capital and labour in bombay city 1928-29

7/28/2019 Capital and Labour in Bombay City 1928-29

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Capital and Labour in Bombay City, 1928-29

S Bhattacharya

This paper attempts to study the historical specificities of class conflict andconsciousness in colonialIndia in the industrial context. This attempt is made on the basis of a study ofcertain long-termtrends converging towards an intensification of labour-capital conflict in the Bombay textile industry anda detailed analysis of a nodal point, the strike actions of 1928-29. The paper questions some currentnotions about the 'irrationality' of working-class behaviour faced with technological change.

An attempt it also made to study the processes accentuating the 'transparency' of class conflictand solidarity of class organisations in the context of the complex interactionbetween capital labourand the colonial State.

Finally, the paper explores the factors which account for the occlusion of working class consciousness.

THIS paper poses some questionsawarding class conflict and its socialand political manifestations in the late1920s using an analysis of certainevents of 1928-29 as a point of departure.The choice of this period is notarbitrary since this period was a nodalpoint where certain long-term trendsconverged towards an intensificationof class conflict and much thatwas latent became explicit in dramaticstrike action in the Bombay textile industry

in 1928-29. The choice of thequestions may, however, appear arbitrarysince the explication of the entireproblematic from which thesequestions originate is not a part of thepresent exercise. The first set of questionsrelate to technological changesin the cotton textile industry whichintensified labour-capital conflict (Section1). The organisation of institutionspromoting class solidarity on bothsides, capitalist and working class, andthe synergistic process of Interaction

that tended to crystallise class solidarityon both sides of the battle linesin 1928-29 raise another set of problems(Section IT). Finally, we shall turnto the quality of consciousness displayedby the working class in the1928-29 struggles and try to locate thesource of weakness in their movement(Section III).


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The significance of the generalstrikes of 1928-29 in Bombay was emphasisedby R P Dutt in "India Today"and the left has continued toregard these years as a water-shed.This is partly because the emergenceof left leadership in the labour movementin Western India coincided withthese strikes. Pravda (June 22, 1929)had hailed the "victorious revolutionarytrade union in Bombay",1 justabout the time when the defeat of theGirni Kamgar Union (Red Flag) becamean acknowledged fact. Authors at differentends of the left spectrum likeSukomal Sen and V B Karnik agreeon the significance of the strike in the

history of Indian working class movementwhile differing on the communists'performance.- However, most ofthe available accounts of the strikes of1928-29 concentrate almost exclusivelyon the ideas and activities of the

leadership and the findings of theStrike Inquiry Committee, the onlysource other than the Meerut depositionsof the leaders, (M D Morris isan exception in being interested onlyin the labour management aspect of thestrike experience.) Evidently we haveto go beyond the mere juxtaposition ofcxtracs from In Pre Cor, AITUC resolutions,and memoirs of left leadersto explore the techno-economic changesto which the mill-hands reacted,the alignment of forces capital brought

to hear upon the strike, the structura-tion of working class consciousness,etc.

At the outset a semantic problemmay be eliminated. In this paper theterm 'working class' has been usedwith this limited connotation that certainobjective existence conditions providea commonality of basic interestsderived from position in the productivesystem; the use of the term 'class' heredoes not posit the existence of class

consciousness (of the kind that is conjuredup by phrases like 'class foritself) among the constituents of theclass. In fact one of the points madehere is the relevance of Lukacs' ideaof 'gradation' in levels of consciousnesswhich has been developed by somesociologists like Giddens into elaboratetypologies (class identity-conflictawareness-revolutionary class consciousness)


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and has left a mark on empiricalstudies like that of John Foster(labour consciousness-class consciousness).Perhaps this notion in Lukacs ismore useful than his more well-knownformulation concerning 'false Consci-ousness'.'3

IIn the 1920s the Bombay textile in

dustry was in the grip of a major technologicai transformation. As A K Bagchi'has pointed out, this was not so muchin terms of introduction of new machineryas "better deployment of labourin relation to machinery". In fact,Bombay had, compared to Ahmedabad,a greater proportion of capital goodsof older vintage which made it difficultto adjust to requirements of expandingdomestic market (displacementof British manufacturers) and to

react to the challenge of Japanesecompetition. How the working classwas affected by this response on thepart of the Bombay millowners, "betterdeployment of labour", has remainedrather obscure.

The millowners, both individuallyand through the Millowners' Association,pursued two schemes 'rationalisation'and 'standardisation ofwages'. M D Morris's is the only studyof this problem. But it is difficult to

agree with his argument in this matter."In the minds of the employersthe standardisation of wage rates wasintegrally linked with a rationalisationof work... Unfortunately for labourforce stability, the employers feltforced [under 'economic crisis'] to face

both problems at the same time

And no trade union in 1928 had thewill or power to enforce acceptance ofsuch combined proposals on the workers,

especially when this threatenedadditional unemployment"5 The suggestionthat employers were willing toseparate the issues of rationalisationand wage standardisation but for thefortuitous coincidence of an 'economiccrisis' is rather naive. There is no doubtthat these two issues were integrallylinked in the millowners' mind preciselybecause they together provided for


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reduction in labour costs through intensificationof labour without anacknowledged wage cut. The consequencesof rationalisation of labour processin terms of labour intensificationis not touched upon by Morris, An-

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

Review of Political Economy October 1981

other problem with his analysis is asuggestion that resistance to rationalisationwas irrational on the part ofworkers. The millowners1 attempt tochange the methods of labour utilisation,i e, radical reform in the industry,"could be carried out only overthe violent protests of the increasinglyself-conscious work force or withits co-operation"; this co-operation,Morris says, was denied and "in thetumultuous, fear-ridden, and violentarmosphere of the mills, the demandsof the Communists especially playedon the workers' hostility to the employers."6 Only an overestimation ofworkers' irrationality and of the rationalityof labour-capital co-operation

can lead to such conclusions. The millownershad as good reasons for undertakingrationalisation and wage standardisationsimultaneously as the workershad for opposing them.

