captain fujii shigeru and the decision for war in 1941

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Captain Fujii Shigeru and the decision forwar in 1941Valdo Ferretti aa Lectures in the Faculty of Political Sciences , University of RomePublished online: 18 Apr 2007.

To cite this article: Valdo Ferretti (1991) Captain Fujii Shigeru and the decision for war in 1941, JapanForum, 3:2, 221-230, DOI: 10.1080/09555809108721422

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NEW LIGHT ON THE PACIFIC WAR • 1

Captain Fujii Shigeru and theDecision for War in 1941

VALDO FERRETTI

The death of the Showa Emperor in 1988 and the recent debate about the conflict inthe Persian Gulf have stimulated interest among people in Japan about war and theresponsibilities of decision-makers for peace and war. Despite, or perhaps becauseof, the fact that the participants in the decision-making for war in 1941 are extremelythin above ground, it has nevertheless become increasingly possible to investigatemore knowledgeably than ever before about the fateful Japanese decision-making inconnection with the Pacific War. Even though a great deal of study has been pursuedover the past half-century, it is still surprising how many diaries and documents havecome into the public domain only within the last decade. Many of these documentsthrow new light on the role of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the crisis and providepossible answers to questions that can still be considered open and worthy ofscholarly attention.

The particular one that I shall consider here relates to a minor aspect of one specialissue. Over the past few years some Japanese historians have been trying to explorethe reasons why all the other political groups in Japanese politics were unable torestrain the army when it advocated a foreign policy line which ultimately led to waragainst America and the European powers with colonial interests in South and EastAsia. One easy answer is that, as Japan since 1935 had become a militaristic state,with more than 50% of the national budget absorbed by the army and navy, otherpolitical elites did not count for much. Thus an attempt to check the army wouldhave been ineffectual. The Imperial institution as well, it has been argued, was notstrong enough to check the army's powers. It goes without saying that such a viewdepends on the fact that in pre-war Japan the latter was not only a military organ, butalso an actor, which legally and very influentially participated both in foreign policyand in selecting prime ministers. Therefore the rise of militarism can be seen as aprocess through which one element of the ruling class took control of the statemachine and national budget, thus succeeding in the last resort in achievinghegemony over other political forces.

There is an objection, however, to this position. The army in fact was not the onlyJapan Forum, Vol. 3, No. 2, October © BAJS 1991

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222 New Light on the Pacific War — 1

one to profit from such a situation. The navy was a parallel institution which in asimilar way took part in international decisions and obtained political advantagefrom the growing military budget.1

If, in 1941, the civil bureaucracy and the political parties had really been against war,and if the navy had aligned with them, one can assume that war could have beenavoided.2 A few examples in the twentieth century Japanese history offer goodground for such an approach. In 1912 on the eve of the so-called Taisho politicalchange {Taisho Seihen), the navy allied itself with parliamentary democratic forcesand their coalition defeated the oligarchic groups centring on thegenro Yamagata andthe army.3 In 1936 on the eve of the February 26 Incident, the basically unyieldingattitude of the navy substantially contributed to restraining those groups within thearmy that favoured the coup, thus allowing the revolt to be crushed.4 In August 1939facing an alliance comprised of Premier Hiranuma and of the Finance, Navy, andForeign Ministers, the Army Minister, Itagaki Seishiro, was beaten down on theissue of revising the Anti-Comintern pact in the manner proposed by Germany.5

According to the diary of Oka Takazumi, at that time Chief of the First Section of theNaval Affairs Bureau in the Navy Ministry, there were rumours that the army wouldstage a coup d'etat and set up a military dictatorship, but this fear, which presumablycame up in talks among leading politicians and bureaucrats, did not restrain theadversaries of an unrestricted alliance with Germany.6

Something must have happened, therefore, inside the Japanese ruling circles and inthe navy itself that may allow us to understand why in the last months of 1941 thingswent a completely different way.

Japanese historians have offered answers to these questions and between 1981 and1988 important new sources like the memoirs of Kobayashi Seizo7 and most of thediary of Sawamoto Yoryo8 have been published. Thus a few clear-cut explanationsare taking shape, while new facts have been revealed.

