,an

improvedKittyHawk designwas developed toaccommodate a nuclearpropulsion plant. Ever eagertomaximize the influence ofnuclear power in the Navy,Admiral Rickover dictatedthat the new carrier shouldhave just as many nuclearreactors(eight!)astherewereoil-fired boilers in eachKittyHawk-classcarrier.Whenthenew carrier, designated USSEnterprise (CVAN-65), was

commissioned in the early1960’s, she was sooverpowered that thestructureoftheshipcouldnotstand the pounding of a full-power run. There are storiesofspeedrunsofftheVirginiacapesinwhichtheEnterprisewent so fast (some say overforty knots; the actualnumbers are still classified),that she left her destroyerescorts far behind, withouttappingherfullpower.

Though Enterprise morethan lived up to the heritageofherproudname,shewastobe a one-of-a-kind ship.28Then-Secretary of DefenseRobert S. MacNamara, nofriend of the Navy, blockedconstructionofmorenuclear-powered carriers. Over thenext decade, only two newcarriers, America (CVA-66)andJohn F. Kennedy (CVA-67), would be constructed.

These flattops, essentiallyrepeats of the earlier KittyHawk-class,werepoweredbyoil-fired boilers. AfterMacNamara’s resignation in1968, the ban on nuclearcarrier construction lifted,and the Navy receivedauthorization for a new classof three nuclear-poweredattack carriers. This wouldbecome the mighty Nimitz-class(CVN-68)program.

A side view of an improvedNimitz-Class (CVN-68)nuclear-powered aircraftcarrier.

JACKRYANENTERPRISES,LTD.,BYLAURADENINNO

TheNimitz-Class(CVN-68)

Supercarriers

Because of the vast base ofexperience developed overthe previous four decades,

even before design of theNimitz-classcarriersbegan inthelate1960’s,theNavalSeaSystems Command(NAVSEA) had a number ofgood ideas about what theywanted from their nextgeneration of flattops.Frankly, they wanted a lot!The largest warships (indimensions anddisplacement)everplannedatthe time, the Nimitz-classcarriers were to be the

ultimate expression of sea-based airpower. Some of the“fighting” qualities of theNimitz-classincluded:

• AircraftCapacity—Forover seventy-fiveyearsthevalueofaflattop has beenmeasured by thenumber and typesof aircraft it cancarry. Ever since

the Navy learnedthat the originalUSS Ranger wastoosmall tocarryacredible air wing,U.S.carrierdesignshave emphasizedbig flight andhangar decks topark, stow, andoperate aircraft.28In addition, growthin the size and

weight of combataircraft has driventhe design ofcarriers. Forexample, an F4FWildcat fighter of1941 left the deckat a maximumweight of 7,952lb/3,607 kg, buttoday’s F-14Tomcat fighter hasamaximum takeoffweight of 74,348

lb/33,724 kg! TheNimitz-classcarriers weredesigned to handleninety or moreaircraft (thoughthey currentlyoperate with airgroups of aboutseventy-five),depending on “spotfactor” (the amountof deck space eachaircraft type

requires).• Armament—Experience withheavy guns andlong-range surface-to-air missile(SAM) batteries onearlier classes ofaircraft carriersproved that thedeck space, interiorvolume, manpowerdemands, and blasteffects of such

weapons interferedwith air operations,the carrier’s truereason forexistence.Therefore,weaponson newer carrierswouldbelimitedtopoint defense (i.e.,“last ditch” self-defense) systemslike theRIM-7 SeaSparrowsurface-to-air missile (SAM)

and Mk. 15Phalanx/CIWS20mm automaticcannon.A few .50-caliber machinegunswould also bemounted fordefense againstsuicidemotor boatsor terroristswimmers.• Crew Size—Forcenturies,experience has

shown that themore sailors youcram aboard awarship, the betterher fightingqualities, especiallywhen you need torepair battledamage. On theother hand, sailorstake up a lot ofspace, and generatelarge “hotel” loadsontheship’spower

plant (forelectricity, water,heating, andcooling) that havenothing to do withfighting. Modernsailors arevolunteers, whoexpect a minimumlevel of comfort.The Royal Navy’seighteen-inchspacing betweenhammocks aboard

warships twocenturies ago mayhave worked forimpressed seamen,butwouldhardlydofor today’s sailors.Therefore, navaldesigners areconstantlybalancing theadvantages oflarger crews withthe costs ofpersonnel on ship

size and capability.The Nimitz-classcarriers would bedesigned to sailwith about sixthousand personnelon board: 155officers and 2,980sailors for the ship;365 officers and2,500 enlistedpersonnelfortheairwing. Now add anadmiral’s staff, a

few dozen civiliancontractors tomaintain the high-techequipment,andaconstanttrickleofdistinguishedvisitors and mediarepresentatives, anda carrier can getreallycrowded!• Deployability—Since a crisis maybe halfway aroundtheworld, a carrier

needstogofast.Ontheotherhand,highspeed is worthlessif the carrier doesnot carry sufficientfuel to getwhere ithas to go withoutfrequent refueling.The interior spaceconsumed by alarge power plantand its fuel is notavailable foraircraft, crew

berthing,ammunition, jetfuel, and otheruseful stowage. Inthe final analysis,the choice of anuclearpowerplantwas a no-brainer.The Nimitz-classcarriers weredesigned to carrytwo GeneralElectric A4W/A1Gnuclear reactors,

and were expectedto operate forfifteen yearsbetweenrefuelings.29 That’sup to one millionnautical miles ofsteaming on justone set of reactorcores.

The carrierUSS GeorgeWashington(CVN-73)conducting anunderwayreplenishment(UNREP)from the fleetlogistics shipUSS Seattle(AOE-3).UNREP is a

vitalcapabilityin keepingbattle groupsforward-deployed, andutilizes both“high lines”andhelicoptersto transfercargoandfuel.OFFICIALU.S. NAVYPHOTO

• Sustainability—Once a carrier hasreached anoperating area, itmust conductoperations for aslong as possiblewithout resupplysince it may takeweeks for fleetsupply vessels tocatch up with thecarrierbattlegroup.Theenemymaynot

wait while youreplenish at sea, sothe amount of fuel,food, ammunition,and spare partscarried on boardhas a direct effecton how long acarrier can stay inaction. It is alsoessentialwhenfleetsupply vesselsreach the carriers;for when carriers

are conductingUnderwayReplenishment(UNREP), basicsafety rules dictatethat they cannotoperate aircraft ormaneuver freely.Thus, the lessoftenthey take aboardfuel and supplies,the more time theycan spend “on theline” conducting

combat operations.The Nimitz-classcarriers weredesignedtostoreupto nine thousandtons of jet fuel andalmost twothousand tons ofbombs,ammunition, andmissiles. This is avast improvementoverearlierdesigns.• Survivability—

Alloftheaboveareworthless if thecarrier is a blazinghulk about to turnturtle and sink.Nimitz-classcarriers weredesigned in an erawhen the threat ofSoviet cruisemissiles andtorpedoes armedwith 1,000-kg/2,200-lb

warheadswasquitereal. Theseweapons couldblow a cruiser ordestroyer in half,anddoconsiderableharm to an aircraftcarrier. The Navywas especiallyconscious of thesedangers after threedeadly fires aboardUSN carriersduring theVietnam

War had taken ahigh toll of lives,aircraft, andequipment.Remember thatthese ships arebasically big boxesfilled withexplosives, jet fuel,and people, allpacked tightlytogether. With allthis in mind, theNAVSEAdesigners

went to extremelengthstomakethenew carriers bothdurable andsurvivable. Theflight and hangardecks, as well asthe hull, would bebuilt from high-tensile steel,with avast scheme ofcompartmentationand built-upstructure. In

addition, the newflattopwouldmakeonlyminimaluseoflight metals likealuminum, whichare flammableunder some easilyreached fireconditions.

By the late 1960’s thecharacteristics of what wasinitially known as SCB-102(Ship Control Board Design

102) were firming up, withthefollowingprovidingsomeidea of what the Navydesired:

• Displacement—Approximately95,000 tons fullyloaded.•Size—Alengthof1,092 feet/332.9meters, beam of134 feet/40.85meters, a flight

deck width of 250feet/76.5 meters,and a maximumloaded draft of nomore than 39feet/11.9meters.• Power Plant—Two WestinghouseA4W nuclearreactors drivingfour GeneralElectric steamturbines, turningfour screws for a

total of 280,000shp. While the topspeed is stillclassified, it iswellover thirty-threeknots.• Manning—SCB-102 provided for aship’s company of2,900 enlistedpersonnel and 160officers.Roomwasadditionallyprovided for two

thousand air wingpersonnel, thirtyMarines, andseventymembersofthe flag staff. Thisadded up to almost5,200 embarkedpersonnel.• AircraftComplement—Approximatelyninety aircraft.These wouldinclude improved

models of aircraftlike the F-4Phantom II, A-6Intruder, A-7Corsair II, and E-2Hawkeye, as wellasnewerand largerplanesliketheF-14Tomcat, S-3Viking, andEA-6BProwler.• DefensiveArmament—Threeeight-round RIM-7

Sea Sparrow SAMpoint-defensemissilesystems.

Allofthesefeaturesadded

up to the biggest class ofwarships ever built.Only theEnterprise had dimensions,displacement, andperformanceanythingliketheproposed SCB-102 design,and“theBigE”was luggingaroundeightnuclearreactors,

thepowerofwhichcouldnotbe fully used. SCB-102would be a much betterbalanced design—a fullyintegratedwarshipthatwouldgrow and modernize as theCold War moved into thepost-Vietnamera.

On the other hand, this

very impressive packagewas

going to be expensive anddifficult to build. Because offoreign competition,America’s privateshipbuilding industry was indecline during the late1960’s. At the same time,government-owned yards runbytheNavyweregettingoutof the ship constructionbusiness altogether toconcentrate on overhauls andmodernization work. Thismeant thatonlyone shipyard

inAmericawaslargeenoughtobuildtheshipsoftheSCB-102 design—Newport NewsShipbuilding (NNS) inVirginia. By 1967, NNS hadbeen awarded a sole-sourcecontractfortheinitialunitsofthe newNimitz class (CVN-68). These eventuallyincluded the leadship,whichwas named for the WorldWar II Commander in Chiefof the Pacific Fleet(CINCPAC), Admiral

ChesterNimitz,andtwoothershipswouldbetheDwightD.Eisenhower (CVN-69—named for the formerPresident) and the CarlVinson (CVN-70—namedforthe Georgia senator andpolitical architect ofAmerica’s World War II“TwoOceanNavy”).

Secretary of the Navy JohnLehman, who headed theNavy Department from 1981to 1986 during theAdministration of PresidentRonaldW.Reagan.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTO FROM THECOLLECTION OF A. D.BAKERIt would, however, be

years until all three of thenew ships were completed.Labor strikes andmanagement problemsplagued the construction ofNimitz, which took overseven years to complete(comparedwithfouryearsforEnterprise). All three shipswound up costing hundredsof millions of dollars morethan planned, making themfat targets for Congressionalcritics of Pentagon “fraud,

waste,andabuse.”Themulti-billion-dollar price tag of thenew ships meant that newcarriersweregoingtobehardto sell to a nation thatincreasingly saw themilitaryasa liability. In fact,notonenewcarrierwasauthorizedbythe Administration ofPresident Jimmy Carter.However,afourthunitoftheNimitz class, TheodoreRoosevelt (CVN-71—afterthe late President and father

of the “Great White Fleet”),was forced upon PresidentCarter by Congress, whofundedtheunitinFiscalYear1980 (FY-80). Others wouldfollow.The election of President

Ronald Reagan launched aperiod of rebirth for theNavy.Thisrebirth,directedatthe perceived threat of agrowing and aggressiveSoviet“EvilEmpire,”wasthe

personal achievement of oneman: then-Secretary of theNavyJohnLehman.Lehman,himself a Naval aviator andheir to the wealth of a greatWall Street investment firm,calledfora“600ShipNavy,”withfifteenaircraftcarriersatits core.30 Fiscal Year 1983(FY-83)sawtheauthorizationof two Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers,Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72)

and George Washington(CVN-73). Navy leadersdubbed this program the“Presidential Mountain,”because three of thepresidentshonoredarecarvedon the Mount Rushmoremonu-ment,and were strongsupporters of the Navy.31Along with the three newcarriers, over a hundred newnuclear submarines, guided-missile cruisers, destroyers,

frigates, and support shipswereauthorizedbytheendofthe1980’s.ItwasthebiggestNavalbuildingprogramsincetheSecondWorldWar.Before the “Presidential

Mountain” was completed,the global oceanic conflictthey were designed to fight(or deter, if you thought thatway) evaporated. With theendoftheColdWarin1991,the supercarriers acquired

new roles and missions. Inoperations like DesertShield/Desert Storm (PersianGulf—1990/1991) andUphold Democracy (Haiti—1994), they showed theirgreat staying power andflexibility. Meanwhile, twomore Nimitz-class carriershadbeenauthorizedinFY-88toreplacethelasttwounitsofthe Midway class. This wasjustenough tokeep theNNSshipyard alive. By the early

1990’sitwastimetoplanonreplacing the fossil-fueledcarriers like Forrestal (CV-59) and America (CV-66),which were due to retire.Though at one point theClinton Administration cutthe number of carriers toeleven, the number waseventually stabilized at aneven dozen (considered theminimum needed to sustaintwo or three forward-deployed carrier battle

groups). In addition, in FY-95, anotherNimitz-class shipwas authorized, rounding outthe third group of three.These three ships, John C.Stennis (CVN-74), Harry S.Truman (CVN-75), andRonald Reagan (CVN-76),will hold the force level attwelve.32

Inmanyways, theNimitz-class ships represent a“worst-case” design, able to

accommodate the mostdifficult conditions andthreats. Designed against aCold War expectation ofimmenseSoviet conventionaland nuclear firepower, theyare almost toomuchwarshipfor an agewhere there is nocredible threat against them.Whether America needs somuch capability right nowand in the near future is amatter I’ll take up shortly.Meanwhile, let’s lookathow

these great ships are puttogether.

NewportNewsShipbuilding:HomeoftheSupercarriers

The Virginia Tidewater hasbeen a cradle of Americanmaritime tradition for almost

four centuries. The firstEnglish colony in NorthAmerica was established in1607onthesouthbankoftheYork Peninsula atJamestown. Later, HamptonRoads was the scene of theworld’s first fight betweenironcladships,whentheUSSMonitor and CSS Virginiadueled in 1862.33 Across theJames River is the port ofNorfolk, the most important

naval base in the UnitedStates. And along the northbankoftheJamesRiveristhetown of Newport News, atwenty-mile-long snake-shapedcommunitythat is thebirth-place of Americanaircraftcarriers.

The nuclear-powered aircraftcarrier Harry S. Truman(CVN-75) being constructedat Dry Dock 12 in theNewport News Shipbuilding(NNS)yard.Thelargebridgecrane in the foreground isused to place superlifts andother components into thedock.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTOAs you drive from

Interstate 64 south ontoInterstate664,theyardmakesits first appearance in theform of the huge pea-green-painted construction cranesthat dominate the skyline ofthecity.AndthenasyouturnoffontoWashingtonAvenue,you will see the name onthose cranes: Newport NewsShipbuilding. Founded in1886byCollisP.Huntington,Newport News Shipbuilding(NNS)isthelargestandmost

prosperous survivor of theAmerican shipbuildingindustry.34 Seven of thebattleships in “Teddy”Roosevelt’s “Great WhiteFleet” were built here. Nowone of just five U.S. yardsstill building deep-draftwarships, NNS is the largestprivate employer in the stateof Virginia, with someeighteen thousand workers(about half of the Cold War

peak). The builder of theRanger (CV-4—America’sfirst carrier built from thekeelup),NNSisthelastU.S.shipyard capable of buildingbig-deck nuclear carriers.Like most shipyards, NNSwas originally built along adeep-channel river withinclined construction ways.Manyoftheoriginalmachineshops and dry docks are stillinuseafteroveracenturyofservice.However, thefacility

has gradually been rebuiltinto one of the mosttechnically advanced andefficient shipyards in theworld.On thenorthernendof the

yard you find the buildingarea for aircraft carriers andother large ships. ThecenterpieceofthisareaisDryDock 12, where deep-draftshipsareconstructed.Almost2,200 feet/670.6 meters long

and over five stories deep, itis the largest constructiondock in the WesternHemisphere. The entire areais built on landfill, with aconcrete foundationsupported on pilings driventhrough the James River siltinto bedrock several hundredfeetbelow.TheconcretefloorofDryDock12isparticularlythick, to bear the immenseweight of the ships builtthere. The end of the dock

extendsintothedeepchannelof theriver,and issealedoffby a removable caisson (ahollow steel box). Runningon tracks the length of DryDock 12 is a huge bridgecrane,capableofliftingupto900 tons/816.2 metric tons,while a number of smallercranes run along the edge ofthe building dock.DryDock12 can be split into twowatertight sections by themovable caisson, so that one

carrier and one or moresmaller ships can beconstructedatthesametime.Only a decade ago NNS

could expect to start a newNimitz-class aircraft carrierevery two years or so. NNSalso had a share of thetwenty-nineplannedSeawolf-class(SSN-21)submarinesonorder. There were also newclasses of maritimeprepositioning ships, as well

as massive overhaul andmodification contracts tosupport John Lehman’s “600Ship Navy.” But today theoutlook is dramaticallydifferent, and the number ofprojects under way has beenscaledbackradically:

• With the carrierforce set at twelveflattops instead offifteen, the U.S.only needs to build

a carrier abouteveryfouryears.• The Seawolfprogram wasterminated at justthreeboats,and thework on all threewenttotheGeneralDynamics ElectricBoatDivision.Thusthe massiveinvestment inspecializedfacilities and

tooling forsubmarineconstructionwilllieunused at NNSuntilthestartoftheNew AttackSubmarine (NSSN)program in theearly21stcentury.• Now that severalhundredU.S.Navalvessels are beingretired because ofcostandmanpower,

the massiveoverhaul andmodificationprogram is only afraction of whatwas originallyplanned.

NNS nevertheless remains

the only American shipyardcapable of building nuclear-powered surface warships. Iffuturecarriersoranyof their

escorts are to be nuclear-powered,thenNNSwillbuildthem.SinceatleastonemoreNimitz-classcarrierisplanned(the as-yet-unnamed CVN-77), the yard will stay fat inflattop construction foranother decade. Meanwhile,Congress has guaranteedNNS a share of the NSSNproduction with ElectricBoat, allowing the companyto utilize its investment insubmarine construction

facilitiesbuiltfortheSeawolfprogramyearsago.Therehasalso been a steady flow ofNavy and commercial refitandmodernizationwork, andthis is proving to be highlylucrative. In fact, NNS ispreparing for one of thebiggestrefitsever,whenUSSNimitz(CVN-68)comesbackinto the yard for its firstnuclearrefueling.

BuildingtheBoat

Before we actually go onboard a Nimitz-class carrier,let’s take a look at how theship is built. A Nimitz-classCVN is among the largestman-mademovingstructures.And with a price tag around$4.2 billion, it is also amongthemostexpensive.Only thebiggest commercial

supertankers are larger. Suchvessels are mostly hollowspace,andtheyaren’tbuilttotake anything like thepunishment a warship mustbe able to absorb. On top ofthat, carriers must hold sixthousand personnel andoperate over ninety aircraft.And finally, no supertankerhas a power plant of suchimpressive capability as thenuclear power plants onNimitz-class—or one that

requires such obsessive care.Every component of thenuclear power plant comesunderthemeticulousscrutinyof the Office of NavalReactors. Very early in thehistory ofU.S.Navy nuclearpropulsion, it was realizedthat the first nuclear accidentwould mean the end of theprogram. Therefore, rigidinspection standards andelaborate safeguards wereapplied to every step of

design, construction, andtesting. For example, everywelded pipe joint (there arethousands of them!) is X-rayed,toensurethatithasnoflaws,cracks,orvoids.Strange as it may sound,

buildinga95,000-tonaircraftcarrier is a precisionoperation, which requiresimmensely detailed planning.For example, the maximumdraft of a ship being built at

NNS is limited both by thesize of Dry Dock 12 and bylocaltidalconditions.Evenatan unusually high tide, DryDock12canbefloodedonlyto a depth of about thirty-threefeet/tenmeters,meaningthat construction of a carriercan be taken only so farbefore itmust emerge out ofthe dock into the JamesRiver. Once that’s done, thehull is moored to a dock ontheeasternendoftheyardfor

final construction andoutfitting. Because of thequick-movingtidalconditionsnear the mouth of theChesapeake Bay, thelaunching is normally timedto the minute, and there arenevermorethanafewinchestospare.A Nimitz-class CVN gets

itsstart inWashington,D.C.,about a decade before itslaunching, when admirals at

theheadquartersoftheNavalSea Systems Command(NAVSEA, formerly knownas the Bureau of Ships, theagency that manages shipconstruction) fix theretirement date of an agingcarrier. This determines thetimelineforbudgetinganewflattop.The time line, almosta decade long, starts at thepoint when money begins tobe committed to the buildingof the new ship. Soon after

that, contracts are signed for“long-lead items”—thosecomponents that can takeyears to order, design,manufacture, and deliver.These include nuclearreactors, turbines, shafts,elevators,andotherkeyitemsthatmustbeinstalledearlyintheconstructionoftheship.Budgeting must also take

intoaccountchangesandnewitems that go into each new

carrier, for each has literallythousands of changes andimprovements over earlierships of the class. To lowerthedragof thehull, themostrecent Nimitz-class carriershavebulbousbowextensionsbelow the waterline.Lowering the hull dragextendsthelifeofthereactorcoresandallowspowertobediverted from propulsion tothe “hotel” systems like air-conditioning and freshwater

production. Most designchangesarenotsosignificant,and usually involve nothingmore than a material orcomponent change, like anew kind of steam valve,electricalswitch,orhydraulicpump.Evenso,everychangeinvolves written changeorders, as well as stacks ofengineering drawings. Backin the 1960’s and 1970’s, asmall army of draftsmen,engineers, and accountants

was required to produce themountain of paperdocumenting the changes onanewcarrier.Today,amuchsmaller force manages acomputerized drawing andchange-management systemcustom-programmed forNNS. In fact, in the interestof efficiency andcompetitiveness, the entireNNS operation has becomeheavilycomputerized.

A prime example ofcomputerization is theordering-and-materials-control system. NNS cannotafford a huge inventory ofsteelplateandothermaterialssitting around rusting in thehumid Tidewater climate.There is only limited spacefor storage and construction,and every bitmust stay busyfor NNS to turn a profit. Tominimizethispotentialwaste,NNS has installed a

computerized “just-in-time”ordering-and-materials-control system. The manycomponents and rawmaterials (steel plate,coatings, etc.) that go into aNimitz-class carrier arriveexactlywhentheyareneeded.No earlier, and no later. Inthis way NNS’s investmentcapital is not needlessly tiedup, and the final cost totaxpayers is reduced bymillionsofdollars.TheNNS

work-force has also becomemore efficient, since feweritems need to be stored,protected, hauled from placetoplace,andinventoried.The actual start of

construction begins somemonths prior to the officialdate of the ceremonial keel-laying. At that time, the DryDock 12 cofferdam is placedsothatabout1,100feet/335.3metersofroomareopenedat

the rear of the dock. Thisleaves 900 feet/274.3 metersat the river-gate end of thedock for construction oftankers or other projects.NNS workers then begin tolay out the wooden andconcretestructuralblocksthatthecarrierwillbebuiltupon.Buildingashipthatdisplacesover 95,000 tons/86,100metric tons on wood andconcrete blocks may soundlike building a skyscraper on

a foundation of paper, butNNSuseslotsoftheseblocksto spread the load around.This very old technique isalso used when ships arebrought into dry dock fordeep maintenance. Somethings just work, and cannotbeimprovedupon.Theclose tolerances in the

constructionofaNimitz-classcarrier demand absoluteprecisionfromthestart.Exact

placement of the first keelblocks is critical, as theyrepresent the three-dimensional “zero” pointsuponwhicheverythingelseisbuilt. This preliminary workgoes on for four to sixmonths, until the keel-layingceremony draws near.At thesame time, some initialassemblies are weldedtogether and stored on thefloor of the dry dock, sincestorage space in the main

construction yard is tight.Atthe ceremonial laying of thekeelonaNimitz-classvessel,the guests include theSecretary of the Navy, theChief of Naval Operations,and hundreds of otherdignitaries. By tradition, theship’s “sponsor” (a sort ofnautical godmother) isappointed—usually the wifeof a high-rankingAdministration official orpolitician whose favor is

being sought by the Navy.Then a ceremonial weld ismade in the first “keel”member (a steel box girderbuilt up along the centerlineofthelowestpartofthehull),and the carrier’s constructionisofficiallyunderway.Now a thirty-three-month

countdownclockstarts.Fromthisdayforwardtothelaunchdate,theconstructionprocessis a race to determine the

milestone bonuses andresulting profits for NNSstockholders. Meanwhile,Navy officials plan dates forcommissioning and firstdeployments, select the“plankowner” officers andcrew who will first man thenewcarrier,andassemblethe“pre-commissioning unit”(PCU). These are the sailorswhowill report on board theship while it is still underconstruction,inordertolearn

every detail of maintenanceandoperation.

Automated flame-cutting ofsteelplatesatNNS.JOHND.GRESHAMBack at Dry Dock 12, the

thirty-three-monthconstruction moves forwardrapidly.The secret to stayingon schedule is “modularconstruction,” a techniqueoriginally pioneered byLitton-IngallsShipbuildinginMississippi. Rather thanconstructing a ship like a

building,fromthebottomup,theship’sdesignersbreakthedesign down into a series ofmodules. Each module iscompleted alongside theconstruction dock, withpiping, fixtures, and heavyequipment already installed.Thenitisliftedintoplaceand“stacked”withothermodulestoformthehull.Whenthatisdone, the modules are“joined” (welded together).Pipes, ducts, and electric

wiringbundles are connectedinto a mostly finishedconfiguration, and the ship is“floated” out of the dock (orlaunched), with final workdonealongsidea“fitting-out”dock elsewhere in the yard.This mode of constructionhasmanyadvantages.Foronething, the ship can belaunchedat amoreadvancedstage of construction thanusedtobethecustom,whichreduces costs considerably.

Workthattakesanhourtodoin anNNSworkshopusuallytakes three hours out in theyard, or eight hours in theshiponce it is floating in thewater. So anything that canbe built in the shops orinstalled in theyardbefore itisassembledreducescosts; itismoneyinthebank.Though modular military

shipbuilding was pioneeredbyLitton-Ingalls, thescaleat

NNS is far greater. At NNS,they call this the “Superlift”concept. By way ofcomparison, Litton’s largestmodule weighs around 500tons/453.6metrictons,whileNNS utilizes modules up to900 tons/816.6 metric tonslugged in place by the hugebridge crane. NNS can builda Nimitz-class carrier withabout a hundred “Superlift”modules. Two dozen“Superlifts” make up a

Nimitz-class carrier’s flightdeck,whilethebowbulbandislandstructureareindividualSuperlifts.ASuperliftstartsasasmall

mountain of steel plates,brought by rail and truck toNNS. Flame-cut to exacttolerances in the shops justsouth of Dry Dock 12, theplates are tack weldedtogether by spot welds, thenpermanentlyjoinedbyrobotic

welders along a pair of side-by-side production lines.Thesearethenlinkedintothestructural assemblies thatformeachSuperlift.Oncethebasic structure is completed,cranes move it to the largeassembly area next to DryDock 12. Then NNS yardworkerscrawloverandinsideit to “stuff” electrical, steam,fuel, sewage, andother lines,fittings, and gear into place.Sometimes Superlifts are

turnedupsidedown, tomake“stuffing” easier. When aSuperlift is ready for joining,the nine-hundred-ton bridgecrane is moved into positionoverhead, the lift cables arefastened,andtheassemblyinDry Dock 12 made ready.Despite a Superlift’s giganticsize and weight, this is aprecision operation, withtolerances frequently dictatedby the relative temperaturesof the ship assembly and the

Superlift. Depending ontemperature, the metalstructure of a Superlift caneasilyexpandorcontractoveraninchduringagivendayontheTidewater.Around theassemblyyard,

several dozen Superlifts arein various stages ofpreparationatanygiventime.Some interior and exteriorpaintingisdoneonSuperlifts,to make this nasty and

environmentally sensitive joba little safer.Because power,water, and air-conditioningcanbeinstalledinaSuperliftwhile it is being assembled,the construction process isconsiderably facilitated. Thisis particularly helpful in thehot, muggy summers andcold, wet winters of theTidewater region. There is aparticular order to howSuperlifts are stacked. Theinitial Superlifts—including

the double bottom, reactors,steam power plants,ammunition magazines, andheavy machinery—are laidaround the keel structure. Ingeneral, these items (makingup the bottom of the middlethird of the carrier) are theheaviest and most deeplyburied components, andcannot be accessed orinstalledeasilylateron.Theytake some four months toassemble.

At twenty-two months tolaunch, everything aft to thefantail and up to themain/hangardeck is inplace.Many of the living andhabitation spaces are alsoincludedinthisphase,aswellasthemajorityofthecarrier’sprotection systems (doublebottoms, heavy plating, andvoids—hollow spaces likefuel tanks, etc.). Now theassemblyisbeginningtolooklike a ship. At eighteen

months to launch, thehangardeck is taking shape, alongwith the great overhanging“sponson” structures thatextend out to port andstarboard. Assembly of thebow is beginning. The flag(admiral’sstaff)andairwingspaces are fitted out, as wellthe offices for the variousship’s departments. Byfourteen months to launch,thehangardeck,sponson,andbow structures are in place,

andthefirstpartsoftheflightdeckare filling inamidships.After four more months, thehangar and flight decks arealmost finished. Meanwhile,the lower bow has beencompleted, as well as theentirefantailstructure.Attwomonths before launch, theentire island structure—aneight-storybuilding—isliftedonto the deck of the ship.ThisfinalSuperliftrepresentsthe completion of major

construction.While the NNS yard

workers seal up the hull andmake it watertight, themanagers and planners getreadyfortheactuallaunchingof the ship. The launchingceremony is similar in manyways to the keel-laying justover two-and-a-half yearsearlier. Again, the Secretaryof theNavyand theChiefofNavalOperationsarepresent,

as is the carrier’s sponsor.She gets to break thetraditional bottle ofchampagne over the newcarrier’sbow.Ahint,though:Scratch thebottle firstwithadiamond-tipped scribe toensure a clean break. Long-winded speeches, prayers,and benedictions completethe launching ritual. Thenthingsgetdeadly seriousandprecise.

Since Dry Dock 12 is notdeep enough to float off afinished Nimitz-class carrier,assoonasthehullstructureiscomplete, it must be quicklyfloatedoutof thedock.Thenthe uncompleted carrier canbemoved toadeeperpartofthe James River channel,where it can bemoored to afitting-out wharf forcompletion.Thedepthof thedock and the tidal conditionsoftheTidewaterregionallow

very littlemargin for error—meaningthatthelaunchingofacarrierissynchronizedwiththe highest tide in a givenmonth, to provide maximumclearanceover theendof thedry-dockgate.Before this can begin, any

other ships in Dry Dock 12are floated out and themovable cofferdam isremoved. Then the dock iscarefully flooded, with

hundreds of NNS and Navypersonnel monitoring tidalconditions and thewatertightintegrityof thecarrier.Whenthedock is fully floodedandtheshiphasliftedoffthekeelblocks, the gate is opened.Nowthingshappenfast.Asasmalltugboatpullsthecarrierout of the dry dock, othertugboats wait just outside intherivertotakecontrolofthemassive hulk. When thecarrier is finally clear of the

gate and safely into the deepchannel of the river, it isturnedandtoweddownstreamtothefitting-outwharfonthesouthern end of the NNSproperty. Here it will bemooreduntilitisturnedoverto the Navy, approximatelytwoyearslater.While it is an impressive

sight sitting at the fitting-outdock, the mass of metalfloatingthereishardlyaship

of war. It is still, in navalterminology, just a “hulk.”Making it into a habitablevessel is the job of almost2,600 NNS yard workers—everything from nuclear-reactor engineers to diesel-engine mechanics, computerspecialists to roughneckwelders. Building a modernwarship takes almost everytechnology and tradecraftknown. Imaginea skyscraperwith offices, restaurants,

workshops, stores, andapartments that can steam atmorethanthirtyknots,withafour-and-a-half-acre airfieldon the roof. That is a fairdescription of a Nimitz-classaircraftcarrier.During a visit to NNS in

thefallof1997,IspentsometimeaboardtheUSSHarryS.Truman (CVN-75) while shewas about nine months fromcommissioning and delivery.

I’d like to share with yousome of my experiencesthere. My first stop, afterNNS and Navy officials ledme aboard, was the massivehangar deck. At 684feet/208.5 meters long, 108feet/33 meters wide, and 25feet/7.6 meters tall, it isdesigned to provide a dry,safe place to store andmaintain the aircraft of theembarked wing. As wewalked forward, I passed

severallargeaccessholesthatled into the two nuclearreactor compartments below.These would be buttoned upshortly, my guides told me.The nuclear fuel packageswould then be installed,followed by testing andcertificationofthetwinA4Wreactorplants.Allaround thehangar deck, workers werebusy welding and installingpiecesofequipment.

Catapult-testing deadweightsaboard the Harry Truman(CVN-75).JOHND.GRESHAM

ThehulkoftheUSSHarryS.Truman (CVN-75) at theNNS fitting-out wharf in thefall of 1997. By mid-1998,the Truman was conductingsea trials off the AtlanticCoast.JOHND.GRESHAM

After climbing severalladders, we emerged on theflight deck, where hundredsmore NNS workers werehustling about at their tasks,and then moved forward tothe catapults, which were inthe process of testing andcertification. They areinstalled in pairs on the bowand the deck angle port-side,and each of the four 302-

foot/92.1-meter-long C13Mod.1catapultsiscapableoflaunching an aircraft everyfew minutes (the cycle timedependslargelyontheskillofthedeckcrew).Eachcatapultispoweredbyapairofsteamcylinders,whicharebuiltintothe flight deck, andnormallyuse high-pressure saturatedsteam from the reactor plant;but since the reactors werenot yet powered up, Trumandrew her power, water, and

steamfromplantsdockside.Testing such powerful

machines is a dramaticprocedure. Scattered aroundthe deck were a number oforange-painted, water-filled,wheeled trolleys calleddeadweights. Eachdeadweight simulates a fullyloaded aircraft, withattachment points that allowit tobehitched to the shuttleof a catapult. After the bow

has been pointed into theJamesRiverchannel,and theCoastGuardandlocalboatershave been suitably warned,each catapult fires the entirerange of deadweights. Thetests are noisy and the sightof the weights flyinghundredsofyards/metersintothe channel is bizarre.Nevertheless, this is a highlyeffective way to prove thatthemachinery is ready.Afterleaving the catapults, we

headed aft to inspect thecatapult control stationbetweenCatapults 1 and 2.35Set on a hydraulically raisedplatform under an armoredsteeldoor, thecontrol stationis a pod where the catapultofficer—or “shooter”—cancontrolthecatapultsinsafetyand comfort. Anotheridenticalstation is locatedonthe port side, controllingCatapults3and4.

The island structure of theHarry S. Truman (CVN-75)beingfinishedatNNS.JOHND.GRESHAMNextwewalkedovertothe

island structure, where ourguides showed us how themanysystemsontheflagandnavigation bridges, theprimaryflightcontrol,andthemeteorology office were

installed. Although the basicNimitz design is over thirtyyears old, the many changesbringing it into the 21stcentury are quite visible. Upon the Truman’s navigationbridge,forexample,aremanyof the “Smart Ship” systems(mentioned in the secondchapter)thatmakeitpossiblefor three people to steer theship from auto-matedcontrolstations (before, almost twodozen people were required

to do the same job). Similarsystems will be scatteredthroughout the Truman, andwill be testedwhen she goestoseain1998.The cluttered flight deck oftheHarry S. Truman (CVN-75) while being fitted out atNNS.JOHND.GRESHAM

As we moved farther aft,we passed by the kinds oftool sheds and othertemporary storage buildingsthat you find at anyconstruction site. Then wedropped down a ladder backto thehangardeckanddownanotherintothebowelsoftheship. At this point, theprimary work on Trumaninvolved preparing someeight hundred (out of a total2,700) compartments for

turnover to the Navy. Thosecompartments contain crewberthing, medical facilities,galley andmess areas, officespaces, the ship’s store, thepost office, and storagerooms. Everything needed tofinish these spaces must becarried up and down laddersand through narrowpassageways by hand.Sprainedkneesandanklesarethe price paid to haul paintcans,powercables,and tools

intotheship.Shortly after this job was

completed, just after NewYear’s of 1998, the first ofthe Navy’s crew of“plankowners” arrived.Several of the ship’s spacesthat had already been turnedover proved to be spotlesswhen we visited them; andthe quality andworkmanshipare very impressive. Inparticular, the

communications spaces,which were just beingbrought to life by a Navycrew,had the lookand smellof a new automobile. As thefinal stop onmy visit, I wasallowed to visit themagazines and the pumproom in the very bottom oftheship.It was close to quitting

timewhenwemadeourwaybacktothehangardeck,aftto

the fantail, and down theaccess ramps to thedock.Aswe sat waiting for our tiredleg muscles to loosen, theshift alarmwent off, andwewatched 2,600 NNS workerscome off shift and head forhome—an impressive sight.As they passed by us on thedock, I was reminded of thebuilders of the Egyptianpharaoh’s pyramids. Bothgroups labored to build awonder of the world. Unlike

the pharaoh’s slaves whohauledandstackedthestonesin the desert, these peoplehave chosen to labor at their“wonder of theworld.”Theywant thesejobs,takeprideinwhattheydo,andmakegoodlivings. For those who thinkthat Americans don’t buildanything worthwhile thesedays, I say go down toNNSand watch these great menand women build metalmountains that float, move,

and fly airplanes off the top.Ittrulyisthe“NNS”miracle.

The“NNSMiracle”:Someofthe 2,600 Newport NewsShipbuilding workers leavetheHarry S. Truman (CVN-75)attheendofanafternoonshift.JOHND.GRESHAMWhentheinitialcrewcadre

cameaboardTrumaninearly1998, they began to help theNNS yard workers bring theship’svarioussystemstolife.This process (ongoing until

theshipishandedovertotheNavy) is designed to makeher ready for her “finalexams,”whenthecarrierwillbecometrulyseaworthy,withher reactors powered up andmost of her “plankowner”crewaboard.Combatsystemstests occur when the ship isabout 98% complete, withevaluations of the radar andradio electronics, defensiveweapons, and all the vastnetwork of internal

communications and alarms.Afterthesetests,itistimeforsea trials off the Virginiacapes,includingspeedrunstoevaluate the power plant.After these trials arecompleted, the Navyconducts one last series ofinspections prior to the mostimportant ceremony of theentire building process (atleast for NNS). This is thesigning of the Federal FormDD-250,which indicates that

the Navy has takenpossession of the vessel andNNScannowbepaid!The next six to eight

months are filled withtraining and readinessexercises, including thetraditional “shakedown”cruise. Following this is ashort period of yardmaintenance(knownas“PostShakedown Availability”) tofix any problems that have

cropped up. The new carrierwill then spend much of hertime over at the NorfolkNavalStation,mooredtooneof the long carrier docks,where she will get ready forcommissioning. At thecommissioningceremony,thehighofficials, thedignitaries,and the ship’s sponsor onceagaingather.Again there arespeeches and presentations.Andalmostadecadeafterthedecision was made to build

thismightywarship, a signalis given, the commissioningpennant is raised, the crewrushes aboard to man thesides, and she is finally awarshipintheU.S.Navy.

TheNimitzClass:AGuidedTour

Let’s now take a short

walkingtourofaNimitz-classcarrier. We’ll start the waymost guests come aboard, atthe officers’ accommodationbrow on the starboard sidejust under the island.One ofthe first things you notice isthe thickness of the hull,which is composed of high-strength steel several inchesthick.Itisthatthicktoprotectagainst battle damage andfires. The same materialmakes up the flight and

hangardecks,providingthemwith a similar resistance todamage and fires.Everywhere, there areredundant water andfirefighting mains, withdamage control stations ineverypassageway.TheNavyis deadly serious aboutfirefighting,andthereevenisawaterdelugesystem,whichcanfloodthedeck,orwashitdown in the event of anuclearorchemicalattack.

A front cutaway view of animprovedNimitz-class(CVN-68) nuclear-powered aircraftcarrier.JACKRYANENTERPRISES,LTD.,BYLAURADENINNOPast the entryway hatch,

youtakethefirstofmanytallstepsoverstructuralmembersthe crew calls “kneeknockers.”Thoughtheyarea

constant nuisance tomovement throughout theship, these steel thresholdsprovide structural strength tothe entire vessel. A Nimitzhas miles of virtuallyindistinguishablepassageways. And there aredozens of places in themwhere just standing aroundwatchingcanbehazardous—due to noise, fumes, movingmachinery, or simply wet,slippery decks. These

passagewaysareconsiderablynarrower than those in othercombat vessels, particularlyamphibiousshipswhichhaveroom for combat-loadedMarines to move around.Despite their huge size,carriers are volume-limited,and space for people to live,work, and walk takes awaycapacity for fuel,bombs,andfighting power. So gettingaroundwith any sort of loadcan be a genuine chore.You

often see “bucket brigades”of sailors moving loads offood and other supplies fromoneplacetoanother.The narrow corridors are

one important reason for theNavy’s constant emphasis onsimple courtesy. A seniorofficerorchiefheaded in theoppositedirectionalwaysgetsa respectful greeting and theright of way in these narrowpassages.Ilearnedavaluable

lesson sometime ago from acivilian analyst who hadspent many years on boardNavy ships: “If you’restandinganywhereandyou’renot touching metal, you’reprobably in somebody’sway.”Moving inboard through

several hatches, you emergeintothevasthangardeck;684feet/208.5 meters long, 108feet/33 meters wide, and 25

feet/ 7.6 meters tall—abouttwo-thirds the total length ofthe ship.Three immense setsof power-driven slidingarmored doors divide thehangar bay into zones, tolimit the spread of a fire ordamage from explosions. Ingoodweather,daylightfloodsin from four huge ovalopenings in the sidewallswhere the elevators arelocated. In bad weathersliding barriers seal off the

elevatoropeningstokeeptheinteriors safe and dry. Theelevators themselves are thelargest aluminum structureson the ship (to saveweight).Each of thesemammoth lifts(one on each side aft, withtwo others forward on thestarboard side) can raise twofully loaded F-14 Tomcats(the heaviest carrier aircraft)totheflightdeckatonetime.This isoneof the fewplaceson the ship where you can

actually see the sea and sky,and remind yourself of theoutside world. The flightdeck,by contrast, is ahighlyrestrictedarea.Sincethereareno portholes, most of thecrew rarely sees the light ofday. You often find crewmembers who go days andweeksatatimewithouteitherabreathoffreshairoraviewoftheoutsideworld.The hangar deck is one of

the three main horizontalstructures on a carrier (theflight deck and keel/doublebottom are the other two),and it provides much of thestiffness and protection forthe rest of the ship. Anydamagefromhitsonacarriershould be contained outsidethe armored boxes thatsurroundthehangardeckandengineering/living spacesbelow.When it’s empty,youwouldhaveroomtoplaytwo

games of American footballin the hanger bay. But whenit’s filled with fifty or sixtyaircraft only inches apart,thereisbarelyroomtowormyourwaythroughthemassoflanding gear, pylons, andmaintenance equipment. Thehangardeckisalwayspackedwithairplanesandequipment,though there is not enoughroomtostrikedownalloftheair wing’s birds at one time.This means that some of the

birds must always be parkedon the flight deck.Fortunately,Navalaircraftaredesigned to withstand thecorrosiveeffectsofsaltwater,and can take the punishmentfairlywell.Justaftof theelevatorbay

isalargestowageareawherethe ship’s boats are stacked,along with bulky items likeforklifts,sparearrestingcablereels, and spare engines.

Movingaft fromthisholdingarea,youfindtheengineandmaintenance shops, whichcompletelyfillthesternoftheship.Here the ship’sAircraftIntermediate MaintenanceDivision (AIMD) repairs,overhauls, and tests engines,hydraulic pumps, electronicsboxes, and countless othermechanical components thatkeep planes flyable andcombat-ready. Themaintenance shops are

divided up into small spaceswhere work is done thatnormally takes acres ofworkshops and hangars backashore.Farther aft of the AIMD

shops, you again break outinto daylight on the stern, orfantail, of the ship, an openareathefullwidthofthehull,roofed by the flight deck,withprojectingplatformsandcatwalks on either side.

Mounted on the fantail aremassive test stands, whereaircraft engines can bestrappeddownandrunatfullpower. Because no bit ofopenspacegoestowasteonacarrier,you’llonlyrarelyfinda time when you can juststandbackhereandwatchtheocean go by. This isespecially true during flightoperations. If an aircraftshould hit the stern (in whataviators dryly call a “ramp

strike”),thefantailisgoingtobeshoweredwithflaming jetfuel and debris. Suchaccidents are very rare, buttheydohappen,whichmeansthat unless you work there,you aren’t permitted on thefantail. So if you get to seethis spot while under way,countyourselflucky.

The hangar bay of the USSGeorge Washington (CVN-

73),aNimitz-class (CVN-68)carrier.JOHND.GRESHAMHere also are one of the

four (three on the Nimitz(CVN-68), Dwight D.Eisenhower (CVN-69), andCarl Vinson (CVN-70)) Mk.15 Phalanx Close-InWeaponsSystems(CIWS).Apedestal-mounted 20mmGatling gun with its owntracking radar, theMk. 15 is

designed to knock downincoming missiles andaircraft. Phalanx has nowbeen in service for almosttwenty years, and isconsidered marginal againstthe latest threat systems (likethe sea-skimming, Mach 2Russian Kh-41/SS-N-22Sunburn missile). The Mk.15’s will eventually bereplacedbytwenty-one-roundlaunchers for the RollingAirframeMissile (RIM-116A

RAM).RAMisbasedon theclassic AIM-9 Sidewinderair-to-air missile, with amodified seeker from aStinger (FIM-92) man-portable SAM. RAM—muchmorecapablethantheMk.15—can actually destroy anincoming Mach 2 missilebefore it hits (or showers theship with supersonicfragments).LocatedbelowthePhalanx

mount are the twin ports forthe ships SLQ-25A “Nixie”torpedo countermeasuressystem. Nixie is a towednoisemaker streamed behindtheshipwhenthereisathreatof incoming torpedoes. Theidea is that the “fish” willchase the towed decoy, anddetonate against it instead ofthe ship. Since each decoycan be used only once, twoNixie decoys are kept at theready, each at the end of a

spooled tether in the stern.Finally, on a platform at thestem next to the Mk. 15stands the instrument landingsystem. This is a stabilized“T”-shaped bar of verticaland horizontal lights, whichhelps a pilot on finalapproach judge the roll andmotionoftheship.Headingback forward into

the hangar bay, you willprobablynotice the “spongy”

feelofthedeck,whichcomesfrom the grayish-black non-skidcoatingthatisappliedtoseemingly every horizontalsurface exposed to theweather.Non-skid—amixofabrasive grit and syntheticrubber applied in a rippledpattern—keeps you fromslipping on a wet, oily, ortilted deck, an all toocommon occurrence on anavalvessel.Upontheflightdeck, the constant pounding

and scraping of landing gearand tailhooks quickly erodethe coating and expose baresteel. When this happens,maintenance crews mix up abatch and “touch up” wornspots. Also notable is thehangar deck’s elaborate fire-suppression system, whichcanputenoughfoamintothehangar bay to drown theunwary.Firehosesandmainssprout from every corner ofthe hangar bay, and damage

control gear is also inevidence.Looking down into the wellof one of the hundreds ofladders aboard aNimitz-class(CVN-68) carrier. These aretallandnarrow,andarequitegruelingtoclimb.JOHND.GRESHAM

Intheoverheadarestorageracks for everything fromaircraft drop tanks to spareengines. You can even see asparecatapultpiston—asteelforging as long as a bus—rackedhighonthewallofthehangar bay. In the forwardpartof thehangarbayon thestarboard side are two moreaircraft elevators, as well asthe passageways that leadinto the forecastle. Here youfindmoreAIMD offices and

shops,aswellasmostof theberthing spaces for enlistedpersonnel from theembarkedair wing. Cramming almostsix thousandpersonnel intoaship,eventhoughit’sclosetoaquartermilelong,makesfortight quarters. Even so, theenlisted and chiefs’ berthingspaces on a Nimitz are stillmore comfortable than thoseaboard a submarine or olderNavysurfacewarship.

Forayoungpersoncomingaboardawarshipfor thefirsttime, the cramped personalspace may seem harsh. Infact, while personal space isspartan, it is neverthelessquite functional. Enlistedpersonnel get a stowage binunder their bunks, and asingle upright locker aboutthe size of the one you hadbackinhighschool.Theycanalso stow some personalitemsintheirworkspaces,but

they still must always planahead when packing to goaboard ship. For sleeping,crew will normally beassigned to a bunk (called a“rack”),whichwillbeoneinastackofthree.Youwillfindaround sixty racks in aberthing space, with anattached rest room/showerfacility(whattheNavycallsa“head”),andasmallcommonareawith a table, chairs, andtelevision connected to the

ship’s cable system.Television monitors can befound in almost every spaceon board, displayingeverything from the ship’sPlan of the Day (called the“POD”), to movies, CNNHeadlineNews,andthe“platcams”—a series of televisioncameras that monitoractivitiesontheflightdeck.The racks themselves are

narrow single beds, with a

comfortable foam-rubbermattress, and basic bedding.There are also privacycurtains, a small readinglamp, and usually a fresh-airvent—often a vital necessity.While most of the interiorspaces of a Nimitz are air-conditioned, even nuclear-powered chillers sometimeshave a hard time keeping upwith the hot and humidconditionsinthePersianGulfortheAtlanticGulfStreamin

summer. That streamof coolaironyourfaceissometimesall that lets you sleep. Otherdistractionsonboardcanalsokeep you from getting rest,such as the launching andlanding of high-performancecombat aircraft on the roof.Crewmembers with quartersjust below the catapults andarresting gear have a hardtime sleeping when nightflight operations are running,which is why the air wing

personnel are berthed here.Whenthewingisflying,theywould not be in their racksanyway.Forward of the living

spaces,intheverybowoftheship, is the forecastle. Herethe anchors, handling gear,and their huge chains arelocated. It is also thedomainofthemosttraditionaljobsintheNavy: theDeckDivision.In an era of computers and

guidedweapons,thesearethesailorswhocanstilltieeverykind of knot, rig mooringlines, and handle small boatsin foul weather. You needthese people to operateanything bigger than arowboat,andaboardacarriertheyareindispensable.Ontheportsideoftheforecastleyoufind the first of a set of“stairs,” which we’ll use toclimbupseverallevels.Theseare not conventional

stairways, but very nearlyvertical ladders, and they arequite narrow. You learn tomove up and down ships’ladderscarefully,andfindinga handy stanchion to graspwhen you’re on thembecomesinstinctive.Opening another hatch,

you find yourself on a smallplatformadjacenttothebow.From here, you can climb afew steps andmoveoutonto

the four andahalf acres thatis the carrier’s flight deck.Again, thespongyfeelof thedeck tells you that there isnon-skid under your feet.Aroundthedeck,twoorthreedozen aircraft are packed intightclusters,tofreeasmuchdeck space as possible.During flight operations, thenoise is incredible. It is soloud that you must wearearplugs just to watch fromupon the island,while flight

deck personnel who mustworkamongtheaircraftwearspecial“cranial”helmetswiththickly padded ear protectorsto preserve their hearing.Only Landing SignalsOfficers (LSOs, the peoplewho guide aircraft duringlandings)areallowedondeckduring flight operationswithout a cranial, since theyhave to clearly hear and seeaircraft as they approach thesternforlanding.

There are other hazards aswell. In fact, the flight deckofamodernaircraftcarrierisarguably the most dangerousworkplace in the world.Aircraft are constantlythreatening to either suckflight deck personnel intotheir engines, or blow themoffofthedeckintotheocean.For this reason, the entireperimeter of the flight deckand the elevators is riggedwith safety nets. In addition,

everyone on the flight deckalso wears a “float coat,”which is an inflatable lifejacket with water-activatedflashing strobe light, and awhistle to call for help—justin case the safety nets don’tcatch you. Standard flightdeck apparel also includessteel-toed boots, thickinsulated fabric gloves, andgoggles(incaseafragmentofnon-skid or some foreignobject/ debris—FOD—is

blownintoyourface).Flight deck personnel aboardtheUSSGeorge Washington(CVN-73).JOHND.GRESHAM

Eachfloatcoatandcranialis color-coded by job.Underthe float coats, deck crewsalso wear jerseys—heavy,long sleevedT-shirts—of thesame color as the float coat(though they may be adifferent color from thecranials). These color-codecombinations are universalaboard Navy ships. Here iswhattheymean:

DECK PERSONNELIDENTIFICATIONGUIDE

For example, only sailorswearingpurplecoats,jerseys,and cranials are allowed tohandle fuel and otherflammable fluids on deck(they are nicknamed the“grapes”).Keeping an eye on flight-

deckoperationsisavitaltask.Up on the island, observersconstantlywatch the positionandflowofplanes,personnel,and equipment around the

deck. Any deviation fromstandardproceduresor safetyrules calls down a sharp andangry rebuke over the flightdeck loudspeaker (loudenough to hear through yourcranial—and that is reallyLOUD) telling you exactlywhat you must do RIGHTNOW! To help thesecommandsmake sense, thereis a standard set ofcoordinates and definitionsfor the various parts of the

flight deck. For example, thecatapults are numbered from1 through 4 in order,starboard to port, bow tostern. The elevators arenumbered,with1and2aheadoftheislandonthestarboardside, number 3 just aft, andnumber four on the port sideaft. The jet blast deflectors(JBDs) are matched to thecatapults, 1 through 4. Thearresting wires are alsonumbered, running from

number 1 farthest aft, tonumber 4 up forward. Areasofthedeckalsohavespecificnames, so that when anobserver or lookout yells outawarning,hecandirectothereyes to it without delay.Someexamplesinclude:

• The “Crotch”—Thepointwheretheroughly14°landingdeck “Angle” endsand the port bow

begins.•The“Junkyard”—Theareaatthebaseof the island aft.Here tractors,forklifts, awreckingcrane,andtheworld’ssmallestfire truck(collectivelyknownas “yellow gear”even though someare now paintedwhite) are parked,

always ready tomovewhenneeded.• The “HummerHole”—The areajust forward of theJunkyard. Here theE-2C Hawkeyes(nicknamed“Hummers”) andtheircargo-carryingcousins, the C-2Greyhounds, areparked.• The “Street”—

The “ Street” is upon the bow in thearea betweenCatapults 1 and 2;theforwardcatapultcontrol pod islocatedthere.• The “Rows”—Alsoonthebowarethe“1Row”and“2Row.” These arethe zones outboardofCatapults1and2and are normally

used as parkingareasfortheF/A-18Hornets when alanding event isactive.•The“Finger”—Anarrowstripofdeckjust aft of Elevator4, with parkingspace for a singleplane.

Workinginthisnoisy,hot,

and dangerous world is thejob of some of the bravestyoung men and women youwill ever meet. Most areunder twenty-five; and somelook so naive (or so scary),you might not trust them tovalet park your car at arestaurant. Yet the Navytrusts them to safely handleaircraft worth several billiondollars, not to mention theinfinitelypreciouslivesofaircrews, each representing

millionsofdollarsintrainingandexperience.Theirs is a world of

extremes. For up to eighteenhoursaday,they’resubjectedto noise thatwould deafen ifnot muffled; heat and coldthat would kill if notinsulated. They aresurrounded by explosives,fuel, and other dangeroussubstances,36 and arefrequently buffeted by winds

of over sixty knots. For this,theyreceiveaspecialkindofrespect and a “hazardousduty” bonus (in 1998, about$130 per month) in additiontotheirseapay.Theseyoungmen and women know theirworkmakesflyingaircraftonandofftheboatpossible,andthey take quiet pride in thisdirty, dangerous job up on“the roof.” Because of theextreme noise, a richlyexpressive sign language is

used to direct operations ontheflightdeck.Usingaseriesof common and easilyunderstood hand signals, thedeckcrewpersonneltelleachother how to move aircraftand load bombs andequipment, and warn eachother of emergencies. Theyconstantlywatchoutforeachother, for only the brother orsister sailor looking out foryou keeps you safe. All ofthese efforts are dedicated to

just two basic tasks: thelaunching and landing ofaircraft. Let’s now look athow it is done in somewhatgreaterdetail.

A top view of an improvedNimitz-class (CVN-68)nuclear-powered aircraftcarrier.

JACKRYANENTERPRISES,LTD.,BYLAURADENINNOIf you move aft from the

bow down the “Street,” youwalk between the two bowcatapults, each as long as anAmerican football field.Andthere is a similar catapultarrangement on the landing“angle”ontheportside.Mostof the machinery for eachC13 Mod. 1 catapult isconcealed under the flight

deck:twoslottedcylindersinalongsteeltrough,eachwitha narrow gap along the top.Overlapping synthetic rubberflangles cover and seal thegaps. In each cylinder is apiston, with a lug projectingthrough the sealing strips ontop. Each of these lugs leadsto a small crablike fixturecalleda“shuttle,”whichisupontheflightdeck.When an aircraft is ready

to launch, it is maneuveredinto position under theguidance of a plane handler.When the nosewheel is justbehind the shuttle, a metalattachment on the gear strut,called a towbar, is loweredinto a slot on the shuttle.Meanwhile, the Jet BlastDeflector(JBD)justaftoftheplane is raised, and anothermechanicalarmisattachedtotherearofthenosegearstrutwith a device called a

“holdback.”37Thisallowstheaircraft to run its engines upto full power, far beyond theability of the plane’s brakestokeepitonthedeck.Inthisway, the bird will have aconsiderable forward thrusteven before it starts moving.Eachaircrafttypeinthewinghas its own special color-coded holdback, to preventthem from being usedmistakenlyonthewrongbird.

The exceptions are the F-14Tomcat and F/ A-18Hornet,which have permanentholdback devices built intotheirnosewheelgearstruts.

ThenosegearofanF/A-18CHorneton the#1Catapult oftheUSSGeorge Washington(CVN-73). The forwardtowbar is linked to thecatapult shuttle, and theholdback device is inposition.JOHND.GRESHAMOnce the aircraft is

properlyhookedupbyoneofthe green-shirted catapultcrewmen, another “green

shirt” holds up a chalkboardwith the plane’s expectedtakeoff weight written on itfor the pilot and catapultofficer (down in the catapultcontrol pod) to see. If bothagree that the number iscorrect (confirmed by handsignals), then the catapultofficer (known as the“shooter”) begins to fill thetwin pistons with apressurized charge ofsaturated steam from the

ship’s reactor plant.38 Thesteam pressure is carefullyregulatedtomatchthetakeoffweight of the aircraft, thespeed of the wind over thedeck(this is thenaturalwindspeed plus the speed of theship), and other factors likeheat,airpressure/density,andhumidity.Thishastobeveryprecise. Too much pressurewill rip the nosewheel gearout of the plane, while too

littlewillcausea“coldshot.”In a cold shot, the aircraftrunsdownthedeckandneverreaches takeoff speed; thecatapult thenhurls it into thewateraheadof theonrushingcarrier.39 At best, the crewwillejectandtheaircraftwillbe lost. At worst, both theaircraft and flight crew willbe lost. As might beimagined, catapult officers(who are themselves veteran

carrier aviators) take thishighly responsible job quiteseriously.Once thepressure isat the

desired level, there is a finalcheck of the aircraft by thegreen shirts. If all appears tobe at readiness, the catapultofficer signals this to thepilot. The pilot selects theproperenginesetting(usuallymaximum power orafterburner), snaps a salute

backtothecatapultofficerinthe pod, and braces forwhatis about to come. At thatpoint, the catapult “shooter”hits a button in the controlpod, and the twin cylindersare released. This snaps theholdback and throws theaircraft down the catapulttrack. The pilot/crew is hitwith several times the forceof gravity (what pilots call“G” forces), and their eyesare driven back into their

sockets. Approximately onehundred yards/ninety metersand two seconds later, thetowbar pops out of theshuttle, and the aircraft is onits own. Having achievedflying speed (usually around150knots), thepilothasnowgainedcontroloftheairplane(thatis,heorshecanactuallyflyit).Back on deck, a cable and

pulley system retracts the

shuttle to its start position,andthecyclerepeats.Awell-trained crew can completethis process in less than twominutes. A normal launchsequence using all fourcatapults can put an airplaneinto the air every twenty tothirty seconds. This meansthat launcheventsforseveraldozen aircraft can take lessthan fifteen minutes fromstarttofinish.However,sincetheaircraft just launchedwill

be back to land in only acoupleofhours,thetimingofwhat gets done next can becritical.Configuringtheflightdeck

foralanding“event”requiresthat the deck be “respotted,”with as many aircraft aspossible moved forward. Inmost cases, these are parkedonRows1and2, so that the“angle” will be clear forreturning aircraft; and this

means thatCatapults1and2are now blocked andunavailable for use.While itis theoretically possible tolaunchaircraftduringlandingoperations,thisisrarelydone.Todosowouldrequiremuchof the air wing to be struckbelow to the hangar deck, atime-consuming and tiringexercise for the deck crews.Infact,carriercaptainsliketouse the aircraft elevators aslittle as possible, since these

constitute part of the flightdeck and parking area foraircraft when they are in the“up” position. It’s hard tofind anything more precioustoacarrierskipperthanflightdeckspace,andeventhefourandahalf acresonaNimitz-class flattop seems smallwhen filled with airplanes,ordnance, equipment, andpeople.The flight deck can not

only get crowded, it caneasilybecomedangerous.Forthis reason aircraft that arenot actually taking off orlanding are parked andchained down as quickly aspossible. Chaining down isalso necessary because aslight listonaslickdeckcansend an aircraft slidingaround like a rogue hockeypuck on an ice rink. In fact,almost everything on deck ischained down when it is not

inuse, including the low-risefirefighting and aircrafttractorvehicles.Normally,assoon as an aircraft is shutdown and parked, a crew ofstrong-backed young blueshirtsmoves in to attach tie-down chains to some of thethousands of tie-down pointsimbeddedintheplatingoftheflightdeck.On the port side aft is a

sponson holding what is

called the “Lens.” This is astabilized(against themotionof the ship) system of lightsand directional lenses,designed to provideapproaching pilots with avisualglidepathdownto thedeck. If an approachingaircrafthastheproperattitudeand sink rate, then the pilotsees an amber light—or“meatball”—fromthesystem.If the pilot can keep the“ball”centered(witharowof

green lights) all the waydown (any offset from theproper attitude shows thepilot a row of “red” lights),then it should put him downin the perfect spot for alandingonthedeckaft.Once the flight deck has

beenrespottedforthecominglanding event, and the shiphasonceagaincome into thewind, things again getexciting. Modern carrier

aircraft are too heavy andtheirstallspeedsaretoohighto possibly land in theroughly 500 feet/152 metersofspaceontheflightdeck.Infact, the only way to get ahigh-performance airplaneonto a carrier deck is toliterally fly it to a“controlled”crash,andstopitforciblybeforeitfallsintothesea. The lens system andother special landinginstruments (some aircraft

even have an automaticlanding system) are usefulaids, but pilots usually needadditional help. Thisformidabletaskisthejobofalotofveryspecialequipmentand is overseen by theLanding Signals Officers(LSOs).Backintheolddaysofpropeller-drivenplanesandtheearly jets,LSOswere theonly landing aid for pilots.They did their job withnothing more than a pair of

lighted paddles (to show thepilots their landing attitude)andafewhandsignals.LSOstoday do their job from asmall platform on the portsideaft,anditistherethatwenow will go to get aperspectiveon the fine art ofacarrierlanding.Landing a carrier aircraft

starts in the aircraft cockpit,when the pilot makes thebreak into the ship’s landing

pattern. The pattern itself iscontrolled by the Carrier AirTraffic Control Center(CATCC) located one leveldown from the flight deck.TheCATCCisaminiatureofwhat you would find at anymajorairport,anditfunctionsinexactlythesameway.Thecontroller’s job is to “stack”the aircraft, prioritize theminto an oval-shaped patternabout a mile wide and fourmiles long around the port

side of the carrier, and“stagger” them, so the LSOhas the necessary time tobringeachaboard. (Theycanland an aircraft about everythirty seconds under goodconditions.) The aircraft inthe pattern are prioritized bytheir“fuelstate,”apolitewayofsaying that thefirstplanesto be brought aboard are theonesthatareabouttofallintothe ocean from fuelstarvation.Justtobesurethis

does not happen, the carrierusuallyhasanairbornetankeroverhead during flightoperations to refuel airplanestoo close to the Empty pointontheirfuelgauges.When the landing event

has been properly organized,the “Lens” is turned on, andthe first pilot in the patternmakes the “break”outof thepatterntolineuponthesternof the carrier. During the

“downwind” leg of thepattern, the pilot drops theplane’s landing gear,tailhook, and flaps, makessuretheradioissetupontheLSOfrequency,andturnslefttowardtheboat.Assumingallthis has been done properly,the aircraft should start itsfinal approach at eighthundred feet altitude, aboutthree-quarters of amile fromthe stern of the carrier, andjust fifteen seconds from

touchdown.Detail of a landing wire andcapstan on the USS GeorgeWashington(CVN-73).JOHND.GRESHAM

As the aircraft finishes itsbreak, the LSO orders thepilot over the radio to “Callthe ball!” This tells the pilotto let the LSO know that hehas spotted the amber“meatball” of the landingsystem. If the pilot does seeit, he or she calls “Rogerball!” back to the LSO toconfirm that. At this point,the final ten-second dash tothe deck is on. On the LSOplatform, the LSO and an

assistant are watching andjudgingtheaircraft’sattitude.Highly experienced pilotsthemselves, LSOs are expertjudgesofallthis.Inhisorherhand, the LSO holdswhat isknown as the “pickle.” Thiscontrolsaseriesoflightsnearthe LSO platform,which arevisibletoaircraftapproachingthe stem. As long as theaircraftcontinuesproperlyoncourse, the pilot gets a green“OK”light.But theLSOcan

also activate “more power”and“waveoff”lightswiththe“pickle.” The LSO can alsocoach the pilot by radio, butthis is not normally done.Since an enemy couldintercept radio signals inwartime conditions,“emissions control”procedures (called EMCOMAlpha in its most extremeform) dictate that combatlanding operations be doneonlywithlights.Iftheaircraft

is set up properly, it shouldnowbeabout thirty feetoverthe fantail, with airspeed ofaround 130 knots/240 kph,and a decided nose-upattitude. At this point, thepilotandLSOhavedonetheirpart of the job, and it is theturnofmachinerytofinishit.Handling this task is the

ship’s arresting gear system,located in the middle of the14° angle aft. Stretched

across the deck are fourbraided steel cables (called“wires” by the crew),numbered 1 through 4, fromrear to front. The wires arespaced about fifty feet apart,and each is hooked to a pairofhydrauliccylinderslocatedone deck below. If the pilotandLSOhavesetthelandingup properly, the aircraftshould hit the deck in theroughly two-hundred-foot/sixty-one-meter-by-fifty-

foot/fifteen-meter rectangleformedbythewiresystem.Ifthis happens, the tailhookhanging from the rear of theaircraft should snag one ofthe wires. If a successful“trap”occurs,theaircraftandhook pull the wire out of itsspools belowdecks, and thehydraulic cylinders slow theaircrafttoastopinabout300feet/91.4 meters, in just twoseconds. The crew is thenthrown forward in their

straps, and lots of negative(forward) “Gs” nearly pushtheir eyeballs out of theirsockets.Once the aircraft is safely

aboard, a green-shirted deckcrewmember called a “hookrunner” clears the landingwire from the hook, while a“blue shirt” plane handlerstarts directing the pilot totaxi forward out of thelanding area. When the

aircraft is clear of the angle,thearrestingcableisretractedand made ready for the nextlanding. While all this ishappening,theLSOiswritingdown a “score” for eachpilot’s landing. They gradetwofactors.First, thegeneralway the pilot actually flewtheapproachandlanding.An“OK” means that this wasdone safely and to acceptedstandards. Second, the wirethe pilot “snagged.” As we

saw earlier in the firstchapter, the favored target iswire number 3, whichprovides the safest landingconditionsandtheleaststrainon the aircraft. Landings onwires 2 and 4, whileacceptable, merit a lowerscore; but hitting wirenumber 1 is considereddangerous and usually bringsthe pilot counseling from theLSO.

Eachpilot’s landingscoresare posted onwhat is knownas the “greenie” board downin the squadron ready roomforalltosee.Thesescoresareaccumulated, and by the endof an entire cruise, a “TopHook” award is given to thepilot with the best landingrecord. The scores alsofrequently affect the ratingsof the pilot’s airmanship,which affects their futurepromotion hopes. Great

“Hooks”maygo to test pilotschoolorbecomeinstructors,whilethosewithlowerscoresmay never fly off a shipagain.In the first chapter, I had

occasion to mention one ofthe rules that every Navalaviator learns early: As soonas the aircraft hits the deck,push the throttles to fullpower. In this way, if thetailhook fails to snag a wire

(calleda“bolter”),hehasthenecessaryspeedtoflyofftheendoftheangle,andgetbackinto the landing pattern foranother try. Bolters happenfairly rarely these days,though every Naval aviatorstill experiences them nowand again. Sometimes thetailhookskipsoffofthedeck,or just fails to connect.Whatever the reason, the14°angleddeckmakesitpossiblefor the pilot to go around

again,andgetaboardanothertime. Angled decks havesaved more aircraft andaviators’ lives than anyinvention since thedevelopment of tailhooks.Thepilot justclimbsout intothetrafficpatternandsetsupfor another try. There also isanemergencynetor“barrier”thatcanberiggedtocatchanaircraft that cannot beotherwise snagged by anarrestingwire.This,however,

is something that no Navalaviator cares to try out if itcanbeavoided.Continuing the tour of the

flight deck, you can seescattered around theperimeter of the deck manydifferent fittingsandnozzles.These provide everythingfrom jet fuel to AFFF(Aqueous Film-FormingFoam). There is also aseawater deluge system, for

nuclear/chemical washdownsand fighting really bad fires,as well as “chutes” wheredeck personnel can dropordinance in danger of“cooking off,” should theyget too hot from a deck fire.This is another of the manyrisks faced by flight deckpersonnel,thoughtheywouldtell you that not doing the“dangerous” things on “theroof” is a good way to geteveryoneaboardkilled.These

are brave people, who doheroic things every time aflightevolution takesplace. Idefyanynationtoeffectivelyoperate sea-based aircraftwithoutsuchfolks.Moving on to the island,

youopenanotherhatch,headinside, and climb up sixladders to the 010 level andthePrimaryFlightControl,or“Pri-Fly,” as it is called.Here, some six stories above

the flightdeck, is the controltower for the carrier, wherealltheoperationsoftheflightdeck and the local airspaceare handled by the Air Bossand the “Mini” Boss, his (orher) assistant. They aresurrounded by computerdisplays showing everythingthey need to help themcontrol the air action aroundtheship.Climb down another

ladder, andyouarriveon thebridge, where the captainspends most of his time. Ontheportsideisacomfortableelevated leather chair, whichbelongs to the commandingofficer, and from which henormally cons the ship(flanked by computerscreens). Over on thestarboard side of the bridgeare the actual conningstations, including thewheel,chart table, and positions for

several lookouts. Eventhoughthebridgeisequippedwith a GPS receiver,advanced radars, and allmanner of electronic aids,human eyes and binocularsare still important to the safeconningofacarrier.Just aft of Pri-Fly is

arguably the most popularspot on board, “VulturesRow”—an open-air balconyoverlooking the flight deck

(and a good place to take insomesun).Thereanyonecansafelywatchthecomingsandgoings below (bring yourcameraandearplugs!).Italsooffers a wide view of thewhole ship, especially thedefensiveandsensorsystem.Fromthereyoucanseethe

sponsonmountsfortheeight-round Mk. 29 Sea SparrowSAM launchers. The Nimitz-classcarrierseachhave three

ofthesesystems,oneforwardonthestarboardside,withtheother two aft (port andstarboard).TheRIM-7MSeaSparrow is a short-rangeSAM,designedtosupporttheMk. 15 CIWS mounts indefending the ship againstany “leaker” aircraft ormissile thatmakes itpast thescreen of Aegis missilecruisers and destroyerssupporting the carrier group.Based upon the venerable

AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-airmissile (AAM), SeaSparrowwas originally developed toprovide small ships likefrigatesanddestroyerswithashort-range point-defenseSAM at a reasonable cost.NATOadoptedthesystemasthestandardshort-rangeSAMsystemforsmallescorts.LikeitsAAMcousin,SeaSparrowutilizes a guidance systemknown as “semi-active”homing. This means that a

Mk. 91 fire-control radar(eachNimitz-class carrier hasthree of these) “illuminates”an incoming missile oraircraft, much as a flashlightisaimedatanobjectinadarkroom.Theseekerheadofthemissile “sees” the targetsreflected radar energy fromthe Mk. 91 radar. Theguidance system of themissile then automaticallyprovides it tracking to the

target.40

Aneight-roundMk.29RIM-

7M Sea Sparrow launcheraboard the USS GeorgeWashington(CVN-73).JOHND.GRASHAMSeaSparrowisanexcellent

point-defense system thatgivestheshipgoodprotectionout to a range of up to 10nm/18.5 km. Back in the1980’s, it was enhancedthroughtheadditionofaMk.23TargetAcquisitionSystem(TAS) radar. This fast-

rotating system can detectlow-flying and high-angletargets, and then pass themalong automatically to theSea Sparrow system forengagement. The system’sonly drawback is that oncethe eight ready rounds havebeen fired from the Mk. 29,the launcher must bemanually reloaded. SeaSparrow is being improvedthrough the development ofthe Enhanced Sea Sparrow

Missile (ESSM) System,which marries the basicseeker system with a newairframe. This will giveESSM more range andperformance than RIM- 7M,as well as the ability to befiredfrombothMk.29’sandthe Mk. 41 vertical launchsystem (VLS) launchersfoundonnewerwarships.Unlike surface ships,

flattops do not have many

convenient spots for placingantennas for radios andsensors.Thishastodopartlywith maintaining appropriateseparation between emittingantennas, and partlywith theneed to avoid clutter on theflight deck during flightoperations. For this reason,the island structures ofAmerican carriers havealways been antenna farms.You’ll also find a number ofUHF/VHF radio antennas on

the edge of the flight deck,placedonspecialmountsthatrotate horizontally duringflight operations. On Nimitz-class carriers there isadditionally a large antennamast just aftof the island, tohold those radar andcommunications antennasthat need to be as high aspossible. These masts andmounts hold a variety ofsensorsincluding:

•SPS-48E—A3-Dair-searchradarthatprovides air trafficcontrol and battlemanagementfunctions. Thishigh-resolutionradarhasareportedrange out toapproximately 60nm/110km.• SPS-49(V)5—This is the bestcurrent Naval 2-D

air-search radar.Extremely reliable,with a detectionrange of up toseveral hundredmiles/ kilometers,SPS-49’s are foundon most majorcombatants in theU.S. Navy, as wellas many foreignvessels.• SPS-64(V)9—This is primarily a

surface-search/navigationradar for keepingformation andoperating close toshore. It is adevelopment of theclassic Litton LN-66navigationradar.• SPS-67—TheSPS-67 is ageneral-purposesurface-searchradar, designed to

provide precisetargeting dataagainst surfacetargets.• Mk. 23 TargetAcquisitionSystem (TAS)—Thisisasmall,fast-rotating radar fordetecting sea-skimming or high-angle missileattacks. It feedsdata directly into

the SYS-2 (V)3weapons-controlsystem, which canautomaticallyactivate the RIM-7/Mk. 29 SeaSparrow SAMsystems.• Mk. 91 FireControl System(FCS)—The threeMk. 91 FCSsprovide guidancefor the RIM-7M

Sea Sparrow SAMlaunched by thethree Mk. 29launchers.• SLQ-32 (V)4—The SLQ-32 is afamily ofelectronic-warfaresystems, which canbe tailored to theprotectionrequirements of aparticular ship. The(V)4 version has a

wide-band radar-warning receiver, awide-band radarjammer,andabankof Mk. 137 SuperRapid BloomingChaff (SRBOC)launchers. Thesesix-barreledmortarsthrowupacloudofchaff (metal-coatedMylar strips) andinfrared decoys toblind or confuse an

incomingmissile atthe last momentpriortoanattack.• WRL-1H—TheWRL-1H is ageneral-purposewide-bandradio/radar-warning/intercept receiver,designed toprovidea basic interceptcapability foreverything fromradio traffic to

bearings on radarsets.

The array of antennas on theisland structure of the USSGeorge Washington (CVN-73). This is representative ofthe configuration on late-production Nimitz-class(CVN-68)carriers.JOHND.GRESHAM

These systems give the

carrier’s commanding officerand battle group staff goodsituational awareness of thebattlespacesurroundingtheirship and the ARG. Alongwith the supporting sensorsystems, the island alsoprovidesmounts formanyofthe ship’s communications

systems.Whilemanyoftheseare classified, they cover thefull range of theelectromagneticspectrumandfunctions. The mostinteresting of these are thedomed antennas for thesatellite communicationssystems,whichprovidemuchof the high-reliability securecommunicationsforthebattlegroup.Since they were originally

designedprimarilytotransmitencoded text messages, eventhese systems have limits.Today, carriers need a lotmore than just a relativelyslow, secure means ofreceiving words. Thisproblem surfaced withparticular impact duringDesert Storm, when none oftheU.S.NavycarriershadtheabilitytoreceivethedailyAirTasking Order (ATO) fromCENTCOM’s air command

in Riyadh. Every other airunit in the theater, includingthose of our allies, could getthe ATO (which ran tohundredsofpagesofdenselyformatted text), even if onlybyhigh-speedFAXmachinesover secure phone lines. Butthe Navy, having alwaysplanned on fighting on theirown in the open ocean, wasill prepared for thecommunications required forjoint operations with other

services. As a result, theNavydidnotreceiveitsdailydeliveryoftheATObyhigh-techsatelliteordatalink,butby hand-delivered papercopies flown in by an S-3Viking. As might beimagined, this was quite anembarrassment for theNavy,andasaresultitbegantoputtogether systems to relievethislackofjointconnectivity.Thefirsttryatasolutionto

the problem was known asthe “Challenge Athena”experiment. ChallengeAthena I—initially anexperimentalsystemonboardtheUSSGeorge Washington(CVN-73)—is a two-way,low-speed (around 768kilobytes per second—kps)satellite link based uponcommercial antennatechnology. Originallydeveloped for use indelivering intelligencephotos

and conducting videoteleconferences, it has growninto a much broadercommunications system, andin the process has becomeincredibly popular witheveryone in the fleet. Alongwith the obvious benefits totop planners andcommanders, ChallengeAthenaprovidesthecrewnotonly with two-way E-mailcontact home, but also withdirect live access to

commercial televisionchannels like CNN andESPN. A new high-speedversion of the system,ChallengeAthenaIII,isabouttobeinstalledthroughoutthecarrier force, as well as onfleet flagships, big-deckamphibious ships, andperhaps even majorcombatants like the Aegiscruisers and destroyers. Acomparable system is beingdeveloped for use by

submarines, to supportTomahawk cruise-missiletargeting, special operations,and unmanned aerial vehicle(UAV)missions. The domedChallenge Athena antennasarelocatedontheflightdecklevel, outboard of the islandandthecrotch.Nowitistimetogobelow.