By and large these two schemesmeant intensification of labour in generaland a fall in what S A Dange called"absolute wages". This was effectivelyconcealed by the management. Theday to day reports on the proceedingsof the Strike Inquiry Committee show

that the millowners' representatives Stones and Saklatvala were mastersof prevarication. For example:

N M Joshi: "You stated that if a mandid double work he would get50 per cent increase inwages."Stones: "Our principle has been definitelystated as: a fair day'swages for a fair day's work."7Dange made the point that even withwages stable or increasing, there may

be less wages for work performed:"There is an absolute increase and arelative increase in these things. Theremay be a relative increase for all appearancesby increasing the work. In

that case the increase does not workabsolutely."11 The management took refugeunder technical complexities.They also reduced wage rates by declaring


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rates for 'new sorts' (new typesof manufacture) for which there wasno standard rate earlier. The answerto these tactics would have to usetime and motion studies, to get dataon speed of machines. productivity perworker, etc, which were not availableto the labour leaders.

It is in the confidential reports ofMillowners' Association that one canget the details of changes in work processinduced by technical changes. TheBMOA surveyed 74 mills to report tothe Director General of Commercial Intelligencethe following changes in1927-29: (a) machinery was rebuilt orrearranged to permit of greater numberof spindles being attended to byone operative, and two sides of spinningframe by one operative; (b) anincrease in spindles per spinner (60 to100) obtained by lengthening the spinningframes in some mills; (c) higher

speed of winding and warping was introduced;(d) more work was compressedby saving time by various means,e g, winding of hanks for dyeing avoidedby direct dyeing in the cheese orbeam; (e) using universal windingmachines which put more weft on theshuttle thus reducing stoppage forweft replacement; (f) some mills alsoused high drafting in spinning, eliminatingthe roving frame and yarn beingspun directly from the intermediateframes.9

The effects were (a) intensificationof labour, without corresponding wageincrease; and (b) redundancy and consequentreduction in employment.One recalls Marx's description of theintensification of labour which inEngland was a response of the employersto the shortening of mill workinghours in the 1860s. "The denserhour of the ten hours working daycontain more labour, i c, expendedlabour power, than the more

porous hour of the tweleve hours'working day".10 Machinery and neworganisation of work "imposes onthe workman increased expenditure oflabour power" and this is "effected intwo ways: by increasing the speed ofmachinery, and by giving the workmanmore machinery to tent". Amongthe 17 points in the Charter of Demandsduring the strike of 1928 we


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find several relating to labour intensificationdue to rationalisation. Pointseven demanded that the system ofeach worker looking after three looms

or the whole frame (two sides) shouldnot be introduced without workers'consent. Point six related to new ratesof piece work, and point five to newrates for "new sorts",13

However, it was not so much thelabour-intensification effect as thethreat of redundancy and unemploymentthat worried the workers. TheBMOA reported reduction in employmentin 1927-29 to the extent of tento eleven thousand as a result ofrationalisation.11 Possibly the rate ofredundancy was greater. In 1926-27 thenumbers employed was 1,54,400 accordingto the Director General ofCommercial Intelligence, and in 1927-28thus fell to l,29,300.14 There is minor

discrepancy between these and thefigures compiled later (Table l).l5

It is noticeable that in 1927-28 therewas a 17.3 per cent fall in employment.The only means of checkingthese figures is to compare them withcensus data. The census shows a fallof textile factory employment from3.41 lakhs (1921) to 1.23 lakhs(193l).16 However 1931 being a fulldepression year the comparison is oflimited value.

One of the features of the strikes of1928-29 was the very prominent participationof female workers in the agitationincluding picketing. One explanationof this is provided by the dataon female employment (again subjectto the above limitation):17 The numberof female workers per 1,000 male workersin Greater Bombay in 1911, 1921and 1931 was, respectively, 158, 187and 123. In the textile industry, specifically,the number of female workers

declined from 32,900 in 1921 to 17,900in 1931 a much sharper declinethan that of all-workers in textiles.The census also shows a ratio ofdependents to workers growing from0.66 in 1921 to 1.09 in 1931."

What impact did the contraction ofemployment opportunities and the non-employment of women have on the


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living standards of working class familiescan be only surmised. There isno working class budget survey in thelate 1920s. However, only six years beforethe strike C Findlay Shirras, Directorof Labour Office, had conducted asurvey which was reported in theLabour Gazette. At that time (1921-22)the government had estimated that"industrial workers consume the maximumof cereals allowed by the FamineCode but less than the diet prescribedin the Bombay Jail Manual".19 Withthe exception of salt, in all otheritems like cereals, pulses, meat, oils.

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etc, the average industrial workingclass family members consumed lessthan the prisoners in jail. It is to benoted, however, that textile workerswere a little better paid than the averageindustrial worker; further, while75 per cent of Bombay industriallabour were mill-hands, 49.5 per centof the above sample budgets were oftextile workers' families.

To sum up, rationalisation meantharder work for the lucky mill-handand no work for the unlucky ones. Ina little known lecture in 1943 D RGadgil deduced the following from thetextile industry situation in the late1920s and the 1930s: "It may happenthat rationalisation, widely adopted,

brings about such changes in the marketrelations between labour and capitalthat labour as a whole suffers eitherby an added volume of unemploymentor by a reduced share of the productof the industry that it is able to securefor itself."20

II

In an earlier paper21 I had suggestedthat the battle lines were drawn andthe class conflict was intensified in

the 1920s and that it was absurd tostudy big capital in India divorced fromits relationship with labour. I wouldlike to pursue that argument a littlefarther, for my earlier paper did notdo justice to the complexities oflabour-capital relationship and thegrowth of class organisations (in whatI shall call a synergistic interactionalprocess).