It is well known that the final crisis started in July 1941 when the United Statesdecided to freeze Japanese assets in America, thus stopping oil supplies to the RisingSun. This was intended as a countermeasure to the Japanese invasion of southernIndochina. It has been observed that the senior echelons of the navy at that time werebasically divided. While the Minister, Oikawa Kojiro, was against resorting to war,the Chief of the Naval Staff, Nagano Osami, took the opposite stand, claiming that by1942 the level of American naval armaments would match that of Japan.9 Thepresent moment was thus opportune to wage a war. Given such contrasts, madesharper by the anti-American feelings of many middle-ranking officers, Oikawa, whobelieved he had not the support of the whole navy, was unable to resist with the sameenergy as Yonai had done in 1939, allowed the Konoe administration to collapse, theTojo Cabinet to be established and a man without political experience such asShimada Shigetaro, to be imposed as Navy Minister by the Premier.10 That wasagainst any traditional pattern and, additionally, the strongest candidate of theservice for the premiership, Toyoda Soemu, who belonged to the anti-war and anti-army wing, saw himself rejected as a candidate.

Additional blame has been put on the former Chief of the Naval Staff, Prince

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Ferretti: Captain Fujii Shigeru and the Decision for War in 1941 223

Fushimi, who even after his retirement in April 1941, continued to enjoyconsiderable influence and to play a major role in politics. After Nagano made clearhis pro-war stand, a few senior naval advisers, such as Kobayashi Seizo and OkadaKeisuke, decided to induce him to leave his position by using the argument that theEmperor did not share his views. Oikawa would have taken his place and Yamamotowould become the new minister. Alternatively, Yamamoto would take charge of theNaval Staff. This manoeuvre, however, needed agreement between Nagano as theoutgoing Chief of the Naval Staff and the old Prince, who was said to oppose it. Whenthe Konoe government fell on 16 October, nothing had come of this, and, because ofTojo's appointment, the die was cast for war.11

The documents suggest one further development. There was a group in the navyincluding the attache in the United States, Yokoyama Ichiro, the Vice-MinisterSawamoto Yoryo, and the former Prime Minister Okada Keisuke, who as a result ofthe German attack on the USSR believed that later on the United States would enterthe war in Europe. When it occurred, according to them, America would probably beless ready than before to take a firm stand in the Far East. Consequently a diplomaticsolution to the crisis with Japan became possible. This was a good reason, stressedYokoyama on 27 June, to avoid war.12 Okada himself put forward the same ideas atthe Liaison Conference of 29 November, claiming that, even if it were very lengthy,there was room for a diplomatic settlement.13 It is interesting to note that Okada,according to Kobayashi's memoirs, had tried to obstruct Tojo's rise to power bystressing that it would cause antagonism between the Emperor and the army, but hisattempt was frustrated by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Kido.14

Broader insights have been provided by using more sophisticated models. Someauthors have emphasised that the navy could not go beyond a weak opposition to thearmy, because its strength in competition for budget appropriations depended forsome years on the risks involved by the estrangement and the chance of war with theUnited States. Should it be solved by diplomatic means and against the army, theadmirals probably would not have been able to face their rivals. By the way, if thenavy had overthrown the Tojo Cabinet in order to avoid war, it has been stressed,public opinion could doubt its readiness to defend the country and the service couldlose face.15

Two points can be considered established by the facts. Between 1940 and 1941 theidea that economic sanctions imposed by Washington would provoke an armedresponse from Japan had become more and more widespread in the service. From thesummer of 1940, when the export to Japan of scrap iron and other items useful forwar were cut by the Washington government, the atmosphere was tenser than at anytime before.

It was in August 1940 that Navy Minister Yoshida Zengo retired and was replaced byOikawa, who gave up, as his predecessor had done, his opposition to the signing ofthe Tripartite Pact. It did not have major importance in a strictly diplomatic sense,because an additional exchange of notes narrowed the scope of the automatic warclause, which had been the main target of discussions up to that moment. The changeof ministers, however, did mean something more for the internal political balancewithin the navy. Oikawa was to a still unclear extent a protege of Prince Fushimi, and

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224 New Light on the Pacific War - 1

we may argue that the group backed his choice in foreign policy.16 As Fushimi was toadvise Shimada on 27 October 1941 to approve the army's stand on the war issuealong the line suggested by the Naval Staff,17 there appears to have existed acontinuous thread running from the Tripartite Alliance to the attack on PearlHarbor.