Afteradropdownastackofsix ladders from the bridge,we find ourselves on the 03

or “Gallery” level, directlyunder the flight deck.Headinginboard,wefindtwocentral passageways runningthe length of the full ship.Almost a quarter-mile long,thesepassagewaysseemtogoon forever, with only anoccasional cross-passagewayto break the monotony of“knee knockers” andwatertight hatches. Most ofwhat we see here are doors,lots of them, behind someof

whicharethereal“brains”ofthe ship—the variouscommand, air wing, andsquadron spaces. In addition,most of the airwing officersand flag staff personnel livehere.Ifyouturnleftandheadaft down the main starboardpassageway, you passcompartments filled with thehydraulic cylinders for thearresting-gear system. Theseare gigantic, filling the spacebetween the two main

corridors. The compartmentshere are also even morespotlessly clean than the restof the ship, since one of thefirst signs of trouble in ahydraulic system is telltaleleaksoffluid.Fartheraftaremanyofthe

squadronreadyrooms.Theselarge spaces are theheadquarters for the variousflying squadrons anddetachments attached to the

carrier’s embarked air wing.The ready room is the innersanctumofaflyingsquadron,a combination of clubhouse,rest area, and meeting/briefing/planning center.Since the rules of navalaviation allow a freedom ofspeech and expression thatwould not be tolerated inotherareasaboardship,readyrooms are extremely privateplaces (where life as a navalaviatorisseenatitsmostraw

and splendid). This meansthat they are for aviators andonly aviators, andpermissionisrequiredbeforeanyoneelseisallowedinside.Readyroomsarewondrous

places, filled with historicphotos, trophies, and plaquesfrom the unit’s past. At thefrontofthereadyroomisthedesk for the squadron dutyofficer and a large whiteboard for briefings and

discussions. There also arerowsofthemostcomfortablechairs you will ever sit in.Based on a design thatpredates the Second WorldWar, they are soft but firm,with thick leather coversembossedwiththesquadron’scolors and logo. They canalso recline for a short napbetween sorties, and havefold-down writing tables forscribblingnotes.

Attherearoftheroomisasmallenclosedareawheretheterminal for the TacticalAircrew Mission PlanningSystem (TAMPS) is located.TAMPS is an automatedsystem that allows air crewstoperform routeandmissionplanning. Since it can takeinto account effects liketerrain masking and enemyair defense weaponsenvelopes,TAMPSisamajorimprovement over the old

system of paper maps,photos,andaircrewintuition.After each squadron doestheir planning over thenetworked TAMPS system,the staff of the air wing canreview an entirestrike/missionplanbeforethemissionisflown.After leaving the ready

room, we’ll head forward.After we’ve passed throughabout a third of the ship, the

tile changes from normalNavy gray to a bright blue,meaning that we havereached what the crew calls“blue tile country.” This isthe central command andcontrol complex for both theship and the carrier battlegroup.Thedeck in “blue tilecountry” is subdivided into aseries of spaces, eachdedicatedtoadifferentsetofwarfaretasks.Theseinclude:

• CombatInformationCenter (CIC)—This is the battlenerve center of theship, with displaysforallof the ship’ssensors, as well asinformationacquired from datalinks and nationalsources (the DoDterm forreconnaissance

satellites, aircraft,and other systems).The CIC isspecificallydesigned to presentall the availabledata on the combatsituation to theofficersmaking thedecisions abouthow to “fight” theship. Filled withconsoles, terminals,and big-screen

displays, this spacehas separate zonesfor antisub, antiair,and antisurfacewarfare,communications,damage control,andotherfunctions.BackinWorldWarII a captainnormallyfoughthisship from thebridge, but today’sArleigh Burke or

Phillip Vian willnormally be foundat a glowingconsole within adimly lit CIC.Aircraft carriers’CICs are somewhatdifferentfromthoseofotherships.Onacarrier, not all ofthe terminals andpersonnel are in asingleroom,astheyare on an Aegis

cruiserordestroyer.This better hardensthe ship againstattack,andavoidsahuge andovermanned space,which could bedestroyed by asinglehit.Thus,thevarious warfarespecialties—antiair(AAW),antisubmarine(ASW), antisurface

(ASUW), etc.—have their ownsmall controlcenters, whichforward their dataintothemainCIC.• Carrier AirTraffic ControlCenter (CATCC)—TheCATCC is acontrol center forhandling airspaceand traffic controlaround the battle

group. This one isdifferent from alocal FAA controlcenter, in that itmoveswiththeshipand has the abilityto data-linkinformation fromoffboard sensorsystems like Aegisships and AEWaircraft (E-2Cs, E-3’s,etc.).• Tactical Flag

Command Center—The TFCC isessentially aduplicate inminiature of theCIC.Thedifferenceis that theTFCC isspeciallyconfigured tomaximize access todata that flagofficers (i.e.,admirals/ battlegroupcommanders)

need. To supportthis requirement,the TFCC wasdeveloped with thesame kinds oflarge-screendisplays andworkstations thatyou would findaboard the Aegisshipsthatscreenthecarrier. (The TFCCused to be called“FlagPlot,”butthat

space now residesupontheisland.)•JointIntelligenceCenter(JIC)—TheJoint IntelligenceCenter is aclearinghouse forinformationrequired by theship, the battlegroup, andembarked air units.Analysts in the JICcan draw fromvast

databases ofNational Imageryand MappingAgency (NIMA)maps, satellitephotography, andanything else theintelligencecommunityprovides. The JICstaff isa“rainbow”organization fromevery unit in thebattle group, as

well as from otherservices andintelligenceorganizations. Evenbetter, they canprobably tell youwhatitallmeans.• Ships SignalsExploitationSpace(SSES)—Thissmall sealed spaceis for the reallysecret stuff:“exploitation” of

enemyradiosignalsand electronicemissions.Equippedwith datalinks to nationaland theater-levelintelligencesystems, the SSEScan provide battlegroup leaders withup-to-dateinformation onenemy intentionsand activities.Only

specially clearedintelligence andcommunicationstechnicians areallowedinside.

Normally, these are all

quiet places manned by asmall staffworking in shifts.But when an operation orexercise is under way, theyresemble a darkened beehivewithout the buzz, everyone

working around the clockuntil the exercise is finished.By the way, it’s really coldthere,duetothevastamountsof air-conditioning and chillwater needed to keep all theelectronics and computersfrom literally melting down.Even in the dog days ofAugust, you often findconsole operators and otherwatch-standerswearingwind-breakers and pulloversweaters tokeepthechillout

oftheirbones.A two-person officerstateroom aboard a Nimitz-class(CVN-68)carrier.JOHND.GRESHAM

Forward of the commandspaces are the flag quarters,where the battle groupcommanderandhisstafflive.If any place on a carrier canbecalled luxurious, this is it.There is fine furniture andwood paneling, a large messand briefing area, a privategalley, and the admiral’sstateroom, office, and head.Comfortable and functional,allof these spacesarewithina few seconds walk of the

TFCC. Its comfortnotwithstanding, nobody Iknow likes working in theflagquarters.That isbecausethe flag spaces are directlyunder the launch shuttle andJBD for Catapult Number 1.The noise during deckoperations is deafening, andliving and working hereduring round-the-clock flightoperations is downrightunpleasant. Such things infact rarelybother theadmiral

andstaffpersonnel,however,sincetheydon’tgetthatmuchsleep anyway. The demandsof running a battle groupmean that if they are gettingmore than six hours of sleepevery day, they are probablynotworkinghardenough!Bya strange irony, the nicer thequarters, the less time anoccupant gets to spend inthem. While rank andresponsibility bring physicalrewards,most senior officers

rarely have the free timewhileaboardtoenjoythem.Moving forward again,we

find more ready rooms, aswell as dozens of stateroomsfortheairwingpersonnelandship’sofficers.Mostof theseare two-man units, and areactuallyquitepleasanttolivein(as Ididforseveraldays).The racks are doubled-decked, and somewhat largerthan those of the enlisted

personnel. There is a fairamount of personal stowagespace,aswellasasmallfold-downdesk.Eachofficerhasasafe for classified materialsandpersonalitems,aswellasa small sink and mirror.Though a few stateroomshave shared heads andshower facilities, mostofficers use one of themanycommunity head/showerspaces around the ship.Roommatesalsousuallygoin

together on electronic itemslike a “boom box” stereo,television, and VCR; andthere is a box for pluggingthese into the ship’s cabletelevision and radio network,as well as the commercialfeeds from the ChallengeAthenasystem.Forward of the living

spaces, there is a trulywonderful place, called the“Dirty Shirt” galley and

wardroom area. This is theonly officers’ wardroomaboard where wearing flightsuits and flight deck workgear is “acceptable.” Whilethe other wardrooms belongto the ship, the “Dirty Shirt”wardroom “belongs” to theair wing, which means thataviator traditions apply here.“Dirty Shirt” menus tend tobemoreinformal,andtalking“shop” is allowable. Eachsquadron has its own table,

andetiquettedictatesthatyouaskpermissiontojoinanyonewho is already there. Still,moreoftenthannot,youwillfind a warm smile and aninvitation to join theconversation. In the “DirtyShirt”mess there is also is aneat, little-known secret: the“dog” machine—thenickname for the soft-serveicecreamdispenser,whichiskept going around the

clock.41 It is a wonderfuldiversion from thesometimes-spartanlifeaboardship; and the “Dirty Shirt’s”dog machine is usually thebestontheship.Heading aft, about two-

thirds of the way back, wecome to a cross-corridorintersection with what lookslike a small store on eachcorner.These are thevarioussquadron “shops” for the

flying units of the air wing,withonesuchspaceforeverysquadron in the air wing.Here all the data on thereadiness, flying andmaintenance status, andordinance/stores loadouts ofevery squadron’s aircraft ismanaged.Here also iswherethe Command Master Chief(CMC) for each squadronworks.TheCMCistheseniorenlisted sailor in eachsquadron, and functions as

the shop foremanwho keepsthe aircraft ready to fly andfight. The CMC alsofunctions as an advisor andadvocate for the enlistedpersonnel of the squadron totheunit’sofficers.Alongwiththe entire corps of pettyofficers, the CMCs are theinstitutional “glue” of theNavy, and a good officerrapidly learns this fact.Finally, they are the keepersofthe“SquadronStore.”This

sells coffee mugs, T-shirts,patches, and stickers of thesquadron logo (called“zaps”). If you get aboard acarrier, be sure to pick up afewofthese,sincethemoneyalwaysgoesintothesquadronrelieffund.Ialwaysdo.Returning aft to the island

ladder well, we head downfour more levels to theSecond Deck (deck levelsabove the hangar or main

deck have numbers—01, 02,etc.—while decks below arespelledout).Heremostofthecrew (officers and enlistedpersonnel) take their meals.Both have galley and eatingfacilitieshere,andsomethinglike fifteen thousandmeals aday are served on this deckalone.Theenlistedpersonneleat cafeteria-style in threelarge spaces amidships thatcan hold about five hundredpersonnel at a time. The

officers’ wardroom (called“Number Three”) is fartheraft, and is essentially a sit-down-stylerestaurant,thoughthere’s a buffet line if youdesire. Always open,WardroomThreeisthesocialcenter of the ship. Here theofficerscancometogetherforafewminutesandsharenewsof the day with theirshipmates. Coffee, “bugjuice” (the Navy version of“Kool Aid”), and nacho

machinesarealwayspoweredup,andyoucanusuallybegameal from themess stewardsifyou lookas thoughyou’veworked hard enough. Thereeven is what is jokinglyknown as the “nuclear-powered cappuccinomachine,” which dispenses apassablecupofthatdeliciousbrew.Surrounding the officers’

wardroom on the Second

Deck are the state-rooms formost of the ship’s seniorofficers and departmentheads. Like the flag quartersonthe02level,theseareverypleasant, with private officesand head/shower facilities.Also like flag quarters, theyareusedverylittlesincethereis very little time for sleepandrelaxationwhileaboardanuclear supercarrier. Aft ofthe wardroom are moreenlisted quarters. These are

much like the ones we’vealready visited, except thatflight deck sounds aremuffled by the mass of theship;andyou’llprobablyhearand feel instead the ship’sengineering plant. At highspeeds (over twenty-fiveknots), when the hull beginsto resonate, the backgroundbuzz can be annoying.Another annoyance is theheatonthelowerdeckswhentheshippassesthroughwarm

waterliketheGulfStreamorPersian Gulf. Things can getdownrightsteamyundersomeconditions.ThemaincontrolpanelofthepumproomaboardthecarrierHarry S. Truman (CVN-75).This panel controls the mainpumpsfortheentireship,andis located between themagazines at the bottom ofthevessel.JOHND.GRESHAM

Dropping down another

ladder, you come upon themachinery spaces on theThird Deck, where most ofthesystemsthatkeeptheship“alive” are contained. Hereand on the deck below aremachine shops, electricalswitchboards and emergencydiesel generators, the ship’slaundry, medical and dentalfacilities, and the air-

conditioning plant. Also onthe Third Deck is the ship’sstore, the post office (asurprisingly large facility),andthenewlyinstalledbanksof satellite phones. Theseallow sailors to call homefrom anywhere in the worldfor about a dollar a minute,andmakearealdifferenceinthelivesofthecrew.BelowtheFourthDeckare

the heavily protected and

restricted spaces dedicated tothe nuclear reactors,propulsion machinery,ammunition magazines, andpump rooms. Surrounded bya double hull with massivevoids (specially designedbuffer zones to absorbexplosions) as protectionagainstdamage, theseare thesafest and most secure areasof the ship. Due to thesecurity restrictions placedupon the Navy by the

Department of Energy andthe Director of NavalReactors (NAVSEA08), I’mnot able to describe theirlayout or equipment.42 I cansay, however, that the twoWestinghouse A4W reactorsprovide enough saturatedsteamtoruntheshipatthirty-plus knots while leavingenough electricity to powerall the ship’s other systemscom-fortably.The four

General Electric steamturbines put out 280,000 shpto four shafts, andarehighlyagileatstartingandstopping.Withthetouratanend,we

drag our weary bones andjoints up to the hangar deck,and walk over to theaccommodation ladder backtothedock.Bynowyouhavea pretty good idea of thelayoutoftoday’sNimitz-classcarriers. However, the four-

decadeproductionrunofthisdesign is starting to winddown, and new ideas arebeginningtobeputforthforanew generation of flattop.Readon,andI’lltryandgiveyou some ideas about whattheywilllooklike.

TheFuture:CVN-77andCVX-78

The Nimitz-class carriers areas capable as their designersand builders could manageback in the late 1960’s,representing an almostoptimum mix of capabilitiesfor operations during theColdWar.YetSCB-102 is adesign in its third decade ofcontinuous production, theColdWarisnowhistory,andit is time to think about areplacement after theRonaldReagan is launched in a few

years. That is exactly whatthe Navy is doing. The U.S.Navy will always have themissionofprojectingforwardpresencewitha regularcycleof carrier rotations. At thesame time, the Navy alsoforesees dealing morefrequently with irregular,unpredictable situations. Andfinally, there is thenecessaryrequirement to keep costs ofbuilding, operating, andmaintaining carriers

reasonable.

Question:HowcantheNavydoallthat?

Answer:Accept thefact thatis it time for a newdirectionin flattop design andconstruction.

Todothis,NNSfoundedacarrier“SkunkWorks”calledtheCarrierInnovationCenter,based a stone’s throw fromDry Dock 12 at NewportNews.44HeretheNNSdesignengineers are studying waysto build carriers that will bemore suited to theoperationsthepost-ColdWarwillbring.Working in concert with anumber of other corporatepartners, as well as

NAVSEA, NNS has helpedthe Navy form a two-stepplan for taking carrierconstruction and sea-basedNaval aviation into the 21stcentury.Phase one of the plan

involves the building of oneadditionalNimitz-classcarrieraftertheUSSRonaldReagan(CVN-76), which is nowunder construction. Thisunnamed carrier, known

today as CVN-77, will be aNimitz only under the skin.Current plans have CVN-77utilizingabasicNimitzpowerplantandhull structureup tothemaindecklevel,butfromthere on up everything elsewillbenew.CVN-77willbeused as a technological“bridge”shipwhereanumberofnewtechnologiesandideaswillbetriedout.Whilesomeofthesetechnologieshaveyettobefullydefined,mosthave

alreadybeeninsertedintothemass of requirementsdocumentsbeingproducedatNAVSEA.Theyinclude:

• SignatureReduction—Thisisstealth technology,or more accurately“low observables.”Can anyoneactually hide aquarter-mile-longmonster from

modern sensorsystems? Theansweris“yes,”butwith qualifications.You have toremember that anobject’s radar,thermal, electronic,and acousticsignature has verylittle to do with itsactual size.Shaping, materials,and other

engineering detailshavemuchmore todo with thesecharacteristics. Bywayofexample,anexpert I spokewithclaimed that a 90%reduction in theradar cross sectionofacarriercouldbeachieved throughrelatively minor,though detailed,changes to the

ship’s island;sponsion, and deckstructures. Thiswould mean that aNimitz-sized shipmight be given aradar signaturesmaller than aguided-missilefrigate’s. Already,outstandingsignature reductionworkhasbeendoneon Arleigh Burke-

class (DDG-51)Aegis destroyers,which areextremely tough tosee on radar andinfraredsensors.•Automation/ReducedManning—A keyNavyinitiativeistoreduce manningaboard ships(primarilyasacost-saving measure).

With over 70% ofevery defensedollar going topersonnelcosts, theNavy figures it cansave over $50,000per year for everysailor who can beeliminated orreplaced byautomation.According tocurrent plans,CVN-77 will

implementmanyofthe “Smart Ship”systems that arebeing tried out onthe USS Yorktown(CG-47). Thesesystems havealready reduced thesize of theYorktown’screwby15%.TheNavyhaseven greater goalsfor CVN-77, and acutof from25% to

33% is consideredpossible.Thiscouldmeanareductionofup to one thousandpersonnel from theship’s company,and a savings ofover $50 million ayear over a“standard” Nimitz.That translates intosome $2.5 billionduring the fifty-year service life of

CVN-77.•AdaptiveMissionFeatures—CVN—77 will be capableof rapidreconfiguration formissions other thanthose traditionallyassociated with“big deck” aircraftcarriers. Operations“short-of-war” anddisaster/humanitarianrelief missions are

becoming the rulerather than theexception. To thisend, the Navy hasdecided to redesignthe interior spacesof CVN-77 toprovide moreadaptability. Thechanges include airwing enlistedberthing areas withthe kinds ofpersonal stowage

(weapons,ammunition, etc.)required byMarines or otherground personnelwho might go intoground combat.Likewise, air wingplanning, control,andunitspaceswillbemorecapableforjoint operations, sothatunitslikeArmyhelicopter

battalionsorspecialoperations forcescouldusethemwitha minimum ofmodification.Finally, the hangarbays and elevatorsare beingredesigned toincrease aircraftoptions,so that tilt-rotor aircraft,UAVs, and eventhe planned new

generation ofunmanned combataerial vehicles—UCAVs—can becarried andoperated. Onesenior Navalanalyst has evensuggested theinclusion of a“Roll-On, Roll-Off” (Ro-Ro) rampon the fantail forloading of vehicles

and cargo. All ofthis adds up to acarrier with morecapability andvariety than anyeverbuilt.• Process/WorkFlowImprovements—NNS has made aformal review ofthe jobs done onboard a carrier inorder to identify

key areas where“processimprovements” canbe implementedinto the CVN-77design. NNS islooking at what iscalled a flight deck“pit stop.” Therethe crews servicingaircraft or waitingto launch could doso under shelterfrom the elements.

Performing moreflight deckfunctions in thehangar deck(arming, fueling,etc.) would alsoreducethewearandtear on bothpersonnel andequipment. Andseveral tasks likeordnance loading(for very strongbacks) and critical

movement pathsthroughtheshipforsupplies andpersonnel will beautomated. Thiswouldeliminatethemany “bucketbrigades” of sailorsmoving suppliesthrough thecorridors. There iseven someconsideration ofputting a “ski

jump” on the bowto enhance thelaunching of thenew generation ofcarrier aircraft,which mighteliminate the needforcatapults.45• MaterialsImprovements—Awidevarietyofnewmaterials are beingconsidered for

inclusion in theCVN-77 design.Heat-resistant silicatiles should allowthe jet blastdeflectors todispense with thetraditional water-cooling system. Anew lightweightblown fiber-opticallocal area network(LAN) cabling willincrease the speed

and capacity of theship’s data networkby up to 100,000times. Compositesfor interior andtopside structures(to reduce weight)andradar-absorbingmaterials (RAM—to assist insignaturereduction)willalsomaketheirdebut on CVN-77.Hull paints and

non-skid coatingswith vastlyexpanded servicelives (measured inyears instead ofmonths) are alsobeing developed,and all of thesesubstances will bemoreenvironmentally“friendly.” Finally,with an eye to thedayinthemiddleof

the 21st Centurywhen CVN-77 willitself go to thescrapyard,amastermaterial listwill beprepared, so thatwhoever takes itapart will knowwhat to be carefulwith. The Navy isstill havingnightmaresremoving asbestoslagging (insulation)

aboard ships builtbefore the EPAbanned the stuff.The mastermaterialslistshouldput an end to suchproblems.•Weapons—Whilethe Mk. 29 SeaSparrow launchersandMk.16Phalanxhave providedadequate pointdefense to past

Nimitz-classcarriers, it is likelythat CVN-77 willbe equipped withmore potentarmament.Following the leadforged by the newSan Antonio-class(LPD-17)amphibious dockships,CVN-77willprobably beequipped with

several clusters ofMk. 41 VLSsystems, suitablefor launching theEvolved SeaSparrow Missile(ESSM) that isbeing developed asa follow-on to theRIM-7M SeaSparrow SAM.Eacheight-cellMk.41 module (whichcan be clustered

with up to sevenadditional modulesto build a 64-cellmissile launcher)cancarryuptofourESSM rounds percell. Since theMk.41 launcher canalso launch otherweapons (like theBGM-109Tomahawk cruisemissile), you mightsee quite a few

VLS cells scatteredabout the deckedges of the CVN-77.Alsoexpectthatthree or four 21-round Mk. 49launchers for RIM-116 point defenseSAMswillbethereas well. RAM israpidly replacingthe old Mk. 1520mm PhalanxCIWSaboardNavy

warships, and it islikely that CVN-77will be equippedwithRAMfromthestart.• Data/ElectronicSystems—Thoughcomputer-basedsystems are usedaboardwarshipsforeverything frompropulsion controlto sending E-mailhome, warship

designers did notactually take thedigital revolutioninto account untilfairly recently. Thetechnology ofpersonalcomputers,networks, andworkstations hasmoved so quicklythat equipment andtechnologies inNAVSEA shipspecifications are

usually obsoletebefore they go outforcontract.NNSisthereforerecommending thatthe Navy “open”thespecificationforthedata, electronic,and electricalsystems to includewhat is known ascommercial, off-the-shelf (COTS)technologies,andto

specifyperformancebeyond anythingcurrently inproduction. Forexample, the fiberoptical LANcurrently installedin the USSGeorgeWashington (CVN-73) is a 10-BaseT/T-1-stylesystem, with data-transfer rates of

around tenmegabytes (MB)per second. For theCVN-77 design,NNS is thinkingabout a shipboardLAN with data-transfer rates in theterabit(TB—thatis,1,000,000MB)-per-second range.Though specifyinga LAN with acapacity 100,000

times greater thanthe one aboardships today maysound absurd, itmakesperfectsenseifyouconsider thatcomputer and LANtechnology isdoubling in speedand capacity everyeighteen months.By allowingcommercial-styleequipment and

software aboardship (such as usingWindows NT as ashipboard-wideoperating system),costs are reducedand the crew willbegivenequipmentthatisasuptodateas governmentprocurement canmake it. Finally,NNSwilltrytouseCOTS systems in

the futurewherevera military-specification,custom-builtelectronic systemmightbeusednow.• Zonal ElectricalDistributionSystems—Whilethecomputer/electronicsrevolution isgenerally a goodthing,youstillhave

to power all thisnew stuff.Unbelievable as itmayseem,allofthelaptop computers,televisions, VCRs,and personal stereoequipment aboardship are nowcausing significantelectrical problemsfor carriers. Eventhough a nuclearpower plant gives

you enoughelectrical power tolight a small city,you still have toeffectivelydistribute all thatpowertowhereitisrequired,when it isneeded, withoutoverloading thepower-distributionsystem. To do this,the Navy and NNSwanttoinstallwhat

is known as ZonalElectricalDistributionSystems.Usingthissystem, forexample, the ship’ssystems involvedwith daytimeoperations (inoffices and workspaces like laundryand galleyfacilities) can bepoweredwhen they

aremostactive,andisolated when theyare idle. ZonalDistribution willalso improvedamage-controlcapabilitiesbecauseof increasedsystemredundancy.•CommunicationsSystems—Eversince Desert Stormpointed out itsrelative isolation,

the USN has beentrying to catch upwith the otherservices incommunicationstechnology.Although theChallenge Athenasystem is a goodstart, it lacks boththe reliability andbandwidth (i.e.,data-flow capacity)to handle the

volume of datarequired in amajorwar. Further, theneed for additionalbandwidth,especially in thesatellitefrequencies, hasbeen growingalmostasfastasthespeedandpowerofcomputer/ LANtechnology.Therefore, CVN-77

will have acommunicationscapacity farbeyondthat of currentships. In particular,the new high-speedsatellite systemspreferred by theregionalCinCswillbe emphasized, aswellassecuredata-link systems fordistributiontootherships in the battle

group.One of several proposedNewport News Shipbuildingdesigns for CVN-77. Basedon a Nimitz-class (CVN-68)hullandpowerplant,thenewcarrier would incorporatestealth technology,aswellasa number of improvedoperatingfeatures.NEWPORT NEWSSHIPBUILDING

All of these features willmake CVN-77 the mostpowerful andcapable aircraftcarrier ever built. Though itwill be a Nimitz in the hulland propulsion systems, itwill be totally new in almostevery otherway.Though thescheduleforCVN-77isbasedupon funding dates that willbe controlled by a Presidentand Congress that have notyet been elected, currentplanshavetheshipfundedin

FY-2001, with delivery inFiscal Year 2008 (it isplanned to replaceUSSKittyHawk(CV-63)).The second element in the

Navy’s carrier productionplan is currently known asCVX (Aircraft Carrier—Experimental),whichwill betheleadshipofanewclassofcarriers, the first in almost ahalf century. The program,which will hopefully deliver

its first ship in FY-2013, isdesignedtoincorporateallofthe “bridge” technologiesfrom CVN-77, as well assome other improvementsthat will be possible becauseof the new hull and powerplant that will be part of thedesign. Some of these newfeatureswillinclude:

• Hull Design—The hull form ofthe CVX is still

understudy,thoughitwillprobablybeatraditionalmonohull design. Itis likely that theCVX will displacesomething morethan the 95,000tons of the Nimitz-classcarriers.Whatthe ship willactually look like,however, isanyone’sguess.

•Propulsion/PowerPlant—If there isany sticking pointin thedesignof theCVX-class carriers,it will be over thequestion of thepower plant.Though powerfularguments againstnuclear-poweredwarships remain,for all its vices

(such as cost andenvironmentalconcerns), nuclearpowerprovidesrealbenefits for thecaptains and crewsof aircraft carriers,and thismeans thatany change hadbetter offersignificantlygreaterbenefits.Inordertoresolve thisquestion, NNS has

been conducting apower plant studyfor CVX at theirCarrier InnovationCenter. There theyare looking at gasturbines, turbine-electric motors,marine diesels,fossil-fueledboilers,andnuclearpower as candidateCVX power plants.While the study is

still in the earlystages, don’t besurprised if nuclearpowerwindsupthewinner. Steamturbines are ahighlycompactandefficient means ofpowering largewarships, andnuclear reactors aremore compact andefficient thanboilers for

producing thatsteam.• Weapons-CVXwill probably havea mix of Mk. 41and 49 launchersvery like CVN-77’s. However,laser weaponry isadvancing so fastthat the first CVXorsomeofitssisterships may well beequipped with a

first-generationlaser CIWS. TheAir Force willdeploy a similarsystem aboard amodified Boeing747-400 in a fewyears, and ashipboard systemwould probably bea highly effectivecounter to the newgeneration ofsupersonic antiship

weaponsnowbeingdeployed aroundtheworld.• Catapults—Though for over ahalf century steamcatapults havebeensuccessfullyshootingaircraftoffcarriers, theynevertheless havesignificantdrawbacks.Foronething, the high-

pressuresteamlinesthat power thecatapults arecomplex and takeup a lot of internalvolume. Foranother, thesaturated steamtheycarryisviciousstuffifalinecracksor breaks or isdamaged.Finally,ifa leak develops orthe pressure is

incorrectly set,steamcatapultswilloccasionally “coldshoot” aircraft intothe water. All ofthese problemshave led toamajorCVX initiative toreplace the oldsteam units with acatapult usinganother technology.For instance, theelectromagnetic

technologythatwasto be used on therail guns beingdesigned for theStrategic DefenseInitiative back inthe 1980s mightwell work oncarriers. However,an internal-combustiontechnology lookslike a betterprospect. Here jet

fuelwouldpoweracontained fuel-airdetonation in apiston to fire theaircraft on its way.Internal-combustioncatapultsaresimpleand reliable inconcept, and coulduse the existing jetfuel system on theflightdeck.• Automated

WeaponsHandling—Sinceweapons stowage,movement,buildup,loading,andarmingeatupanenormousportion of acarrier’s personnel,a high priority inthe CVX design isto automate theweapons handlingand loading onfuture aircraft

carriers. One ideaalready underconsiderationinvolves using anunpowered, buthuman-controlled,bomb cart andloader that makesclever use ofcounterweights andlevers to uploadeven the largestpieces of Navyordnance. Other

ideas includeroboticinventory/handlingcontrol of weaponsinthemagazines.• AdvancedFlight/HangarDeckManagement—One of theNavy’s biggestchallenges is toimprove theefficiency ofoperations on the

flight and hangardecks. Specifically,theywanttoreducethe number ofpersonnel involvedinoperationsontheflight/hangar decks,to improve thequality of theworkenvironment,andtoincrease the rate ofsortie generationfor the embarkedair wing. Along

with the “pit stop”systemsplannedforuse on CVN-77,robotic servicingequipment willprobably be usedfor fueling, arming,aircrafthandling/positioning,and for monitoringsystems.

If the CVX-78 program

managestostayontrack, thefirst ship of the classwill becommissioned sometime in2013, and a second unit willprobablybeaddedtothefleetaboutfourorfiveyearslater.Beyond that, it’s anybody’sguess. We’re talking aboutaircraft carriers that will beoperating in a world fiftyyears from now. What willthe world and the militarybalance of 2050 look like? IwishIknew.Butifthepeople

at NNS and NAVSEA havedone their homework, thecarriers being built andplanned today will provideuseful platforms to base thecombat aircraft of tomorrowwellpastthehalfwaymarkofthe21stcentury.

ToolsoftheTrade:BirdsandBombs

OnedaywhenIwasayoungmanjustbeginning

todesignairplanes,thegreatpersonwhofoundedthecompanythatborehisname,DonaldDouglas,tookmeby

theshoulderandtaughtmealessonthatwassimple,thoughvitaltosuccess.Atthetime,wewere

tryingtogeneratebusinessfromtheU.S.Navy.“Navyplanestakeabeating,”hesaid.“Theyslamdownon

thecarrierswhentheylandandgetroughedupbytheunforgivingelementsofthehighseas.Ifwe

wanttheNavytobuyourairplanes,wemustbuildthemrugged.Theyhavetotakepunishmentandstill

work.”

AircraftDesign(EdHeinemann,1985)

It is a matter of historicalrecord that some things oncarrier aircraft are terriblysimple, and can’t be easilyreplaced. The Curtis biplane

that Eugene Ely first landedon the Pennsylvania in 1911was equipped with many ofthe same items used bymodern carrier aircraft. Inparticular, it had a smalltailhook and a beefed-up tailstructure so that the suddenshock of deceleration fromtheprimitivearrestingsystemwould not tear the aircraftapart.However,goodasthese“shade tree” solutions togetting on and off carriers

were, they were just a start.Future naval aircraft wouldhave even more systems toadapt them to the uniqueproblems and challenges ofthe ocean environment.Hardas it is on sailors and ships,theoceanisaterrorforpilotsand aircraft, and thechallenges it offers toairplane designers are unlikeanythingfoundonland.First andmostobviousare

theproblemsofmoistureandcorrosion,whichcan literallyeataplaneorhelicopterfromtheinsideout.Thentherearethe limitations of the ship’sconfinedspaces foroperatingand storing aircraft, and theneed to reduce the aircraft’s“footprint”whileontheflightdeck.Theseaircraftmustalsobeabletooperateinwhathasto be an “expeditionary”environment, where crewsmay lack the maintenance

and repair facilitiesof a landbase.Thenthereisthematterof assisting the aircraft intoand out of the air withoutdestroying them.And likeallmilitary aircraft, these flyingmachinesmust be capable ofcarrying useful payloads anadequate distance withacceptableperformanceandagoodsurvivalrate.With this inmind, it’s not

hard to understand why only

a handful of companiesworldwide have successfullybuilt aircraft for navalservice. Carrier aircraft areodd hybrids, combining thequalities of conventionalplanes that fly off concreterunways with the uniqueability to operate off theconfined spaces of warships.While naval aircraft performvirtuallyall themissions thatland-based aircraft do, theyarealsotaskedwithanumber

ofmissionsunique to theseaservices. For example, theU.S.AirForce(USAF) takesa well-deserved pride indropping laser-guided bombs(LGBs) down the center ofbuildings, but the U.S. Navyhas aircraft that can do thattoo. In addition, these sameNavy craft can huntsubmarines, defend shipsagainst missile attacks, andtransfer supplies betweenvessels. These are just some

of the many jobs unique tonaval aviation, and Navyaircraft have to be equippedto handle the fullest possiblerange of roles and missions.This has generally madenavalaircraftamongthemostcapable and flexible designsof their design generations.Perhaps the best example ofthis was the classic F-4PhantomII,whichservednotonly with the Navy andMarine Corps, but also the

USAF and over a dozenforeign countries. Suchdiversityandcapabilityisnoteasy, and it comes at a highprice.In general, naval aircraft

are both heavier and morecomplex than equivalentland-based craft. In an erawherethecostofnewaircraftisdirectlytiedtotheirweight,USN aircraft generally aremore expensive—which

usually means smallerproduction runs and higherfinancial and technical risksfor the manufacturers. Veryfew companies have beenable to meet all of thesechallenges and turn a profit.For decades, just a fewmanufacturers havedominated the Americannaval aviation scene.Airframes made byGrumman, McDonnellDouglas, and Sikorsky were

for many years all that youcould find on the decks ofU.S.carriers.Infact, therarebird from a company likeLockheed or GeneralDynamics (traditional USAFcontractors) was consideredan aberration, a sign that thefavored incumbent hadmadean error during the designcompetition. As a result,naval aircraft design grewinbredandlackedsomeoftheinnovationseeninland-based

designs. Back in the 1970’s,theNavywasfullybriefedonthe results of the USAF’sHaveBlueprogram.Thiswasthe flying prototype of the1970’s that led to thedevelopmentoftheLockheedF-117A Nighthawk stealthfighter.ButtheUSNchosetoignore thenewtechnology infavor of more conventionalaircraft—onlyoneexampleofsuch lost opportunities.Another lost chance came

when Texas Instrumentsbegan to develop its third-generation Paveway III LGBand the Navy stuck with theolder-generation Paveway II-seriesbombs.With just thesetwo decisions, the USNdenied itself the two mosteffectiveweaponsoftheGulfWar.By making a string of

similar decisions, navalaviation leadership fostereda

two-decade-long Dark Agethatdenied themsomeof thebest that modern aerospacetechnology had to offer. Theresult was the near-mortalwoundingofnavalaviationasa community in the early1990’s, just at the time thattheywerebeingforcedtofindnewroles,newmissions,andevennewenemiesinthepost-Cold War world. In an erawhen military power wasbecoming more “precision”

oriented, naval aviation stillvaluedhowwellapilotcoulddeliver a “stick” of unguidediron bombs. As of thiswriting, it has been overfifteen years since the Navyhas taken delivery of acompletely new tacticalaircraft for fleet use. Duringthatsameperiod,overahalf-dozen other major aircraftprogramshavebeencanceledor terminated. Desert Stormfound the fleet ill-equipped

for the first major post-ColdWar conflict, and the part itdid play was poorlypublicized to aworld hungryfor the high-tech images ofLGBs hitting their targetswitheye-splittingprecision.43

Even worse, following thePersianGulfwar, it began toappearthatthetopleadershipof U.S. naval aviation couldnot evenbuy the aircraft andweapons they would need to

fit into the new “littoralwarfare” strategyplanned forthe 21st century. There waseven an attempt by the topleaders of the USAF toreplacecarrieraviationwithaconcept called “VirtualPresence.” This was thenotion that long-rangebombers based in thecontinental U.S. and armedwithprecisionweaponscouldthreaten potential enemiesenough that forward-based

forces like carrier battlegroups would not benecessary.44 “Virtualpresence” was a nice idea,especially if you wanted tojustify the purchase ofadditionalB-2ASpirit stealthbombers. Unfortunately, itwas completely unrealistic ina world where “presence”really is the sight of a gray-paintedUSNshipnearwherea crisis is breaking. Clearly,

naval aviation had to “getwell”sothatitcouldfulfillitsessential task in the nationalsecurityoftheU.S.

AllFallDown:NavalAviationinthe1980s

Earlier(seethethirdchapter),we saw how the culture ofnaval aviators has been

forcedtodealwithchangesinthesocietyof thenation theyserve. Unfortunately, therewas more than just a moraleproblem to be dealt with.Material problems were alsoattheheartofthequestioningof the credibility of navalaviation by the nationalleadership. Not that thesewere new problems—theyfirststartedovertwodecadesago. Naval aviation’sdownward slide really began

back in the 1970s, when theadministration of PresidentJimmy Carter cut off thefunds for services toupgradetheir equipment, an actionthat was coupled with analmost complete moratoriumonthebuyingofreplacementweapons and spare parts foraircraft. Carriers frequentlywent on cruises short ofairplanes with only partiallyfilled magazines, requiringthe“cross-decking”ofplanes,

munitions, and equipmentfrom ships headed home.Naval aviation was beingforced to eat its “seed corn”to fulfill the missions it hadbeen assigned. Though theCarter Administration dideventually reversepolicyandspend some badly neededfundsonprocurement for thesea services, by then it wastoo late. The damage hadbeendone.

ThenextAdministration—that of President RonaldReagan and his Secretary ofthe Navy, John Lehman—attempted to rebuild navalaviation in the 1980’s.Lehman was a smart,energetic man, with a strongsense of purpose. But hecould not instantly doeverything that needed to bedone, so priorities had to beset.Hisvisionofa“600ShipNavy,” for example, meant

that since naval vessels hadthelongestprocurementtime,the largest portion of earlyfundsfromthehugeReagan-era defense expenditureswould have to go intoshipbuilding. He did findfunds to replenish theweapons and spare partsinventories, however, andwithin a few years, theexisting aircraft fleet wasflying and healthy. But thequestion of how to build the

right mix of aircraft inadequate numbers was aproblemthatwoulddefyevenSecretary Lehman’sformidable powers oforganization, persuasion, andinfluence. Under his “600Ship” plan, the numbers ofcarriers and air wings(CVWs)weretobeexpandedand updated.An active forceof fifteen carriers would bebuilt up,with fourteen activeandtworeserveCVWstofill

theirdecks.Toprovide some“depth” to the force, thereserve CVWs would begiven new aircraft, so theywouldhavethesamemakeupand equipment as the activeunits.Unfortunately this plan

contained the seeds of adisaster. The basic problemwas airframes—or morespecifically, the shortage ofthem. Because of financial

constraints, theNavyhadnotboughtenoughaircraft in the1970’s to flesh out sixteenCVWs. Furthermore, the seaserviceswerealreadyheavilycommittedtothereplacementoftheirforceofF-4Phantomfighters and A-7 Corsair IIattack jetswith thenewF/A-18 Hornet. Normally, theNavy tries to stagger suchbuys,sothatonlyoneortwoaircraft types are beingmodernized at any given

time. Now, however,Secretary Lehman was facedwith buying or updatingeveryaircrafttypeinthefleetvirtually simultaneously.Eitherway,thecostwouldbeastronomical.During this same time, the

SovietUnion, under the newleadership of MikhailGorbachev,wasnotquite the“evil empire” it had beenunderKhrushchev,Brezhnev,

and Andropov. Meanwhile,the growing federal budgetdeficits began to take theirtollonthedefensebudget.Ata time when the Navy’sbudget needed to beincreasing, the decline of theSoviet Empire and growingdomestic problems at homemade a continued armsbuildup seem unnecessary,andsotheNavywasnotableto obtain the funding itneeded.

When John Lehman leftthe Administration in 1986for a career in the privatesector, the budget forprocuring new aircraft wasalready being slashed. Farfrom building sixteen fullystocked CVWs, the Navy’sfocus now became buildingjust one new type of aircraftfor the 1990s. That oneairplane, the A-12 AvengerII, came close to destroyingnaval aviation. Few people

outsidethemilitaryareawareoftheA-12program.Thoughnot actually a “black”program, the shadow ofsecrecy that shrouded it wasat least charcoal gray.45 TheA-12wasdesignedtoreplacetheagingfleetofA-6Intruderall-weather attack bombers,but the exact roots of theaircraft are still somethingofa mystery, though somedetailshavecometolight.

Backinthe1980s,thefirstmajor arms reduction accordsigned between the Reaganand Gorbachev governmentswas a controversialagreement known as theIntermediate Nuclear Forces(INF) treaty. The INF treatycompletelyeliminatedseveralwhole classes of land-basednuclear weapons, andseverely restricted others.Under this agreement, bothsides would remove land-

based nuclear missiles basedin Europe, and aircraftcapable of nuclear weaponsdeliverywouldbelimitedandmonitored. This was asignificant reduction intheater nuclear stockpiles,and at least gave theappearance of a reducedthreat of regional conflict.Theappearancewasnotquitethe reality, however, becausebothsideswantedtomaintainas large a regional nuclear

stockpile as possible. Asmightbeimagined,bothsidesbeganlookingforloopholes.U.S. defense planners

immediatelynoticed thatsea-basednuclear-capableaircraftand cruise missiles were notcounted or monitored underthe INF accord—whichmeant that the existing fleetof A-6’s and F/A-18’s couldimmediately provide aninterim replacement for the

lost nuclear missile fleet. Asgood as that was, it wasn’tgood enough. What thenuclear planners reallywanted was a carrier aircraftthat would hold even the“hardest”targetsintheSovietUnion and Warsaw Pactcountries “at risk,” and thatwoulddoitwithimpunity.The Navy was thus

directedbytheDepartmentofDefense (DoD) to develop

such an aircraft. The DoDwanted an aircraft that couldreplace a variety of attackbombers, including the A-6Intruder,F-111Aardvark,andevenneweraircraftliketheF-117A Nighthawk and F-15EStrike Eagle. The programwould be developed in totalsecrecy, and would takeadvantage of the newtechnology of passiveelectromagneticstealth,muchliketheF-117Nighthawkand

the B-2A Spirit. It wouldcarry a two-man crew, havethe same levels of stealth asthe B-2A, and carry a newgeneration of precisionmunitions (some possiblywith nuclear warheads)guided by the newNAVISTAR GlobalPositioning System (GPS).Planshadthefirstunitsbeingassigned to the Navy andMarine Corps, with the AirForce getting their A-12’s

laterintheproductionrun.The Navy had problems

with the A-12 from the verystart. First, thanks to its lackof interest in the Have Blueprogram,theNavyknewverylittle about stealth—aproblem that was magnifiedby the strange rules of“Black” programs, whichrequired them to almostreinvent the technology fromscratch. USAF contractors

were not allowed to transfertheir experience with the F-117andB-2programs to theNavy and to potentialcontractors for the A-12.Even companies likeLockheedandNorthrop,whoalready had stealthexperience, were restrictedfrom transferring theircorporate knowledge to theirown teams developing A-12proposals. Furthermore, theNavy program management

lackedexperience in takingasmall “Black” researchproject and turning it into alarge, multi-billion-dollarproduction program. Fromthe beginning, progress wasslowandcostswerehigh.The winning entry in the

A-12 competition came fromthe GeneralDynamics/McDonnellDouglas team, utilizing astrange-looking design that

had been under developmentby General Dynamics since1975. Because of itstriangular flying-wing shape,it was quickly nicknamed“the flying Dorito.”DesignatedtheA-12AvengerII (after the famous WorldWar II torpedo bomber), itwas designed to carry up to10,000 lb/4,535 kg ofordnance in internalweaponsbays. It alsowould have hadenough unrefueled range to

hit targets in Eastern Europeif launched from a carrier inthe Mediterranean Sea.Unfortunately, the A-12would never make it off theshop floor, much less onto acarrierdeck.From the start of theA-12

engineering anddevelopmenteffort, there weredisagreements between theNavy programmanagers andthe contractor team over a

number of issues. The planewastooheavy,foronething,and there were difficultiescreatingthecompositelayupsthat made up the A-12’sstructure. Costs escalatedrapidly. While the Navy hasnever officiallyacknowledgedthis,itappearsthat every othermajorNavalaircraft program was eithercanceled or restructured inorder to siphonmoney to thetroubled A-12. What is

knownisthatduringthetimewhen theA-12was sufferingits most seriousdevelopmental problems, theupgradedversionsoftheF-14Tomcat fighter and A-6attack bomberwere canceledoutright, and several otherprograms took severe budgethits.Thesituationreachedthecritical point in 1990, whenthe A-12 and a number ofothermajoraircraftprogramswere publicly reviewed in

light of the recent fall ofCommunism in EasternEurope. By this time theAvenger programwas a yearlate and perhaps a billiondollarsoverbudget.Evenso,in hismajor aircraft programreview presentation toCongress, then-Secretary ofDefense Dick Cheneydeclared the A-12 to be a“model”program.Nine months later, he

radically changed his tune.Though what the DoD andNavy were thinking at thistime remains something of amystery, the pendingcommitment of an additionalhalf-billion dollars to the A-12 program certainly hadmuchtodowiththedecision.Whatever the reason,SecretaryCheneyorderedtheprogram canceled in Januaryof 1991, just as the DesertStorm air campaign was

gettingunderway.Sosuddenwas this action that severalthousand General Dynamicsand McDonnell Douglasemployees were simply toldto put down their work andgo home. All told, the Navyhadspentsomethinglike$3.8billion, and did not have asingle plane to show for it.46Even worse was the totalwrecking of the Navy’saircraft acquisition plan,

whichhadseensomanyothernew aircraft programscanceled to support the A-12.47

A depiction of the proposedA-12 Avenger stealth attackbomber. This aircraftprogram was canceled in1991 as a result of costoverruns and technical/managementproblems.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTO

Itdidnot take longfor thefleet to begin suffering theconsequences of the A-12debacle. The Navy tried tomake a fresh start with aprogram called A/FX(Attack/Fighter,Experimental), which wasdesigned to replace the A- 6and the F-14 fleets, both ofwhich were aging rapidly.A/FX would have made use

of the systems developed forthe A-12, but would notattempttoachievethelevelofstealth planned for theAvenger. Unfortunately, inthetightbudgetclimateoftheearly 1990’s, there was littlesupport or money for theA/FX program, and it diedbefore a prime contractorteam was selected. Anotherblow to the naval aviationcommunity came at thebeginning of the Clinton

Administration, whenSecretary of Defense LesAspin, as a cost-cuttingmeasure, decided toprematurely retire the entirefleet of A-6E/ KA-6DIntruder attack/refuelingaircraft.51Withinmonths,theentire medium-attackcommunity was wiped out,leaving the F/A-18 as theNavy’s only strike aircraft,and only a single high-

performance Naval aircraftwas in development: anevolved/growthversionoftheHornet.Withnothingelseonthe horizon, Naval aviationwas going to have to bet thefarmonamachinecalled theF/A-18E/FSuperHornet.

NewParadigms:TheRoadBack

By late 1995, naval aviationhadhit rockbottom.Militaryanalysts were beginning tobelieve that the Navy hadforgottenhowtodevelopandbuy new weapons andaircraft. In fact, many werequestioning if the NavyshouldlettheUSAFbuytheiraircraft,sincetheyseemedsomuch better at it. The realdoomsayers were projectingthe end of naval aviation aswe know it sometime in the

early 21st century, when theexisting aircraft would wearout and have to be retired.But these people did notknow the true character ofnaval aviation leadership.Though the Navy’s aviationproblems were deadlyserious, in 1996 navalaviation took the first stepstoward putting itself back onahealthycourse.Even before he became

Chief of Naval Operations,Admiral Jay Johnson wasalready working toward thisgoal.Hestartedbyappointingtwo of his most trustedofficers, Rear AdmiralsDennisMcGinnand“Carlos”Johnson (no relation to theCNO), to key leadershippositions as the heads ofNAVAIR and the NavalAviation Office in thePentagon known as N88.Soon they started to shake

things up. They began topromote a new vision fornaval aviation, in directsupport of the Navy’s“Forward from the Sea”doctrine, and to develop arealistic long-range plan forupgradingNavalaviationanddeveloping new capabilities.The two men also saw theneedtoputafewgoodnavalaviators in key positionswithin the Pentagon so thatthe procurement program

problems of the past wouldnot be repeated. They knewthat people with real talentwouldneed to be in someofthekey staff jobs to helpgetnewideasintonavalaviation.As a consequence of this

kind of thinking, the NavyStrike Warfare Directorate(N880—the group thatdefines future specificationsandcapabilitiesfornewnavalaircraftandweaponssystems)

came under the inspiredleadership of a talented F/A-18 Hornet driver, CaptainChuck Nash. While heprobablycouldhavegoneonto command his own CVW,he chose the good of theservice over his ownambitions,andtookchargeofN880inthePentagon.It was Chuck Nash who

really started to shake thingsupfornavalaviationin1996.

Underhis leadership,supportfromthefleetwasfocusedonthe new Super Hornet, in aneffort to ensure that therewould be at least one newairframetoanchorthecarrierair wings of the early 21stcentury.

Storm aircampaign wasthe A-6EIntruder. Itcould operate

at night,deliver LGBsand otherPGMs, andhad enoughfuel capacityto minimizethe impactupon thelimited tankerresources ofthe Alliedcoalition.

At the same time, Nashincreased Navy support forother developmental aircraftprograms like the V-22Osprey and Joint StrikeFighter (JSF), as well as anew Common SupportAircraft (CSA) to replace theS-3 Viking, E-2 Hawkeye,and C-2 Greyhoundairframes.To shore up the existing

force of carrier aircraft, he

helped start a program toequip the fleet of F-14Tomcat interceptors with thesame AAQ-14 LANTIRNtargeting pod used on theUSAF F-15E Strike Eagle.LANTIRN pods allowTomcats to carry outprecision strikes with LGBsand other weapons ashore, acompletely new mission forthem. In order to arm theTomcats, the Navy wasdirectedtoprocureastockof

highly accurate Paveway III-SERIESLGBs,aswellasthedeadly BLU-109/I-2000penetratingwarheads.Nash’soffice also began to contractfor modifications to existingprecision weapons like theAGM-84E SLAM, so thattheir range, lethality, andservicelivesmightbefurtherextended.Finally, N880 took a

leadership position with the

other services on a newgeneration of precision-strikeweapons. These would beguidedtotheirtargetsbyGPSnavigation systems, and thengivenfinalguidancebyanewfamily of self-locking, all-weatherseekersystems.By the time he retired in

early 1998, Chuck Nash haddonemoreforNavalaviationas a captain than mostadmirals. As a result of the

programs inspired by thelikes of Jay Johnson, DennisMcGinn, “Carlos” Johnson,Chuck Nash, and manyothers,thereisnowrealhopeanddriveinnavalaviation.Anew air wing structure hasbeen defined, and plans foraircraft procurement are nowclear for the next quartercentury.Today the climate in the

fleet and naval aviation

program offices is verydifferent. Much like theircounterpartsatNAVSEA,theleaders at the Naval AirSystems Command(NAVAIR) are now lookingtoward the future rather thanback toward the past. Theirgoalistoproducetheaircraftandweapons thatwill flyoffthenewgenerationofcarriersthat are due in themiddle oftheseconddecadeofthenextcentury.Forthefirsttimeina

generation, Naval aviationleadersarenotcontent torunprograms and buy updatedversions of old aircraft andweapons. Naval aviation’svision is now on the cuttingedgeofweaponstechnology.Tothisend,anewaircraft,

theF/A-18E/FSuperHornet,is being tested and headedinto the fleet, while existingaircraftliketheF-14Tomcat,EA-6B Prowler, and S-3B

Vikinghavebeenmodifiedtotake on new roles andmissions. These will helpmaintain the credibility ofnaval aviation until the newaircraft types arrive in a fewyears. New weapons, withgreater precision and utilitythan those used in DesertStorm, are on their way aswell. The sea services, alongwiththeotherbranchesoftheU.S.military,areintheearlystages of developing the

replacement for today’saircraft through the new JSFprogram. There are evenvisionary studies for the firstgeneration of UnmannedAerial Combat Vehicles(UCAVs), which will likelybeseenintentotwentyyears.What a difference just a fewyearsmake!

AnF-14TomcatdeliveringaGBU-24 Paveway III laser-guided bomb during tests.The addition of new air-to-ground strike systems haveturned the Tomcat into apotentfighterbomber.RAYTHEON STRIKESYSTEMS

ThePlan:NavalAviationinthe21st

Century

Theplanfornavalaviationasitheads into the21stcenturyis designed to take carrieraviation from the currentpost-Cold War CVWstructure to one that reflectsthe perceived needs of theNavy in 2015. To do this,

NAVAIR has put together athree-stage program ofprocurement andreorganization that reliesheavilyon the successof thepast—and that learns fromthemistakes thatweremade.Back in the early1970’s, theso-called “CV Air Wing”organization was created toreducethenumberofcarriersand air groups in the fleet.ThistypeofCVWwasanall-purposeunit,withcapabilities

in antiair warfare (AAW),antisubmarine warfare(ASW), antisurface warfare(ASUW),and landattack. Itsstructureislaidoutbelow:

Aircraft parked on the busyflight deck of the USSGeorge Washington (CVN-73). Efficient deck handling

ofaircraftcanmakeorbreakthedailyairtaskingorderofabattlegroup.JOHND.GRESHAM

As the table shows, the“CV”airwinghadaprimaryemphasis on defense againstair and submarine attack. It

could also dish out a greatdeal of punishment againstenemy naval forces, thoughits ability to strike landtargets was more limited. Itwas this air wing structurethat John Lehman tried toflesh out with his aircraftprocurement plan in the1980’s. But because of thefallout from theA-12 fiasco,the aircraft necessary to fillout sixteen such units wereneverpurchased,andthefleet

made frequent draws onMarine F/A-18 Hornet andEA-6B Prowler squadrons inorder to sustain the heavydeployment schedule of thelateColdWaryears.After the end of the Cold

War, the following air wingorganizationwascreated,andis in use today around thefleet:

This CVW structurereflectsanumberof realities,mostimportantlythefactthatthere will only be elevenCVWs (ten active-duty and

one reserve) for twelvecarriers, greatly reducing thenumber of new aircraftrequired to sustain carrieraviationintothe21stcentury.Also,this1990’sCVWhasanew orientation: to projectprecision-strikingpowerontotargets ashore. Both the F-14’s and F/A-18’s areequipped with precision-targeting and reconnaissancesystems, as well as a widevariety of Desert Storm-era

PGMs. All of these systemsgive the new CVWs muchmore punch than before, andwhile the number offighter/attack aircraft hasbeen greatly reduced, thisnew air wing actually canstrike twice the number ofprecision targets that a ColdWar CVW could hit. It willacquire even greater powerwhen the new generation ofGPS-guided PGMs arrivesoverthenextfewyears.

The next big move willoccurintheearlyyearsofthe21 st century. Startingsomewhere around 2001, theNavy will commission itsfirstcombatsquadronofF/A-18E/F Super Hornets,replacing the F-14 Tomcatsquadron in CVWs. TheNavy will then be able torapidly retire the elderly F-14As, someofwhichwill beover three decades old whenthey head to the boneyard.

During this same period, theSH-60B/F and HH-60G fleetwillberemanufacturedintoacommonvariantknownastheSH-60R.The survivingH-60airframes will then beconsolidated into a singleversion that can be usedeither on carriers or escorts.The Navy will also buy anumber of CH-60 airframes,whichwilltakeoverfromtheoldUH-46SeaKnight in theVertical Replenishment

(VERTREP) mission aboardsupply ships, as well as thespecial operations/combatsearch and rescue(SO/CSAR) mission of theHH-60G.Despite all these changes,

thedominantairframeof thisair wing will continue to belate-model F/A-18C Hornets,which will soldier on wellinto the 21st century. Withthese changes, the typical

CVW of 2001 to 2015 willprobablylooklikethis:

Again, the key attribute ofthis CVW will be strikingpower against land-basedprecision targets. However,

withanewgenerationofself-designating, GPS/INS-guidedPGMs, itwillbeable todishout truly devastating damageto targets afloat or ashore,and in almost any kind ofweather.Thefinalstep in theCVW

modernization plan is shownbelow, and will begin toappeararound2011:

This is an air wing that isalmost entirely composed ofaircraftthatnowexistonlyonpaper.Evenso, ithasseveralclear advantages over earlierCVW structures, includingthe fact that this projectedCVW has just four basicairframes: the JSF, F/A-18E/F, the CSA, and H-60.This means lower operatingandmaintenancecostsaswellasasimplerlogisticschain.ItwillalsohavetheNavy’sfirst

true stealth strike fighter (theJSF), a new EW/ SEADaircraft(theproposedEF-18FElectric Hornet), as well asnew sea control, ESM, andAEWaircraftbasedupon thenew CSA airframe. Thislikely will be what will goaboardthenewCVXwhenitis commissioned around2015.OnceallelevenCVWshave their first squadron ofJSFs, the Super Hornets willbegin to be retired, and

eventually there will be fourJSF squadrons aboard eachcarrierwithtenaircrafteach.None of this will come

cheaply or overnight. Justmaintaining the existing fleetof aircraft is expensive, andbuying something like twothousand new F/A-18E/FSuper Hornets, JSFs, CSAderivatives, and any othermajor airframe that comesalong will cost between $20

and $30 billion. And that’swithout even beginning toaddress the spare parts,engines, weapons, and othernecessities that these aircraftwill consume in theiroperational lifetimes.Meanwhile, naval aviatorswill continue to fly theaircraft they’ve flown formost of their careers. Thedesignsofnota fewof theseaircraft, in fact, date frombefore many of the men and

women who fly them wereborn.

NorthropGrummanF-14Tomcat:Kingof

theAirWing

You always know when youseeanF-14Tomcatthatitisafighter. It is a big, noisy,

powerfulbruteofanairplanethat lacks any pretense ofstealth or subtlety. For overtwodecades,theF-14Tomcathas been the king ofAmericancarrierflightdecks,yet only recently has itrealized its full combatpotential.Itisalsooneofthemost difficult and dangerousof Naval aircraft. As theplane that Tom Cruise“piloted” in the movie TopGun, it has become the

symbol of naval aviation inAmerican popular culture.More tellingly, to date theTomcat has a perfect air-to-aircombatrecord.Nowinthetwilightofitscareer,theF-14isbeingaskedtobuytimeforthe rest of naval aviation togetitscollectiveacttogether.TheoriginsoftheF-14lay

back in the 1950’s whenAmerican intelligenceagencies identifiedagrowing

familyofSoviet air-launchedcruise missiles as a potentialthreat to NATO fleet units.Carriedtotheir launchpointsby heavy bombers, aircraftlike theTu-16BadgerorTu-95 Bear, they could belaunched well outside therange of enemy SAMs andantiaircraft (AAA) guns.Designated by NATOintelligence analysts as AS-1“Kennel,” AS-2 “Kipper,”AS-3 “Kangaroo,” AS-4

“Kitchen,” AS-5 “Kelt,” andAS-6 “Kingfish,” these long-ranged,radar-guidedpilotlessjet- or rocket-poweredweapons packed enormousship-killing power. Armedwith 1,000-kg/ 2,200-lbwarheads (or high-yieldnuclearwarheads), theywerecapable of destroying adestroyer or frigate with asingle hit. By way ofcomparison, the single AM-39 Exocet air-to-surface

missile (ASM) that sank theBritish guided-missiledestroyer HMS Sheffield (D80) in 1982 had a warheadjustonetenththatsize.Sincea single large bomber mightcarry two or three suchmonsterASMs,findingawayto defend the fleet againstthem became a high-levelpriority.Experience in World War

IIagainstJapaneseKamikaze

planes (which wereessentially manned ASMs)showed that the best way toprotect a fleet was to shootdown the missile-carryingenemy bombers before theycould launch their missiles.Thus the response to theASM threat was theaccelerated development ofextremely long-range air-to-air missiles (AAMs), whichcould maintain an outer ringin a layered defense system.

Any missiles that “leaked”through the outer ringwouldthen face an inner barrier ofpatrolling fighters, ship-launched SAMs, and point-defense missiles launchedfrom surface ships. Thiswassupposed to be the U.S.strategy until the end of theCold War—a scheme thatenvisioned an extremelyhigh-performance, long-ranged AAM that could becarried by a relatively slow

but long-endurance carrieraircraft, the Douglas F6DMissileer. The Missileerwould have carried eightlong-range Bendix EagleAAMs, along with powerfulairborne radar. The F6DswouldhaveactedasairborneSAM sites, and would havebeen placed hundreds ofmilesaheadofacarriergroupto intercept incomingbombers. However, fiscalrealities now began to effect

theNavy’splans.The F6D program was

canceled in December 1960,mostly due to the fact that itwas a single-mission aircraftonly for fleet air defense.Even so, the Eagle missilewaseventually resurrectedastheHughesAIM-54Phoenix,which today iscarriedby theF-14. Already strapped forfunds, theNavy decided thatits next fighter shoulddo the

job of the F6D, as well asprovide air superiority andother missions. Then high-level politics stepped in. Inthe early 1960’s, then-Secretary of Defense RobertMacNamara, frustrated byseemingly endless inter-service rivalries and hopingto savemoney, tried to forcethe Air Force and Navy toprocure common types ofaircraft. Out of this dreamcame the TFX (Tactical

Fighter, Experimental)program—which became theAir Force’s F-111 swing-wing bomber. To meet itsfighter missions, the Navywas directed to develop avariant of the F-111 thatwould be suitable for carrieroperations. It was expectedthat it would accomplish itsfleet air defense and air-superiority missions with theplanned F-111B, whichwouldreplace theclassicF-4

PhantomII.The problem was that the

“navalized” F-111B (whichwas built by Grumman inpartnership with GeneralDynamics,theUSAF“prime”contractor) was just tooheavy, fragile, and complexfor carrier operations, and itslanding speed was too highforasafelandingonacarrierdeck. Furthermore, the F-111B, with little

maneuverability and thrustfrom itsoverworkedengines,was not much of a fighter.For all of these reasons, theNavy rejected the F-111B,and the program wasscrapped, though notwithoutafight.Inthosedays,onedidnot go against a man aspowerful as SecretaryMacNamarawithoutpayingaprice. The Navy paid inblood. Inascenereminiscentof the 1940’s “Revolt of the

Admirals” a generationearlier,aseniornavalaviator,RearAdmiralTom“Tomcat”Connelly, sacrificed his owncareer by standing up toMacNamarainCongressionaltestimony.He stated flatly inan open session, “Senator,there is not enough thrust inallofChristendomtomakeafighter out of the F-111!”With this legendary remark,theF-111Bdied,andtheF-14Tomcatwasborn.

Politics aside, the NavystillhadtheproblemofthoseSoviet ASM armed bomberstodealwith.Asiftoamplifythe problem further, theRussianshaddeployedanewsupersonic swing-wingbomberinthelate1960sthatcaused a near panic inU.S./NATOdefenseplanners:the Tu-22M Backfire. Theeventual answer to theNavy’sproblemcameafter aseries of fighter studies

funded by the Navy and runby Grumman. The plan wasto wrap a completely new,state-of-the-art airframearound the basic avionics,weapons, and propulsionpackage that had beenintended for the F-111B(including the Phoenixmissilesystem),and thenruna series of productimprovements upon the newbird. One of the aircraft’smost notable features would

be a variable geometry“swing-wing” design thatwould allow it to “redesign”itselfinflight.Forgoodslow-speed performance duringlanding and cruise the wingswouldbesetforward,andbeswept back for supersonicdashes.Itwasanambitiousdesign

for the late 1960s. The newfighter would not only carryuptosixofthemassiveAIM-

54 Phoenix missiles and theAWG-9 radar to guide them,butitwouldalsobeasuperbdogfighter.InVietnamtheF-4 Phantom II had severeshortcomings during close-inair-to-air engagements. ThePhantoms weren’t verymaneuverable, were easy tosee(bothbigandsmoky),anddidn’t havemuch range. Thenew fighter would be verydifferent.

The Request for Proposalswent out in 1968, and anumber of airframemanufacturers submittedresponses to build the newbird. However, with theirfighter study and F-111Bexperience, Grumman had aclearedge,andearly in1969theywonthecontracttobuildwhat would become knownas the F-14. Quickly,Grumman got to work andbegan to cut metal, and the

new bird rapidly cametogether. The first flight oftheF-14Aprototypeoccurredalmost a month ahead ofschedule, on December 21st,1970, at Grumman’sCalverton plant on LongIsland. Though three of thepreproduction aircraft werelost in testing (including theprototype on its secondflight), the programprogressed well. The newfighter moved along on

schedule, with the first twofleet squadrons, VF-1 (the“Wolfpack”) and VF-2 (the“Bounty Hunters”), standingup in 1974. In honor ofAdmiralConnelly’sroleinitscreation, theNavynamedthenewbirdthe“Tomcat.”48

The Tomcat is a two-seat,twin-engined fighter thatmeasures 62 feet, 8inches/19.1 meters in length.Its height to the tip of the

vertical stabilizer is 16feet/4.88 meters. Themaximum wingspan is 64feet, 1.5 inches/19.54 metersataminimumsweepangleof20°. Minimum wingspan inflight is 38 feet, 2.5inches/11.65 meters at amaximum flight sweep angleof 68°. For storage in thecrampedconfinesoftheflighthangar decks, the wings can“oversweep” (only on deckfor stowage) to an angle of

75°, overlapping thehorizontal tail surfaces andreducing the span to only 33feet,3.5inches/10.15meters.The Tomcat’s empty weightis40,150lb/18,212kg,withamaximum takeoff weight of74,500 lb/33,793 kg. The F-14 is by far the heaviestaircraft flying on and off acarrier these days. You canactuallyfeelanaircraftcarriershudder whenever one iscatapultedoff.

The famous Grumman“Iron Works” has a well-earned reputation forproducing the most durableand robust aircraft in theworld. Much of the plane’sstructure, including thecritical “wing box”(containing the swing-wingmechanism), is made oftitanium, ametal lighter thanaluminum, stronger thansteel,andnotoriouslydifficultto weld. The Tomcat’s

horizontal tail surfaces werebuilt from boron-epoxycomposite—averycostlyandadvanced material that wasusedfor thefirst timeonanyaircraft.The F-14 is the Navy’s

only “variable geometry”aircraft, a trait it inheritedfrom its predecessor, the F-111B. While complex, theswing wing was a validengineering solution to a

difficult design problem fortheNavy.TheF-14hadtobeboth a long-range interceptorthat could “loiter” (fly slowand wait) and a high-performance fighter for air-superiority missions. If oneaircraft was to do both jobsand still be capable ofoperatingoffaircraftcarriers,it had to be able to literally“redesign” itself in flight.Thiswasthejoboftheswingwing. The Tomcat’s wings

sweep forward for increasedlift in low-speed flight,particularly the criticaltakeoffandlandingphasesofa carrier-based mission, butwhen the wings sweep backfor reduced drag at highspeed,theF-14canmovelikeascaldedcat.Unlike other variable-

geometry aircraft like the F-111AardvarkandMiG-23/27Flogger, the F-14’s wing

sweep is controlledautomatically by a computerknown as the “Mach SweepProgrammer.” This meansthatthepilotdoesnothavetoworry about it—the planedynamically reconfiguresitself from moment tomoment for the optimumsolution to the complexequations governing lift anddrag.Thewingsthenpivotonimmensely strong bearings,moved by jackscrews driven

by powerful hydraulicmotors,givingtheflightcrewthebestpossible“design”foranysituationtheyarein.Theresult is an aircraft that isalways being optimized,whether it is making a low-level, high-speedreconnaissance dash, ordigging into a cornering turnpulling “lead” on an enemyfighter.Alongwiththeswingwings, the F-14’s engineersmanagedtoprovidetheflight

crew with a full array ofcontrol surfaces, includingfull-span flaps along thetrailing edge, leading edgeslats, and spoilers on theupper surface of the wings.Thespeedbrakeispositionedfar aft, between the twinvertical stabilizers. In fact, itwas the seemingly randommovement of these surfacesthat caused Landing SignalsOfficers(LSOs)todubtheF-14“theTurkey”duringtests.

Visually, the F-14 is animposingaircraft.Thetopsideof the Tomcat’s forwardfuselageandtwohugeenginepods blend into a flatstructure called the“pancake,” which supportsthe tail surfaces and thetailhook.Thepancakeitselfisa formof “liftingbody,” andprovidesasignificantamountoftheaircraft’stotallift.Thelarge canopy offers superball-around visibility—a great

improvement over previousNavy fighters like the F-4Phantom,whichhadadeadlyblind spot to the rear. Thiswasoneofthedesigncriteriathathelpedmake theTomcatamuchbetterdogfighterthanthe F-4, or the MiGs that itwas designed to kill. Thetwo-person flight crew (apilot and Radar InterceptOfficer or “RIO”) enters thecockpit using a retractableboarding ladder and cleverly

designed “kick-in” steps.Both positions have Martin-Baker “zero-zero” ejectionseats, meaning that they canactually save an air crew iftheaircraftissittingstill(zerospeed) on the ground (zeroaltitude). Three rearviewmirrorsarepositionedaroundthe canopy frame to help thepilotwithrearvisibility.The design of the pilot’s

station was quite advanced

for theearly1970’s,withthemost important data beingdisplayed on an integrated“Air Combat Maneuveringpanel.”TheTomcatwasalsoequipped with the Navy’sfirst heads-up display (HUD)projected into the pilot’sforwardfieldofview,andthefirst use of the “Hands-on-Throttle-and-Stick”(HOTAS)in the cockpit. The controlstickandthrottlesarestuddedwith buttons that govern

weapon selection, radarmodes, and other functions.HOTASallowspilotstokeeptheireyesoutside thecockpitduringadogfight.Therestofthe cockpit is not soadvanced.SincetheF-14wasdesigned a decade ahead of“glass cockpit” aircraft (likethe F/A-18 Hornet), most ofthe control panels aretraditional dial-type “steamgauge” indicators. UnlikeUSAF fighters, though, the

RIO’s backseat position doesnot provide flight controls(unlessyoucounttheejectionseat).Alargecirculardisplayscreen—the TacticalInformation Display—dominatestheRIO’sposition,with a smaller Detail DataDisplaypanelaboveit.Theseprovide readouts for theAWG-9 radar/ fire controlsystem, as well as weaponscontrol. Again, circular“steamgauges” dominate the

RIO’scockpit.When they arrived upon

theaviationscene, thesensorand weapons systems of theTomcat were a revolution.49The heart of the F-14weapons system (in the -Aand -B models) is theRaytheon-Hughes AirborneWeapons GroupModel Nine(AWG-9)fire-controlsystem.Composedofpowerful radar,weapons-computer, signal-

processor, and othercomponents, the AWG- 9made the F-14 the mostpowerfulfighterintheworld.Unfortunately, it never reallygot a chance to show itsawesome capability incombat. Designed for theextremely long-range,multiple-target engagementsthat were projected for theCold War at sea, the F-14spentagenerationwaitingforabattle thatnevercame.The

AWG-9 requirement was tosimultaneously track up totwodozenairbornetargets(inan environment that mighthave hundreds), whileactually engaging (that’sNavy for “shooting”) six ofthem at once. The actualtracking ranges againstvarious-sized targets arehighly classified, but theAWG-9hasregularlytrackedfighter-sized targets outbeyond100nm/185km.

SinceF-14operationshavealways been constrained bystrict rules of engagement(ROE) that require visuallyidentifying the target, long-rangeshotswithradar-guidedAAMs have been rare. Thefive enemy air-to-air “kills”thattheTomcathasscoredtodate were all achieved atfairlyshortranges,thekillingmissile shots all occurringwith visual range of thetargets. In recognition of

theseROE realities, theF-14carries a pod under theradome holding a televisioncamera system (TCS). TheTCSisequippedwithazoomlens that can be used toidentify targets visually atfairly long ranges. As anadded bonus, it feeds anonboard videotape recorder,which provides the flightcrew an excellent visualrecordoftheirengagements.

A VF-102 F-14B Tomcataboard the USS GeorgeWashignton (CVN-73) in1997.Fully loaded, it carriedfuel tanks and “iron” bombs,aswellasAIM-9Sidewinderand AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-airmissiles.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTOFrom the very start of its

career,theF-14wasintendedas an air-to-air killer, with

little effort or moneyexpended togive itanair-to-ground capability. TheTomcat’s claws weredesignedtogiveit theabilityto kill at every range, fromclose in to over 100 nm/185km, which is still somethingofarecord.The weapon with the

longest range is the mightyRaytheon-Hughes AIM-54PhoenixAAM.Anoutgrowth

of the original Eagle AAMthat was to have armed theF6D,theAIM-54firstflewinthe 1960’s. With a range inexcessof100nm/185km,theAIM-54 was the firstdeployed AAM equippedwith its own active onboardradar-guidance system. Thisgaveitthecapabilityofbeinglaunched in a “fire-and-forget” mode, allowing thelaunching aircraft to turnaway to evade or begin

another engagement afterfiring.Italsomeansthatuptosix AIM-54’s can belaunchedatuptosixdifferenttargets at once. Oncelaunched, the missile climbsin a high-altitude parabolictrajectory, reaching speedsapproachingMach5.WhenaPhoenix gets near a target, ahuge 133.5-lb/60.7-kg high-explosive warhead ensuresthatitdiesquickly.Itwasthiscapability thatNavyplanners

wanted to utilize had theSoviet bomber/ASM missilethreat ever been encounteredinwartime. The Phoenix hashad several versions, eachone designed to keep pacewith Soviet improvements intheir own weaponry; theAIM-54Cisthelatest.Along with the AIM-54,

the Tomcat is equipped withthree other weapons forkillingaerialtargets.Thefirst

of these, theRaytheonAIM-7M Sparrow, is an updatedversion of the semiactiveradar-guided AAM that hasbeen in service since the1950’s. Weighing some 503lb/228kg,thismedium-range(outtotwenty-plusnm/thirty-seven-plus km) AAMrequires continuous“illumination” from theAWG-9radartohititstarget.Once there, the eighty-eight-pound /forty-kilogram blast-

fragmentation warhead cankill any aerial target that ithits.However,theAIM-7hasalways been a difficultweapon to employ, becauseof its need for constant radarillumination of the target.There were plans to replacetheSparrowontheF-14withthe new AIM-120 AdvancedMedium Range Air-to-AirMissile (AMRAAM).Unfortunately, budget cuts atthe end of the Cold War,

combined with the fact thatthe Tomcat already had along-range fire-and-forgetAAM in thePhoenix, causedthistobecanceled.Shorter-range missile

engagements are handled bythe classic AIM-9MSidewinder AAM, whichutilizes infrared (heat-seeking) guidance to find itstargets.ThecurrentAIM-9Mversion is badly dated, and

almost obsolete comparedwiththeRussianR-73/AA-11Archer, Matra R.550 Magic,or Rafael Python-4. Thesemissiles are not onlycontrolled via helmet-mounted sighting systems,butalsocanbefiredupto90°“off-boresight” (i.e., thecenterline of the firingaircraft). This shortcomingwill be rectified in the early21st century with theintroductionofthenewAIM-

9X.The last of the Tomcat’s

air-to-air weapons was theone that designers of theF-4PhantomthoughtunnecessaryintheageofAAMs:a20mmcannon. During the VietnamWar,Navypilotscomplainedbitterly about the MiG killsthat they missed because ofthePhantom’slackofaclose-inweapon(itwasarmedonlywithAIM-7/9AAMs).When

the specification for theF-14was being written, “Tomcat”Connelly made sure that ithadaguntodealwiththreatsinside theminimum range ofAAMs.ThegunintheF-14isthe same one in most U.S.fighters, the classic six-barreled 20mmM61Vulcan.Able to fire up to sixthousand 20mm shells perminute,itcanliterally“chop”anenemyaircraftinhalf.