Nicos Poulantzas makes an importantpoint when he argues that classes

cannot be defined outside of classstruggle: "Classes involve in one andsame process both class contradictionsand class struggle: social classes donot firstly exist as such and only thenenter into class struggle. Social classescoincide with class practice, i e, theclass struggle, and are only defined inmutual opposition."22 Much that Poul-antzas says about advanced capitalist


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society does not and is not intendedto apply to backward or colonial contexts,and we may also disagree withhis rather peculiar notion of structuraldetermination of class both at thepolitical, ideological and economiclevels. But we are concerned here withhis methodological point of departure.This methodological point is importantbecause convenience shapes our habitsof thinking and we tend to forget thatclasses are not "pigeon-holes in astatic social structure"; it is so muchmore convenient to burrow into a

pigeon-hole of one's own making.23

If we do not fail to locate classes intheir interactional/antagonistic contextand if we avoid a static conceptionof classes as 'things', the historyof labour is inseparable from that ofcapital. What we simplify as a polarrelationship between labour and

capital is, of course, within the politicalfield of forces of a complex pentagonalinteraction between organisedlabour and Indian and foreign capitalistinterests, with their apex bodiesthe AITUC, FICC, and ACCI on theone hand, and the nationalist leadershipat the helm of the Congress andthe colonial government on the other.(Perhaps one should add that this isjust a schematic map of the interactionprocess and does not imply amonolithic homogeneity at any point

in the polygon).

In the late 1920s the organisation ofall-national apex organisation of capitalistassociations, the FICC (December1927), and the emergence of aradical leadership in the trade unionmovement (their self-assertion in theAITUC in the sessions of Kanpur 1927,Jharia 1928. leading to the split inNagpur 1929 and above all the growthof the Girni Kamgar Union GKUfrom 1928) accentuated the "transparency"

of class confrontation andheightened awareness and solidarity onboth sides of the barricades. Here weneed not go into the history of thetrade union movement in India as awhole and the development of radicalideologies with the movement.24

So far as Bombay textile industry isconcerned the Bombay Textile Labour


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Union (BTLU), founded in 1926 byN M Joshi (President) and R R Bakhale(General Secretary), and the GirniKamgar Mahamandal, led by ArjunAtmaram Alve, were the only trad 2unions in the beginning of 1928. Inthe first quarter of 1928 their positionwas threatened by the growth of athird union, Mill Workers' Union(President: S J Jhabvala) and the veryeffective intervention of some membersof the Workers' and Peasants' Party inorganising the spontaneous surge ofresentment of mill-hands against therationalisation scheme, consequent retrenchment,and coincident wage reduction(e g, for 'new sorts' producedby mills). BTLU and GKM were compelledto recognise the mood of theworkers evidenced by demonstrations(April 16, 1928), and the formation ofa Strike Committee by the militants.Although the BTLU had the largestnumber of registered members its op

position of the proposed strike wasswept aside by the workers (generalstrike from April 26). A Joint StrikeCommittee was formed (May 2). Thisconsisted of 15 representatives ofBTLU (including Joshi, F J Ginwala,and Asavale', 11 from the GKM (includingAlve, Dange, Mirajkar), andfour from the MWU (including Jhav-bala and Nimbkar). While this Com-mittee was functioning (from May 3)

the Girni Kamgar Union was founded(May 22) with a small body of 300members. Communists who have beenmentioned above as working in theGKM and MWU founded this unionknown generally as Lal Bavta (RedFlag). It was registered and recognisedby the Bombay Millowners' Association(June 5). This was the unionthat was in effective leadership in the

1928 general strike (April 26 to October6) and exclusive control of the

1929 strike action (April 26 to thefourth week of May when the generalstrike petered out, though the GKUdid not formally call it off till September19). Between the two strike periodsthe front rank of GKU leadership wasarrested (March 20, 1929^ for trial atMeerut and a younger leadership, S VDeshpande and B T Rariadive, took


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over.25

We are not interested in chronoclingthe history of the strikes beyond thisbrief outline. Before we proceed todiscuss capitalist reactions to thesedevelopments let us briefly summarisethe casus belli and the form of unionorganisation. The 1929 strike wasagainst retrenchment combined withvictimisation of union activists whohad taken a prominent part in theprevious strike. The 1928 strike wasdirected chiefly against rationalisationand surreptitious wage reduction. Theseventeen point Charter of Demands(May 3) can be divided into threeparts. Some points related to rationalisation,which we have seen in SectionI above. Another set of points (1, 2.8 and 12) demanded restoration ofwages to the 1925 level, raise forthose who received less than Rs 30 pet-month, consolidation of high price

allowance (HPA) with wages, and 10hours maximum limit on hours ofwork. A third set of points relatedto miscellaneous grievances regardingworking conditions (machine cleaning,attendance record. termination of servicenotice, etc). The interesting thingto note is that on each issue theCharter demanded "consultation withrepresentatives of workers' organisa-tion'', "approval of workers through

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their organisation", etc.26 This wasobviously meant to make a place forthe union in the 'government of thefactory' so to say it had a politicalsignificance beyond the contents ofdemand. The Charter was framed bythe Joint Strike Committee whosecomposition has been described above.On this co-ordinating body were representedthe managing committees ofthe trade unions. The managing committeesin turn consisted of representativesof mill committess. At each ofthese three levels actual manual workerswere included though their participationin negotiations with the employerswas negligible compared to therole of 'Advisers' like Joshi or Dange.27A A Purcell, MP, and delegate of

the British TUC to the Kanpur sessionof AITUC, made a very interestingcomparison: "The growth of tradeunionism in our country has beenlargely coincident with the growth ofcapitalism itself. The young Indianmovement is, however, faced with theexperienced and highly organisedmovement of the employers in thecountry".28 Indian business as a lobbywas active even from the 1860s andwas a force to reckon with in Bombay'spolitics from the last quarter of

the 19th century; from acting as informalinterest groups occasionallyuniting to memorialise the governmenton specific issues in the 1860s, byearly 20th century they had begun toorganise themselves into permanentbodies of which the most importantwere the Indian Merchants' Chamberand the Millowners' Association.29 Theyhad vast experience in the game thatinterest groups can play. But thesituation confronting them in 1928-29presented new problems. Industrial employers

had begun to learn to livewith trade unions (especially after thepassage of the Trade Union Act of1926) but here was something far moredangerous.