The substance of this connection is still foggy and it is very difficult to put all theblame on Fushimi or on the middle-ranking officers, whose influence is suggested bysome sources but is far from having been definitively demonstrated.18 At any rate, atleast one point is certainly based on the above elements. As Kobayashi Seizo'smemoirs stress, the service was divided just when some of its men felt that thehistorical responsibility of restraining the partisans of a war against the USA restedon their shoulders. Probably for that reason Oikawa was unable from August 1941 toshoulder the task of taking a stronger stand and the future looked very bleak.19

Given all that, however, it is not clear how many groups were involved and wherepossible dividing lines ran. This side of the problem can be clarified, I believe, bypaying attention to a much ignored figure. This person belonged to a small groupwith links to Prime Minister Konoe and probably expressed an attitude differentfrom both that of Nagano and of moderates like Okada and Yonai. On the side of the'doves', men like Yamamoto Isoroku stressed the lack of readiness for war fortechnical reasons, while Sawamoto and Yokoyama laid emphasis on politicalreasons; on the hawkish side we find the strictly military reasons advocated byNagano and, as far as we know, by Fushimi. Fujii's diary,20 allows us to look at howhe saw things as an observer and a political actor. He certainly did not share thepositions of the moderates, nor can he be identified with their adversaries.

The author, at that time a captain, was a member of both the 2nd Section of the NavalAffairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry and of the so-called First Committee, created inthe same Ministry in order to study political affairs, a task basically common to theformer office also.21 Fujii had extensive experience of Chinese affairs, and wasparticularly involved in the Wang Ching-wei business late in 1939, as we shall seelater.

His diary runs from January 1940 to October 1941, six days before the fall of theKonoe government. It therefore does not give us any information on the author'sattitude in the final stages of the decision for war.

Some strong views lead us to understand, however, that Fujii did not like thepartisans of the so-called Genji Ijiha,22 the conservative faction that was against boththe social programme of Konoe and the China policy of the Japanese government.Even if in a very broad sense, for lack of better evidence, he appears as a supporter ofthe renovationist group who, generally speaking, backed Konoe up to the summer of1940 and approved the Tripartite Pact, by sharing much common ground with thearmy. The basic ideas in Fujii's approach to international problems were apparent inhis activity as an expert on China.

At the beginning of 1940,23 he noted that the sum of money requested by the army inorder to win the war in China was enormous and beyond the financial capabilities ofJapan. Hence, in his opinion, the problem had to be solved by diplomatic means. At

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that time two methods had been suggested within Japanese ruling circles: directnegotiations with Chiang Kai-shek's government or setting up a puppet regimeunder Wang Ching-wei. Fujii definitely preferred the first solution,24 even if hisdiary does not explain why. In his view, however, the two alternatives were notmutually exclusive. The real purpose of Japan, he stressed, was to end the war inChina. When the final negotiations with Wang Ching-wei started in May 1940, Fujiiobserved that a step had been taken in order to solve the Chinese Incident, but addedthat one had to work fast. Otherwise, in his words, blame had to be placed on thesenior echelons of the navy who were unable to go beyond routine and to makedecisions.25 On 4 April 1940, he put down in writing that the most brilliant momentin Japanese foreign policy had to be the era of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's campaigns onthe continent, which failed miserably because Korean sea power curbed Japaneseambitions. Thus, in order to escape another humiliating defeat, according to Fujii,the Imperial Navy had to be made strong enough to solve the Chinese problem onceand for all.26

Hence negotiations with Wang Ching-wei seem to have been, in his eyes, the propermethod for inducing the militarily strong and menacing Chiang Kai-shek to come toterms and accept an agreement with Japan. He had previously remarked that Wang'srecognition was possible, even if a section of the army had a different opinion.27

One can argue that basically Fujii tended to think like a politician and favoured astrong navy as a means to achieve a negotiated and peaceful solution of the ChinaIncident. Moreover nothing leadsDus to believe that he had strong ideological notionsor was a hot-headed advocate of southward expansion. Fujii appears to have lookedto the US-Japan crisis of 1940-1941 with the same sort of mentality. The diary doesnot tell us at which moment the author realised that the axis of the internationalbalance in the Far East had started to shift to confrontation between Tokyo andWashington. Following other sources,28 however, we may assume that the Japanesemilitary visualised its beginning, as some contemporary historians do, in theunilateral denunciation of the Japanese-American treaty of commerce in 1939, whichoccurred only a few weeks before the beginning of the war in Europe. After theAmerican sanctions in the summer of 1940, Fujii must have started to believe that aclash between the two powers could not be avoided, but there were still avenues toprevent the worst. On 23 September, when Japanese forces occupied French airportsand railways in northern Indochina, he noted that another world war was beginningand that war in Indochina differed from China war.29 At the same time he must havebecome convinced that a combination of economic sanctions by Washington andmilitary retaliation by Japan did not in principle leave much or any room for apeaceful solution. At the same time, he must have seen a strong connection betweenthe Indochina issue and the problem of the Tripartite Pact. He remarked that sinceApril 1940 the Army General Staff had wanted to advance into northern Indochinabut the brake had been applied by the navy. Its Vice-Chief of Staff, KondoNobutake, finally approved the idea and opposition to the plan ended.30