With the exception of theinternalsix-barrel20mmM61Gatlinggun,all theTomcat’sweapons are carriedexternally. For mechanicalsimplicity, there are noweapon pylons on themovable portions of thewings, since these wouldhavetoswiveltostaypointeddirectly into the airflow.Because of this, drop tanksandotherexternalstoresmustbe accommodated under the

fuselage and engines, or onthe structure of the wing“glove”insidethepivot.Fourdeep grooves known as“wells,” shaped to thecontours of AIM-7 SparrowAAMs, are sculpted into theflatunderbellyofthefuselagein the tunnel between theengine pods.When the huge(984-lb/447.5-kg) AIM-54Phoenix missiles are carried,they are mounted onremovable pallets that cover

theSparrowwells.Uptofourof the AIM-54’s can becarried here, along withanother pair on the “glove”pylons. However, thesepylons are more normallyconfigured with rails for anAIM-9SidewinderandAIM-7SparrowAAM.The reason for this is an

arcane number called“bringback weight,” whichrepresents the maximum

landing weight of an aircrafton a carrier deck. Thebringback weight is acombination of the aircraft’s“dry” weight with theminimum safe fuel load (forseveral attempts at landing)and whatever ordnance andstores are being carried. AnF-14 loaded with six of thebig Phoenix AAMs and aminimum fuel load is abovethe allowable bringbackweight,whichmeans that the

largest external stores loadallowed are four AIM-54’s,twoAIM-7’s,apairofAIM-9’s, two external fuel tanks,and the internalM-61 20mmGatling gun. A normal“peacetime” weapons load iscomposedoftwoofeachkindof missile, the gun, and twofuel tanks. Other kinds ofweapons mixes are designedaround particular kinds ofmissions, including airsuperiorityandstrikeescort.

A fighter lives or dies byitsengines,andtheF-14fleetsufferedformanyyearsfroman inadequate power plant,thePratt&WhitneyTF-30-P-412. This was the firstturbofan engine designedspecifically for a fighter, andwas inherited from the F-111B program. Originallyintended for the subsonic F-6DMissileer andused in theVoughtA-7Corsair II attackbomber, it was augmented

with an afterburner (as theTF30-P-100) for thesupersonic F-111, andadapted as a “temporary”expedient for the F-14A.Turbofan engines are morefuel-efficient and powerfulthan turbojets, but are“finicky” about the airflowinto their first stage ofcompressorblades.Turbulent“dirty” air, such as thewakeof another aircraft, can causecompressor stalls, flameouts,

and, too often, loss of anaircraft. The TF-30’ssensitivity to dirty air waswell understood by theGrumman designers, whoprovided the engines withhuge inlets and a system ofair valves or “ramps.” Theseare a complex system ofhydraulically controlledmechanicalplatesdeployedathigh speed, creating internalshock waves that slow theincoming air to subsonic

velocity.Though these fixes tamed

the TF-30 for the Tomcat’sintroduction, the Navy hadplans for something better.This was to have been thePratt & Whitney F-401, inwhatwouldhavebeenknownas the F-14B. Once again,however, developmentalproblemsandescalatingcostsprevented it from enteringservice. This left the entire

force of F-14A’s equippedwiththeTF-30engine,whichhas killed more aircraft andcrews than enemy fire everdid.For over two decades

Tomcat crews have tried toget the most out of theirfinickyTF-30’s(evenastheylived in dread of them). Tofeedthesehugepowerplants,the Tomcat carries plenty offuel, allowing long-range

missions or long loiter timeon patrol. Internal fuelcapacity is 2,385 U.S.gallons/9,029 liters, and twoexternal drop tanks can bemounted under the engineinlets,eachwithacapacityof267U.S. gallons/1,011 liters.To extend its range evenfurther, a NATO-standardretractable refueling probe isfittedonthestarboardsideofthe forward fuselage. Evenso, in these days of littoral

warfare, the F-14’s rarelyhave to “hit” a tanker toconduct their missions. Thisis increasingly important, forthe retirement of the fleet ofKA-6D Intruder tankersmeans the only remainingrefuelingaircraftinthecarrierairgrouparetheovertaxedS-3Vikings.Along with its air-to-air

duties, the Tomcat wasdesignedtotakeonanother—

and perhaps its most vital—task. This is the dangerousjob of photo-reconnaissancefor thebattlegroupand localtheater commanders. Aboutfifty Tomcats of all modelshave been speciallymodifiedto carry the Tactical AirReconnaissance Pod System(TARPS) pod under thefuselage. This large externalstore(17feet/5.2meterslongand about two feet/.6 metersin diameter) contains three

different sensors. Theseinclude a conventional framecamera that looks forwardand down, a “panoramic”camera that captures theground picture from horizonto horizon on either side ofthe aircraft, and an infraredline-scanner that sweeps theterrain directly below theaircraft. Normally, four F-14’s in each CVW are fittedto carry the TARPS pod (inaddition to their normal

avionics fit), and at least sixcrews get special training toflythem.A D/TARPS reconnaissancepod mounted under thefuselage of a VF-102 F-14BTomcat.JOHND.GRESHAM

TARPS is the best low-to-mid-altitude photo-reconsystem in theworld,and isasignificant national strategicasset,abletocaptureimageryat a level of detail muchgreater than the high-flyingU-2 or reconnaissancesatellites. During the 1991Gulf War, TARPS wasespecially valuable for post-strike battle-damageassessment (BDA), and wasmuchfavoredovertheUSAF

RF-4C(whichhassincebeenretired).Currently,TARPSisbeing upgraded to providebattle group commanderswith awhole new capability:near real-time photo-reconnaissance. By replacingone of the existing filmcameras with a digital unit,and tying it into the existingUHF radio system, anairborne F-14 equipped withthe new pod can send apicture with good resolution

back to the carrierwhile stillin the air. With a delay ofonlyabout fiveminutes fromthe time the picture is takento itsviewingby intelligencestaff, the new system (calledDigitalTARPSorD/TARPS)can give a battle groupcommander the necessaryinformation to rapidly hit amobile target. This is acapability long sought bymilitary leaders of allservices, and is being

improvedallthetime.Even though it has fought

infewactualbattles,theF-14hashadanactiveservicelife.The first operationaldeployment came inSeptember 1974, withPacific-basedsquadronsVF-1andVF-2onboardEnterprise(CVN-65).TheTomcat’sfirstknown combat action cameon the morning of August19th,1981,whentwoLibyan

Su-22 “Fitter” interceptorsmadethemistakeofengaginga pair of patrolling Tomcatsfrom VF-41 (the “BlackAces”)flyingfromtheNimitz(CVN-68).Usingtheirsuperbmaneuverability, the twoTomcats evaded a LibyanAAManddownedtheFitterswith a pair of short-rangeAIM-9LSidewinder shots.Afew years later, in October1985,fourTomcatsfromVF-74 (the “Bedevilers”) and

VF-103 (the “Sluggers”),embarked on USS Saratoga(CV-60), intercepted anEgyptian737airlinercarryingthe terrorists who hadhijackedtheItalianpassengershipAchilleLauro.ByMarchof 1986, Tomcats were backonthefrontlineswhenLibyafired S-200/SA-5 GammonSAMs at F-14’s fromAmerica (CV-66) andSaratoga (CV-60) patrollingover the Gulf of Sidra. In

response, the carrier groupsattacked the SAM sites andsankanumberof threateningLibyan patrol boats. Laterthat year, F-14’s providedcover forOperationEldoradoCanyon,thebombingraidsonTripoli and Benghazi.January 1989 saw anotherconfrontation with theLibyanswhenapairofVF-32Tomcats engaged anddestroyed a pair of MiG-23Flogger-Bs. When the MiG-

23’s cameout andacted in athreatening manner, theywere quickly dispatched in abarrage of Sparrow andSidewinderAAMs.Duringthe1990/91Persian

Gulfcrisis,mostofthedutiesof the Tomcats embarked onthe deployed carriersinvolved regular Combat AirPatrol (CAP) andreconnaissancemissions,withnone of the glamor accorded

to the land-based USAF F-15’s. Day after day, theTomcats flew cover for thecarrier and amphibiousgroups in the Red Sea andPersian Gulf, and supportedthe embargo of Iraq. Part ofthe reason they had fewopportunities to show theircapabilities was thereluctance of the Iraqi AirForcetocomeoutoverwaterand be slaughtered. But thebig reason was the Navy’s

failure to develop thenecessary systems andprocedurestointegratecarrierairgroupsaspartofajointaircomponent command. Keyamong these was the abilityto conduct Non-CooperativeTarget Recognition (NCTR),which utilizes variousclassified radar techniques toidentify enemy aircraft bytype. This allows fighterswith Beyond Visual Range(BVR)AAMsliketheAIM-7

and AIM-54 to fire theirmissiles at long ranges.Because USAF F-15’s hadthese systems and theTomcats did not, it was theEagle fleet that was usedagainst the Iraqi Air Forceovertheirhomeland.The onlyTomcat air-to-air

kill of the war was scoredwith a Sidewinder by an F-14A from VF-1 over anunfortunate Iraqi Mi-8 Hip

helicopter.Thebadnewswasthat an F-14B, from VF-103ontheSaratoga,wasdownedby an Iraqi V-75/SA-2Guideline missile on aTARPS reconnaissance runover Wadi Amif. The onebright point throughoutDesert Storm for the F-14community was the timelyand accurate battle-damageassessment provided byTARPS-equippedF-14’s.

The fall of the SovietUnion and Warsaw Pactmeant thata largepartof thethreat that theF-14hadbeencreatedtodefendagainstwasgone. The big Russianbombers and their massiveASMswererapidlyscrapped,and the Tomcat communitywasleftscramblingforarolein the New World Order.Tomcats were not able toperformmanyofthemissionsthatwouldmake themuseful

to regional commanders inchief in the new age of“joint”warfare. In particular,the AWG-9’s lack of NCTRcapabilities made theTomcats also-rans comparedwithF-15’s.50Butthebiggestdrawback for Tomcats wasthe huge cost of buying andmaintaining them.Because itwas the most expensiveaircraft on a carrier deck toprocure, operate, and

maintain, the Navy sawcuttingtheTomcatpopulationas a way to save money.Ironically, this occurred justas the F-14 was finallygetting the engine andsystems upgrades it hadalwaysneeded tomake it thefighteritcouldhavebeen.Back in the 1980’s, John

Lehman’s original aircraftacquisitionplanhad includedupgrades to theTomcat fleet.

The first phase of this effortwas to re-engine a large partof the existing fleet of F-14A’s, and upgrade itsavionics. This was to beaccomplished by modifyingthe -A model Tomcats tocarry a pair of the newGeneral Electric F110-GE-400 advanced turbofanengines.TheF110(alsousedintheAirForceF-15EandF-16C/D fighters) had greaterthrust and none of the vices

of the TF-30. It came to theF-14in1986.ThenewF110-equipped Tomcat, designatedF-14B (originally the F-14A+), entered service inAprilof1988.Someofthe-Bmodels were re-engined F-14As, while the rest werenewlybuilt.Thecontrastwiththe old TF-30-poweredTomcatwas spectacular.TheF-110-engined Tomcats arethefastestoftheirbreed,withbetter acceleration and

performanceindogfightsthanmostotherfightertypes.There is a story about

several of the prototype F-14Bs visiting NAS Oceananear Norfolk, Virginia. Onthe other side of theChesapeake Baywere the F-15’s of the USAF’s 1stFighter Wing at LangleyAFB, their premier air-to-airfighterunit.Normally, theF-15’s easily defeated the F-

14As with their anemic TF-30’s; but this time the high-spirited Naval aviatorsdecided to play a trick ontheir blue brethren andchallenge theUSAFpilots toan air-to-air “hassle” over anoffshore training range. TheNaval aviators showed up inthe souped-up Tomcats, andleft the two Eagle driversrunning away screaming,“Who were those guys!”Clearly, the F-110 made the

new-generation Tomcats avery different cat. The newbird still had one significantshortcoming, though. It wasstill equipped with theoriginal 1960’s-vintageAWG-9 radar and avionicssystems.The Tomcat community

had always dreamed ofmakingafinalbreakwiththeold F-111B systems andproducinganF-14withanew

generationofdigitalavionics.Atonepoint,anF-14Cmodelwith more advancedelectronicswasproposed,butit was never developed.Finally, in the fall of 1990,thedreamwasrealizedintheform of the F-14D. Like theearlier F-14B program, someof the -D-model Tomcatswere rebuilds of earlier -A-model aircraft,while the restwere new productionairframes. The -Dmodel has

thesameF110enginesasthe-B,butaddsanewradar(theHughes APG-71) and a hostof avionic, computer, andsoftwareimprovements.The APG-71 is a vast

improvement over the earlierAWG-9, and is based uponthe APG-63/70-series radarsused on versions of the F-15Eagle. This is a state-of-the-art, multi-mode radar with avariety of capabilities. In

additiontothebasicair-to-airfunctions of theAWG-9, theAPG-71 is capable of bothLow Probability of Intercept(LPI—making it difficult todetect with passive sensors)and Non-Cooperative TargetRecognition (NCTR) modes.In addition, the APG-71 hasthe ability to performadvanced groundmapping inheavyweather, a feature thatwould come in handy whenthe Tomcat community got

interested in air-to-groundoperationsinthe1990’s.Though the F-14D is the

ultimate Tomcat, equippedwith everything that a crewcouldwantinafightertoday,budget cuts meant that lessthanfifty-Dswerebuilt, justenough for two or threesquadrons. When newproduction and conversionsof -B- and -D-model F-14’swere terminated, plans were

made to phase out theaircraft. It began to look liketheTomcatmightgothewayof the A-6/KA-6 Intruders—straighttotheboneyard—justas the aircraft had finallygotten the engines andavionics that the crews hadalways dreamed of. ThehungertocutcostswithintheDepartmentofDefenseintheearly 1990’s meant that anumber of valuable aircrafttypeswere retired, regardless

of the consequences, and theF-14 almost suffered thesamefate.Fortunatelyfor theTomcat

community, even allowingfor the downsizing of post-ColdWarCVWs,therewasashortage of tactical carrieraircraft. Meanwhile, newmissions were found for theF-14.Nowthattherewerenolonger regiments of missile-armed Soviet bombers to

defend against, the Navyplanned to provide theTomcat community with arudimentary capability todrop “iron” (unguided)bombs (called “Bombcat”conversions)andperhapsfireAGM-88 High-Speed Anti-RadiationMissiles (HARMs)against enemy radars. At thesametime,membersoftheF-14 communitywere teachingtheir oldTomcats a fewnewtricks.While the majority of

the Navy’s aviation-procurement dollars wereheaded toward F/A-18Hornets, the Tomcatoperators found ways tosqueeze a few of the scarcegreenbacks to preserve theirmounts.Tobetterunderstandwhat they did, you need toknow a bit about how manyTomcats of various modelswere built. Here is a look atthetotalproductionrunoftheF-14program:

F-14TomcatProduction

A total of 712 Tomcatswere delivered to the Navy,the first inOctober1972andthelastinJuly1992.51WhilenoUSNF-14hasbeenlostinair-to-air combat, more than125 have been lost inaccidents—mostly engine-related (Iranian losses areunknown, at least in opensources).At the end of 1997some250F-14’sremainedinU.S. Navy service. Most of

the USN F-14As are nowbetweentenandtwentyyearsold, and have only hadrudimentaryupgradestotheirstructures and avionics. Thetwo F-14As that shot downtheLibyanMiG-23’sin1989still had the same APR-25radar-warning receivers(RWRs) that had beeninstalledwhentheywerebuiltin the 1970’s. These RWRsweresoelderlytheycouldnotdetect the signals from the

MiGs’ radars, which alsodated back to the early1970’s.Becauseof their age,NAVAIR has decided tosacrifice the -A-modelTomcatstotheboneyard,andpreserve the fleet ofremaining -B- and -D-modelF-14’s.It isunlikelythatanyF-14Aswillbeinservicepast2001, when the first F/A-18E/FSuperHornetsquadronstands up. That leavesapproximately 130 F- 14Bs

and -Ds to flesh out the tenremainingsquadronsthatwillserve into the first decade ofthe21stcentury.AlloftheseaircrafthaveF-

110 engines, and are beinggivenavionicsupgrades suchastheinstallationofnewGPSreceivers and radios. Tomcatcrews have also beenprovided with Night VisionGoggles(NVGs)togivethemimproved low-level

situational awareness indarkness. But the jewels ofthe upgrade program are theD/TARPS program(mentioned earlier) and anair-to-ground weapons-deliverysystem: theAAQ-14LANTIRN targeting pod.This is a self-containedsystem equipped with aForward Looking Infrared(FLIR) thermal-imagingsystem, a laser range finder,laser spot tracker, and laser

illuminator. The AAQ-14pod, one of two used on theUSAF’s F-15E Strike Eagle,has proven to be the best ofitskindintheworldtoday.Itcan detect targets on theground from their thermalsignatures, and then deliverLGBs and other weapons.The Navy version of theLANTIRN pod has anadditionalfeature:abeer-can-shaped Litton GPS/InertialNavigation System (INS),

whichprovidestheF-14withthe necessary navigational/positionalaccuracy todeliverthe new generation of PGMsthat are coming into service.Carriedonthestarboardwing“glove”pylon,theLANTIRNiscontrolledbytheRIO,andcan deliver LGBs day ornight with greater accuracythan any other aircraft in thefleet.These improvements,

however,didnotcomeeasily.They cost a great deal ofmoney, which the seniorleaders at NAVAIRcontrolled. Focused onacquiring the F/A-18, theNAVAIR “Hornet Mafia”was sworn to eliminateanythingfromthebudgetthatmightdetractfromthateffort.On theotherhand, therewasalsoa“TomcatMafia”downatNASOceana(wherealltheF-14 squadrons had been

consolidated),whichwasableto find small parcels ofmoney, as well as supportfrom out in the fleet. Also,contractors like LockheedMartin, the manufacturer oftheAAQ-14 LANTIRN pod,spent their own money todevelop systems for use onthe Tomcat. They workedbetter than anyone hadimagined. Suddenly, regionalCincswantedalltheTomcatsthey could get. The

incomparable navigationalaccuracy of the GPS-EQUIPPEDLANTIRNmadethem excellent “quick-look”reconnaissance birds,especially against mobiletargets like SCUD missilelaunchers.Now,thetwentytothirty F-14’s that aredeployed at any given timeare precious national assetsand are doing far more thanmerely carrying their loaduntil the first squadrons of

Super Hornets arrive earlynextcentury.Theyremainthemost versatile and powerfulaircraftinthefleet.“Tomcat”Connelly would have beenproud that his dream hasprovedsoadaptable.

A cutaway view of aLockheed Martin AAQ-14LANTIRNTargetingPod.

JACKRYANENTERPRISES,LTD.,BYLAURADENINNO

F/A-18Hornet:TheNowandFuture

Backbone

Originally conceived as alow-cost replacement for twoaging naval aircraft (the F-4

Phantom and A-7E Corsair),the F/A-18 Hornet fighter-bomber was designed tofulfill a number of widelydifferentroles.Itfunctionsasboth the Navy’s primarylight-strike bomber and as afighter for the Navy andMarines. Though some thinkthe Hornet does neither jobvery well, others consider itthefinestmulti-roleaircraftintheworld.Somewilltellyouthat the F/A-18 is a short-

legged burden on navalaviation, while others willmake a case that it is thebackbone for all of navalaviation.Iwouldtellyouitisall of these things, andmanymore.Thedrawbackwithanymulti-role combat aircraft isthatittriestodotoomuchfortoomanydifferentpeople.Onthe other hand, when such acomplex beast works, itworks out quite well indeed.ReadonandI’llexplain.

The origins of the Hornetprogramdatebacktothemid-1970’s, when the Navy wasbeginning to suffer “stickershock” from the costs ofbuying new aircraft for itscarrierforce.Thedouble-digitinflation of the early 1970’swas driving the price of newcombat aircraft up at adangerous rate, bringingabout a reassessment of thekindsandnumbersofaircrafttheU.S.militarycouldafford.

AfterastartwasmadeonthemodernizationoftheF-14,A-6, and S-3, the Navy lookedto the problem of replacingthe existing force of A-7light-attack bombers. Sinceevery CVW had twosquadrons each of the A-7’s(with a dozen aircraft persquadron), this represented ahuge aircraft buy. At thesame time, the Navy andMarineshad to replaceabouta dozen squadrons of elderly

F-4 Phantom fighters, whichoperated from carriers andbases.Fromthese twinneedscamewhatwasknownastheVFAX (Navy Fighter/Attack,Experimental) requirement.The hope was that a singleaircraftmight be designed tofulfill both the fighter andlight-strike roles, and thussave money by reducing thenumber of airframes. Aboutthesametime,theUSAFwasevaluating a pair of

“lightweight” fighterdesigns,andwaspreparing toprocureoneofthem.SincetheUSAFwasgoing touse thisaircraftas a multi-role fighter-bomber, the Congress andDepartment of Defensedirected that the Navy andMarinesshoulduseaversionof the same aircraft. That iswherethetroublesbegan.The two competing

lightweight fighter designs,

the General Dynamics (GD,now part of LockheedMartin) YF-16 and theNorthrop (also now part ofLockheedMartin)YF-17,hada “fly-off” competition atEdwards AFB in California.Whenitwasover, theYF-16wasdeclared thewinner, andhas proved to be anoutstanding combat aircraft.The USAF and our allieshaveboughtthousandsofthelittlefighters,andcontinueto

do so to this day.Unfortunately, many of thequalitiesthatmadetheUSAFlove the F-16 wereunacceptable in a carrier-based aircraft. For example,the Navy prefers twin-engined aircraft for theirredundancy and ability toaccept battle damage.TheF-16 has only a single engine,and is too lightly built tocarry some of the equipmentneededforcarrieroperations.

Since the Navy had beendirected to base the VFAXaircraft on the contendersfrom the USAF lightweight-fighter competition, it choseto run a “paper” competitionthat would allow it toevaluate and choose theairplaneitwouldbuy.Meanwhile, both GD and

Northrop decided that sinceneitherhad recent experiencebuilding carrier aircraft, they

would look for a partnershipwithanaircraftcompanythatdid. Thus GD in FortWorthteamedupwith itscrosstownneighbor Vought, whileNorthropadoptedMcDonnellDouglas (MDC) in St. Louisas its partner. At the end ofthe evaluation process, theNavy chose a derivative ofthe twin-engined, twin-tailedYF-17, which it judged wasbetter suited to the rigors ofduty aboard aircraft carriers.

ThisawardtoMDC/Northropprovokeda loudprotest fromthe losingVought/GD team,which had thought theoriginal DoD/Congressionaldirection was an ironcladguarantee that they wouldwin. Though it took aninspiredcampaignofpoliticalpressure and technicaldocumentation by the Navyto preserve the decision, theMDC/Northrop team held ontotheirwin.Butthereismore

tothestory.Winning a contract is one

thing. Building the aircraftspecified is another thingentirely;especiallywhenit isthemostadvancedofitstypeever built. The Navy andMarine Corps were asking agreatdealmorefromthenewaircraftthantheUSAFwasofthe F-16, and thatcomplicated matters greatly.For instance, the new bird,

now designated the F/A-18Hornet (the F/A stood forFighter/Attack), would haveto carry a great deal moreequipment than the USAFbird. This included a multi-mode radar capable ofproviding guidance for thelargeAIM-7 SparrowAAMsand FLIR targeting pods itwastobeequippedwith.TheHornetwouldalsohavetolugaround a lot of extra weightin the form of beefed-up

structure (representing about4,000 lb/1,818.2 kg,approximately 20% of theHornet’s total weight), toallowittooperateonandoffcarriers. These requirementsproved to be far beyond themodestabilitiesoftheYF-17.TheNavywas in fact askingnotsimplyforaNavyversionof the original Northropdesign, but for a brand-newaircraft.SimplyscalinguptheYF-17wasnotgoingtodo.

To further compound thedifficulties presented by thisdesign, there was no trueprototypeof theF/A-18.Thefirst Hornets to fly werepreproduction aircraft, whichwentdirectly intooperationaltesting at NAS PatuxentRiver,Maryland. This meantthatanynormalproblemsthatmight have shown up (andbeen eliminated) in aprototypewerenowfound inthe preproduction birds. This

provedtobeacostlymistake.In fact, someproblems (suchas structural cracks) did notshowupuntiltheHornetwasactuallyintosquadronservicewith the fleet. There werealso troubles with theaerodynamics around the“cobra hood” and leading-edgeextensions,whichhadtobemodified fairly late in thedevelopment process.Luckily, the ability of theF/A-18’s new digital fly-by-

wire(FBW—thefirsteverona carrier-capable aircraft)flight-control system to bereprogrammed made the fixrelatively easy. The worstproblem, though, was thescarcity of internal fueltankage.One of themost important

measures of a combataircraft’s range is expressedby a number called the fuelfraction;thatis,theweightof

internal fuel expressed as apercentage of an aircraft’stakeoff weight. Normally,combataircraftdesignersliketo build aircraft with a fuelfraction of between .30 and.35.Thisgivesenoughgastofly a decent distance, dropbombs or dogfight, and thenreturntothebaseorboatwithaminimumofrefuelingfromairborne tankers. In thedesignoftheHornet,thefuelfraction was woefully low.

The origins of this problemdatedfromtheoriginalYF-17design.Thataircrafthadbeena technology demonstratorthat did not require the kindoffuel loadacombataircraftwould normally carry. Thus,the Northrop designers hadnot installed large internalfuselagetanks.Intheprocessof “scaling up” the YF-17into the Hornet, the MDCdesigners had failed to takethis into account. For some

reason that still defiesexplanation, the F/A-18 wasgiven the same fuel fractionas the original YF-17—around .23. As a result, theHornet would never be ableto flyallof themissions thathad been specified in theoriginal VFAX requirement.For example,whenoperatinginabombingmode, theF/A-18 cannot possibly fly thesameweaponsloadsasfarasthe A-7E Corsair, which it

replaced.The Hornet’s “short legs”

cametolightjustastheNavywas about to make theproduction decision for theaircraft. It took more than alittlehand-wringingandmorethanafewbriefingstoNavy,Marine, and Congressionalleaders to make the case toput the F/A-18 intoproduction. The NAVAIRrationalizationwas that since

the aircraft had shown suchgoodperformanceinsomanyother areas of flight test, thereally-long-range-strike-missionrequirementcouldbecompromised. For example,the newAPG-65multi-moderadar was quickly hailed asone of the best in theworld,and the weapons systemintegration made the Hornetan ordnance-delivery dream.Besides, the test and fleetpilots loved flying the new

bird. They could see itspotential,andwerewillingtoaccepta fewshortcomings toget the Hornet into the fleet.So the decision to buy thefirst production batch ofHornets was made, and thefirstdeliveriestoVFA-125atNAS Lemore, California,beganin1980.Withthispartof the story told, let’s take acloserlookattheF/A-18.At first glance, theHornet

looksverymuchliketheF-14(twin engines and tails), butthe similarities are onlysuperficial. The F/A-18 ismore than a decade ahead ofthe Tomcat in technology.Asizable percentage of theHornet’s structure, forexample, is composed ofplastics and compositestructures. The twin GeneralElectric F404-GE-400engines utilize the sameengine technology as the

F110, and give the Hornetexceptional agility.Aerodynamically, the fixedwing of the F/A-18 isoptimized for dogfighting,withsixstationsonthewingsforordnance(aswellasAIM-9 Sidewinder AAMs on thewingtips).At themidpointofeachwing isa foldinghinge,which allows the deck crewsto reduce the “footprint” ofthe F/A-18 on the limitedspaceoftheflightandhangar

decks. On the fuselage aretworecessedwellsforAIM-7Sparrow and AIM-120AMRAAMAAMs,aswellasvarious types of sensor anddata-linkpods.Therealsoisacenterline station suitable fora small external fuel tank.The nose of the Hornet is avery busy place, with theAPG-65 multi-mode radarmounted just aheadof abay,whichhousestheM6120mmGatling gun. Normally,

placing a vibration sensitiveinstrument like a radar closetoafire-spittingdevicelikeacannon would be suicidal inanaircraft.Unfortunately,theF/A-18’s limited internalspace gave MDC designersno choice. That this unlikelypairingofsystemsinthenoseactually works speaksvolumes about the care thatdesigners gave everycomponentoftheHornet.

The Navy has a realaversiontodoingnewthings,and frequently prefers to letother services pioneertechnology and ideas.However, for the F/A-18 tofulfill its missions, the Navyhad to try some things thatnobodyhaddonebefore.Oneof these was to make theHornet an effective dual-role(fighter and attack) aircraft,with only a single crewman.The only way to make this

possible was to use anadvanced cockpit design, agenerationaheadofanyusedby anyother combat aircraft.Like other fighters of itsgeneration, the F/A-18 has abubblecanopy,with thepilotsitting with his/her shouldersabove the cockpit rails in anACES-series ejection seat,whichprovides thenecessary“zero-zero”capabilityneededfor safety in flight and deckoperations. After that, the

noveltybegins.To design the Hornet

cockpit, MDC brought aunique talent to bear.Engineer Eugene Adam,acknowledgedtobethefinestcockpitdesignerintheworld,led the MDC cockpit designteamthatproducedthe“frontoffice” for the F/A-18. Foryears,Adamhadadvocateda“glass” cockpit, composedonly of computer screens,

whichcouldbeconfiguredinanywaydesiredby thepilot.With computer screens, awidevarietyofdatacouldbedisplayed at any time,depending upon what thepilot was doing at a givenmoment. Such a system wasinstalledinthecockpitof theHornet,whichismadeupofaseriesofsquarecomputerizedMulti-Function Displays(MFDs) with buttons aroundthebezelsthatallowthepilot

to select the data they want.To complement the MFDs,there were a second-generationHUDandHOTAScontrols on the throttles andcontrol stick. This made itpossible for the pilot toswitch from “Fighter” to“Attack” mode with just aflickofaswitch.SoadvancedwastheHornetatthetimeofits introduction that it evenincluded the first onboardGPS receiver seen in the

fleet. These systems arebackedupbyoneof thebestavionics suites ever installedinatacticalaircraft.The result was a cockpit

still considered to be amongthe world’s finest. Perhapsbest of all, it was a cockpitwith room for improvementsand upgrades. Soon, therewill be a new helmet-mounted sighting system,whichwill allow the pilot to

cue the radar and weapons-targeting systems by justlooking at a target. The newAIM-9X version of theclassicSidewinderAAMwillbe the first to use this newfeature.Naval aviators love to tell

me how much “fun” theHornet is to fly, and this hashad a positive effect on itsimage in the fleet. Pilotsespecially love the

responsiveness of the FBWcontrol system and theintegrated “glass” cockpit.The F/A-18 can even landitself, using a system called“Mode-1” to automaticallyflythebirdtoaperfect“OK-Three” landing. Maintenancepersonnelloveittoo,sinceitsdigital electronics are soreliablethataircraftarerarelydown for equipment failures.There is a “down” side,though. Because of the F/A-

18’s small internal fuelfraction, it almost alwayscarries a pair of large fueltanks under the wings, andfrequently another one underthecenterlineofthefuselage.This leaves just four wingstations for actual weaponscarriage. Since the two outerwingstationsareload-limited(they are outboard of thewing fold line), these areusually reserved foradditional AAMs, leaving

just the two middle wingstations for carrying air-to-groundordnance.52

IftheHornetistaskedforabombing mission, the twofuselage stations willnormally be filled with asingle AIM-120 AMRAAM,and an AAS-38 NighthawkFLIR/laser targeting pod.This configurationallows theF/A-18 to pick up targets indarknessorlowvisibility,and

then deliver PGMs (likePaveway-series LGBs) or“iron” ordnance onto themwith accuracy. Unlike theLANTIRN system used onthe F-14, F-15, and F-16,Nighthawk(builtbytheLoralDivisionofLockheedMartin)isdesignedtobeoperatedbyjustasinglecrewman.57Thismeans that a Hornet drivercanpickupatargetusingtheNighthawk FLIR, “lock” it

up, and then trust the pod toautomatically track the targetand handle the release anddelivery of the weapon.While early versions of theNighthawk lacked the laserdesignator and had somereliability problems, thecurrentversionisdoingafinejob in the fleet. More thananyotherpieceofequipment,the Nighthawk pod hastransformed the image of theF/A-18 around the world.

Whereonce itwas seenonlyas an “iron” bomber, now itcarriesareputationfordeadlyprecision.

A cutaway view of aRaytheonAGM-65Maverickmissile.JACKRYANENTERPRISES,LTD.,BYLAURADENINNOThe Hornet can also

employ other PGMs like theAGM-88 HARM antiradarmissile, the AGM-65Maverick tactical ASM, theAGM-84D Harpoonantishipping missile, and thenew AGM-84E Standoff

Land Attack Missile(SLAM).58 SLAM is arelative newcomer to thefleet, having first beenintroduced and employedduringDesertStormin1991.Since that time, SLAM hasseenactioninBosniain1995,and has become one of thefineststandoffstrikeweaponsin the world. What makes itsuchawinneristheuseofthebasic (and very dependable)

AGM-84 Harpoon engine,airframe, and warheadpackage, which is nowmarried to a new guidanceandseekerpackage.Thisnewsystem combines a GPS/INSunit, an imaging infrared(IIR) seeker head from anAGM-65 Maverick ASM,and a man-in-the-loop data-link unit from the oldWalleyeguidedbomb.Theresultisaweaponthat

achieved perhaps the mostspectacular hit of DesertStorm. On its first combat“shot,” run against a heavilydefendedIraqiweaponsplantnear Baghdad, two SLAMswere launched severalminutes apart. The firstmissile, taking its basicguidance from the GPS/INSunit, flew to the target andlocked up the desiredaimpointwithoutdifficulty.Itthen flew directly into the

buildingwall, detonated, andmade a very large hole.Several minutes later, thesecond SLAM flew throughthe hole created by the firstmissile and destroyed theequipment inside. Furthersuccess for the SLAM cameduring Operation DeliberateForce in Bosnia. Theoutstanding performance ofSLAMhasmadeitoneofthemostfearedPGMsintheU.S.arsenal.

AnAGM-84ESLAMmissilebeing launched fromanF/A-18CHornet.SLAMwasusedduring Operations DesertStorm and Deliberate Force,where it performed withamazing precision andlethality.BOEING MILITARYSYSTEMS

In fleet service in its early

years, theHornet showed theshortcomings that had beenseen in testing. While theF/A-18’s range limitationsbecame obvious at once, forexample, this could beimproved simply by alteringthealtitudeandspeed(calledthe flightprofile) that it flewduring missions. Thus, theaircraft’s range could be

stretched simply by flying itat higher altitudes,where theF404 engines were moreefficient. Still, some of theHornet’s originalspecificationswouldneverbemet, especially those ofacceleration and range. Still,in the crucible of combat itpassed theultimate test.Thisfirst came in 1986, when anumber of Hornet squadronstook part in operationsagainst Libya. In ACM

engagements against theMiGs and Mirages of theLibyanAirForce,theHornetshadnotroublestayingonthetails of the opposingwarplanes. They also helpedsuppress the Libyan airdefenses with HARMmissiles, another role theytookoverfromtheA-7E.TheHornet provided the Navywith one other pleasantsurprise: its incrediblereliability compared with

otherNavyaircraftliketheF-14 and A-6. This meant thatthe Hornet was cheaper tooperate, and could be flownmore often than othercomparable aircraft—sooften, in fact, that the earlyF/A-18As wore out fasterthan expected, and had to bereplacedearlierthanplanned.This led to an improvedvariant, the F/A-18C/D,which arrived in the fleetduring1986.

The -C/D model gainedsome weight over the -A/BHornets, but unfortunatelydid not carry any more gas.The radar, avionics, engines,and other systems weresignificantly improved,however, includingprovisions to carry theAIM-120AAMandIIRversionoftheAGM-65MaverickASM.The new Hornet also had anew-generation monitoringsystem that allowed

maintenance crews todiagnose problemsautomatically and evenpredict when individualcomponents and “blackboxes”mightfail.Therewerealso provisions for the newHornettobeoperatedatnightwith night-vision goggles(NVGs),andanewradar:theAPG-73(plannedforthenewF/A-18E/FSuperHornet).The F/A-18C/D was the

Hornet that the Navy andMarines had wanted allalong; and theMarine Corpsbought six squadrons ofmodified-Dmodelsasnight-attackaircrafttoreplacetheirforce of retired A-6’s. TheHornet was also becomingsomethingofasuccessintheexport market. The firstforeign customer wasCanada, which bought 138CF-18’s to conductcontinentalairdefenseaspart

of the North American AirDefense (NORAD)Command. Australia(seventy-five), Kuwait(forty), Spain (seventy-two),Switzerland (thirty-four),Finland(sixty-four),Thailand(eight), and Malaysia (eight)alsoboughtvariousmodelsofthe F/A-18 to upgrade theirair forces. All told, around1,500Hornetshavebeenbuilttodate.

By the time of the Iraqiinvasion of Kuwait in 1990,the Hornet had been inservice for almost a decadeandwas ready for its biggestcombat challenge. Almost assoon as the U.S. began toreact to the invasion, F/A-18unitswereinthefrontlinesofDesert Shield. Eventually,five carrier groups and anentireMarineAirWingwithHornets as their backbonedeployedintothetheater.The

Canadians also contributed asquadron of their CF-18’s totheeffort.InDesertStormtheF/A-18provedtobeadeadlyair-to-air killer. On January17th,apairofVF-81HornetsfromtheUSSSaratoga (CV-60)downedapairofIraqiF-7’s (ChineseMiG-21 clones)withasalvoof“in-your-face”AAM shots. The two F/A-18’s were loaded for abombingmissionat the time,but quickly switched to the

air-to-air mode, shot downtheenemyfighters,thenwentontocompletetheirbombingmission. The rest of the warwas mainly spent delivering“iron”bombsontobattlefieldtargetsinKuwaitandIraq.Inthis mission, the success ofthe Hornets was somethinglessthantotal.Partoftheproblemwasthe

weather,whichwastheworston record in the region.

Because many of thebombing sorties requiredvisual identification of thetargets, some of these had tobe aborted due to the cloudcover. There was also arequirement that bombs bedelivered from mediumaltitude (above 10,000feet/3,048 meters), makingthe accuracy of the resultsuncertain. Had the Hornetbeen armed with LGBs andother precisionweapons, this

problem would not havearisen. Unfortunately, thenew version of theNighthawk pod (with thelaser designator and tracker)hadnotyetcomeintoservice.There also was the fuel

problem. Since most of theHornets were based oncarriers in the Red Sea, theyrequired several in-flightrefuelings in order to reachtheir targets in Iraq and

Kuwait.This placed a severeburden on the limitedairborne tanker resources ofGeneral Horner’s CentralCommand Air Force(CENTAF). This meant thattheF/A-18’sweresometimesleftoff thedailyAirTaskingOrder(ATO)infavorofotheraircraft, like USAF F-16’s,which were based closer totheir targets. Eventually, theNavy moved a total of fourcarriergroupsintothePersian

Gulf itself, to bring theHornetscloseenoughtotheirtargetstodosomerealgood.AnAAQ-38Nighthawklasertargetingpod,mountedonthestarboard fuselage station ofanF/A-18CHornet.Thispodallows Hornet crews todeliver laser-guided bombsand other precisionmunitions.JOHND.GRESHAM

By the time Hornets next

went into combat (in Bosniain 1995), a number ofimprovements had beenmade. The -C/D-modelHornets had been rearmedwith new AIM-120AMRAAM AAMs, SLAMASMs, and Paveway LGBsguided by their newNighthawk targeting pods.And this time, their carrier,the USS Theodore Roosevelt(CVN-71),operatedcloser toshorethanwasthepracticein

Desert Storm and they weregivenadequatetankersupportfromNATO/USAFresources.Now that theywere properlysupported and armed, thePGM-armed Hornets(including a squadron ofMarine F/A-18D NightAttack variants) were theheartofOperationDeliberateForcein1995,anddidallthatwas asked of them. In fact,Navy and Marine CorpsHornets dropped and

launched the bulk of thePGMs that were used duringtheBosniastrikes.Today the Hornet is the

backbone of U.S. carrieraviation,andwillremainthatway for at least the nextdecade.EveryCVWisbeingequipped with three F/A-18squadrons (each with twelveaircraft), which means thatfully half of the aircraft onU.S. carrier decks today are

Hornets. There will soon besignificant Hornet upgrades,with the introduction of newPGMs, as well as a newversion of the classic AIM-9Sidewinder. Even so, therecan be little doubt that theF/A-18’s short legs, limitedweapons load, and designcompromiseswillcontinuetobe a lightning rod for critics.Still, the folks who fly theHornet love their mounts.Though it’s a flying

compromise, it’s easy to fly,forgiving for new pilots, andcapable of many differentmissions.

EA-6BProwler:TheElectricBeast

Looking like a flying metaltadpole, the EA-6B Prowlerwill probably be the last

survivor of a long line ofGrummancarrieraircraft thatdate back to before theSecond World War. Itsmission is electronic warfare(EW), which explains whytheaircraftlookslikeaflyingantenna farm. As many asthirty (ormore) antennas aresmoothly faired into thefuselage or packed into the“football” (actually, it looksmore like a Brazil nut), afiberglass radome at the top

of the vertical stabilizer.These devices allow theProwler to throwan invisibleveil of protection over theaircraft and ships of thecarrier battle group. Theydetect, classify, and locateenemy radar, electronic datalinks, and communications,then jam themwithpreciselycrafted and targetedinterference.Andasanaddedbonus, since 1986 Prowlershave also been capable of

making“hardkills”usingtheAGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM),which homes in on radartransmitters and shreds themwith a blast-fragmentationwarhead.53

Today, the Prowler is thefinest tactical EW aircraft inthe world. It’s so good thatthe USAF is quietly retiringitsownfleetofEF-111RavenEW aircraft and employing

EA-6Bsinjoint(USN/USAF)squadrons. All this is evenmore impressive when youconsider that the thirty-year-old Prowler design has beenaround for almosthalf of thesix decades that radar hasbeen used in militaryoperations; and with regularupdates,ithasatleastanothertenorfifteenyearstogo.Electronic warfare

(intercepting and jamming

enemy signals) began withthe firstmilitaryuseof radioin the Russo-Japanese War(1905), and reached a highdegree of sophisticationduring the Second WorldWar, as Axis and Alliedscientists and techniciansfought for control of theelectromagnetic spectrum.EWaircrafthavebeen inusesince World War II, withmodified USN TBF/TBMAvengers being among the

firstsuchaircraft.Thestartofthe Vietnam War saw twocarrier-capable EW birds inservicewiththeNavy,thoughbothwerealreadygettingold.The EA-1E was amodification of the classicDouglas AD-1 Skyraider,while the EKA-3B “ElectricWhale”(whichalsoservedasa tanker aircraft) was adevelopment of the ColdWar-era A-3 Skywarriorattack bomber. As American

aircraftbegantofalltoradar-controlledAAAguns,SAMs,andMiGs over Vietnam, theneed for a third-generationEW aircraft became almostdesperate. Out of this needcame the development ofwhatwouldbecometheEA-6Prowler.The original airframe of

theProwlerwasderivedfromthe A-6 Intruder, which wasthe Navy’s first true all-

weather, day or night, low-level medium-strike aircraft.The Intruder saw extensivecombat inVietnam, theColdWar, and Desert Storm, andwas immortalized in StephenCoonts’s 1986 novel, FlightoftheIntruder.TheProwler’simmediate ancestor, the EA-6A,was amodified two-seat“Electric Intruder”developedto fill a Marine Corpsrequirement for a jammeraircraft that could escort

strikemissions into thehigh-intensity threat of NorthVietnam’s integrated airdefense system. Hard-wonexperience showed that whatwas really needed for suchmissions were more EWoperatorsandjammersaboardthe aircraft. From this camethe all-new EA-6B Prowler,whichisanall-weather,twin-engine aircraft manufacturedby Northrop GrummanAerospace Corporation as a

modificationofthebasicA-6Intruder airframe. The firstflight of the EA-6B was onMay 25th, 1968, and itenteredoperationalservice inJuly of 1971. Just a fewmonths later, the ProwlerenteredcombatoverVietnamwith VAQ-132, based onaircraftcarriersintheGulfofTonkin.The Prowler is big for a

“tactical”aircraft.Theoverall

length is 59 feet, 10inches/17.7 meters. It has awingspan (with the wingsunfolded) of 53 feet/15.9meters, and sits 16 feet, 3inches/4.9metershighonthedeck. It is also quite heavy,with a maximum grosstakeoff weight of 61,000 lb/27,450kg,muchofwhich isfuel. The Prowler has acruising speed of just over500 knots/575 mph/920 kph,an unrefueled range of over

1,000 nm/ 1,150 mi/1,840km, and a service ceiling of37,600feet/11,460meters.The EA-6B can hardly be

called a “high performance”tacticalaircraft.Althoughitisquite stable in flight andrelatively easy to fly, theProwler is somewhatunderpowered. The two non-afterburningPratt&WhitneyJ52-P408 turbojet engineslack the kind of thrust

available to F-14 or F-18crews (11,200 lb/5,080kgofthrust each), which presentsthe pilot with a number ofchallenges during everymission(especiallyontakeoffand landing). Due to thecomplexityofitssystems,theEA-6B is also a relativelyhigh-maintenance aircraft—about one mission in threereturns with a “squawk” ormalfunction requiringunscheduledmaintenance.On

theplusside,theside-by-sidetwin cockpit arrangementgives maximum efficiency,visibility,andcomfortforthefour-person crew. This isimportant during longmissions,whichcanlastuptosix hours with in-flightrefueling. The canopies arecoatedwithamicroscopicallythin (and very expensive)transparentlayerofgoldleaf,which reflects microwaveenergy and protects the crew

from getting cooked by theirownhigh-energyjammers.The Prowler’s crew

includes a pilot and up tothree ElectronicCountermeasures Officers(ECMOs). The senior officeron board—either the pilot orone of the ECMOs—isnormally the missioncommander. In fact, aProwlersquadroncommanderisoftenanECMOratherthan

a pilot. ECMO-1, who mansthe position to the pilot’sright, handles navigation andcommunications, whileECMO-2 and -3 (they sit inthe rear cockpit) manage theoffensive and defensive EWsystems.Withinthesquadron,there are normally morecrewsthanaircraft,duetotheworkload of flying,administration, and missionplanning. In a low-threatenvironment, a crew of three

isconsideredsufficient—withoneECMOremainingbehindon the boat to plan the nextmission, catch up onpaperwork,orperformanyofthecountlessadditionaldutiesthat Naval aviators mustjuggle when they aredeployed.The Prowler’s EW

capabilitiesdependlargelyonthe ALQ-99 electroniccountermeasuressystem.This

is not a single piece ofequipment,butacomplexandever-changing mix ofcomputers, jammers, controlsand displays, receivers, andtransmitters. Some of thesecomponentsarebuilt into theairframe, while others arepackaged in pods. All areexternally identical, but eachis optimized for specificfrequency bands. Up to fivesuch pods can be carried—twoundereachwingandone

under the fuselage. A moretypical mission configurationistwoorthreepods,withtheother stations occupied byfuel tanks or AGM-88HARM missiles. Each podgenerates its own electricalpower, using a “ram airturbine” or RAT (a compactgenerator spun by a smallpropeller). To generate fullpower for jamming, theaircraft must fly above aminimum speed (225 knots).

Using the RATs brings aslight drag penalty; theProwlerlosesabout1%ofitsmaximum combat radius foreach pod carried. Still, thepods and missiles are thereason why the Prowlerexists.Without theelectronicsmokescreenprovidedbytheEA-6B’s jamming pods,losses to enemy defensivesystemswouldbemanytimesgreaterthantheyhavebeen.

Normally, the EA-6B isused to provide acombination of services forstrike packages inbound to atarget area. If active SAMsites are nearby, the ECMOswill use the ALQ-99 toprovide targeting for theHARMs, which are deadlyaccurate when fired from aProwler. Once the HARMsare gone, the EA-6B orbitsawayfromthetargetareaanduses the ALQ-99 jammer

pods to “knock back” enemyradars and other sensors thatmight engage the strikegroup.Othermissionsincludeelectronicsurveillance,astheALQ-99 is a formidablecollection system forelectronic intelligence(ELINT). Because they areconsidered“highvalueunits”by enemy defenders, one ortwo fighters usually providethem with an escort, just incase the locals get nosey. In

fact, no Prowler has everbeen lost in combat, thoughabout forty have beendestroyed in accidents. Theworst of thesewas a horrificcrash while landing aboardtheNimitz (CVN-74)back in1979,which killed the entirecrew aswell as a number ofdeckpersonnelintheensuingfire.EW is an unusual facet in

the spectrum of warfare. For

every measure there is acountermeasure, and theusefullifespanofasysteminactualcombat isoftenonlyafew months. Because a new“generation” of electronicwarfare technology emergeseveryfewyears, ifyoufallageneration behind you are“outofthegame.”Thishelpsto explain the bewilderingvariety of upgrades andvariants that mark theProwler’s long career.

Production of new-builtProwlers ended several yearsago,but about125 remain inactive service today. This isjust enough for twelveNavy,four Marine Corps, and four“joint”squadronsofEA-6Bs.Normally, each deploys withfour aircraft. Navy and jointUSAF/USN Prowlersquadrons are home-based atNAS Whidbey Island,Washington, while theMarine units live at MCAS

CherryPoint,NorthCarolina.The joint EA-6B squadronsareanewphenomenoninthepost-Cold War world, anexpressionofbudget realitiesthat no longer allow theservices to duplicate aircrafttypeswith the samemission.Although the Navy andUSAF developed verydifferent EW concepts anddoctrine over the years, theAirForcehasagreedtoretireits only tactical jammer

aircraft, the EF-111 Raven.Now the two services will“share” five joint“expeditionary” Prowlersquadrons,whichwilloperatewith mixed Navy and AirForce ground and flightcrews.Despitethepredictableconcerns about USAFofficers commanding Navysquadrons(orviceversa),thisprogram is well under wayandlookstobearealwinner.

Like their brethren in theTomcat community, EA-6Bcrewshavelearnedsomenewtricks in recent years, likeshooting AGM-88 HARMmissiles at enemy radars.Prowlershaveevenbeenusedas command and controlaircraft, functioning as strikeleaders for other planes onbombing missions. Otherimprovements include plansto start another upgradeprogram known as ICAP

(Improved Capability) III.This will take the basic EA-6B package as it currentlyexists (known as Block 89)andaddimprovedcomputers,signal processors, andjammers, as well as a GPSreceiver,newradiosanddatalinks, and other new avionicsystems. ICAP III-equippedProwlers should begin toappear inafewyears.AsforfutureEWaircraftoncarriers,long-range plans have been

developedfora two-seatEWversionofthenewF/A-18E/FSuper Hornet. A highlyautomated follow-on versionofALQ-99wouldbefittedtothis bird, as well as moreadvanced HARMs and othersystems. However, sincethere is no money for thisbirdinthecurrentbudget,theold Prowlers will have tosoldieronforatleastanotherdecadeortwo.

A cutaway view of aRaytheon AGM-88 HARManti-radiationmissile.JACKRYANENTERPRISES,LTD.,BYLAURADENINNO

E-2CHawkeye:EyesoftheFleet

Put a sensor of sufficientresolution high enough, andyou will see enemy forcesbefore they can harm you.This is the guiding principalbehind most early warningsystems,fromreconnaissancesatellitestoUnmannedAerialVehicles (UAVs). For naval

leaders, there is no moreimportant“highground”thanthat occupied by AirborneEarly Warning (AEW)aircraft. The first U.S. NavyAEW birds date back toWorld War II, whenconverted TBF/ TBMAvengers were modified tocarry a small airborne radarand operator for the purposeof detecting incomingJapanese Kamikaze aircraftfarenoughout for fighters to

bevectoredtointerceptthem.After the war, specialpurpose-built AEW aircraftwere developed. These weredesignedtodealwiththenewgeneration of jets and ASMsfacedbyColdWar-eraNavalforces.The firstof thesewasthe Grumman E-1 Tracer, adevelopment of the S-2FTracker ASW aircraft. Foralmost a decade the E-1worked as the primarycarrier-based AEW aircraft

for the USN; but theoperational conditions of theVietnam conflict showed thenumerous shortcomings ofthe Tracer, including pooroverland radar performanceand limited endurance andservice altitude.Though theyserved aboard modifiedEssex-class (SCB-27C/CV-9)carriersuntil1976, therewasa clear need for a moreadvanced AEW aircraft forthefleet.Thataircraftwasthe

E-2Hawkeye.

The business end of a VRC-40 C-2A Greyhound CODaircraft on the deck of theUSS George Washington(CVN-73). These aircraft areused to ferry personnel,cargo, and supplies to andfromcarrierbattlegroups.JOHND.GRESHAM

One of the last propeller-driven aircraft in the CVW,the E-2C Hawkeye is theNavy’s all-weather, carrier-based tactical AEW aircraft.The E-2C uses computerizedsensors for early warning,threat analysis, and controlagainst air and surfacetargets.Itprovidesthecarrierbattle group with all-weatherAEW services, as well as

command, control, andcommunications (C3)functionsforthecarrierbattlegroup. Additional missionsinclude surface surveillance,strikeandinterceptorcontrol,Combat Search and Rescue(CSAR) guidance, Over-the-Horizon(OTH)targeting,andcommunications relay.Designed to a 1955specification, and upgradedthrough at least six

generations of electronictechnology, the Hawkeyeremains in production today.The E-2C has also beenadoptedby theFrenchNavy,and at least five othercountries that do not evenhave aircraft carriers. This isa tribute to the cost-effectivemix of robust airframe,compact sensor and avionicssuite, and turboprop powerplants.Unitcost:$51million—cheap for the protection it

provides. Before you gag onthat number, consider that anewF/A-18E/FSuperHornetwill cost you even more percopy, and I don’t know anybattlegroupcommanderwhowouldnotlikeafewmoreofthepreciousE-2Cs.One thing all that money

does not buy is beauty. Asyou walk up to a Hawkeye,piecesof it seem tobegoingeverywhere.Wingsarefolded

backonthefuselage,withthebig radar rotodome perchedup top like a tethered flyingsaucer. Though it is notgorgeoustolookat,theE-2Chas a functional elegance,doing the same kind ofmission as its larger USAFcousin, the Boeing E-3Sentry.Thatitdoesthisonanairframe a fifth the size, andoff a carrier deck, is ameasure of its sophisticationand value. When the

Grummanengineersdesignedthe E-2, they started with aperfectcylinder.Intothistheypacked all the electronics,fuel, two pilots, and threeradar controllers. Thefinishing touch came whenthey mounted the rotatingradar dome (called a“rotodome”) on top, andattachedapairof longwingsmountingapairofAllisonT-56-A427 turboprop engineswith five thousand shaft

horsepowereach.Dimensionally, the

Hawkeye is 57 feet, 6inches/17.5meters long,witha wingspan of 80 feet, 7inches/28 meters, and aheight of 18 feet, 3 inches/5.6 meters to the top of theradar dome. Though it is thelargest aircraft flying on andoffcarrierstoday,itisnottheheaviest. At a maximumgross takeoff weight of

53,000 lb/23,850 kg (40,200lb/18,090kg“dry”),theE-2Cisactually lighter than theF-14 Tomcat. The wings havethe longest wingspan of anycarrier aircraft in the world;andwhenfolded,theyusetheclassic Grumman “Stow-Wing” concept, which hasthem folding against thefuselage. The tail iscomposed of a horizontalstabilizer with four verticalstabilizers to give the

Hawkeyethenecessary“bite”to move the heavy birdaroundthesky.Thoughithasonlytenthousandhorsepowerbehind the twin props, theHawkeyeiscapableofspeedsover 300 knots/345 mph/552kph, and can operate ataltitudesof30,000 feet/9,144meters. Because Hawkeyesare unarmed, no battle groupcommander would beconsideredsane if therewereless than two fighters

protecting his E-2C.Hawkeyes are true “highvalueunits”andarealwaysatargetforenemyfighters.Onboard, thecrewof five

is busy, for they’re doing ajob that on the larger E-3Sentry takes several dozenpersonnel. The pilot andcopilot fly preciselypositioned and timedracetrack-shaped patterns,designed to optimize the

performance of the E-2C’ssensors. In back, the threeradar-systems operators aretasked with tracking andsorting the contacts detectedby the Hawkeye’s APS-145radar. This Westinghouse-built system is optimized foroperationsoverwaterandcandetect both aircraft andsurface contacts out to arange of up to 300 nm/345mi/552 km. To off-load asmuch of the workload as

possible, a great deal of theraw data is sent back to thetaskforce’sshipsviaadigitaldata link.With thisoff-boardsupport, the three consoleoperatorsareabletocontrolanumber of duties, includingintercepts, strike and tankeroperations, air traffic control,search and rescue missions,andevensurfacesurveillanceandOTHtargeting.Alongwith the 141 E-2Cs

produced for the USN, theHawkeye has hadconsiderable export success.No less than six foreigngovernments have boughtthem: Israel (four), Egypt(six), France (two for theirnew carrier Charles deGaulle), Japan (thirteen),Singapore(four),andTaiwan(four). There are moreHawkeyes in use throughoutthe world than any otherAEWaircrafteverbuilt.

There also has been onemajor variant of theHawkeye, a transportversionknown as the C-2AGreyhound. Basically an E-2airframe with a broaderfuselage and the radarrotodome deleted, it candeliver cargo and passengershundreds of miles/kilometersout to sea.KnownasaCOD(for Carrier OnboardDelivery) aircraft, it replacedtheelderlyC-1Trader,which

isitselfavariantoftheearlierE-1 Tracker. With its broadrear loading ramp andfuselage,theC-2cancarryupto twenty-eight passengers,twenty stretcher cases, orcargoup to the size of anF-110enginefortheF-14.The Hawkeye has had a

longruninUSNservice.Theoriginal -A model was firstflown in October 1960, toprovide early warning

services for the newgeneration of supercarriersthen coming into service. InJanuary 1964, the first offifty-nine E-2As weredelivered to their squadrons,andwere shortly headed intocombat in Southeast Asia.These were later updated tothe E-2B standard, whichremainedinuseuntilreplacedby the E-2C in the 1970’s.The firstE-2CsenteredUSNservice with Airborne Early

Warning Squadron (VAW)123 at NAS Norfolk,Virginia, in November of1973. The -C-modelHawkeye was produced inorder to provide the F-14Tomcat with an AEWplatformmatched to the newfighter’s capabilities. Thoughvisually identical to theearliermodels, theE-2Cwasequipped with new-technology digital computersthat provided a greatly

increased capability for thenew Hawkeye. These gavethe operators the ability totrackandinterceptthedozensof Soviet bombers andhundredsofASMsandSSMsthatwereexpectedtobefiredat CVBGs if the Cold Wareverturned“hot.”

E-2CHawkeyeAEWaircrafton the deck of the USSGeorge Washington (CVN-73). They generally parkedalongsidetheislandstructure,onaspotcalled“theHummerHole.”JOHND.GRESHAMIn any event, the E-2Cs

neverdirectedthemassiveairbattles they had beendesigned for. Instead, theHawkeye crews spent the

declining years of the ColdWar flying their racetrackpatterns over the fleets,maintaining their lonely vigilfor a threat that never came.Carrier-basedHawkeyeswerenot strangers to combat,however. E-2Cs guided F-14Tomcat fighters flyingcombat air patrols during the1981 and 1989 air-to-airencounters with the LibyanAirForce,aswellasthejointUSN/USAF strike against

terrorist-related Libyantargets in1986. IsraeliE-2Csprovided AEW supportduring their strikes intoLebanon in 1982, and againduringthelargerinvasionthefollowing year. Morerecently, E-2Cs provided thecommand and control forsuccessful operations duringthe Persian Gulf War,directingbothlandstrikeandCAP missions over Iraq andproviding control for the

shoot-down of the two IraqiF-7/MiG-21 fighters bycarrier-based F/A-18’s. E-2aircraft have also workedextremely effectively withU.S. law enforcementagenciesindruginterdictions.Today the entire Hawkeye

fleet isbeingupgradedunderwhat is called the Group IIprogram. Along with thirty-six new-production aircraft,the entire USN E-2C fleet is

being given the improvedAPS-145 radar, newcomputers, avionics, datalinks, and aGPS/INS systemto improve flight path andtargeting accuracy. Thismeans thatasingleHawkeyecan now track up to twothousand targets at once in avolume of six million cubicmilesofairspaceand150,000square miles of territory.Current plans have theHawkeye/ Greyhound fleet

servinguntil at least theyear2020, when a new airframeknown as the CommonSupport Aircraft (CSA) willbe built in an AEW version.By that time, the basic E-2airframewillhave served foralmostsixdecades!A VS-32 S-3B Viking ASWaircraft on the deck of theUSS George Washington(CVN-73)withwingsfolded.The S-3B has rapidly taken

over many critical roles incarrier operations, espciallyin-flight refueling of otheraircraft.JOHND.GRESHAM

LockheedMartinS-3BViking:TheVital

“Hoover”

Antisubmarine warfare(ASW) is probably the mostcomplex, frustrating,operationally challenging,and technically secretive

mission that any aircraft canbecalledupontoperform.Tolocate, track, classify, anddestroy a target as elusive asa nuclear submarine in theopen ocean often seemsvirtually impossible. Andagainstaquietmoderndieselboat in noisy coastal waters,the odds are even worse. Infact, the ASW missiondoesn’t have to be thatsuccessful. It has succeededas long as enemy subs are

forced to go deep, run quiet,andkeeptheirdistancefromaNavaltaskforceorconvoy.Itis amatter of record that themost effective weaponagainstsubmarinesduringtheSecond World War was theASW patrol aircraft. Suchaircraft have continued to dothisjobeversince.Today, the USN operates

twofixed-wingASWaircraft.One is the venerable four

engined P-3C Orion, whichoperatesfromlandbases.Theother is its “little brother”from the Lockheed Martinstable, the S-3B Viking,which is carrier-capable.AirborneASWhaslongbeena Lockheed specialty. Theirland-based Hudson andVentura patrol bombersplayed a key role in WorldWar II against German U-boats.Morerecently, theirP-2V Neptune and P-3 Orions

have kept vigil over theworld’s oceans,watching foreverything from submarinesto drug-running speedboats.The so-called “sea control”mission is thankless work,with nearly day-longmissions, most of which areflown over inhospitable andempty seas. The boredomarisingfromthesemissionsinno way reduces theirimportance. A maritimenation that cannot monitor

and control the sea-lanes ituses is destined to sail at thewhimsofotherpowers.Early on, carrier aviators

knewthattheytooneededtheservices of such aircraft, andbegan to build speciallyconfigured ASW/patrolaircraft shortly after the endof World War II. The firstmodern carrier-based ASWaircraftwasGrumman’stwin-engine S-2 Tracker, which

entered service in 1954 andremainedinthefleetforovertwenty-five years with morethan six hundred built.54 In1967, the growingsophistication of the SovietsubmarinethreatledtheNavyto launchacompetition foraradically new generation ofcarrierASWaircraft.Knownas the VSX program, it wasdesigned both to replace theTracker and to provide a

utility airframe for otherapplications. In 1969, thedesign submitted byLockheed and Vought wasdeclared the winner anddesignatedS-3.TheprototypeS-3AfirstflewonJanuary21st,1971,andthetypeenteredservicein1974withVS-41atNASNorthIsland,California.By the timeS-3Aproductionended in1978,179hadbeendelivered.

The S-3 Viking is acompact aircraft, withprominentenginepodsforitstwin TF-34-GE-2 engines.This is the same basic non-afterburningturbofanusedonthe Air Force’s A-10“Warthog,” and its relativelyquiet “vacuum-cleaner”sound gives the Viking itsnickname:the“Hoover.”Thecrewoffoursitsonindividualejection seats, with the pilotand copilot in front, and the

tacticalcoordinator(TACCO)andsensoroperator(SENSO)in back. A retractable aerialrefuelingprobeisfittedinthetopofthefuselage,andallS-3B aircraft are capable ofcarryinganin-flightrefueling“buddy” store. This allowsthe transfer of fuel from theVikingaircrafttootherNavalaircraft. Because ASW is atime-consumingbusiness thatrequiresa lotofpatienceandequipment, the Viking is

relatively slow, with a longrange and loiter time. ThismeanstheS-3isprettymucha “truck” for the array ofsensors,computers,weapons,and other gear necessary tofindandhuntsubmarines.Butdon’t think that theViking isasittingduckforanyonewitha gun or AAM. The S-3 issurprisingly nimble, and it’sable to survive even in areaswhereAAWthreatsexist.

There are three primarywaystofindasubmarinethatdoes not want to be found.You can listen for sounds,you can find it magnetically(something like the waycompass needles find north),or you can locate a surfacedsub with radar. Since soundwaves can travel a longwayunderwater, a sub’s mostimportant “signature” isacoustic. But how can anaircraft noisily zooming

through the sky listen for asubmarineglidingbeneaththewaves? The answer,developedduringWorldWarII,isthesonobuoy.Thisisanexpendable float with abattery-powered radio and asuper-sensitive microphone.“Passive” sonobuoys simplylisten. “Active” sonobuoysadd a noise-makerthat sendsout sound waves in hope ofcreatinganecho.Bydroppinga pattern of sonobuoys and

monitoring them, an ASWaircraftcanspreadawidenetto catch the faint sounds ofthe sub’smachinery, or eventhe terrifying“transient”ofatorpedoormissilelaunch.Another detectable

submarine signature ismagnetism. Since mostsubmarinesaremadeofsteel,theycreateatinydistortionofthe earth’s magnetic field astheymove.55Thedistortionis

very small, but it isdetectable. A “magneticanomaly detector” (MAD)cansensethissignature,butitis so weak that the aircraftmust practically fly directlyoverthesubatlowaltitudetodoso.56InordertoisolatetheMAD from the plane’s ownelectromagnetic field, it ismountedontheendofalong,retractable“stinger”atthetailoftheaircraft.

Eventually, everysubmarine must come toperiscope depth tocommunicate,snorkel,orjusttake a quick look around.Although periscope, snorkel,and communications mastsareusuallytreatedwithradar-absorbing material, at closerange sufficiently powerfuland sensitive radar mayobtain a fleeting detection.Finally, there are moreconventional means of

detection. For example, anairborne receiver anddirectionfindermaypickupasub’s radio signals, if it isfoolishor unlucky enough totransmit when an enemy islistening.And sometimes thetelltale“feather” fromamastcan be seen visually orthroughanFLIRsystem.The integrated ASW

packageof the initialversionof theViking, theS-3A,was

designed to exploit all ofthese possible detectionsignatures.Sixtylaunchtubesfor sonobuoys are located inthe underside of the rearfuselage. In addition, thedesigners provided theASQ-81MADsystem,anAPS-116surface search radar, a FLIRsystem, a passive ALR-47ESMsystemtodetectenemyradars, and the computersystems that tie all of thesetogether. Once a submarine

hasbeenfound,itisessentialthatalleffortsbemadetokillit. To this end, the S-3 wasnot designed to be just be ahunter;itwasalsoakiller.Aninternal weapons bay canaccommodateup to fourMk.46 torpedoes or a variety ofbombs, depth charges, andmines. Twowing pylons canalso be fitted to carryadditional weapons, rocketpods, flare launchers,auxiliary fuel tanks, or a

refueling“buddystore.”AllthismadetheS-3Aone

of the best sub-huntingaircraft in the world, whichwas good enough in its firstdecade of service. By 1981,though, the -AmodelVikingclearly needed improvementin light of the growth innumbers and capabilities oftheSovietsubmarinefleet.Inparticular, the improvedquietingof theRussianboats

madehuntingevenmoreofachallenge. In order toimprove the S-3’s avionics,sonobuoy, ESM and radardata processing, andweapons, a conversionprogram was started. Theresult was the S-3B, whichupgraded basic -A modelairframestothenewstandard.The first S-3Bs began toarriveinthefleetin1987,andthey quickly showed boththeirnewseacontrolabilities

and capability to fire AGM-84Harpoonantishipmissiles.Thisistheversionthatservestoday.

TheprototypeES-3AShadowon a test flight. The sixteenShadows provided the fleetwith electronicreconnaissance andsurveillance services untilrecently.JOHND.GRESHAMOne of the original hopes

for the S-3was to provide abasic airframe for a number

of other aircraft types.Unfortunately, the smallproduction run of theVikinghas limited its opportunitiesfor other roles. A smallnumber of early S-3As weremodifiedbyremovingall theASW equipment and fittingsfor armament, allowing themtocarryurgentcargoandmailandprovidingseatsforacrewof three and up to sixpassengers (with minimalcomfort). Designated US-3A

andpossessingamuchlongerrange than the normal C-2AGreyhound COD aircraft, atotal of five served in thePacific fleet until they wererecently retired. A dedicatedtanker version, the KS-3A,wastestedin1980,butneverwentintoproduction.The single most important

variant was the ES-3A“Shadow,” an electronicsurveillance (ESM) and

signals intelligence(SIGINT)platform, which replaced thevenerable EKA-3B “ElectricWhale.” Externally, theShadow is quite distinctive,withaprominentdorsalhumpand a retractable radome.About 3,000 lb/1,360 kg ofASW gear was removed and6,000 lb/2,721 kg ofelectronics were packed intothe weapons bay. While theShadow is unarmed, it canalso carry external fuel tanks

and“buddy”refuelingstores.Sixteen of these aircraft aresplit between two squadrons:VQ-5(the“SeaShadows”)inthe Pacific Fleet and VQ-6(the “Ravens”) in theAtlantic.Detachmentsof twoor three aircraft normallydeploy with every carrier airgroup, providing ESM,SIGINT, and OTH supportfortheCVBG.Unfortunately,recent budget cuts havetargeted the shadow

community which appears tobe headed fordisestablishment. Plan onseeing the ES-3 head for theboneyardin1999.The S-3 community has

changedagreatdealsincetheendoftheColdWar.Aslongas the Soviet Unionmaintained the world’slargest submarine fleet, theASW squadron was anintegralpartof thecarrierair

group. But today, that “blue-water” submarine threat hasreceded. This hardly meansthat the S-3’s can be retiredand their crews given pinkslips.Onthecontrary,theVSsquadrons have taken on awhole new set of roles andmissions, making them morevaluable than ever. After thepremature retirement of theKA-6D fleet in 1993, theytook on still another role,becoming the primary aerial

refuelingtankerfortheCVW.Thishasnotprovedtobethebest solution to the aerialrefuelingproblem,sinceanS-3B can only off-load about8,000 lb/3,628 kg of fuel, ascompared to over 24,000lb/10,886 kg for the KA-6D.With the thirsty F/A-18’sneeding at least 4,000lb/1,814 kg every time theygo on a long CAP or strikemission, even the ES-3Shadows are being used as

tankers!Toreflectallthis,thepreviousASWdesignationoftheir squadrons has beenchanged to “Sea Control,”which uses the “VS”nomenclature.The S-3B community

currently includes tenoperational squadrons,administratively dividedbetween two Sea ControlWings: one for the AtlanticFleetandone for thePacific.

A single Fleet ReplacementSquadron, VS-41, based atNorthIslandNAS,California,serves as the advancedtraining unit. DuringOperation Desert Shield andDesert Storm, S-3 squadronsflewmaritimepatrols tohelpenforce sanctions againstIraq. In fact, the onlycomplaint I’ve ever heardabout this wonderful aircraftis that the Navy bought toofew of them. Another two

hundred would have beeninvaluabletoday,butthepoorchoices on the part of navalaviation leaders scuttled thatidea. At the end of 1997,about 120 S-3’s remained inservice. Eventually, all oftheir taskswillbe takenoverby the future CommonSupport Aircraft that isscheduled to enter servicearound2015.

SikorskyH-60Seahawk:AFamily

ofWinners

Fixed-wing aircraft that huntsubmarinesontheprowlhaveone major vice: They movetoo fast. One solution is touse an aircraft that can standstill, dip a sonar into thewater, and just listen for awhile, thewayasurfaceship

or submarine can. Then, ifneeded,itcanrapidlydashtoanother spot, and do it allagain. In other words, youneed ASW helicopters. TheGermanswerethefirsttousehelicopters for this purpose.During World War II theyused them to hunt Russiansubmarines in theBalticSea.Following the war, it wasonly a matter of time andtechnological developmentuntil a true ASW helicopter

was developed.After severalfalse starts in the 1950’s,Sikorskydeveloped theSH-3Sea King. One of the finesthelicopters ever built, it wasequipped with a dippingsonar and homing torpedoes,and had plenty of range andpower.However,bythemid-1970’s it was clear that theoldSH-3washeadingintoitslast legs as the USN’spremier sub-huntinghelicopter.

Meanwhile, the USN hadoperated another fleet ofASW choppers, so-called“light”helicopters,whichcanoperate off small platformson escort ships. Starting inthe late-1960’s, this missionwasfilledbytheKamanSH-2 Seasprite LAMPS I (LightAirborne Multi-PurposeSystem). For three decades,SH-2’shaveoperatedofftheNavy’s smallest ships (suchasthenow-retiredKnox-class

(FF-1052) frigates), and arestill being produced forforeignnavies.WhiletheSH-2was a good start, it lackedtherangeandpayloadtohuntfront-line Soviet submarines.The Navy wanted a LAMPShelicopterthatcouldhuntthenew generation of Sovietsubmarines coming intoservice, and begandevelopment in the early1970s.

In1977,theNavyawardeda contract to IBM FederalSystems and Sikorsky tobuild a new light ASWhelicoptersystemcalledLightAirborne Multi-PurposeSystem—Mark III (LAMPSIII).57 The helicopter itselfwas called the SH-60BSeahawk. The SH-60B wasdeveloped from Sikorsky’sUH-60 Blackhawk transport

helicopter, which hadrecently won the Army’scompetition to replace thevenerable UH-1 “Huey.”58This saved a lot ofdevelopment money for theNavy and gave them anairframe with excellentgrowthpotential.Equipped with sonobuoys,

MAD, radar, and otherdetection gear, the SH-60Bwould be the helicopter

equivalent of the S-3B forescort ships.TheLAMPS IIIbirds would be based aboardthe new generation ofTiconderoga-class (CG-47)Aegis cruisers, Spruance(DD-963) and Kidd-class(DDG-993) destroyers, andOliver Hazard Perry-class(FFG-7) frigates.Theseshipswere being designed withenlarged helicopter hangarsand landing platforms, and acombat center with two-way

data links to processinformation from the SH-60’s onboard sensors. Whenthey first deployed in 1984,the LAMPS III-CAPABLEshipswerethemostpowerfulASWescortsintheworld.Ina task force or convoy, theywould form an “outer zone”barrier against anysubmarinestryingtoattack.Meanwhile, it was time to

replace the SH-3, the

protectorsofthe“innerzone”of ASW defenses for theCVBG. Once the SH-60Bshad been well launched, itwasa logical jumptobuildaSea King replacement fromthe existing Seahawkairframe. In 1985 the USNcontracted with Sikorsky fordevelopment and productionof seventy-four “CV-Helo”versions of the H-60. Theywould be equipped with anew lightweight dipping

sonar and some avionicsimprovements over theearlier-B-model Seahawks.These improvements came ata price, however: the loss ofmost of the LAMPSequipment, including thesonobuoy launchers and datalinks.ThenewSH-60Fcameinto service in 1989, andbegan to replace the elderlySH-3’saboardthecarriers.Atthis same time, in responseto- an ongoing initiative to

expand the special warfarecapabilities of the USN,another H-60 variant wentinto development. The HH-60H version of the Seahawkprovided a whole new rangeof capabilities for battlegroups commanders,includingCombatSearchandRescue (CSAR) and thecovert insertion and retrievalof Special Forces like thefamous Sea-Air-Land(SEAL)teams.

An HH-60G specialoperations/SAR helicopterlanding on the deck of theUSS George Washington(CVN-73).JOHND.GRESHAMHaving three aircraft all

based upon the same H-60airframe has saved lots ofscarce naval aviation dollars.All share the same 1,690-

horsepower General ElectricT700 turboshaft engines, aswell as a common rotorsystem(withadiameterof53feet, 8 inches/16.4 meters)and transmission. In fact, theprimary differences betweenthe -B, -F, and -H versionsare in the various mission-equipmentpackages.Withanoverall length of 64 feet, 10inches/ 19.75 meters, heightof 17 feet/5.2 meters, andmaximumgrossweightof21,

884lb/9,908kg,theSeahawkis a compact and nimbleaircraft. It handles well onwet,rollingdecks,eventhoseof small escort ships. Toassist ships’ crews inhandling, Seahawks have acable system called RAST(Recovery, Assist, Secure,and Traversing), allowingships’ crews to haul it downsafely in heavy seas.DevelopedfromtheCanadian“Beartrap”system,RASThas

a tracked receiver on thehelicopter platform, which“captures” a small cablehanging from the bottom ofthe helicopter. Once thereceiver has snagged thecable,thehelicopterishauleddown, and then towed intotheship’shangar.The armament of the

Seahawks, while limited, iswell tailored for theirassigned missions. The

normal weapons load for theASW versions is a pair ofMk.46orMk.50lightweighttorpedoes. Extra fuel tankscan also be carried to extendtheSeahawk’s range.The -Bmodelisalsoequippedtofirethe Norwegian-built AGM-119 Penguin Mk. 2 Mod. 7ASM.With a range of up to18 nm/33 km and a passiveinfrared seeker, it can takeout a patrol boat or smallescort ship, even in close

proximity to a shoreline orneutral shipping traffic. Allthe variants of the Seahawkcan be fitted with lightmachine guns, and haverescue hoists for hauling indowned air crews or otherpersonnel.The various models of

Seahawk have helpedmaintainthesometimes-diceypeace in the post-Cold Warworld.InthePersianGulf,for

instance, LAMPS III birdshave been monitoringmaritime traffic and themaritimeembargoofmilitarymaterials into Iraq. At thesame time, the -F modelshave kept awary eye on thethree Project 877/Kilo-classdiesel boats of the IranianNavy, and -H modelSeahawks have beentransporting inspection teamsto ships and conductingCSAR missions. Seahawks

have been active insupporting our operations inBosnia as well. In fact, youprobably could not evenoperate a modern USN taskforcewithoutSeahawks.Thisis emphasized by thecontinuing popularity of theH-60 to export customersaround the world. So far,Spain, Japan, Australia, andTaiwan have all bought theirownversionsoftheSeahawktooperateoffvariousclasses

ofescort.

A cutaway view of a

Raytheon BGM-109Tomahawk Land AttackMissile.JACKRYANENTERPRISES,LTD.,BYLAURADENINNOThe futureof theSeahawk

community is lookingdecidedly upbeat these days,mostly due to themodernization plan that hasrecently been announced.Shortly, the two hundred orso surviving -B, -F, and -H-

modelSeahawkswillbe sentback to the Sikorsky factoryin Stratford, Connecticut, tobe remanufactured to acommon SH-60R standard.AllSeahawkswillnowcarrytheLAMPSIIIand-Fsensorpackages (both sonobuoysanddippingsonar),aswellasimproved engines andavionics.Thisupgradeshouldmake it possible for the -RSeahawks to last into the 21st century until the next

generation of sea controlhelicopterisdesigned.Unfortunately, the use of

the HH-60H airframes toproduce -R-model birds willcreate a shortfall for theCSAR/special operationsforce. At the same time, theelderly fleet of UH-46 SeaKnight VerticalReplenishment (VERTREP)helicoptersisabouttofalloutoftheskyfromwearandtear.