The reaction of the industrial capitalist,and 'the capitalist class as awhole, was very perceptive. One canbroadly distinguish four different strategies


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supported in various degrees bydifferent sections of big capital. Thefirst and the simplest reaction to theproblem of communist leadership inthe working class movement was typifiedby Sir D R Tata. The BMOA hadexpressed its alarm to the Governmentof India and had gone to Press withquotation from the Pravda about the"Bolshevik" inroads.30 P Thakurdashad spoken in the Legislative Assemblyurgjn;) strong action to stem this

threat.31 Sir D R Tata however was notsatisfied with such action. He was"convinced of the necessity of a strongcapitalist organisation to combat thispoisonous evil" causing "labour troublesin Bombay and elsewhere", (Jamshedpurwas deep in labour trouble,)And European and Indian capital,Tata thought, "are at one with uswhere the red flag is concerned".32 Apolitical wing of the capitalists was

needed to protect "the interests ofthose who have a large stake in thebusinss of the country, faced as theyare at present with so many destructiveelements, in particular the RedFlag, bent upon creating mischiefamong the workmen and bent uponviolence against the capitalists."33 Tothese fulminations, the reaction of hisfriends like R Thakurdas and G DBirla were rather cold. Communism,Birla wrote, "finds a fertile soil only inpoverty and discontent. Most of the

capitalists ignore the fact that theythemselves are responsible for breedingcommunism, and I have not theleast doubt in my mind that a purelycapitalist organisation is the last bodyto put up an effective fight againstcommunism".34

What then was the alternative?This is spelt out by Birla in severalletters: "What we capitalists can do"is to "co-operate with those whothrough constitutional means want to

change the government for a nationalone".35 (Later, when there were socialistswithin the Congress, Birla wrote:"Vallabbhai, Rajaji and Rajendra Babuare all fighting communism and socialism.It is therefore necessary thatsome of us who represent healthy capitalismshould help Gandhiji as far aspossible and work with a commonobject".36 Birla believed that Gandhi


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would not stand for socialism in theCongress.) It was about this time thatThakurdas declared as the President ofthe Federation of Indian Chamber ofCommerce: "Indian commerce and industryare intimately associated with,and are, indeed an integral part of thenational movement growing with itsgrowth and strengthening with itsstrength".37

A third line of attack stemmed fromthe above strategy; the propagation oflabour-capital co-operation as a nationalduty. Thus Tairsee, President of theIndian Merchants' Chamber (Bombay)deplored "appeals to class warfare" andadvocated "rational and national lines"of co-operation between labour andcapital.38 Earlier the President of theIndian Chamber of Commerce (Cal

cutta) had similarly appealed to labour

not to be misled by those who wereacentuating the cleavage between Indiancapital and labour"39 The idea beingput forward was that future prospectsof India depended on industry, there-fore labour must not damage theseprospects by refusing co-operation.Ahmedabad provided a ready modelfor such co-operation.

A fourth line of action was to bringpressure upon the government forlegislation and administrative action

against the 'Bolshevik' threat in thelabour movement. Thus the Presidentof the Maharashtriya Vyapari Parishadurged the government to use extraordinarypowers to suppress "Bolshe-vick influence" which was "underminingIndian society'.40 Thakurdas,during the mill strike of 1928, privatelysaw the Police Commissioner to askhim "why he would not remove Dangeand Nimbkar by executive order andthus stop further poisoning of the millhands' minds in Bombay".41 He also

lobbied Sir George Rainy with the samepurpose and promised to organise politicalsupport for such action in theLegislative Assembly.42 Sir P C Sethnawas equally active in obtaining governmentaid to "check the activities of thecommunist strike leaders"; he was oneof the promoters of the Trade DisputesBill, 1928, to curb union activities,48The Millowners' Association put strong


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pressure on the Government of Bombayto enact a Criminal Intimidation law tomake picketing by strikers cognisableoffence. The Viceroy refused to exercisehis special powers to make anordinance, but the Bombay LegislativeCouncil passed it promptly in a sessionspecially convened earlier than it wasdue.44

Actually the Government's actions,motivated in part by reasons of theirown, rendered signal service to theindustrialists in a number of ways. TheTrade Disputes Act of 1928 and thearrest of the Meerut accused in March1929 are prominent instances. But itwas the second and third lines ofattack on the radical labour movementwhich appeared to business leaders tobe more suited to their needs at thatparticular juncture in 1928-29. Aboutthis time the Currency Question exercisedthe businessmen and the tariff

question brought them into direct clashnot only with the foreign capitalists'ACCI, but directly with the government(which had recently rejected theTariff Board's recommendations infavour of Indian cotton textile interests),45

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Monetary stringency was acutely feltby Bombay millowners. Mody, Presidentof BMOA, estimated that "theindustry as a whole had a deficitamounting to Rs 2.07 crores at the endof 1929 without taking into considerationa contingent liability of Rs 1.18crores and the fact that practically nodepreciation could be allocated duringthe year,"46 There was a ''serious lackof borrowing power" and in many millsall liquid assets had been pledged.Under these circumstances the Governmentof India's currency and tariff policieswere bound to bring Bombay businessmencloser to the nationalist leadership.Even the loyal Sethna suspectedthat "our British friends are not sorrythat .Indian capitalists should suffer''.47

He went so far as to declare himselfas ."half a Swarajist" I48; it was theSwarajists who attracted most trustfrom businessmen at Bombay till about1928. Financing political parties withdoles from time to time was not uncommon.Bombay had always been asource of Congress funds.49 MotilalNehru had live contacts in Bombay andat least in 1928 there is evidence ofcontribution sought from Bombaybusinessmen, especially Thakurdas.50Soon after this the revival of the boycott

programme would forge furtherlinks between the nationalist leadershipand the cotton millowners.

One of the dividends of good relationswith the 'moderate' national leaders(as distinct from suspect radicalslike Bose and Jawaharlal Nehru) wasthe containment of radicalism in thelabour movement and a schism within which was dramatised in the splitat the AITUC Nagpur session, 1929.In Bombay in 1928, to the credit of the

Joint Strike Committee, unity was, forthe purposes of strike action, sustained(though not in the long run). TheJoint Strike Committee wrote to theSecretary, Millowners' Association:"In regard to your query as to whichof the members of the Committee areextremists and which moderates, wehave to inform you that our Committeedoes not recognise any distinction such


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as moderates and extremists among itsmembers so far as the prosecution ofthe demands sent to you is concerned.'51 That was a remarkable reply toan attempt to divide them. Incidentally,the avoidance of intervention by toplevel nationalist leaders during theIndustrial war of 1928-29 in Bombaywas also remarkable,58