In his 19 September entry, he said that the navy had finally approved the TripartiteAlliance as war with the United States was expected to come later on because ofAmerican economic sanctions. Also the alliance with Germany created a new

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situation, he reasoned, and allowed them to do something new.31 He added thatdomestic public opinion was strongly in favour of it and, amidst many hesitations,the pact made it easier for the navy to obtain higher budget appropriations.32 Theimportance of these considerations, however, is far from clear in the diary.Fujii remarked, that, if the appropriations were not granted, the service would beunable to perform its duties and believed that tension was to a larger extent arisingfrom the general international environment. In his view America did not want asettlement with Japan for several reasons, some of which seem very relevant. Acompromise between Washington and Tokyo would in fact weaken the Britishposition in the Far East and make Germany stronger in Europe; in addition, theUnited States would have to change the traditional stand on Far Eastern problems ithad maintained since the Washington Conference in 1922. As long as there was noagreement, the United States could hope to restrain Japan. Furthermore, they knewthat the resources of the Rising Sun were not sufficient for a long war. Ultimatelyputting an end to the crisis in the Far East, in Fujii's interpretation of Americanpolicies, would impede a solution to the war in Europe.33

Basically, however, he thought that in fact the alliance existed before its signing,which in concrete terms had added nothing new; and for this very reason Britain, hestressed, had not been impressed at all.34 It is worth noting that his opinion differedfrom that of men like Matsuoka or Muto Akira, the Chief of the Military AffairsBureau, who considered the Pact as a type of bloc to be extended to the USSR.35 Fujiideemed that a desistement between Japan and the USSR, with or without Germanmediation, was impossible, as he expected Russia to ask for something which Tokyocould not give, such as a sphere of influence in China, or legal recognition for theChinese Red Army.36 Fujii, just after telling us why the navy had signed the alliancewith Germany and Italy, appears in the end much more pessimistic and cold thanMatsuoka and does not conceal his mistrust of Germany which, after the signing,continued to show some interest toward China.37

In 1941 his perception of international developments grew more and more clear. It iswell known that after the Franco-Thai dispute of January 1941 and Japan'sintervention on Bangkok's side, a brief diplomatic incident between Tokyo andLondon ensued, as the British Foreign Office suspected an attack on Singapore to beimminent.38

Fujii wrote that an excited atmosphere extended even to Australia, whileAnglo-American collaboration was being strengthened. In Japan Matsuoka himselftried to cool the situation and had rejected the pleas of the military for a furtheradvance into Indochina. According to Fujii, mutual distrust and provocationbetween the Anglo-American group and Japan was now reaching its peak. There wasnow, the author noted, a strong danger of war and only an extremely rigid attitude onJapan's side could lead Washington to soften its line. America itself, he stressed,would attack if Japan looked weak or hesitant.39

As stated above, Fujii was a member of the First Committee in the Navy Ministryand for this reason his views are worthy of careful consideration. On 5 June 1941, theFirst Committee produced a document addressed to the higher ministry hierarchyproposing an advance into southern Indochina, even if this entailed the risk of war.

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Actually such a stand simply implemented one more decision taken after the Franco-Thai dispute, namely that in the case of full-blown Western economic sanctions,Japan would resort to war. Such a conclusion had never been ratified by the Cabinet,but so far as the military and their influence were concerned, it must be seen as thepremiss of this document quoted above.40 Fujii tells us something of its background.Basically, he says that the middle-echelon officers angrily sensed the danger of acomplete alignment between the Anglo-Saxon powers, Holland and China. TheFirst Committee put pressure on senior officers and Indochina was included in theCo-Prosperity Sphere. On 3 June, the ambassador in Germany, Oshima Hiroshi,informed Tokyo that Hitler had decided to attack the Soviet Union. It was at thattime that the debates between the advocates of a southern advance and the partisansof waging war against the USSR commenced. The navy was, generally speaking,against a continental adventure and in this frame the 5 June document was written.41

