camele 1975, time in merleau-ponty and heidegger

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Time

in

M E R L E A U P O N T Y

and

H E I D E G G E R

by nthony c mele

Merleau-Ponty

sets

the

theme

of

h i s discussion of temporality

with

a

quote from Heidegger: The meaning

o f Dasein is Temporality. The f u l l

sentence

in Heidegger reads: The

thesis that the meaning of Dasein is

Temporality must be confirmed in the

concrete content

of the

entity's basic

state, as it has

been

set

forth. ^

In

Heidegger this

sentence falls in a

sec

tion

marking the transition from the

consideration of Dasein's authentic po-

tentiality-for-being-a-whole to the con

sideration of Temporality and Every-

dayness.' The purpose of this latter

section

is the temporal interpretation

of everyday Dasein,

which is to say

the demonstration

of the

possibility

o f Dasein's state of being on the basis

o f

temporality . . Comparing

these

statements

of Heidegger

with

the f o l -

lowing

one from Merleau-Ponty,

e can now say of temporality

what we said earlier about sexual

i t y

and

spatiality,

for

example:

existence can have no external or

contingent attribute. It cannot be

anything —spatial, sexual, tem

poral

— without being so in its en

tirety, without taking up and car

rying

forward its 'attributes' and

making them into so many dimen

sions

of its

being,

with the

result

that

an analysis of any one of them

that

is at all searching real ly

touches upon subjectivity itself.

There

are no

principal

and

sub

ordinate problems: a ll problems are

concentric. To analyse time is not

to fo l l ow out the consequence of

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

56

FALL 975



a

pre-established conception of sub

jectivity,

it is to gain access,

through time, to its concrete

Structure,*

discloses

rather

clearly an

agreement

as to the central role

which

the

theme

o f

time plays for both Heidegger and

Merleau-Ponty;

however as to the inter

pretation of time and, consequently, the

interpretation of the conscious subject

o r

Dasein, the agreement is not so

clear. For both, temporality is situ

ated i n the very core of the subject's

being.

Temporality is not a character

istic,

a property, an accident; nor is

i t

merely a figment of consciousness.

Rather, temporality as the meaning of

Dasein

is, in Heidegger's words, the

upon

which

of a primary projection in

terms of which something can be con

ceived

in its possibility as

that which

i s . *

To unravel this highly compressed

complexity

— to

which

Merleau-Ponty

seems

to subscribe given the central po

sition of his fir st quote fr om Heideg

ger — is the purpose of this paper.

Merleau-Ponty's second reference

to Heidegger is the use of the

phrase

a

succession of instances of now.' *

Merleau-Ponty rejects this interpreta

tion

since such a

view

of time is self-

contradictory. If by *now' one

means

an

indivisible

point distinct from pre

vious and subsequent points, then one

must explain the synthesis of these

'nows' into a succession. In attempting

such an explanation one is necessarily

thrust back to a Kantian-type solution

resulting in a time-less world whereas

time —

past,

present,

future — is only

too unmistakably in the

world. ^

On

the other hand, because *now' means a

present

not only given as

present

but

as announcing

itself

as what

w i l l

soon

be

past

as

w e l l

as a

present

in

which

we feel the

pressure

of a future intent

o n

dispossessing the

present,

the notion

of

a succession of *nows' destroys the

very notion of 'now' and that of suc

cession.^

Thus, for Merleau-Ponty the syn

thesis of time is not through some

form

of

sensuous

intuition. Rather, the

synthesis of time is a

matter

of seeing

through the

present

moment the mean

i n g

of the

past

and the structure of

the future.

More w i l l

be said on this

below.

At this point, however, it is

only

fair to say that Merleau-Ponty

seems

to misrepresent Heidegger by

implying that

Heidegger offers the

above as his own definition or descrip

tion. If one were to read a bit beyond

the cited text of Heidegger one would

f i n d :

In the everyday way in

which

we are

with

one another, the levelled¬

o f f

sequence of 'nows' remains com

pletely unrecognizable as regards its o r i -

g i n

in the temporality of the

i n d i v i d -

u a l

Dasein. ^ Fo r Heidegger, the

lev¬

elled-off

sequence is possible only be

cause authentic temporality already is

as a possibility, in much the

same

way

that there

can be such a thing as pro

miscuous sex only

because

there

is

true

sexuality already as a possibility. Since

this paper is not a philosophical witch

hunt let us leave the

matter

of possible

misinterpretation and consider how

Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty compare

i n

view of the above references.