The outcome of this industrial warwas complete failure of the workers'movement to gain the objective in

their Charter of Demands. Negotiationsbetween the sub-committee of BMOAand the Joint Strike Committee endedin stalemate, the 1928 Strike InquiryCommission's report yielded no gainsto workers, retrenchment continuedthroughout 1929 and victimisationalong with it. The Girni Kamgar Unionwas reduced in membership strengthfrom 65,000 (March 1929) to a few

hundreds by the end of the year.Could this be the end? Sir Harry Haigwrote in a memo in the Home Departmentin 1929: "It appears to me thatthe suppression of communists as suchwill not provide anything like a permanentremedy for the trouble betweenlabour and capital in the Bombay millindustry, and no legislation can preventdiscontented workmen from followingextremist leaders". 53

III

We have used the term 'class' herein a limited sense defined in the beginningof this paper limited in that itdoes not postulate class consciousness.Further, from the long view as opposedto the short-run perspective, if 'class'in the process of becoming is the objectof study, to attribute to it consciousnessby the very act of definitionis literaly preposterous. While it ispossible to defend the definitionemployed here, one cannot defer an

assessment of the quality of consciousnessof the working class at this particularpoint of time. Given the severelimitations on our present knowledge,we have to attempt some very tentativeanswers to this crucial question.

To begin with one may contraststatements of two observers, both inthe leadership of the strike movements


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of this period. K N Joglekar speaksvery confidently of the dawning ofconsciousness: "it was through theexperiences of the strike that the workersrealised the importance and significanceof their class organisation..."'54S V Ghate, on the other hand, soundsa more cautious note. He recountshow a GKU President repudiatedcommunism within a year ("Ghatecame to me and asked me to sign aform and I signed that") and yet Ghatemaintains that "some of the leaders didunderstand what communism stoodfor.""'5 One statement by him is worthquoting in extenso: "It is some eie-mental consciousness that comes", saidGhate of the workers in general. "Allthese years they had been suppressed.They did not know what they couldand what they could not do. Nowsuddenly there was the union which

upheld them....All the suppressed

anger against the haves came up, butwe were genuinely not interested inthat, genuinely not interested. We[i e, Ghate, Joglekar, Mirajkar, Nimbkarand Dange] were interested only inthe union becoming strong so that lateron we could organise the workers'.56

In the present state of research it isimpossible to resolve, on the basis ofgrassroot level documentation, the discrepancybetween the above views.One can only make certain inferences

from the behaviour of workers actingen masse. First, if discipline and loyaltyto the class organisation is an index ofmotivation and conscious deliberation,the textile workers in 1928-29 scorevery highly. For instance Sir HarryHaig of the Home Department, Governmentof India, noted that on April 26,1029, exactly at 12 noon, as announcedby the GKU, 75,000 workers in differentmills downed tools and left theirplace of work. Haig and Kelly, thePolice Commissioner (Bombay), cited

this incident to underline the pointthat there was disciplined and voluntaryparticipation.17 This view wascontrary to that of the millowners whoascribed the successful general striketo 'intimidation'. The Bombay PoliceDepartment and Haig advised theViceroy that "millowners were exaggeratingthe extent and effect of intimidation".58 In this connection one


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should also bear in mind the tenacityof striking workers in 1928: they sustaineda general strike for six monthscosting them about Rs 25,000,000 inwages.

On the other hand, when the movementwas on the down-swing disciplineand commitment disintegrated rapidly.The GKU had about 300 members inMay 1928, 54,000 in December 1928,65,000 in March 1929 and a few hundredsat the end of 1929. Membershiphad increased astronomically when themovement was on the upswing and thedefeat of the April-May 1929 strike ledto desertion of the ranks on a massscale and in an incredibly short time.It also seems that the period betweenthe strikes of April-October 1928 andApril-May 1929 was a period of trialfor the leadership, both BTLU andGKU, for they were unable to checkwild cat strikes spontaneously generated

without reference to factory committeesor the trade unions. Saklatvala, speakingon behalf of the BMOA, tauntinglyasked the trade union leaders, Joshi,Dange, Asavale, etc: "If you are leadersyou should have some influence?-,and Asavale, Vice-President, BTLU,

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replied: "Workers themselves do notlisten".59 Likewise in the GKU,Ghate testified later, the union was unableto stem the rising tide of lightningstrikes which were purposeless andinimical to organised movement.60Ghate said the workers, anxious foraction, did not Rive the GKU time toorganise them in these days before theApril 1929 general strike. In May 1929when the general strike began to fail,all the weaknesses came to the surface.The GKU leaflets calling for "disciplin-ed unity" (April 25), urging "peacefulmeans'' (picketing and not intimidationwhich became common when the strikebegan to disintegrate), warnings against"communal bitterness" (May 6), call to"fight to the end" (May 7) advice to

strikers to leave for their village homerather than join work (May 17), promiseof relief to the hungry strikers(May 24), even in these drasticallyabbreviated headlines, tell their ownstory.61 Disunity under impendingdefeat, use of intimidation when loyaltyfaltered, readiness to be duped intoviolence fomented by millowners, anda landslide towards capitulation undereconomic duress this was the stateof the union when the 1929 strikebegan to falter and fail.

Two explanations of the failure ofthe great strikes of 1928-29 have beensuggested. First, that the workers werepauperised by the six month long strikein 1928 and that their staying powerwas very limited in early 1929. Secondly,that the leadership failed the workersin 1929 after the arrest of frontrank leaders (Meerut trials), for thenew leaders like B T Randive and S VDeshpande were inexperienced, toomuch influenced by dictates from

Moscow, and too prone to launch onthe 'criminal adventure' of generalstrike.62 The first explanation is obviouslytrue and one may add that thebargaining position of workers waspoor in the late 1920s under the threatof economic crisis and unemployment.The second explanation, offered byKarnik, is debatable. But neither ofthese explanations is germane to the


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the short term objectives, sustained bywhat Lenin calls "trade union consciousness",and the long term politicalprogramme, ingrafted by the leadership.