Recognizing this, the Navyhas ordered the developmentandproductionofanentirelynew model of Seahawk, theCH-60, which will take overthe CSAR/special operationsduties previously assigned tothe -Hmodel, as well as theVERTREPmissionoftheSeaKnight.Thefirstprototype iscurrently flying,and low-rateproductionhasbeenapprovedfor up to two hundred of theCH-60 variants. First

deliveries to the fleet willbegininFY-1999.

RaytheonBGM-109Tomahawk:The“Other”Strike

Aircraft

Not all the aircraft that flyfrom theCVBGaremanned.

Another strike weaponavailable to battle groupcommanders for hittingtargets ashore is the BGM-109 Tomahawk cruisemissile.TheTomahawkisanall-weather submarine- orship-launched land-attackcruisemissile,with a varietyof warheads. Stowed invertical launch tubes orcontainers,itcanbelaunchedfrom long range, and canstrikewithpinpointprecision

(less than three meters/tenfeet from the aimpoint). IntheU.S.Fleet,everyonecallsit the TLAM (pronounced“tea-lamb”), which is anacronymforTomahawkLandAttackMissile, todistinguishit from the discontinuedTASM, or Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile. Conceived inthe 1970’s for a nuclear“Doomsday” scenario,TLAMhasbeenreborninthe’90’sas the big stickofU.S.

policy.TLAM looks rather like a

cigar with stubby pop-outwings and tail fins. A solid-fuel booster rocket (which isattached to the rear of themissile and looks like anoversized coffee can) hurlsthe missile out of its launchcanister/ container. TLAM is18 feet, 3 inches/5.6 meterslong (20 feet, 6 inches/6.25meterswiththebooster),20.4

inches/51.8cmindiameter(itfits inside a standard 21-in/533mm torpedo tube), hasa deployed wingspan of 8feet,9 inches/2.7meters,andweighs 2,650 lb/1,192.5 kg(3,200 1b/1,440 kg with thebooster).Itfliesataspeedofapproximately Mach .75/550kn/880 kph, and has a rangeof870nm/1,000mi/1,610kmfor the basic land-attackversion.Thestandardpayloadfor a TLAM is a 1,000-

lb/454-kg-class “unitary”warhead that has blast,fragmentary, and penetrationeffects. There are alsoversions with other types ofwarheads, including smallsubmunitions for use on areatargets like SAM sites andairfields. TLAMs are not asstealthy as F-117’s or B-2’s,but they are still almostundetectable by an enemy,thanks to the missile’s smallradar cross-section and low-

altitude flight path.59 Andbecause the turbofan engineemits very little heat energy,infrareddetectionisnoeasier.The current TLAM

inventory has a complexfamily tree of variants andmodifications, extendingthrough three distinctgenerations or “Blocks.”These are distinguishedmainly by the differentguidance and warhead

systems shown in the tablebelow:BGM-109 TomahawkVariantChart

The launch of a BGM-109Tomahawk Land AttackMissile (TLAM) from theAegis cruiser USS Shiloh

(CG-67) during OperationDesertStrike in1996.Cruisemissiles like the Tomahawkarefrequentlyintegratedwithmanned airstrikes to helpsuppressenemyairdefenses.OFFICIAL U.S.NAVYPHOTO

Thenuclear-armedTLAM-Nwastakenoutofserviceby

aPresidentialexecutiveordershortly after the end of theColdWar in1991.Similarly,the collapse of the SovietFleet at the end of thatconflict meant that the long-range (greater than 300nm/555 km) antishippingcapabilities of the TASMwere no longer required.Following their withdrawalfrom service, the TLAM-Nand TASM airframes wereremanufactured into new

Block III missiles (the Navyoftendoesthiswithso-called“legacy”systems).TheBlockIII missiles have beenrecentlygiventhenewBDU-36B penetrating warhead,with a case composed ofhighly reactive titanium forpenetrating a good thicknessof reinforced concrete, aswell as exceptionalincendiaryeffects. Inaboutahundred of the Block IIIs,there is also a one-way

satellite data link that atvarious times during theflight sends updates on themissile’s status and positionback to the firing units andcommandcenters.TheBlockIII’s precision navigationalsystemsuseacombinationofguidancemodestogivethemthe same kind of accuracy(less than three meters/tenfeetfromtheaimpoint)asanLGB.

When a Tomahawk islaunched,theMk.111rocketbooster fires, thrusting itvertically into the air (afterburnout, the booster isdiscarded). The wings andguidance fins are thendeployedandacoverplate isblownofftheinletductofthetiny Williams InternationalF107-WR-402 turbofanengine. The F107 burns aspecial high-energy, high-density liquid fuel called JP-

8,which gives itmore rangeper gallon than normal JP-5.As soon as the missile hasstabilized, it begins to fly apreprogrammed route to itsfirst navigational waypointjust prior to landfall. Onceover land, the missile fliesalong its programmed flightpathtothetarget.Mostofthetime, the flight path ismonitored by an inertialguidance system, whichsenses the drift from winds

and small flight errors. Inorder to compensate for any“drift” in the inertial systemitself, the TLAM utilizes asystem called TerrainContour Mapping(TERCOM) to match theterrain belowwith data frompre-surveyed strips of landstored in the missile’scomputer. Should the flightpathdeviatefromtheplannedcourse, it will be corrected,and themissilewill continue

tothenextTERCOMstrip.60

When the missile reachesthe target area, the precisionDigital SceneMatchingAreaCorrelation(DSMAC)systemtakes control. This utilizes adownward-looking infraredcamera with an infraredillumination system (forconsistent lighting at night)that matches up features onthe ground and makes anynecessary corrections to the

missile’s flight path. ThoughtheDSMACsystemdoesnotactually “home” onto thetarget,itdoesprovideenoughaccuracy to fly a TLAMthrough thegoalpostuprightsonafootballfield.Inordertoimprove the existingInertial/TERCOM/DSMACguidance package, a GPSreceiverhasbeen installed inthenewBlockIIImissiles.Intheeventofarapidlyplannedstrike, GPS eliminates the

needforTERCOMmaps;andwith GPS, the atomic clocksaboardthesatellitesprovideaprecision Time-of-Arrival(TOA) control capability.Using this, the missile’sarrival at the target can betimedtothesecond.OncetheTLAMisoverthetargetarea,themissile’s job is toput thepayload onto the desiredtarget. It can fly or dive intotheimpactpoint(abunkerorbuilding), explode over a

“soft” target (such as anaircraft or radar), or spreadaload of submunitions over adesiredarea.While the existing

stockpile of Block II and IIITLAMsarecapableofdoinga fine job, there are plans tomake them even better.Admiral Johnson would liketo drive the cost of TLAMstrikemissiles down, and theway to manufacture them

more cheaply is to re-engineer the design to takeadvantage of new structures,materials, andcomputer/software advances.ThisproposedTLAMvariantis the so-called “TacticalTomahawk,” which wouldprobably cost around$575,000 a copy. TacticalTomahawk would beequipped with a two-waysatellite data link, whichwould allow it to be re-

targeted in flight. The newTLAMwill alsobeequippedwith a camera system,allowing the missiles toconduct their own damageassessments. Expect to seethis newvariant in the a fewyears.One of theprototype/preproduction F/A-18 Super Hornets during atest flight. The SuperHornetwillreplaceearly-modelF-14

Tomcats in the early 21stcentury.BOEING MILITARYSYSTEMS

Once upon a time, theTLAM filled naval aviatorswith anxieties. They fearedthattheTomahawkhad“Thismachine wants your job!”written on the side.But theirfears have faded, and todaymostofthemviewtheTLAMthe way a hunter sees hisfavorite hunting dog—goodand faithful beasts that arewilling to go places wherehuman beings should not go,and do things that human

beings really should not do.Still, naval aviators like tojoke that in the next war nomore Navy Crosses will behanded out; the cruisemissiles will have hit thereally difficult targets! Everybomb carries a politicalmessage. Today, TLAM isprobably America’s mosteffective bomb-carryingpolitical messenger. The“Gunboat Diplomacy” of the19th century has become

“Tomahawk Diplomacy” inthe20thand21st.

TheFuture:BoeingF/A-18E/FSuper

Hornet

The shortcomings of theexisting F/A-18 Hornet arewell understood, and have

longcausedNavalaviatorstowish for their resolution.Meanwhile, the 1993retirement of the A-6E/KA-6D fleet and the failure toproduce a replacement for ithavemeantthatNAVAIRhasbeen hard pressed to getanykindofnewaircraftontoU.S.carrier decks. At one pointthe feeling seemed tobe thatsincetheNavywasunabletoproducenewaircraft,perhapsit might be able to field a

highlymodifiedone.Back in1991, the Navy leadershipdecided tobuildanupgradedversion of theHornet,whichwould replace the F-14 andearly versions of the F/A-18.This redesigned F/A-18would (hopefully!) resolvethe Hornet’s fuel-fractionproblem as well as othershortcomings and provide aninterim aircraft until a moreadvanced and suitable long-term solution to the Navy’s

aircraft procurement needcouldbedeveloped.Thuswasborn the F/A-18E/F SuperHornet,thekeytotheNavy’scurrent naval aviationupgradeplan.As planned, the F/A-18E

(singleseat)and-F(two-seattrainer) are more than just -C/D models with minorimprovements. They are infact brand-new airframes,with less than 30%

commonality with the olderHornets. The airframe itselfhas been enlarged toaccommodate the internalfuel load that was lacking inthe earlier F/A-18’s. With afuel fraction of around .3 (asopposed to the .23 of theearlierHornets),muchof therange/endurance problems ofthe earlier birds should beresolved. The twin enginesare new General ElectricF414-GE-400’s, which will

each now deliver 22,000lb/9,979 kg of thrust inafterburner. There is also anewwing,withenoughroomfor an extra weapons pyloninboardof thewing fold lineon each side, which shouldhelp resolve some of thecomplaintsabouttheHornet’sweapons load.Toensure thatthe Super Hornet can landsafely with a heavierfuel/weaponsloadthanearlierF/A-18’s, the airframe

structure and landing gearhave also been strengthened.Since most of the-E/F’sweaponsloadisplannedtobeexpensivePGMs,whichmustbe brought back if notexpended,thisisessential.TheSuperHornetwillalso

be the first USN aircraft tomake use of radar andinfrared signature-reductiontechnologies. Most of theworkin thisareacanbeseen

in themodifiedengine inlets,which have been squared offto reduce their signature andcoated with radar-absorbingmaterial. This should greatlyincrease the survivability andpenetrationcapabilitiesofthenewbird.Finally, the Super Hornet

willbethefirstnavalaircraftto carry a new generation ofelectronic-countermeasuresgear including theALE-50,a

towed decoy system that isproving highly effective intests against the newestthreats in the arsenals of ourpotentialenemies.To back up the new

airframe and engines, theavionics of the new Hornetwillbeamongthebest in theworld. The radar will be thesame APG- 73 fitted to thelate-productionmodelsof theF/A-18C/D. An even newer

radar, based on the samefixed-phased-arraytechnologyastheAPG-77ontheUSAF’sF-22ARaptor, isunder development as well.To replace the sometimestroublesome Nighthawk pod,Hughes has recently beenselected to develop a third-generation FLIR/targetingsystem for the SuperHornet,which will give it the besttargeting resolution of anystrikeaircraftintheworld.

The cockpit, designedagain by the incomparableEugene Adam and his team,will have a mix of “glass”MFDs(infullcolor!),andanimproved user interface forthepilot.Onepartofthiswillbeahelmet-mountedsightingsystem for use with the newAIM-9X version of theSidewinder AAM. Otherweapons will include thecurrentarrayofironordnanceandPGMs,aswellasthenew

GBU-29/30/31/32 JDAMS,AGM-154JSOW,andAGM-84E SLAM-ER cruisemissile.There will also be

provisions for the SuperHornet to carry largerexternaldroptanksaswellasthe same “buddy” refuelingstoreusedbytheS-3/ES-3totankotheraircraft.Allthiscapabilitycomesat

acost,though.Atamaximum

grossweight of some 66,000lb/29,937 kg, the SuperHornetwillweighmore thanany other aircraft on a flightdeck, including the F-14Tomcat.WhenMcDonnellDouglas

(nowpartofBoeingMilitaryAircraft) was given thecontract todeveloptheSuperHornet,theysetouttohaveahigh level of commonalitywiththeexistingF/A-18fleet.

Early on in the designprocess, though, it becameapparent that only a smallpercentage of the parts andsystemscouldbecarriedoverto the new bird. Despite thislackoftruecommonality,theSuper Hornet was the onlynew tactical aircraft in theNavy pipeline, and so theNavy went forward with itsdevelopment.Today, the aircraft is well

into its test program, withlow-rateproductionapprovedbyCongress.61Ataround$58million a copy (when fullproduction is reached), theSuperHornetwillhardlybeabargain ( -C/-D-modelHornetscost abouthalf that).On the other hand, whenstacked next to the estimated$158-million-dollar-per-unitcost of the USAF’s new F-22A Raptor stealth fighter,

the Super Hornet looks likequite a deal!Considering thecurrent budget problemswithin the Department ofDefense, there is a realpossibility that one programor the other might becanceled. Since the SuperHornet is already inproduction (the F-22A hasjustbegunflighttests),itmayhave an edge in the fundingbattlesahead.

If the Super Hornetsurvives the budget wars,current plans have the Navybuying at least five hundredof them in the next decade.Thismeanstheywillbegintoreplace early model F-14Aswhen the first fleet squadronstands up and goes to sea in2001. Meanwhile, there isadvanced work on severalSuper Hornet derivatives,including a two-seat all-weather strike version (that

would restore the lostcapabilities of the A-6Intruder) and an electroniccombat version of the F/A-18F (the so-called “ElectricHornet”) that would replacetheEA-6BProwler.

TheFuture:JointStrikeFighter(JSF)

Airmenandotherwarfightersoftengettestywhentheyhearsomebody trying tosell thema “joint” project. All toooften, “joint” has meant,“Let’s pretend to cooperate,so the damned bean-countersand politicians won’t slashour pet projects again.” Oneof the longest-running ofthesejointdreamshaslookedto find a common airframethatalltheservicescouldusetosatisfytheirtacticalfighter

and strike requirements. Thenewest incarnation of thisdream is called the JointStrikeFighter(JSF).Thelureof potential multi-billion-dollar savings from such aprogram is the basis for theJSF program, which is anattempttoreversethehistorictrend of escalating unit costforcombataircraft.Taxpayer“stickershock”atthepriceofaircraft like the F-22 Raptorand F/A-18E/F SuperHornet

is threatening to unleash apolitical backlash against theentire military aerospacecomplex. Thus the JSFprogram is aiming for aflyaway cost in the $30-to-$40-million range, for thefirst time emphasizingaffordability rather thanmaximumperformance.

An artist’s concept of theLockheed Martin Navyvariant of the proposed JointStrikeFighter(JSF).LOCKHEED MARTIN,FORTWORTHThe contracting battle for

JSFwillpitLockheedMartinagainst Boeing (newlymerged with McDonnellDouglas), with the winner

possiblybecomingthebuilderof the last manned tacticalaircraft of all time. With aplanned buy of some twothousand aircraft, it certainlywill be the most expensivecombat aircraft program inhistory. Meanwhile, for thisprogram to succeed, it willhave to satisfy fourdemanding customers—theUSAF, theUSN, theUSMC,and the British Royal Navy.To satisfy these customers,

the JSF Program Officeenvisions a family of threecloselyrelatedbutnot totallyidenticalairframes.The USAF sees JSF as a

conventional, multi-rolestrikefightertoreplacetheF-16. With many foreign airforcesplanning to retire theirF-16fleetsaround2020,thereis a huge potential exportmarketforsuchanaircraft.Inaddition, the Marine Corps

needs some six hundredSTOVL (Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing) aircraft toreplace both the F/A-18C/DHornet and the AV-8BHarrier. The similar RoyalNavy requirement is for justsixty STOVL aircraft toreplace the FRS.2 SeaHarriers embarked on theirsmall Invincible-class (R 05)aircraftcarriers.InDecemberof1995,theUnitedKingdomsigned a memorandum of

understanding as acollaborative partner indeveloping the aircraft withthe United States, and iscontributing $200 milliontoward the program. TheRoyal Navy plans to replacethe aging V/STOL SeaHarrier with a short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing versionoftheJSF.The U.S. Navy’s

requirement is for three

hundred “highly survivable”(meaning “stealthy”), carrier-based strike fighters toreplace early-modelF/A-18’sand the last of the F-14Tomcats. Its version of theaircraftwillhaveanumberofdifferences with the othervariants. For instance, thelanding gear will have alongerstrokeandhigherloadcapacity than the USAF andUSMC versions. To helpduringlow-speedapproaches,

theNavyversionwill have alarger wing and larger tailcontrol surfaces than theotherJSFvariants.Thelargerwing also means increasedrange and payload capabilityfor the Navy variant, withalmost twice the range of anF-18Coninternalfuel.As you would expect, the

internalstructureoftheNavyvariant will be strengthenedin order to handle the loads

associated with catapultlaunches and arrestedlandings. There will be acarrier-suitable tailhook,though this may not have tobe as strong as on previousnaval aircraft, because theJSF will be powered by thesamePratt&Whitney F119-PW-100 turbofanplannedforuse on the USAF F-22ARaptor.Thisenginehasa“2-Dimensional” nozzle (it willrotate in the vertical plane),

which will allow it to havemuchlowerlandingapproachspeeds than current carrieraircraft, and may allow thenext generation of carriers(CVX) to do away withcatapultsaltogether.The Navy’s need for

survivability means that theJSF design will have a levelof stealth technologycomparable with the F-22 orB-2stealthdesigns,whichare

the current gold standard inthat area. All ordnance willbe internally carried, andplans are for it to carry two2,000-lb/909.1-kg-classweapons in addition to aninternalgunandAAMsBoeing and Lockheed

Martin are scheduled toconduct a fly-off of theircompetingJSFdesignsintheyear 2000, with a contractawardthefollowingyear.The

BoeingmodelisknownastheX-32, while the LockheedMartin design has beendesignated X-35. Thewinningentryshouldbecomeoperational sometime around2010, at which time it willbegin to replace theremainingF/A-18C/Daircraftinservice.Thisisamake-or-break program for all thearmed services of theUnitedStates. If it works, then theU.S. and our allieswill have

the pre-eminent strike fighterof the 21st century at theircommand.

TheFuture:CommonSupport

Aircraft

While fighters and strikeaircraft are important, the

various support aircraft likethe S-3 Viking and E-2Hawkeye play equally vitalroles in a CVW. And likefighters, they will somedayhave to be replaced. Whilethis is not going to happensoon, planning for what willbe known as the CommonSupport Aircraft (CSA) isalready underway. Thisaircraft will take over theAEW, COD, ESM/SIGINT,andperhapseventankerroles

currently handled by no lessthanthreedifferentairframes.As always, funding is aproblem. Right now, there isvery little money availableforthedevelopmentofanewmedium-lift airframe thatcould be made carrier-capable. In current-yeardollars, it would probablycostsomethinglike$3billionjusttodesignanddeveloptheairframe.Andthepriceofthevarious mission equipment

packages for each role isanybody’sguess.

An artist’s concept of anAGM-84 SLAM-ER cruisemissile. The SLAM-ER isheaded into production, andwill be the long-range strikeweapon for naval aviationintothe21stcentury.BOEINGMISSILESYSTEMSOnelikelywayaroundthis

dilemma might involveadapting for the Navy thenew V-22 Osprey tilt-rotortransport currently entering

productionfortheUSMCandUSAF. A V-22-based CSAcould eliminate much of theairframe development costsandallowthedesignofstate-of-the-art mission-equipmentpackages. It might evenreplacetheSH-60RsandCH-60’swhentheybegintowearout.

TheFuture:Bombs

andMissiles

With the introduction ofGPS-guided air-to-groundordnance and improvedversionsofanumberofolderPGM systems, the era ofNavy aircraft dropping andfiring unguided ordnance isdead.62 In OperationDeliberate Force in Bosnia,for example, something like

70% of the weaponsexpended in that short buteffective air campaign werePGMs. This percentage islikely to rise in futureconflicts. What follows is aquick look at the programsthat are important to navalaviators.

AGM-84ESLAMExpandedResponseMissile

As mentioned earlier, theengineers at Boeing MissileSystems have been workingonanimprovedversionoftheAGM-84E SLAM missile,which they call SLAMExpandedResponse (SLAM-ER). SLAM-ER is designedto add a new generation oftechnology to the solidfoundation laid by HarpoonandSLAM.ThisnewmissilewillgivetheNavyastandoffstrike weapon with

unprecedented lethal powerand accuracy. Improvementsto thebasicSLAM include apair of “pop-out” wings(similar to those on theTLAM), which will give itmore range (out to 150nm/278 km) and bettermaneuverability. A newwarhead utilizes the samekind of reactive titaniumcasing used on the Block IIITLAM, while its nose hasbeen modified with a new

seeker window to give theseeker a better field-of-view.The guidance system ofSLAM-ER incorporates anew software technologydevelopedbyBoeingand thelabs at Naval WeaponsCenter at China Lake,California. Known asAutomaticTargetAcquisition(ATA, also known as DirectAttack Munition AffordableSeeker—DAMASK), itallows the SLAM-ER seeker

to automatically pick out atarget from the backgroundclutter. The seeker then“locks” it up and flies themissiletoaprecisehit(withinthree meters/ten feet of theplanned aimpoint). TheSLAM-ER isalready in low-rate production and haspassed all of its tests withflying colors. In fact, thisprogram has become sosuccessful that the Navy hasdeleted its funding for the

planned Joint Air-to-SurfaceStandoff Missile (JASSAM),since SLAM-ER completelymeets the requirements forthat. Current plans haveSLAM-ER entering the fleetin1999.Atestingversionof theJointDirect Attack Munition(JDAM) guided bomb.JDAM utilizes GPStechnology to guide itwithinjustafewyards/metersofthe

aimpoint.BOEINGMISSILESYSTEMS

GBU-29/30/31/32Joint

DirectAttackMunition(JDAM)GuidedBomb

Family

One key limitation of thecurrent generation of LGBsand Imaging Infrared (IIR)-guidedPGMs is that they donot perform well in poorweather. Water vapor andcloud cover are the enemiesof these weapons andtargeting systems, and haveproven to be significant

roadblocks to theiremployment. What airpowerplanners need is a family oftrue, all-weather PGMs.Creatingthisisthegoalofthejoint USAF/USN/USMCJoint Direct AttackMunition(JDAM)program,whichwillgointoservicein1999.Now being developed by

Boeing Missile Systems(formerly McDonnellDouglas Missile Systems),

JDAM is designed to be a“strap-on” guidance kit,compatible with a variety ofdifferent bomb warheads.JDAMwillbeequippedwitha GPS guidance system andcontrol fins, which can fitaroundaconventionalMk.83(1,000-lb/454 kg), Mk. 84(2,000-lb/909-kg), or BLU-109 (2,000 lb/909 kg) bomb.Since theJDAMwill take itsguidance from theconstellationofGPSsatellites

in orbit around the earth, allyou’ll need to designate atargetwillbethesixteen-digitnumeric code that representsthe target’s geographiclocation on the earth’ssurface.Ascurrentlyplanned,there

willbefourseparateversionsof thePhase I JDAMfamily.Theyinclude:

An F/A-18C Hornet armedwith four AGM-154A JointStandoff Weapons (JSOWs)during a test flight. JSOW isone of a family of precision-strikeweaponsguidedby theNAVISTAR GPS satellitenavigationsystem.RAYTHEON STRIKESYSTEMS

ThemajorityoftheJDAMacquisitionwill be composedof kits for the GBU-31 and-32versions.These are sizedto fit around bothMk. 83/84

general-purpose bombs, aswell as BLU-109/110penetrationwarheads. So far,the program is proceedingwell in tests, and has provedto be quite accurate. Thespecifiedthirteen-meter/forty-three foot-accuracy (sixmeters/ twenty feetwhen thenewBlockIIRGPSsatellitesare put into service) isregularlybeingbeatenindroptests,andJDAMshouldcomeintoserviceonschedule.Ata

price of only about $15,000over the price of the bomb,JDAM is going to bequite abargain. It needs to be, sincecurrent plans have theAmerican military alonebuying over 87,000 JDAMkits over the next decade orso. One intriguing questionabout JDAM is whether ornot it will be fitted with anATA-type seeker toenable itto hit really precise targets.While anATA seekerwould

only add another $15,000 tothe cost of each kit, theaccuracy would narrow tolessthanthreemeters/tenfeet—asgoodasthePavewayIIILGBs in service today. Iwouldexpect thatyouwouldsee an ATA-based seekerdeployedonJDAMby2003.

AGM-154JointStandoffWeapon(JSOW)

Wellonitswayintoactiveservice, the AGM-154 JointStandoff Weapon (JSOW) isintended to be a munitions“truck”abletocarryavarietyof weapons and payloads.63Designed to glide to a targetwith guidance from anonboard GPS/INS system, itcan deliver its payload withthesameaccuracyasaJDAMbomb.TheinitialAGM-154Aversion is armed with BLU-

97 Combined EffectMunitions(CEMs),while the-B model will carry BLU-108 Sensor Fused Weapons(SFWs) for attacking armorand vehicles. There are alsoplans for a -Cmodel for theNavy,whichwillhavea500-lb/226.8-kgMk.82/BLU-111unitarywarhead as well as aman-in-the-loop data-linksystem similar to that onSLAM.AnATA-type seekermay also be fitted. This

weapon is now officiallyoperational with the fleet,with six -A models forward-deployed on the USSNimitz(CVN-68) prior to the 1997Iraqcrisis,wheretheyalmostgottheircombatintroduction.

AIM-9XSidewinderAir-to-AirMissile

For almost a decade, thefighter pilots of the United

Stateshavebeenflyingwithashort-range AAM that hasbeen thoroughly outclassedby competing products fromRussia, Israel, and France.Despiteitspastsuccesses,thethird-generation AIM-9L/MSidewinder AAM has beenpassed by and is nowthoroughly outclassed. Helpisonthewayhowever,intheform of a new fourth-generation Sidewinder, theAIM-9X.Built byRaytheon-

Hughes Missile Systems, itwill become operational in1999. The changes in theAIM- 9X start at the seekerhead, which will be a“staring” IIR array, able todetect targets at rangesbeyond those of the humaneye. A new guidance andcontrol section at the rear ofthe missile will make it themost maneuverable AAM intheworld.Reduceddragwillalsoextenditsrangeand“no-

escape” zone for enemytarget aircraft. Finally, theentireAIM-9Xsystemwillbecontrolled by a new helmet-mounted sighting system,whichwillfirstseeserviceinthe Super Hornet (but it willalso be fitted on the Tomcatand earlier-model Hornets).This new missile will be somaneuverable that an AIM-9X can be fired at enemyaircraftthatarealongside thelaunchingaircraft!

TheRealFuture:UnmannedCombatAerialVehicles

Even as the JSF designs arebeing finalized and theeventualwinnerselected,itisimportant to remember thatLockheedMartin andBoeingcan’t engineer out the natureofthehumansthatwillflyit.Right now, combat aircraft

require their air crews toendure dynamic forces thatarenothinglessthanphysicaltorture. At times thesestresses can turn deadly. Therapid onset of G-forces insharpturnsliterallydrainstheblood from pilots’ heads,causingasudden“G-InducedLoss-of-Consciousness,” orG-LOC. This means thatthere is a limit to theperformance engineers canput into new aircraft—the

physical limitations of thehumanpilots.

A flight of LockheedMartinUnmanned Combat AerialVehicle (UCAV) conceptaircraft. Such remote-controlled aircraft will likelyserveinthemid-21stcentury.LOCKHEEDMARTINWith this in mind, it is

likely that the generation ofcombataircraftafterJSFwillbeunmanned.Today,inroles

like photo-reconnaissanceandwide-area surveillance, agreat deal is already beingdone with Unmanned AerialVehicles(UAVs).Backinthe1970’s therewere even trialswith armed drones, thoughthe threat to pilot billets putshortwork to that idea.Evenso,theymakealotofsense—if not today, then tomorrow.What will be known asUnmanned Combat AerialVehicles, or UCAVs for

short, will probably start outas modified existing designs(such as leftover F-16’s orF/A-18’s) whose cockpitswillbefilledwithsensorsanddata links back to theoperators on the ground. Infact, a modified F/A-18Cwould make an excellentfirst-generationUCAV, sinceit already can conductautomaticcarrierlandings.The aircraftwould fly and

operate conventionally, withtheexceptionthatwhenhigh-Gmaneuvers are needed, the9-Glimitintheflight-controlsoftware could be disabledand the UCAV flown to theactual structural limits of thedesign.Sincewealreadyhavein service AAMs that makethirty-G turns, we couldeasily produce combataircraft with performancesthat would make mannedaircraft obsolete overnight.

UCAVswoulddoubtlessalsobemuchcheaperthancurrentdesigns,sincesomuchofthemoney in a manned aircraftdesign goes into making itsafe for thepilotandcrewtooperate.Keep an eye on thisemerging technology. It willbeexciting!

CarrierBattleGroup:PuttingItAllTogether

AircraftCarrierBattleGroups(CVBGs)are the singlemostusefulmilitaryforceavailablein time of crisis or conflict.No other military unit, be itanairbornebrigadeorawingof strategic bombers, gives

the leadershipofanation theoptionsandpowerthatsuchaforce commands. This isbecause the real value ofCVBGs goes far beyond thesimple existence of the unitand its availability forcombat;CVBGsalsoprovidepresence.America’sforward-deployedbattlegroups in theMiddleEast and theWesternPacific are the most visiblesymbolofthenation’sglobalcommitments. Because of

thesebattlegroups,ournationhas a say in the affairs ofnations and people whothreaten our vital nationalinterests. The commander ofsuch a battle group bears anawesomeresponsibility.Rear Admiral Jay Yakley

was one of thosecommanders.He’sgonefromflying fighters in Vietnam tocommandinghisownaircraftcarrier battle group (CVBG),

based around the USSAbraham Lincoln (CVN-72).Back in the early days ofAugust1990,hewas theoneofthepointmenfacingdowntheforcesofSaddamHusseinfollowing the invasion ofKuwait. As commander ofCarrier Air Wing Fourteen(CVW-14) aboard the USSIndependence (CV-61), hewas in charge of the firstorganized combat air unit toreachtheregionfollowingthe

invasion. In this capacity,together with roughly tenthousand other Americans ofthe Independence CVBG, hehadthejobofholdingthelineuntil other reinforcementscouldarrive.He did not have long to

wait. Within days, Alliedunits began to pour in andformthecoreofthecoalitionthat eventually liberatedKuwait and defeated

Saddam’s forces. But forthose first few days, JayYakley and his roughlyninetyairplanesweretheonlycredible aerial force thatmight have struck atSaddam’s armored columns,had they chosen to continuetheir advance into the oilfields and ports of northernSaudi Arabia. Only Husseinhimselfknowswhetherornotthe Independence group wasthe deterrent that kept

Saddam from invadingSaudiArabia.However, the ability to

quickly move theIndependence and her battlegroup from their forward-deployedpositionnearDiegoGarcia made it possible todemonstrate Americanresolve to the Iraqi dictator.That is the real point ofaircraft carriers: to be seen.Onceseen,theycancausean

aggressor to show commonsenseandbackoff.Butiftheaggressor fails to showcommon sense, then theCVBGcanact tomake thembackoffwithforce.It is not just the obvious

power of the carriers—ormore particularly, of theaircraft that fly off them—that is the source of theoptions a CVBG providesnationalleadership.Infact,to

look at a CVBG withoutseeingbeyondthecarrieristolook at an iceberg withoutseeing what lies submerged.TherealpowerofaCVBGisfarmorethanwhattheflattopwithitsairwingcanbringtobear. Each CVBG is acarefully balanced mix ofships,aircraft,personnel,andweapons,designedtoprovidethe national commandauthorities with an optimummix of firepower and

capabilities. That the groupcan be forward-deployedmeans that it has a presencewherever it goes, and thatAmerican leaders haveoptions when events take asuddenor unpleasant turnonthe other side of the planet.Thedownsideiscost.CVBGsare among the mostexpensive military units tobuild, operate, train, andmaintain; a country can onlybuysomany.Nevertheless,in

theyearssincetheendoftheCold War, CVBGs havedemonstratedhowveryusefulthey can be on a number ofoccasions. Operations likeSouthernWatch (Iraqi no-flypatrols, 1991 to present),Uphold Democracy (Haiti,1994), and Deliberate Force(Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995)areonlyafewofthese.

CarrierBattleGroupDevelopment

Common sense dictatesprotecting the most valuablewarships in your arsenalwhen they head intopotentially hostile waters.And that—simply—is thereason why aircraft carriersare placed in battle groups.Aircraft carriers are useless

unless they are carryingaircraft. But it takes morethan just airplanes to insurethe carrier’s survival. Moreimportant, using the CVW’sassets for carrier defensedefeats the real strength ofsea-based aviation. Unlesscarrier-based aircraft areflying attack missions ordefending other fleet vessels(and aircraft are not in factable to stay airborne longenough to fully accomplish

that job), they are beingwasted. In other words,sentinels with more stayingpower than aircraft mustprotect the carrier againstthreats—particularlysubmarines—thatcanleaveitso much burned and twistedscrap metal on the oceanfloor. Any ship, no matterhow well built, even a hugeninety-thousand-plus-tonNimitz-class (CVN-68)carrier, can be sunk by

conventional weapons.Withoutsomesortofescort,acarrier is just a very largeopportunity for some enemyofficer.The original configuration

that gave birth to CVBGdevelopment dates from theearly experiments withcarriers in the late 1920’s.Because of their high speedsand medium-caliber gunarmament, the large carriers

that emerged from the 1922Washington Naval Treatytended to be assigned to thescouting or cruiser forces ofnavies. They initially wereusedas“eyes”forthelinesofbattleships thatwere then thereal measure of seapower.But before long, carrieradmirals found ways tooperate independently,showing that they couldsurvive without the backingofalineofbattleships.Bythe

outbreakoftheSecondWorldWar, they were the battleforces.In 1939, no nation had

morethanahalf-dozenlarge-deck carriers, and mostCVBGs had only a singleflattop, with a handful ofcruisers and destroyers asescorts. However, thispracticebegantochangeveryrapidly with the outbreak ofWorld War II. Early in the

war, theBritishbegan toaddfast battleships and battlecruisers to carrier groups,providing protection againstenemysurfaceunits.ThentheJapanese grouped their sixbig-deckcarriersintoasingleunit called the Kido Butai(Japanese for “StrikingForce”). Its escort included apair of fast battleships, somecruisers, and over a dozendestroyers—enough to standup against all but the largest

surface fleet. With multipleflight decks and hundreds offighters and strike aircraft,Kido Butai could overwhelmany fleet or air force itencountered. Officiallyknown as the “First AirFleet,” and commanded byAdmiral Chichi Nagumo, itwas Kido Butai that struckPearl Harbor on December7th, 1941. For the next sixmonths, Nagumo and KidoButai ranged across half the

globe, the most powerfulforce in Naval history. Onlythe “miracle at Midway”stopped Kido Butai, andreturned the initiative inCVBG evolution to theAmericans.By early 1943, the power

of American industry begantomakeitselffeltasastreamof new Essex (CV-9) andIndependence-class (CVL-22)fastfleetcarrierssteamed

across the Pacific. Beforeheading for action, theywouldstopatPearlHarbortoconduct training and beintegrated with fast, newbattleships, cruisers,destroyers, and other supportships, and then formed intoTask Groups. (Two or moreTask Groups formed a TaskForce.) Experience gainedduring raids on Japaneseisland outposts in 1943showedthattheoptimumsize

for such groupswas three orfour carriers, a pair of fastbattleships, four cruisers, andtwelve to sixteen destroyers.Morecarriersthanthattendedtomakethegroupsunwieldy.Task Groups werecommandedbyaseniornavalaviator, who assigned strikemissions, refuelingassignments, independentraids,andotherjobs.Byearly1944,TaskForce

34/58haddeveloped into themostpowerfulNavalforceinhistory. This force, basedaroundfourTaskGroupsandcommandedbyAdmiralMarcMitscher, won key battles—in the Philippine Sea, offFormosa,atLeyteGulf,intheSouthChinaSea, andaroundOkinawa—thateventuallyledto Allied victory in thePacific. Task Force 34/58never lost a battle, andthroughout its two-year life

spanlostonlyasingleflattop,the light carrier Princeton(CVL-23).The end of World War II

broughtanumberofchangesto CVBGs. In fact, themassive force reductionsfollowing the war almostspelled their end. Results ofthe early atomic tests atBikini showed the need todisperse carrier groups. Thussingle-carrier CVBGs again

became the norm. On theotherhand,new technologiesbegan to make theseindividualcarriersmuchmoreeffective and powerful.Angled flight decks, steamcatapults, jet engines, air-to-air missiles (AAMs), andatomic weapons marked justafewofthenewsystemsthatNaval aviators saw arrive inthe decade of Elvis and Ike.As new technologies arrived,CVBGsbegantochangetheir

mixes of aircraft and ships.Piston-engined propelleraircraft were sent to theboneyard, and replaced bysupersonic jets and high-performance turboprops. Thebattleships and big-guncruisers were also retired, asnew guided-missiledestroyers and cruisers tookover the job of escorting anew generation of flattops.Even without the destructivepowerofthenuclearweapons

theycarried,eachcarriernowhad more firepower than anentire World War II TaskGroup.AtthestartoftheVietnam

War in the mid-1960’s,America had more carriersthan the rest of the worldcombined, allowing theUSNtoeasily station threeor fourCVBGs in the South ChinaSea.Eachgroupnormallyhadoneattackcarrier,aswellasa

guided-missile destroyer orcruiser to provide surface-to-air missile (SAM) coverage.KnownasTaskForce77,theflattops were on station nearVietnam from the torpedoboat attacks of the Gulf ofTonkin Incident in 1964 tothe evacuation of Saigon adecade later. By then, theolder World War II-eracarriers were worn out andhad to be retired. Yet, withthedefensebudgetdrainedby

the Vietnam War, one-for-onereplacementofshipsandaircraft was impossible.Instead,theNavybuiltanewgeneration of amphibiousships with flight decks forhelicopters (theTarawa-class(LHA-1)), and combined theattack and ASW missionsintotheairwings(CVWs)onthe fifteen newer carrierscommissioned since the endofWorldWarII.ByaddingasquadroneachofS-3Vikings

and SH-3 Sea Kinghelicopters to the existingattack carrier wings, the so-called “CV Air Wing” wascreated in 1975. Thisremained the basic CVWstructure for the rest of theColdWar.While the Navy was

reducing the number ofcarriers and beefing up theirair groups, the new Nimitz-class (CVN-68) nuclear

supercarriers began to arrive.A new generation of aircraftalso began to appear on thedecks of American flattops.In 1974, the F-14 Tomcatarrived in the fleet, alongwith new models of the A-6Intruder and A-7 Corsairattack bombers, andimproved models of the E-2HawkeyeandEA-6BProwlerelectronicaircraft.By the late 1970’s the

driving force in CVBGdevelopment was no longerAmerican plans ortechnology.ThathonorfelltoAdmiral of the Soviet NavySergei Gorshkov. In thegenerationfollowingthehighseas humiliation of his fleetduring the Cuban MissileCrisis, Gorshkov hadmanaged tocreate the largestnavy in the world. Thoughmuch of the Soviet navalbuildup was designed to

support and protect itsgrowing fleet of ballistic-missile submarines, a largeshare of its maritime budgetwas devoted to thedestruction of AmericanCVBGs.Over a period of two

decades, Gorshkov grew hisfleetwithafocusonthelargeair-to-surface (ASMs) andsurface-to-surface missiles(SSMs)thatIdiscussedinthe

fifth chapter. Supporting thisconstruction effort was aprogram of tacticaldevelopment, exemplified byGorshkov’s concept of “theBattleoftheFirstSalvo.”Hisplanwas towin a navalwarby crippling enemy CVBGsbymeansofanearlyseriesofmissile strikes, someof thempre-emptive. By the late1970’s, the Soviet fleet ofASM-armed bombers, andSSM-armedsurfaceshipsand

submarines, was thought bysome to be ready to take ontheUSN for globalmaritimedominance.None of these Soviet

developments wentunnoticed, and systems likethe F-14A Tomcat, AIM-54Phoenix AAM, and E-2CHawkeye were the firstresponses. Then, with thearrival on the scene ofPresidentRonaldReaganand

Secretary of the Navy JohnLehman in 1981, themen ofAmerica’sCVBGsfinallygotthenewshipsandequipmentthat had been needed sincethe 1960’s. After years ofbeing undermanned,underpaid, and short onsparesandordnance,theU.S.Navy was ready to win itsshareof theColdWar’sfinalvictory. To meet theincreasingly sophisticatedSoviet threat, the Navy

bought new Aegis SAMships, and improved aircraftand weapons. However, thebasic structure of the CVBGremained unchanged in the1980’s, and would stay thatwayuntiltheendoftheColdWarandthecomingofDesertStorm in the early 1990’s.What did change was thestrategy by which carrieroperations were to beconducted. In SecretaryLehman’svision(called“The

Maritime Strategy”), in theeventofwarwiththeSoviets,massed groups of three ormoreCVBGswouldadvanceinto the Norwegian Sea orNorth Pacific to strikemilitary bases on the Sovietmainland. In the event, thecollapseoftheSovietEmpireput an end to “TheMaritimeStrategy.”The post-Cold War

Americanmilitarydrawdown

scaled John Lehman’s visionofa“600ShipNavy”backtojustoverhalfthatnumber.Inaddition, the structure ofbattle groups and air wingswas radically altered. Olderclasses of ships were rapidlyretired, along with the entirefleet of A-6 attack bombersandKA-6tankeraircraft.TheCold War-era CVW ofapproximately ninety aircraftshrank to just over seventy.Because the Soviet threat of

ASMs launched frombombers and SSMs fired bysubmarines and surface shipswasnolongersignificant,theneedforfleetairdefensewasgreatlyreducedandtheCVWcould become an almostpurely offensive force. The“outer air battle” wasthereforehandedofffromthesquadrons of F-14’s, F/A-18’s, and E-2’s to the Aegisradars and SM-2 StandardSAMs of the battle group’s

cruisersanddestroyers.Today, the Tomcats and

Hornets have been assignedto carry a variety of air-to-ground ordnance, includingprecision guided munitions(PGMs) for delivery ontotargets ashore. In the currentera of “littoral warfare” (asdefined in “From the Sea”and“ForwardfromtheSea”),this is to be the primaryfunction of sea-based naval

aviation units. Along withdelivering air strikes, thebattle groups of the 1990’shave been given otherpowerful offensivecapabilities. Now CVBGshaveeachbeenteamedwithathree-or-four-shipamphibiousready group (ARG)embarking a battalion-sized“Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable”(MEU (SOC)).64 This means

that as the first century ofnaval aviation comes to aclose, theCVBG/CVW teamstands as an almost purelyoffensive targeting andstriking force for supportingunitsandobjectivesashoreinthelittoralzones.

ForceStructure:HowManyCarriers?

Thoughthepower,flexibility,andmobilityofCVBGsmakethem a critical asset fornational leaders, and this isunlikelytochangeinthe21stcentury, those same leadersmust justify the costs ofbuilding, training, operating,and maintaining such forces.The costs of CVBGs areimmense. The price tag forthe U.S. version probablyruns close to $20 billion tobuild and equip, and another

$1 billion a year to operateand maintain—a lot ofmoney! With those mind-numbingnumbersinmind,letme put a question to you:How many carriers do weneed?Theansweriscomplex.For starters, there are very

fewnationsintheworldwiththe means to even ownflattops. The Royal Navy iscommittedtomaintainingtwocarriers, as is France. Spain

and Italy also plan to buildadditional flattops to givethem each two CVBGs.Russia, Brazil, Thailand, andIndia will struggle tomaintain the single carriergroupstheycurrentlypossess—largely for reasons ofnational prestige. And then,standing alone, the UnitedStates is currently committedtokeepingadozencarriersincommission—as manyflattops as the rest of the

world combined. In the1980’s, John Lehman’s “600Ship Fleet” included fifteenCVBGs,atotaldrivenbythestrategy of simultaneousstrikes around the SovietUnion’s vast periphery.Launching strikes from theNorwegian Sea, theMediterranean,andtheNorthPacific required between sixandeightgroupsreadytogetunder way at any time.Today, with no monolithic

threat on the horizon, theneed for a dozen carriers incommission seems lessobvious.SoistwelveCVBGsoverkill?No,notreally.Thenumberofcarriersour

nation requires is ultimatelydetermined by itscommitments in the post-ColdWar world. In a worldwithout superpowerconfrontation, our “enemies”become “rogue states,” like

North Korea and Iraq, whileinternational terrorists,criminal cartels, and chaoticregional, ethnic, or tribalconflicts now are the keythreats to day-to-day peace.In today’s world order,America’s major overseascommitmentsandinterestsliemainly outside the WesternHemisphere. At the sametime, our victory in theColdWar has burdened the U.S.with responsibility for

peacekeeping and stability inareas that, frankly, mostAmericans would prefer toignore. Consider thefollowing list of globalflashpoints:

• North Korea—On the verge ofstarvation andcollapse, NorthKorea continues tothreaten the SouthKoreans and other

nations in theregion. It hasrecently deployedthe Tapo-Dongballistic missile,and may have oneor two nuclearwarheads.• People’sRepublic ofChina(PRC)/Republic ofChina(ROC/Taiwan)—Following their

confrontation overdemocraticelections andballistic-missiletests/exercises in1996(inwhichtwoAmerican CVBGsintervened), thesetwo estrangedcountries continuetofaceoffinaslowsimmer.• India/Pakistan—As both countries

celebrate theirgoldenanniversaries, theyconfront each otherover disputedborders and ethnicand religiousdifferences. Anacceleratingnucleararms race raisesthreats of regionalnuclear war, andthe proximity ofChina only

exacerbates theproblem.• Persian Gulf—UN—sponsoredsanctions and “no-fly” operationsagainst Iraqcontinue,whileIranincreases the sizeandcapabilityofitsmilitary forces,causing concernamong othercountries in the

region. Iran andIraq once again aredisputing borderareas in thenorthern end of thePersian Gulf, andfiring into eachother’sterritory.• Balkans—ThecrisisintheBalkanshas continued,despite attempts toimplementthe1995Dayton Peace

Accords. Bosniacontinues to be ahot spot, requiringcontinuousmonitoring byNATO forces,while old ethnichostilities areerupting in Kosovoandotherareas.• Algeria—Achronic Islamicinsurrection faces arepressive military

regime, as fanaticgroups commitbrutal massacres invillages near thecountry’s largecities, killinghundreds ofinnocentcivilians.•CentralAfrica—Hutu and Tutsifactions wagegenocidal war,spilling acrossnational borders

and defyinginternational reliefefforts.• West Africa—Destitute nationscontinue to bewracked by coupsand civil wars thathave been endemicsince the end ofcolonial rule in the1960’s, requiringfrequentevacuations of

foreigncivilians.

Current U.S. national

military strategy calls for aforce structure sufficient todealwithtwo“majorregionalcontingencies”(smallwarsorbigcrises)plusone“complexhumanitarian emergency”(natural disaster, epidemic,famine, refugee migration,etc.). Youmight think that adozen CVBGs would be

enough to handle all that.Unfortunately, theunforgiving demands ofcomplex machinery and thenatural limits of humanendurancesetboundariesthatmake a dozen carrier groupsjust barely sufficient tomaintaintwoorthreecarrierson distant deployment at anyonetime.Letmeexplain.Whenyoubuild awarship

like an aircraft carrier, it is

not available for deploymentoverseas all the time.Warships require regularmaintenance and upgrades.Thus, in the forty-five-yearplanned life of an aircraftcarrier, itwillspendasmuchasafifthof its timeindocksand yards being repaired andmaintained. For example, forevery year the ship is inservice, two or three monthsare spent on minor upgradesand maintenance to keep the

ship going between “deep”overhauls (when the warshipis brought into dry dock formajor work). These majoroverhaulsaredoneeveryfiveyearsorso,takefromeighttotwelve months to complete,and include everything fromrepainting the hull toupgrading the living quartersand combat systems.Additionally, nuclear-powered carriers areperiodicallyoutofservicefor

a three-year refueling, anintricate surgery (withmeticulous attention toradiation safety) that requirescutting great holes throughdecksandbulkheadsandthenwelding everything backtogether.Allthismeansthatawarship is only available tosail about three years out ofeveryfive.Thecrew,also,requiresits

own “overhaul,” for the

multitude of combat skillsembodied in the battlegroup’s ten thousand sailors,marines, and aviators are“perishable.” If skills are nottaught, practiced, and testedregularly, the combatpotential of a ship or airgroup rapidly deteriorates,even when deployed into aforward area. So a battlegroupmustbeassembledand“worked up” for almost sixmonths before each six-

monthdeployment.Finally, and no less

important,today’ssailorsandmarines demand and deserveapersonallife.Peoplearenotrobots; theyneedrest, familyrelationships, andopportunities to advancepersonallyandprofessionally.Warship crews need someportion of their servicecareers at or near their homeports. This human factor is

the first casualty whenpoliticiansdenypayincreasesand hardship bonuses, orextend emergencydeployments to extremelengths. Because relativelyfew of today’s nationalleaders have the personalexperience of long militarydeployments,theseaserviceshave especially suffered. Toremedy this problem,Admiral Johnson hasinstituteda six-month“portal

toportal”deploymentpolicy.That is, the Navy haspromised that sailors willspend 50% of their time inhomeport.Navy planners struggle

constantly to build schedulesthatmaximize the number ofcarrier groups available fordeployment, while providingthe best quality of life forembarked sailors andmarines.Givenacarrierforce

level of a dozen units, itworks out something likethis:

• DeepOverhaul/NuclearRefueling—Twoorthree units at atime. Currently,there are threeshipyards(Bremerton,Washington;Norfolk, Virginia;

and Newport NewsShipbuilding)capable of doingthis intensive job,which essentially“zeros themileage”onaship.• Yearly/PeriodicMaintenance—Two or threeadditional carriersare usuallyconductingyearly/periodic

maintenance,whichis mainly donedockside at theship’shomeport.•Deployment/WorkupCycle—Theremaining six orseven carriers areon an eighteen-month cycle,broken into thefollowingphases:

—Leave/UnitTrainingPeriod—Thefirst sixmonths of thecycle aredevoted toresting crewscoming offdeployment,with leave andtraining time.Someindividualship

orunittrainingis alsoconductedthen.—WorkupPeriod—Thesecond sixmonths of thecycle aredesigned torefresh unitcombat skills,conduct

combinetraining, andvalidate theunit’s abilityto conductjointoperationsprior todeployment.

•Deployment—Designed

tobesixmonthslong,thisistheperiodwherethecombinedbattlegroup

ispackagedandforward-deployedforactualoperations.

Assumingthatthiscycleis

not interrupted by a majorregional contingency, two orthreeCVBGscanbeforward-

deployed at any given time.ThereisalwaysonefromtheEast Coast, which can beassignedtothe2nd(Atlantic),5th (Persian Gulf/IndianOcean), or 6th(Mediterranean) Fleets. TheWestCoastusuallyhasoneortwo groups available, whichwork with the 3rd (EasternPacific), 5th (PersianGulf/Indian Ocean), or 7th(WesternPacific)Fleets.65

Yes,ittakesagreatdealofeffortandinvestmenttokeepjust two or three carriergroups forward-deployed atone time. Yet the lack offorward U.S. bases in areascritical to American nationalinterests makes these mobileair bases critical to thenational leadership. IfAmerica wants to have avoice in a crisis somewhereontheothersideoftheworld,thenweneedeitherafriendly

allied host nation66 or acarrier battle group offshore.AndCVBGs have onemajoradvantage:They do not needanyone’s permission to sailanywhere in recognizedinternationalwaters.The current scheme of

carrier group rotationsassumes a generous (by paststandards)allotmentofhome-port time for ships andsailors, given the operations

tempos(OpTempos)oftoday.Inanemergency, though, thegroups working up can berapidly “surged” forward toreinforce groups already inthecrisiszone.Thisisexactlywhat happened in 1990 and1991 during Desert Shieldand Desert Storm. By thetime war broke out in early1991, six CVBGs were inplace for strikes against Iraq.TwootherAmericanCVBGshad operated in support of

Operation Desert Shield androtatedhome,whileaBritishcarrier group covered theEasternMediterranean to fillNATO commitments. Inotherwords,evenifforward-deployed carriers are taskedin a crisis, there is enough“flex” in the rotationalschedule to allow units athomeintheU.S.to“backfill”other Americancommitments.

USSGeorgeWashington(CVN-

73)

Let’s take a look at one ofthese groups “up close andpersonal.” Specifically, theCVBGbasedaroundtheUSSGeorge Washington (CVN-73), one of the East Coastcarriergroupsassignedto2ndFleet at Norfolk. “GW,” as

her crew calls her, is animprovedNimitz-class(CVN-68) nuclear aircraft carrier.One of the second group ofthree built during JohnLehman’s glory years of the1980’s,shewas laiddownatNewport News Shipbuildingon August 26th, 1986;launched from the dry dockon July 21st, 1990; andcommissioned on July 4th,1992. Manned by over sixthousandsailorsandMarines,

the GW has conducted threeMediterranean and PersianGulf deployments sincecommissioning, averyheavyOpTempo. During hermaiden voyage she wasceremonial flagship for the50thAnniversaryCelebrationof the D-Day Landings inNormandy, and hasconducted “no-fly”operations like SouthernWatch(Iraq)andDenyFlight(Bosnia).

USS George Washington(CVN-73).OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTO

The official emblem of theaircraft carrier USS GeorgeWashington(CVN-73).JACKRYANENTERPRISES,LTD.,BYLAURADENINNOAs a “working class”

carrier,GWlackssomeoftheglamor and polish that fleet“showboats” enjoy (thecarrierJohnF.Kennedy,CV-67,oncehad this reputation).

This is a warship, not somefloating palace to impressvisiting dignitaries. You’llnotice on GW’s bridge, forexample, the row of “E”(Efficiency) awards paintedthere.Thesearefleetawards,which are given within eachclass of ships (aircraftcarriers, guided-missilecruisers, etc.) to display theship’s visibleaccomplishments. Eachaward reflects a particular

specialty, ranging fromengineering and weapons tofood service and tacticalability. In fact, just beforeleaving on her 1997 cruise,the GW crew got the wordthattheyhadbeenselectedtoweartheBattle“E”(markingthem as the top warship forthe entire Atlantic Fleet) for1997, their third such awardin just five years. From thebridgetothepumprooms,themen and women who serve

aboardtheGWknowtheyareexpectedtobethebestinthefleet. They make a prettygood case that they haveachievedthatgoal.What follows is a

“snapshot”oftheGWteaminthe late summer and fall of1997, and should help youappreciate thekindofpeoplewho make a carrier battlegroup work. But be awarethat Navy crews, like all

militaryunits,areinastateofconstant transition. Thesailors and aviators thatappear here will certainlyhavechangedassignmentsbythe time you read this book.One other quick point.Because of the mixedNavy/Marine Corpspersonnel base aboard thebattle group, it is easy toconfuse the ranksofofficers.To help straighten these out,refer to the following table

forclarification:MILITARY OFFICERRANKTABLE67

HeadingtheGWcommandteam when we were aboard

was Captain Lindell G.“Yank” Rutheford, USN. Agraduate of theUniversity ofMissouri, “Yank” has spentmuchofhiscareerasanF-14Tomcatpilot(healsoflewA-4SkyhawksandF-4PhantomIIs). He commanded asquadron, VF-142 (the“Ghostriders”), aboard USSEisenhower (CVN-69) in1988 and 1989. Following astaff tour abroad theTheodore Roosevelt

(nicknamed “TR,” CVN-71)during Desert Shield andDesert Storm, he decided totake the carrier commandtrack (described in the thirdchapter).

Captain Lindell “Yank”Rutheford, the CommandingOffice (CO) of the carrierUSS George Washington(CVN-73).JOHND.GRESHAMTwo years later, following

nuclear power training andcommand school, he becametheExecutiveOfficer(XO)ofTR for two deployments tothe Mediterranean andPersian Gulf. Captain

Ruthefordthenspenteighteenmonths as CommandingOfficer (CO) of thereplenishment ship USSSeattle (AOE-3), whichqualified him for deep-draftcommand. While drivingSeattle, he acquired areputationaroundthefleetforsuperb ship-handling andorganizational skills—veryuseful talentsduring thenextstep in his career. FollowinghisreliefasCOoftheSeattle

in November of 1996, hejoined the GW ascommanding officer. Alongwith his partner, thecommander of the embarkedCarrierAirWingOne(CVW-1),Captain JohnStufflebeem(whomwewillmeetlater),heprovides the commander ofthe GW battle group with apowerful core of strikingcapability.The Navy supports its

carrier captains withhandpickedsubordinateswhorun the day-to-day activitiesof the boat and her three-thousand-plus-person crew(the air wing brings alongmore than 2,500 more). Ofthese,themostcriticaljobonboard is the ExecutiveOfficer, or XO. While wewere aboard the GW, wewere fortunate to observe ahandover between two XOs,when Captain Michael R.

Groothousen (the GW’s XOsinceMay 1996) left to takecommand ofSeattle, and thenewXO,CommanderChuckSmith, arrived to take hisplace.CaptainGroothousen,alongtime F/A-18 Hornetaviator, was on his way to adeep-draft command inpreparation for commandinga carrier of his own, whileCommander Smith issomething else entirely,having served in S-3 Viking

ASW/SeaControlsquadrons.Atall,leanprofessional(he

resembles a young PeterO’Toole),ChuckSmithisthekindofaviatoryou’dwantatthecontrolsifyourplanehadtomake a night landing in astorm with one engine out.Carriercaptainsusuallycomefrom fighter and attackaviation backgrounds. The“right stuff” mystique andold-boy network of TopGun

fighterjockeysmakeit toughfor aviators from electronicwarfare,ASW,AEW,andseacontrol specialties to clawtheir way to the top of thepromotion ladder. However,theincreasingimportanceandversatilityoftheS-3incarrieroperations,hasenabledafewformer Viking drivers to getchoice commands: big-deckamphibious ships (like theTarawa (LHA-1) andWasp-class (LHD-1) helicopter

carriers), and even somesupercarriers. Chuck Smithwill make a terrific carrierCOwhen he “fleets up” in afewyears.CommanderSmithtook over theXO job in lateAugust 1997,whileGWwassteaming into the battlegroup’sfinaltrainingexerciseprior to deploying to theMediterranean. The changehappened quickly andseamlessly. The only sign ofitaboardtheshipwasthefew

minutes it took for everyofficer who could fit intoflight-deck control to seeCaptain Groothousen off theship, en route to his nextassignment.Master Chief Petty OfficerKevin Lavin, the CommandMaster Chief of the USSGeorge Washington (CVN-73). Here he is just minutesaway from boarding theGWfor the 1997/98 cruise to the

PersianGulf.JOHND.GRESHAM

Commander Chuck Smith,theExecutiveOfficer(XO)ofthe carrier USS GeorgeWashington(CVN-73).JOHND.GRESHAM

Of the three thousandcrewmembers aboard theGW, something like 95% areenlisted sailors. Theirrepresentative, advocate, andambassador to theCaptain isGW’s Command MasterChief (CMC) Petty Officer,the senior NCO on board.This is a job of greatresponsibility. If the food orlaundryserviceintheenlisted

spaces is unsatisfactory, it istheCMCwhomakessuretheCaptain knows about it. If asailor’s family memberashoreneedsassistance,heisthe one to coordinatesolutions through the RedCross or other appropriateauthority.OnGW, the job isably filled by CMC KevinLavin. When you meet himhe seemsmore like the vice-president of a start-upcomputer company than the

traditional gruff, tattooedNavychief(hisbackgroundisin electronics maintenance).Chief Lavin is CommanderSmith’s senior enlistedadvisor, and when he speaksboth the CO and XO listenclosely!Captain Rutherford and

Commander Smith managean organization that seemsmore like a small city orcorporation than a ship. Its

various departments are keyto keeping the GW runningsmoothly for the six monthsor more that she may spenddeployed, or “on cruise” asher crew calls it. Eachdepartment performs specifictasks, which make possiblethe operation of her men,aircraft, and weapons. Thealphabetical breakdown ofthese departments and theirheads in the fall of 1997 isshownbelow:

• Administration(ADMIN)—Headed byLieutenant JerryMorrison,thisistheprimary record-keeping group forthe ship, andincludes personnel,maintenance,supply, financial,andotherfiles.• AircraftMaintenance

Division(AIMD)—With almost sixhundred personnelassigned, AIMDprovides the GW’sembarked air wingwith spare parts,maintenancefacilities, andspecialized supportpersonnel.CommanderGordon Cowardheadsthisdivision.

• Air Department(AIR)—One of thebusiest groupsaboard theGW, theAir Departmentcontrols theoperations of theGW’s hangar andflightdecks,aswellas the airspacedirectly around theship. The AirDepartment is ledby an officer

nicknamed the“AirBoss,” and hisdeputy, the “MiniBoss.” While wewere aboard GW,the Air Boss wasCommander JohnKindred, while the“Mini” wasCommander CarlJune. Both areexperienced pilotswho have the skillsand knowledge to

control every typeof carrier-capableaircraft under allweather and seaconditions. In late1997, CommanderKindred wasplanning to moveon to his nextassignment, whileCommander Junewould stay aboardand “fleet up” asthe new GW Air

Boss. Then it willbehisjobtotrainanew “Mini” beforehe moves on in ayearorso.•CrewRecreationand MoraleDepartment(CRMD)—Thisdepartment dealswith the crew’sspiritual and moralwelfare, and isheaded by GW’s

CommandChaplain, CaptainJimNichols.• Deck Division(DECK)—Even ina“high-tech”ageofnetworkedcomputers andPGMs, there is stilla need on everyNaval vessel forsailors who canhandle lines, smallboats, anchors, and

all theparaphernalia oftraditionalseamanship. TheGW’s “DeckDivision” handleseverything fromlaunchingtheship’sboats to manningthe replenishmentstations duringunderway refuelingand replenishment(UNREP).

LieutenantCommanderJohnnie Draughton,who will retire inlate 1997, and willbe replaced byLieutenant GregWorley, leads thesailors of the DeckDivision.• DentalDepartment(DENTAL)—Acommunity of over

sixthousandpeopleis bound to havesome cavities,broken teeth, anddental emergencieswhile on cruise.Sending themashorefortreatmentto a Navy hospitalwould beimpractical andexpensive, so GWis equipped with afull dental clinic.

Headed byCommander RogerHouk, DDS, theDental Departmenthas everythingnecessary for gooddental hygiene, notonlyforthecrewofthe GW, but alsoforthecrewsontheother ships of thebattlegroup.• EngineeringDepartment

(ENG)—TheEngineeringDepartmentoperates andmaintains almostevery systemaboard GW exceptthe two A4Wnuclear reactors.These systemsinclude electricalpower, air-conditioning, jetanddiesel fuel,and

sewage transfersystems.Supervisingliterally hundredsof miles of pipes,ducts, and cableruns,andthousandsof valves, pumps,switches,transformers, andgadgets, is GWChief Engineer(CHENG)Lieutenant

Commander PetePetry.•Combat SystemsDivision (CSD)—Without sensorsand electronics,modern weaponssystems are aboutas useful in battleas paperweights.The CombatSystems Divisioncares for the vastarray of controlling

hardware andsoftwarethatmakestheGWaneffectiveweapons andaviation platform.HeadingtheCSDisthe GW’s CombatSystems Officer(CSO),CommanderDianaTuronis.• LegalDepartment(LEGAL)-Sixthousand sailors,

Marines, and theirfamiliesadduptoalot of legal advice.Tosupport this, theGW has a fullystaffed LegalDepartment toensure thateveryone aboardhas an up-to-datewill and power ofattorney beforedeployment, and tohandle any

investigations andcourts-martial thatmight arise. As ithappens, today’smilitary personneldon’t get in troublewith the lawnearlyasoftenaspreviousgenerations.However, longdeployments makefor high divorcerates and complexfamily problems.

The ship’s LegalOfficer (LEGAL-OFF) is LieutenantCommander JimRoth, a sharp andable young lawyer.The Legal OfficerisalsotheCaptain’stechnicaladvisoronRules ofEngagement(ROE),theintricateand ever-changingdocuments that

specify where,when,andhowyoucanshoot.• MedicalDepartment(MEDICAL)—TheGW MedicalDepartment isequipped andstaffed to handleeverything fromminor lacerationsand sunburns tolife-threatening

traumaandaccidentcases. Becausesmallershipsofthebattle group haveonly modestmedical facilitiesand staff, GW actsasacentralhospitalfor the force.Heading the GWmedical team is theShip’s MedicalOfficer (SMO),Commander Dean

Bailey, MD. He isdueforrelief inthefall of 1997 byCommander MikeKrentz,MD.• MarineDetachment(MARDET)—Traditionally, thetwenty-six-manMarineDetachmentaboardsupercarriersprovided security

for the “special”(the euphemism for“nuclear”)weaponsthat used to becarried aboard.Today, nuclearweapons are nolonger carriedaboardcarriers,andin late 1997 theCorpsreassigneditsMARDETs. Butuntilthathappened,the GW’s

MARDETcommanderwas1stLieutenant GrantGoodrich.• NavigationDepartment(NAV)—Thetraditional nauticalskill of navigationhas beenrevolutionized byGPS, digital charts,and real-timesatellite weather

updates. But it stilltakes anexperiencednavigator to advisethe bridge watchabout how exactlytosteertheshipinanarrowchanneloratricky tacticalsituation. GW’sNavigationDepartment isequipped withevery kind of

navigationalinstrument, fromsextants to GPSreceivers. TheNavigationalOfficer (known as“GATOR” forshort) isCommander RonRaymer. He isexpecting to leavethe ship in early1998, and will berelieved by

Commander BrianCosgrove.• OperationsDepartment (OPS)—Everything fromeating schedulesand flightoperations tomaking arendezvous with areplenishment shiprequires a highdegree of skill andcoordination. This

isthejoboftheGWOperationsDepartment, thegroup thatrecommends to theCO and XO howthey will actuallyoperate and “fight”theGW, should theneedarise.TheGWOperations Officer(OPSO) isCommander DonHepfer,whoisasly

andskillfulofficer.• ReactorDepartment(REACTOR)—Ofall the departmentsaboard the GW,noneisshroudedintightersecuritythanthe “Nukes.” Onnon-nuclear Navyvessels theEngineeringDepartmentcontrols the ship’s

propulsion. But onthe GW, adedicated ReactorDepartmentcontrols the twomighty AW4 unitsand otherassociatedmachinery. Theydon’tlikepublicity.They won’t talk toyou. Don’t evenask. Thedepartment is

controlled by acareer nuclearsurface officer,Captain JoeKrenzel, who willbecome thecommander of theUSS SouthCarolina (CGN-37)when he finisheshis tour as ReactorOfficer (RO)aboardGW.• Safety

Department(SAFETY)—GWisbasically a largesteelboxfilledwithjet fuel, explosivesand rocket fuel,toxicchemicalsandwaste, fissilematerial—and, ofcourse, people!Working hard tokeep them undercontrolistheGW’sSafety Department.

This group ischarged withmonitoringhazardousmaterials,inspectingfirefightingequipment andsanitation gear, andcoordinatingdamage controlwith the othership’s departments.The GW’s Safety

Officer(SAFETYO) isCommander JackHassinger,whowillbe relieved in thefall of 1997 byCommander DaveHegland.• SupplyDepartment(SUPPLY)—TheGW utilizesthousands ofdifferent items

during day-to-dayoperations at sea.Jet fuel and floppydisks, ground beefand paper towelsare all used inquantities thatstagger theimagination.Keeping up withthe ordering,stowing, andrecord-keepingrequired to keep

GW running is theSupplyDepartment.The GW’s SupplyOfficer or SUPPOis Commander JimEllison,whocanbeeither the most orleastpopularofficeraboard!• TrainingDepartment(TRAINING)—One of the biggestchallenges for the

GW’s crew is tocontinue theirprofessionalgrowthand training whileembarkedoncruise.Doing this requiresregular refreshertraining andqualification forvarious skills andequipment,whichistheresponsibilityofthe TrainingDepartment,

commanded byLieutenant MattHempel. He is dueto be relieved inlate 1997 byLieutenant AnnHollenbeck. Thisdepartmentsupportscorrespondencecourses to helppersonnel qualifyfor their nextpromotion,

distance-learningclasses, and videoclasses, for newtactics and onboardequipment.• WeaponsDepartment(WEPS)—ThoughGW is not asheavily armed asher battle groupescorts, she stillpacks aconsiderable self-

defense “punch”—including Mk. 29Sea Sparrow SAMlaunchers and20mm Mk. 15Phalanx CIWSsystems. GWadditionally has anumberofM-2.50-caliber machineguns for defenseagainst swimmersand small boats.These are

maintained by theWeaponsDepartment, whichis headed by the“Gunner,”Commander LeePrice. Actualweapons firing iscontrolled by theTactical Officer(TACO) in theship’s CombatDirection Center(CDC).

The official emblem ofCarrierAirWingOne(CVW-I)JACKRYANENTERPRISES,LTD.,BYLAURADENINNO

CarrierAirWingOne(CVW-1):THE

SHARPEND

That theGWʼs embarked airwing, CVW-1, is a powerfuloffensive tool is asurprisingly recentdevelopment. During theCold War, the focus ofAmerican carriers and theirair wings was not the

projectionofoffensivepowerbut thedefenseof the carriergroupsandothernavalforces(convoys,amphibiousgroups,etc.). In those days, airwingtraining and weapons weremainly oriented toward war-at-sea missions against theNavy of the former SovietUnion, not toward landtargets requiring precisiondeliveries. This is one of thereasonswhy theperformanceof Navy aircraft and units

during the1991PersianGulfWar was so disappointing.Though Navy aircraft flewalmost a third of the attacksorties into Iraq, they lackedthe PGMs and sensorsnecessary to kill precisiontargets. On the positive side,Navy reconnaissance andelectronic-warfareaircraftdidreallyusefulwork,asdidtheA-6E Intruder all-weatherattackbombers(recallthattheweatheroverIraqwasterrible

during much of the aircampaign). Incredibly, in thename of cost-saving, theentire fleet ofA-6E bombersand KA-6D tankers wasretiredaftertheGulfWar!So, after building their

plans and policies around anow-dead threat, and buyingand retaining the “wrong”aircraft and weapons for theturn-of-the-millenniumworld, naval aviation entered

the post-Cold War era indisarray. Happily, navalaviators are resourcefulpeople, and during the mid-1990’s Navy aviatorsgraduallydevelopedtechnical“quick fixes” andorganizational reforms thatwill equip the Cold WarCVWtotacklethechallengesof the next decade.Understanding that it wouldtake years and billions ofdollars to develop and build

new aircraft and weapons,they concentrated onupgrading existing airframeswith new systems andweapons.These focused on

supporting the initiativespresentedinhigh-levelpolicystatements like “From theSea” and “Forward from theSea,”whilegrimlydefendingthe huge funding allocationnecessary for the next-

generation “Super Hornet”(F/A-18E/F). Some of thefixes—like acquiring theimproved Nighthawktargeting pod for the F/A-18Hornet and buying morelaser-guided bomb kits—were just amatter ofmoney.Others—liketurningtheF-14Tomcat (traditionally an airdefense interceptor) into astrikeandinterdictionaircraft—were a bit more difficult.Still, in just a few years

things began to turn around.Operation Deliberate Force(thebombingofBosnianSerbmilitary facilities in 1995)proved that the Navy andMarines could deliver PGMsand suppress enemy airdefenses just aswell as theirAir Force counterparts.Today, the embarked carrierair wings are just as deadlyand efficient as any of theirland-basedcounterparts.

CVW-1 is one of the tenair wings in active-dutyservice today, a survivor ofnumerouspost-ColdWarcutsand drawdowns. The wingspent much of its Cold Warcareer aboard USS America(CV-66, which was recentlyretired), and moved over tothe GW in 1996. A Navycaptain (traditionally calledthe “CAG” for “commander,airgroup”)commandstheairwing;andheisapartner,not

asubordinate, to thecarrier’sskipper. They both report tothe admiral who commandsthe battle group (generally atwo-star rear admiral), andwork together as a team. It’san article of faith that flightoperations are alwayscontrolled and authorized bytrained naval aviators, notsome distant seniorcommanderwho never sat inacockpit.

As the GW battle grouppreparedtodeployinthelatesummer of 1997, thecommander of CVW-1 wasCaptain John D. “Boomer”Stufflebeem, USN.Stufflebeem began his navalcareer as an enlisted sailoraboard a destroyer. He thenwent to the Naval Academy,graduating in 1975. Afterduty aboard a frigate, helearned to fly the F-14Tomcat, rising to command

squadron VF-84 (the “JollyRogers”). He then tookcommand of CVW-1 in July1996. While he has spentmost of his career flyingTomcats, he generally fliesF/A-18 Hornets today. Butlike most “CAGs,” CaptainStufflebeemisqualifiedtoflythe majority of the aircraftassigned to his CVW.68 Aquiet, modest, focusedwarrior, he prefers to let his

air crews and their resultsspeak for him. Stufflebeem’sXO is the Deputy CAG(DCAG), Captain CraigCuninghame. Together theysupervise the CVW staff,which acts as a “shell” formanaging the variousembarked squadrons, each ofwhich may be flying adifferent aircraft type ormodel.The official emblem of

Fighter Squadron 102 (VF-102),the“Diamondbacks.”JACKRYANENTERPRISES,LTD.,BYLAURADENINNO

Captain John D. “Boomer”Stufflebeem, the CO ofCarrierAirWingOne(CVW-i). He is shown here in hisPentagonofficefollowingthe1997/98 cruise. There heworks as an executiveassistant to Admiral JayJohnson,theCNO.JOHND.GRESHAM

As squadrons are shuffled,merged, disbanded, or re-equipped, the makeup of anairwingmaychange,but thegrouping of squadrons tendsto be fairly stable over aperiod of years. The actualwingstaff isquite small, justa few dozen officers andenlistedpersonnel.Becauseitis a “downsized” post-ColdWar air wing, CVW-1 hasgiven up one squadron of F-14’saswellastheA-6/KA-6

Intrudersquadron,andpickedup a third F/A-18 Hornetstrike fighter squadron inreturn.TheCVW-1squadronassignments looked like thisinlate1997:

• FighterSquadron 102(VF-102—The“Diamondbacks”)— One of the oldF-14squadronsthatsurvived the

drawdown a fewyearsback,

an“AirGroup”insteadofanAirWing,thustheterm

“Commander,AirGroup.”Formostnavalaviators,thehonorofbeingaddressedas“CAG”

bytheofficersandenlistedmenoftheirwingisconsideredtobeone

ofthegreatestachievementsoftheircareers.

VF-102 iscommanded byCommander KurtDaill. Based atNaval Air Station(NAS) Oceana,

Virginia,andflyingF-14Bs (equippedwith F-110engines), theDiamondbacksbegan the 1997/98cruise with severalnew capabilities.They wereequipped with thenew AAQ-14LANTIRN/GPStargeting pod, theimproved Digital

TARPS pod, andthe GBU-24Paveway III laser-guided bomb withBLU-109penetratorwarhead.These new systemsmake the Tomcat apowerful day andnight strike fighter,as well as a potentreconnaissanceplatform. VF-102operatesfourteenF-

14Bs,ofwhichfourare wired for thenewD/TARPSpod.The squadron isalsoassignedsixoftheLANTIRN/GPStargeting pods. Ofcourse, theDiamondbacks arestill highly capablefighters, deployingthe AIM-9MSidewinder, AIM-7M Sparrow, and

AIM-54C Phoenixair-to-air missiles(AAMs).

CVW-1 has three

squadrons of Navy andMarine F/A-18C Hornetstrikefighters.Eachsquadroncan conduct strike or fightermissions, dropping Paveway

II/IIILGBsandotherPGMs,firing AGM-88 HARMmissiles, aswell asAIM-9Mand AIM-120 AMRAAMAAMs. Normally, eachsquadron of twelve aircraftdeploys with six NighthawkFLIR/lasertargetingpodsandthree data-link pods forAGM-84E SLAM missiles.However, there are minordifferences in the threeunits,whichI’lldescribebelow:

TheofficialemblemofStrikeFighter Squadron 82 (VFA-82),the“Marauders.”JACKRYANENTERPRISES,LTD.,BYLAURADENINNO

• Strike FighterSquadron 82(VFA-82—the“Marauders”)—BasedatNASCecilField, Florida andled by CommanderSteven Callahan,

the Marauders flythe new Block 18version of the F/A-18C, with sharpereyes in the formofthe new APG-73radar. This is theradar that will gointo thenoseof theF/A-18E/F SuperHornet when itcomes into service.The APG-73 willfinally give the

Navy the ability toperform high-resolution groundmapping in anyweather, as well asnon-cooperativetarget recognition(NCTR) againstenemyaircraft.

The officialemblem ofStrike FighterSquadron 86

(VFA-86), the“Sidewinders.”JACK RYANENTERPRISES,LTD., BYLAURADENINNO

• Strike FighterSquadron 86(VFA-86—the“Sidewinders”)—Also based atNAS Cecil Field,Florida, VFA-86has long been asister squadron toVFA-82. VFA-86flies the Block 10version of theHornet, and iscommanded by

Commander RobertHarrington.

The officialemblem ofMarineFighterAttackSquadron 251(VMFA-251),the“Thunderbolts.”JACK RYANENTERPRISES,LTD., BY

LAURADENINNO

• Marine StrikeFighter Squadron251 (VFMA-251—the“Thunderbolts”)—The NavyperiodicallyrequeststheloanofMarine Corpscarrier-capablestrike-fighter andelectronic-warfaresquadronstofilloutair wings for

deployment. Basedout of MCASBeaufort, SouthCarolina, theThunderbolts flythe Block 16version of the F/A-18C, and arecommanded byLieutenant ColonelTonyValentino.

Along with strike andfighter“muscle,”theairwingincludes several supportsquadrons, which providespecialized services to thebattlegroup.

The official emblem ofCarrier Airborne EarlyWarning Squadron (VAW-123),the“Screwtops.”JACKRYANENTERPRISES,LTD.,BYLAURADENINNO

• Airborne EarlyWarningSquadron 123(VAW-123—The“Screwtops”) —Flying the E-2CHawkeye, the

Screwtops providethe GW battlegroupwithairborneearly warning(AEW). Based atNAS Norfolk,Virginia,VAW-123isoneoftheNavy’soldest E-2squadrons. Thesquadron’snickname isreflected in a boldblue and yellow

spiral patternpainted on theradome of eachaircraft. They arecommanded byLieutenantCommanderEdwardRosenquist,and deploy withfour late-model E-2Caircraft.