Since both reject Kant's interpre

tation^ and maintain

that

time is of

the being of the conscious subject and

that

the

present

moment reveals

past

and future, then time

seems

to be the

development, the going for th of con

sciousness itself.^^ Time is the devel

opment of consciousness as a river, to

use Merleau-Ponty 's metaphor, is a de

velopment out of the waters of a melt

i n g

glacier. What we are aware of

when we are aware of time is the de

velopment of our consciousness.

Merleau-Ponty's next quote from

Heidegger is : Temporalization is not

MERLEAU PONTY ND HEIDEGGER • • •

57



a succession of

ecstases.

The future is

not posterior to the

past,

or the

past

anterior to the

present.

Temporality

temporalizes

itself

as future-which-

lapses-into-the-past-by-coming-into - the

present. ^^

This quotation

takes

place

i n a section in which Merleau-Ponty

is

describing time as cumulative

l i v i n g -

through. Merleau-Ponty's own imme

diate

statement

is:

Time

maintains what it has caused

to be, at the very time it expels it

from

being,

because

the new being

was announced by its predecessor

as destined to be, and because, for

the latter, to become

present

was

the

same

thing as being destined

to

pass

away.

G i v e n

Merleau-Ponty's description

o f

time as a dimension of subjectivity

or

consciousness, then consciousness

could

be substituted for time in the

preceding

statement.

Thus, conscious

ness

is pictured as moving toward

'things', constructing and

giving

mean

ing

to things in the

world

but as driven

by

and according to structures and di

rections already assimilated in con

sciousness so

that

not only does con

sciousness

f i n d itself

impelled by

itself

to go out to a

world

but consciousness

finds a

world

rushing to it. The

world

rushing to

meet

consciousness is a

world

pushed by consciousness as much

as consciousness pushes

itself

to

meet

the world. Because one understands a

language, for example, not only is one

forced

to

hear

and understand the

lan

guage

but

because

one

understands

the

language

there

is rushing toward one

who

understands

occasions of having to

hear

in

that

language. To use

M e r

leau-Ponty's metaphor,

there

is a down

stream

because there

is an upstream

pushing the stream along.

That the above interpretation also

fits Heidegger is easily seen when one

PHILOSOPHY T O D Y

•

considers the context in Heidegger.

The above cited quote from Heidegger

is

from a section in

which

he has been

describing

the temporal constitution of

understanding, state-of-mind,

f a l l i n g

and discourse.

According

to Heidegger,

i n understanding,

one's

own potential-

ity-for-Being

is disclosed in such a way

that one's

Dasein always knows under-

standingly what it is capable of. It

'knows' this, however, not by having

discovered some fact, but by maintain

ing itself

in an existentiell possibility

When one understands oneself

projectively in an existentiell possibil

ity,

the future underlies this under

standing, and it does so as a coming-

towards-oneself out of

that

current

possibility

as

which

one's

Dasein

exists. ^^ When one comes to under

stand the binomial theorem, f or exam

ple,

one

understands

all his study and

mathematizing up to and through this

new understanding. A l l

that

one has

learned and assimilated has worked ac

tively

and directionally to bring about

this new understanding. The under

standing of the formula is a going out

to bring the formula into oneself, a

movement ahead of oneself, a future

oriented action and is precisely the

act which enables one to see the

past

as

past.

It is this future oriented act

of understanding which enables the

seeing of the

past

as pushing the pres

ent to a future just as the future has

shed light on or illumined what is the

past

and

present.

One finds the same analysis and

reasoning in Heidegger's description

and interpretation of state-of-mind and

f a l l i n g .

As future was primary in un

derstanding, the

past

is primary' in

state-of-mind and the

present

in

f a l l i n g .