Let us turn to the two hypothesesmentioned earlier. The first appears atfirst sight easy to eliminate. For it iswell-known (as M D Morris has takengreat pains to prove) that industriallycommitted labour force had come intoexistence in Bombay long before the1920s. In particular he has argued thatthere is a "very clear trend of increasinglength of service" in Bombay textileindustry.66 However, this trend is notso very clear for the pre-1928 period.Data are available for only one year(1890) and that too of a dubious sample(26 mill-hands, witnesses before theFactory Commision). The estimate for

1927-28 is, however, technicallysound and Morris deduces from it that

37.5 per cent had served in the industryfor less than five years and 23.4 percent for 5-9 years. However, if onelooks into Morris's data closely onefinds that not only did the LabourDirectorate suggest that their estimatetended to over-estimate length of service,but also that there are availablefigures adjusted to exclude non-employmentin the industry. These adjustedfigures show that in 1927-28 46.5 percent of the sample had been in theindustry for less than five years and

24.3 per cent for 5-9 years. Thereforeit seems that Morris, in arguing againstthe labour instability thesis, has underestimatedthe proportion of newentrants in the industry with less thanfive years industrial experience.

As R K Newman has pointed out,the 1921 Census before the strike putthe member of Bombay-born amongmill-hands at about 4,000 out of1,46,000 employed daily.67 Even ifone accept Morris's upward revision of

this ratio to 18.9 per cent, this is asmall proportion. During 1928 thestaying power of the strikes might havebeen augmented with resources derivedfrom their rural links. There is, how-ever, no evidence for this. But in 1929there was undoubtedly a large-scaleimigration back to their village homes.The Press reported of trains overflowingand special steamers plying and


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20,000 were reported to have left.68Incidentally, the Government felt"apprehensive of the effect of the returnto villages in large numbers ofmill-hands infected with these subversiveideas."69

To sum up this argument, the numberof new entrants in the textile industrywas substantial (46.5 per centwith less than five years industrialexperience) mid the rural links of manyof them were alive. This had a bearingon their effective organisation andconsciousness. Perhaps, from the 1930sas the numbers of new entrants diminishedand proporation of workers withlong industrial work experience increased,their 'organisability' as a cbssincreased.

Our second hypothesis was thattraditional divisions became blocks inthe way of consolidation of classes as

cohesive units. This has relevance tothe fact that involvement in communalriots weakened workers' solidarity inBombay at two crucial junctures: inFebruary 1929 when preparations forthe General Strike were afoot andApril-May 1929 when the General

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Strike was on. The Police Report(1929) on the second riot and theBombay Riot Enquiry CommissionReport (1929) on both the riots, makeit abundantly clear that the riots originatedin the mill area in the chawls.This version was also supported byPress reports. Ghate believed that thefirst riot was "provoked by the workersthemselves".70

A digression into the causes of theriot and causes of workers' involvementin the riots may be instructive.At first sight the communal riots appearto be re-enactment of the familiarfestival of violence India has seen sooften. Widespread rumour aboutMusalmans (Pathans) kidnapping Hinduchildren was the immediate cause ofthe first riot (149 persons killed), and

Muslim objection to music and Hindupalkhi procession in the neighbourhoodof a mosque was the immediate provocationfor the second riot (35 personskilled).71 Scribblers of pamphlelsgave, as usual, a helping hand. Whilethe Muslim scribbler (language Gujarati)would ask "will Mosques have to beclosed up?", the Hindu scribbler (languageMarathi) would exhort the coreligioniststo join the Hindu Sanrak-shak Mandal to "get protection" and togive protection to Hindu temples. A

political leader it happened to be aMuslim leader, Shaukat Ali wouldstate to the Press his resolve "to organisethe Mohammedans for purpose ofself-defence" and withdraw the statementafter its publication has done theintended damage. The prominent citizenswould pin the blame on the 'inflammatoryspeeches' of left radicals(GKU leaders' speeches during 1928strike) which "weakened respect forlaw and order". And the GovernmentEnquiry Committee presided over by a

British civil servant aided, predictably,by one Hindu and one Muslim gentleman,would concur with this view thatcommunists were to blame for the communaloutbreak. It was all dreadfullyfamiliar, except for that last bit ofirony.

On closer examination the detailedevidence reveals some interesting facts.


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In 1929 many among the Muslim workerswere persuaded to act as strike-breakersand the consequent striker vs non-striker conflict easily got transformedinto a communal riot.72 Blacklegs wereused on a large scale first in December1928 to break the strike in the foreignowned oil installations at Sewri (Bur-mah Shell). These blacklegs werepathans and clashes with them led toattacks on Pathan watchmen in cotton

mills, and eventually to "a regulaiPathan-hunt by the mill hands" in themill area and to a generalised Hindu-Muslim riot.73 It is true that the chawlpopulation took the most active part inthe riot, but this was at least in partthe result of manipulation by their employers.A Muslim correspondent wrotein the Bombay Chronicle: "The Musalmansection of the mill workers havebeen won over by the owners withtempting wages (temporary of course)

and lorries for their safe conveyance toand from mills, etc. But what will bethe psychological effect produced in themass mind of the vast number ofilliterate Hindu workers?".74

That effect was of course exactlysuited to the designs of millowners. Itis interesting to note G D Birla'sforthright comments: "I noticed in thepapers that Mohammaden strikers areearning back to work while Hindus afekeeping out. One likes to see the strike

ended, but I am a bit upset by theway in which communal tension hasbeen utilised by the millowners forending the strike,"76 Repeatedly Birlacondemned this "exploitation of thecommunal situation" by Bombay millowners.76 The condemnation was notworth very much since it was in confidenceto Thakurdas: Birla had, ofcourse, no strikes to lose. However, thatdoes not diminish the value of his assessmentof the situation. Incidentally, inthe closed world of Bombay business

magnates there might have been alsostrong reaction to this manipulation ofcommunalism from a pro-Hindu lobby.Thakurdas writing to Tairsee, Presidentof Indian Merchants' Chamber, urgesthat "Sane practical patriotic Hindus...not be carried away by any religiousover-zeal."77 The industrialists were notlikely to be carried away by such zealin their steady pursuit of means of


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breaking the strike of 1929. The establishmentof military pickets in workingclass areas during the riots was particularlyopportune. The army picketswere kept even after the terminationof riots. The Police Reportobserved that "the withdrawal [ofarmy] was carried out by slowdegrees owing to the state of highnervous tension ... and also becausethere was the likelihood of industrialdisturbances owing to the general millstrike, and the decision of the millownersto withhold the pay of strikerson pay day, the 15th May".78 Thus didthe government combine the duty ofsuppressing communalism and communismat one stroke.