The officialemblemofSeaControlSquadron(VS-32), the“Maulers.”JACK RYANENTERPRISES,LTD., BYLAURADENINNO

• Sea ControlSquadron 32 (VS-

32—The“Maulers”)—Ofall the squadronsassigned to CVW-1,nonehasseenitsrole changed andenlarged more thantheMaulers ofVS-32. Flying eight S-3B Vikings, theyprovide the battlegroup with surfaceand ASW services.But their most

valuable job is asaerial tankers forthe rest of thewing’s thirstyaircraft. Based atNAS Cecil Field,Florida,theyareledby LieutenantCommanderJohnJ.Labelle.

The officialemblem ofTactical

ElectronicWarfareSquadron 137(VAQ-137),the“Rooks.”JACK RYANENTERPRISES,LTD., BYLAURADENINNO

• TacticalElectronicWarfareSquadron 137(VAQ-137—The“Rooks”)—VAQ-137 is tasked withsuppressing andjamming enemyradars andcommunications.The Rooks fly aquartet of EA-6BProwler aircraft.

VAQ-137 is basedout of NASWhidbey Island,Washington, and iscommanded by a“retreaded” A-6Intruder crewman,Commander CraigGeron.

The officialemblem ofHelicopterAntisubmarine

Squadron II(HS-II) the“DragonSlayers.”JACK RYANENTERPRISES,LTD., BYLAURADENINNO

• HelicopterAntisubmarineSquadron 11 (HS-11—The “DragonSlayers”) —TheDragon Slayers ofHS-11 are anothersquadron that hasseen its capabilitiesand responsibilitiesgrow in recentyears.Inadditiontothe traditional roleof providing the

battle group withASW protection inthe “inner”defensive zone,they have taken onnewrolesofspecialoperations supportand search andrescue. They flyfour SH-60F(ASW) and twoHH-60H(SAR/SpecialOperations)

variants of theSeahawk. HS-11 isbased at NASJacksonville,Florida, and is ledby CommanderMichaelMulcahy.

The officialemblem ofFleet AirReconnaissanceSquadron 6(VQ-6), the“BlackRavens.”JACK RYANENTERPRISES,LTD., BYLAURADENINNO

• Fleet AirReconnaissanceSquadron 6,Detachment “C”(VQ-6, Det. C—The “BlackRavens”)—Flyingone of the newestaircraft in Navalaviation, the BlackRavensDetachment“C” provides thebattle group withelectronic

surveillance,intelligence, andtargeting. Flying atrio of ES-3Shadowaircraft,thedetachment can, ina pinch, load upwitharefuelingpodand extra fueltanks, to provideadditional airbornetanking services.The small size ofthe ES-3 force

means thatsquadronheadquarters andschoolhouseremainhome-basedatNASCecilField,Florida,while smalldetachments or“Dets” deploy witheach CVW. In thefall of 1997, VQ-6wascommandedbyCommander Robert“Bob” Wilson, and

Det “C” aboard theGW is headed bytheir Officer-in-Charge (OIC),LieutenantCommander TerryIsley.

The officialemblem ofFleet LogisticsSquadron 40(VRC-40), the“Rawhides.”JACK RYANENTERPRISES,LTD., BYLAURADENINNO

• Fleet LogisticsSupportSquadron

40, Detachment 1(VRC-40,Det. 1—The “Rawhides”)—Perhaps the leastappreciated task inCVW-1 is the vitaltask of logisticalsupport. TheRawhidesflyapairof C-2A Traderaircraft for CVW-1out of theirDetachment 1.VRC-40 is based

out of NASNorfolk,VA,andiscommanded byCommander PaulaHinger. LieutenantCommander StevenFaggart led Det. 1whileoncruise.

The combat aircraft makeupand organization of CarrierAirWingOne(CVW-I).JACKRYANENTERPRISES,LTD.,BYLAURADENINNOAllof theseresourcesgive

Captain Stufflebeem acompact and powerful airunit, capable of dishing outimpressive amounts offirepower upon targets afloatand ashore. If CVW-1 has avice,itisthelackofdepthin

its attached units. With justover seventy aircraftassigned,anylosswillbefeltinbothlostresourcesandunitmorale. Nevertheless, it is awell-structured and balancedforce, which can hurt anenemyifproperlyhandled.

Cruiser-DestroyerGroupTwo:

GuardingandGuiding“TheBoat”

Aircraft carriers andsubmarines may be theglamorous and expensivesuperstars of seapower, butthe “surface warfare” sailorsand their cruisers,destroyers,and frigates are anincreasingly visible and vitalpartofthebattlegroup.These

“small”ships(ifyoucancalla ten-thousand-ton cruiser“small”) carry an increasingproportion of the Navy’susable “in-your-face” combatpower. Systems like theAegis combat system, SM-2SAM, Tomahawk cruisemissile, and SH-60 LAMPSIII helicopter are commonaboardsurfacecombatants.Inthe drawn-downNavy of the1990’s, the Cold Warfrictions between surface,

submarine, and aviationcommunities have rapidlybrokendown,makingwayfora unique kind of “joint”warfare.To get a view of this

synergy, you need to take alook at how today’s CVBGsare organized andcommanded. FollowingDesert Storm and the end ofthe Cold War, a newarrangement was set up to

spread CVBG leadershipopportunities more fairly.Previously, each CVBG wascontrolledbyaCarrierGroup(CARGRU) headed by aNaval aviator rear admiral.TheescortsformedaCruiser-Destroyer Group(CRUDESGRU),andthetwogroups to-gether became thebattle group. Now, only halftheCVBGsarestructuredthisway. The rest (usually threeor four at a time) are headed

by the CRUDESGRUcommander (a rear admiral,lower half, traditionallyaddressed as “Commodore”),with the carrier and CVWsubordinated. Other elementsmay be attached—the ARG,MEU (SOC), MCM(minesweeping) squadrons,SEALteams,etc.—andthisisthe force thatdeploys for sixmonthsatatime.

Rear Admiral MichaelMullen, the commander ofthe George Washingtoncarrierbattlegroup.JOHND.GRESHAMThe GW group includes

theshipsofCruiser-DestroyerGroup Two (CRUDESGRUTwo), home-ported at NavalStation Norfolk, Virginia.CommandedbyRearAdmiralMichael G. Mullen, USN, itis a well-balanced mix of

older and newer ships.Admiral Mullen is a careersurface warrior, in thetradition of great surfaceleaders like Admiral ElmoZumwalt and Vice AdmiralJoseph “Little Joe” Metcalf.He previously commandedthe destroyer USSGoldsborough (DDG-20)andthe Aegis cruiser USSYorktown (CG-48), both top-of-the-line SAM ships. Agraduate of the Annapolis

Class of 1968 (his notableclassmates include AdmiralJay Johnson, the currentCNO), he went on to earn aMaster’s degree fromHarvard University. AdmiralMullen represents the newgenerationofNavalleader,aswell educated and savvy asany corporate executive.We’llget toknowhimbetterinthenextchapter.Admiral Mullen’s

“flagship” is a section of theO-3 level “blue tile country”of the George Washington,comfortable and nicelyfurnished, but quite noisyfrom aircraft operations onedeck above. Here he makeshis home and office afloat,along with the staff ofCRUDESGRU Two. Fromthere he commands thevarious ships of the force.Let’s look at CRUDESGRU

Two:69

• USS Normandy(CG-64)—AnimprovedTiconderoga-class(CG-47) Aegisguided-missilecruiser, Normandyis commanded byCaptain James F.Deppe. Normandyhas alreadyaccumulated an

outstanding combatrecord. In fact, shehas fired moreBGM-109Tomahawk cruisemissiles in anger(thirteen duringOperationDeliberate Force inBosnia back in1995) than anyother Navy cruiser.The heart ofNormandy’s

combatpoweristheAegis combatsystem, with fourSPY-1phased-arrayradars to trackhun-dredsof targets atonce. Aegis-equipped ships canengage dozens ofairborne targets(aircraft andmissiles) with SM-2SAMs,whilealsocontrolling the

weapons of otherships in the battlegroup. She carriesup to 122 missilesin two Mk. 41vertical launchsystems (VLS),including SM-2Standard SAMs,BGM-109Tomahawks, andRUM-139AVertical LaunchAnti-Submarine

Rockets.Inadditionto her twin 5-in/127mmgunsandmissiles,Normandycarries a pair ofSH-60B Seahawkhelicopters that candeliver ASWtorpedoes andAGM-119 Penguinantiship missiles.During 1997 and1998, Normandy’sSeahawks came

from HelicopterSquadron—LightForty-Eight,Detachment Eight(HSL-48, Det. 8),headed byCommander BrentBarrow. For the1997/1998 cruise,the Detachment 8OICwasLieutenantCommander SteveBlaisdell, whocommanded two

SH-60B aircraft, aswell as their flightand maintenancecrews.

The Aegisguided-missilecruiser USSNormandy(CG-60), oneof the escortsof the GeorgeWashingtonbattlegroup.

JOHN D.GRESHAM

• USS SouthCarolina(CGN-37)—Commanded byCaptain David K.Brown, SouthCarolinawillbethelast U.S. nuclear-powered cruiser incommission.Because of budgetpressures, this shipand her sister,California (CGN-

36), will retire in1999. Until then,South CarolinagivestheGWbattlegroup excellentservice. Thanks toher nuclear powerplant, she is theonly escort in thegroup that can staywiththecarrierinalong-range, high-speed dash to adistant crisis.South

Carolina also hasthe “New ThreatUpdate” (NTU), anelectronics packagethat establishes adatalinkwithAegisships, and acceptsfiring commandsfrom theircomputers. This isespecially useful,since SouthCarolina’s missiledirectors (steerable

dish antennasprojecting anintense, narrowmicrowavebeamto“lightup”thetargetfor a missile’sseeker head) areconsidered moreeffective in coastalareas than those ofAegisships.• USS Carney(DDG-64)—Oneofthe newer ships in

theNavy,Carneyisan Arleigh Burke-class (DDG-51)Aegis destroyer.Displacing only8,300 tons (ascompared toalmostten thousand tonsfor Ticonderoga-class cruisers), theBurkes areconsidered thefinest surfacecombat vessels in

theworldona ton-for-ton/capabilitybasis.ThefirstU.S.warships designedwith stealthtechnology toreduce their radarand infraredsignatures, theypack the sameAegis combatsystem andweaponsmixasthelarger cruisers.

They carry fewerweapons(ninety-sixmissilesinherVLSlaunchers and asingle 5-in/54 mmgun mount),though, and nohelicopterhangar isfitted. Carney isbased at NavalStation Mayport,Florida, andcommanded byCommander Mark

H.Buzby.•USSJohnRogers(DD-983)—Anupdated Spruance-class destroyer,John Rogers isbased at NavalStation Mayport,Florida.Herskipperis CommanderJamesM.Carr,andthe two embarkedSH-60B LAMPShelicopters are

drawn from HSL-46 (headed byCommander TimAlexander) atMayport. For theGW battle group’s1997/1998 cruise,the HSL-46 Det. 6OICwasLieutenantCommander KenanShaffer.

Along with the four

cruisers and destroyers,CRUDESGRU Two includesa pair of Oliver HazardPerry-class (FFG-7) guided-missile frigates. Thesesmaller (3,660 tons) escortships are particularly usefulfor inshore work common inlittoral operations. Thoughlimited in gun and SAMcapabilities, FFG-7’s have

good sonars for shallow-water ASW, excellenthelicopter facilities, and vastexperience in maritimeembargo and joint counter-drug operations. Like theirnamesakes from the age offighting sail, frigates are fastships that frequently go inharm’sway.70

• USS Boone(FFG-28)—Basedat Naval Station

Mayport, Florida,Boone iscommanded byCommander ArthurS.Mobley.HerSH-60B Seahawkhelicopter camefrom HSL-42(commanded byCommander RobertPresler) during her1997/1998 cruisewiththeGWgroup.This unit, HSL-42

Det.1,isheadedbyLieutenantCommander StuartHoward.• USS Underwood(FFG-36)—Underwood isbased at NavalStation Mayport,Florida, andcommanded byCommander DanielM. Smith. She alsohas a single SH-

60B Seahawkdetachment, thisone from HSL-44(headed byCommanderWayneTunick). The HSL-44 Det. 7 OIC isLieutenantCommander JackShepard.

The last two combat

vessels of the GW battlegroupare apair of improvedLos Angeles-class (1688)nuclear-attack submarines,which give Admiral Mullenadditionalcapabilitiesthatwecan only describe in generalterms because of the tightsecurity restrictions thatsurround and protect the“Silent Service.” In additionto hunting down potentialenemy submarines inshore,they can fire Tomahawk

cruise missiles, trackmaritime targets, gatherelectronic intelligence, andcovertly deliver and retrievespecialoperationsforces.TheassignedSSNsare:

• USS Toledo(SSN-769)—Basedat the submarinebase in Groton,Connecticut,Toledo iscommanded by

Commander BillBurke.• USS Annapolis(SSN-760)—Alsohome-ported atGroton, Annapolisis led byCommander DanielParson.

Logistics may be the least

“sexy” part of Naval

operations, but supplies arealways the first concern andconstant worry of theprofessional warrior. Youdon’t leave port withoutcarefully planning how thefleetsupplytrainwillsupportyour operations at sea overmany months and thousandsofmiles. Themark of a real“blue-water” Navy is theabilitytosustainoperationsatsea indefinitely. The U.S.Navy pioneered at-sea

replenishment over sixdecadesago.

• USS Seattle(AOE-3)—Thegreat advantage ofnuclear-poweredwarships is thatthey do not requirefuel oil forpropulsion. Withfour nuclear ships(a carrier, cruiser,and both

submarines), theGW battle grouphas no need for aflotilla ofsupporting oiltankers. Only onecombat supportship is assigned tothe GW battlegroup, but what aship! With over53,000 tonsdisplacement fullyloaded,USSSeattle

(of the Sacramentoclass) carriesbunkerandaviationfuel, fresh food,spare parts,supplies, andammunition. Shecan defend herselfwith a Mk. 29 SeaSparrow SAMsystem, a pair of20mm Mk. 15PhalanxCIWS,anda full SLQ-32

ESM/ECM system.Captain StephenFirks commandsSeattle.

Partners:TheGuamAmphibiousReady

Group

When I wrote about theMarine Corps a few yearsago, teaming CVBGs andARGs/MEU (SOC)s intocombinedtaskforceswasstilla very new concept.71Though joining these twopowerful and flexible units

makes great sense, bigtechnical, institutional, andcultural barriers had to beovercomeinorder tomake ithappen. Once the conceptwasimplemented,however,itquickly proved its worth, inthe Balkans, the TaiwanStraits, Africa, and thePersian Gulf. TheCVBG/ARG/MEU (SOC)teams have held the line forAmericaninterestsandkeptalidonthechaosofthe1990s.

For their 1997/1998Mediterraneancruise,theGWbattle group teamed with anARG based aroundAmphibious Squadron Two(PHIBRON-2). These fourships are commanded by an“ARGCommodore,”CaptainPhillip Sowa,USN, from hisflagship, the amphibioushelicopter carrier (LPH)USSGuam (LPH-9). ThoughGuam lacks the larger flightdeck, well deck, and hangar

found on newer Tarawa(LHA-1) and Wasp-class(LHD-1) assault ships, theARG has found ways tocompensate for theseshortcomings.Tomakeupforthe shortage of well deckspace as well as vehicle andcargo capacity, theARG hasan extra Dock Landing Ship(LSD) to carry the full rangeof gear needed by an MEU(SOC). Since flight deckparking space on Guam is

minimal, the AV-8B HarrierIIdetachmentassignedtotheMEU (SOC) was reduced tofour aircraft. For close airsupport, theMEU(SOC)canrely on VMFA-251, theMarineCorpsF/A-18Hornetsquadron embarked on GW.Marines prefer to have theirown aviators flying coverover a hot beach or landingzone.

The amphibious helicoptercarrier USS Guam (LPH-9),flagship of the amphibiousready group attached to theGeorge Washington battlegroup.JOHND.GRESHAM

• USS Guam(LPH-9)—Guam isamong the last ofher kind—one of

onlytwooftheIwoJima class (LPH-2)stillinservice—andis scheduled to bedecommissionedafter the1997/1998cruise. Until thenshe will beCommodoreSowa’s flagshipand theheadquartersfortheembarked MEU(SOC). While she

lacks the comforts,as well as some ofthe advancedcommunicationsand electronics, ofher youngerLHA/LHD cousins,Guam is an oldwarhorse, able tocarry up to 1,500Marines andtwenty-fourhelicopters.CaptainWilliam J. Luti

commandsher.• USS Shreveport(LPD-12)—Another “rusty buttrusty” veteran ofAmericanamphibiousoperations. AnAustin-class (LPD-4) AmphibiousTransport Dock,Shreveport is the“inshore” elementof the ARG, with

much of the“special” warfarecapability of theMEU (SOC)aboard. Thisincludes an organicremotely pilotedvehicle (RPV) unitof Pioneerreconnaissancedrones, as well asthe rubber boats,the force reconelement, and a

Navy Sea-Air-Land(SEAL) team. Ledby Captain DenbyStarling II, she canexpect at least adecade of serviceahead before herfinal trip to thescrap yard andreplacement by anew San Antonio-class (LPD-17)amphibiousship.• USS Ashland

(LSD-48)—Designed tocarryamix of landingcraft, vehicles, andcargo,Ashland is aWhidby Island-class (LSD-41)amphibious ship,capable of carryingup to four LandingCraft, AirCushioned(LCAC), which arefavored in today’s

amphibiousoperations.Captained byCommanderTimothyR.Hanley,Ashland is amodern and verycomfortable shipfor its crew andembarkedMarines.• USS Oak Hill(LSD-51)—OakHill is one of fourHarpers Ferry-

class LSDs, cargovariants of theWhidby Islandclass.Byshorteningthe well deck sothat it only has acapacity for twoLCACs, Oak Hillgains vastlyincreased stowagefor vehicles andcargo. Oak Hill isan another state-of-the-art amphibious

ship, withCommanderMichael A. Durnanatthehelm.

Amphibious ships like

these are hardly sleekgreyhoundsofthesea.Sailorsjoke that the designator“LSD”standsfor“largeslowduck!” For this reason,Admiral Mullen has teamed

several of his escorts forregular operations with theGuamARG,dependinguponthe mission. For example,during inshore amphibiousoperations, South Carolinaand John Rogers usuallyprovide cover for the ARG.This includes ASW andgunfire support, as well as aSAM air defense “bubble.”Thanks to her NTU system,South Carolina can tap intothe sensor and automation

systems of the Aegis ships,and take firing cues fromthem.The ARG’s combat power

is the cargo it can deliver—Marinesandtheir“stuff.”FortheGuamARG,thatcargoisthe 24th MEU (SOC). The24thwastheunitthatpluckedAir Force Captain ScottO’Grady out of Bosnia backin 1995, after his F-16CFighting Falcon was shot

downbyaBosnianSerbSA-6 SAM. Today the unit iscommanded by ColonelRichard Natonski, USMC,and has roughly the samestructure as in 1995. The24th’scomponentsinclude:

• BattalionLanding Team(BLT) 3-6—Thecore of the 24thMEU(SOC)isbuiltaround BLT 3-6, a

reinforced Marinerifle battalion. Its1,200Marineshavetheir own armor,artillery, andtransport, providinga capability tolaunch smallcoastal raids orspearhead largeinvasions. During1997 and 1998, the24th MEU (SOC)has been

commanded byLieutenant ColonelRichardP.Mills.•Medium MarineHelicopterSquadron 263(HMM-263)—Theair component ofthe 24th MEU(SOC) is areinforcedsquadronof twelve CH-46ESea Knightmedium-transport

helicopters.Attached arequartets ofCH-53ESuper Stallionheavy-lift, UH-1NIroquois command-and-control, andAH-1W SuperCobra attackhelicopters.Normally there is adetachment of sixAV-8B Harrier IIfighter-bombers

assigned, butGuam’s limiteddeck parking spacereduced this to justfour. LieutenantColonel MichaelDuva is thecommander ofHMM-263, and isequipped tooperateas a Joint ForcesAir ComponentCommander(JFACC—

commandingArmy,NavyandAirForceaviation assets onthe scene) ifnecessary.• MEU ServiceSupportGroup24(MSSG-24)—the24thMEU (SOC)’slogistical tail is the24th MSSG.Commanded byLieutenant ColonelBrianL.Tonnacliff,

this compact unitkeeps the 24thsupplied witheverything fromfloppy disks andammunition to jetfuelandwater.

All of the above

componentsmake for one ofthe best-balanced, mostcompactfightingforcesintheworld.What it lacks, like its

CVW-1teammate,isdepth—it is only a couple thousandsailors and Marines in aworld where dictatorscommand tens of thousandsof soldiers. But one of thenice things about being a“gator” sailor or Marine isthatifyougoinharm’sway,a lotmoreMarinesandotherAmericanwarriorscanbeontheway,soontobackyouup.

“CatsandDogs”:MiscellaneousAttachedUnits

CVBGs, ARGs, and MEU(SOC)s are just three of themanyunits “owned,” trained,and “packaged” by U.S.Atlantic Command(USACOM) in Norfolk,Virginia.72 Before a CVBGor ARG/MEU (SOC) goes

into combat, it will likely bereinforced with additionalsupportunits.Whilethismaynot be a complete list, it isrepresentative of what hasbeenregularlyusedinthelastdecadeorso.

•Land Based AirSupport—Inaddition to CVW-1and HMM-263, theGW battle groupfrequently needs

support from land-based aviation tosustain long-termoperations in high-threat areas. Thiswas seen clearlyduring OperationsDesert Storm andJoint Endeavor.Theseaviationunitscaninclude:

—AirborneTanker

Support—Every CAGdreams,hopes,and lusts formore airbornetankersupport.Since theretirement ofthe KA-6DIntruder, theonly tankershe actually“owns” are S-3 Viking and

ES-3 Shadowaircraft, whichcan carryunder-wing“buddy”refuelingpods.Each of thesecan “giveaway” about8,000 lb/3,627kg of fuel fortanking. Thisis less than athird of what

used to bedispensedbyasingle KA-6D,so any land-based tankersupport isprecious. Oneoption is aMarine KC-130 Herculestankerdetachment“on-call” forthe 24thMEU

(SOC). Inaddition toMarine tankersupport, othertanker assetscan make thelife ofCVW-1easier. Navycarrier aircrafthave refuelingprobes that fitalmostanyAirForce, Navy,or NATO

tanker aircraftavailable.Especiallyvaluable arethe big AirForceKC-10AExtenders,which canrefuel aircraftwith eitherboomorproberefuelingsystems. OneKC-10A

carries overten times the“give-away”fuelloadofanS-3/ES-3tanker,andhasmuch greaterloiter time. Afavorite Navy“trick” is touse a largeland-basedtanker, like aKC-135, as a

“milk cow” totop off S-3/ES-3tankers, whichthen distributethe fuel toother carrieraircraft.—AirborneEarlyWarning(AEW)Support—

Back in 1982,the RoyalNavylearnedahard lessonaboutoperatingwithout AEWsupport in ahigh-threatenvironment.Ships weresunk, sailorsdied, and theexpedition to

retake theFalklandIslands wasseriouslyjeopardized.While VAW-123’s four E-2C HawkeyesprovideexcellentAEWcapability,AdmiralMullen is

happy to haveadditional“eyes in thesky.” Ifsupport fromAir Force E-3SentryAWACSaircraft isavailable,count on himusing it withgusto. Datalinks on Navy

ships can talkto computerson Air Forceand NATOSentries.Secure voiceradios are alsocompatible,assumingeveryone hascorrectlyloaded theproper codes(this is a

common foul-up inexercises, andit’s beenknown tohappen incombat).—J-STARSGroundSurveillance—The GWCVBG haspowerful

sensors tomonitor thesky, but itsability todetect andtrack surfaceand ground-based targetsis morelimited.TheS-3Bs of VS-32can flyeffective dayand night

maritimesurfacesurveillancemissions, butthis competeswith theirother missionsas tankers,ASW aircraft,andseacontrolplatforms.Real-timetracking ofground targets

ashore is evenmore difficult.If you need tomonitor aground threat,have yourCinC ask theAir Force fortheloanoffewE-8 JointSurveillance,Tracking, andReconnaissanceSystem (J-

STARS)aircraft. Basedon acommercialBoeing 707airframe, theE-8’s carryside-lookingsynthetic-aperture radar(SAR)thatcandetect bothstationary andmoving targets

on the earth’ssurface.TheJ-STARSsystem alsohas specialmodes fordetecting andtrackingmaritimetargets, thenpassing thedata to thebattle groupviaadatalink.

Because J-STARS isdesigned for“wide area”surveillance, itcan monitorthousands ofsquare milesofterritoryatatime.—Air ForceWings—CVW-1 is

trained andequipped towork jointlywith air unitsof otherservices, oreven of alliedcountries. Thisreflects aprofoundtransformationin Navythinking since1990,andeven

aslateas1995the capabilitywas marginal.But now theCVBG finallyhas its owncapability togenerate anduse AirTaskingOrders tosynchronizeand “de-conflict” all

kinds of airoperations(strikes,sweeps, recon,cargodelivery,airmobileassault, cruise-missile salvos,search andrescue—youname it!).Someday wemay see“expeditionary”

Air Forcewings(likethe366th, acomposite unitof fighters,bombers, andtankers)directlysupportingcarrieroperations orprovidingcover for aCVBG or

ARG.—MarineAviationSupport—TheMarine Corpscan quicklydeploysquadron oftwo-seat F/A-18D Hornetall-weatherstrike fightersto support

CVBG, ARG,and MEU(SOC)operations.Equipped withNighthawklaser-targetingpods forLGBs, as wellas AIM-120AMRAAMand AGM- 65Maverickmissiles, the

F/A-18Ds arehighly capablestrike fighters.Marines alsofly land-basedEA-6BProwlerelectronicwarfare (EW)and jammeraircraft toaugment thosealready aboardthe carrier.

Also, MarineHornets andProwlers caneasily operatefromcarriersifnecessary,since they toohavetailhooks!

• ReconnaissanceSupport—To planair strikeseffectively you

need high-quality,up-to-the-minuteimagery ofpotential targets,and intelligenceanalysts whounderstand how tointerpret theseimages. The mainreconnaissanceasset on the carrieris a quartet ofTARPS-equippedF-14’s. Older

TARPS pods bringback reels of filmthat has to bedeveloped in anonboardphotographic lab.New DigitalTARPSpodshaveadata link that canreturn a stream ofpictures to thecarrierbeforetheF-14 lands. Othersourcesforimagery

tendtosoundlikeabowl of alphabetsoup: Satelliteimagery will comefrom the NationalReconnaissanceOffice (NRO) inChantilly, Virginia,with its fleet ororbital imaging andradar satellites.UAVs and otherairborne imagingsystemscanalsobe

tasked for theCVBG staff. Toprocess anddistribute imageryand other products,the NationalImaging andMapping Agency(NIMA) wascreated in 1996.NIMA willcombine theservices of NRO,theCentralImaging

Office (CIO), theNationalPhotographicCenter (NPIC), andthe DefenseMapping Agency(DMA), allunder asingle roof. Digitaland paper maps,annotatedphotography, andcustomized targetgraphics will be“pulled”ondemand

by regional jointintelligence centersand“pushed”downto the wing andsquadronintelligenceofficerswhowillneedit.

The big NRO satellites

produce a huge volume ofhigh-quality“close look”and“wide area” imagery, but

many urgent demandscompeteforlimitedtimeslotson these precious nationalassets. Smaller and lessexpensive collection systemswillcomeonlineintheearly21st century. NRO is tryingto improve the timeliness ofthe images they deliver, andto “downgrade” the Super-Secret classification of finalproducts,sothatmorepeopleand organizations can seethem.Analternativethatwill

become available in 1998 iscommercial satellite imageryatone-meterresolution(goodenough to distinguish tanksfrom trucks, but not toidentify specific models). Inthelongrun,themilitarywillprobably be one of thebiggest users of commercialimagery, since it will becheap,timely,andbestofall,unclassified!UAV systems continue to

make steady progress towardthe goal of long-duration,stealthy, unmanned airbornereconnaissance. The PioneerUAV continues in servicewith theMarineCorps.Also,the first Air Force Predatorunit(the11thReconnaissanceSquadron), at Nellis AFB,Nevada,formedseveralyearsago.Predator isderivedfromthe Gnat 750 UAVs, whichwere combat-tested by theCIA inBosniaback in1994;

and Predators were usedduringarecentworkupoftheCarl Vinson (CVN-70)CVBG off the southernCalifornia coast. The Navytoday can receive the datafeed from Predators, andcontrol them from carriers.Trials have even testedcontrolling the big UAVsfromnuclear submarines!Onthe downside, there are nofacilities for carrier takeoffsor landings, and Predators

mustbelaunchedfromalandsite. But the multi-dayendurance of the Predatormakesthisaminorlimitationinmostareas.APredatorUnmannedAerialVehicle (UAV)fliesover theUSS Carl Vinson (CVN-70)during an exercise off thesouthern California coast.Within a few years, suchUAVs will be a commonasset supporting carrier

groups.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTO

In addition to the Predator

and Pioneer programs,progress is being made onlong-endurance surveillanceUAVs, like Dark Star,produced by the LockheedMartin “Skunk Works.” Theeven-longer-range TeledyneRyanGlobalHawkisalsoontrack,aswellasthedatalinks

and common control stationsneeded to make the UAVavailabletousers.Traditionalmanned reconnaissancesystems include the RF-18DHornet introduced in 1997,equipped with a newAdvanced TacticalReconnaissance System(ATARS).

• IntelligenceSupport—Inaddition to imagery

and mappingsupport, the GWbattle group canalso make use ofmany of the otherproducts generatedby the various“spook” agencies.Some of theseinclude:

—NationalSecurityAgency(NSA)

—The NSA,which controlsall electronicand signalsintelligencecollection, is asignificantsupportingagency for anamphibiousunit like theGW battlegroup. Acramped,high-

securitycompartmentcalled the“Ships SignalsExploitationSpace”(SSES)lets battlegroup, ARG,and MEU(SOC)commanderstap into awealth ofelectronic

intelligencesourcesincluding RC-135 RivetJointandEP-3Orionelectronicintelligenceaircraft, aswell ascommunicationsintelligencesatellites.Ship-based

sensors (likethe ClassicOutboardESMsystem) canintercept andanalyzeelectronicsignals, fromSAM and airtraffic radar tocellularphonesand televisionsignals.

—U.S. SpaceCommand(USSPACECOM)—Based atFalcon AFB,Colorado, USSPACECOMprovidesspace-basedservices tosupportcombatoperations.

Key assetsincludeweather, GPSnavigation andcommunicationssatellites,ballisticmissilewarnings, andin the future,theater missiledefensecommand andcontrol.

—CableNewsNetwork(CNN)—Intelligenceanalysts, aftera few drinks,will usuallyagree thatCNN is thefinestreal-timeintelligence-gatheringservice in theworld. In fact,

one of thegreatestbenefits of theChallengeAthena systemwas to givecommandersand staffsaccess tonetworks likeCNN, Skynet,and MSNBC.A side benefitis improved

crew moralewhen up-to-the-minutenews andsports fromhome areavailable.

BattleGroupOperations:The

Concept

When the Army guys talkabout “doctrine,” Navy guystalk about CONOPS.“Doctrine” or CONOPS ishowwe think about the waywefight.ForAmericanNavalcommanders, tradition, morethan technology, dominatesthe way they look atCONOPS. Carrier-based airunitstendtobemore“brittle”than land-based wings andsquadrons. When you havevery few aircraft, and

reinforcementsmaybeweeksaway, the loss of each planeand crew hurts—a lot. Thatmeans that battle group andairwingcommandershavetobe very cautious when theycommit their limitedresources, yet very bold inemploying them tomake theeffort effective. Balancingsuch conflicting objectivestakes a special gift—even akind of operational andtactical genius. The capacity

forsuchjudgmentisrare.Aviators are an incredibly

select group to begin with,and only the best of the bestever rise to commandcarriers, airwings, andbattlegroups. Perhaps this explainswhynavalaviatorsseemtobesosuccessful,notonly in thetop ranks of themilitary, butalso in government andindustry.Theydon’tjusthave“the right stuff.” They have

therightCONOPS.A trained, well-led battle

group is an ideal tool formany different missions.Thesemissionsinclude:

•Presence—Globalnaval presence istheprimarymissionof every peacetimeCVBGdeployment.Justhavingacarriergroup in theneighborhood

encouragesregionalbullies andopponents to backoff, as seems tohave happened inthe Straits ofTaiwan in 1996when a pair ofCVBGs deterredaggression by thePeople’s Republicof China againstTaiwan. It’s reallyvery simple: If you

attack even a smallAmerican ship,you’vegot yourselfan internationalincident. If youattack anAmericancarrier, you’ve gotyourself a waragainst the peopleof the UnitedStates. You lose.Anyquestions?•ShowofForce—This might be best

described as a one-time application ofmilitary power forthe purpose ofsending a message.It is a punitivemilitary actiondesigned to applyameasured amountof force against aspecific target.Operation DesertStrike against Iraqin 1996 and the

1986 raid on Libyaareprimeexamples.• MaritimeEmbargo—In thedays of sailingships, this missionwas called ablockade. Thoughmoderninterpretations ofinternational lawhave made thehistoric concept ofblockade obsolete,

maritime embargoand inspectionoperations are astaple of CVBGoperations today.At one point in1994, the U.S. andits allies weresimultaneouslyrunning embargooperations againstIraq, Haiti, and intheBalkans.• Freedom of

NavigationExercise—“Freedom of theSeas” is a conceptthe U.S. Navyinherits from thePax Britannica—the age of Britishglobal empire,when the RoyalNavy enforced the“right of innocentpassage” atgunpoint, anywhere

in the world. Totyrannical regimes,the notion of freenavigation is asincomprehensibleas most otherfreedoms. Dictatorsareoftentemptedtosimply close theircoastal waters,applying the surferpunk’s rule of “mybeach, my wave!”As a matter of

policy, the UnitedStates willchallenge anyattempt to preventor restrict freenavigation inrecognizedinternationalwaters. Ouroperations on theLibyan “Line ofDeath” in the Gulfof Sidra in 1981and1986areclassic

examples of thismission.•Maritime Escort—High—valuecommercialvessels,like tankers andcontainer ships, ormilitary transports(like MaritimePrepositioningSquadrons)sometimes have tobe escorted pasthostile shores and

through dangerouswaters. CVBGsprovide powerfulforce for escortmissions,with theirarrayofair,surface,and subsurfacecapabilities. OurescortofAmerican-flagged Kuwaiti-owned tankersduring 1988 and1989 in thePersianGulf demonstrates

thismission.• ExpeditionarySupport—“Expeditionary”is a fancyword forinvasion, theultimateexerciseofforce. Though rare,invasions stillhappen. Recentexamples are the1983 invasion ofGrenada, ourlandings in Beirut

during the sameperiod, and theliberation of Haitiin 1994. CVBGsandARGswerethekey units inprosecuting eachoftheseactions.•PowerProjection—Sometimes, youjusthavetoflyalotofsortiesoversomebeach for a longtime to support a

long-term nationalcommitment.Desert Storm andoperations in theGulf of Tonkinduring theVietnamWar are examples.This kind ofoperation usuallyinvolves two ormore CVBGssharing the burdenofoperationsoveraperiod of days or

weeks. The key tothiskindofwarfareis pacing the aircrews andmaintaining anadequate supply ofmunitions fordelivery onto thetargets.

Each of these missions

depends on having all theelements of the CVBG team

in place, so that the battlegroup commander has a fullrange of options to block ordefeat any hostile action. Abattle group commander canonly do his job, however, ifhe has political support fromthe National CommandAuthorities, necessaryfreedom of action from hisregional CinC, and Rules ofEngagement (ROE) thatallow him to accomplish themission.

A Non-CombatantEvacuation Operation (NEO)being run by U.S. Marines.These operations havebecomealmostcommonplacesince the end of the ColdWar.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVYPHOTOSo how would a CVBG

commanded like Admiral

Mullen use the tools at hiscommand to prosecute anactual crisis? Consider theproblem facing manyAmerican travelers in someof the world’s rougherneighborhoods: walking intothe middle of a civil war.Since the end of the ColdWar in the early 1990’s,literally dozens of national,tribal, ethnic, or religiousconflicts have sprung up.They drag on for years

withoutone sideor theothergainingadecisiveadvantage.During particularly chaoticperiods, immediateevacuation of Americancitizens and other non-combatants from the warzone is required to preventmassacres or hostagesituationsfromdeveloping,astheydidinIranbackin1979.In a “typical” NEO (Non-

Combatant Evacuation

Operation),Marines fromtheMEU(SOC)flyintoacapitalcity to reinforce the guard inthe American embassy, andthen safeguard the helicopterevacuationofnon-combatantsto thewaiting shipsoffshore.TheU.S. and our allies haveconducted literally dozens ofNEOs in the last few years,particularly in West Africaand the Balkans. Usually anNEO is accomplished bydetachinganddispatchingthe

ARG/MEU(SOC)teamandafew escorts to conduct themission independently.DuringDesert Shield (1990),simultaneous NEOs wererequired in Somalia andLiberia,withouttakingforcesawayfromthebuildup in theGulf. Most combatants incivilwarsthesedayshavethegood sense to let us run ourNEOs without getting in theway. However, some trulyfanatical terrorists or tribal

warriors just can’t resist theurge to test their prowessagainsttheMarines.A“worstcase”NEOinour

time might involve rebelforces closing in on a city;notjustragtagguerrillaswithAK-47’s and RPG-7’s, butwell-equipped and trainedforces with artillery, armor,helicopters, and fighter-bombers. Let’s say that theyhave taken a hard stand

against Americanintervention; not just nastyrhetoric but closing offnormal evacuation routes.Overlandroads,seaports,andairportshavebeenclosed,andseveral thousandciviliansaretrapped inside embassies inthe surrounded city. Toemphasize their dislike ofWesterners,rebelshavetakenshots at embassy guards andkilled some news crews,inciting outrage from the

worldmedia.Since the situation is

clearlygettingoutofhand,anentire CVBG/ARG/ MEU(SOC) team is dispatched tobring the civiliansoutwith aminimumof losses.With theorders and ROE from theNational CommandAuthoritiesinhand,thebattlegroup commander brings theforcetotheoffshorewatersofthe embattled country, then

calls his unit commanderstogether for a planningconference aboard theflagship. Meanwhile,intelligence agencies will beworking overtime to gather,generate, and deliver thenecessaryimagery,maps,anddataonpotentialthreats.As thebattlegrouparrives

offshore, rebel and loyalistforces are fighting in thestreets around the embassies,

and the rebel air force isbombingthecapitalcity.Theembarked CVW is tasked totake out the air threat to theMarine helicopters, andescort and protect theevacuees as they are flownbacktotheshipsoftheARG.The CVW sets up a combatairpatrol(CAP)stationofF-14TomcatsbackedupbyanE-2CHawkeyeAEWaircraft.At the same time, the Stateand Defense Department

spokesmen back inWashington, D.C., aremaking the intentions of theforce clear to the rebels andthe rest of the world:Americans will fire onanyone interfering with theevacuation.Initially, the showof force

deters any rebel response,which is exactly the intent.Meanwhile, additional airunits are already being

preparedforoperations.Eachoperationalmission isknownas an “event” to the air bosson the carrier, who managesand controls the localairspace to ensure that nomidair collisions or enemyincursions interfere withoperations. Events arenormallyscheduledaboutonehour apart to allow a littleslacktimeforflightanddeckcrews to “respot” aircraft(shuffle them around on the

deck) and take a few breaks.These “cyclic ops” can bemaintained indefinitely ifrequired.Meanwhile, an Aegis ship

moves closer inshore, withone of the HH- 60GSAR/special operationshelicopters aboard standingby for Tactical Recovery ofAircraft and Personnel(TRAP) in case a plane goesdown. The escort provides

inshoreradarcoverageof theairspace, and establishes aforward SAM “bubble” toprotect the shipsof theARGshould the rebels try an airstrike against them. Aboutthis time, the first wave ofMarine reinforcementsaboard its helicoptertransports arrives at theembassyandpreparestotakeout the first of the evacuees.Within a few hours of theinitial Marine guard

reinforcement,thehelicoptersloadedwith evacueeswill beshuttling out to the ARGships on a regular schedule.Sinceevacuationscaninvolverescuing hundreds andsometimes thousands ofcivilians, and it can takehours toget themallclearofthe war zone, trouble caneasily occur during thisperiod.A few hours into the

evacuation cycle, the rebelshave carefully noted thetiming and routes of theevacuationhelicopters,withaview to teaching theAmericans a lesson. Undercover of darkness a mobilebattery of radar-controlledSAMs moves into theevacuationcorridor.And justas dawn is breaking, a flightof MiG fighters attempts tointerceptoneofthehelicoptergroups. These threats do not

go unnoticed. A few milesoffshore,systemsoperatorsinthe backseats of an ES-3Shadow ESM aircraftintercept radio messagesbetweentheSAMbatteryandrebelheadquarters,aswellascommunications traffic goingout to the MiG base outsidethe city. To deal with thisthreat, the battle groupcommander reinforces thenext rescue group withadditional CAP escorts, and

orders alternative routeplanningforthehelicopters.SuddenlyanescortingEA-

6B Prowler begins to detectthe telltale signals of theSAM surveillance radar. TheProwlerfiresapairofAGM-88 HARM anti-radiationmissiles at the radar vehicle,destroying it in seconds.Momentslater,apairofF/A-18 Hornet fighter-bombersdive into thearea,destroying

the SAM launch vehicleswith LGBs and AGM-65Maverickmissiles.Asthestrikeaircraftfinish

theirdeadlywork,wordgoesoutoverthesecuredatalinksthat the AEW Hawkeye andES-3 have detected severalflights ofMiG fighters beingvectored into the area.Rapidly, the CVWcommander maneuvers hisfighters into position to stop

them. He orders his mostcapable fighters to intercept(these aircraft have LowProbability of Intercept—LPI—radars equipped withNCTR operating modes). Asthe American fighters moveinto place, they acquire therebel fighters on radar, andfire their AIM-120AMRAAM AAMs atmaximumrange.OverhalfoftherebelMiGsarevaporizedin clusters of oily fireballs.

The rest flee back to theirbase.Nowthattheimmediatedangerispast,theevacuationcontinues without a breakuntil the last of the civiliansandembassystaffhavesafelyreachedtheshipsoftheARG.As the Marine guard and

reinforcement force isrecovered, the NationalCommandAuthorities decidetopunish the rebelviolationsof international law prior to

withdrawal.WiththeMarinesand helicopters back aboard,the ARG heads back out tosea, and one last strike isplanned, briefed, andassembledaboard thecarrier.Throughout the NEOoperations, nationalintelligence agencies and theCVBG’s ownTARPSF-14’shavebeentryingtolocateandidentify critical rebelcommand posts and heavy-weaponssites.Becauseofthe

earlierattacksonU.S.forces,a one-time show of forceagainst the rebels isauthorized and rapidlyexecuted.Close inshore, the Aegis

ship launches several dozenBGM-109 Tomahawk cruisemissilestoattackfixedradarsand command posts. Behindthemcomeawaveoffighter-bombersandsupportaircraft,which attack the rebel MiG

base, as well as theheadquarters of the insurgentforces.Tominimizecollateraldamage,onlyPGMsareusedto hit bunkers and aircraftshelters.Once their ordnanceisexpended,allaircraftsafelyreturn to the “boat” for awell-deservedrest.As the battle group

withdraws, Aegis ships andone CAP section provide a“rear guard” until the force

exits the threat area. A fewdayslater,theevacueessafelydisembark; and weapons,fuel, and supplies arereplenished. Then the battlegroup moves on to its nextdestination, the cycles ofnormal operations arereestablished, and the crewsbegintothinkabouttheirnextport call and the exercisesthat will follow. While thisscenarioismuchsimplified,itillustrates how CVBGs can

rapidly adapt to a fast-breaking situation. Getting abattle group into such a highstate of readiness is, ofcourse,nosimplematter.Thenext chapter explains howAdmiral Mullen, CaptainRutheford, and CAGStufflebeem spent the hotsummer of 1997 preparingtheir people, ships, andaircraft for the challenge ofan actual deployment. Joinme, and I’ll show you how

theyspenttheirvacation!

FinalExamination:JTFEX97-3

“Thisis4.5acresofsovereignU.S.territory”

RearAdmiralMichaelMullen,

Commander,GeorgeWashingtonBattleGroup

In the fall of 1997 troublewas once again brewing inthePersianGulf.Onceagain,Iraqwasdefyingtheauthorityof the United NationsSecurity Council, trying tohide from the world the

weapons of mass destructionSaddamHusseinhadspentsomuch to produce. As usual,the Iraqi dictator railedagainst UN weaponsinspectors’ attempts to detecthis research and productioncenters for chemical,biological, and nuclear arms.And once again, the worldwenttothebrinkofwar.As in previous years, this

crisis required a U.S.

response that was both rapidand clear. Quickly, units ofthe Army’s XVIII AirborneCorpswere put on alert; andtheU.S.AirForcedispatchedreinforcements to the aerialtask force (based at PrinceSultan Airbase in SaudiArabia)alreadyenforcing thesouthern Iraqi “no-fly” zone.But this time there was acomplication. For the firsttime since August of 1990,ourPersianGulfalliesdenied

us the use of bases on theirterritory. Though we still donotknowwhether thisactionresulted from pent-upfrustrationoverour failure toform a clear policy towardIraq, or from fear of thereaction of their own Islamicfundamentalist factions, thismuch was clear. If Americawere to react to this crisis,thentheresponsewouldhaveto come from U.S. shipssailing in international

waters.To this end, the newly

installed Chairman of theJointChiefsofStaff,GeneralHenryShelton,sent theworddownthechainofcommand:“Sendinthecarriers.”Withindays,thecarrierbattlegroups(CVBGs) based around theaircraftcarriersNimitz(CVN-68) and George Washington(CVN-73) were sailing forthe Persian Gulf, where they

could quickly mount air andcruise-missile strikes againstIraqi targets should these berequired. As the CVBGsrattled sabers, UN SecretaryGeneralKofiAnnancarefullyconstructed a diplomaticeffort to persuade Saddamthat further intransigencewould lead to falling bombs.The persuasion—eventually—worked, and the inspectorswere able to return to theirjobs.

ThecarriersNimitz(CVN-68)and George Washington(CVN-73)inthePersianGulfduring fall 1997. These twovesselsandtheirbattlegroupscomprised the bulk of thestriking power that stooddownSaddamHusseinduringthearmsinspectioncrisis.OFFICAL U.S. NAVYPHOTO

Meanwhile, the two battlegroups spent almost sixmonthsonstationintheGulf,until they were relieved oftheir vigil in the spring of1998 by two more CVBGs,centered around the carriersIndependence (CV-62) andJohn C. Stennis (CVN-74).The U.S. kept two carriergroups in the Persian GulfuntillateMay1998,bywhichtime tensions in the regionhad relaxed. Back home in

America, most of us gavelittlethoughttothethousandsof men and women on theseships. Even though we mayhave worried a great dealabout the Iraqi crisis itself,they were out there, doing avital and dangerous job forus, and generally making itlook easy. This last is asignificant point: Making itlook easy is hard work. Ittakes practice, training,intense education, constant

drilling.Theprocessofpreparinga

CVBG for an overseasdeployment begins monthsbeforeitdeploys,andittakesthe efforts of every personassignedtothegroup,aswellasthousandsofotherswhodonot leave American waters.Let’s look at part of thateffort, as the GW (GeorgeWashington) group ratchetedup its combat skills in the

summerof1997.

GettingtheGroupReady:JointTraining

You fight likeyoutrain!

CommanderRandy “Duke”Cunningham,USN(Ret.)FirstU.S.Air-to-Air “Ace”oftheVietnamWar

Thisstatementdatesfromthespring of 1972, soon after

then-Lieutenant Cunninghamand his valiant backseater,Lieutenant, J.G. “Willie”Driscoll, shot down fiveNorth Vietnamese MiGfighters and becameAmerica’s first confirmedVietnam fighter aces.Cunningham and Driscoll’ssuccess did not come out ofthe blue; their generation ofnaval aviators had been thefirsttobegivenanewkindofpre-combat schooling, called

“force-on-force” training.Simply put, force-on-forcetraining involves trainingunits and personnel againstrole-players who simulateenemy units at the peak oftheirgame.The firstof theseprograms was the famous“TOPGUN” school, thenlocatedatNASMiramarnearSanDiego,California.Whilethetoolsandcurriculumwererudimentary by today’sstandards, the results were

spectacular. The Navy’s air-to-air kill ratio in Vietnam,the measure of aerial fighterperformance,improvedbyanamazing 650%. Notsurprisingly, the otherservicestooknotice.Today,everybranchofthe

U.S. military has multipleforce-on-force trainingprograms and facilities, andeach of these has beenvalidated by the outstanding

combat performance of theirgraduates.73 CVBGs, likefighter pilots, do best whenthey have been tuned up bymeans of intense force-on-force training—a tune-upthat’s considerablycomplicated by the varietyand multiplicity of roles aCVBG might be required toundertake.Today’sCVBG ismore than a group of shipsdesigned to protect the

flattop. When properlydeployed and utilized by theNational CommandAuthorities (NCAs), aCVBG’s mission can rangefrom“coolingoff”acrisis tospearheading the initialphasesofamajorinvasionorintervention.Meanwhile, preparing a

war machine as large andcomplex as a CVBG for asix-monthoverseascruiseisa

hugeundertaking.Infact,thevarious components of thegroup spend twice as muchtime recovering from the lastcruise and getting ready forthe next as they actuallyspend out on deployment.And all of this has grownmore complicated in the lastdecade as a result of thechanges in the NCAcommandstructurestemmingfrom the Goldwater-NicholsDefense Reorganization Act.

Backinthe1980s,andbeforeGoldwater-Nichols, theNavywas the sole owner andtrainer of carrier groupsbefore they were sentoverseas. Today, thatownership has moved toanotherorganization,theU.S.Atlantic Command(USACOM) based inNorfolk,Virginia.LedbyAdmiralHaroldW.

Gehman, Jr., USACOM is a

mammoth organization—infact, the most powerfulmilitary organization in theworld today. USACOMessentially “owns” everyArmy, Navy, Air Force, andMarine unit based in thecontinental United States. Itsjob is to organize, train,package, and delivermilitaryforcesforthecommandersofthe other unifiedCommanders in Chiefs(CINCs)—the heads of the

various regional commandsresponsible for conductingmilitaryoperationsaroundtheglobe. Whenever the NCAsneed to send an Americanmilitary force somewhere inthe world, the phone usuallyrings first in Norfolk atUSACOMheadquarters.Goldwater-Nichols has

also brought practicalchanges to the U.S.military.Forinstance,CVBGsnowno

longer operate independentlyof other units—or indeed ofotherservices.Soanairstrikefrom a carrier may receiveaerial tanking and fighterprotection from U.S. AirForce units, and electronicwarfare support from a U.S.MarineCorpsEA-6BProwlersquadron,andhavethetargetlocated and designated by anArmy Special Forces team.This, in essence, is what ismeantby“joint”warfare,and

it’s far removed from ColdWar practices that gave theNavy few responsibilitiesother than the killing of theships, aircraft, andsubmarines of the formerSoviet Union. Needless tosay, joint war fighting skillsdon’t justhappen.Theymustbe taught and practicedbeforeacrisisbreaksout.TheCVBGmustpracticenotonly“Naval” skills, but also“joint” skills with other

servicesandnations.This job falls to the joint

training office (J-7) ofUSACOM,whichlaysoutthetraining regimes for unitsbeing “packaged” formissionsinwhatarenormallyknownas JTFsor JointTaskForces. Getting a particularunitreadyfordutyinaJTFisa three-phased program,which is supervised byindividual groups of subject-

matter experts. For example,oneachcoastaCarrierGroup(CARGRU) composed of arear admiral and a fulltraining staff is assigned toprepare CVBGs fordeployment. On the PacificCoast, this is done byCARGRU One, whileCARGRU Four does thesame job for the AtlanticFleet. The trainingCARGRUs supervise thevarious elements of the

CVBGs through their three-phase workups. These breakdownthisway:

• Category ITraining—Service—specific/mandatedtraining thatfocuses on thetactical unit level.Examples includeeverything fromcarrier

qualifications tomissile and ACMtraining at theship/squadron/CVWlevel.• Category IITraining—This isjoint field training,in which thevarious pieces ofthe CVBG cometogetherinwhatareknown asCapabilities

Exercises(CAPEXs) andJoint Task ForceExercises(JTFEXs).• Category IIITraining—This isa purely academictraining phase,which takes placejustpriortotheJTFdeploying.Composed of aseries of seminars,

briefings, andcomputer wargames, it isdesignedtogivetheunit commanders amaximumof up-to-the-minuteinformation aboutthe areas wherethey will likely beoperating and thepossiblecontingencies thattheymayface.

These exercises provide a

multi-level training regimefor every member of thebattle group, from the sailorsinthelaundriestotheCVBGcommanderandhisstaff.Andmostparticipantswilltellyouthat the pre-workup trainingis usually tougher than theactual overseas deployment.The old saying that sweat intrainingischeaperthanblood

in combat remains true. In aworldasuncertainastoday’s,we as a nation owe the menand women of our armedforces the very toughesttraining we can provide forthem.74 All of this brings usdownto themenandwomenof the GW group in thesummer of 1997, facing aterribly real experience,designed to test the limits oftheirenduranceandskills.

GettingtheGroupReady:PartI

The countdown to GW’sdeployment in the fall of1997 actually began inFebruary of 1996. That iswhen the battle group basedaround the USS America(CV-66) returned from theirown six-month cruise to theMediterranean Sea.75 Since

America had been scheduledfor decommissioning andeventual scrapping, this washer final cruise. The GWwould replace her. Otherships in this combinedCVBG/Amphibious ReadyGroup(ARG)werescheduledfordeepmaintenanceassoonas they arrived back home.Thus theWasp (LHD-1) andtheWhidbeyIsland (LSD-41)wereheadedintodrydockforalmost a year of overhaul.

Replacingthemwouldbetheamphibious ships Guam(LPH-9), Ashland (LSD-48),and Oak Hill (LSD-51). Atthe same time, a number ofthe escorts and submarineswere swapped out, as thepersonnel at Atlantic FleetHeadquarters and USACOMpackaged the new CVBG.Even though the CVBGwouldmakejustonecruiseinthis form, the plans are toreconstituteitagaininamore

permanent form for its 1998/1999cruise.82

InFebruaryof1996,whilethe thoughts of most of thegroup’s personnel were ontheir upcoming leave periodsand visiting with theirfamilies and friends, at theUSACOM and Atlantic/2ndFleet headquarters planningfor the CVBG’s training anddeployment in 1997 hadalready begun. For starters,

there was the scheduling ofminoroverhaulsfortheshipsassigned to the CVGB thatwoulddeployin1997,aswellasmanagingtheusualflowofpersonnel coming and goingto new assignments. Thesemonths of relative quietoffereda time forgetting thenew folksup to speed, andachanceforthoseremaininginthe group’s units to attendtechnical and service schoolsortotakesomeleave.

By the fall of 1996, thevarious pieces of the battlegroup were ready to begintheir Category I training. So,for example, theGuam ARGand the 24th MarineExpeditionary Unit—SpecialOperations Capable (MEU(SOC)) were beginning theirown workups, supervised byteams of USACOM trainingmentors.Meanwhile, even asCARGRU Four personnelweredeepintothetrainingof

theJohnF.Kennedy(CV-67)CVBG(whichwouldproceedthe GW group to theMediterranean in the springof 1997), theCARGRUstaffhad already begun to assignpersonneltotheGWgrouptostart the workup process. Atthe same time, the varioussquadrons of Carrier AirWingOne(CVW-1)begantocome to life at Naval AirStations (NASs) fromWhidbeyIsland,Washington,

to Jacksonville, Florida.Abouthalfofthesesquadronswould also be breaking in anew commanding officer,normally a freshly frockedcommander (O-5) who hadjust “fleeted up” from theexecutive officer’s job in theunit. Along with thecommand changes came in-squadrontraining.Alotofit!Getting a squadron ready

to deploy starts with

refresher/upgrade training foralltheflyingpersonnelintheunit. This brings everyone intheunituptoacommonlevelof proficiency across a rangeof skills and missions. Asthey do this, the squadronmaintenance chiefs begin tobring the squadron’s aircraftup to standard.This isnot tosaythattheaircrafthavebeenallowed to go to seed. Butsince the squadron is not a“deployed” unit, and

personnelwereawayonleaveand at service schools,keeping every aircraft fullymission-capablehasnotbeenapriority.Deployedunitsgetthe pick of the “good”airplanes, as well as firstpriority on trainingammunitionandspareparts.While the air units were

starting on their road todeployment, so too were thecrews of the ships of the

battlegroup.Andtheofficersand enlisted personnel werere-learningthedetailsoftheirtradeonshorttrainingcruisesout of their home ports.During these cruises, thecrews powered up all theship’ssystemstofindoutthenew capabilities andliabilities the yard workershad installed. Also, duringthese cruises the new crewmembers began the bondingprocesswith their shipmates.

This is especially importantin the escorts (known as“small boys”),whichwill doso much of the worksupportingandprotecting thecarrierandARG.Forthemenandwomenof

the GW battle group, theirfinal run to deploymentstarted inMay of 1997,withthe departure of the John F.Kennedy battle group. Nowthat that group was on its

way,theCARGRUFourstaffcould devote their fullattention to making the GWgroup ready for their earlyOctober deployment. Severalkey training events, whosedates had been previouslybeensetbytheUSACOMJ-7staff, began to haveimmediate importance.Theseincluded:

•NavalStrikeandAir Warfare

Center Rotation—Since “Boomer”Stufflebeem, thecommander ofCVW-1, had unitsspread over fivebases in fourdifferent states ontwocoasts, the rareopportunities forgetting his unitstogetherweremoreprecious than gold.Oneofthesegolden

opportunitieshappened at theNaval Strike andAirWarfare Center(NSAWC) at NASFallon near Reno,Nevada. For overthreedecades,ithasbeen Navy policythat every CVWpreparing to deploydo a rotation at theNSAWC. Over aperiod of three and

a half weeks, thevarious CVWcomponents arebased at NASFallon, where theycan practice the artof compositewarfare together.While there, theyundertake a seriesofairstrikesagainstthe target arrays upon the Fallonbombing range.

Supervised by theCenter Staff, andassisted byaggressor aircraftand ground unitsacting as surrogateenemies, the wingworksup throughanumber of phases,culminating withthe three-dayAdvanced TrainingPhase (ATP).76

During ATP, thewing must conducta series of large“Alpha” strikes(usually involvingbetween two andthree dozenaircraft) againsttargets up on theFallon ranges. Allof this trainingbrings the entirewing, from pilotsand planners to

maintenancepersonnel andphoto interpreters,up to combatstandards.With theair wing nowmolded into aunified fightingunit, it was time tomerge it with theGW and her battlegroup. TheUSACOMCategory I training

nowcompleted, theGW group wasready tomoveontothe challenges ofCategoryII.• CapabilitiesExercise (CAPEX)—In mid-June of1997, after CVW-1had returned fromNAS Fallon, theships of the GWbattlegroupmetoffthe Virginia capes

to conduct what iscalled a CAPEX.This exercise,whichwasrunovertwo weeks, wasdesigned tointegrate CVW-1into the rest of thebattle group’soperations. Thismeant doing anumberofthingsina very short time.Once the battle

group hadassembled, theCVW-1aircraftandcrews flew aboardfrom staging basesalong the Atlanticcoast. Whatfollowed wereseveral days ofcarrierrequalification foreveryone in thewing, includingCaptain

Stufflebeem. Withqualificationscompleted, thewing and battlegroup began aseries of trainingexercises, designedto show theCARGRU Fourstaffthattheycouldsafely andeffectively conductstrike operations.During this time,

therestofthebattlegroup practicedvarious skills, suchas simulatedTomahawk cruise-missile strikes, andcombat search-and-rescue (CSAR)training. TheCAPEX was a testof skill andendurance,designed to stresseveryoneintheGW

battle group fromAdmiral Mullendown to the chiefsof the variousships’ laundries.Again, all wentwell, and its endhad melded theassortedpartsofthebattle group into afighting unit. Nextcame the final partof the GW group’sCategory II

training, theJTFEX.•JointTaskForceExercise (JTFEX)97-3-Run overthree weeks in lateAugust and earlySeptemberof1997,JTFEX 97-3 was a“finalexam”forthecombined GWCVBG/CVW/ARG/MEU(SOC) team.JTFEXs—the

crown jewels ofUSACOMexercises—are thelargest and mostcomplex series ofexercises regularlyrun by USACOM.Even as the seaservices are usingthem as benchmarkexercises for Navygroups, the otherservices areutilizingtheminthe

same way: to testtheir own fast-reactionunits (suchas the 82ndAirborne Divisionat Fort Bragg,North Carolina, orthe 2ndBombardmentWing based atBarksdale AFB,Louisiana).

With the Category IItraining completed, the shipsand aircraft of the battlegroupheadedhomeforafinalleave period. During thistime,theCategoryIIItrainingand briefings for the battlegroup staff and leaders tookplace around Washington,D.C. While their actualsequence and locations areclassified, the briefings andwar games were conductedby a variety of military and

intelligence agencies, withthe goal of sharpening theminds of theCVBG/CVW/ARG/MEU(SOC) leadership. Whentheseexerciseswerefinished,the CARGRU Four staffstartedpreparing for thenextgroup, which was basedaround the new Nimitz-classcarrier John Stennis (CVN-74).

JTFEX97-3

In the confusing (maybeanarchic is a better word)post-ColdWarworldof jointand coalition warfare, theUSACOMstaffmustpackageand deliver to theunified/regional CinCs unitsthatare ready to“plug in” toa joint/ multinational JTF.The JTF must start combat

operations on almost nonotice, and function in anenvironment where the ROEcan change on a moment’snotice. That means the unitsassigned to the JTF must betrained with an eye tofunctioning in a variety ofscenarios that wereunimaginableasrecentlyasadecade ago. Some of thesemay even involve situationswhere conflict may beavoided(ifashowofforceis

sufficiently effective), orwhereconflictmaynotbeanoption (in what are calledOperationsShortofWar).Training units for

situations like these requiresmore than the simple force-on-force training that wasgood enough for themilitaryservicesduringtheColdWar.Exercises like Red Flag (atNellis AFB, Nevada) andthoseattrainingfacilitieslike

theArmy’sNationalTrainingCenter (at Fort Irwin,California) were alwaysbased upon assumptions thata “hot” war was alreadyhappening. Because of this,the engaged forces’ onlyrequirementwas to fight thatconflict in themost effectivemanner possible. While theservices teach combat skillsquitewell,teaching“short-of-war”trainingisamuchmorecomplicated and difficult

undertaking. Only in the lastfew years (after high-costlessons learned in Haiti,Somalia, and Bosnia) hasprogress been made on thisdauntingtrainingchallenge.So far, the leader in this

new kind of “real world”force-on-force training hasbeen the Army’s JointReadiness Training Center(JRTC) at Fort Polk,Louisiana.77 The JRTC staff,

for example, was among thefirst to insert into traditionalforce-on-force training whatthe military calls “friction”elements and non-traditionalideas like “neutral” role-players on the simulatedbattlefield, and to include agreater emphasis on logisticsand casualty evacuation.JRTC’s focus on these kindsoflayeredissueshavemadeita model for other jointtraining operations run by

USACOM (such as theJTFEX-SERIES exercises,which are run approximatelysix times a year—three oneachcoast).The result of all this

thinking has been a gradualevolution in the scenariospresented to participants intheJTFEXs.Aslittleasthreeyears ago, every JTFEXwasessentially a forced-entryscenario into an occupied

country that lookeda lot likeKuwait, and the opposingforces were structured muchlike the Iraqis. The criticswho were complaining thatUSACOM was preparing to“fight the last war” weremaking a good point. Todaythere’d be no justice in thatcriticism. Now, each JTFEXis made a bit different fromthelastone,orforthatmatterfromanyother.Foronething,USACOMhasgottenintothe

habit of making the JTFEXstruly“joint,”byspreadingoutthecommandresponsibilities.By way of example, a JTFheadquartersbasedat8thAirForce headquarters atBarksdale AFB, Louisiana,controlled JTFEX 97-2 (runin the spring of 1997),whilethe first of the FY-1998JTFEXswillbeanArmy-runexercise,controlledbyXVIIIAirborneCorpsatFortBragg,North Carolina. Now that

each of the services hasopportunities each year to bethe JTFEX “top dog,” thescenarios have tended tobecome not only more freshandinnovative,butalsomorefair in the distribution oftraining responsibilities andopportunities.The quality of JTFEX

exercises has also beenimprovedbymeansofwhatiscalled a “flexible” training

scenario—that is, a scenariowithout highly structuredschedules and situations. Inmorestructuredscenarios,forexample, participants knewexactly when and how theexercise would transition to“hot war” status. In currentJTFEXs, there ismuchmoreuncertainty. Furthermore, theactionsoftheparticipantscanaffect the“flexible”elementsof the scenario, and theseactions can be scored

positively or negatively. It isevenpossiblethatparticipantsmight contain a JTFEX“crisis situation” sowell thata transition to a “hot” warsituation might never occur.But creative work by theUSACOM J-7 staff makesthis unlikely. Thus when acommanderorunitdoeswell,“friction” and challenges areaddedsonoparticipantgetsachance to “break” thescenario. On the other hand,

if a unit has itself been“broken” by the situations itfaces, the exercise staff maychoose to give it additionalsupport or opportunities to“get well enough to go backinto the game,” as it were.You have to remember thatexercisesliketheJTFEXsaredesigned to build units up,notbreakthemdown.For the GW group, the

focus in the late summer of

1997 was getting ready fortheir particular “final exam,”JTFEX 97-3 (the third EastCoast JTFEX of FY-97).With their deployment datescheduled for early October1997, every person in thebattlegroupwaseager togetthrough the exercise andmove on to theMediterranean. But theUSACOM J-7 training staffwasn’t going to make thateasy.Tothatend,severalnew

elementswerebeingaddedtothescenarioinanticipationofnewcapabilitiessooncomingon-line. Within a couple ofyears, forexample, theentireforce of Ticonderoga-class(CG-47) cruisers andArleighBurke-class (DDG-51)destroyers will be receivingsoftware and new StandardSAMs capable of providingthe first theater-wide defenseagainst ballistic missiles.Thus in JTFEX 97-3, the

opposing forces wereassumedtohaveasmallforceof SCUD-type theaterballistic missiles, somepossiblyarmedwithchemicalwarheads. The U.S. forceswere not only expected tohunt these down, but to“shoot” them down withPatriot SAMs or with theAegis systems on boardseveral of the escortingvessels. The group’s abilitiesin this areawould be closely

watchedbyUSACOM.

TheactivitiesofJTFEX97-3in August and September1997.JACKRYANENTERPRISES,LTD.,BYLAURADENINNOIn addition, CVW-1 was

testing procedures forgeneratingmore sorties fromthe GW. This effort wasbased on a demonstrationcalled a “SURGEX”—orSurge Exercise—run theprevious July off the Pacific

coast by the Nimitz battlegroup.SURGEXattemptedtodiscover howmany sorties asingle carrier/air wing teamcould generate over a four-day period. By augmentingthe air wing and ship’scompany with additional aircrews and flightdeck/maintenance personnel,andbyaddingtheservicesofa number of land-basedUSAF tankers to support theeffort, the Nimitz and her

embarkedairwingwereableto generate 1,025 sorties injust ninety-six hours. Thiswas almost 50% better thanhad been planned (thoughflight and deck crews woreout rather quickly). By thelate summer of 1997, theGW/CVW-1 team wasalready implementing theselessons. Though theywouldn’t have the additionalflight personnel used byNimitz, the flying day would

be extended, USAF tankerswouldbemadeavailable,andsome new procedures formonitoring crew fatiguewould be tried. By doingthings smarter, it was hopedthat the average of aroundone hundred sorties a daymight be increased by asmuchashalf.

JTFEX97-3:Players,Places,andPlans

The scenario for thisJTFEX 97-3was inspired bythe 1990 invasion of Kuwaitby Iraq, with the coastalwaters of Virginia, NorthCarolina, andSouthCarolinaproviding the primary battlearena. But thanks to themagic of today’s electronicsandGPSsatellitetechnology,USACOM has been able todispense with the actualgeography of these littoralspacesand invent“synthetic”

terrain for this and otherrecentexercises.Specifically,theUSACOMstaff createdaseries of “no-sail” zones offthe East Coast that formed asimulated battlespace thatlooks a great deal like thePersian Gulf or Red Sea—longandnarrow,withonlyalimited number of entrancesand exits. It was into thisarena that the GW battlegroup would sail duringJTFEX97-3.

For JTFEX 97-3 theopposing players would beknown as Koronans, and theneutral victims of Koronanaggression would beKartunans. Kartuna’shomelandwouldbethecenterof the scenario’s crisis. TheKoronan forces would beplayedbyvariouselementsofthe 2nd Marine Division atCamp Lejeune, NorthCarolina, 2nd Fleet atNorfolk, Virginia, and some

Marine aviation units fromtheMarineCorpsAirStationsat Cherry Point and NewRiver, North Carolina andBeaufort,SouthCarolina.While the simulated

Koronan military would benowhere as large as that ofIraq prior to the invasion ofKuwait in 1990, it wouldnevertheless have somedistinct similarities. Forexample, Marine F/A-18

Hornet fighter/bombers fromMCAS Beaufort wouldsimulateMirageF-1Csarmedwith Exocet antishippingmissiles and MiG-29Fulcrums equipped withadvanced air-to-air missiles(AAMs). Several Spruance-class (DD-963) destroyersand Oliver Hazard Perry-class (FFG-7) frigates wouldsimulate Russian Kashin-class missile destroyers andChinese missile corvettes.

Finally, Marines based atCamp Lejeune would playKartunangroundunits,whileLejeune itselfwouldplay thepart of the Kartunanhomeland.The forces of the Allied

coalitionwould,ofcourse,beplayed by the GW battlegroupandCVW-1,aswellastheir attached Guam ARGand theembarked24thMEU(SOC).Thoughabattalionof

the Army’s 82nd AirborneDivision and a number ofUSAF KC-135 aerial tankeraircraft based at LangleyAFB, Virginia, would alsoplay, the focus of thisparticular exercise was navaland expeditionary. Thismeant that if combat unitscouldnotflyorfloat intotheJTFEX 97-3 scenario, theywouldnotparticipate.One of the largest (and

most interesting) of theparticipants was StandingNaval Force Atlantic(STANAFORLANT).STANAFORLANT,established in 1967, was theCold War equivalent of aWorld War II Hunter-Killer(HUK) ASW group—butwith a unique twist. EachNATO nation involved wasto assign a destroyer orfrigate from their Navy toSTANAFORLANT,and then

the total force was placedunder a single joint NATOcommander. Thisarrangement has theadvantage of providing theSTANAFORLANTcommander with an eclecticmix ofweapons and sensors,and with personnel whosetraining, talents, andexperiences are widelyvaried. Ships from Canada,Germany, the Netherlands,theUnitedKingdom,and the

United States of Americaform the permanentmembership ofSTANAFORLANT(thereareusually a half-dozen shipsoperating in it at any giventime); but they are joinedperiodically by Naval unitsfrom Belgium, Denmark,Norway,andPortugal.STANAFORLANT carries

out a program of exercises,maneuvers, and port visits,

and can be rapidly deployedto a threatened area in timesof crisis or tension.Throughout the Cold War,STANAFORLANT providedarapid-responseescortgroupfor NATO navalcommanders, in case of asudden “surge” by thesubmarineandnavalforcesofthe former Soviet Union.Today, STANAFORLANT’smission has broadened fromthis ColdWarmission. Now

STANAFORLANT is one ofseveral NATO ready-reservenaval units that provide seacontrol services to thealliance (another of theseunits is in theMediterraneansupporting operations aroundBosnia); and it could easilybe found enforcing amaritime embargo orproviding disaster/humanitarian relief. DuringJTFEX 97-3, it wouldpracticeallofthesemissions,

and some others that wouldhavebeenhardtoimagineaslittleastenyearsago.While STANAFORLANT

wouldnot technicallybepartof the GW battle group, itwould nevertheless beattached to it. Since shipsconstantlycycleinandoutofSTANAFORLANT, there isnosuchthingasa“standard”mix of ships and weapons.However, the

STANAFORLANT groupthat participated in JTFEX97-3 is representative. Let’slookatit:STANAFORLANT ShipsParticipating in JTFEX97-3

As you can see, theSTANAFORLANT groupassigned to participate inJTFEX 97-3 was a compact,powerfulsurfaceactiongroup(SAG) that could bring awide variety ofweapons andsystems to bear on aparticularthreatormission.For this exercise, the

command of

STANAFORLANT fell ontoRear Admiral Peter van derGraaf of the Netherlands, atall blond bear of a sailor,who was based aboard hisflagship, HMLMS Witte DeWith (F 813). With his vastsmile and hearty laugh,Admiral van der Graafquickly became a favorite oftheGW battle group. In fact,hewouldhoisthisflagaboardthe George Washington atonepointduringtheexercise.

That he was a superb shiphandlerandleaderonlymadeSTANAFORLANT’spresence in JTFEX 97-3 themoretelling.One other small, but

useful, naval force took partin JTFEX 97-3: a specialmine warfare component.Thisunitwouldtestanumberof new ships, systems, andtechnologies designed tocounter what most

professional Naval analystsagree are the single greatestthreat to naval littoraloperations. These deadly“weapons that wait” areextremely cost-effective.They are not only relativelycheaptomake,buttheydon’thavetobehigh-techtodothejob. In fact, many currentmines have basictechnologies going backdecades. At the same time,like their land-based

counterparts,sea-basedminescan make areas of oceanuninhabitable for years at atime.Thefactthatfourofthefive U.S. ships sufferingcombat damage in the lasttwodecadeshavebeenhitbymines (the supertanker SSBridgeton, frigate Samuel B.Roberts (FFG- 58), Aegiscruiser Princeton (CG-59),and helicopter carrier Tripoli(LPH- 10)) only highlightsthe threat. I should note that

three of these ships weredamaged by mines whoseRussian design actuallypredatestheFirstWorldWar.Despite the obvious threat

presented bymines, over thelast two decades minewarfare has been allocatedless than one percent of theUSN budget. The problem:Mine warfare is notglamorous. Compared withcommanding a sleek

destroyer or submarine, orflying a combat aircraft, it isconsidered decidedly “un-sexy” by most navalprofessionals. Much likeinfantry combat in urbanareas,itisanasty,dangerousbusiness. Clearing minestakes a lot of time, it’s filledwith headaches, it generatescasualties, and failure is easyto come by—not a smartcareermove.All thesame, ifthe U.S. sea services are to

become a littoral-capableforce,minewarfarewillhaveto become an equal partnerwith surface, subsurface, andair components of the fleet.The Navy has been takingserious action to make thisintentionareality.For JTFEX 97-3, a

“rainbow”minewarfareforceof ships, helicopters, andpersonnel was assembledfromunits along the coastof

the Gulf of Mexico. Theseunits represent the state-of-the-art ofUSNminewarfaretechnology and doctrine.Under the command ofCaptain Bruce Van Velle(whowould act as the unit’sCommodore and the minewarfare componentcommander), the unit wascomposedof theunitsshownbelow:JTFEX 97-3MineWarfare

TaskForce

JTFEX 97-3 was the firstoccasionthattheNavy’snewemphasis on mine warfarewas included in a majorAtlantic Fleet joint exercise.Thecoreof theminewarfarecomponentwastheconvertedhelicopter carrier Inchon(MCS-12).Designedtoactasacommandshipfortheminecountermeasures force ofmine-hunting helicopters and

minesweepers, the Inchon isthelargest,mostcapableshiptoever takeon this task.ForJTFEX97-3,shewouldactasa mobile air base for eightRH-53E Sea Dragon mine-countermeasures helicoptersand four hundred personnelfrom Mine CountermeasuresSquadron Fifteen (HM-15,the “Blackhawks”). Based atMoffetFieldnearSunnyvale,California, and commandedby Commander John Brown,

theBlackhawks are amix ofactive and reserve personnelwho fly one of the mostinteresting aircraft in theNavy inventory. Their MH-53E Sea Dragon, a modifiedversionof theMarineCH-53Super Stallion heavytransport, tows mine-countermeasures “sleds” andother equipment from a fewhundred feet above the sea,and is one of the mosteffective means of clearing

lanes through mine-infestedshallow waters. Lookingmuch like their Marine CH-53Ebrethren,theSeaDragonis easily distinguishable bythe large side sponsons filledwith extra fuel, which theMH-53E guzzles at lowaltitude.AlongwiththeInchonand

her mine-countermeasureshelicopters,fournewAvenger(MCM-1) and Osprey-class

(MHC-51)mine-hunterswiththeir reserve crews wouldparticipate in the exercise inorder to demonstrate newideasandtechnologies.Theseincluded an autonomousmine-detectionvehicle,alongwith an explosive mine-clearingsystemtoclearlanesfor landing craft in the surfzone of an invasion beach.This increased emphasis onminewarfareislongoverdue,and theeffortsbeingpursued

during JTFEX 97-3 are justthefirstofwhatwillbemanybadlyneededsteps.RH-53E Sea Dragonhelicopters ofHM-15 aboardthe flagship of the MineCountermeasures Task Forceduring JTFEX97-3, theUSSInchon(MCS-12).OFFICAL U.S. NAVYPHOTO

JTFEX97-3wasunderthecontrol of the 2nd Fleetcommander, Admiral PaulReason, who would watchover the exercise from thefleetflagship,theUSSMountWhitney (LCC-20). AboardtheMountWhitney would bethe various warfarecomponent commanders (air,naval, ground, specialoperations, etc.) that wouldrun JTFEX 97-3, as well asmany of the exercise

observation personnel.JTFEXsandotherlarge-scaleexercises require significantnumbersofpeopletomanageand recordwhat is going on.Thus, JTFEX 97-3 requiredthe efforts of severalthousandmilitaryandcivilianpersonnel to observe,document, and analyze allthatwentonoverthemillionsof cubicmiles of battlespaceoff the Atlantic coast. Theseincluded observation teams

from the Center for NavalAnalysis (CNA—a U.S.Navy-funded “think tank”)and members of the SeniorOfficers Observer Team(SOOT). The SOOT team ismade up of ship, squadron,and other commanders whoare temporarily detachedfrom their own commandsand assigned to observe andevaluate the actions of theircounterparts.