However,

understanding is in every

case

a Present

which

is in process

o f

having been; state-of-mind temporal

izes

itself

as a future

which

is making

58



present;

the

present

leaps away from

a future that is in process of having

been through fallenness.^^ Heidegger's

conclusion

to all this is

that

in every

ecstasis, temporality temporalizes itself

as a whole; and this

means

that

in

the ecstatical unity with which tem

porality

has f u l l y temporalized itself

currently, is grounded the totali ty of

the structural whole of existence, fac-

ticity,

and

f a l l i n g

—

that

is, the unity

o f the care-structure. ^*

It is interesting

that

this conclu

sion

immediately

precedes

the

sentence

Merleau-Ponty quotes

in support of his

ow n ecstatical theory of time. That

Merleau-Ponty

does not even allude to

the above conclusion is not a mere

oversight. There are metaphysical over

tones

in Heidegger's conception of tem

porality which the psychologist would

perhaps rather not hear.

More

w i l l

be said on this later.

Thus far we have seen

that

time

is the development of the conscious

subject as conscious. It is a develop

ment

which

in every moment or

aspect

shows forth or discloses its antecedents

and its directions.

More

accurately,

time is the consciousness of the devel

opment of consciousness as develop

ment of consciousness.

Merleau-Ponty's next quotation

from Heidegger is taken from the in

troductory paragraphs of Temporal ity

and

Historicality.'

These paragraphs

are not only introductory but also tran

sitional since Heidegger is moving from

a consideration of the totality of con

sciousness to

viewing

it as a unity. The

reason for this changeover is

that

the

w a y

in

which

Dasein

stretches

along

between birth and death has so far

been unnoticed. The connectedness-of-

l i f e in

which

Dasein somehow main

tains itself constantly, is precisely what

we have overlooked in our analysis of

Being-a-whole. ^^ Heidegger's mean

ing,

as is borne out by his discussion

o f Historicality, is not that

there

is

something beyond or beneath temporal

i t y as the meaning of Dasein and,

there

fore,

the source of temporality itself.

Rather, Heidegger says

that

historical

i t y is temporality seen as finite ^« C o n

sequently, his earlier thesis

that

tem

porality

is the meaning of Dasein is

maintained since the connectedness-of-

l i f e does not rest upon any foundation

other than temporality.

The important point in the above

paragraph is

that

for Heidegger, the

connectedness-of-life is given in the

vision

of temporality as finite. If we

look at the passage in Merleau-Ponty

i n

which

the phrase connectedness-of-

l i f e appears we w i l l see

that

the

dif

ference between the two which has

already begun to show itself becomes

even more visible. Merleau-Ponty's f u l l

statement is:

There is no need for a synthesis

externally binding together the

tempora

into one single theme, be

cause

each one of the

tempora

was

already inclusive, beyond itself, of

the whole open series of other tem

pora being internal communica

tion

with

them, and because the

connectedness of a l i f e is given

with

its ek-stase.̂ ^

According to Merleau-Ponty one

sees in the present moment one's l i f e -

connectedness just as one sees one's

past

and future in the

present;

but

Me r

leau-Ponty says this in such a way

that the slightest trace of historical

determinism is an inescapable, unmis

takable scent.

F o r Heidegger, finitude is essen

t i a l

for the

vision

of the connectedness-

o f - l i f e ; for Merleau-Ponty, this vision

o f finitude is irrelevant. On the surface,

whether or not anyone takes notice

o f finitude seems a

matter

of little mo

ment. However, by finitude Heidegger

MERLEAU-PONTY ND HEIDEGGER • • •

59



does not mean a limited segment of

an immeasurable length. On the con

trary, according to Heidegger the no

tion

of infinitude is based on the notion

o f finitude. * Thus the beginning —

on-tologically and therefore conceptual

l y even though everyday understanding

may distort this authentic understand

ing

— of time is birth; the end — on

tologically

and therefore conceptually

authentical ly — is death. No more

than one can

l iv e

beyond

one's death

or before

one's

birth, no more can one

interpret time as anything other than

as finitude. But such a

sense

of f i n i -

tude

is not

present

in Merleau-Ponty.