Another economic element in thiscomplex situation was that the Pathanswere identified in the mill-hands' mindas moneylenders. The survey of workingclass family budgets in 1921-22 showed

that 47 per cent of workers' familieswere in debt; indebtedness extended"ordinarily to the equivalent of twoand half a months' earning". The usualrate of interest was 75 per cent per annumand in some cases it was 150 percent or more.79 The Riots Inquiry Committeenote that Pathan moneylenders'homes and records were particular objectsof attacks. According to Ghate theresentment of the indebted against kabu-liwallas was the main cause of the firstriot of 1929.80

To sum up, the mill-hands' weaknesses,their readiness to fall under theinfluence of communal propaganda, wasexploited by the Indian millowners. Thecommunity oriented institutions like theAkhadas the Shuddhi, movement, thetanzimat movement provided a culturalmilieu laden with latent communal tension.81 The leftist trade union leadershipwas unable to counteract this, althoughin at least one leaflet the GKU warnedworkers against the communal riots the

millowners were provoking. KumariJayawardena has shown that in Ceylon"one of the direct consequences of theeconomic depression was on increase incommunal tension among the workingclass" and strike breaking by importedIndian blacklegs from 1929.82 Nowhere has it been easy to erase eommunalismfrom the consciouness of theworkers.


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We know too little about the developmentof working class consciousnessin India to employ sophisticated typologies(e.g. Giddens') concerning varyinglevels of consciousness. However,the recognition of such varying levelsis in itself a useful check against roman-ticisation. At the same time, the analysisof constraints on the growth of classconsciousness in colonial India has toproceed on new lines. The constraintspointed out by J Foster in his historicalstudy of decline of revolutionary classconsciouness in Britain, or the processof decomposition of labour and statifica-lion that followers of Dahrendorf haveanalysed, belong to a different context that of the more advanced capitalistsocieties. For one thing, a fundamentaldifference is that capitalist relations nothaving been sufficiently generalised incolonial society, the multi-structuralcharacter of the economy in colonial

India imparts a special complexity to

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the class structure, and hence an'opaqueness' to perception of classes.Secondly, more particularly about industrialcapital: it becomes the standardbearer of 'national development'winch affords it some advantages in thestruggle of 'national capital' versusworking class. Here the role of the intelligentsia,I have suggested elsewhere,was crucial in promoting an ideologysubordinating inter-class conflicts to a'supra-class' contradiction between 'nationalinterests' and imperialism. Thirdly,stratification within the working class,wage differentiation, and social distancingbetween 'skilled/high wage' andmanual/low wage' labour which affectsclass cohesion in advanced capitalismhad hardly begun in colonial India.

For example, immediately before thestrike of 1928 there was a survey ofwages. This indicated wide gap between'coolie' wages (Rs 24.4 per month) andaverage monthly earnings of all workers(Rs 37.6 per month); but the modeof earnings distribution for all workers(Rs 25 per month) was almost equal tounskilled workers' average, and the medianof earnings distribution (Rs 30.8)for all workers was only a quarter higherthan unskilled wages.83 Fourthly andfinally, the carry over of communal and

other divisive tendencies occlude classconsciousness in colonial India, blockingthe cohesion of class, though this maynot always come in the way of collectiveaction in the political arena. Theseare some of the reasons why we haveto look at the growth of working classand its consciousness in a colonial societyin a new perspective differentfrom that developed in the context ofadvanced capitalist western societies.

Notes

[The following abbreviations have been

used.

NMJ: N M Joshi Tapers, Nehru MemorialMuseum and Library (NMML).

MTUC: Vapors of All India TradeUnion Congress, NMML.


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IL:. Industry and Labour Department.

Home Foll: Home Department, PoliticalBranch, Government of India,National Archives.

Comm: Commerce Department, Gov-ment of India, National Archives.

PT: P Thakurdas Papers, NMML.

FCS; P C Sethna Papers (uncatalo-. gned).

SVC: S V Ciliate Interview Transcripir,NMML.

AlCC: Papers of All India CongressCommittee, NMML.

BMOA' Millowners' Association,Bombay

FICC: Federation of Indian Chambersof Commerce

IMMC: Indian Merchants' Chamber of

Commerce, BombayGDI: Government of India.]

1 PT, 42 (V.)

2 Sukotnal Sen, - "Working Class ofIndia-,' Calcutta, 1977, pp 259-265;V B Karnik, "Strikes in India",

Bombay, 1967; Chapter VII.

3 Georjg Lnkacs, 'History and ClassConsciousness", London 1971 p 79and. pp 46 ff; ' Anthony Giddens,"The Class: Structure of the Advanced'Societies", London, 1977,P 112 and Chapter 6. John Foster,"Class Struggle and the IndustrialRevolution", London, 1974.

4 A K Bagchi, "Private Investmentin India, 190049", Cambridge,

1972, pp 247 ff.

5 M D Morris, "The Emergence ofan Industrial Labour Force inIndia", Bombay, 1965, p 171

6 Ibid p 186.

7 NMJ, File 42, "Proceedings of


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Labour in India", Poona, 1943,p 62. He was at the time of writinga member of Bombay TextileLabour Enquiry Committee.

21 S Bhattacharva, 'Cotton Mills and

Spinning Wheels: Swadeshi andthe Indian Capitalist Class, 1920-

23

24

26

27

29

30

31

32

33

34

3536

373839

40

41

42

43

4445

22', LPW, November 14, 1976,N Poulantzas, "Classes in Contemporary

Capitalism", London, 1975,p 14.

Erik Olin Wright, 'Class Boundariesin Advanced Capitalist Societies'New Left Review, 98,1976, p 5.

Sukomal Sen, "Working Class ofIndia", Calcutta, 1977: K Panik-


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kar, "An Outline History of theAITUC", New Delhi, 1959; S DPunekar, "Trade Unions in India"Bombay, 1948; J S Mathur, "IndianWorking Class Movements", Allahabad,1964; and "Indian TradeUnions: A Survey", Bombay,1978.