It was against thisbackdropofobjectives,plans,technologies, ships, aircraft,and personnel that JohnGresham (my researcher forthis series) and I traveledsouth to the VirginiaTidewater to take in theeventsofJTFEX97-3 in lateAugust and early September1997—almost three weeks.Partly because space doesn’tpermit, but even morebecausemuch of what I saw

concerned operationallysensitive issues, I cannotbegin to tell you about all ofwhat went on there.Nevertheless, I’ll show yousome of the high points, aswell as some of what life islikeaboardU.S.warships.

Sunday,August17th,1997

August of 1997 was hotand humid in the mid-

Atlantic.As if thechallengesof the coming JTFEX werenotenough,theweathergodswere going to make thesailors and Marines suffer.On the afternoon before thegroup sailed, it was hot.Reallyhot!Sohotthatanewhigh-temperature record of104° F/40° C had been setthat afternoon at the NorfolkNaval Base. In this kind ofheat, officers and NCOs hadtowatch closely for signs of

heatstrokeandexhaustion intheir enlisted personnel astheylaboredtofinishloadingsupplies and equipment,while ships and equipmenthad become so heat-soakedthat they would stay hot fordays to come. Even theheavy-duty air-conditioningof ships like the GW andSouthCarolinawashavingahardtimekeepingupwithit.To my good fortune, I

managedtomissmuchoftheheat wave, since I would flyintotheexerciseseveraldayslater. But for John Gresham,the heat and humidity wouldbecomepartofhispermanentmemoryofJTFEX97-3.Johnarrived late in the afternoon,thusmissing theworstof themiddayheat.Ashepulledhiscar up to the long row ofcarrierdocks,hecouldseeallmanner of ships. Two otherbig Nimitz-class carriers, the

Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and John Stennis (CVN-75),weretiedupinthedeep-water berths next to theGW.The“TR”wasabout toheadinto Dry Dock 12 across theriver at Newport NewsShipbuilding for her firstmajor overhaul, while the“Johnny Reb” was workingup for her first overseasdeploymentin1998.Hauling his bags up the

long brow to the hangar-deck-level entrance, togetherwith what seemed likethousands of other officersandmen,Johnfeltverysmalland very diminished. Andwellhemight.Forinfact,theGW was full. Every singlebunk,stateroom,andcotwasfilled; some were actuallybeing shared by contractor,observation-team, andtraining personnel who wereaugmentingthenormalship’s

crew.ThoughLieutenant JoeNavritril, the capable youngPublicAffairsOfficer (PAO)for the shipandbattlegroup,had managed to find astateroomformeuponthe02level,Johnhadtomakedoinsomewhat less comfortableaccommodations lower in theship. Meanwhile, as Johnwaited for LieutenantNavritriltoescorthimbelow,hewasabletomeetanumberof the ship’s officers,

including Captain Ruthefordand the newly appointedExecutive Officer (XO),CommanderChuckSmith.After the young PAO

arrived, he and John headedinto the interior of the shipand went below. Once theyreached the third deck, theyheadedaft to a small fifteen-man bunk room that wasbeing used for overflowberthing during the coming

exercise—hardly what youwould call “plush”accommodations.Yetaquicklook showed that nobodyunder the rank of lieutenantcommander, or less than acontractor’s technicalrepresentative, was gettingeven these berths. So John,counting himself lucky,wedged his gear and largeframe into a center bunk togetsomerest.

Even after nightfall, theentire ship was still like asauna bath from the brutalpounding of the day’s sun.Despitethebesteffortsoftheair conditioners, some spaceswould not cool down duringthe coming voyage.Unfortunately, John’s bunkroomwasgoing tobeoneofthese (it was located directlyover one of thereactor/machinery spaces).Stoically accepting what

couldn’t be changed, Johnand his shipmates settleddown for the night, quietlysweatingawaythehoursuntilthe carrier sailed thefollowingmorning.

Monday,August

18th,1997

JTFEX97-3—Day 1 : The

situationintheGulfofSabanicontinues togrow worse,withtheforcesof Koronacontinuing tomassalongtheKartunanboarders.Responding torequests fromthe Kartunangovernment,

Alliedcoalition navalforces arebeingassembled tomove to theGulf toprotectAlliedinterests, andto be preparedfor possiblecontingenciessuch asevacuations of

civilians andotherendangeredpersonnel.

After 0600 reveille, John

rolledout of his rack to startthe first of what would bemany long, hot days at sea.Despite his cramped andsteamy accommodations onthe third deck, his locationofferedsomeadvantages.For

one thing, he was close to anearby officers’ head(bathroom), complete withshower facilities; and themain officers’ dining roomwas located just a few stepsforwardofhisberthingroom.“Wardroom3,” the largestofthe officers’ dining areasaboardtheGW,withroomforover a hundred personnel tositatonce,isthesocialcenterof the ship.Servicecomes intwo ways there. You can

either pass through acafeteria-styleservingline,oryou can have a messspecialisttakeyourorder.This morning, since he

wanted to have a good viewof the sailing, and CaptainRuthefordhadannouncedthatthe shipwould slipmooringspromptly at 0700, Johnhurriedthroughhisbreakfast.Afterward, he headed up to“VulturesRow”ontheisland

andfoundaplaceoutboardtowatch the proceedings.“Yank” Rutheford wasprompt, and the lines wereslippedatthetopofthehour.Overhead,anHS-11HH-60Ghelicopter kept watch forsignsoftrouble,aswellastofeedthetrafficsituationinthechannel down to CaptainRutheford. Gently putting afewturnsofreversepoweronthe screws, he eased the bigflattopfarenoughawayfrom

the pier for the three tugs totake a hold on the carrier’shull.All of these actions are

donewithexquisiteprecisionand patience. On the onehand,theberthsinthispartoftheharborgiveaNimitz-classcarrier only about tenfeet/threemetersofclearancefrom the muddy bottom. Ontheother, thehugepropellerstend to stir up the mud and

sand, which can clog thedelicate seawater inlets andcondensers,andthustheyareusedcarefullyuntiltheshipisin the middle of the mainchannel.After backing carefully

away from the pier, CaptainRuthefordconned the ship ina wide reverse “Y” turn,leaving the GW aimeddirectly down the mainchannel leading to Hampton

Roads. Calling, “All aheadone third,”henowbegan therun down the channel to theright-hand turn that leads toHampton Roads and themouth of the ChesapeakeBay.Meanwhile, other ships of

the battle group and ARGwere pulling out of theirberths behind the GW,preparingtofollowherdownthe channel. These included

the cruisers Normandy (CG-60) and South Carolina(CGN-36), theSeattle (AOE-3), and the Guam. Thecruisers would act as guardsfor the GW until the otherships of the battle grouparrivedtoassistwiththatjob.TheGuamwasonherwaytomeet up with the other threeships of her ARG, whichwere based down the Bay atLittleCreek.Fromthere,theywould head south to

Moorehead City, NorthCarolina, to pick up thepersonnel and equipment ofthe24thMEU(SOC).In fact, all along the

eastern seaboard of theU.S.,warshipswereleavingporttojoin up with theGW for thecoming exercise. At thesubmarine base at Groton,Connecticut, the nuclearattack submarines Toledo(SSN-769) and Annapolis

(SSN-760) cleared theThames River channel andLongIsland,headingsouthtojoin up with the rest of thegroup. Similarly, down atMayport, Florida, thedestroyersCarney (DDG-64)and John Rodgers (DD-983)and guided-missile frigatesBoone (FFG-28) andUnderwood (FFG-36) wereclearing the mouth of theSaint John’s River andheading north to the

rendezvous point off of theCarolina coast. Finally,STANAFORLANT wasfinishing its trans-Atlanticrun,planningtoarriveseveraldayshence.While all of this activity

was going on, the variouselements of CVW-1 werefinishing their movement toairfields in the mid-Atlanticregion and preparing toconduct their “fly-on” to the

GW the following day. Formostofthesquadrons, thingshadgonequitewell.Mostoftheairwingwouldflyaboardthefollowingafternoon,afterwhich they would conductseveral days of carrierqualifications prior to theactual start of the JTFEXscenario.As they proceeded toward

theopensea, thecrewof theGW concentrated on getting

things squared away afterseveralmonthsofberthinginNorfolk. All over the ship,electrical lines, hoses, andother pieces of equipmentwere being coiled, stowed,and put away. Even beforethe ship passed over theHamptonRoadsTunnel,therewasabuzzofactivityalloverGw. Captain Rutheford hadseveral training evolutions torun before the carrier exitedthemouthof theChesapeake

Bay—anchoring drills in theforecastle and tests of thevarious firefighting anddamage-control systems.After GW passed the outerbay, Captain Ruthefordordered course 090° (dueeast), and headed for theVirginia capes, where theymet the two cruisers, andbegan a run south to pickuptheairwing.

Tuesday,

August19th,1997

JTFEX97-3—Day 2: Thewar of wordsbetweenKorona andKartunacontinues,withadditionalKartunanmilitary units

being broughtto aheightenedstate ofreadiness. Inaddition,AlliedNationalIntelligenceSources havebegun to tracksuspectedKartunanSCUDballistic

missileunitstotheir trainingand testranges.

Thatmorning theGW andher cruiser escorts wereoperating in clear sunshineabout 125 nm/230 kmsoutheast of MCAS CherryPoint,NorthCarolina.Earlierthey had broken into an areaof high pressure and lowerhumidity, allowing the air-

conditioning toget a start onremoving the heat soak fromthe ships. Meanwhile, theGW flight deck crews weregetting ready to take aboardtheir first jet aircraft of thiscruise—not CVW-1 jets, buta group of USMC AV-8BHarrier II jump jets fromCherry Point. About 1100,theHarriersarrived,attractinglots of attention up onVultures Row. Many of theyoung sailors had never seen

a Harrier perform a verticallanding, a wondrous sight tofolks used to the normalarrested landings ofconventional carrierairplanes.Aftera shortbreakfor lunch, the Marines wereoff,sothatthedeckwouldbeclearfortheaircraftofCVW-1arrivingthatafternoon.1300foundtheGWandher

escorts steaming into thegentle southwest wind,

preparing to take aboard thefirst of the aircraft fromCVW-1. This was aparticularly dangerous timeforthepilotsandcrewsoftheairwing, since landing skillsare easily lost withoutpractice and it had beenseveralmonthssincetheirlast“traps”aboardtheGWduringtheCAPEX. For that reason,everyone on board the shipandintheairwasbeingextracareful. Across the deck

public-address system camethe booming voices of the“AirBoss,”CommanderJohnKindred,andhisassistant,the“Mini Boss,” CommanderCarl June. Neither wasrisking ruining their perfectsafety record during theirassignments on board theGW. After making sure thatthe Landing Signals Officers(LSOs) were on theirplatform, the deck/safetycrews were ready, the plane

guard helicopter fromHS-11was overhead, and thecruiserswereattheirstations,the Air Boss and Mini Bossturned on the lights of thelanding system and began tobringtheairwingaboard.Oneofthefirsttolandwas

Captain “Boomer”Stufflebeem, flying an F/A-18C Hornet. Behind himcame the approximatelyseventy aircraft of CVW-1.

As soon as each plane wassafelydownandthearrestingwire was cleared of thetailhook, the pilot wasdirectedforward toaparkingarea ahead of the island.There theaircraftwereeitherchaineddownordirectedtwoat a time to one of theelevators, where they wouldbestruckbelowtothehangardeck. There they would becarefully parked, sometimeswith only inches between

each bird. The crews thenheaded below to theirsquadron ready rooms downon theO-2 level,where theywould check their landingscores from theLSOs.Thesescores were important to theflight crews, since each ofthemwouldhavetorequalifiytolandaboardtheGWbeforebeing allowed to flyoperationally in the comingJTFEX. For the next severaldays in fact, carrier

qualifications would be themajor activity of GW andCVW-1. Until eachsquadron’s entirecomplement of air crew hadsuccessfully completed theirrequired day and night“traps,” the GW would benothing more than a trainingbase.All of this took severaldays of nearly round-the-clock flight operations, andwastobethefirstrealtestofendurancefortheGWandher

crew.

Wednesday,August

20th,1997

JTFEX97-3—Day3 :At thedirection ofthe U. S.Department ofState,allU.S.citizens in

Korona andKartuna havebeen orderedto evacuatedue to thethreat ofarmed conflict. In particular,due to thethreat ofKoronanarmedintervention,the National

CommandAuthorities ofthe UnitedStates haveordered the24th MEU(SOC) toconduct aNon-CombatantEvacuationOperation(NEO) . Thiswill be

composed ofU. S. citizensand other at-risk personnelfrom theKartunancapitalassoonas they cantakeup stationin the Gulf ofSabani. Inaddition,elements ofthe George

WashingtonBattle Group,the GuamAmphibiousReady Group,STANAFORLANT,andotherunitswill stand byto support theNEOandotheroperations asrequired.

Myownexpedition to joinJTFEX97-2beganatmidday,whenIboardedaVRC-40C-2A Greyhound CarrierOnboard Delivery (COD)aircraft of VRC-40 at NASNorfolk. As I had beenwarned, the flight was fullybooked and every seat filled.Everyone travelingout to thebattle group had only thethreeCODflightstoandfromtheGWasavailabletransport.

Flying as a passenger onboard a C-2 is unlike anyother flying experience I’veknown.Forstarters,yousitinmildly uncomfortable“bucket” seats, facing aft inrows of four. Since payloadandrangearemoreimportantthan creature comforts, theGreyhound has no sound-deadening material, and theair-conditioning system isdecidedly crude, thoughrobust.Inthekillingheatand

humidityoftheNASNorfolkramp, the vents spewed achillingfog,whichdidnotletupuntilweclimbedtocruisealtitude.To help protect the

passengers against the noiseofthetwinturbopropengines,we were each issued a“Mickey Mouse” cranialhelmetwithearprotectors.Inaddition, we each wore a“float coat” life preserver,

just in case we had to ditchduringtheflight.Whenallofus were strapped in, the twocrew chiefs gave us a safetybriefing, then raised the rearcargo ramp, and the flightcrew started the engines. Assoonasthesehadwarmedup,the aircraftwas taxied to theend of the runway, and wewereoff.Once the C-2A reached

10,000 feet/3,048meters, the

ride became morecomfortable. The fog fromtheair-conditioningventshadbecome a flow of fresh air,and except for the constantrumble of the twinturboprops, everything waspleasant. As the aircraftturned southwest,wecrossedoverthecoastandwent“feetwet.” From my smallwindow, I could see the fouramphibious ships of theGuam ARG loading up the

elements of the 24th MEU(SOC). When they finishedthis task, theywould join upwith the rest of the battlegroup, now operatingapproximately 200 nm/370kmoffshore.It took us just under an

hour to reach the battlegroup’s operating area, atwhichpointwewereputintoa wide port turn to hold forlanding. Since qualifying

pilots is considered moreimportant than landingVIPs,wecircledthebattlegroupforalmostahalfhourbefore thecommand came from theGW’sairtrafficcontrolcentertogetintothelandingpattern.Soon after the Greyhoundbrokeintothelandingpattern,the flight crew gunned theengines and headed onto thefinalapproachtothecarrier.Back in the

passenger/cargocompartment,thecrewchiefsordered all of us to braceourselves. After a big“thump” when the wheelstoucheddown,Iwasjammedback into my seat as thetailhook snagged one of thearresting wires. Once theaircraftwasstopped,thedeckcrewsquicklydisengaged thehook and began to fold thewings. The flight crew thentaxied forward to a parking

space ahead of the island,where the deck crewsimmediately began to chainthebirddown.Moments later, I was

following the otherpassengers to a hatch in theisland structure, and thendown a ladder to the GW’sAir Transport Office (ATO)on the O-2 level. There wechecked in with the ATOwatch officer, handed in our

survival gear, and picked upour bags. By this time, JohnGresham and LieutenantNavritrilhadarrivedtoescortmetomystateroomontheO-2level.Afterashowerandaquiet dinner in Wardroom 3with John and LieutenantNavritril,Iwenttobed.Eventhepoundingnoiseofaircraftlaunching and landing onedeck above did not keep mefromsleeping.

Thursday,August

21st,1997

JTFEX97-3—Day 4: TheKoronangovernmenthas continuedto threatentheir Kartunanneighbors.They are

claiming thatthe NorthernKartunanprovince ofKhemis islegally part ofthe Koronanhomeland, andare demandingits concessionto avoidhostilities.Meanwhile,the various

personnel tobe evacuatedduring theplanned NEOhave begun toassemble atthe AmericanembassyintheKartunancapital city ofTemal.

Iawokeat0600,showered,

andheadeddown the ladderstoWardroom3forbreakfast.There I met John andLieutenant Navritril. As wefinishedbreakfast,LieutenantNavritril informedus thatwewould be meeting withAdmiral Mullen later thatmorning to discuss his plansfor the upcoming exerciseandhisphilosophyofrunningacarrierbattlegroup.Promptly at 1000, we

arrived in the flag officersquarters in “Blue Tile” landon the O-2 level, and soonafter thatwe headed into theadmiral’s sitting room.ThereRear Admiral Mike Mullen,the commander of Cruiser-Destroyer Group Two(CRUDESGRU 2) and theGW battle group, warmlygreetedus.AdmiralMullenisa surface line officer, one ofthe new generation of battlegroup commanders now

sharing commandopportunities with navalaviators. He is a handsomeman, cool and intellectual;it’s no surprise that he has aHarvard master’s degree. Atthe moment, he was clearlypreoccupied with getting thebattle group set up for thecomingJTFEX97-3exercise.Spacing his remarks

between themetallic roarsofCatapult Number One

(located directly above hisstateroom), he discussed hisvision of CVBG operations.Back in the Cold War, heexplained, the Navy fearedthat the Soviet Union wouldtrytoeliminatetheU.S.navalpresence by sendingmultipleregiments of Tu-22MBackfire and Tu-16 Badgerbombersarmedwithhugeair-to-surface missiles (ASMs).The idea was to kill theCVBGs, after which Soviet

submarines and surfacegroups would clean up thesurvivors with their ownSSMs. It was against thisthreatthatsystemsliketheF-14 Tomcat fighter andAegiswere developed; theirfunction was to shield theCVBG from waves ofincomingmissiles.Today the world has

greatly changed. With thebomber regiments of the

Soviet Union a thing of thepast, the threat of air attackon a CVBG has been soreduced that it is no longernecessary to maintainstanding combat air patrols(CAPs) of airborne fighters.At the same time, the once-formidable fleet of Sovietsubmarines andmissile shipsis now either rusting atanchor, or else has been cutup into scrap metal. At thispoint the new CVBG tactics

now practiced by AdmiralMullen and hiscontemporaries take thestage.Today’s CVBG tactics

revolvearoundtherealitythatin the post-Cold War worldvery little threatens U.S.navalforces.Theonlynaviesinanywaycapableofhurtingus are not likely to do that,sincetheyarealreadyfriendslike our NATO allies and

Japan. Even if the friendshipwere somehow to cease, wecould probably beat all ofthem together in a fair fight.All of this means practicallythatwecangreatlyreduceourcommitment of aircraft andvesselstoself-protection,andtheir resources can now bededicatedtotheprojectionofoffensive power. Now thatthey are relativelyunconcerned about themilitary threat from other

nations, CVBG commanderslike AdmiralMullen want tobe the military threat in atheater of operations.Obviously, Admiral Mullendoesnotplantoignoreenemythreats. To do that would beboth foolish andirresponsible. Rather, heplans to leverage his bestsystems so as to defend thefleet with the greatestpossible efficiency andeffectiveness.

Thepracticalconsequencesofallthisdoctrinalthinkingisthat the “Outer Air Battle”concept that drove fleet airdefense tactics in the 1980’sis dead and gone. Instead ofmassed CAPs of F-14Tomcats and F/A-18 Hornetfighters, backed by awall ofSAM-armed escorts directedby the Aegis cruisers anddestroyers, a more modestdefense plan has beenadopted.TothatendAdmiral

Mullen now planned todependontheSM-2StandardSAMsaboard theNormandy,South Carolina, and Carneyto project an air defense“bubble” over the battlegroup and ARG, whilecontinuing theirother jobsofkeeping naval and submarinethreats at bay. This wouldallow him to reserve thesorties of his Tomcats andHornets for the job ofdeliveringordnanceontoland

and naval targets. In otherwords, the escorts would bedoingakindof“doubleduty”so as to allow the rest of theforce to project offensivepowerintothelittoralregionsthatwould be their operatingareas. Tomahawk andHarpoon cruise-missilestrikes would be usedwhereverpossibleonfixedornaval targets, so thatmannedaircraft sorties would besaved for more mobile or

moredifficultmissions.ForJTFEX97-3,hewould

take the fullest possibleadvantage of bothSTANAFORLANT and theUSAF KC-135 tankers hewas being supplied with.Also, wherever possible, hewould make use of specialoperations forces (from hisownonboardSEAL(Sea-Air-Land) team and the 24thMEU (SOC) as force-

multipliers andreconnaissance assets.Finally, though he wasdiscreet in his references tothem, Admiral Mullenplanned to make full use ofthe two available SSNs, theToledo and Annapolis. Bothrepresented immenselycapable platforms for anumber of missions (such asintelligence-gathering, ASW,andTomahawkcruise-missileattacks), and he clearly had

bigideasfortheiruse.Just before our visit came

toanendandweheadedbackdown to Wardroom 3 forlunch, Admiral Mullen toldus what he would stress themost in the coming exercise:safety.Hehadgoodreasontobeconcerned.Therehadbeennumerous deaths during theprevious three East CoastJTFEXs. In JTFEX 96-2, forexample, which was run in

May of 1996 by XVIIIAirborne Corps, thirteendeaths had resulted from thecollision and crash of twoUSMC helicopters at CampLejeune,NorthCarolina. Forthe JTFEX about to begin,AdmiralMullen had just onesimple objective: to bringevery one of the participantshome alive with all theimportant parts attached andinworkingorder!Heplannedto accomplish this objective

by a variety of means,rangingfrom“buddysystem”checks of deck crews forfatigue, to regular drills fordamage control and battlestations. As John and I left,wecouldonlypraythattheseplanswouldwork.

Friday,August

22nd,1997

JTFEX97-3—Day 5: As theKoronanscontinuedtheirthreat, theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil votedthe first of anumber ofsanctionsagainst them,in the form ofa maritime

embargo onweapons andpetroleumproducts.This embargowas to go intoeffectimmediately,and would beenforced bythe militaryforces of theU.S. and hercoalitionallies. To

support thisoperation, thecoalition navalforces willmove into theGulfofSabaniimmediately.Also, theGuam ARGand24thMEU(SOC) ,supported byelements oftheGWCVBG

andSTANAFORLANT,will begin toconduct theplanned NEOfrom theAmericanembassycompound inTemal.

This morning John and I

were extremely busy, as we

wereabout tomovefromtheGW to the Aegis cruiserNormandy, where we wouldspend time with the “smallboy”sailorsoftheGWbattlegroup.Asluckwouldhaveit,ourrushingaroundturnedoutto be unnecessary. A heavysquall line had movedthrough overnight, leavingbehind rough seas, highwinds, and heavy patches ofrain—and delaying ourdeparture. Meanwhile, the

high summer heat continued,with peak temperatures over90°F/32C°.Allofthismeantthat flight operations aroundthe battle group and ARGwereextremelydicey.Before our departure, we

hadascheduledmeetingwiththreeoftheCVW-1squadroncommanders down in the airwing ready room. Joining usfor coffee and a chat in thecomfortable, leather-covered

ready room chairs wereCommander Curt Daill ofVF-102 (flying F-14Bupgrades), CommanderRobert M. Harrington ofVFA-86(flying theBlock10F/A-18C Hornet), andCommander MichaelMulcahy of HS-11 (flyingSH-60F and HH-60HSeahawk). The three men’scomments about the aircraftthey flew and the units theycommanded turned out to be

bothcandidandinformative.CurtDailliseveryinchthe

classic F-14 Tomcat driver,withalltheegoandambitionthat go with the job. Ascommander of VF-102, heheaded a squadron that wasrapidly acquiring new anduseful capabilities. Alreadyflying one of the mostpowerful warplanes in theworldwith its F-110 enginesandAWG-9/AIM-54Phoenix

weapons system, the“Diamondbacks”hadrecentlyadded two new systems totheir aircraft. These are thenewDigitalTacticalAirborneReconnaissance Pod System(D/TARPS) and theAAQ-14Low Altitude Navigation(LANTIRN) pod. The fourD/TARPS pods assigned toVF-102allowedthemtotakeand transmit near-“real-time”targeting images while stillover the target. This

capability would allowAdmiral Mullen to plan astrike on target just minutesafter the D/TARPS-equippedF-14 locates it. TheAAQ-14LANTIRN pod (which has abuilt-in GPS/INS system)givestheF-14communitytheability to conduct day andnight precision strikes withPaveway LGBs, as well asaccomplishing wide-areareconnaissance with GPSpositional accuracy. Both of

these new capabilities madeVF-102 one of the mostdesirableairunitsthataCinCmightbeassignedinatimeofcrisis.Commander Bob

Harrington, a quiet, intenseman,who letshis squadron’sactions speak for him, headsVFA-86. Another long-timeNaval aviator who has seenhis chosen flying communitymoveinsurprisingdirections,

Commander Harrington hasgone from operating A-7Corsairs armed with “iron”bombs to taking up the F/A-18C armed with the mostadvancedPGMs.Our third squadron leader,

Commander MichaelMulcahy of HS-11, arrivedjust a little late. Though hedidn’t tell us then, we laterlearnedthattheskipperofthe“Dragon Slayers” had just

flown one of the firstmissionsoftheUN-mandatedmaritime embargo of theKoronan forces. Flying anHH-60HloadedwithaSEALteam, he had swooped downon the fleet oilerMerrimack(AO-179), which was beingused by USACOM tosimulate a merchant shiptransporting concealed armsand other sensitive cargo toKorona. Hovering over theoiler’s deck, the SEAL team

had“fast roped”down to theship and conducted asimulated “takedown” of thesuspectedweaponscachethatintelligence sources hadreported there. After seizingthe ship, theSEAL teamhadcalled for a prize crew fromone the battle group escortsand turned the ship over tothem.“Ihaven’treallybeenupto

anything important this

morning,” CommanderMulcahy remarked as hecoolly joined us in the readyroom.HS-11 is one of the few

carrier aviation units that flytwo different aircraft. Inaddition to the SH-60Fvariant used for submarinehunting,theyalsoflytheHH-60H search and rescue(SAR)/special operationsversion. This means that in

additiontohelpingprotecttheGW from submarines thatmight penetrate the so-called“inner zone,” inside theprotective ring of escortvessels, theyalsoprovide thebattle group with the abilityboth to rescue downed aircrews and to deliver andretrieve special operationsteams.Thisisawiderangeofroles andmissions for a unitwith only six aircraft (fourSH-60Fsand twoHH-60Hs),

anditmeansthattheyalmostalwayshave a birdor two intheairsomewhere.Following our chat with

the squadron leaders, JohnandIreturnedtoourquarterstopickupourbags,andthenwe headed up to the ATOoffice with LieutenantNavritril. There we checkedin with the ATO watchofficer, gathered our floatcoatsandcranialhelmets,and

taggedourbags.Oncewehadtaken care of these details,Lieutenant Navritrilintroduced us to CaptainJames F. Deppe, the CO oftheNormandy. JimDeppe, atall, slim, handsome, nativeTexan, is a 1974 NavalAcademy graduate who hasspenthiscareerinthesurfacewarfare community. Afterserving most of his sea timeon frigates (he commandedtheUSSKauffman (FFG-59)

from 1992 to 1994), he wasselected to take overcommandoftheNormandyinearly1997.As we began talking with

him, the ATO watch officerannouncedthatitwastimetoheaduptotheflightdeckandboard an HS-11 SH-60F forthe flight over to theNormandy. Grabbing ourbags and other gear, wefollowed a yellow-shirted

flight deck handler up aladder, exited the island, andwalked into a full-blownsquall, complete with fortyknot winds over the bow,blasting horizontal raindrops(heated to over 80° F/27° Cbythelocalweather)intoourfaces!Leaningintothestorm,we struggled across the deckbetween other aircraftpreparing to take off. TheSeahawk was parked on aspot over one of the waist

catapults with its enginesalreadyturning.Soonafterwehadcrowded

aboard andwere strapped in,thecrewgotreadytotakeoff.But as the pilot ran throughhischecklistandthrottledup,he got a warning lightindicatingaprobleminoneofthe T700 engines. Quickly,both power plants were shutdown, andwewere asked toleave the aircraft and head

back over to the island. Bythis time thoroughly soaked,wedescendedbacktotheO-2level and the ATO office,while flight deck crewscleared the broken bird fromthe deck and started up thenext flight event. Withinminutes, the voice of AirBoss John Kindred boomedover the flight deck PAsystem,soonfollowedby theroars of jet engines and thescreechofcatapults.

As we stripped off oursoaked survival gear, theATOpersonnelhandedusdrytowels and colddrinks.Thenwe sat down towait. Fifteenminutes later, we were toldthat the Normandy wouldlaunch one of her own SH-60B Seahawks,whichwouldcollectusfollowingtheflightevent currently under way.The bad news was that itwould take at least threehours before they could land

aboard the GW. We had along wait ahead of us. Thegood news was that thiswould give us a chance totalkwithCaptainDeppe,andget some feel about how heandhis shipwerebeingusedbyAdmiralMullen.AsCOof one of themost

capable Anti-Air Warfare(AAW) platform in the fleet,Deppehadbeenassigned thejob of AAW coordinator for

theentireforce.Sincemostofthe other warfare functionscoordinators (ASW, Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW),etc.) were based aboard theGW, and theNormandy hadnothinglikethesecure,wide-bandwidth satellitecommunications systems thatwould allow secureteleconferencing, he had tomake the commute over tothe GW almost daily. Thiswas necessary in order to

attend secure conferencesamong the officersresponsible for the battlegroup’s defense. Add to thisthe relative novelty of thebattle group tactics beingpracticedbyAdmiralMullen,and you have Jim Deppespendingseveralhours in theair each day going back andforthbetweenNormandy and“BlueTileLand”inGW.ThisnewwayofrunningaCVBGis an extremely “hands on”

way of doing business, anduntil new wide-bandwidthsatellite telecommunicationssystems become morecommon in the fleet, you’regoingtoseealotofshipCOsflyingbackandforthbetweenships.It was almost 1500 (3

P.M.) by the time the last ofthe CVW-1 aircraft werebroughtaboard,andthewaisthelicopter landing spots

cleared. The HSL-48Seahawk had circled theGWfor almost an hour, and thecrewwasclearlyinahurrytoget back home,approximately 100 miles/161kilometers away. By thistime, the squall had clearedenough for us to cross theflight deck without gettingsoaked. This time, thepreflightchecksallwentwell,andwithinminutes, the crewwas cleared to launch. After

we liftedoff,weheadedeastto rendezvous with theNormandy. Flying at around1,500 feet/ 457 metersaltitude,westayedbelow thecloudbaseandranflatouttotheeast.Abouthalfwaytothecruiser, I looked out awindow and saw below adirty brown streak in thewaterspreadingoutformiles.When I asked the crew chiefabout it, he frowned.“Pollution,” he said. Some

ship had passed through andpumpeditsbilgeintotheblueoftheAtlantic.Itoccurredtome just then that an antishipmissilemight come in handy—pourencouragerlesautres.Soon our new home, the

Aegis cruiser USSNormandy, came into view.Steaming into the wind, shewasmaking ready to take usaboard.Thedeckcrewsweremaking quick work of it.

After just a single circle ofthe cruiser, the pilot ran upthewakeoftheship,matchedhis speed to the ship’s, andhovered over the helicopterdeck. At this point, the crewchief winched down a smallline with a “messenger”attachment at the end.Whenitreachedthedeckbelowus,a deck crewman scamperedacross to the messenger andinserted it into the clamp ofthe ship’s Recovery, Assist,

Secure, and Traversing(RAST)system—asystemofmechanicaltracksinthedeckof the ship’s helicopter pad.Theclamp,whichrunsonthetracks,isdesignedtoholdthemessenger at the end of theline. The helicopter can thenbe winched down safely andsecurely onto the deck, evenin heavy seas. Soon, wefoundourselvesondeck,andCaptain Deppe was rushinguptothebridge.

Captain Jim Deppe, the COof USS Normandy (CG-60),cons his shipwhile refuelingunder way from the USSSeattle(AOE-3).JOHND.GRESHAM

The reason for his hurrywas quickly evident. ThehugebulkoftheUSSSeattle,the GW battle group’s fleetreplenishment ship, wasshowing on the horizon. Wehad arrived just in time forhim to take over the delicateandsometimesdifficultjobofconning the ship whilereplenishingunderway.Afterleavingourbagsfor thedeckcrewstotaketoourquarters,wefollowedhimtothebridge

—not an easy undertaking.To reach the top of thecruiser’s massive deckhouserequiresclimbingsomesevenladders.Theeffortwasworthit, though, for up there wehadasplendidviewofoneofthe most beautiful dancesperformed by U.S. Navyships.I’ve always believed that

the skill that separates greatNavies from the also-rans is

theabilitytosustainafleetatsea with underwayreplenishment (UNREP).Something of an AmericaninventionpriortoWorldWarII, UNREP is a little like anelephantballet.Thedynamicsof conning a ship in closeproximity to another arecompletelydifferentfromanyother kind of ship handling,andCaptainDeppewasaboutto give us a textbook lessonintheart.

Initially, he allowedCaptainStephenFirks,COofthe Seattle, to come up onNormandy and position hisship on the cruiser’s port(left) side. Once this wasdone, the Seattle began toshoot messenger lines acrossthe gap to the deck crews ofthe Normandy. After thesewere recovered, the deckcrewmen pulled larger linesacross and began to rig therefueling lines. For this

UNREP, only two refuelinglineswouldbeset,sinceonlyJP-5 jet fuel for theNormandy’s gas turbineengines and helicopters wasbeing transferred, so therewouldnotbeany“highlines”for moving cargo or othersupplies.TherewouldalsobenouseoftheSeattle’sUH-46Sea Knight VerticalReplenishment (VERTREP)helicopters, as theNormandywas still well stocked with

foodandotherconsumables.Within ten minutes, the

lines were rigged, and therefueling hoses were pulledacross the hundred feet/thirtymetersorsoofspacebetweenthe two ships.Each hose hasa “male” probe, which locksintoa“female”receptacleonthe receiving ship.Thesecanberapidlydisconnectedintheevent of an emergency,whatthe Navy calls a

“breakaway.”When properlysetandpressurized,eachhosecan move several thousandgallons a minute of distilledpetroleum products. As soonas the refueling probes weresecuredintotheirreceptacles,theSeattlebegantopumpJP-5 over to the cruiser.Gradually, the pressure wasbuilt up, and the flowincreased.Whileallofthiswasgoing

on, the two ship captainswere carefully conning theirvessels,making sure that thespacing and alignmentremained constant. This canbe difficult with ships ofdifferent sizes. Since thelargeronewantsto“suck”thesmaller vessel into its side,maintaining station duringUNREPs is a delicatebusiness measured in anadditionalrpmortwoofshaftpower, or a twitch of

propeller pitch. Thisafternoon all wentexceedingly smoothly, andCaptainsDeppeandFirks(ofSeattle)putonashowofshiphandling that one could onlyadmire.Part of the beauty of this

operation is that it is donevirtually without radio orother electronic signals. Tokeep thingssimpleandquiet,onlylightsandflagsareused.

After about thirtyminutes ofrefueling, the call came upfrom engineering that theNormandy’s fuel bunkerswere full and the UNREPcompleted. As theyuncoupled the hoses, thecrews of both ships werecareful to limit JP-5 spillsinto the sea, to minimizepollution. Not many of usrealize how tough pollution-control rules are on themilitary, and how hard they

worktobe“green.”Oncethehoses were retracted back tothe Seattle, the deck crewsbegantostriketheirlinesanddropthemoverthesidetoberetrieved by the oiler’spersonnel.Nowcameonelastticklishoperation.Captain Deppe ordered all

ahead two thirds (abouttwenty knots/thirty-sevenkilometersanhour),andthenbegan a gradual turn to

starboard, a maneuverdesigned to make thebreakaway from the 53,000-ton oiler as smooth and easyas possible. Deppe ran thecruiser through a full 360°turn and almost 10,000yards/9,144 meters ofseparation from the Seattlebefore he felt free tomaneuver again. At thecompletion of this turn, heordered the cruiser to headwest to join up with some

other ships of the GW battlegroup. After that, we alladjourned below to freshenupfordinner.I was escorted to quarters

usually reserved for anembarked flag officer—veryluxurious after the crampedquarters of the GW. Withonly around 350 personnel,theNormandy is much moreintimateandpleasantthanthecarrier. People can actually

findprivacyhereandthereonNormandy if they want it.Another nice thing aboutbeing on one of the “smallboys”was theabsenceof thehundreds of extra VIPs,observers, media personnel,and contractors now on thecarrier, making space andcomfort more plentiful thanaboard the GW. Perhaps theonly thing I missed was thelive video feeds from CNNand other networks provided

by the onboard ChallengeAthenasystem.As we gathered in the

Normandy’s wardroom fordinner, I was struck by theyouth of Captain’s Deppe’sofficers. While thedepartment heads weremostly lieutenantcommanders, most of theothers were lieutenants withless than five years service.Escort duty is a young

person’s profession, andaround the table themajorityofthefaceswereunderthirty.Aboard the “small boys” ofthe cruiser/destroyer/frigateforce, theofficers’wardroomis the center of their socialworld.Thewardroomtableisa place of open expression,with rank and positionholding little sway. Hereproblems are discussed,assignments made, andprofessional experience

passed along to youngofficers. There is very littleformality. The only real ruleisthateveryonestandsforthecaptain, andwaits for him toservehimselfbeforeeveryoneelsedoesso.Asforthefood,it’s as good as any you willfind in the fleet. From theNormandy’s small galleycame a mountain of edibles,includingafinesaladbarandexcellent baked chicken andrice.Theonlyproblemyou’ll

findisdealingwiththerollofthe ship. And therein lies astory.The Ticonderoga-class

(CG-47) Aegis cruisers werebuilt upon hulls originallydesigned for the Spruance-class (DD-963) general-purpose destroyers. Theyshare a common structuralhull power plant and manyother systems. However, theextra load of weapons and

other equipment associatedwiththeAegiscombatsystemhas definitely “maxed out”theoriginalSpruancedesign.The “Ticos,” as they areknown, displace fully 15%more than a Spruance,muchofwhichislocatedinthetalldeckhouses that mount thefour big SPY-1 phased-arrayradarsthataretheheartoftheAegis system. What this allmeans is that the Ticos aretop-heavy. Not enough to

make themunstableorproneto capsizing, mind you; butenough to make them lessthan comfortable for thosewho don’t enjoy pitching,swaying, and rolling. In fact,they handle the seas quitewell and maneuver like asmall Italiansportscar in thehands of a professional.However, they do roll a lot!In a heavy sea or sharp turn,theycanheelup to40° fromthe vertical. It is not

particularly uncomfortable,and does not tend to causemotion sickness.However, itdoes make activities likeeating meals potentiallyexciting. And for us thatevening, more than once theship took rolls steep enoughto force us to grab hold ofplatesandservingdishes.After dinner, we were

given a tour of theengineering departments and

combat center. WhileNormandyisalmosttenyearsold(shewascommissionedin1989) andcoming to the endof her second five-yearoperating period, she is interrific shape. In fact, I wasamazed how well her crewhas maintained her.Everythingwasspotless,eventhe deck corners; and all thesensor and combat systemswere “up” and ready foraction.

Normandyisrepresentativeof the “Baseline 3” Ticos,with improved lightweightSPY-1B radars (each Aegisship has four of these) andnew computers. Followingthe 1997/98 cruise, she willheadintotheyardforamajoroverhaul, which willcompletely update her Aegiscombat system to the latestversion.Whenshecomesoutoftheyardsometimein1999,shewillbeequippedwiththe

new SM-2 Block 4 SAM,whichwillgiveheranabilitytoengageanddestroytheaterballistic missiles (TBMs).Eventually, theentire fleetofAegis cruisers anddestroyerswill have this capability,whichwillgreatly reduce therisks from enemy TBMs toour forward-deployed forces.Today, the crew of theNormandy and the Aegisdestroyer Carney weresimulating some of the

engagement techniques thatwill be part of that futurecapability.After the tour, I headed

down to the commodore’sstateroomandsleep.JohnandIwere scheduled to return totheGWinthemorning,aswehadbeenhearingrumors thatthe “hot war” part of theJTFEX scenario might startwithin a day or two. I hadwanted to be aboard theGW

when that happened in ordertohavethebestpossibleviewof the start of the hostilities.As it happened, thingsdidn’twork out according toschedule—to our great goodfortune, for we ended upexperiencing the mostinteresting day of theexercise.

Saturday,August

23rd,1997

JTFEX97-3—Day 6: TheKoronangovernmenttodaycontinued topressureKartuna bytest firingseveral SCUDballistic

missiles ontheir testrange. This isseen as a signthat they arebringing theirtheaterballisticmissilecombatunits to a highstate ofcombatreadiness. Inaddition, the

Koronan fleethas beensurged out oftheirports,andis currentlymoving intoposition totrack and trailthe CoalitionNaval forcesmassing in theGulf ofSabani.Meanwhile,

elements ofthe 24thMEU(SOC) andGuam ARGhavecommencedtheir NEO ofthe Americanembassycompound inTemal. It isexpected thatthis operationwill be

completedearly on themorning ofAugust24th.

By Saturday morning,

much had happened inJTFEX 97-3. Overnight, theNormandy and the otherescorts had rejoined theGW,and the combined battlegroup had entered thenorthern end of the Gulf of

Sabani. Passing by the(imaginary) Willo and HirtIslands, the group turnedsouthintotheGulftosupportthe Guam ARG/24th MEU(SOC) in their NEO ofendangered personnel fromKartuna.Meanwhile, the USACOM

J-7 exercise leaders wereworking hard on the “flex”partof thescenario, tryingtobait Admiral Mullen and his

commanders intoactions thatwould cause hostilities tobreak out immediately. Fortheadmiralandhisstaff,theirjobwastokeepa“lid”onthescenario for as long aspossible—important in thelight of the NEO the 24thMEU (SOC) which hadbegun in the predawn hours.Herewas to be the “eyeball-to-eyeball” phase of theexercise, simulating the“short-of-war” realities that

our commanders would facein an actual crisis. Eventhough this was a trainingexercise, you could feel thetension of the emergingsituation. Everyone in thebattle group knew that theywerebeingevaluatedfortheirreadiness to go into apotential combat situationduring JTFEX 97-3, andnobodywanted to let the restoftheforcedown.

Allaroundthebattlegroup,ships from the Atlantic Fleetwere being used to simulateKoronanNaval vessels in an“aggressor” role. Andnumerous other ships weresimulating neutral shippingtraffic, trying to get clear oftheemergingfracas,ortogetonemorecargoruninbeforethe “war” started. The finalproof that the “hot” phase ofthe exercise was about tobegin arrived on a UH-46

transport helicopter’smorning run in the form oftheNormandy’s SOOT teamrepresentative. This wasCaptain James W. Phillips,the CO of the Aegis cruiserVellaGulf (CG-72),whohadcome aboard to observe theproceedings and to evaluatethe performance of CaptainDeppe and his crew duringthe exercise.CaptainPhillipsis a courtly gentleman whoquickly attached himself to

Jim Deppe, and they weresoon chatting away like twoold friends working out thebest place to catch a prizebass. But you only had tolook out a porthole of theNormandy’s wardroomduring breakfast to see thatthe game afoot in this pondbeat the hell out of anyfishingyoumightfindashore.Things were about to get

very interesting in this little

patch of the Gulf of Sabani.About 1,000 yards/914meters off the starboardbeam,aNormandywhaleboatwas taking a maritimeinspection teamto thefrigateSamuel Elliot Morrison(FFG-13), which wascurrentlyplayingthepartofaneutral merchant ship.Breakfastwashardlyfinishedwhenthewordcameoverthatthefrigatehadarealcasualtywho needed to be evacuated

back to the mainland, anaction that caused a problemfor John and myself. Thediagnosis was hepatitis, andthe patient was beingtransported over in thewhaleboatwithacorpsman.With only a single HS-11

sortie scheduled to fly fromNormandy to GW that day,this meant that the casualtyandcorpsmanwouldtakeourplaces on the Seahawk, and

we would have to waitanother day or two to returnto the carrier.CaptainDeppemade it clear that he woulddo his best to get us back assoon as possible. Andbesides, he went on to say,therewas plenty of room forus aboard, and since it wasSaturday in the “real”world,itwouldbepizzanightontheNormandy. Since Normandyhadoneofthebestgalleysinthe Atlantic Fleet, this

sounded likemaking thebestofabadsituation.After the HS-11 Seahawk

arrived and collected thecasualty and corpsman, theship passed into acomfortable high-pressurezone,whichhadtheeffectofdroppingthetemperaturetoarefreshing 80° F/27° C, anddrying out the air to asparkling clarity. Visibilitybecame almost unlimited,

with line-of-sight rangesrunning to almost 30,000yards/27,400 meters. It soonbecame the most beautifuldayI’dseeninmonths,withaflat calm sea and almost nowind. Meanwhile, the“bubble” of visible spacearound us had becomecrowdedwithships.Later that afternoon,

around 1600 (4 P.M.), as Istood on the helicopter

platform aft, I noticedsomethingstrange.Oneofthenearby ships suddenly closedfrom astern to around 2,000yards/1,828meters, and triedtomovearoundus,muchasacartriestopassatruckonaninterstate highway. Amoment later, I felt the deckshudder underneath my feet,andheard thesharpwhineofthe Normandy’s four LM-2500 gas turbines going tofullpower.Injustsecondsthe

cruiser jumped from twelveto thirty knots, and CaptainDeppe radically cut in frontoftheothership,blockingthepass. Somewhat dazzled bythismaneuver,Ilookedaftatthe other vessel, aSpruance-classdestroyer that I initiallyexpected tobe theUSSJohnRodgers (DD-983) from ourbattle group. But then InoticedthatthisSpruancedidnot have the ASROClauncheroftheJohnRodgers,

and a quick glance at herpennant number confirmedmy suspicions. It was theUSSNicholson (DD-982)—aVLS-equipped SpruancesimulatingaKoronanKashin-class guided-missiledestroyer.Clearly theJTFEX97-3 scenario was growinghotter. John and I headedforward to the bridge at adeadruntofindoutwhatwasgoingon.

As we arrived on the portbridge wing, I saw theNicholson trying to slip upourbeam.Overattheedgeofthe bridge were CaptainsDeppeandPhillips,watchingintently as the destroyermaneuvered. At the sametime,theTBS(TalkBetweenShip)radiocircuitcamealivewith traffic from all aroundthebattlegroup.Twofrigatessimulating Koronan guided-missile gunboats were

maneuvering aggressively.Looking to one of the younglieutenants, I asked, “Whatthehellisgoingon?”“They’replayingchicken,”

he said, “like the Russians.”The remark was like a tripthroughtimeforme.Back in theColdWar, the

ships and submarines of theSovietNavyused to trailourCVBGs the way Nicholsonwas doing. This was a

favorite tactic of the lateAdmiral Sergei Gorshkov(the longtime chief of theSoviet Navy), and tookadvantageofthe“freedomofnavigation” rules accordedships on the high seas. Theidea was to maneuver for aclear line of sight to thecarrierthewaythey’ddojustbefore the outbreak of a realconflict.Inthe“firstsalvo”ofthat war, the ships and subswould fire their missiles,

torpedoes, and guns andattempt to put the flattop outof action. The only way todefeat this threatwas forourownescortshipstomaneuveraggressively, physicallyplacing themselves betweenthe enemy ships and thecarrier. At times, vessels ofboth sides would actually“bump.” Such aggressivemaneuvering now and thenincreased tensions between

the superpowers.78 We usedto call it “Cowboys andRussians,” and I had thoughtthatitwasathingofthepast.1wasclearlywrong.Though it’s not publicized

by the U.S. Navy, the tacticof interposing an escort shipbetweenanopponentand thecarrier is still practiced; itresembles the “hassling” thatfighter pilots engage in tokeep themselves sharp. But

“dogfighting” with billion-dollar cruisers anddestroyersis riskier. Clearly theUSACOM training staffwanted to stress AdmiralMullen and his staff into asituation where the Koronanforces could claim aprovocation and initiatehostilities while the 24thMEU (SOC) was stillconducting their NEO inTemal. The challenge wasclear. If a Koronan ship was

able to draw a line-of-sightbead on the GW, then theescorts would be required to“fire”ontheoffendingvesseltokeeptheflattopsafe.Atthesame time, becauseGW wasconducting flight operations,there was very little CaptainRutheford could do to helpcombattheintruders.ThedestroyerUSSNicholson(DD-982), during hermaneuvering duel with the

USSNormandy(CG-60).JOHND.GRESHAM

For the next few hours, itwould be up to the “smallboys” of the battle group tokeep the Koronan missileships at bay. Clearly, theNormandy’s Saturday nightpizza tradition was about togo on hold for a while.Captain Deppe, immediatelygrasping the challenge, wentto the taskwithagrinonhisface.Opportunitieswere rare

to maneuver his ship to itslimitsagainstafellowskipperin an almost perfectlymatched ship. This was justsuchachance.Althoughthereare clear exercise rules abouthow close opposingcombatants are allowed toapproach, these rules wereabout to be bent. In fact, theonlyruleseemedtobe:Don’tactuallytouchtheotherguy!The next few hours went

by very quickly, as weparried and thrustedwith theNicholson.ThecaptainoftheNicholson(CommanderCraigE. Langman) was extremelyaggressive, doing everythinghe could to get past us. Henever succeeded. CaptainDeppe maneuvered theNormandy like a Formula Iracing car, keeping thedestroyer solidly away fromtheflattop.Attimesweracedahead at over thirty knots,

only to crash-stop within aship length or two. Then wemight sit for ten or fifteenminutes,with justa thousandyardsorsoseparatingthetwovessels. Suddenly, theNicholson would jam on thespeed, and the maneuveringwould begin again. Eachtime, Captain Deppe wouldmatch his counterpart move-for-move. At times theNormandy would heel asmuch as 40°, and you could

hearthesoundsofpizzapansandcrockeryhitting thedeckback in the galley. Othertimes, it would be a race tosee if the Nicholson couldinch ahead just a little,followed by a radical turn totrytogainposition.It wasn’t until sometime

after 2000 (8 P.M.) that theNicholson and the other twoKoronan intruders finallyturnedaway,andthejousting

was over. As Captain Deppeordered the engines throttledback and began to con theNormandy to her assignedpositioninthedefensescreen,AdmiralMullen’svoicecameup on the TBS circuit. Forseveral minutes, the admiralcommented on theperformance of each ship inthe screen, after which hepaidaglowingcomplimenttothe skippers of the threeescortsthathadfendedoffthe

Koronan warships. After hishearty “Well done,” youcould feel the tension easearound the ship. Though wedid not know it at the time,the GW battle group hadpassedasignificanttest; theyhadboughttwomoredaysof“peace” for the Kartunansandtheircoalitionallies.Aboard theNormandy, life

began to settle back tonormal.Down in thegalleys,

themess specialists salvagedwhattheycouldofthepizzastheywould serveatmid-rats.Though the 2300 (11 P.M.)feedingwasheavythatnight,manyoftheofficersandcrewchose to just hit their racksand grab some sleep instead.Theseweretheveterans,whoknewthatwhattheyhadseentodaywasonlythebeginningofwhatcouldbeanothertwoweeks of “combat.” Thosewith less experience and

more adrenalinemunched onthick-crust pan pizza, andchattedabouttheterrificship-handling Captain Deppe hadshowntheentirebattlegroupthatday.AsIlingeredoverapiece of the baked pie, Ianswered a question that hadbeen in my mind for sometime: Since the end of theColdWar, the surface forcesof the USN have not had aserious enemy. Such acondition can breed

complacency and lead to“sloppy” habits incommanders and crews. JimDeppe’s performance on thebridge of the Normandy thisSaturday evening convincedmethatoursurfaceNavystillhas“therightstuff.”

Sunday,August

24th,1997

JTFEX 97-3-Day 7: The24th MEU(SOC)completedtheir NEOearly today,and isevacuating thecivilians to aneutrallocation. Theaggressiveactions of

KoronanNaval forcesyesterdayhavebeen reportedto the UNSecurityCouncil,which hasissued anadditionalresolutionallowingexpanded useof force in the

event offurtherharassment.The onlyKoronangovernmentresponse hasbeenadditionalmobilizationof theirmilitaryforces.

The morning after the

game of “Cowboys andRussians” dawned humid,overcast,andstormy.Iawoketoaknockonmydoorfromachiefpettyofficer at 0600 (6A.M.). He informed me thatthecaptainhadarrangedforaUH-46 VERTREP helicopterto pick up us and shuttle usover to the GW. Quicklyshoweringandpackingupmy

bag, I met John in thewardroom for breakfast, andwe discussed our plans forreturningtothecarrier.Sincethe helicopter was dueoverhead at 1000 hours (10A.M.), I took the time to goup to the bridge and thankCaptain Deppe for hishospitality.Afterward,onmywaydown,IranintoCaptainPhillips, who confirmed myown thoughts about theprevious night’s proceedings.

He had noted Normandy’simpressiveperformanceinhisreport to the SOOT teamleader aboard the commandship Mount Whitney. “Keepaneyeoutforthingstobreaktomorrow,” he added slyly.Armedwith this information,JohnandIcollectedourbags,and then headed aft to thehelicopterhangartoawaitourridebacktotheGW.At the hangar, a chief

handed us float coats andcranialhelmets,andgaveusaquick safety briefing on theSea Knight. And then at theappointedtime,theUH-46setdown gently on theNormandy’s helicopter pad.The big twin-rotor SeaKnightwas a tight fit on thesmall landing platform, andyou could see the deckpersonnel carefully watchingthe clearance between therotor blades and the

superstructure. We quicklyboardedthebirdandstrappedinto our seats. Two minuteslater, the crew buttoned uptheUH-46and liftedoff intotheovercast.Theridebacktothe GW took about fifteenminutes.In the ATO office,

LieutenantNavritrilhadgoodnewsforJohn.Sincemanyofthe VIPs, contractors, andother extra ship riders had

flown home, he would nowget to occupy a two-manstateroomupontheO-2levelnear mine. He also let usknow that the ChallengeAthena link was workingwell, which meant that wecouldexpecttoseeoneoftheopening-day NFL footballgames the followingSunday.“So take it easy,” he toldus,“and relax the rest of theday.” Both of us gratefullytook him up on this

suggestion,andretired toourstateroomsforalittle“down”time. If things got “hot” onMonday, I wanted to beready.

Monday,August

25th,1997

JTFEX97-3—Day 8: Atdawn this

morning, thearmed forcesof Koronabegan ageneralinvasionoftheKartunanhomeland.Elements ofevery branchoftheKoronanmilitary areinvolved, andhave been

identified, andare rapidlyoverrunningthe country.The UNSecurityCouncil, theU.S.government,and thegovernment ofall coalitionallies havecondemned

this action.Meanwhile,the UNSecurityCouncil hasvoted anumber ofresolutions,including onewhichencouraged“use of allnecessary andappropriate

force” to halttheaggression.

As soon as word of the

invasion reached him,Admiral Mullen initiated arevised ROE, and put intoeffecttheattackplansthatheand his staff had beenworking on since we hadsailed. One of his first actswas to activate CaptainDeppe’s fleet air defense

plan.WithDeppe designatedas “Alpha Whiskey” (AW—the fleet AAW commander),the three SAM ships werespread through the area tofullycoverall thehigh-valueunits. The Normandy wouldstay close to the GW, whilethe South Carolina wouldmove closer to the GuamARG (the superior over-landperformance of her missileradardirectorsgaveherbetterinshore characteristics than

thoseoftheAegisships).TheCarney would act as a“missile trap,” and work asthe AAW “utility infielder”for the fleet. Shewould stay“up threat”of themain fleet,and do her best to break upanyairattacksfromKoronanairunits.This day would see the

opening of the air campaign(which would follow themodelsetforthduringDesert

Storm). Today’s air andmissile strikeswere designedto eliminate the Koronanability to hurt the coalitionfleet; CVW-1 would destroythe Koronan air defensesystem, air force, and navy,while Tomahawk cruise-missile strikes from theNormandy, the Carney, andthe submarines woulddecapitate the Koronancommand and controlnetwork. Itwas a good plan.

Still,thekeytomakingaplanwork is to keep it flexibleenough to respond to anycountermeasures that anenemy might respond with.This meant getting theTARPS F-14’s of VF-102intotheairtosweeptheGulfof Sabani, Kartuna, andKorona for targetsworthy ofCVW-1’s attentions. Withonly four TARPS-capable F-14’s, and whatever satelliteimagery that could be

downloaded from theChallengeAthenasystem,thebattle group intelligencewouldbehalf-blind.Luckily,they would also have theservices of the three VQ-6ES-3’s,givingthem“ears”tosupplementtheireyes.This day launched the

entire group into wartimeoperating conditions; theywouldstay thatwayuntil theEndExercise(ENDEX)time,

sometime the followingweek.

Tuesday,August

26th,1997

JTFEX97-3—Day 9: TheKoronanmilitaryforces,continuing

their invasionof Kartuna,claim to havetaken controlof more thanhalf thecountry, andhave flownnumerousmissionsagainst thecoalition airand Navalforces in the

GulfofSabani(with resultsthat arecurrently notknown) .Meanwhile,the coalitionforces, basedaround thecarrier USSGeorgeWashington(CVN-73) andher battle

group havebeguncounterattacksagainst theKoronaninvaders.

Oneof the first thingsyou

getusedtoaboardanaircraftcarrier isyouneverfindtotalquiet.Downbelow,youhear

themachinerynoises thatarethe heart and lungs of theship.Asyourise through thedecks,thenoisesoftheflightdeck begin to makethemselves heard, until youreachtheO-2level,wherethe“airport” is on your roof.Surprisingly, you can evensleepthroughallthenoisesofthe catapults firing, arrestingwires straining, the tailhooksand landing gear slamminginto the deck, and the jet

noise coming through thearmoredsteeldeckoveryourhead.Afterawhilethenoisesblend into one another andyoujustsleepinspiteofitall.A young Navy maintenancetechnician works on an HS-11 helicopter in the hangarbay of the USS GeorgeWashington(CVN-73).JOHND.GRESHAM

On this second day of the“war,”Iwanderedaroundtheshiptogetasenseofhowtheyoung men and women whoweredoingmostof theworkwere handling both theirwork and what leisure wasavailable to them. Down onthehangardeck,forexample,I witnessed some amazingmechanical and technicalexploits.Jetenginesweighingfive tons were changed withless than a yard’s clearance

between aircraft. Kids whodon’tlookoldenoughtoowna “boom box” back homehandledmillion-dollar “blackboxes.” Sweat, oil, jet fuel,hydraulic fluid, metalshavings, and salt air allmixed into a pungent smellthat says only one thing:You’re in an aircraft carrierhangar bay. This is a landruled not so much by theship’s officers, as by thosemythic people who hold the

naval service together—thechiefs.In the Navy, there is a

saying that officers makedecisionsandthechiefsmakethingshappen. It’s true.Hereon the hangar deck, the bulkofthemaintenanceandrepairwork is done by seniorenlisted personnel and non-commissioned officers(NCOs), who spend theirdays (and frequently nights)

putting back into workingordertheaircraftthatofficersgo out and break. Anymachine, no matter howrobust and well built, willeventually break or fail ifusedlongenough.Itthereforefalls to these unsung heroesof naval aviation to do thedirty and not very wellrewardedworkofkeepingtheairplanes flying. How do thetaxpayersoftheUnitedStatesrewardthesededicatedyoung

people? While the pay ofenlisted/NCO personnel hasslipped a bit in the last fewyears (by comparison withwhat the average civilianearns), it is still light-yearsahead of the near-povertylevel of the 1970’s. In fact,the Congress has recentlyvotedasmallpayraise,anditshouldbeinpayenvelopesbythetimeyoureadthis.As for accommodations,

well, as we’ve already seen,don’texpectafour-starhotel.With 90% of the crewmadeup of enlisted/NCOpersonnel,so-called“personalspace” for non-officers isalmost absurdly lacking.Most enlisted and NCOberthing is made up of six-manbunk/stowageunits,withan attacked locker unit.Eachperson has an individualbunk, bunk pan, and locker.Each bunk has a reading

light, privacy curtain, andfresh-airduct,allpackedintoa space about the size of agood-sized coffin. The six-man modules are groupedinto berthing spaces, whichshare a communalhead/shower, as well as asmall open area equippedwith a television, table, andchairs. Normally, when youwalk through these spaces,red battle lamps (to preservenight vision) illuminate the

areaandallowthoseofftheirworkshiftstogetsomesleep.In the common areas there’susuallyatelevisiongoingandsomeone is probably ironingtheirclothes.

The officers’ mess inWardroom 3 aboard USSGeorge Washington (CVN-73)JOHND.GRESHAMTheNavy, recognizing the

necessaryshortcomingsofthepersonal accommodations,doeswhat it can tomake upfor that by giving navalpersonnel the finest foodmoney can buy. It’s notfancy, tending toward good,

basic chow, but the messspecialistsworkhardtothrowin favorites like pizza, stir-fry,orMexicandishesseveraltimesaweek.Inaddition,thedietitians try to keep foodrelatively low in fat byoffering fresh vegetables andsaladswheneverpossible.Fortheenlistedsailors,mealsareusually served cafeteria-stylein the large serving areaforwardofWardroom3.Oneof the largest open spaces in

the ship, this is the centralfocus of the enlistedpersonnel aboard ship. Herethey can eat, talk, attend aclass,playavideogame,andperhapsescapetheroutinefora little while. There are alsootherdiversions.Workout facilities are

located here and therethroughout the ship. Thesehave become extremelypopularinrecentyears,asthe

“hardbody” culture hasbecome fashionable. Formore serious fitnessenthusiasts,thereareexerciseand aerobic classes held onthehangardeckseveraltimesa day, as well as a jogginggroup that makes the circuitof the flight deck, weatherand flight operationspermitting. The ship’s cabletelevision system normallybroadcasts over six channelsfromasmallstudioontheO-

1 levelunder the island.Runby a technical team underLieutenant Joe Navritril, itshows movies, news, ship’sbulletins, and otherprogramming.Thereisalsoasmall cable radio station,which broadcasts an“eclectic” mix of rock androll, blues, and jazz. A four-page newspaper, TheGuardian, comes out everydayatlunch.Itisadelightfulmix of news from “the

world,” as well as moretopicalpiecesrelatingtodailylife aboard the GW. Finally,movies (complete with bagsofpopcorn)andVCRscanberented for off-duty videoparties back in enlistedberthingareas.An innovation made

possible by the ChallengeAthenasystemispersonalE-mail over the Internet foreveryone on board. This is

handled through the ship’sown onboard Intranet, whichfeedsintoacentralfileserver.EachpersonisassignedanE-mail account and address(aboard the GW, this endswith the suffix@washington.navy.mil). Themessages are then routedthrough the server andChallenge Athena system toand from the Atlantic Fleetcommunications center inNorfolk,Virginia.Thismeans

thateveryoneontheshipwithaccess to a computer (someare in common areas inkiosks for those who do nothave personal laptops oroffice machines) can receiveE-mailmessages fromhome.Already, it is changing thefaceofshipboardlife.For example, the three

thousand sailors andMarinesaboard the amphibious shipPeleliu (part of the Nimitz

battle group,which deployedfromtheWestCoastamonthbefore the GW CVBG) sentover fifty thousand E-mailmessages in just their firstmonthunderway!Theeffecton crew morale has beenastounding. The arrival ofNavalE-mail has come nonetoosoonforoursailors,sincetheoldNavydraw—“JointheNavy and See the World”—has become all but obsolete.Over the last decade, the

ships of our battle groupshave made less than half ofthe port calls on deploymentthat they used tomake. Thismeans that seeing foreigncountries, long a recruitingattraction, has been almosteliminated. Ever since the1979 Iran Crisis, long(ninety-plus days) lineperiods have become thenorm for CVBGs, and thishas been tough on crewmorale.

Wednesday,August

27th,1997

JTFEX97-3—Day 10: Themilitary forcesof Koronahave todaycompletedtheiroccupation ofKartuna,

including thecapital city ofTemal. Thelast elementsof theKartunangovernmentevacuated tothe country ofTelari, whichtodayannounced itsjoining of theAllied

coalition.Meanwhile,the coalitionforces havebeen steppingup theirattacks onKoronanmilitarytargets,reportedlyinflictingheavydamage.The battle

continues....

This morning found the

GW battle group continuingtodishoutpunishmentontheKoronans.The objectivewasto destroy enough of theirarmed forces to allow theMarines of the 24th MEU(SOC)tomakealandingnearthe Kartunan capital city of

Temal (in actuality, CampLejeune, North Carolina)sometime the followingweek. A battalion from the82nd Airborne Divisionassaulting a nearby airfieldwould support this landing.This would allow follow-onforces to be landed from theseaandair.Before this could be done,

the Koronan forces wouldhavetobereducedinsizeand

power,andthiswasthejobofthe ships, missiles, andaircraft of the GW group.Already, significant progresshad been made toward thisgoal.ThoughKoronanairandNavalforceshadaggressivelylaunchedattacksonthenavalunits of the allied coalition,Admiral Mullen’s detailedplans forprotecting the shipsoftheforcehadbeenworkingto near perfection.Throughout the battle group,

the various warfarecommanders had beenworkinghardtoeliminatethespecialized threats they wereresponsiblefor.Captain Deppe on the

Normandy (the group AWcommander) had beenespecially busy in dozens ofAAW engagements betweenhisSAMshipsandtheplanesof the Koronan Air Force.Deppe’s disposition of his

SAM ships had workedparticularly well, with theNormandy absorbingmost ofthe attacks aimed at theGW.The Carney and SouthCarolinaalsoshotdowntheirshare of enemy intruders,with the result that theUSACOM exercisecontrollers rapidly had tostrengthen the Koronan AirForce, lest it be completelydestroyedbeforetheshootingphase of the exercise was

only three days old. Onceagain,theJ-7controllersfromUSACOMwerebeing forcedto“ratchetup”thethreatleveloftheexercise,justtokeepitchallenging for the GWgroup.

“Give me afast ship for Iintend to gointo harm’s

way!’”Captain JohnPaul Jones,ContinentalNavy

TheKoronanNavywasput

out of action equally fast.Becausesafedistanceshadtobe maintained between theKoronan KILO-class diesel

boats (being played byborrowed USN nuclearsubmarines)andtheshipsandsubs of the GW group,exerciserulestendedtomakethem sitting ducks. TheKoronansurface shipsdiedalittle harder, though they diddie quickly. Within hours ofthe outbreak of hostilities,every one of the Koronanmissile destroyers and patrolboats had been hunted downand dispatched by the allied

forces. Sometimes, theireliminationcameatthehandsof aircraft firing standoffmissiles like AGM-65Mavericks and AGM-84Harpoons. Particularlyeffective against the missilepatrol boats were SH-60BLAMPS III helicopters fromtheescortsarmedwithAGM-119 Penguin air-to-surfacemissiles(ASMs).Usingtheselittle helicopters as perimetersecurity guards proved to be

an efficient way of keepingthe Koronan patrol boats atarm’s length, withoutrequiring a mission by anF/A-18orS-3Btokillthem.There were also a number

of surface engagements byships of the GW escort andSTANAFORLANT—not allgoing in favor of the alliedcoalition. In justa singledayof surface combat, hits bysimulated Koronan missiles

(assumed to beChinese-builtC 802’s) damaged theCarney, Samuel ElliotMorrison,andSeattle,puttingthem out of action (and theexercise) for various lengthsof time. In addition, theBoone was assessed to havebeenhitbyNavalgunfire. Inreturn, the Underwood andHMS London were assessedto have sunk a Koronanmissile patrol boat withRGM-84 Harpoon SSMs.

LittoralNavalwarfare is likeknife fighting: close andbloody. However, by settinghisunitsuptofightthisway,Admiral Mullen was able tomaximize the number ofattack sorties that could begenerated by CVW-1 off theGW. Though he risked hissurface ships, he got thedesiredresultsonthebeach.

Thursday,

August28th,1997

JTFEX97-3—Day 11: Therehave beenreports todayof variousatrocities byKoronanmilitary forcesagainst thepopulation of

Temal, thecapital city ofoccupiedKartuna. Inaddition, itappears thatthe Koronanforces aredigging in toprotect theirgainsagainstapossiblecounter-invasion by

Alliedamphibiousand airborneforces.

Ever since our sailing,

Captain Rutheford had madeapointofexercisinghiscrewwithaseriesofbattledrills—a deadly serious businessaboard any warship, and

particularly on an aircraftcarrier. Most of the damagesufferedbyflattopsincombathascomeasaresultoffire.Itis the worst nightmare ofcarriersailors,whosehomeisbasicallyabigmetalboxfullof jet fuel, explosives, andother combustible materials.UntilacarrierliketheGWisfully “buttoned up” (that is,put inaconditionwhere it ismost survivable), a fire canrage through it much like

those that devastated theOriskiney (CVA-34),Forrestal (CV-59), andEnterprise (CVN-65)back inthe 1960’s. Buttoning upusually comeswhen the shipgoes to “General Quarters”(GQ) or Condition “Zebra.”Sinceit takestimeforsailorsto learn to live and work atGQ, Captain Ruthefordmakesapointofpracticingitregularly.EveryTuesdayandThursday evening at 2000

Hours (8 P.M.) while underway, theGWgoestoGQforseveral hours of combat anddamage-control drills. It is atGQ when a warship trulybecomes a living organism,with the personnel aboardactingasnerves,muscles,andimmune systems, making itcapableandstrong.It takes just a fewminutes

for the ship to get fullybuttonedupandreadytotake

whatever punishment anenemymightcaretodishout.Every person on the GW(even John and I) had anactionstation,wheretheyareexpectedtobeduringGQ.Soat 2000, we were manningour action station—a coupleofdesksinsideLieutenantJoeNavritril’s small publicaffairs office on the O-1level. From there we couldsit, sweat a little (it’s warmwith all the computer and

televisiongear), and listen tothe drills around the ship.This evening, a firefightingtraining drill was going onseverallevelsaboveusontheisland. At the same time,weaponsdrillswerebeingrunwiththeMk.29SeaSparrowlaunchers.Allaroundus,youcould feel the crew bondingwith the big ship, becomingas much a part of it as thenuclear reactors, plumbing,andcatapults.Italsoisatime

of great stress and concern,even during training. This isbecause the ship must stillfunction while buttoned up.Moving from onecompartment to anotherbecomes difficult, as heavyhatches and watertight doorsmust be opened, and thenredogged. There are chancesformistakes tobemade, andthiseveningtherewasone.One of the important jobs

that must be done dailyaboard ship is the testing ofthe various petroleumsystems to make sure thattheir contents are pure andfree of contamination likewaterordirt.Thisevening,ayoung sailor was carryingseveral glass jars of samplesdown from the flightdeck tothe metrology lab for testingwhen he dropped one up onthe O-2 level above us.Unfortunately, in the

darkenedcompartmenthelosttrack of the spill, andwoundupslippingand falling in theslippery puddle. Almostinstantly, therewas an alarmover the 1MC system of“MAN DOWN!” and a callfor a medical team. Withinseconds theyoung sailor hadacorpsmanathisside,andahazardous-materials team onthe way to clean up thedangerous spill. I was struckby theway that theothers in

the compartment with Johnand me stopped what theywere doing to wait for wordon the young man, almostlike waiting for a player tostand up after an injury at afootball game. It was quietfor a few minutes, untilCaptainRuthefordcamebackonthe1MCtotellusthatthesailor’s injuries were slight(aninjuredwristwasall),andthat the response teams haddone a great job of taking

careofhim.AsIsteppedoutofthepublicaffairsofficefora drink from the waterfountain in thepassageway, Isaw the young man beingcarrieddownthe ladder fromabove on a Stokes litter, notunlike a dozen eggs beingcradledbyahousewifeonherwayhome.A few minutes after the

GQalertwas lifted, Iheadedback to my stateroom two

levelsup.Ihadtoadmiretheway that the GQ had beenhandled. It was just likecombat.Itwasatthismomentthat I knew the real truthabout this ship.TheGWandher crew were ready forwhatever the comingdeploymentwouldbring,andGod help the enemy foolishenoughtotrytohurtthem.Itwouldnotbeafairfight.Youcanalwaystellamilitaryunitthat is functioning well:

When it is stressed, youcannotevenseethemsweat!

Friday,August

29th,1997

JTFEX97-3—Day 12: Pressreports fromthe AlliedCoalitionreport the air

and navalforces ofKorona havebeen heavilydamaged, andrenderedeffectivelyharmless. Inaddition, airunits flyingfrom the USSGeorgeWashington(CVN-73),

USS Guam(LPH-9), andother navalvessels havebeen flyingover 100attack sortiesevery daysince theoutbreak ofhostilities.CommandersJohn Kindred

(the Air Boss,left) and CarlJune (theMiniBoss, right) inPrimary FlightControl (Pri-Fly) aboardthe USSGeorgeWashington(CVN-73).JOHN D.GRESHAM

The payoff for all the

efforts of the “little boys” ofthe GW battle group andSTANAFORLANT was theability of CVW-1 toconcentrate on their real job—attack sorties againstKoronan military targetsashore. Did they destroy theoccasionalairornavaltarget?Absolutely. And they did so

with a ruthless efficiencywhen the targets wereavailable. But an old sayingexplains what AdmiralMullen had in mind for hisflyers:

“Fighterpilotsmake movies.Bomber pilotsmakehistory!”

UnknownNavy AttackPilot

The aircraft and crews of

CVW-1 were really earningtheir keep only when theywere delivering ordinanceonto targets of value ashore.ThismeantthatthefiftyF-14Tomcats andF/A-18Hornetsaboard the GW were flyingmorning, noon, and night to

hitasmanyhigh-valuetargetsaspossible.Inparticular,theywould give special attentionto enemy units and systemsthat could threaten theMarines of the 24th MEU(SOC) and the airbornetroopersofthe82ndAirborneDivisionwhentheycameintoplay in a few days. Theseincluded targets like mobileantiship missile sites alongthecoast(whichcouldhittheamphibious ships of the

Guam ARG), mobile SCUDballistic-missile launchers,and SAM/AAA sites in theplanned invasionarea.Alongwith these high-valueKoronan targets, therewouldbe attacks on the fieldedforces of the Koronanmilitary in and aroundKartuna.Because it is theaircrewswhoflytheplanesanddrop the weapons who givenavalairpoweritsworth,let’stakeacloserlookathowtheir

dangerous job gets done ontheGW.If you want the best view

of a carrier’s air operations,there isonlyoneplacetogo:Primary Flight Control—or“Pri-Fly”asitisknown.ThisisthedomainofCommandersJohn Kindred (the Air Boss)and Carl June (the MiniBoss). Kindred and June arethe lords and masters of theGW’s flight deck and the

airspacearoundtheship.TheNavy has for generationsmade it a practice to handresponsibility to highlyqualified naval aviators forthosejobsaboardcarriersthatrelatedirectlytoflying—jobslike catapult and landingsignals officers (LSOs).These jobs have to be doneright. People who do themproperlyarepromoted.Thosewho don’t can look forwardto new civilian careers. Of

these jobs, the captain’s, ofcourse, carries the greatestresponsibility.However,rightafter the captain comes theAir and Mini Bosses. Noother pair of individuals hassomuchinfluenceonthecoreservices (flying aircraft insupport of Naval/Marineoperations) the ship wasdesigned to deliver. Thesetwo officers control virtuallyeveryaspectof theboat’sairoperations,fromthepaceand

number ofmissions flown tohow the aircraft are parkedand serviced. This means,practically,thatwhentheshipis flying aircraft, there is nomargin for error despitemassive stress, a thanklessworkschedule,andverylittlesleep. Clearly you needspecialpeopletobeBosses.Since a good long look at

Pri-Fly seemed essential tothetotalexperienceofcarrier

operations,Iaskedtospendaday there with Kindred andJune.After climbing the fiveladdersfrommystateroomtotheO-7 level of the island, Ijoined the crowded and busyteam in Pri-Fly. Along theport side overlooking theflight deck are three chairs,much like CaptainRutheford’s chair on thebridgeone level below.Hereis where Kindred and Junespend their days and nights.