This point, however, probably deserves some additional discussion. The Chief of the2nd Section of the Naval Affairs Bureau, where Fujii was working, was IshikawaShingo, who also directed the First Committee. He had been very close to theextreme rightists in the early 1930s and had belonged to the strongest opponents ofnaval disarmament, led or inspired by the so-called Togo group and by SuetsuguNobumasa. In 1941 he must have shared strong anti-American and anti-Britishfeelings, while his influence on the events of June 1941 seems obvious.42

One may wonder, however, to what extent Fujii approved his line of argument. Thelatter's attention was directed toward China, while the former's concern was mainlywith South-East Asia. Nonetheless, as far as we know, Fujii only believed that a veryfirm and resolute stand could prevent the worst. After the American oil sanctions, thediary talks about the events which led to the Imperial Conference decision on 6September, which concluded that unless a diplomatic solution came by the end ofOctober, Japan would make war.43 One also learns that originally this scheme hadtaken shape in the First Committee and eventually reached the Imperial Conference,in spite of the braking influence of the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, OkaTakazumi.44

Basically, we may assume that Fujii endorsed the strong attitude of the 2nd Sectionof the bureau to which he belonged and whose powers, he stressed, had to bedrastically increased.45 Moreover, even after the 6 September decision, his diaryconfirmed that he saw it as unavoidable because of the attitude of America andBritain. Vis-a-vis the former he saw a similarity with the situation existing before theRusso-Japanese war, when Japan offered to reduce its demands in Korea, but all talkof compromise had been rejected by Russia. In the summer of 1941, the Americanattitude over China looked to him the same as that of St. Petersburg thirty-sevenyears before;46 since 1940, the sanctions also, although apparently just economic innature, had in his view military significance or were seen as an implicitly aggressiveact.47

By comparing this reflection with the author's reference to Hideyoshi's wars, itseems to be arguable that in Fujii's mind Japan could not fully renounce its positionin China, thus making compromise necessary if America wanted peace to be

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228 New Light on the Pacific War - /

preserved.47 The chances of this, however, seemed meagre to him because of thetough US line. Nonetheless, he still believed that a strong stance and a final effortcould be of help. Probably this was the background of his understanding of the 6September decision, which could be expected to hinder any sort of weak-kneeddiplomacy. On 12 September he had Saionji Kinkazu, a member of the small groupto which he belonged, tell Prince Konoe, whose government was vacillating underpressure from the pro-war War Minister, Tōjō Hideki, that he should not resign, for,if negotiations should fail, the blame would be laid at Washington's door.48 Fujiihimself had noted that the weakness of the cabinet stemmed from the fact that Tōjōwould not give up, in his words, even against the Emperor's feelings.49 It should beobserved that the Emperor's hostility to war was the principal weapon of themoderates and that Fujii used very hard words indeed against them even to the pointof guessing the dismissal of the popular Commander-in-Chief of the CombinedFleet, Yamamoto Isoroku.50 Hence, one is led to conclude that in September 1941,before Tōjō's rise to power, he and perhaps a larger body of opinion in the navy,continued to believe that a line as hard as possible could change the fatal coursewhich was shortly to be taken.

Conclusion

At first sight, Fujii and the small group to which he belonged do not seem to havecounted much in decision-making. Fujii's diary, however, does offer morestimulating in-depth insights that are useful for demonstrating that traditional sharpdistinctions between a conservative pro-Western faction and a pro-German hawkishgroup inside the navy need to be reconsidered. Fujii in 1940 approved the TripartitePact and in 1941 supported the invasion of southern Indochina. But in Septemberand October 1941, he seems to have been against resorting to war. His strategy ofdisplaying a rigid attitude in order to deter the USA from attacking Japan reveals acast of mind far from both moderates such as Sawamoto or Yonai and that of menclose to the pro-war army such as Ishikawa Shingo. It is to be hoped that futureresearch will permit greater insight into their roles in the years before 1940comparable to what has been learned in the years immediately preceding theoutbreak of war.

Notes1. With reference to the so-called Kokka Sōdōinpō, see Nagao Ryūichi, 'Teikoku Kenpō to Kokka

Sōdōinpō,' Kindai Nihon Kenkyū, Vol. 4.1982, pp. 3-27 and Furukawa Takahisa. 'Kokka Sōdōinpōo meguru seiji katei,' Nihon Rekishi 1987/6, p. 63-80, where the role of Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasais accorded special significance.

2. See Nomura Minoru, 'Kaigun to Taiheiyō Sensō ketsui,' Shigaku 1987/4, pp. 1-28 and especially pp.23-24.

3. For a fuller discussion of this theme, see the well-known works by Najita Tetsuo, Hara Kei and thePolitics of Compromise, 1905-1915. Cambridge, Mass., 1967, and Banno Junji, Taishō Seihen. 1900-nen taisei no hōkai. Kyoto, 1982.