NMJ Papers, File 45, passim. TheAITUC later condemned thearrests in a formal resolution movedby V V Giri and JawaharlalNehru in the chair deplored the"offensive against the labourmovement". AITUC Papers, FileL Minutes of Executive CouncilMeeting, Bombay, April 27-28,1929. Also see AITUC, File Lletters from Ail-China Labour Federationto AITUC, March 2,1927.

NAJ, File 45, Joint Secretaries,

JMSC to Secretaries, BMOA, May3, 1938, Paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 7.NMJ, File 42, Proceedings ofStrike Enquiry Committee; andFile 45 containing records ofnegotiation between sub-committeeof BMOA and JMSC; File 54,BTLU Statement to Court of Inquiry(1929) by R R Bakhale, July15, 1929.

Quoted in S Sen op cit, p 282, (Ihave not been able to check the

source).

C Dobbin, "Urban Leadership inWestern India", Oxford, 1972;A D D Gordon, "Businessmen andPolitics", Delhi, 1978.Bombay Chronicle, May 18, 1929;Daily Mail July 2, 1929.PT, 42, (V), Thakurdas to Mazumdar,Secretary to D R Tata, July24. 1929.

PT. 42, (V), Mazumdar to Thakurdas,

July 3, 1929.PT, 42, (II), Mazumdar to Thakurdas,May 22, 1929.PT, 42, (V), G D Birla to Thakurdas,July 30, 1929.Loc cit.

PT, 42, (VI), G D Birla to Thakur-das, August 3, 1934.Quoted in Bhattacharva, op cit.


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Indian Daily Math April 28, 1929.Report of Indian Chamber of Com-metre, Calcutta, 1926, p 4.PT, 42, (III), Bombay Samnchor,December 5, 1928.PT, 42, (II), Thakurdas to Mazumdar,June 7, 1929.Loc cif.

P C Sethna Papers (uncatalogued),Sethna to Srinivas, August 13,1928.

Home Poll, 303/1929 and KW,especially the Note by H G Haig,June 4, 1029.

For a review of the overall scenesee, Bipan Chandra, Indian CapitalistClass and British Im-

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periailsm, in R S Sharma (ed),"Indian Society: Historical Prob-

tags", Delhi, 1977; and for a detailedstudy of later years, seeSumit Sarkar, 'The Logic ofGandhian Nationalism', Indian HistoricalReview, July 1976.

46 Comm, September 1930, 1946-C,Secretary, BMOA, to Secretary,Commerce Department, January 7,1930.

47 P C S Sethna to Srinivas, August13, 1928.

48 PCS Sethna to Lindsan, May 4,1928

49 AICC Papers, 5/1924, 28/1924, JNehru, Kilchlew and G B Desh-pande's reports on Congress Funds-Bombay business had contributedsubstantially to Tilak Swaraj Fund,cf Bhattacharya, op cit,

50 PT, File 71, Thakurdas to MotilalNehru, October 8, 1928; MotilalNehru to Thakurdas, September29, 1928; PT, File 42, (II), Birlato Thakurdas, April 26, 1929.

51 NMJ, File 45. Joint Secretaries,TMSC, to Secretary, BMOA, May6,, 1928.

52 This might have been one of thereasons why textile labour wascompletely apathetic to the civildisobedience movement; see Ra-vinder Kumar: 'From Swaraj toPuma Swarj; 1920-32' in D ALow (ed), "Congress and the Raj:Facets of the Indian Struggle

1917-47".

53 Home Poll, 303/1929, ConfidentialNote by H G Haig, June 4, 1929.

54 Meerut Conspiracy Case Records,Defence Statement of K N Ingle -kar, 3, (5).

55 Transcript of S V Ghate, Interview,


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July 9, 1970, in NMML OralHistory Transcript, Accession Number326 (hereinafter referred asSVG), p 47.

56 SVG, p 60.

57 Home Poll, 303/1929.

58 Ibid, Telegram to Viceroy.

59 NMJ, File 42, Proceeding ofEnquiry Committee, November 16,1928.

60 SVG, pp 52-53, 60.

61 In the absence of the papers ofGKU the leaflets reported by thePress are used here. Referencesare to Bombay Chronicle of April26, and May 7, 8, 18, 1929.

62 S Sen, op cit, pp 263-265; V B

Karnik, op cit, (1978) p 74.

63 SVG, p 43.

6 4 Home Poll 10/1001930, Report of

Percival Committee, Appendix,

Summary of Speeches.

65 NMJ. 45, Secretary, IMSC toSecretary, BMOA, May 6, 1928.

66 M D Morrw, op cit, p 89.

67 R K Newman 'Social Factors inthe Recruitment of Bombay Mill-hands', in K N Chaudhuri andC J Dewev feds), "Economy andSociety", Oxford, 1979.

68 Bombay Chronicle May 18, 19,1929; The Times of India May 23,1929.

69 Horns Poll 303/1929, Note by H

Haig, June 11, 1929.

70 SVG, p 57.

71 Ibid; Report of the Bombay RiotsEnquiry Committee 1929, ChapterI; Home Poll, 10/10/1930, PoliceReport on Bombay Riot of April-May 1929. Passim.


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72 Home Poll, Home Department(Bombay) to Home Department(GOI), Cable dated May 4, 1929.

73 Home Poll, 10/10/1929 EnquiryCommittee Report, Chapter III.

74 Bombay Chronicle, May 13, 1929,S Murtaza's Letter to Editor.

75 PT, 42 (II), Birla to Thakurdas,June 19, 1929.

76 PT, 81 (II), Birla to Thakurdas,May 10, 1929.

77 PT, 81 (I), Thakurdas to Tainee,February 23, 1929.

78 Home Poll, 10/10/1929, PoliceReport.

79 G Findlay Shirras, op cit, p S3.

80 SVG, p 53.

81 Home Poll, 10/10/1929, Riot EnquiryComouttee Report, p 18.

82 V K Jayawardena, "The Rise of theLabour Movement in Ceylon",Duke University, 1972.

83 D Mazumdar, 'Labour Supply inEarly Industrialisation: The Case ofBombay Textile Industry', EconomicHistory Review, August 1973,

p 482.

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capital and labour in bombay city 1928-29

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