Soon after I entered, theyverygraciouslyinvitedmetositinthecenterchairbetweenthem. It was an impressiveview. On command fromCommanderKindred, a chiefpetty officer behind mepassed forward a steamingcup of coffee and the AirTasking Order (ATO) FlowSheet—or Air Plan for short—thedocument that explainsand controls the day’s airoperations. Printed double-

sided on a single legal sheetof paper, it is the daily biblefor the flight deck. On oneside is a set of time lines,witha lineforeachsquadronor air unit participating thatday.Thesetimelinesarethenbroken down into individual“events,” each of whichrepresents a particularplanned launch/landing cycleon the flight deck. The flipside shows detailed notesabout the flight schedule and

the schedule of tankeraircraft, and is personallysigned(theyhavetoreviewitdaily) by the GW’s Air,Strike, and Operationsofficers.As I read the Air Plan, I

was struck by the number offlight “events” on theschedule.Alltold,therewerenine of them, which wasnormal for this phase ofJTFEX 97-3, Commander

June informed me. BecauseoftheNavy’srecenteffort toincrease the number of dailyair sorties, the two AirDepartment officers weretrying to implement some ofthelessonslearnedduringtherecent SURGEX by theNimitz group. To supporttheir SURGEX, Nimitz andCVW-9 had been heavilyreinforcedwith additional aircrews and deck personnel,allowing them to run over

two hundred sorties a day.GWandCVW-1hadnosuchaugmentation. Even so, therewas still room for increasingthe number of events andsorties over the fleet norms.More efficient use ofpersonnelandresources(suchas better organization of thehangarandflightdeckcrews)and enforced rest and eatingperiods between events hadallowedKindred and June tosafely expand the five or six

flight events of a “normal”daytoasmanytenortwelve.In this way, CVW-1 couldeasily run over 150 sorties adayforanindefiniteperiodoftime,shoulditbecalledupontodoso.After taking in all that I

couldoftheAirPlan,Iliftedmyhead towatchas the twomen took aboard a dozen orso aircraft from the day’ssecond air event. Included in

this gaggle was CAG“Boomer”Stufflebeemflyinga VMFA-251 Hornet, whobaggedaperfect“OK-3”trap.Meanwhile, another strikewasgettingreadyupforwardto head out on the noonmission (Event-3), whichwouldconcentrateonhuntingenemy SAMs and mobilemissile batteries.Most of theaircraft for thismissionwereon the bow, andwould haveto taxi aft once the area

around the deck angle wasclear.As soon as the last of the

Event-2aircraftwere aboard,the Air Boss called for theLSOs to stand down for awhile and the landing lightsystem to be shut down (thelonger it is lit, the sooner itwill wear out). Momentslater, Commander Junepointed out severalhelicopters in holding

patterns.Therewouldbe justenough time to bring themaboardbefore thenextevent,he explained. During awindow of less than fifteenminutes, two SH-60’s fromHS-11andanSH-3SeaKingcarrying VIPs from theMountWhitney (LCC-20, thefleet command ship) arrived,and then were either parked,towedaway,or flownoff forthe next event. Once thehelicopters were taken care

of, the flight deck wentrelatively quiet, whilehundreds of people withcolored jerseys swarmedabout, doing their variousjobs.UpinPri-Fly,thepacehad

hardlyslackened.Tomyrear,thechiefsandrepresentativesfrom the various CVW-1squadrons were exchanginginformation andmaking surethat everyonewas in sync. If

anyone had a question, hewouldcomeforwardandwaitrespectfully until Kindred orJune took notice. After ashort discussion, a decisionwould be made. As thesecontinued, I turned myattention back to the flightdeck, where—as always inmy experience—I saw greatenergy and purpose, and nowasted movements, nounnecessary actions. It is theworld’s most dangerous

dance—a dance made evenmore risky in light of thenecessity to run the deckcrews until the late hours ofthe evening because of theexpanded number of airevents.But fornow,Kindredand June were working hardtogetEvent-3intotheair.As I watched, I was

amusedtoseethenthatsomethings never change—andshouldn’t. In spite of the

array of new computers andother available high-techtools, Kindred and June stilluse many of the same toolsand procedures that theirpredecessorsinWorldWarIImight have used. Forexample, eachman has a setof colored grease pencils tomake notes on the thickwindows in front of them toremind them about whichaircraftarealoftandthestateoftheirfuel.

“Why do you do that?” I

asked.“Some things computers

and software will neverimprove on,” they explained.“Computers and electronicsmight fail; an explosionmightputthemoutofaction;but grease-pencil marks andpaperhardcopieswillworkaslong as they still exist.Perhaps not as well or as

quickly, but theywillalwayswork.”

The busy flight deck of theUSS George Washington(CVN-73), filledwithCVW-1aircraftduringJTFEX97-3.JOHND.GRESHAMAbout 1150 hours,

Commander Kindred pickeduphisheadsetandannouncedto the flight deck that it wastime to start engines for theEvent-3 launch cycle.

Carefully, the aircrafthandlers directed the aircrewstotaxi theiraircraftaftfor their launch fromCatapults 3 and 4. Momentslater, after everyone was inthe proper place andCaptainRutheford had given hisapproval, Kindred gave thecatapultofficerpermission toconduct the launch. AlreadyoverheadwastheplaneguardHH-60GfromHS-11,aswellas a USAF KC-135 airborne

tanker flying from LangleyAFB (in the simulatedcountryofTelari).First off the GW’s deck

were a pair of VS-32 S-3BVikings configured astankers, followed by areplacement VAW-123 E-2CHawkeye AEW aircraft.These were followed by aquartetofVF-102F-14’s,twoconfigured with D/TARPSpods for the noon

reconnaissancerun,whiletheothers had LANTIRN podsfor laserbombing.FollowingtheTomcatswasaVAQ-137EA-6B Prowler loaded forSuppression of Enemy AirDefense (SEAD) operations.LastoffwereadozenF/A-18Hornets, with a variety ofloads—from HARM missileand LGB simulators, to liveiron bombs for training runson a local range. This was alargelaunch,withalmosttwo

dozenaircraftinvolved.Morethan that would make theninety-minute Air Eventcycle impossible to sustain,andwouldactuallyreducethetotal number of sorties thatCVW-1 could generate perday. It also made optimumuse of the flight deck space,whichevenonashipthesizeoftheGWislimited.Once the Event-3 aircraft

had launched (it only took

about fifteen minutes), theangle was reset for recoveryof the HS-11 HH-60G onplane guard duty and thelaunch of its replacement.After this, activities on theflightdecksloweddown,andtherewastimeforafewbitesof sandwiches brought upfrom below by one of thechiefs. By 1300 hours (1P.M.), the F/A-18’s wereback in the landing pattern,preparing to come aboard.

The relatively short range ofthe Hornets means that theynormally operate within asingle air event, while theTomcats and other aircraftwould come back at thecompletion of Event 4. Fornow,thedeckaftwascleared,the arresting wires checked,and the landing light systemturned on. The landing cycletook about fifteen minutes,afterwhich theHornetswererapidly taxied forward to the

bow, where they could berefueled and rearmed to takepart in other strikes later inthe day.Also coming aboardwasoneofthethreeVRC-40C-2CODaircraft,bringingitsload of mail, personnel, andspare parts from NASNorfolk. It would return toNorfolk with a load ofnonessential folks. The shiphad been packed sincesailing,butnowasLaborDayweekend approached, the

many VIPs, news mediatypes, and technicians werefinding reasons to head backtothebeach.As for me, it was time to

leave the two Air Bosses totheir grueling task. They hadsix more launch/recoverycycles ahead before theycouldgrabsomesleepandgetready for the first launch thefollowingmorning.

Saturday,August

30th,1997

JTFEX97-3—Day 13: TherearereportsthatAllied forcesare preparingto invade theoccupiedcountry ofKartuna to

evict theKoronanmilitaryforces. At thistime, Alliedpublic affairsofficers willonly reportthat operationsagainst theKoronanforcescontinue, withno new

informationonresults.

While most of America

was getting started on theirLaborDay holidayweekend,theparticipantsofJTFEX97-3 were just beginning to hithighgear.CaptainBruceVanVelle’s mine-countermeasuresforcemoved

inshore to clear lanes for theamphibious units throughKoronan minefields. Thisrequired that CVW-1 finishclearing out the last of theKoronan’s coastal antishipand SCUD missile sitesbefore the vulnerableamphibious ships of theGuamARGbegan tooperateclose to the Kartunancoastline(actuallynearCampLejeune, North Carolina).Meanwhile, a continuous,

twenty-four-hour-a-day CAPhad to be flown over theamphibious ships, to protectthem and theMarines of the24thMEU(SOC).Infact,thetransition to the amphibiousphase of operations meantthat therewas evenmore foreveryonetodo,andevenlesstimetodoitin.Now, because I wanted to

findouthowtheaircampaignwas actually going “over the

beach,” I went to the oneplace where I knew I wouldhear the truth about suchthings—the pilot’s “DirtyShirt” mess. Located upforwardontheO-2level,itisa less formal place thanWardroom 3. Also, becauseofitsinformalityanditsmore“meat and potatoes” diet,most officers in fact preferthe “DirtyShirt.”Herepilotscan wear their flight suits torelaxandcatchameal(hence

the name). All themeals areservedcafeteria-style,andareeaten on tables reserved foreachsquadronintheairwing.If you’re an outsider, youhave to ask to join them.Theyrarelyrefuse.ThisdayIhad an old Navy favorite,“Sliders and Fries” (“Navy”for cheese-burgers andFrench fries), and a glass ofcoldmilkwith someVF-102“Diamondbacks,” flying F-14BUpgrades.

This was an exciting timefor the Diamondbacks, whohadseentheircommunityrisePhoenix-like from the ashesof theirCold-War interceptormissiontobecomeoneoftheNavy’spreeminentstrikeandreconnaissance platforms.The addition of the AAQ-14LANTIRN targeting pod andthe new D/TARPSreconnaissance pod haschanged the face of theTomcat community, making

themonceagain thekingsofthe airwings.You could seethe pride in the faces of theyoung pilots, who are nowcertain of a mission in theCVWs of the 21st century.They will eventually be thefirstcommunitytoreceivethenewF/A-18E/FSuperHornetwhenitarrivesinafewyears,and the new pods will makethe timewaitingall themorepleasant.DuringJTFEX97-3,theyhadbeenheavilytasked,

flying some fifteen to twentymissions a day (they hadfourteen F-14 airframesaboard)—heavy usage forTomcats. And since theirmissionstendedtolasttwotofour times longer than thoseof the Hornets, due to theirgreater internal fuel load andrange,theTomcatcrewsweregettingmoreflighthoursthantheHornetdrivers.When I asked how things

were going, the variety ofanswers reflected the greatrange of their activitiesduring the previous twoweeks.While they all agreedthat the new sensor andtargeting capabilities of theLANTIRN pod were terrific,they had to admit that theywerestilllearninghowtogeteverything out of it. Inparticular, the Navy versionof the AAQ-14, which has aGPS/INS unit built in, has

opened new targetingpossibilities. On the downside,thenewpodiscurrentlyunable to send images fromthe LANTIRN back to thecarrier in the samenear real-timemannerastheD/TARPSpod. But this problem isbeing worked on, and willprobably be solved by late1998. As for the newD/TARPS pod, they hadabsolutely no reservations(except for their small

numbers).Theadditionofthedigital line scannerandnear-real-time transmissioncapability for imagery hasgiven theater commanderstheir first real ability to findand target mobile high-valuetargets likeSCUD launchers.With only four D/TARPS-capable F-14’s per CVW,these are arguably the mostvaluable aircraft in the airwing.

When I asked about thecurrent exercise, they allagreed that theDiamondbacks and theirCVW-1 partners had doneverywellduringJTFEX97-3.The few air-to-airengagements during theexercise had been decidedlyone-sided, with most endingin a hail ofAIM-54 Phoenixand AIM-120 AMRAAMshots and the Koronanaircraftgoingdowninflames.

The reconnaissance missionshadgoneequallywell,thoughthe classified aspects of theirtactics and equipment kepttheaircrewsfromdiscussingthe results. The real smilescamewhen they talkedaboutthebombingresultswiththeirLANTIRNpodsandPavewayII and III LGBs. Thanks totheir superior FLIRs,dedicated RIOs as operators,and excellent weapons, theTomcats had become the

scourgeof themobile targetsashore. Though there was ageneral feeling that KoronanSCUD and antiship missilelauncherswereprobablydeadby now, a few older Tomcatcrew members who hadflown in Desert Stormdoubted this. Theywould go“SCUD hunting” one moretime later that night, whileothers would hunt downKoronan artillery pieces, sothey would be out of action

before the Marine landingrumored for the followingnight.At that point, it was time

for me to move on. Deepfatiguewasvisibleintheeyesofthesemen,andIwantedtointrudenomoreontheircrewrest.Alltoosoon,theywouldbe climbing into theircockpitsandheadingintothenightskiestoonceagainhunttheir “enemies.” Meanwhile,

theUSACOMstaffhadafewmoretricksuptheirsleevestokeep things interesting. Andas I stopped by the publicaffairs office, I learned fromJoeNavritrilthatacontractedcivilianLearjet,pretendingtobe a CNN camera aircraft,had simulated a kamikazedive into one of the escortships. The Kamikaze attackhadbeendefeatedbyashort-rangeSAMshot,thoughonlyjustbarely.

Sunday,August

31st,1997

JTFEX97-3—Day 14: Therumors of anAlliedinvasion nearthe Kartunancapital city ofTemalcontinue, with

reports ofAllied Navalvesselsbeginning toconduct shorebombardmentswith gunfire.There is afeelingthattheexpectedAlliedinvasion bycoalitionforces may be

only a matterofdaysaway.

This morning found

everyoneonGWbusygettingthings ready for the plannedinvasion. The actual time ofthe invasion was a secret tomost people on the GW,includingme.Iassumed,likejust abouteveryoneelse, that

theMarinesofthe24thMEU(SOC) would hit the CampLejeune beaches sometimearound midnight of thefollowingevening—atacticaltimethathadbecomemoreorless standard in the last fewJTFEXs. Meanwhile, Iwanted to head up to FlightDeck Control for a smallceremony that has been atradition going backcenturies. Today, CaptainGroothousen, the GW’s XO,

would leave the ship andofficiallyhandoverthejobtoCommander Chuck Smith, afast-trackedflierfromtheS-3Viking community. In a fewmonths, Groothousen(“Groot” to his friends)wouldtakeovercommandofthe Shreveport (LPD-12),over in the Guam ARG,which was the next step onthe way to command of hisown flattop. Around noon,the ship’s department heads

met in the Flight DeckControl Room, where theysaid their final good-byes to“Groot.” After he headedacross the flight deck to thewaiting COD aircraft, thevariousdepartmentheads leftthe room and went back totheir tasks; but I laggedbehindtowatchtheactivities.FlightDeckControl,at the

base of the island, monitorsandcontrolsthemovementof

aircraft, personnel, andequipment on the flight andhangar decks. On a pair ofscalemodelsoftheflightandhangar decks, movabletemplates show the locationof aircraft (with their wingsfolded) and equipment (suchastractors,firefightingtrucks,etc.).Meanwhile,onthewallsthere are a series oftransparent status boards,upon which are noted (ingrease pencil) the side

numbers of every aircraftaboard the flattop. You cansee at a glance on theseboards what every aircraftbased aboard the ship isdoing, how it is loaded, andwho is flying it. Themodelsand templates are moved byskilled aircraft handlers,whoknow just how much roomyou need to park a line ofaircraft in the smallestpossible space. Decades ofexperiencehavegoneintothe

procedures that run the flightand hangar decks, and it islikely that theywill continueforaslongasAmericanstakeaircrafttosea.That night, as the aircraft

continued their round-the-clock shuttle over the beach,John, Lieutenant Navritril,and I joined CommanderSmith for a short visit in hisnew quarters. The XO’squartersaboardaNimitz-class

carrier are quite pleasant,though the lack of time thathe gets to spend there morethan makes up for the fewpleasures. With CommanderSmith sitting at his desk, therest of us found comfortablespotsonthecouches,andwetalkedofhowhehadcometobe here tonight.He talked ofthe path to command of acarrier, and why he supportsnuclear propulsion for futureU.S.flattops.Healsospenta

fewminutestalkingaboutthefine people and proceduresthatCaptainGroothousenhadleft him. As the minutesbecameanhour,he talkedofhisexperiencesonthewaytothis job,andhowmanygoodjobs the folks coming out ofthe S-3 Viking communitywere getting.About the onlything missing was a goodcigar and a snifter of brandyto go with it. But the U.S.Navyis“dry”andsmokingis

rapidly leaving our ships asan allowable vice. Whatstimulation Chuck Smithwould find aboard the GW,hewouldhave to findonhisown. As the new mayor ofalmost six thousand people,he undoubtedly would overthe next two years. As werose, the chaplain came overthe 1MC to announce thecommand to darken ship forthe night and say a prayer.Headinguptheladderstomy

stateroom, I again wasreminded why I love theNavy so much. Here werethousands of youngmen andwomen, going to sea topreservethekindsof thingsIlove America for. As I wentto sleep, I felt the safety ofknowing that good peoplewerearoundme.

Monday,September

1st,1997

JTFEX97-3—Day 15: Therehas been anews blackoutby the Alliedcoalitionforces, whichwould seem toindicate thatthe plannedinvasion of

occupiedKartuna isimminent.Meanwhile,the Koronangovernment iscalling fortheir forces toprevail in thecoming“MaximumBattle,” whichwill determinethe fateof this

region.Almost two weeks earlier,

Admiral Mullen hadmentioned that ColonelRichardNatonski, the CO ofthe 24thMEU (SOC),was a“sneaky”kindofMarine.Heproved itwhenhedecided toinvade Camp Lejeune beforethe sunwent down. At 1600(4P.M.),thefirstelementsofBattalion Landing Team(BLT) 3-6 began to hit the

beaches and landing zonesaround the town of Temal(actually the communitiesaround theNewRiver inlet),and a battalion of the 82ndAirborne Division began todrop from the skies. I heardlater that theKoronan troops(being played by severalbattalions of the 2ndMarineDivision) had been caughtgetting ready to watch theopening game of MondayNightFootball.Thetruthwas

that the colonel’s bold movehad stolen amarch on them;and with the Koronan forcealready heavily depleted byair and missile strikes fromtheGWgroup,the24thMEU(SOC)maderapidprogress.Through it all, the round-

the-clock flight schedulecontinued, although youcould see the fatigue in themovements of the air crewsand flight deck personnel.

They had done their jobswell.

Tuesday,September2nd,1997

JTFEX 97-3-Day 16: TheAlliedcoalitionforces landedyesterday near

Temal, thecapital ofoccupiedKartuna.Elements ofthe 24thMEU(SOC) and82nd AirborneDivision haveseized abridgehead,and areawaiting thearrival of

follow-onforces. TheKoronanforces arereportedly inretreat, headedback to theiroriginalborders. Otherreportsindicate thatthe exiledgovernment ofKartuna will

return toTemalsometime latetoday....

I awoke this last morning

oftheexercisetothesoundofJoeNavritrilknockingonmystateroom door. As I openedup, he informed me with asmile that theexercisewould

beterminatedinafewhours.Since the reoc- cupation ofKartuna was essentiallycomplete, he had alreadyarranged seats for John andmeonthemiddayCODflightback to NAS Norfolk. Afterpacking, I headed to thewardroom for a quickbreakfast.Around1000hours(10:00 A.M.), CaptainRutheford came up on the1MCand addressed the ship.“The ENDEX [End of

Exercise] time has beendeclared,” he announced,“and we’ll be hometomorrow. I am thereforeordering an immediatesuspension of flightoperations. I hope everyonecantakeabreatherbeforewetake the GW back to thecarrierdockatNorfolk.”All over the ship, you

couldfeelacollectivesighasthe tension of the exercise

passed.During the next hour John

andIpaidourmessbills(yes,theNavymakesmepaytoeaton their ships), bought a fewpatches and “zap” stickersfromthesquadronstores,andmade our farewells.As noonapproached,weheadedup tothe ATO, grabbed our floatcoatsandcranialhelmets,andwaited for theword tomoveout to the flight deck. Soon

after the command came,wemarched up the stairs to theflightdeck,wherewehadtheopportunity to see one moreimpressivesightbeforetheC-2A Greyhound taxied to thecatapult. Now that theENDEX time was now amatterof record, the shipsofSTANAFORLANT hadrequested to make a paradepast the GW before theyheadedhometoEurope.

The USS South Carolina(CGN-37) deploys onOctober3rd,1997.Partoftheescort force assigned to theGeorge Washington battlegroup,thenuclearcruiserwasonher final deployment.Shewas decommissioned whenshereturned.JOHND.GRESHAMSoon Witte De With,

Admiral Peter van derGraaf’s flag flying on herhalyard, came alongside. Asthe rest of the multinationalforce passed in review, thecrew chiefs buckled us intoourseatsandraisedthecargoramp. Once again, thefamiliar sounds of the CODaircraftfilledourears,andweprepared for the thrill of acatapult shot. Two secondsand more than a fewheartbeats later, we were

airborne, flying northwesttoward NAS Norfolk. OurtripaboardtheGWwasover.But for the personnel of thebattle group, it was a newbeginning. School was outand they were about tograduate to the job they hadallsought.Atriptotheotherside of the world to supportAmericaninterestsoverseas.

Deployment:TheAcidTest

In October 1997, John and Idrovesouthonemoretimetosaygood-bye to themenandwomen who had been ourshipmates the previousmonth,towalktheflightdeckonemore time, and see howready the GW was for hersix-month cruise. The first

thing we noticed when westepped aboard was the non-skidcoatinguponthe“roof.”During JTFEX 97-3, it hadbeen worn to bare metal.Nowitwasfactoryfreshandready to receive CaptainStufflebeem’s airplanes.Down below, supplies werebeing loaded and personnelwerebringingaboard the lastof their personal items.Mostofthecrewwouldstayaboardthatnight.Asthesunsetover

the JamesRiver,we returnedtoourhotelandasked foranearly wake-up call, so wecould take part in a verymoving ritual: the sailing oftheGWbattlegroup.

Friday,October3rd,1997

Thegatheringbeganbeforedawn, as the families andfriends came down to thecarrier dock atNaval Station

Norfolk to see the GW off.For most, there was a quicktriptotheMcDonald’sacrossthe street for an EggMcMuffin and some coffee.Most of the crew had stayedaboard the night before,including Lieutenant JoeNavritril,whohadsaidgood-byetohisfamilyinMarylandseveral days earlier. All theofficersandmenwereintheirwhite uniforms, lookingdistinctly cooler than they

had four weeks earlier. Thetropical heat of summer hadgivenwaytoapleasantfallinthe Mid-Atlantic region, andthis morning was cool andsweet.As a rose-colored sunrise

began to appear over theeastern sky, the last of thepreparations for sailing cameto an end. Now it was timefor a little public-relationswork. Joe Navritril and

several of his staff wereherding television cameracrews and newspaperreporters around the dock,shooting pictures of CaptainRutheford taking aceremonial sword from aGeorge Washingtonlookalike. Command MasterChief Kevin Lavin prowledthe dock with CommanderSmith,herdingthelastof thelate arrivals aboard the ship.Both shook our hands good-

bye,andheadedaboardtogettotheirsailingstations.Atthesame time, the crowd ofseveral hundred families andwell-wishersbegantoholduptheir signs of encouragementfor their sailors on board theGW.What followed was a

duplicate of the sailing amonth earlier, with CaptainRutheford again at the helm.With an HH-60G helicopter

overhead for security andguidance, Chuck Smithordered the last linesbroughtoverandthebrowsraised.Atprecisely 0800 hours (8A.M.),asignalwasgiven,theAmerican flag was raised,andoverathousandsailorsintheir best whitesmanned thesides. This impressive sightwas made even more so bythe emotions of the peopleleft behind on the dock—somesobbing,somestoically

silent, some talkingnervously.AsthetugspushedtheGW

into the channel, the crowdbegan to move to variouspoints around the bay towatchthecarrierheadout.AsJohn and I walked up thedock to our cars,we stoppedand chatted with a youngwoman wearing a cruisejacket that must havebelongedtooneofthesailors

on board. She just sat therewatching the ship and herman move into the channel,then walked with us back tothe cars. Her Sailor was amember of theCVW-1 staff,and they were planning tomeet in Europe for theholidays. As we parted,though, John and I had theterriblefeelingthatshemightnot get the chance. Theaffairs of the world weregoingtheirusualchaoticway.

Already that morning, theNimitz battle group had beenordered to the Persian Gulf,toshowtheflaginthefaceofrenewedtensionbetweenIraqand Iran. And the crisis thatwould bring the GW to theGulfwasonlyamonthaway.Now, though, the GW

began to move down thechannel, followed at ten-minute intervals by theNormandy, Guam, South

Carolina, andSeattle.Again,at bases up and down theAtlantic coast, other ships ofthe battle group and ARGwere sailing, planning torendezvous off the Virginiacapes the following day.CVW-1 flew aboard thatafternoon,andthe24thMEU(SOC) was already loadingdown at Moorehead City,North Carolina. As I droveout of the Naval stationseveral hours later, I passed

by the British aircraft carrierHMS Invincible (R 05) andher battle group,whichweremaking a port visit of theirown. Ironically, these sameships would also wind up inthe Persian Gulf severalmonths later, along with theNimitz andGW. Before that,though, therewouldbe someof the planned exercises andport visits that had beenscheduled before Saddam’snewesttroublemaking.

The GW battle group andGuam ARG took part inOperationBrightStar97, theannual joint U.S./Egyptianmaneuvers in the desertwestof Cairo. However, by mid-November,thecrisisovertheUN weapons inspectors hadbroken,and theplans to splitthebattlegroupwerealreadyin the works. The GW,Normandy, Carney,Annapolis, andSeattlewouldmakea run through theSuez

CanalandRedSea,followinga short port visit to Haifa,Israel. The rest of the groupwould stay in theMediterraneanwiththeGuamARGtosupportoperationsinBosnia, and generally “showthe flag.”79 On the night ofNovember20th/21st, theGWand her escorts went to GQ,ran through the Straits ofHormuz, and joined theNimitzgroupinflyingpatrols

over Southern Iraq. Themenand women of the battlegroup never did get theirChristmasinEurope.There was a personal cost

totheGWandCVW-1duringtheseoperations.OnFebruary6th, two VMFA-251 F/A-18’scollidedwhileonpatrol.While both pilots ejected(albeit with injuries),Lieutenant Colonel HenryVan Winkle, the XO of

VMFA-251, was killed. Hiswouldbe theonly life lost inthe crisiswith Iraq. TheGWand Nimitz continued theirvigil, until relieved by theStennis and Independencegroups. The Seattle was leftbehind for a time because ofthe need for extra logisticsships in the Persian Gulf.Moving back through theSuez Canal, the GWrendezvousedwith theGuamARG and her escorts, and

headedhome.They arrived home several

weekslater,andtheeighteen-month cycle began anew.Alongtheway,morechangestook place to the people thatwe had met. CaptainStufflebeem was relieved inlate1997,andbecameanaidetoAdmiralJayJohnsonintheCNO’s office. CaptainGroothousen took overcommand of the Shreveport

about the same time, andcontinues on the path tocommand his own carriersomeday.Thoughthevariouscrises continue, the cycleneverstops.Thebattlegroupswork up, go out, and comeback. Let us hope that theycontinuethatway.

AircraftCarriersintheRealWorld

Asthroughoutthisseries,I’vereservedabit of spaceat theend of this volume to spin ayarn,totrytotellthestoryofwhat I think future carrieroperations might be like.Thoughthefollowingstoryis

set some two decades in thefuture,itisbaseduponwhat1believe to be solid plans andideas. Ihope that italsosayssomething about theevolution of our world, andhow democratic nations willfunctioninthe21stcentury.

BirthofaNation:SriLanka,2016

In the terrible summer of2015,thegreatpowersoftheworld—the United States,Russia, andChina—all knewthat the Indo-Pakistani Warwas likely to go nuclear atsome point. They also knewthat there was absolutelynothing thatanyonecoulddotoprevent it.Yetwhen IndiaandPakistanwenttowarovera series of escalating borderclashes in Kashmir, thesuddennessandmagnitudeof

thecatastrophetookeveryonebysurprise.The roots of the conflict

lay in over sixty years ofdeepening hatred. Borderraids and warfare, terroristactions, fighting on everylevel had been a part of thelandscape since Pakistan’sseparation from India afterthe end of British colonialrule. By the time fightingescalatedinKashmirin2015,

themorefanaticalelementsofthe Indian military andpolitical leadership saw noway to resolve the conflictusing conventional means.Instead, they chose a do-or-die course. India fired eightnuclear-tipped ballisticmissiles at Karachi andIslamabad, the two mostimportant cities in Pakistan.The results were terrible,horrifying beyond the mostexaggerated expectations of

the almost forgotten ColdWarbackinthe20thcentury.Both Karachi and

Islamabadwere bracketed bya quartet of five-hundred-kiloton warheads, set toairburst over the cities formaximum damage tobuildings and people. In amatterofminutes,bothcitieswere destroyed, withfirestorms roaring outwardfromtheexplosionepicenters

at over sixty miles an hour.Over twenty-two millionPakistanis were killedinstantly. Retaliation wasautomatic and immediate.Though somewhat morelimited in their arsenal thanthe Indians, the Pakistaniarmed forces also hadmissiles with nuclearwarheads, and they usedthem. They fired a dozenmissilesatIndia,eachwithitsown four-hundred-kiloton

warhead. The targets theyselected were Bombay, NewDelhi, and Bangalore—thehigh-technology center ofIndia’s booming military-industrial complex. Overfifty-twomillionIndiansdiedin the initial explosions. Asprevailing winds carriedlethal clouds of fallout overSoutheast Asia, an outragedworld demanded animmediate cease-fire. Thedemand was enforced by a

unanimous United NationsSecurity Council resolution.Withindays,thatdemandwasbacked up by the rapidlygrowingmilitary presence ofits members in the IndianOcean.

AmapoftheactivitiesintheIndiantheaterofoperationsin2015and2016.JACKRYANENTERPRISES,LTD.,BYLAURADENINNOPakistan’s provisional

military regime immediatelyagreedtothecease-fire.Theyhad seen that country’sgovernment and fully tenpercent of its population

snuffed out, and had theirhands full dealing with theaftermathoftheIndianattack.India’s government,evacuated to a commandcenter tunneled deep beneatha Himalayanmountain hoursbefore its capital wasvaporized, grudginglycomplied. Nevertheless, theycontinued to denounce“external interference in ournatural and inevitableleadership of South Asia.” It

was clear to everyone in theworld that the situation wasunstable, likely to explodeagainatanytime.Bythetimediplomats had ironed out thenew cease-fire line in late2015,theothernationsintheregion were beginning toconsidertheiroptions.Ever since the enforced

partition of England’simperial “Jewel of theCrown”ledtothecreationof

India and Pakistan in 1947,conflict between the twonewly independent nationshad never died down. Othernations bordering the IndianOcean took natural sides,with Muslim statessupportingPakistan,andnon-Muslim ones supportingIndia. Yet after the nuclearholocaust that threatened notonly India and Pakistan, butalso the entire region, andpossibly theworld, the states

in the region began todistance themselvespolitically from the twonuclearroguenations.Thus the small island

nation of Sri Lanka, whichhadbeenundervirtualIndiancontrol since the partition,took initial steps to removeitself from India’s sphere ofinfluence. The reaction ofIndia to Sri Lanka’s attemptto declare independence was

quick and fierce. India wasdetermined to retain controlof the island nation; andmight even havemanaged todo so if the rivalry of theisland’s Sinhalese and Tamilpopulations had followed itstraditionalcourse.TheIndiangovernment had learned theartof“divideandrule”alltoowell during two centuries ofEnglish domination. AfterindependencewasdeclaredinIndia, the ruling class put

those lessons to good use,playingthedivergentinterestsand goals of many minoritygroupsoff against eachotherinordertokeepafirmgriponnational affairs. But thecurrent disaster had changedthe Indian subcontinentforever.And in the days thatfollowed, India woulddiscoverthattheoldruleshadchanged.

AboardtheCommandShipUSSMountMcKinley

(LCC-22),TwoHundredFiftyNauticalMiles(NM)NortheastofDiegoGarcia,

February4th,2016

Vice Admiral MattConnellywasalwayshappiestwhen he was at sea. Hiscurrentpostascommanderofthe U.S. Fifth Fleet, and thenaval component commander(NAVCENT) for the U.S.

Central Command(CENTCOM), had kept himout at sea for months now,overseeing amission vital tohiscountyand theworld.Hewas in charge of the Navy’sships and aircraft in a placethatwasasgeographicallyfaras you could go from themiserableclimateandpoliticsof Washington, D.C. Evenbetter, he was a real fleetcommander,inchargeofrealpersonnel, ships, and aircraft

doingacriticalmission inanareaofgreat tension.Best ofall,hisshipsandaircraftwerethe newest and best in thefleet. Given where he wasand what he was doing,nothing less was acceptable.Indiawaspoisedonthebrinkofanotherwar,possiblyevenanother nuclear war. Hissuccess or failure inachieving his mission mightdeterminethefateofthispartoftheworld.

The ship he was aboard,the Mount McKinley (LCC-22), was a purpose-builtcommand ship, based uponthedesignoftheSanAntonio(LPD-17)amphibiouslandingdockship.Eventhoughitwasbuiltasapoliticalconcessionto keep several shipyardsbusy following thecompletion of twelve SanAntonio-class ships, theMountMcKinley was one ofthe finest fleet flagships ever

built.Comfortableandfast,itwas a marvelous balance ofthecomplextechnologiesthatmake up specializedwarships. Other wonderfulships were part of the FifthFleet, which Connelly wasusingtoquarantinetheIndiansubcontinentwhiletheUnitedNations decided what to dowith the Indians andPakistanis.Several hundred miles to

the east was the new carrierUSSColinPowell(CVN-79),another proud ship with anotable namesake. Thesecond of the new class ofcarriers that was then beingconstructed,shecarriedanairwingwith ten of the new F-25B joint strike fightersbacked up by thirty F-18Eand F-18F Super Hornetstrikeaircraft.Thesejetswerearmed with a new family ofprecisionstandoffweapons—

weapons with amazing newwarheadeffects.Also aboard the Colin

Powell were several newvariants of the V-22Osprey,including the SV-22ASW/sea-controlversion, theEV-22 airborne-early-warning /surface-surveillancevariant, and the KUV-22tanker/utility model. Thoughthe Colin Powell was onlyoneshipcarryingafewdozen

aircraft, it was a formidableweapon in the current crisis.Theaircraftlaunchedfromitsdeck could maneuveranywhere in the region andhitanythingthat theNationalCommand Authorities caredtotarget.ConnellyalsohadanMEU

(SOC)aboard the three shipsof his amphibious readygroup (ARG), as well as adozen highly capable escort

vessels. Eight of these wereAegis-capable cruisers anddestroyers, while the restwere new SC-21-class land-attackandASWdestroyerstoprotect the underwayreplenishment train ships.Finally, he had four nuclearsubmarines prowling about,just in case the Indiansdecided to get aggressivewith their fleet of dieselboats.

A few Allied ships wouldrotate in and out of what hewas calling Task Force 58(named in honor of AdmiralRaymond Spruance’s famousWorldWar II force), but byand large this was anAmerican force, protectingAmerican interests andvalues. Not that Connellydidn’t enjoy working withcoalition allies. Over theyears he had become knownas a master of naval

diplomacy. But like anycommander, he felt morecomfortable with a forcewhose personnel andcapabilities he knewintimately, whosecommanders spoke hislanguagewithout the need toresort to translators, andwhose ships and men didwhat he told them to dowithout him needing to say“please”first.

His mission was essential,even if it could sometimesgrow rather monotonous. Hehad learned the quarantinegame back in 1990 duringDesertShield,andknewhowto make it work. Backed upbypatrolaircraftoutofDiegoGarcia and satellitesurveillance from the U.S.Space Command(USSPACECOM)warfighting center atColorado Springs, Colorado,

TaskForce58had thewholeregion under tight control.His force would keep it thatwayaslongastheequipment,crews,and foodheldout.Hewas an American navalofficer doing what he hadspent a life training to do.Here in the MountMcKinley’s Tactical FlagCommand Center (TFCC),with the computerizedequipment around himconstantly monitoring every

creature and machine largerthanagnatwithinthetheaterof operations, Connelly wasexactly where he wanted tobe.Asheclearedhisheadforthe morning video tele-conference with his ship andairunitcommanders,he tooka deep breath, drank somecoffee, and reviewed thecomputer screen in front ofhim. So far, it had been aquietmorning. Itwashis jobto be sure that it stayed that

way.

UniversityofNewMexicoHighEnergyPhysics

Laboratory,February5th,2016

Jill Jacobs was a lovelyblonde. She could have beena college cheer-leader inTexas,orpossiblyastarletinBeverly Hills. She turnedheadswherevershewent;she

had the kind of looks thatmademostpeopleassumeshegot by on body, not brains.Mostpeoplewouldbewrong.She was a well-regardeddoctoral candidate in high-energy physical chemistry,exploring rare earthproperties for her thesis. Itwas slow, painstaking work,typically done at night whenthelabspaceswereopenandshe could mix and test thebizarre concoctions thatwere

the basis of her ideas aboutsuperconductivity. Tonight’sworkwastypicalofwhatshehadbeendoingforalmostsixmonths—another apparentfailure. It had not generatedanyoftheimprovementsthather computer models hadprojected two years earlier.Ohwell,shethought,at leastthisbatchdidn’texplode.Shestared thenat thenext

batchonherlist—samplesof

a hybrid copper-platinum-scandium mix thatrepresented a sort of cul-de-sacinherprojectedfamilyofsuperconducting materials.Always a low-probability setwithinhercomputer-modeledgroup, she hadmixed it onlybecauseshehadthetimeandmaterialsathand,andneededto try this particular formulaout sometime. She took thesamples, formed into lengthsof wire, to her test bench to

measure their resistance andconductivity properties. Asshe stepped up to the bench,shewas tired toherbones. Itwas discouraging to work sohard without noticeableprogress.Sheknewtheworldneeded

metals that weresuperconductive at averageatmospherictemperatures,butwondered if she would everfind them. If she didn’t find

them soon, would she evermake a difference with thiswork?Mostlikely,shewouldwind up in a corporate labsomewhere working onimproved alloys for jetengines or householdappliances. It was the firsttime she’d even allowedherself to visualize failure,and it surprised her. Maybethesleepshewaslosingeverynight to acquire the lab timefor her tests was taking its

toll. Or maybe it was thenews in the paper everymorning.Thatwasenoughtodepress anyone. Butsomething wasn’t right, shedecided.Shewasnormallyanoptimist with a rose-tintedworld-view. She needed abreak. Perhaps after shefinished this test, she wouldtakeofffortheweekend,anddrivetoTaosforanovernightvisit to a spa, or up into themountainsforacampingtrip.

If she could get away for alittle, maybe she’d feelhumanagain.Maybe.Turning her attention back

tothesampleintheteststand,she began to run currentthrough it at a variety oftemperatures. At first thereadings did not seem out ofthe ordinary. At -200°Centigrade, the sample hadexactly the superconductingproperties that one would

expect it to have. But as thesamplecameuppast0°C, itfinally hit her what waswrong, or more properly,what was right. The samplehad stabilized its conductiveproperties at 98% of theiroptimum,andheldthem.Shecontinued to ramp thetemperatures up, and thematerial held up until itfinally melted at about 300°C.

She’ddoneit.If her eyes and her

machinery weren’t lying toher,she’dfoundhermaterial.Stunned, she cleaned up thechamber, recalibrated herequipment, loaded anidentical sample into the testrig, and tried it again.Identicalresult.“I’ve really done it,” she

whisperedtoherself.As she fumbled in her

purseforhermobilephonetocall her faculty adviser, herbrainwasspinninglikeapairofdiceinVegas.Herdoctoralthesis was a done deal now.She could finally finish herdegree and get on with herlife in the real world. She’drealized her goals in hercurrent research and couldmoveontonewfrontiers.Butevenasshecalledheradvisertosharethenews,shehadnoidea how crucial her new

discoverywouldbetotherestof the world. She’d justcreated a practical high-temperature superconductor,and in sodoingwasabout tochange the face ofcivilization. “Power” and“wealth” would never be thesameagain.

HeadquartersoftheLiberationTigersofTamilEelam,NearMankulam,Sri

Lanka,February7th,2016

Arjuan Ranatunga sat inthe place he called his officeand contemplated how tochange the course of hisnation’s history. Grandthoughts for a man whosemajor passion had onlyrecentlybeenplayingcricket.Butthecontinuedsuppressionof the Tamil sect by theIndians on the mainland andtheSinhaleseonthesouthern

halfofSriLankahadnoendin sight. This repression haddrawn him to the LiberationTigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE), more commonlyreferred to as the “TamilTigers.” The Tigers hadalways been a part of hiscountry’s political landscape—for as long as he couldremember,anyway.Hewasarevolutionary soldier in abattle thathadbeengoingonfor longer than he had been

alive. Now, at age thirty-seven—an age when heshould have been coaching aregionalcricketteam—hehadbecome the leader of theLTTE. When events in hiscountry had spun out ofcontrol,hehadbeenunabletoturnhisbackon theneedsofthe people. The final strawthat had made his currentoccupationinevitablewasthedeath of the previous Tigerleader, his brother Sanath.

SanathhadbeenkilledbyanIndian helicopter gunship afewweeksearlier.He was sitting in a tent

surrounded by jungle nearRoute A9. His “desk” was afolding table and his officechairarationcrate.Infrontofhim were a laptop data slateand his encrypted satellitecellular phone. Despite thespartan surroundings, he hadthe power to control

considerable military cloutfromthehumbleresourcesathis fingertips. He coulddispatch forces ranging frompatrol boats to specialassassination teams with justafewtapsonhiskeyboard,orasimplephonecall.And yet, force wasn’t

doing the job. Decades ofactive resistance against theIndians and Sinhalese hadutterly failed to give the

Tamil Tigers the homelandthey dreamed of. Alreadytoday,hehadbeenadvisedbyhis regional commanders tobeginaterrorcampaigninthesouth to avenge his brother’sdeath. Yet revenge was nothisobjective today.Heknewbetter than anyone did howfutile it was. Nothing wouldbring back his brother.Instead of planning andsetting into motion acampaign of terror, he’d

chosen to spend themorningconsidering his options, andthe options of theorganization and his people.Thoughwell financed by theTamil supporters on themainland, he could see nocombination of militaryaction that would ever resultin Tamil domination of SriLanka. Even if theywon thebloody civil war that wouldbe necessary, they wouldinevitably lose thepeace that

would follow. The Sinhalesewould start their ownliberationmovement, and thecyclewouldstartagain.What he needed was

something different. A newkind of weapon—some newpower that would break therules, that would give hiscause an edge that wouldcount for something in aworld where large-scaleviolence was relatively rare,

but where the warfare ofcommerce, corporations, andeconomics was everywhere.Afewdaysearlier,itcametohim that an answermight liein the rich earth at his feet.Sri Lankawas his home, themotherofhispeople.Perhapsthatmothermightprovidethemilk that would make thempowerful enough to win,powerful enough to keep theIndians from crushing them,powerful enough to

encourage a superpower likeAmerica to support them, asthey had Kuwait back in1990.Notaneasytask.To catch the attention of

theUnitedStatesandfocusitonthesufferingsofahandfulof people on the far side ofthe globewould take no lessthan magic. Luckily, he hadrecentlyhiredawizard.

WestoftheKokkitaBirdSanctuary,SriLanka,

March9th,2016

The foothills of north SriLankaareuniqueintheSouthAsian region.While most ofthe Indian subcontinent isamong the newest terrain onthe globe, these foothills aresomeoftheoldest.Oldthingsare likely tobevaluable,andthat was why the geologistwas here. The contract to

survey this area had beenboth lucrative and timely.Short of money for hischildren’s school tuition, hehad jumped at the chancewhen the Internet inquiriesabout his availability hadreached his home in Perth,Australia. He hadimmediatelysaidyes.Before he’d even started

packing, he hadcommissioned a series of

one-meter-resolution multi-spectral satellite photographsfrom the French SPOTCorporation. Running theimages through his desktopworkstation in Perth, he hadfoundseveralpromisingareasto explore. The commissionhad been explicit. Find rareand valuable mineraldeposits, report them to thecommissioning agent, acceptthefee,andthendenythathehad ever visited Sri Lanka.

As an enticement to silence,theagenthadpromisedhimatenth-of-a-percent royalty onanything that he found thatwas developed during hislifetime. With an offer likethat, he had gone toextraordinary efforts for hisemployers. For almost amonth, he had run the tiresoff of his hired Land Rover,looking for some exceptionalmineraldeposittoreportbacktothem.

Now he was working thelast area on his list ofpossibilities. So far he hadfound some promisingdiscoveries, but nothingspectacular. A few daysearlier,hespottedwhatmightbe a major vein of platinuminthesideofamountain,andhe had taken several coresamples around it to assaywhenhegothome.Today,hischemical “sniffer” wasfinding samples of rare earth

metals; and there seemed tobe particularly largeconcentrations of scandium.What struck him was thepurity of the sample he’dcollected here—it exceededanything he had ever heardreported.In three days, he would

return to Perth and start onhis analysis and report. Hehoped, for the sake of hisfuture royalties, that the

platinumfindwouldpanout.Nobody had ever found asignificantuseforscandium.

NationalPressClub,Washington,D.C.,April

1st,2016

April Fool’s Day isnormallyadayforpranksandlies, but this day would godown in thehistorybooks asa day when new truths were

told. Jill Jacobs and theheadof the Sandia Labs stoodbefore a packed house ofdisbelievingsciencereportersto announce a breakthroughin superconductortechnology, which wouldallow for thedevelopmentofelectric motors thousands oftimes more compact,powerful, and efficient thanany made previously. Apatent for the metalformulationhadbeenapplied

for,anditwouldbeavailablefor commercial licenseimmediately.Chucklesbrokeout among

the reporters, and there werecracks about cold fusion—until Jill came to thepodiumand asked everyone to godown to the street below,where she promised todemonstrate the material.Momentslater,theassembledpress personnel found what

appeared to be a completelynormal pair of buses paintedwith the logos of theUniversity of New Mexicoand Sandia Labs. After thereporterswereallaboardandseated, Jill stepped onto thefirst bus, the Sandia chiefonto the one behind it. Amoment later, the busesaccelerated smartly awayfrom the curb, silent asghosts, the typicaldiesel roarcompletelyabsent.Infact,the

street noise outside wasdeafening by comparison.The stunned reporters sat insilence as they rode to thebase of the WashingtonMonument several milesaway.After everyone got out of

the buses and filed onto thesidewalk, Jill and the SandiaLabschiefopenedtheenginecompartments to show thepress corps a single car

battery running an electricmotor the sizeof abeerkeg.All told, they informed thereporters, the two buses hadconsumed less than an amp-hour of power, less than onepercentofwhatwasstoredineachbattery.Evenbetter, themotors, which had beendesigned from existingmodels, had cost less than athousand dollars to build.Mostofthereportersdraggedouttheircellphonesthenand

there to report in, rather thanwaitingforthebusestoreturnthem to the Press Clubbuilding.

HeadquartersoftheLiberationTigersofTamil

Eelam,NearAnuradhapura,SriLanka,

April3rd,2016

TodayArjuanRanatunga’sheadquarters were located in

a gamekeeper’s hut, and histable and chairwere actuallycomfortable. Moreover, thenewson thedataslatebeforehimwaslikeagiftfromGodhimself.Forthebetterpartofaweek,he’dhad themineralreport he’d commissioned,but until now, it had seemeddisappointing. It hadpromised nothing like theriches he had hoped for. Butovernight, the news fromAmerica had turned the

economyof theworldupsidedown. Everyone had gonesuperconductor-crazy. Oilpriceshadtakenaprecipitousdrop, and the prices forplatinum and scandium hadjumpedoffofthecharts.Thiswas hardly surprising. Theworld’s known reserves ofscandium could bemeasuredin just a few tons. Thesewould supply a bare handfulof the proposed applicationsfor the new superconducting

metalformula.He did not need to be a

financial genius to figure outthat what had been found inthefoothills to theeastcouldmake Sri Lanka thesuperconductor capital of theworld.TheproblemwaswhatIndia would do when theyfoundoutwhatwassittinginthe foothills of Sri Lanka.Once they knew what wasthere, they would crush both

the Tamils and SinhalesefasterthantheyhadnukedthePakistanis. Even worse, therest of the world wouldprobablynot care, ifwhathehadseenover theInternetonthevariousnewsservicewebpages could be believed. Aslong as the resource wasdeveloped, it didn’t matterwho was offering it. He hadto act quickly if he were tosave his people and—ironically—theirenemies,the

Sinhalese. Taking a deepbreath, he tapped out an E-mailmessagetohisSinhalesecounterpartinColombo.

IndianNationalCommandBunker,NeartheHimalayanTownof

Puranpur,April4th,2016

RoshanGandhiwashavinganotherinalongstringofbaddays here in his bunker. The

IndianPrimeMinisterhadnotseen a ray of sunshine forweeks, andwas beginning towonder if he would ever seesunagain.Sincethedayfourmonths ago when he hadauthorized the firing of thenuclear-tipped missiles intoPakistan, his fortunes andthoseofhiscountryhadbeenspiralingoutofhiscontrol.Like somany other Indian

politicians who shared his

name,Gandhiwasinnowayrelated to the greatmanwhohadledIndiatoindependencesix decades earlier. It hadnever seemed to worry theIndian people that the nameGandhihadhelpedastringofpoliticians gain power inIndiaovertheyears.Still,hisfamily did share a politicalconnection with him.Roshan’s grand-father hadbeen a follower of the greatGandhi’s, and had adopted

the name after theassassination in the late1940s.The current Gandhi had

been a popular provincialgovernor before he ran forand won his present office.Hed become the politicalleader of his party, and wasthenelectedtonationalofficebecause he was an honestman.He’doffered a pleasantcontrast to the scandal and

graft of the previousadministration. Unfortunately(tragically, as it transpired),duringallthediscussionsandanalyses ofwhat hewas not,nobody had ever thought toask what kind of leaderRoshan would be. It wouldhave been an illuminatingquestion. As Roshan himselfwasthefirsttoadmit,hewasa better follower than leader.And,honestmanthathewas,he’dhaveadmittedthattothe

press. But no one thought toask the question. From hisfirstdayasPrimeMinisterofIndia,withavastmajority inParliament, Roshan Gandhihadbeeninoverhishead.In the early days of his

administration, his DefenseMinister had badgered himinto ordering a nuclear warwith Pakistan. Even after thewar was unleashed socatastrophically,themanwas

still badgering him formore.Roshan wasn’t happy aboutthewaymatters stood, eitherfor him or for his country.Gandhi was aware of theproblems his government’sactions had caused. Howcould he not be, eveninsulated here in themountain fortress? Therewere tens of millions ofIndians dead. Even fourmonths after it was over,more were dying every day

fromthelastingeffectsofthenuclear exchange withPakistan. Prevailing windshad swept the fallout to theeast, making whole swathesof the land uninhabitable.Uncontaminatedwaterwasincritically short supplythroughout the country.Plague and famine wererampant.Existingfoodstores,the crops in the fields, dairyproducts—all werecontaminated by radioactive

waste.Unrest was everywhere in

India, in a thousand villagesandtowns.Overthewar,overthe lack of food and water,over the destruction of theinfrastructure, even over theUN quarantine. Mobs wereforming, demanding action.Military units weresuppressing thedemonstrators and rioters,using deadly force if

necessary.Roshanhadagreedto that. It was a bad choice,but the only one that mightallow India to survive as anation.But Roshan’s current

problemwas not centered onIndia’s massive domesticdifficulties. Just at themoment, he was worryingabout what would happen ifany of India’s neighborsbecame too independent.

Both Bangladesh and SriLanka had been showingsigns of slipping away fromIndia’s influence. India wasnotreallya“meltingpot”liketheUnitedStates, but ahugepatchwork quilt composed ofmany thousands of distinctlanguage and ethnic groups.Held together now only bythe iron force of the Indianmilitary, India mightfragmentintoahundredlittlekingdoms and regions—

unless Roshan could makethe center hold. In Roshan’sopinion,acrucialstageinthisprocess would be getting thetrade and imports embargoimposedby theUNdropped.Roshan’s people werestarving, dying of thirst,rotting away from radiationsickness,andsuccumbingtoalong list of ordinary diseasesthat could be controlledwithpropermedications.

Roshan wanted the meansto repair the damage he’ddone.Heneededthebasicsoflife—food, water, medicalsupplies. What the DefenseMinister needed—ammunition—heunfortunately had inabundance.Maybetheycoulduseittobuymoretime.Rightnow, India had none. WhatRoshan really needed was asolution to the problems hehimself had created by

authorizing the launch ofnuclear missiles againstPakistan.Suchasolutionwaseven less likely tomaterialize.

APrivatePlantationnearColombo,SriLanka,April

5th,2016

The plantation was ahallowedplaceinSriLankanhistory. It was the former

homeofacelebratedscientistand science-fiction authorwhohadspenthis lateryearstapping out novels on acomputer in the study, andthen uploading them to hisNew York publisher via apersonalsatelliteuplinkinthecourtyard. A literary shrinefor tourists, it was closedtoday,ostensiblyforcleaningand maintenance. VenkateshPrasad, the Sinhalese PrimeMinister, had come here in

response to an E-mail he’dreceived the day before fromhis counterpart in the LTTE.The unofficial cease-firebetween the government andthe Tamil Tigersnotwithstanding, Prasad wasextremely suspicious of thismeeting.But Prasad’s suspicion

rapidly gave way toastonishment when, a fewminutes later, Arjuan

Ranatunga arrived,accompaniedonlybyadriverfor his Land Rover. Prasadhad spent a lifetime fightingthe LTTE to preserveSinhalese control of SriLanka.Nowhewas about tosit down for a private talkwithhisswornenemy.Aboutwhat?Hehadnoidea.MaybeArjuan would suggest thatthey settle everything in anice, civilized way, perhapswith a cricket match. That

thought made him smilethinly.As the two men sat

together in the formerauthor’s study, the LTTEleaderlaidoutanastonishingoffer before Prasad. Arjuanproposed that they just stopfighting. Stop fighting, putdown their weapons, andshare the most valuablemineral strike in the historyof mankind. It was a peace

proposal so remarkablysimple it was impossible torefuse. Both men could seeclearlywhatwouldhappen ifthey could just cooperate.Their little island wouldbecome the 21st centuryequivalent ofOPEC,with allthe wealth, power,advantages, and liabilitiesthat would naturally ensue.They agreed on the need forsupport from outside,particularly from the

Americans.Most of all, theydecidedthattheexistenceandlocation of the platinum andscandium would remainsecret, until the security oftheirnewnationwasassured.Otherwise, that knowledgewouldbringgenocideonboththeirpeoples.

UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilChamber,New

York,NewYork,May2nd,

2016

ThetwoSriLankanleadershaddecided to let theBritishambassador, rather than theAmericans, convey theirproposal to the SecurityCouncil.Theoldcolonialtieswith the British Empirewould lend credibility to theproposal, and the Americansecond would almostcertainly assure its passage.By nightfall, the following

resolution had been passed,withonlytwoabstentions:

RESOLUTION2209

The SecurityCouncil,Recognizingthe desire ofthe combinedpeoples of the

Island Nationof Sri Lankafor self-determination,Alarmed bythe recentactions byIndia in thesuppression oftheir ownethnicminorities, aswell as theillegal use of

weapons ofmassdestructionagainst allknowninternationallaws andtreaties,Determiningthat thereexistsabreachofinternationalpeace as a

result by theGovernmentofIndia, Actingunder Articles39 and 40 ofthe Charter ofthe UnitedNations,

1.CondemnstheIndiansuppression

oftheirregion;2.DemandstheimmediaterecognitionoftheSriLankanRepublicby

theIndianGovernment;3.CallsupontheGovernmentoftheSriLankanRepublicand

theGovernmentofIndiatobeginimmediatelyintensivenegotiationsfortheresolutionoftheir

differencesandsupportsalleffortsinthisregard;4.OrdersthattheIndiansshall

betheobjectofareinforcedUN-sanctionedair,ground,andNavalquarantineofallIndian

effortsagainsttheSriLankanRepublic;5.Authorizesthatmembernationsprovidingforcesfor

thequarantinemayusemilitaryforceconsistentwiththeirownsecurity,andtheenforcement

ofthepreviouslymentionedaction;6.Decidestomeetagainasnecessarytoconsider

furtherstepstoensurecompliancewiththepresentresolution.

IndianNationalCommandBunker,nearthe

HimalayanTownof

Puranpur,May4th,2016

PrimeMinisterGandhiwasin the middle of anothershouting match, this oneinvolving his DefenseMinister and the servicechiefs. Themysterious unionofthetwowarringfactionsonSri Lanka into a singlegovernmentwaspuzzling,butirrelevant. More importantwas the fact that the islandwas a de facto province of

India, and the mainlandpopulation would see anyattemptbytheislanderstogotheir own way as a sign ofweakness on the part ofGandhi’s government. Butneither Gandhi nor the menaround him could decidewhattodoaboutit.TheNavyand Air Force chiefs werebusily trying to explain thesuicidalfollyoftryingtotakeSri Lanka in the face of theprevious day’s UN vote.

After the war with Pakistan,the UN was looking for anyexcuse it could find to turnIndia into a null-power inSouth Asia. Within a matterofhours,AmericanArmyandMarine pre-positionsquadrons would sail fromDiego Garcia. In just fourdays, they would unload inthe harbors at Colombo andTrincomalee with enoughequipment for a 25,000-manjoint air/land task force to

protect the small island.Already,therewerereportsoftheAmericanARGbeginningtoheadforSriLanka.Asiftoadd to Roshan’s troubles,there were reports from theBBC and CNN that units ofthe 82nd Airborne Divisionwere preparing to deploy toSriLankafromFortBragg.Inless than a week, Sri Lankawould be as free of India’sruleasAntarctica.

Gandhi knew this turn ofeventswouldmeantheendofhis government, and hewanteditstopped.Sincesuchan effort would involveamphibious and airoperations, it would fall onthese two chiefs to make ithappen,andtheydidnotwantany part of it. Their forceshad suffered in the short andbloodyfightwithPakistantheprevious winter, inhumanitarian missions after

the war, and in quelling theriots ever since. Bothcommanders, doing theirutmost to holdwhatwas leftof their services for bettercauses, better days, werefirmly opposed to Roshan’sdecision. Predictably, theDefense Minister was infavor of the Sri Lankanexpedition. He didn’t careabout the preservation of thelivesofthemeninthearmedforces; trained men could be

replacedorbought.Afteratime,furtherdebate

was useless. A decision hadto be made. Roshan closedhis eyes, thought for amoment, and ordered theexpedition.Itwasanotherbadchoiceinaseeminglyendlessline of bad choices, datingfrom the very moment he’dsought to become PrimeMinister.

AboardtheCommandShipUSSMountMcKinley

(LCC-22),FiveHundredNauticalMilesSouthofColombo,May5th,2016

“Well, Jack, I think weunderstand what is neededhere.I’llgetthestaffworkingon it,” Vice AdmiralConnelly said into his videoteleconferencing terminal.His satellite-assisted meetingwith the Chairman of the

JointChiefsofStaffhadgoneas expected, and the officialorders from the UN andAmericanNationalCommandAuthoritieswouldbeontheirway via secure FAX in amatter of minutes. Now hecouldofficiallybeginwhathehadprivatelystartedtwodaysearlier when the chairmanhad told him of the probableUN resolution. Already, hehad begun to concentrate hisforces aroundSriLanka, and

set up the wall of fire andsensorsthatwouldbeneededto protect the island nationfromwhatwasconsideredtheinevitableIndianresponse.Shutting down the

terminal, he walked back tohis day cabin, pulled out ayellow legal pad andmechanicalpencil,andbeganto sketch an outline of theplan for the defense of SriLanka.Heknewusingpencil

and paperwas so outdated itwas laughable, but he alsoknew that he did his bestthinking while he wrote theold-fashionedway.Hesmiledas he began, knowing hisFifth Fleet staff wouldprobablytaketwiceaslongtoargueoverwhathewasabouttowriteashewouldtodoso.Thatwasafterthey’dlaughedthemselves sick over hismethodofencoding thedata.Well, he thought, this ishow

we did it on the old daysbefore voice-recognitionword processors and eye-controlled pointing devices.And it will work under anycircumstances,eveninatotalpower outage. I’d like to seethem say that about theircomputers. Thirty minuteslater,hewasfinished.Theplanwasquitesimple,

actually. The 26th MEU(SOC) would land on the

island and establish coastaldefenses to keep the Indiansfrom crossing the Gulf ofMannar.Twobrigadesof the82nd Airborne Divisionwould begin arriving inthirty-sixhourstobackuptheMarines. He would thencreate a series of “missiletraps,” composed of pairs ofAegis ships and land-attackdestroyers, to provide firesupport and protect againstair and ballistic missile

attack. Finally, his commandship, thecarrier,and thefourremaining escorts wouldestablish an operating areasoutheast of Sri Lanka toprovideaircoverandsupportfor the ground and navalforces.When theMPS shipsarrived in three days, hewould land their cargo, andbeginflyingintheArmyandMarine Corps personnelneeded to make the islandintoafortress.Afterthat,UN

peacekeeping personnel withtheirblueberetswouldarriveandtakeover,alongwiththeinevitable multi-national airandNaval force to cover theislandfromattack.Allhehadto do was keep the Indianshonestforthenextfewdays.Unfortunately, this

particular Indian governmentwas composed of a fewirrational people with theugly habit of launching

nuclear weapons when theylost their temper. He wasmore than a little concernedaboutwhetherhisAegisshipsand the battle staff atUSSPACECOM in ColoradoSprings were ready to playfor all the marbles. TheIndians were using seriousfirepower. Not modifiedSCUDs fired like shotgunshells, but IRBMs withnuclear weapons. He foundhimself wondering if

American magic would bebetterthanIndianmagic.

IndianNavalBase,Goa,India,May6th,2016

After the destruction ofBombay,themajorfleetunitsof theIndianNavyhadmadeGoa their new fleet base.Alltold, over a dozen warshipsand a comparable number ofsubmarines lay at anchor,

surrounded by the merchantships being taken up andloaded with men andequipment for the expeditionto Sri Lanka. As he lookedacross the bay at his fleet,Admiral Ajay Jadeja, theChief of the Indian Navy,contemplated the death ridethat his fleet was about totake.Hewonderedhowmuchhewouldpersonally sacrificein the name of Indian honor,andhowmanyyoungmenon

both sides he would havekilledashedidso.He had no doubt of the

Americans’ ability to destroyhis surface force before itroundedCapeComorinatthesouthern tip of India. Rightnow, his most hopefuloutcomewasfortheworldtobe so appalled by his lossesthattheUNmightbackawayfrom their resolution tomaintainacompleteembargo

against India. Meanwhile,sincemuch of his submarineforce had been destroyedwhen Bombay had beendestroyed, he wanted to becareful with the handful ofsubshestillhad.Hewasstillhopeful that his submarineswould get in a few luckyshots against the Americanships,thoughnobodyhadhadmuchluckonthatscoresincethe1990’s.

Butinhishearthefearedaround of Indian nuclearmissile launches against SriLankawouldcauseretaliationin kind against his country.Should thatoccur,hemused,India, the world’s largestdemocracy, might just havesolved its populationproblems permanently. Hewas a man of no littleintegrity; and he had arguedagainst thissillyadventuretohis superiors. It didnogood.

They’d simply told him to“be silent and leadyourmenin their duty.” He wouldfollowhisorderstothedeath,he supposed—anything but aglorious death. Itwould be aslaughter.On theotherhand,if he resigned, hisreplacement would beindifferent to the fears thatburned within him. Better totakehisfleettosea,andtrytosavewhathecould.

OvertheGulfofMannar,May6th,2016

The first action betweenthe American and Indianforces inevitably took placein the air. In the lateafternoon, an Indian force of24 Su-30 Flanker fighter-bombers armedwith antishipmissiles launched with adozen old MiG-29 Fulcrumsasescorts.Their targetswerethe twomissile-trap ships on

either side of the narrowsbetween Sri Lanka and theIndian mainland. The Indianpilots had no idea they hadbeen detected even beforetheir aircraft had left theground. Their takeoff waspickedupbyoneof thenewEV-22 surveillance aircraft.As they flew toward theirdestination, they wereintercepted by eight F-25BstealthstrikefightersfromtheColinPowell,armedwith the

newest long-range version oftheAIM-120AMRAAMair-to-air missile. Before theIndian fighters had evenformedup,twothirdsoftheirforce was vaporized by thefirst salvo of Americanmissiles. These werefollowed by a quartet of F-18E Super Hornets thatfinished off all but three ofthe survivors. Then came asalvo of standard surface-to-air missiles from one of the

Aegis destroyers. When itwas all over, only a singleMiG-29pilotmadeithometotell about the massacre overthe Gulf of Mannar. TheAmericanswould later call itan “overmatch.” The Indianscalleditsuicide.

AboardtheAircraftCarrierUSSColinPowell(CVN-79),FiftyNauticalMilesSoutheastofSri

Lanka,2000Hours,May6th,2016

Admiral Connelly hadtakenahelicopterover to theColin Powell to congratulatethepilotsontheirinterceptofthe Indian fighters, and toconfer with the captain andair wing commanders onwhat theywould do the nextmorning when the Indianfleet came into range. Theyallagreedthatwhathehadin

mind was not going to beeasy, and could becomeextremely difficult if theIndian fleet commander triedanything radical with hiscourseorformations.As things were then

proceeding, this appearedunlikely. The Indiancommanderseemedbentonadeath ride.Already, theFifthFleet staff analysts haddecided that the Indians

hoped to shame theAmericanswith the slaughter—as the Iraqis had doneduring Desert Storm bydrawing media attention towhat was falsely called the“Highway of Death.” Morethan one historian had notedthat press coverage of thatevent had caused the war tobe stopped at least a day ortwo earlier than it shouldhave been. The price hadbeen several decades of

problemsinthePersianGulf.Connelly did not intend torepeatthatmistake.

OvertheLakshadweepSea,0700Hours,May7th,2016

The Global Hawkreconnaissance drone wassettled safely over the Indiantask force, and the livesatellite imagery feed wasoperatingperfectly.Launched

eighteen hours earlier fromDiegoGarcia,itwouldstayinthe air for days, feeding datatotheAmericanforces.Rightnow, the main camera wasfocused upon the Indianaircraft carrierViraat, at onetime the British flattopHermes. She carried a dozenmodernized Sea Harrierfighter-bombers, which werecurrently loaded with ratherelderly Sea Eagle antishipmissiles. Admiral Jadeja

figured that he’d beenindulging in a bit of wishfulthinking when he’d had theHarriers tasked. More thanlikely,theywouldneverleavethe deck of the Viraat. Hisonly real question waswhether the attack thatdemolished them all wouldcome from a submarine orfrom the air. Either way, thedeathofhisfleetmightservetoshamethesuperpowerintorelaxing its hold on Sri

Lanka. In truth, he doubtedthat.

CNNCenter,Atlanta,Georgia,2000Hours,May

6th,2016

TheLIVEEVENTgraphicwent up on the screenfollowed by an introductionbythenewsanchors.Viewersworldwidewere about to seea live feed from the Indian

Ocean where the Sri Lankanquarantinewas ineffect.TheCNN feed was accompaniedby a voice-over from theChairmenoftheJointChiefs,who began to provide theworld’s first official play-by-playcommentaryofanactualbattle. What the world sawwastheGlobalHawkviewoftheIndiancarriergroup,withanoccasionalzoominontheViraat. What was said nextstunned the worldwide

audience.“Since the United States

wishes to fulfill itscommitment to the SriLankan people and its UNpartners,butwishesnoexcessbloodshed in the process,weare about to show theworld,especially the Indiangovernment, what willhappen toallof theirships ifthey do not turn back theirforcesimmediately.”

Henodded tohisassistant,who relayed a signal toAdmiral Connelly on theMountMcKinley.

OvertheLakshadweepSea,0705Hours,May7th,2016

The four F/A-18Es SuperHornets had just downlinkedthe final targeting templatesfor their ATA-equippedhypersonic cruise missiles,

and fed the image of theViraat into the guidancesystems. When AdmiralConnelly gave the order, thefour pilots salvoed themissiles at fifteen-secondintervals, the better for theworld to watch the results.Each missile immediatelyignited its rocket motor, andclimbed at Mach 6 into theupper atmosphere for thetwo-minute run to the target.When directly over the

Viraat, eachmissilebegan todive,andscannedthesurfacebelow for a shape thatmatched the image templatein its guidance package. Theresultswerestunningeven tothe people who had plannedthestrike.The Global Hawk camera

zoomed in on theViraat justbefore thefirstmissilestruckthe flightdeckon the fantail.The missile penetrated the

flight deck before thethousand-pound warheaddetonated,blowingchunksofthe after flight deck into theair. Seconds later, the nextmissilearrived,landingaboutone hundred feet forward ofthefirstmissilehit.Thistimethree Sea Harriers wereblownapart, thepieces flunginto the air. The explosionscontinued. By the time thelast twomissiles arrived, theship was a mass of flames

and explosions. Since therewasno longera target tohit,themissilessplashed into theocean. Almost immediately,theoldflattopbegantosettle.Within ten minutes it wasnothingbutapoolofburningoil, floating debris, and menfightingfortheirlives.OneofthemwasAdmiralJadeja.

CNNCenter,Atlanta,GA,2010Hours,May6th,2016

The images of the finalmoments of Viraat shockedeven the JCSChairman,whohad to recompose himselfbefore he completed hisstatement.“As you can see, the

United States has the abilityto strike, and destroy atwill,any Indian naval unit that itdesires. In the interests ofhumanity, I make thefollowing statement to the

Indian National CommandAuthorities. You may spendthe next two hoursconducting searchand rescueoperations. At that time, ifyour ships have not reversedcourse,wewill begin to sinkadditional units at ourdiscretion. In the name ofdecency, please return yourfleet to its base at Goawithoutdelay.”He need not have said

anything. As a burned andbruised Admiral Jadeja waspulledfromtheoilywater,hehimself ordered the fleet tocomplete search and rescueoperations,andthentoreturnto Goa at best speed. TheIndian Sri Lanka expeditionwasover.

IndianNationalCommandBunker,nearthe

HimalayanTownof

Puranpur,0900Hours,May7th,2016

Onceagain,PrimeMinisterGandhiwaswatching a fightbetweenhisDefenseMinisterand his service chiefs. Thisone had turned uglier thanusual. Physical blows hadbeen exchanged even beforenews of Admiral Jadeja’sfleet recall order had beendelivered. Far from shamingthe Americans with a

slaughter, the Indian Navy,themostpowerfulnavyintheregion, had been punishedandhumbledbeforetheworld—notjustbyashowofarmsbutbyashowofmercy.After they’d watched the

broadcast on CNN, theservicechiefshadwithdrawn,for their own physicalsecurity (they feared that theDefenseMinistermightfindaweapon and kill them). In

their absence the DefenseMinisterhadturnedhiswrathon Gandhi. This infamy, theMinister ranted, must beavenged, and the Americanmission stopped, whateverthe cost. It was at thismoment thatRoshan realizedthat he was a coward; helacked both the moral andphysical courage needed todefend himself and hiscountry.SowhentheDefenseMinister pressed for a

nuclear-missile strike on SriLanka, as the madman hungover him threateningly,Gandhi signed the releaseorders.As the Defense Minister

left to commit another crimeagainst humanity, the PrimeMinisterloweredhisfaceintohis hands to sob, silentlypraying to his God thatsomeone would stop thisman,evenifitkilledthemall.

Hecouldonlydieonce.Bestfor that to happen before theblood of more millions ofinnocentsstainedhishands.

NorthCoastofSriLankanearJaffra,1200Hours,

May7th,2016

Admiral Connelly likedwhat he saw. The MEU(SOC) was already in itsdefensive position. The

troopersofthe82ndAirbornedown at Colombo hadvolunteered to send them aplatoon of engineers withbulldozersandearthmoverstoimprove the sites. Theartillery was already dug in;and the air defense vehicleshad excellent engagementarcs.Seeingthattheircolonelhad things well in hand, hewalked back to his HH-60RhelicopterfortheridebacktotheMountMcKinley.

As they lifted off andheaded out to sea, he got amessage on his securesatellitephone,whichsethimimmediately on edge. AnNSA ferret satellite hadpicked up indications ofcommandsbeingissuedtoanIndianIRBMbattalion.Earlyanalysis indicated that theunithadbeenorderedtoerectand fuel their missiles, andprepare them for launch.Estimated time until they

wouldbereadyforactionwasless than three hours.Realizing that his force hadvery little time toprepare forwhat might be the world’sfirst duel between nuclear-armed ballistic missiles andtheater ballistic-missiledefenseforces,heorderedhispilot to push the chopper tothelimit.

USSPACECOMTheater

BattleManagementCenter,FalconAFB,Colorado,

0322Hours,May7th,2016

The battle managementstaff was fullymanned, withoff-shift personnel crowdingin between the workstationterminalsand thegallery.AnAir Force brigadier generalfrom the 50th Space Wingwasincommand,andhehadhis command and controllinks and satellites fully

netted and ready. For years,they had practiced this veryscenario on complexcomputer networks againstsynthetic missiles. Today,they would be doing it forreal, with actual nuclear-tippedmissilesastargets,andthe lives of several millionhuman beings at stake. Theearliest deadline for possiblelaunch of the Indianmissileshad passed about twentyminutes earlier. Everyone

wasgettingalittleedgy.Justas the general was about todeclare an alert break so hispeoplecouldgetsomecoffeeand donuts, the DefenseSupport Program (DSP)satellite console operatorcameon thenetwithavoicethat was frighteninglydetached.“Wehavemissile launches

in central India. I repeat, wehave multiple missile

launches in central India.Confidence is high. I repeat,confidenceishigh.”It took a few seconds for

theDSPbird toobtain roughtracking information onwhatwas now looking like sixIRBM-type missiles as theyclimbed away from theirlaunchersnearNagpur.Whenthe information came in, itwas fed automatically to thebattle management consoles,

wheresoftwarebegantosendorders to a series of high-resolution targeting satellitesin medium Earth orbit.Within thirty seconds of thelast Indian missile’s launch,each missile was beingtrackedbyatelescope,whichwas supplying precise firecontrol information to thebattle management network.Thegeneral,seeingthattherewas only a single wave ofmissilesheaded south toward

Sri Lanka, quickly made hisdecision, then spokeover thenetwork.“This is Silicon Palace to

all stations. Werewolf.Werewolf! We have sixinboundmissile tracks to theSriLankaarea.Confidenceishigh. I repeat, confidence ishigh.Allshipsandbatteries,Ideclareweaponsfree.Repeat.I declare weapons free! Goget’um,spacerangers!”

Hehad done his job.Nowthey all got to see if a fewhundred billion dollars hadbeenwasted.

AboardtheCommandShipUSSMountMcKinley

(LCC-22),FiveHundredNauticalMiles(NM)SouthofColombo,1525Hours,

May7th,2016

The displays showed the

inbound missile tracks, eventhoughtheradarsofhisAegisships could not yet see theweapons on their own. Likeeveryone else, AdmiralConnellyhadrunsimulationsof missile defense time andtime again. But this time, itwas terribly real. Right now,the targeting data was beingrelayedviasatellitelinkfromFalconAFB,anditwasgoodenough to shoot with. Theideawas to try toengage the

incomingmissiles as soon asthey came into view of theAegis ships. He had alreadygiven weapons-releaseauthority to the theaterballistic-missile defenseofficer in the corner consolein the TFCC. The younglieutenantcommanderhadanAegis cruiser and twodestroyers to engagewith, aswellasapairofArmyPatriotbatteries from XVIIIAirborneCorpsonSriLanka

itself. This gave them twolayers of firepower to applyagainst the incoming missilestream.Hehopeditwouldbeenough.Over on the destroyers

Mahan (DDG-72) andHopper(DDG-70),aswellasthe cruiser Cape St. George(CG-71), the battlemanagement software fromFalcon Field ordered eachship to launch a modified

Standard SAM with aminiature homing vehicle asthepayload.Becauseof theirlimited loadout of ATBMSAMs, the threeshipshad tofire one at a time at theincomingmissiles,sothatthechances of a kill would bemaximized. The first salvohad been dispatched beforethe Indian IRBMs had evencome over the horizon, butthis would increase thenumber of possible shots

againstthemissilestream.AdmiralConnellywatched

transfixed as the six SAMsymbols moved across thelarge-screen display towardthe IRBM icons. The flighttimewasalmosttwominutes,and the results weregratifying. Three of theIndian missiles weredestroyed by direct kineticenergy hits from the SAMs,while the others would

require further engagement.Another salvo of threeATBM SAMs erupted fromthe Aegis ships, this timewithaflighttimeoflessthanforty-five seconds to theirtargets. The miniaturehoming vehicles vaporizedtwo more IRBMs. That leftjustonetargetedonColombo.Connelly began to ball his

fists when he saw two shotsat the final Indian missile

miss due to bad engagementgeometry,allowingitpastthepicket line of Aegis ships.This left only theirgoaltender,thePatriotbatteryon a hill overlookingColombo Harbor. The sitehad originally been theheadquarters of Lord LouisMountbatten during theSecondWorldWar, andnowhad the best firing arc of theArmy SAM batteries. TheIndian missile was less than

two hundred miles out whenthe battery spat out a pair ofPAC-3 ERINT anti-missileSAMs. The Army haddeployed thissystemingreatnumbers,andasecondpairofERINTs were fired to makesurethatthislastinboundhadnochance.The problem was that the

Indianmissilewasofafairlyadvanced design, with asystem for detaching the

warhead at apogee. Thisimproved theaccuracyof thewarhead and madeinterception more difficult.However, U.S. design teamshadn’t been standing stilleither. Hard-won experiencefrom several decades earlierinthePersianGulfhadtaughtthe software engineers somevaluable tricks, and thePatriotradareasilypickedoutthe warhead from thefragments of the missile that

were breaking up uponreentry into the atmosphere.As it turned out, the firstsalvoofERINTswasenough.ThesecondPAC-3struckthewarhead,vaporizingitintoanexploding stream ofplutonium and ceramic fromtheheatshield.Onbothsidesof the world, the winners ofthe first nuclear-missile/anti-missilebattle jumped to theirfeet and issued a collectivevictory cry. The American

magichadbeenbetter.

IndianNationalCommandBunker,nearthe

HimalayanTownofPuranpur,1835Hours,May

7th,2016

PrimeMinister Gandhi satalone now in the conferenceroom. He’d sent the militarychiefs away to their quarters,andput theDefenseMinister

under arrest. He had finallypulled himself togetherenough to do the right thing,whichwas precisely nothing.The failure of the missilestrikehadgivenhimbackhisoptions, and now he wasgoing to limit the retributionon India to this bunker, andprobably the missile launchsite. He knew that theAmericans had probablyalready targeted bothlocations,andthattheywould

hitthemsoon.Heorderedallnon-essentialpersonneloutofthefacility,thansatdownandbegantoprayforhissoul.Hehoped that it would be oversoon.

FlightDeckoftheAircraftCarrierColinPowell,1925Hours,May7th,2016

They had been forced towaituntiltheresolutionofthe

Indianmissile strike toknowwhich weapons they wouldupload.HadanyoftheIndianIRBMs hit their targets, thenthe F-25Bswould have beeneachloadedwithapairofB-61-15 nuclear penetratinggravity bombs targeted onwhat had been called“strategic” targets. Thepopulation density of Indiameant that the use of anysuch weapon would killhundreds of thousands of

civilians at a minimum.Thankfully for the ordnancepersonnel and the pilots, theorders from the NationalCommand Authorities hadbeen explicit. Response inkind.Thismeantthatunlessanuclear detonation had takenplace, only conventionweapons were authorized foruse in the coming strike onthe Indian leadership andtheirnuclearmissiledepots.

The F-25Bs would eachcarryaGBU-32JDAMSwitha modified BLU- 109 two-thousand-pound penetratingwarhead to seal the bunkerentrances. Then the F/A-18Super Hornets would finishthe job with 4,700-poundGBU- 28 “Deep Throat”bombs armed with BLU-113warheads to collapse thetunnels. Similar attentionwouldbegiven to the IndianmissilesilosnearNagpur.

It took a little over threehours to get the aircraftloadedandthecrewsbriefed.As usual for such things, itwould be a precision nightstrike to help degrade theIndian defenses. As the firstpair of F-25Bs taxied up tothe catapults at the bow, thedeck crews lined thecatwalks, cheering the pilotsas they launched into abeautiful night sky. It wouldtake a few hours for the

planestoreachtheirtargets.