4. Cf. Ben-Ami Shillony, Revolt in Japan. The Young Officers and the February 26, 1936 Incident.Princeton UP, 1973, pp. 169-71.

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5. One need only refer here to the vivid account provided by Harada Kumao, Saionji kō to seikyoku.Tokyo, 1951-1959, Vol. VIII, p. 42.

6. See Oka Takazumi Kaigun chūjō nikki, entries for 10-12 August 1939.

7. Itō Takashi and Nomura Minoru, eds. Kaigun Taishō Kobayashi Seizō oboegaki. Tokyo, 1981.(Hereinafter cited as the Kobayashi Memoirs.)

8. Itō Takashi, Sawamoto Tsuneo & Nomura Minoru, eds., 'Sawamoto Yōryō Kaigun shikan nikki:Nichibei kaisen zenya,' Chūō Kōron 1988/1, pp. 434-481, hereinafter cited as Sawamoto nikki.

9. Nomura, op. cit., 1987, provides a careful description of the crisis in the summer of 1941.

10. This interpretation of Oikawa's behaviour seems to come from Yonai Mitsumasa: KobayashiMemoirs, p. 105.

11. Ibid., p. 100.

12. Sawamoto nikki, p. 438.

13. Kobayashi Memoirs, p. 119.

14. Ibid., pp. 106-107.

15. For key bibliographical references, see Hatano Sumio, 'Daitōā Sensō' nojidai. Tokyo, 1988, p. 212,and Nomura, op. cit., 1987, pp. 23-24.

16. Nomura Minoru, Taiheiyō Sensō to Nihon gunbi. Tokyo, 1983, p. 345.

17. Bōei-chō, Bōei Kenkyusho, Senshi-shitsu, eds., Senshi Sōsho. [Nomura Minoru, ed.] DaihoneiKaigunbu Kengō Kantai, (1) Kaisen made. Tokyo, 1975, pp. 561-562.

18. For a brief overview of this issue, see Ikeda Kiyoshi, 'The Japanese View of the Royal Navy,' in: I.Nish, ed., 'Anglo-Japanese Naval Relations,' International Studies 1985/3, pp. 1-9.

19. Kobayashi Memoirs, p. 95.

20. Fujii Shigeru Nisshi: Shōwa 15-nen/16-nen, hereinafter cited as Fujii Nisshi.

21. For more details about this body, see Bōei-chō, op. cit., pp. 293-297.

22. Fujii Nisshi, entry for 19 September, 1941.

23. Ibid., 2 September 1940.

24. Ibid., 8 January 1940. However, Fujii showed little faith in Wang Ching-wei: entry of 27 April 1940.

25. Ibid., 8 May 1940.

26. Ibid., 18 April 1940.

27. Ibid., 8 May 1940.

28. See, for example, Oka Takazumi Kaigun chūjō nikki.

29. Fujii Nisshi, 23 September 1940.






35. For further information about Mutō, see Hatano Sumio, 'Nichi-Doku-I Sangoku Dōmei ni kansurujakkan no kōsatsu,' Gunji Shigaku 1984, N.77, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 51-62.

36. Fujii Nisshi, 29 September 1940.

37. Ibid., 30 September 1940. Fujii added in a later entry on 9 November 1940 that the benefits Japanactually derived from the Tripartite Pact did not match the expectations.

38. See in particular Kyozo Sato, Japan and Britain at the Crossroads. Tokyo, 1986, pp. 93-106.

39. Fujii Nisshi, 25 June 1941.

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40. Cf. Asada Sadao & Hatano Sumio, 'The Japanese Decision to Move South,' in: E. Robertson & R.Boyce, eds., Paths to War. London, 1988.

41. Fujii Nisshi, 2 July 1941.

42. For a profile of Ishikawa, see Kudo Michibirō, Nihon Kaigun to Taiheiyo Sensō. Tokyo, 1984, Vol. II,pp.263ff.

43. This background to this decision is well known: see Bōei-chō, op. cit., pp. 554-555.

44. Fujii Nisshi, pp. 240-244.

45. Ibid., 15 October 1940.


47. Ibid., 29 September 1940. Fujii questioned whether Art.2 of the Tripartite might be construed ascovering armed aggression only and not include the use of economic sanctions.

48. Ibid., 4 October 1941.



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captain fujii shigeru and the decision for war in 1941

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