IndianNationalCommandBunker,nearthe

HimalayanTownofPuranpur,2242Hours,May

7th,2016

PrimeMinisterGandhi layin his bedroom waiting forthe end. He had authorizedthe actions that had resultedin the deaths of tens of

millions of human lives. Hewould be remembered as thefirstgreatgenocidaldespotofthenewmillennium,and thatwasadifficult thought todiewith. But he knew he wasdoing the right thing now.Down the corridor he heardthe sounds of the firstpenetratingbombssealingtheexits. At the same time, theair raid sirens went off, anunnecessary distraction.Death was at most a minute

ortwoaway.

When the F/A-18s finallyarrived overhead thirtysecondsafter theF-25Bshaddone their jobs, it took justafew minutes for the fourpilots to set up their laserdesignators, get the weaponsintoparameters,andmakethedrop. Thirty seconds later,

eight of the big bombsentered the solid graniteprotecting the mountainbunker. They split the wetstone for almost a hundredfeetbeforedetonating,settingupashearshockwave in therockstrata.Theeffectwastocollapse the bunkers below,destroying everyone andeverything inside instantly.With the destruction of thecommand bunker, theAmerican aircraft headed

hometotheColinPowellandanearlybreakfast.

AboardtheCommandShipUSSMountMcKinley

(LCC-22),FiveHundredNauticalMilesSouthof

Colombo,0400Hours,May8th,2016

“That’s right, Jack,”Admiral Connelly said overthe conference phone to the

JCSchairman.“Wegot themback safe and with all thetargets hit, at least as far asthe early BDA can tell. Inaddition, the two MPSsquadrons arrive in themorning, and should be off-loading bymidday.What doyouhearonyourend?”The JCS chairman was

quick and concise, havingbeen up for almost two daysholding the President’s and

National Security Advisor’shands during the short butbrutal combat. “Well, what’sleftof theIndiangovernmentis asking for UNpeacekeeping and nation-buildingteamstoreformtheirgovernment. Pakistan isdoing the same thing. Myguess is thatwe’ll be able topullyouandyourpeopleoutwithinafewweeks,whenthepermanent UN units arrive.The boss says to tell your

people that they did anincredible job out here, andthat he’ll meet them whentheygethomenextmonth.”“Thanks, Jack,” said

Connelly. “You know, he’llprobably want to give meanother star or some otherdamned thing and get meback home again on shoreduty.”“He just might at that.

You’llbebacktothatsnoozer

workyou lovesomuch,” theJCSchairmanreplied.Unableto resist thatperfectopening,he ended the conversationwith,“Haveanicenap.”As it happened, Connelly

sleptfortwostraightdays.

Stockholm,Sweden,February14th,2017

The Nobel Prizeceremonies were agreeably

short this year, though thesignificance of the awardsmade the usually esotericdescriptions of the winners’work absolutely sparkle withexcitement. The combinedprizes in physics andchemistrywent,of course, toJillJacobs,whowasalreadyabillionaire fromher licensingadvances on thesuperconducting-wireformula.Shechose todonatetheNobelPrizemoneytoher

alma mater at New Mexico.The Peace Prizewent jointlyto Venkatesh Prasad, theSinhalesePrimeMinister,andhis new Interior Minister,Arjuan Ranatunga, for theirpeaceful forging of a newnation.Bothmenhaddecidedtodonatetheirprizes,aswellassignificantfundsfromtheiroverflowing national coffers,todisaster relief in India andPakistan, an olive branch totheir new customers to the

north. Finally, the NobelCommittee had awarded aspecial peacekeeping awardtoAdmiralConnelly,nowtheJCS Chairman inWashington, D.C. It was thefirsttimethatallofthemhadmet, but their paths hadalready crossed in thecurrents of history, andbetween them they hadcreatedabetterworld.

Conclusion

When I started working onthisbookin1997,Ihadlittledoubt that I could justifygood reasons for America tocontinue its support forcarrier aviation. If I’ve donenothing else in this book,those reasons should bereadily apparent by now.

However,at the same time, Iwent into this book with arealconcernabout theabilityof the U.S. Navy to addressthe many leadership andmaterial problems that haveplagued the service since theend of the Cold War. As itturned out, I need not havebeen so worried. The U.S.Navyisaresilientinstitution,which has endured trial,scandal, and other ills manytimes, and continued to

prosper. So too, with theNavy of our times. Thesimplefactisthatasanationwhose trade is primarilymaritime based, we need theoceans the way that humansneed oxygen. This countrywas founded on a strongmaritime tradition, and willlikelybethatwayfortherestof our existence. Therefore,the question is not whetherwe need naval forces, butwhatformandnumbersthose

units will represent. Withinour current concept of navaloperations, that means thataircraft carriers and theirembarked air wings are heretostay.In fact, after thedisastrous

years followingDesertStormand the Cold War, navalaviation seems on the vergeof a new golden age, withnew carriers, aircraft, andweapons on the way, and

strong leadership to guide it.Best of all though, the U.S.Navy seems to be movingaway from the self-imposedtyranny that has marked thedevelopment and use ofcarrierairpowersincetheendofWorldWarII.Farfromthedreadedexpectations,thenew“joint” method of packagingand deploying U.S. armedforces (as a result of theGoldwater-Nichols reformbill) has actually allowed

carrier admirals greaterlatitude in the use of theirflattops. Jay Johnson’sinnovative use of his carriersduring the 1994 Haitioperation would have beenunthinkable just five yearsearlier. Even today, there aremany naval aviation leaderswho consider his actionsheresy. Those voices though,are growingmore silentwithevery new JTFEX andtraining exercise. Joint

warfare is here to stay, andnothing will ensure a strongfuture for carriers and theiraircraft more than regionalcommanders and joint taskforce commanders whowanta carrier battle group as partoftheircomplementofunits.From this is coming new

and innovative roles andmissions for aircraft carriersand their supporting battleamphibious groups. One oftheseis theuseof“adaptive”

airwingorganizations,whichwould allow changing themix and types of aircraftembarked for a particularmission. Haiti back in 1994was just a point of departureforwhatmightbepossibleinthe future. Using aircraft,UAVs, and UCAVs fromother services as well theirown will allow the Navygreaterparticipation in futuremilitary operations, andexpand the range of possible

supporting missions. It alsoraises the possibility ofutilizing thebig-deckflattopsin disaster relief andhumanitarian aide missions,which have become ahallmark of post-Cold Warmilitary operations.Ironically, these expandedmissionswillalsohelpjustifyfuture construction of newcarriers, since their inherentvalue and flexibility willbecome more apparent and

valuable to a wider base ofusers. The idea of Armygenerals helping to supportnew warship constructionmay seem outlandish, but isalreadyhappeningonCapitolHillandthePentagon.It is with this knowledge

that I want to take one lastlook ahead at what the newcentury may bring for navalaviators. For starters, therewill finally be a new set ofcarrier designs. The CVX

program is committed totransitioning from theexisting Nimitz-class (CVN-68)shipstoanewdesignthatwill be oriented toward thepower projectionmissions ofthe newmillennium. Thoughthe program is undergoing arestructuring at the moment,planonseeingaseriesoftwoor three transitional designswhilethenewdesignfeaturesare ironed out. By that time,around 2020, the future of

warship design should bemuch clearer, given thepolitical/world situation ageneration from now. Therealso is the real possibility oftechnical breakthroughs thatmay effect new designs,particularly if low-temperature superconductorsor high output fuel cellsfinallybecomeareality.There also will be new

aircraft, some so wondrousthat I cannot even describe

them. JSF and the F/A-18EFSuper Hornet I have alreadyshown to you. However, thenew generation ofUninhabited Combat AerialVehicles (UCAVs) is likelyto appear sooner than later,given the rapidly escalatingcostsofmannedaircraft.Theperformance of those aircraftare likely tobeunimaginableby today’s standards, withmaneuvering capabilitiesmore like that of air-to-air

missiles than 20th-centurymanned aircraft. The fighterpilots of tomorrow may noteven need to be flightqualified. Flown fromconsoles aboard ships ortransportaircraft,theywillbeable to fly missions thattoday’s manned aircraftwouldnotevenbeconsideredfor.Bestofall,a lostaircraftwill just be money, and nothuman lives.Before you callthis science fiction, it is

useful to remember that theNavy ran maneuvering trialsbetweenanF-4Phantomandan unmanned Firebee dronein the early 1970s, and thedroneconsistentlywon!These, though, are matters

for another generation ofAmericans, some of whomhavenot evenbeenbornyet.Todaytheissueisfindingthemoney tomake the transitiontothesewondrousnewships,aircraft, and weapons, and

this is the real challenge.Since the end of the ColdWar, both we and our allieshave downsized the armedforcestothepointwheretheircredibilityisnowcomingintoquestion. For the Navy, thismeans that the dozen carrierand amphibious groups thatare being retained are theabsolute minimum if we areto maintain the currentrotation policies. It also hasmeant that the personnel are

nowat thebreakingpoint, asAdmiralJohnson indicated inhis interview. U.S. militarypersonnel have been exitingthe services in growingnumbers for the boomingcivilian job market. Longdeployments and erodingsalaries are a formula fordisaster, and must be dealtwith if our forces are toremain strong and credible.Theanswerofcourseismoremoney, and that is going to

require leadership.Leadership from an electedadministration and Congress,which currently is moreinterested in politicalsquabbling than nationalsecurity issues. It also willtake military leaders willingto put their own careers onthe line to tell the truth tothosecivilian leaders,even iftheydonotwanttohear.Finemen like Jay Johnson andChuckKrulakareleadingthis

fight, but cannot do itthemselves. All of us mustacceptthefactthatthecurrenteconomic boom, which hasbeenpoweringthe1990s,hasbeen accomplished in a timeofvirtuallynomilitarythreatsto America or its Allies. Toassume that thishappysetofcircumstanceswillcontinueisfolly, given the eruption ofnationalism since the end oftheColdWar.Thethreatsareoutthere,andIhavenodoubt

that theywill finduswithoutdifficulty. Let us hope thatour sea services continue tohavethenecessarysupporttoprotect us all from them.We’regoingtoneedit.

Glossary

A-12 GeneralDynamics/McDonnellDouglas A-12 Avenger, a1990’s Navy program for astealthycarrierstrikeaircraft,canceledduetocostoverrunsand programmismanagement.

AAA Antiaircraft artilleryalso called “triple-A” or“flak” (from the German“fliegerabwehrkanone” or airdefensegun).AAQ-13/14LANTIRN LowAltitude NavigationTargeting Infrared for Night.A pair of sensor podsmounted on the F-15E andcertainF-16C/Daircraft.TheAAQ-13 Navigation PodcombinesaForwardLooking

Infrared sensoranda terrain-followingradar.TheAAQ-14Targeting Pod combines aForward Looking InfraredandLaserTargetDesignator.Entire system is built byMartin Marietta (nowLockheedMartin)and tightlyintegrated with the aircraft’sflight control and weaponsdelivery software. A versionof theAAQ-14 targetingpodwith an internal GPS/ INSsystem is used aboard the F-

14Tomcat.ACCAirCombatCommand.MajorcommandoftheUSAFformedin1992bythemergerof Strategic Air Command(bombers and tankers) andTactical Air Command(fighters).ACES II Standard U.S.ejectionseatbuiltbyBoeing,based on an original designby the Weber Corporation.ACES is a “zero-zero” seat,

whichmeans that it can savethe crewperson’s life (at therisk of some injury) down tozero airspeed and zeroaltitude,aslongastheaircraftis not inverted. Humorouslyknown as the “hostagedeliverysystem.”ACM Air CombatManeuvering, the art ofgetting into position to shoottheotherguy,preferablyfrombehind, before he can shoot

you. A vital but expensivepart of advanced flighttraining for fighter pilots,ACMismosteffectiveonaninstrumentedradarrangewith“playback” facilities fordebriefing.Aegis Advanced automatedtracking and missile fire-control system on modemU.S. Navy cruisers anddestroyers. Key componentsare the SPY-1 phased-array

radar and the SM-2 missile.NamedfortheshieldofZeusinGreekmythology.AEW Airborne EarlyWarning.Specificallyusedtodescribe aircraft like theNorthrop Grumman E-2CHawkeye and Boeing E-3Sentry, but also usedgenericallytodescribesimilartypes used by other AirForces.AFBAirForceBase.

Afterburner Device thatinjects fuel into the exhaustnozzle of a jet engine,boosting thrust at the cost ofgreater fuel consumption.Called “Reheat” by theBritish.AGM-62 Walleye AGM-62television-guided glide bombwith 2,000-1b warhead.Maximum range of about 20miles, depending on speedandaltitudeoflaunchaircraft.

Used in Vietnam War;obsolescentbutstillinstock.AGM-65 Maverick Familyof air-to-surface missiles,produced since 1971 byHughes andRaytheonwith avariety of guidance andwarhead configurations.Range about 14 nm. Navyversions carried by S-3, P-3,F/A-18,andotheraircraftuseimaginginfraredguidance.AGM-84 Harpoon/SLAM

AGM-84, turbojet poweredantiship missile, up to 120miles rangewith 488-lb/220-kgexplosivewarhead.AGM-84E version (“SLAM”) usesMaverick IIR seeker andGPS-aidedguidance.AGM-154 JSOW JointStandoff Weapon. Low-cost1,000-poundglidebombwith25-mile range, usingINS/GPS guidance. Carries145 BLU-97 bomblets. A

version carrying a 1,000-pound unitary warhead isunderdevelopment.AH-1W “Cobra” attackhelicopter found in Marinelight-attack squadrons.Nicknamed“WhiskeyCobra”or“Snake.”AIM-9 Sidewinder Heat-seeking missile family, usedby the Air Force, Navy,Marines, Army, and manyexport customers. A letter,

such as AIM-9M or-9X,designatesvariants.AIM-120 AMRAAM AIM-120 Advanced MediumRange Air to Air Missile(AMRAAM). First modernair-to-air missile to useprogrammablemicroprocessors with activeradar homing (missile has itsown radar transmitter,allowing “fire and forget”tactics). Currently carried by

NavyandMarineF/A-18’s.ARG Amphibious ReadyGroup.ATO Air Tasking Order. Aplanning document that listseveryaircraftsortieandtargetfor a given day’s operations.Preparation of the ATOrequires careful“deconfliction” to ensure thesafety of friendly aircraft.During Desert Storm theATO ran to thousands of

pageseachday.AvionicsGeneraltermforallthe electronic systems on anaircraft, including radar,communications, flightcontrol, navigation,identification,andfire-controlcomputers. A “data bus” orhigh-speed digital networkincreasingly interconnectscomponents of an avionicssystem.BDA Bomb Damage

Assessment. Thecontroversial art ofdetermining from fuzzyimagery and contradictoryintelligence whether or not aparticular target has beendestroyed or renderedinoperative.BVR Beyond visual range;usually used in reference toradar guided air-to-airmissiles. “Visual range”dependson theweather,how

recently the windscreen wascleanedandpolished,andthepilot’s visual acuity, butagainst a fighter-sized targetrarely exceeds 10 miles (16km).C-130 Hercules Lockheedmedium transport aircraft.FourAllisonT56 turboprops.Over 2,000 of these classicaircraft have been built since1955, and it is still inproduction.

C3I Command, Control,Communications, andIntelligence; the componentsand targets of informationwarfare. Pronounced “C-three-I.”CallSign (1).An identifyingnameandnumberassignedtoan aircraft for a particularmission.Aircraft in the sameflight will usually haveconsecutive numbers. (2). Anicknamegiven toanaviator

by his/her squadron matesand retained throughouthis/her flying career, oftenhumorous.Canopy Transparent bubblethat covers the cockpit of anaircraft. Usually made ofPlexiglas, or polycarbonate,sometimes with amicroscopically thin layer ofradar-absorbing material orgold. Easily scratched orabraded by sand or hail.

Ejection seats have a meansof explosively jettisoning orfracturing the canopy toreduce the chance of injuryduringejection.CAP Combat Air Patrol, abasic fighter tactic thatinvolves cruisingeconomically at high ormedium altitude over adesignated area searching forenemyaircraft.CBUClusterBombUnit.An

aircraftmunitionthatisfusedto explode at low altitude,scattering large numbers of“submunitions” over a targetarea. Submunitions can beexplosive grenades, delayed-action mines, antitankwarheads, or otherspecializeddevices.CENTAF Air Forcecomponent of U.S. CentralCommand, including unitsdeployed to bases inKuwait,

SaudiArabia,andotherstatesin the Gulf region. ThecommanderofCENTAFisanAir Force It. general, whotypically also commandsNinth Air Force based atShawAFB,SC.CENTCOM United StatesCentral Command, a unified(jointservice)commandwithan area of responsibility inthe Middle East andSouthwest Asia.

Headquartered at McDillAFB, FL, and generallycommanded by an Armyfour-stargeneral.CENTCOMnormallycommandsnomajorcombat units, but in a crisissituation it would rapidly bereinforced by units of theArmy’s XVIII AirborneCorps, the U.S. MarineCorps,andalliedforces.Chaff Bundles of thin stripsof aluminum foil or

metallized plastic film thatareejectedfromanaircrafttoconfusehostileradar.Achaffcloud creates a temporary“smokescreen” thatmakes itdifficult for radar topickoutrealtargets.Theeffectivenessofchaffdependsonmatchingthe length of the chaff stripsto the wavelength of theradar.Chine A sharp-edgedprojection running along the

fuselage of an aircraft, oftenas an extension of theleading-edge wing root.Particularlyprominenton theF/A-18Homet.CinC Commander in Chief.Usedtodesignatedtheseniorofficer, typically a four-stargeneral or admiral in chargeofamajorcommand,suchasCINCPAC (Commander inChief of the U.S. PacificCommand).

CIWS Mk. 15 “Close-inWeapons System.”Pronounced“Sea-Whiz.”ThePhalanx automatic gun andradar system, as installed onNavyshipsofmanyclasses.CONOPS Concept ofOperations. Thecommander’s guidance tosubordinate units on theconductofacampaign.CSAR Combat Search andRescue.Recoveryofdowned

air crew evading captures inan enemy-held area.Typically a helicoptermission supported by fixed-wingaircraft.CTAPS ContingencyTactical Air Control SystemAutomated Planning System.A transportable network ofcomputer workstations,linking various databasesrequiredforthegenerationofanAirTaskingOrder.

CVW Carrier Air Wing; aforce of Navy aircraftorganized for operation froman aircraft carrier, Typicallyincludes one fightersquadron, two attacksquadrons,andsmallunitsofhelicopters, antisubmarine,electronic warfare, and earlywarningradarplanes.DoDDepartmentofDefense.U.S. Government branchcreated in 1947, responsible

for the four armed servicesand numerous agencies,program offices, and jointprojects.Drag The force that resiststhe motion of a vehiclethrough a gaseous or liquidmedium. The opposite forceislift.E-2C Hawkeye U.S. Navycarrier-based twin-turbopropairborne early warningaircraft built by Northrop

Grumman.Enteredservice in1964. Also operated byFrance,Israel,Egypt,Taiwan,Singapore,andJapan.E-8 JSTARS JointSurveillance and TargetingAttack Radar System. AnArmy/Air Force program todeployabout20BoeingE-8Caircraft equipped withpowerful side-lookingsynthetic-aperture radars todetectmoving ground targets

atlongrange.E/O Electro-optical. Ageneral term for sensors thatuse video, infrared, or lasertechnology for assistingnavigation or locating,tracking, or designatingtargets.ECM ElectronicCountermeasures.Anyuseofthe electromagnetic spectrumtoconfuse,degrade,ordefeathostile radars, sensors, or

radio communications. Theterm ECCM (electroniccounter-countermeasures) isused to describe active orpassive defensive measuresagainst enemyECM, such asfrequency-hoppingorspread-spectrumwaveforms.ELINT ElectronicIntelligence. Interception andanalysis of radar, radio, andother electromagneticemissions in order to

determine enemy location,numbers,andcapabilities.ESM Electronic SecurityMeasures. Usually refers tosystems that monitor theelectromagnetic spectrum todetect, localize, and warn ofpotentialthreats.Exocet French-built antishipmissile, widely exported inair-launched (AM-39), ship-launched (MM-38/40), andsubmarine-launched (SM-39)

versions. Two AM-39Exocets fired by an Iraqiaircraft damaged the U.S.Navy frigate Stark (FFG-31)in the Persian Gulf on May17,1987.F/A-18 Hornet Boeing“Hornet” carrier-capablefighter-bomber, operated byNavy andMarine squadrons,andtheAirForcesofCanada,Kuwait, Malaysia, Spain,Switzerland, Australia, and

Finland.ImprovedF/A-18E/Fmodelunderdevelopment.FADEC Full AuthorityDigital Engine Control, acomputer that monitors jet-engineperformanceandpilot-throttle inputs and regulatesfuel supply for maximumefficiency.FlameoutUnintendedlossofcombustion inside a jetengine,duetoadisruptionofairflow. This can be

extremelyseriousiftheflightcrew is unable to restart theaffectedengine.Flap A hinged controlsurface, usually on thetrailing edge of a wing,commonly used to increaselift during takeoff and dragduringlanding.Flare (1). A pyrotechnicdevice ejected by an aircraftas a countermeasure to heat-seekingmissiles.(2).Apitch-

up maneuver to bleed offenergy performed duringlanding, just before touchingdown.FLIR Forward LookingInfrared: an electro-opticaldevice similar to a televisioncamera that “sees” in theinfrared spectrum rather thanvisible light. FLIRs displayan image based on minutetemperature variations, sothathotengineexhaustducts,

forexample,appearasbrightspots.G-Force One G is the forceexertedbyEarth’sgravityonstationaryobjectsatsealevel.High-energy maneuvers cansubject the aircraft and pilotto as much as 9 Gs. Someadvancedmissilescanpullasmuchas60Gsinaturn.GBU Guided Bomb Unit.General U.S. term forprecision-guidedmunitions.

GBU-29/30/31/32 JDAMJointDirectAttackMunition.A general-purpose bomb orpenetration warhead, withinertial/GPS guidancepackage in the tail cone.Initial operational capabilityplanned for 1999. Navyrequirementis12,000bombs;Air Force requirement is for62,000.GeosynchronousAlsocalled“geostationary.”Asatellitein

equatorial orbit at an altitudeof 35,786 km (about 22,230miles) will take 24 hours tocircle the Earth. In 24 hoursthe Earth rotates once on itsaxis, so the satellite willappear tobe“fixed”over thesamepointontheearth.“Glass”CockpitDesign thatreplaces individual flightgauges and instruments withmulti-function electronicdisplay screens. A few

mechanical gauges areusually retained foremergencybackup.Goldwater-NicholsCommonnamefortheMilitaryReformActof1986,whichcreatedaseries of Unified Commandscutting across traditionalservice boundaries andstrengthenedthepoweroftheChairman of the JointChiefsofStaff.GPS Global Positioning

System.Aconstellationof24satellites in inclined earthorbits, which continuouslybroadcastnavigationalsignalssynchronizedbyultra-preciseatomic clocks. At least foursatellitesareusuallyintransitacross the sky visible fromanypointonEarthoutsidethePolar Regions. A specializedcomputerbuiltintoaportablereceiver can derive highlyaccuratepositionandvelocityinformation by correlating

data from three or moresatellites.Anencodedpartofthe signal is reserved formilitary use. A similar,incomplete,RussiansystemiscalledGLONASS.HARMAGM-88HighSpeedAnti-Radiation Missile,produced by TexasInstruments. Mach 2+. 146-1b blast-fragmentationwarhead. Typically fired 35to 55 miles from target, but

maximum range is greater.Firstused incombat inApril1986 raid on Libya; 40missilesfired.Have Blue OriginalLockheed “Skunk Works”prototype for the F-117Stealth fighter. Considerablysmaller than the productionaircraft, and still highlyclassified.HEI High ExplosiveIncendiary, a type of

ammunition commonly usedwithair-to-airguns.HOTAS Hands on Throttleand Stick. A cockpit flightcontrol unit that allows thepilottoregulateenginepowersettings and steeringcommandswithonehand.HSHelicopterAntisubmarineSquadron.HSL HelicopterAntisubmarine Squadron,Light.

HUD Heads-Up Display: atransparent screen above thecockpit instrumentsonwhichcritical flight, target, andweapons information isprojected, so that the pilotneed not look down to readgaugesanddisplaysduringanengagement. Current HUDtechnology provides wide-angle display of radar andsensordata.IIR Imaging Infrared. An

electro-optical device similartoavideocamerathat“sees”small differences intemperature and displaysthem as levels of contrast orfalse colors on a operator’sdisplayscreen.ILS Instrument LandingSystem. A radio-frequencydevice installed at someairfields that assists the pilotofasuitablyequippedaircraftin landing during conditions

ofpoorvisibility.INS Inertial NavigationSystem. A device thatdetermines location andvelocity by sensing theacceleration and direction ofevery movement since thesystem was initialized orupdated at a known point.Conventional INS systemsusing mechanical gyroscopesare subject to “drift” afterhours of continuous

operation. Ring-laser gyrossense motion by measuringthe frequency shift of laserpulsesintwocounter-rotatingrings, and are much moreaccurate.TheadvantageofanINS is that it requires noexternal transmission todeterminelocation.InterdictionUseofairpowerto disrupt or prevent themovement of enemymilitaryunits and supplies by

attacking transportationroutes, vehicles, and bridgesdeepintheenemyrear.IOC Initial OperationalCapability. The point in thelifecycleofaweaponsystemwhen it officially entersservice and is consideredready for combat, with alltraining,spareparts,technicalmanuals, and softwarecomplete.Themorecomplexthe system, the greater the

chance that the originallyscheduledIOCwillslip.IRBM Intermediate RangeBallistic Missile. A rocket(typically two-stage)designedtodeliverawarheadover regional rather thanintercontinental distances.This class of weapons waseliminated by treaty andobsolescence from U.S. andRussian strategic forces, butis rapidly proliferating in

various world trouble spots,despiteinternationaleffortstolimit the export of ballisticmissiletechnologies.JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff.The senior U.S. militarycommand level, responsiblefor advising the President onmatters of national defense.The JCS consists of aChairman,whomaybedrawnfromanyservice,theChiefofNaval Operations, the Chief

of Staff of the Army, theCommandant of the MarineCorps,and theChiefofStaffof the Air Force. JFACCJoint Forces Air ComponentCommander.Theofficerwhohas operational control overall air units and air assetsassigned to a theater ofoperations. The JFACC istypically drawn from theservice that has the greatestamount of airpower in thearea of operations, and

reports directly to the theaterCommanderinChief.JP-5StandardU.S.jetfuel.Apetroleumdistillatesimilar tokerosene.JTF Joint Task Force: amilitary unit composed ofelements of two or moreservices, commanded by arelativelyseniorofficer.JTFsmay be organized for aspecific mission, ormaintained as semi-

permanent organizations,such as the anti-drug JTF-4basedinFlorida.KC-10 Extender Heavytanker/transport based onBoeing DC-10 wide-bodycommercial airliner. 59aircraft in service, somemodified with droguerefuelinghosereelaswellastail boom. Three CF6turbofan engines. Maximumtakeoffweightis590,000lbs.

KC-130 Lockheed“Hercules” four-engineturboprop,usedasatransportand aerial tanker by Marineairunits.Knot Nautical miles (6,076feet)perhour.OftenusedbyU.S. Air Force and Navy tomeasure aircraft speeds,particular in the subsonicrange. One knot equals onenauticalmileperhour.LGB Laser-guided bomb,

such as the Paveway-seriesLGBsproducedbyRaytheon.LHA Large amphibiousassault ship designed tooperate helicopters andSTOVL aircraft, with a welldeckforlandingcraft.LHD Amphibious assaultshipwithflightdeckandwelldeck.LPD Amphibious ship withwelldeck.

LPH Amphibious assaultship designed to operatehelicopters.LRIP Low Rate InitialProduction. A phase in thedevelopment of a newweapon system in which the“bugs” are worked out ofmanufacturing techniques,tooling, and documentationbefore shifting to full-rateproduction.LSD Amphibious landing

dockship.M-61 Vulcan Six-barreledrotary (“Gatling”) 20mmcannon used as standardweapononU.S.aircraft.Veryhigh rate of fire. Alsomounted on Army vehiclesand Navy ships for short-rangeantiaircraftdefense.Mach The speed of sound atsea level (760 feet persecond). An aircraft’s Machnumber is dependent on

altitude, since sound travelsfaster in a denser medium.Named for Ernst Mach(1838-1916), Austrianphysicist.MAGMarineAircraftGroup.MAGTFMarineAir-GroundTaskForce.MAWMarineAircraftWing.MCAS Marine Corps AirStation.MEB Marine Expeditionary

Brigade.MEF Marine ExpeditionaryForce.MEU Marine ExpeditionaryUnit.MEU (SOC) MarineExpeditionary Unit (SpecialOperationsCapable).MFDMulti-functionDisplay.Asmallvideomonitororflatpanel display on an aircraftcontrol panel that allows the

operator to display andmanipulate different kinds ofsensor information, statusindications, warnings, andsystemdiagnosticdata.MiGRussianacronymfortheMikoyan-Gurevich DesignBureau, developers of someofthegreatestfighteraircraftin history. Survived thebreakupof theSovietUnion,and is actively competing intheglobalarmsmarket.

MOS Military OccupationalSpecialty.MPF MaritimePrepositioningForce.MPS MaritimePrepositioningShip.MPSRON MaritimePrepositioning ShipSquadron.MRC Major RegionalContingency Pentagoneuphemism for small war or

large crisis requiring asignificant intervention ofU.S. military forces asdirectedbythePresident.MRE Meals, Ready to Eat.Military field ration inindividual serving packs.Eaten by Marines ondeployment until regulardining facilities can beconstructed. Humorouslyknownas“MealsRejectedbyEveryone.”

NAF Naval Air Facility(typicallyasmallerbasethanaNavalAirStation).NASNavalAirStation.Nautical Mile (nm) 6,076feet.Not tobeconfusedwithStatuteMile,of5,280feet.NAVAIRNavalAirSystemsCommand. Organization thatprocuresandmanagesaircraftand related systems andequipment for the Navy andMarine Corps. Formerly

calledBureau ofAeronautics(BuAir)NAVSEANavalSeaSystemsCommand. Organization thatprocures and manages shipsand related systems for theNavy. Formerly calledBureauofShips(BuShips).NBC Nuclear-Biological-Chemical. General term forweaponsofmassdestruction,including nuclear bombs orweaponsdesignedtodisperse

radioactive material, toxicgases, liquids, or powders,infectious microorganisms orbiological toxins. Forbiddenbymanyinternationaltreatiesthat have been widelyignored.NCO Non-CommissionedOfficer. An enlisted soldier,sailor, or airman withsupervisory responsibility ortechnical qualifications.There are nine standardized

enlisted pay grades, but eachservice has its own complexnomenclatureforNCOranks.In the navy these are pettyofficer, chief petty officer,seniorchiefpettyofficer,andmaster chief petty officer.The seniorNCOonavessel,regardless of rank, isinformally known as“CommandMasterChief.”NEO Non-combatantEvacuation Operations. Use

of military force to rescueAmerican and foreigncitizens, diplomaticpersonnel, and reliefworkersendangeredbycivilunrestorfactionalfighting.NORADNorthAmericanAirDefense Command. JointU.S.-Canadian headquarterslocated inside CheyenneMountain, CO, responsiblefor air defense of NorthAmerica. CINCNORAD is

also the Commander of U.S.SpaceCommand.NRO NationalReconnaissance Office.Formerly super-secretintelligence agencyestablished in early 1960’swithin the Department ofDefense. Not officiallyacknowledged to exist until1990’s. Responsible forprocurement, operation, andmanagementofvarious types

of reconnaissance satellites.A separate organization, theCentral Imagery Office, isresponsible for processing,interpretation, anddissemination of satelliteimagery.NSNavalStation, typicallyalarger base that includesshore facilities, airfields, andlogisticinstallations.“Nugget”Pilot jargon foraninexperiencedaviator,ornew

personinthesquadron.O&M Operations andMaintenance.Amajorbudgetitemforallmilitaryunits.OpTempoOperationaltempo—subjective measure of theintensity of militaryoperations. In combat highOpTempos can overwhelmthe enemy’s ability torespond,attheriskofburningout your own forces. Inpeacetime a high OpTempo

can adversely affect moraleandexhaustbudgetedfunds.Ordnance Weapons,ammunition, or otherconsumable armament.Frequentlymisspelled.OTHOvertheHorizon.Usedin references to sensors andtargeting. Distance to thevisual horizon may be 20milesfromthemastheadofaship, ormore than 200milesfrom an aircraft at high

altitude.PAA Primary AircraftAuthorized—the number ofplanes allocated to a unit forthe performance of itsoperational mission. PAA isthe basis for budgetingmanpower, supportequipment, and flying hours.In some cases, a unit mayhavefeweraircraftbecauseofdelivery schedule slippage oraccidents. Units may also

have more aircraft than theirPAA, such as trainers, spare“maintenance floats,” orinoperable“hangarqueens.”PAO Public Affairs Officer.Military staff officerresponsible for mediarelations, coordination withcivil authorities, VIP escortduties, and similar chores.ThePAOofanaircraftcarrieristypicallyaNavylieutenant,supervising a small team of

enlisted writers and mediaspecialists.Paveway Generic term forlaser-guidedbombs.MadebyRaytheon/Texas Instrumentssince 1968. Latest PavewayIII version provides standoffrangeof3-5nm.PGM Precision GuidedMunition.Commonlycalleda“smart bomb,” any weaponthat uses electronic, electro-optical, inertial, or other

advanced forms of terminalguidance to achieve a veryhigh probability of hitting itstarget.PitchChangeofanaircraft’sattitude relative to its lateralaxis(alinedrawnfromlefttoright through the center ofgravity). Pitch up and thenoserises;pitchdownandthenosedrops.“PuckerFactor”Flightcrewanxiety level. Typically

related to highly stressfulcombat situations such asmajor aircraft systemmalfunctionswhileunderfirefromenemymissiles.PylonAstructureattachedtothe wing or fuselage of anaircraft that supports anengine, fuel tank,weapon,orexternalpod.Thepylonitselfmay be removable, in whichcase it is attached to a “hardpoint” that provides a

mechanical and electricalinterface.RAM Radar AbsorbingMaterial. Metal or metal-oxide particles or fibersembedded in synthetic resinapplied as a coating orsurface treatment on radar-reflectiveareasofavehicleinordertoreduceitsradarcrosssection. A particular RAMformulation may be specific

toanarrowbandoftheradarfrequencyspectrum.RC-135V Rivet JointProgram name for electronicreconnaissance aircraft,operatedby55thWingbasedat Offut AFB, NE. Used inSaudi Arabia during DesertShield/DesertStorm.RH-53E Sikorsky “SeaDragon” found in mine-countermeasureunits.RIM-116ARAMRIM-116A

Rolling Airframe Missile.Development began in 1975as a jointU.S./German/Danishprogram. Entered service inJune 1993 on USS Peleliu(LHA-5). Combines seekerhead of Stinger SAM withmotor, warhead, and fusefrom AIM-9 Sidewinder.Angled tail fins cause themissile to spin in flight forstability. Range of around 5nm,andcarriedina21-round

boxlauncher.RO-RO Roll-on/Roll-off. Acargo ship with vehicleparkingdecks,flexibleramps,and special ventilation,allowing loaded vehicles todrive on or off under theirownpower.ROE Rules of Engagement.Guidanceoftendeterminedatthe highest levels of nationalgovernment, regarding howand when warriors may

employtheirweapons.Inair-to-air combat, ROE usuallyspecify specific criteria fordeclaring a non-friendlyaircraft as hostile. In air-to-ground combat,ROEusuallyforbids attacking targetslikely to involve significantcollateral damage to civilianpopulationsor religioussites.Regardless of the ROE, theright of self-defense againstdirect armed attack is neverdenied.

Roll Change of attituderelative to the longitudinalaxis (a line drawn fromnoseto tail through the center ofgravity). Roll to port and anaircrafttiltstotheleft;rolltostarboard and it tilts to theright. Roll also describes aclassofaerobaticmaneuvers,suchasthebarrelroll.RWR Radar WarningReceiver. An electronicdetectortunedtooneormore

hostile radar frequencies andlinked to an alarm that alertsthe pilot to the approximatedirection, and possibly thetype of threat. Similar inconcept to automotive policeradar detectors. Also knownas a RHAW (Radar HomingandWarningReceiver).SAM Surface toAirMissile.A guided missile with theprimary mission of engagingand destroying enemy

aircraft. Most SAMs userocket propulsion and sometype of radar or infraredguidance.SAR Synthetic ApertureRadar. An aircraft radar (oroperating mode of a multi-function radar) that canproduce highly accurategroundmaps.SCUD Western reportingname for the Soviet R-11(SCUD-A)andR-17(SCUD-

B) short-range ballisticmissiles. Based largely oncaptured WW II Germantechnology. Range of 110-180mileswith900-kg/1,980-1b warhead, with inaccurateinertial guidance. Can betransported and erected forlaunch by a large truck.Widely exported to Iraq,NorthKorea,andotherSovietclient states. Iraq modifiedbasic SCUD-B design toproduce longer-ranged Al

Abbas and Al Husseinmissiles with much smallerwarheads.SEADSuppressionofEnemyAir Defenses. This requiresenticing the enemy to “lightup” search and trackingradars, launch SAMs, or fireantiaircraft guns, which canthen be targeted fordestruction or neutralizationby jamming and othercountermeasures.

SIGINT Signal Intelligence.Interception, decoding, andanalysis of enemycommunicationstraffic.Skunk Works® Lockheed’sBurbank, California,Advanced Developmentgroup,createdduringWWIIbyengineerClarence“Kelly”Johnson.Developed theU-2,SR-71, F-117, and othersecret aircraft. LockheedMartin copyrights the name

andskunkcartoonlogo.Slat A long, narrow,moveable control surface,usually along the leadingedge of the wing, to provideadditionallifeduringtakeoff.Sortie The basic unit ofairpower: one completecombat mission by oneaircraft.“Sortiegeneration”istheabilityofanairunittore-arm, refuel, and serviceaircraft for repeatedmissions

inagivenperiod.Sparrow AIM-7 family oflong-range radar-guided air-to-air missiles produced byRaytheon. Variants includethe ship-launched SeaSparrow.StallSuddenlostofliftwhentheairflowseparatesfromthewing surface;may be causedby a variety of maneuvers,such as climbing too steeplywith insufficient thrust.

“Compressor stall” is adifferent phenomenon thatoccurs inside a turbineengine.Stealth A combination ofdesign features, technologies,and materials, some highlyclassified,designed to reducetheradar,visual,infrared,andacoustic signature of anaircraft,ship,orothervehicle.Thiscanbetakentothepointwhere effective enemy

detection andcountermeasures areextremelyunlikelybefore thevehicle has completed itsmission and escaped. The F-117A is the best-knownmodernexample.STOVL Short Takeoff-Vertical Landing. Capabilityof certain vectored-thrustaircraft, notably the Harrierand variants of the futureJoint Strike Fighter. Short

takeoff is assisted by a fixed“ski-jump”ramp.T-38 Talon Twin-turbojetadvanced trainer, over 1,100built by Northrop. Enteredservice in 1961. Firstsupersonic aircraftspecifically designed as atrainer.T-3A Firefly Lightweighttwo-seat propeller-driventrainer based on BritishSlingsby T67. Used by U.S.

Air Force for screening ofprospectivepilots.Top speed178mph,ceiling19,000ft.TARPS Tactical AirReconnaissance Pod System.A 1,700-pound/770 kg podbuilt by Naval AvionicsCenterandfittedtofourF-14fighters in each carrier airwing. Pod carries a 9-inchpanoramic camera, 12-inchframe camera, and infraredlinescanner.

TDY Temporary Duty. Amilitary assignment to alocation away from one’snormal duty station. TDYgenerally involves separationfrom family and entitlespersonnel to supplementarypayandallowances.TERCOM Terrain ContourMatching, a cruise-missile-guidance concept that relieson a radar altimeter and astored digital map of

elevations along the line offlight. Flight plans requiredetailed and lengthypreparation, and cannot begenerated for relatively flat,featurelessterrain.TopGun U.S. Navy FighterWeapon School at NASFallon, NV. Responsible fortraining fleet pilots in air-combatmaneuvering.TRAP Tactical Recovery ofAircraftandPersonnel.

U-2 High-altitude (over90,000 ft/27,430 m)reconnaissance aircraftoriginally developed in 1950for the U.S. CentralIntelligence Agency byLockheed. Single J57, laterJ75 turbojet. Many variantswithdiversesensorsoperatedby the USAF and NASA(civilianresearch).UAV Unmanned AerialVehicle. Also known as a

drone or RPV (remotelypiloted vehicle). Arecoverable pilotless aircraft,either remotely controlledover a radio-data link, orpreprogrammed with anadvanced autopilot. TheU.S.AirForcehastendedtoresistany use of UAVs, except astargets, because they takejobs away frompilots. Thereare also real safety concernsabout operating UAVs andmanned aircraft in the same

airspace, since they areusuallysmallandhardtosee.UCAV Unmanned CombatAerial Vehicle. Also knownas adroneorRPV (remotelypiloted vehicle). Arecoverable pilotless aircraft,either remotely controlledover a radio-data link, orpreprogrammed with anadvancedautopilot.UH-1N “Huey” light utilityhelicopter found in Marine

light-attack squadrons andsupportunits.UH-46 Aging Boeing Vertol“Sea Knight” twin-rotorhelicopter found in Navyutilityandlogisticsquadrons.Nicknamed“Bullfrog.”UPT Undergraduate PilotTrainingV-22 Osprey Bell-Boeing-built twin-engine tilt-rotoraircraft,combiningtheagilityofahelicopterwiththespeed

and range of a fixed-wingturboprop. JointMarine/Navy/Air Forceprogram, delivery began in1997.VA Navy Attack Squadron,previouslyequippedwithA-7or A-6 aircraft. With theretirementofthesetypes,thissquadron designation is nolongerused.VAQ Navy TacticalElectronicWarfareSquadron,

equipped with EA-6 Prowleraircraft.Variable geometry Abilityof an aircraft to change thesweep of its wings in flight,tooptimizeperformanceforagivenspeedandaltitude.VAWNavyCarrierAirborneEarly Warning Squadron,equippedwithE-2CHawkeyeaircraft.VF Navy Fighter Squadron,typically equipped with F-14

Tomcats.VFA Navy Strike FighterSquadron, typically equippedwithF/A-18Hornets.Viewgraph An overheadprojector transparency orslide used in briefings orpresentations. Also spelledVu-graph.VMA Marine AttackSquadron (e.g., VMA-211).TypicallyequippedwithAV-8BHarrier.

VMAT Marine AttackTraining Squadron (e.g.,VMAT-203). Typicallyequipped with AV-8BHarrier.VMFA Marine FighterAttack Squadron (e.g.,VMFA-115). Typicallyequipped with F/A-18Hornet.VMFAT Marine FighterAttack Training Squadron(e.g., VMFAT-101).

TypicallyequippedwithF/A-18Hornet.VMGR Marine AerialRefueler Transport Squadron(e.g., VMGR-252). TypicallyequippedwithKC-130.VP Navy Patrol Squadron,typically equippedwith land-basedP-3Orionaircraft.VRCFleetLogisticsSupportSquadron (Carrier onboarddelivery) equipped with C-2Greyhoundaircraft.

VS Navy Sea ControlSquadron equipped with S-3Vikingaircraft.V/STOL Vertical/ShortTakeoffandLanding.VTNavyTrainingSquadron.Equippedwithawidevarietyof aircraft—carrier trainingsquadronstypicallyflytheT-2BuckeyeorT-45Goshawk.Wild Weasel An aircraftconfigured with Radar

Homing and Warning(RHAW) gear and Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARMs)operated to suppress enemysurface-to-air-missile sites.Originally performed by F-100F, F-105F, and F-4GPhantom II aircraft, thismission will increasingly bebornebyspeciallytrainedandequipped F-16Cs, F/A-18Cs,andEA-6Bs.XO Executive Officer,

second in command of asquadron, vessel, orequivalentunit.

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Little,Brown,1993.Toliver,ColonelTaymondF.,and Trevor J. Constable.Fighter General: The Life ofAdolf Galland. AmPress,1990.Townsend, Peter. Duel ofEagles. Simon & Schuster,1969.TRW Space Data, 4th ed.TRW,1992.Ulanoff, Stanley M.,

Brigadier General, USAR,and David Eshel, LieutenantColonel, IDF (Ret.). TheFighting Israeli Air Force.ArcoPublishing,1985.U.S.NewsandWorldReportStaff. Triumph withoutVictory: The UnreportedHistory of the Persian GulfWar.RandomHouse,1992.Valenzi,KathleenD.Forgedin Steel: US Marine CorpsAviation.HowellPress,1987.

Van der Vat, Dan. ThePacific Campaign, WorldWar II. Simon & Schuster,1991.Venkus, Colonel Robert E.RaidonQaddafi.St.Martin’sPress,1992.Volkman, Ernest, and BlaineBaggett. Secret Intelligence:TheInsideStoryofAmerica’sEspionage Empire.Doubleday,1989.VonHassell,Agostino.Strike

Force: US Marine SpecialOperations. Howell Press,Charlottesville, Virginia,1991.Wagner, William. Firefliesand other UAV’s. MidlandPublishingLimited,1992.—.LightningBugsandOtherReconnaissance Drones.AeroPublishers,1982.Walker,Bryce.FightingJets.Time-LifeBooks,1983.

Walter, Douglas C. TheCommandos: The InsideStory of America’s SecretSoldiers. Simon & Schuster,1994.Ward, Commander Nigel“Sharkey,” DSC, AFC, RN.Sea Harrier over theFalklands: A Maverick atWar. Naval Institute Press,1992.Warden, John A., III,Colonel, USAF. The Air

Campaign: Planning forCombat. Brassey’sPublishing,1989.Ware,LewisB.LowIntensityConflict in the Third World.U.S. Government PrintingOffice,1988.Warnock, A. Timothy. TheBattle against the U-Boat inthe American Theater. TheU.S. Army Air Forces inWorldWarII,1992.Watson, Bruce W., Bruce

George, MP, Peter Tsouras,and B. L. Cyr. MilitaryLessons of the Gulf War.GreenhillBooks,1991.Wedertz, Bill. Dictionary ofNaval Abbreviations. NavalInstitutePress,1977.Weinberg,Gerhard.A WorldatArms:AGlobalHistoryofWorld War 11. Cambridge,1994.Weinberger,Caspar.Fightingfor Peace: Seven Critical

Years in the Pentagon.WarnerBooks,1990.Weinberger, Caspar, andPeter Schweizer. The NextWar.Regnery,1996.Weisgall, Jonathan M.Operation Crossroads: TheAtomic Tests at Bikini Atoll.NavalInstitutePress,1994.Weissman, Steve, andHerbertKrosney.TheIslamicBomb.TimesBooks,1981.

Werrell, Kenneth P. TheEvolution of the CruiseMissile.AirUniversityPress,1985.Westerfield,H.Bradford, ed.Inside CIA’s Private World:DeclassifiedArticlesfromtheAgency’s Internal Journal.YaleUniversityPress,1995.Whipple,A.B.TotheShoresof Tripoli: The Birth of theUS Navy and Marines.Morrow,1991.

Wilcox, Robert. Scream ofEagles. John F. Wiley &Sons,1990.—. Wings of Fury. PocketBooks,1996.Winnefeld, James A., andDanaJ.Johnson.ALeagueofAirmen:USAirPowerintheGulf War. Rand Project AirForce,1994.—. Joint Air Operations:PursuitofUnityinCommandand Control 1942-1991.

NavalInstitutePress,1993.Winter, Frank H. The FirstGolden Age of Rocketry.Smithsonian Institution,1990.Winton, John.ULTRA in thePacific.NavalInstitutePress,1993.Wood, Derek. Jane’s WorldAircraft RecognitionHandbook, 5th ed. Jane’sInformationGroup,1992.

—. Project Cancelled: TheDisaster of Britain’sAbandoned Aircraft Projects.Jane’sPublishingInc.,1986.Woodward, Robert. TheCommanders. Simon &Schuster,1991.Woodward, Sandy, Admiral,RN.OneHundredDays:TheMemoirs of the FalklandsBattle Group Commander.NavalInstitutePress,1992.Yergin, Daniel. The Prize:

The Epic Quest for Oil,Money and Power. Simon&Schuster,1991.Yonay,Ehud.NoMargin forError.Pantheon,1993.Yoshimura, Akira. Build theMusashi! The Birth andDeath of the World’sGreatestWarship. Kodansha,Tokyo,1996.—. Zero Fighter. Praeger,1996.

Zaloga, Steven J. TargetAmerica: The Soviet Unionand theStrategicArmsRace,1945-1964. Presidio Press,1993.Zumwalt, Elmo, Admiral,USN (Ret.). On Watch.AdmiralZumwaltAssociates,Arlington,Virginia,1976.Zuyev, Alexander, withMalcolm McConnell.Fulcrum: A TopGun Pilot’sEscape from the Soviet

Empire.WarnerBooks,1992.

Pamphlets:

GPS: A Guide to the NextUtility. Trimble Navigation,1989.MeasuringEffectsofPayloadand Radius Differences ofFighterAircraft.Rand,1993.Reaching Globally Reaching

Powerfully:TheUnitedStatesAir Force in the Gulf War.Departmentof theAirForce,1991.Space Log, 1993. TRW,1994.TRW Space Data, 4th ed.TRW,1992.

Magazines:

Air and Space Smithsonian.SmithsonianInstitute.Air Force. United States AirForceAssociation.Air Forces Monthly. KeyPublishing,Ltd.Air International. ExpeditersofthePrintedWord,Ltd.Airman. Air Force NewsAgency.Airpower Journal. UnitedStatesAirForce.

Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology. McGraw HillPublications.CodeOne.LockheedMartin.Command: Military History,Strategy and Analysis. XTRCorporation.Naval History. United StatesNavalInstitute.The Economist. TheEconomist.The Hook. The Tailhook

Association.USAF Weapons Review.Commandant, USAFWeaponsSchool.U.S.NewsandWorldReport.U.S.NewsandWorldReport.USNI Proceedings. UnitedStatesNavalInstitute.Wings of Fame. AerospacePublishing Ltd., AirtimePublishing,Inc.World Airpower Journal.

Aerospace Publishing Ltd.,AirtimePublishing,Inc.

Videotapes:

AGM-137 (ISSAM). U.S. AirForce,9/6/94.A New Legacy. NorthropTelevision Communications,1994.BLU-109B: Penetrate and

Destroy. Lockheed MissilesandSpaceCompany,1992CIA: The Secret Files, parts1-4.A&EHomeVideo,1992.FIA-18 Hornet ’94.McDonnell Douglas,Northrop Grumman, GeneralElectric,Hughes,1994.Fighter Air Combat Trainer.SpectrumHoloByte,1993.Fire and Steel. McDonnellDouglas,1992

Heroes of the Storm. MediaCenter,1991It’saboutPerformance.Sight&SoundMedia,1994JSOW Update 1994. TexasInstruments,1994.Loral Aeronutronic-PaveTack Exec. Version. Loral,1991MAG-13 Music Video, longversion.McDonnellDouglas,1992

Navy League—1992.McDonnell Douglas &Northrop,1992.Navy League—1993.McDonnell Douglas,Northrop, General Electric,Hughes,1993.New Developments in theHarpoon and Slam. MediaCenter,1996Night Strike Fighter F/A-18.McDonnell Douglas,Northrop, General Electric,

Hughes,1992NightHawkF/4-18TargetingFLIR Video. LoralAeronutronic,1995Nobody Does It Better.McDonnellDouglas,1996OM94008 Lantim TurningNight into DavlllOM94154Lantim/Pathfinder CockpitDisplay. Martin Marietta,9/29/94.On the Road Again.

McDonnell Douglas,Northrop, General Electric,Hughes,1995Operation Desert StormNight Hawk and Pave TackFLIR Video for IRIS. LoralAeronutronic,1991Paveway Stock Footage.Defense Systems &ElectronicsGroup,1991Slam/SlamERProductVideo.MediaCenter,1994

Slam Video Composite.MediaCenter,1992Stealth and Survivability,revision 5. TelevisionCommunications,1994Storm from the Sea. NavalInstitute,1991.The Canadian Forces in thePersianGulf.DGPA-DirectorGeneralPublicAffairs,1991WarintheGulfVideo,Series1-4. Video Oradance Inc.,

1991.Wings of the Red Star,volume 1, 2, and 3. TheDiscoveryChannel,1993.Wings over theGulf, volume1,2, and 3. DiscoveryCommunicationsInc.,1991.

Games:

Ace of Aces of Jet Eagles.

NOVA Game Designs, Inc.,0-917037-07-3.Ace of Aces Wingleader.NOVA Game Designs, Inc.,0-917037-06-5.AceofAcesWWIAirCombatGame. NOVA GameDesigns,Inc.,0-917037-00-6.Air Strike: Modern Air-to-Ground Combat. GameDesigners Workshop, 1987,0-943580-30-7.

Air Superiority: Modern JetAirCombat.GameDesignersWorkshop, 1987, 0-943580-19-6.Captain’s Edition Harpoon.GDWGames,1990,1-55878-054-8.Dawn Patrol: Role-PlayingGame of WWI Air Combat.TSRHobbies,1980.Flight Leader: The Game ofAir-to-Air Jet CombatTactics, 1950-Present. The

AvalonHillGameCompany,1985,0-911605-22-3.Harpoon. Game DesignersWorkshop, 1987, 0-943580-12-9.Over the Reich: WWII AirCombat over Europe. ClashofArmsGames,1995.The Speed of Heat: AirCombat over Korea andVietnam. Clash of ArmsGames,1993.

1“Tora ... Tora ... Tora” isJapanese for “Tiger ...Tiger... Tiger.” This was theradio call indicating a fullysuccessful strike on theHawaiian air and Navalbases.2

MidwayandtheBattlesoftheCoralSea,EasternSolomons,and Santa Cruz Islands wereall fought between Japanese

and American carrier groupsin1942.Theywereuniqueinbeing the first battles wherethe major opposing forcesnever actually sighted eachother,andthemajorityofthedamage was inflicted by airstrikes instead of gun ortorpedofire. In theseactions,six Japanese and threeAmericanflattopsweresunk.3

In the spring of 1998,

oceanographer andadventurerDr.RobertBallardledanexpeditionthatlocatedthe sunken Yorktown on theocean floor north ofMidwayAtoll.Uprightonthebottom,sheisinexcellentshape,withhergunsstilltrainedout,asifreadyforaction.4

“Littoral” regionsaredefinedgeographically as those areaslying within several hundred

miles/kilometers of acoastline. Since the majorityof the world’s population,finance, industry, andinfrastructureresideinlittoralregions,theseaservicesfocusonoperationsthere.5

For more on the ARG andMEU (SOC), see:Marine: AGuided Tour of a MarineExpeditionary Unit (BerkleyBooks,1996).

6The primary Zeppelin basefor operations againstEngland and the North Seafleets was at Tondern nearWhelimshaven (on theGerman/Danish border). InJuly of 1917, seven SopwithCamels flying from theflying-off deck of HMSFuriousattackedtheZeppelinsheds there; three Zeppelinswere destroyed in their

hangar.7

Battle cruisers, a Britishinvention, combined a largehull and power plant with abattleship’s armament.Whileas fast as a cruiser (twenty-five-plus knots) and asheavilyarmedasabattleship,they lacked the armorprotection of a traditionaldreadnought.Thismadethemvulnerable toenemyfire ina

gunnery duel, though theycould normally run awayfromastockbattleship.8

The “5:5:3 ratio” representedthe allowable naval tonnageunder the treaty for theU.S.,Great Britain and Japanrespectively. The treaty helduntilthe1930s,whentherun-uptoWorldWarIIbegan.9

Though it would be twodecades before practicalexperience would prove it,the single most importantcharacteristic of carrierdesignisaircraftcapacity.Noother factor, including speed,antiaircraft armament, orarmor protection is sodesirable as the ability tocarry and operate lots ofaircraft. The British foundthis out the hard way, whenthey sacrificed aircraft

capacity for armor protectionin their Illustrious-classcarriers, which could onlycarry about thirty-six planes(while the AmericanYorktown (CV-5) andJapanese Shokaku-classcarrierscouldcarryninety).10

Of the three battleships thatsanktothebottomofTarantoHarbor,theLittorioandCaioDuillowereeventually raised

and returned to service. Thethird vessel, the Conte deCavor,wasnotrepairedpriorto the Italian Armistice in1943.11

Unlike the Japanese, whotended to keep their warriersincombatuntiltheydied,theUnited States developed arotation system to rest andreplenish its combatpersonnel at all levels—even

admirals. Thus, the fastcarrier fleet had two sets ofcommanders and staffs: the3rd Fleet under AdmiralHalsey, and the 5thcommanded by AdmiralRaymond Spruance. Aftereach operation, the two fleetstaffswouldswitch,allowingtheoutgoinggrouptorestandplan the next mission. Thus,when Halsey was incommand, the fleet wasknownasTaskForce34;and

whenAdmiralSpruance tookover, the carrier force wasknownasTaskForce58.12

In addition to the loss of theHiyo, the Japanese also lostthe two large fleet carriersShokaku and Taiho tosubmarineattacks.13

One of the few survivors ofthe purge was Admiral

Arleigh Burke, later tobecome—arguably—theNavy’s greatest modernleader.14

The CSS Virginia is morewidely, though incorrectly,knownastheMerrimac,afterthe Union ship that she wasbuiltfrom.15

In1995,theAirForcesigned

an agreement with the Navyand Marine Corps to retiretheirfleetofEF-111ARavenelectronic warfarc/jammingaircraft for a series of jointsquadrons composed of EA-6B Prowlers. These jointsquadrons, which havepersonnel from all threeservices,havebeenformedtoprovidesuppressionofenemyair defense (SEAD) servicesfor joint componentcommanders, and deployed

CVWs.16

Navyjargonforarookieflieron their first cruise ordeployment.17

The most extreme of theseengagements occurred earlyin the Battle of Leyte Gulf,when the commander of AirGroup Nine aboard the USSEssex (CV-9), Commander

David McCampbell, and asingle wingman, LieutenantRoy Rushing, engaged anincoming Japanese fighterforce of over fifty enemyaircraft. McCampbell shotdown at least nine, whileRushing killed six. No otherAmericanfightermission—inany war—shot down somany. For this performance,McCampbell was awardedthe Medal of Honor, andRushingtheNavyCross.

18A pun. For the Navy,Airedales are not a breed ofEnglish terrier but thenickname used by ship’spersonnel to describe theNaval aviators of theembarkedairwing.19

The worst of these lossesoccurred on the 1967/68cruise of the USS Oriskany(CVA-34) and CVW-16.

During122daysofactionon“theline”intheTonkinGulf,thirty-nine CVW-16 aircraftwere lost to combat andaccidents, with twenty aircrew killed, and anotherseven taken prisoner—overhalf the embarked aircraft,and something over 10% ofthe aircrew personnel.Vietnam combat cruiseswithlossesofover twentyaircraftwerenotunusual.

20Elmo Zumwalt was an earlyleader in improvingconditions for enlistedpersonnel in the Navy. Heprovidedmuchoftheimpetusfor the necessary changesrequired for the all-volunteermilitary force that followedVietnam. He also helpedredefine the relationshipbetween officers and enlistedpersonnel, greatly increasing

respect andcourtesybetweenthetwogroups.21

The name derives from theTailhook Association, acivilian organization thatpromotes and supportsNavalaviation. The Association,which actually sponsors theLas Vegas conferences, hadnothing at all to do with theTailhook scandal (and wasofficially exonerated during

the Department of Defenseinvestigation). TheAssociation is a fineorganization,whichpublishesa superb magazine, TheHook.22

There are still a few enlistedbillets in naval aviation, butthesearclimitedtopersonnelin charge of cargo loading,para-rescue, and some sensoroperations. In general, any

position of responsibility isgoingtohaveanofficerinit.23

The naval aviation programalso trains air crews for theCoast Guard, which istechnically a part of theDepartment ofTransportation.Theseincludegraduatesof theCoastGuardAcademy in New London,Connecticut, as well as theCoast Guard Officer

Candidate School atYorktown, Virginia. Othernations also send their navalaviation candidates to taketheirtrainingintheU.S.24

Just a few years ago, serviceacademy graduatesautomatically received aregular commission upongraduation. However, in anattempt to even the playingfield for non-academy

graduates, all new officercommissionsarenowreservecommissions. Once officershave risen to the rank oflieutenant, theycanapplyforwhatiscalled“augmentation”toaregularstatus.25

Most new aircraft havereplaced traditional dial and“strip” instruments withcomputer-drivenMultiFunctional Displays

(MFDs). These have theadvantageofbetterpresentingdatatotheaircrews,andtheycanbe reconfigured in flight.This means that duringtakcoff, for example, the aircrewcanpicktheinstrumentsmostimportanttothematthattime. So-called “glasscockpits” have between fiveandadozensuchMFDs,andhavebecomequitepopular.26

In the 1960s when air-to-airkill ratios against NorthVietnamese MiG fightersbegan to fall off, thededicated efforts of a coupleof F-8 Crusader FRS IPs(James “Ruft” Ruliffson andJ.R. “Hot Dog” Brown)created the famous Topgunschool.More recently, theF-14 FRS at NAS Oceana,Virginia, managed to hang amodified LANTIRN lasertargetingpodonto aTomcat,

so that it could deliver laser-guidedbombs.Thislittletrickincreased the number ofaircraft that could deliverprecision weapons in everyCVWbyabout25%,whichisnot shabby for an ad hoceffort!27

The atomic combatrequirementwasoutlinedinafamous 1947 memorandumprepared by Rear Admiral

Dan Gallery. He was alegendary Naval aviationfigure (he commanded theescort carrier group thatcaptured the German U-505in1944),andhispaperwouldeventually start a virtual warbetween the Navy and thenewly created Air Force. 28The original carrier USSEnterprise (CV-6) wasarguably the U.S. Navy’sgreatest warship, with acombat record second to

none. She fought in five ofthe six great carrier-versus-carrier clashes, survivingseriouscombatdamagemanytimes.TheEnterprisewas sohated by the Japanese thattheyclaimedtohavesunkherby name on a number ofoccasions.28

USSRanger (CV-4),was thefirst American carrier builtfrom the keel up. At only

about fourteen thousand tonsdisplacement, Ranger wastiny compared to LexingtonandSaratoga, and it showedwhen she went into service.With less than half of theaircraft capacity of the twolarger ships, Ranger wassimplytoosmall tosupportapowerful air group, and wasnever considered a front-linevessel.Despitethis,theNavylearnedvaluablelessonsfrombuilding Ranger, and it

showed in the next class ofaircraftcarriers.29

A new reactor design underconsideration for futurecarriers will never needrefueling. This is atremendous advantage, sincerefueling is a complexoverhaul that takes threeyearsinashipyard.30

Secretary Lehman alsoauthorized the reactivationofthe four World War II-eraIowa-class (BB-61)battleships armed withantishipandlong-rangecruisemissiles.31

Thomas Jefferson alsoappearsonMountRushmore,but he was always skepticalabout sea power, and in theNavy’seyeshedidnotmerit

thenamingofacarrier.32

Originally, CVN-75 was tohave been named the USSUnited States, after theoriginal supercarrier (CVA-58)brokenuponthebuildingways in 1949. In fact, thereexistphotosofherkeelbeinglaid under that name.However, for politicalreasons, the ClintonAdministration decided to

renameherHarryS.Truman.Soforthesecondtime,HarryTruman “sank” the USSUnitedStates!33

The Virginia is frequentlyand incorrectly referred to asthe Merrimac, which waspreviously a steam frigate inthe Federal Navy.Incompletely burned andscuttled when the GosportNavalYard(nearthepresent-

dayNorfolkNavalBase)wasabandoned in 1861 byFederal forces, it was raisedand then used to build theConfederateironclad.34

AfteryearsofbeingapartofTennaco Corporation,Newport News Shipbuildingseparatedin1996andisnowa full-time shipbuildingconcern.35

The four catapults on everycarrier are numbered 1through4,fromthestarboardbow (Catapult 1) to the portangle(Catapult4).36

For example, the tiny “LOXcrew” cares for a tank ofimmensely hazardous liquidoxygen, which is used torefill the breathing airsystemsofsomeaircraft.Thistanksitsonan inclined ramp

on the deck edge. A quick-release fitting allows it to besent into the sea in the eventof a fire, to prevent acatastrophicexplosion.37

Because of the hightemperaturesgeneratedbytheengineafterburnersofaircraftlike the F-14 Tomcat andF/A-18 Hornet, the JBDscontain a system of coolingchannels, through which are

pumped seawater. Thissystem keeps thehydraulically erected JBDsfrom melting under thethermalpounding.38

The Navy does not useradioactivesteamtopoweritscatapults. The steam thatpowerseverythingontheshipis actually heated in thesecondary (non-radioactive)loop of the reactor plant.All

oftheradioactivecomponentsof the reactor plant arecontainedineitherthereactorvesselsortheprimarycoolingloopofthesystem.39

Some people get lucky. In1983, during an attemptedlaunch on board the USSJohn F. Kennedy (CV-67),thecrewofanA-6EIntrudersuffered a “cold shot,” andejectedjustbeforetheaircraft

pitched over the end of thebow into the water. Thepilot’sejectionseatfiredhimup,andhisparachute lethimdowngently,unhurt,ontothedeck just in frontof the JBDof the catapult that hadmisfired his aircraft! Thebombardier/navigatorwasnotquite so lucky. Because hisseatfiredaninstantearlier,hewas thrownfartheraftand tothe side, and his parachutecaughttheoverhangingtailof

an EA-6B Prowler before hehittheocean.Theemergencycrewssearchedforoverahalfhour before they found thecrewman hanging over thesideaftof the island,bruisedfrombanging heavily againstthehull,butalive.40

The only known “live”servicefiringofSeaSparrowoccurred in 1992, when theUSS Saratoga (CV- 60)

accidentally launched a pairof the SAMs, one of whichstruck the Turkish destroyerMauvenet. Five Turkishsailors were killed by thedetonation of the warhead,includingtheship’scaptain.41

The name is a particularlyrude reference to a habit ofman’sbestfriend.42

Forthoseofyouwithadesireto fully understand theworkings of nuclear reactorsin detail, see my bookSubmarine:AGuidedTourofa Nuclear Warship (BerkleyBooks, 1992). 44 The term“SkunkWorks” refers to theoriginal Lockheed AdvancedProjectsDivisioninBurbank,California,whichwasheadedby the legendary KellyJohnson and Ben Rich, andwas designed to produce

“out-of-the-box” ideas thatcould be rapidly andeconomically produced.Examples of the SkunkWorks concept in actioninclude the F-80 ShootingStar, the U-2 and SR-71reconnaissance aircraft, andthe F-117A Nighthawkstealth fighter. A number ofcompanies, includingNewport News ShipbuildingandBoeingMilitaryAircraft,have set up similar

organizations. 45 “SkiJumps” were developed bytheRoyalNavyinthe1970’sto improve the takeoff andload-carrying characteristicsof V/STOL aircraft like theFRS.1/2SeaHarrierandAV-8BHarrierII.Theadditionofaslightinclinetotheendofaflight deck provides theaircraft an upward “push” atthe critical point of takeoff.So effective are ski jumps atgiving V/STOL aircraft

“somethingfornothing,” thatalmost every nation withcarriers,withtheexceptionofthe United States, utilizesthemintheircarrierdesigns.43

While Naval aviators didhavesomeprecisionweaponssuchasPavewayIILGBsandthenewAGM-84EStandoffLand Attack Missile(SLAM), their stockpileswere small, and lacked the

capabilities of the newestsystems like the Paveway IIILGB and GBU-15 electro-optical guided bombs. Sorapidly were these stocksusedup that theNavyhad toborrow a supply of PavewayII LGB kits from the USAFsothattheycouldcontinuetostrikeprecisiontargets.44

The “Virtual Presence”campaign was designed to

support additionalprocurementoftheB-2Spiritstealth bomber, hopefullywith the funds that could bediverted by cancelingproduction of additionalaircraft carriers and theiraircraft. Saner views tookhold, and the production ofthe B-2 was capped attwenty-one.45

“Black” procurement

programs are designed to beso secret that they are notofficially acknowledged inthe federal budget. Only aselectgroupoflegislatorsandadministrators are allowed toknow of these projects, andthe clearances required toworkon themareaboveTopSecret.46

As if all thiswas not absurdenough, there was the

problem that DoD and theNavyimproperlycanceledtheA-12 program, claiming thatthe GD and MDC hadsomehow “defaulted” on thecontract. Normally, suchcancellations are ofgovernment “convenience,”allowing the contractors torecover their lossesandcostsfor shutting down theprogram.However,DoD andthe Navy contended that thecontractors had failed to do

their jobs properly, and thusactuallyowedthegovernmentaround$1.3billion inmoneyalready paid. As might beimagined,thisrapidlybecamea matter for high-pricedlawyers, and resulted in anexpensive show trial that thegovernment decisively lost.While the government andcontractors continue arguingover the details, it looks liketheNavywill have to coughupsomethinglike$3.8billion

over the roughly $4.8 billionalready spent to pay for itsimproper cancellation of theprogram.47

The shame of it is that thedesignoftheA-12appearstohavebeensound,andwhileitwouldhavebeenexpensiveatbetween S150 and $175million a copy, that seemsquite reasonable whencompared to the Lockheed

Martin F-22A Raptor stealthair-superiority fighter, whichis priced almost identically!51 To put an ironicperspective on this decision,General Charles “Chuck”Horner, who commandedU.S. Air Forces in DesertStorm, has told me that theonly Navy strike aircraft hevaluedduringtheDesert48

This also conformed to the

usualNavypracticeofgivingfeline names to Grummanfighters.49

When Soviet intelligenceobtainedthespecificationsforthe F-14 in the early 1970’s,thenumbersactually terrifiedtheRussian fighter pilots.Sodesperatewere theSoviets tocounter the F-14, and theother third-generationWestern fighter designs, that

they began to spendexhorbitant amounts ofmoney on new fighterdesigns, and on intelligenceefforts to obtain technicalinformation that they couldcopyintotheirnewaircraft.50

Compared to the F-14’ssingle helicopter air-to-air“kill” during the war, F-15’sscored thirty-five victories.Much of this was due to the

advanced NCTR systems ofthe USAF aircraft, whichmade them better able toemploy their long-rangeweapons with the certaintyrequired to avoid possible“blue-on-blue”incidents.51

Along with the U.S. Navy,there was a single foreigncustomer for theTomcat: theImperial Iranian Air Force(IIAF).TheIIAFTomcatsale

wasapprovedby theShahofIran, based upon thecapability of the AIM-54Phoenix to hit the fast, high-flying MiG-25 Foxbat-Rreconnaissance aircraft thathadbeenintrudingacrosstheborder shared with the then-Soviet Union. Of the eightyIIAFTomcatsordered,allbutone was delivered, with thelast F-14 being embargoedand eventually delivered totheUSN.Verylittlehasbeen

published in open sourcesabout the air battles of theIraq-Iran War (1980-88),thoughsomeoftheF-14’sarereportedlystillflyingtoday.52

During Desert Storm, thiswas usually four Mk. 831,000-lb/454.5-kg general-purpose bombs or a pair ofMk. 20 Rockeye clusterbombs. Today, the Hornettends to carry PGMs like

PavewayLGBs.57WhiletheLANTIRNsystemisusedonsingle-seat F-16C fighter-bombers, it tends to belimited to striking fixed,preplanned targets only. Formissions requiring a searchfor a target, two-personaircraft like the F-14Tomcator F-15E Strike Eagle arenecessary.58TheA/U/RGM-84 Harpoon has been inservice since the late 1970’s,originally having been

designed to deal with patrolboats and other surfacecombatantsatrangesofupto60 nm/100 km. Thousandshave been bought by dozensofnationsforuseonaircraft,ships, and submarines. Itremains the most commonand popular antishippingmissileintheworldtoday.53

The Raytheon (formerlyTexas Instruments) AGM-

88AHARMmissileis13ft,7in/4.2meterslong,10in/25.4cm in diameter, and weighs798 lb/363 kg. Rangedepends on the speed andaltitude of the launchingaircraft, but a standoff of 50nm/92.6 km is typical forProwlermissions.54

In 1953, some of theNavy’solder aircraft carriers wereredesignated as

Antisubmarine AircraftCarriers, with air groupsspecificallytailoredforASW.These were mostly made upofASWhelicoptersandS-2FTrackers.55

The Soviet “Alfa”- and“Sierra”-class SSNs, alongwith a few experimentalboats, hadhullswelded fromtitanium,averynon-magneticmetal. The Russians can no

longer afford the exoticconstruction methodsrequiredtobuildsuchboats.56

This can be as low as fivehundred feet, according tosome open-sourcepublications. For obviousreasons, MAD performancespecsarehighlyclassified.57

Because of the scope of the

original LAMPS Mk. IIIsystem with ship-mounteddatalinksandprocessors, theNavyfeltthattheaircraftwasonlya secondarycomponent.Therefore, IBMwas selectedto integrate the entireaircraft/shipsystem.58

For more on the UH-60Blackhawk, see my bookArmored Cav (BerkleyBooks,1994).

59On the nose of all Block 11and III TLAMs is a small“lip” that helps reduce theradar signatureof themissileby deflecting, rather thanreflecting, incoming radarwaves.Also,RAMisusedatvarious places around theTLAM airframe to furtherreduce the missile’s radarreturn.60

The development andproduction of the thousandsof TERCOM terrain mapsthat were necessary to hittargets around theworld is amind-numbing job. So muchso that it took the DefenseMapping Agency (now partof the National Imagery andMappingAgency)sixmonthsto build the TERCOMmapsneeded to give TLAMplannersjustthreeroutes(oneeach from the Persian Gulf,

Red Sea, and MediterraneanSea) for the missiles to flyintotheBaghdadarea.61

Current Navy plans havesome thirty F/A-18E/FSuperHornets being built in FiscalYear 1999, which willprovide enough of the newaircraft to constitute the firstadvanced training and fleetsquadrons.62

For a general primer onairborne ordnance, seeFighter Wing (BerkleyBooks,1995).63

One of the more interestingpossibilities for JSOW is touseitasaresupplysystemforSpecial Forces units behindenemylines.Itcouldevenbepacked full of MRE rationpackages, and used forhumanitarian relief in “hot”

combatzones.64

TheUSMCMEU(SOC) isamulti-purpose/capability unitbased around a reinforcedMarine battalion andmedium-helicopter squadron.For more information onMEU (SOC)s and theiroperations, see my bookMarine: AGuided Tour of aMarine Expeditionary Unit(BerkleyBooks,1996).

65Therearemorecarriergroupsin the Pacific because theU.S. still maintains oneCVBG/CVW at Japanesebases. The remaining groupsare based at the West Coastports of San Diego,California; Alameda,California; Everett,Washington; and Bremerton,Washington.66

Given the historicunreliability of the UnitedStates in foreign affairs andalliances, very few nationsarewillingtoriskthepoliticalfallout it takes to invite inU.S. forces. For example,because of the political andcultural risks, Saudi Arabiadenied America access tobases during the 1997/98Iraqicrisis.67

Currently,O-10(AdmiralandGeneral)arethehighestranksallowed by Federal law. TheO-11 rank is a rare honor,votedbyCongressforspecialpersonnel and occasions.These are known asAdmiralof the Fleet, and General ofthe Army/Air Force/MarineCorps. The last livingrecipient of this honor wasGeneral of the Army OmarBradley.

68“CAG”isa termdatingbacktobeforeWorldWarII,whenthe air unit aboard a carrierwasknownas69

Much of this informationcomesfromCombatFleetsofthe World (A.D. Baker, III,U.S. Naval Institute Press),which is the finest suchvolume in the world. If youwanttoknowmore,lookitup

inCombatFleets.70

Despite their intended “lowmix” status in the ColdWarstructure of the U.S. Navy,the FFG-7’s have frequentlybeen in the thickofmaritimeoperations and actions. Twoof them, the Stark (FFG-31)andSamuelB.Roberts(FFG-58), were severely damagedbymissilesandminesduringoperationsinthePersianGulf

in the late 1980’s, butsurvivedtoservetoday.FFG-7’s were later key assets inthe maritime embargoes ofIraq, Bosnia, and Haiti, aswell as in combat operationsduringDesertStorm.71

Formoreon theARG,MEU(SOC), and their variouscomponentsandmissions,seemy bookMarine: A GuidedTour of a Marine

Expeditionary Unit (BerkleyBooks,1995).72

In addition to USACOM,therearesevenotherregionalCinCs. These include thePacificCommand(PACOM),Strategic Command(STRATCOM), SouthernCommand (SOUTHCOM),Central Command(CENTCOM), SpecialOperations Command

(SOCOM), Space Command(SPACECOM), EuropeanCommand (EUCOM), andTransportation Command(TRANSCOM).73

Though there are literallydozens of such programs(ranging from staff-levelexercises to war gamesinvolving tens of thousandsof participants), the bestknown are at the Army’s

National Training Center atFort Irwin,California, and atthe Air Force’s OperationRed Flag at Nellis AFB,Nevada.74

Most veterans of DesertStorm will tell you that theextensive force-on-forcetraining prior to theirdeployment to the PersianGulf was tougher thananything the Iraqis threw at

them. This is hardly asurprise, since the OpposingForce units they trainedagainst are usually the best-trainedandmotivatedunitsintheU.S.military.75

This is the samegroup that Ihighlighted inmy1996bookMarine:A Guided Tour of aMarine Expeditionary Unit(Berkley Books, 1996). 82The GW, Norrnandy (CG-

64), South Carolina (CGN-37), and Guam were allscheduled either for deepoverhaul or scrapping at theendofthecruisein1998.76

ThissimilartotheRed/GreenFlag exercises conducted bythe USAF at Nellis AFB tothesouthofFallon.Althoughsomewhat smaller than theNellis exercises, there is agreater emphasis on live-fire

andelectronic-warfareissues.77

For a closer look at theoutstanding JRTC program,see my book Airborne: AGuided Tour of an AirborneTask Force (Berkley Books,1997).78

It was these kinds of“bumping” incidents thatcaused the creation of the

“Incidents at Sea” treatiesbetween the United States,theSovietUnion/Russia, andanumberofothernations.79

TheGW group that went tothe Gulf had two things incommon with the NimitzCVBG. In addition to thecarrierandlogisticsship,bothof the escort ships wereAegis- and Tomahawk-capable, as was the

submarine.Inshort,theytookthe ships with the mostfirepower where they wouldbeneeded.