Indeed, i n a

passage

which is unmis

takably a backhand at Heidegger, Me r -

leau-Ponty states quite emphatically

that our own births and deaths are un

known to us.^

What is cropping up is not the

difference of opinion between two phe

nomenologists. It is the difference be

tween the metaphysician and the psy

chologist looking at consciousness. As

one follows Heidegger's analysis of time

one sees Heidegger bringing time and

therefore history more and more into

the ontological structures of Dasein.

Consequently, the beginning and end

o f

time, birth and

death

. . . fini tude . . .

take

on a significance which would not

be found where time is not a meta

physical

principle.

o l l ow i n g Heidegger, to say

one's

time is fi ni te is to place history into

the context of

one's

own temporality.

To be more explicit, just as the insight

into death is an insight which dialecti

cally discloses

that

all else

that

one is

or undergoes and the manner of

one's

existence, the circumstances of that ex

istence, are the results of

one's

own

choice;

so too, the insight into his

tory through the consciousness of the

finitude of temporality is the dialec

tical

insight into the ambiguity of his¬

PHILOSOPHY

T O D Y •

tory. In the

v s on

of the

present

mo

ment not only is Dasein's own tem

poral antecedents and directions dis

closed to him but also historical ante

cedents

and directions. However, just

as

death

has revealed Dasein's free

dom

as

regards

his temporal

antece

dents

and directions, so too

does

f i n -

itude reveal his historical freedom. If

one is a

v i c t im

of historical,

social,

cultural

determinisms it is only be

cause one has by

one's

own choice al

lowed

oneself to be so determined. On

the other hand, given the significance

of death, for one who is authentically

temporal and free for his own death,

history is based on

one's

temporality

and not the reverse. Thus, one

takes

responsibility for

one's

history and his

tory itself by taking responsibility for

or care of

one's

own time. One appro

priates history but not in the sense that

one

takes

this or that incident, im

poses one or another interpretation

thereon and uses this distortion for

whatever

ends

one chooses. Indeed, one

may do this but the point is

that

whatever the point of view, whatever

the interpretation,

on appropriates.^ ̂

One is responsible. History does not

force a meaning or interpretation upon

one.

Even

i f history offers but one

meaning or interpretation,

that

mean

ing

or interpretation is not forced upon

one. Quite literally, one has chosen

to be or not to be and as Merleau-Ponty

would say, one cannot choose to be

without choosing to be something any

more than one can see without seeing

something. Thus, even though hi story

offers but one meaning or interpreta

tion, that is, possibil ity, the truth of

the matter is that only through

one's

choice is there a meaning, interpreta

tion,

possibility.

Such

a

sense

of history is miss

ing

f rom Merleau-Ponty. True,

there

is

not time prior to

one's

own time.^

26



He

agrees that

history does not have

only

one meaning yet he

goes

on to say

that freedom consists only in taking

up the meaning

which

history is of

fering

at the moment in question.^ We

confer a significance upon history but

not without history putting

that s i g -

nificance

forward itself.^^ Just as to

see means to see something, so too to

be

means

to be as the historical situa

tion allows. However, whereas H e i -

degger seems to place temporality on

an ontological level alongside

that

of

nothingness such that existence is most

properly described as "to be the basis

o f

a nullity" and therefore, the choice

to be (something) is made only along

side the choice not to be, (see below,

page

20); Merleau-Ponty

rests

noth

ingness on time and thus, any choice,

even the choice not to be is one offered

by

history.

Thus far we have arrived at a

notion of time as the consciousness of

the development of consciousness. Ac

cording

to one of our sources

that

de

velopment is, at least to some extent,

determined. To the other, the develop

ment is, in theory at least, radically

undetermined.

Continuing,

then,

with

our cross-

referencing we

f i n d

that Merleau-Ponty

makes a rather off-handed reference

to Heidegger. In describing time as the

"archetype of the relationship of self

to

self

23 Merleau-Ponty remarks

that

"Heidegger refers somewhere to the

'Gelichtetheit'

of the Dasein." The

'somewhere* is in the section entitled

'The Temporality of Being-in-the-world

and the Problem of the Transcendence

of the W o r l d . Heidegger's point in this

section, as w e l l as in the earlier section

i n which

the

same

term occurs,^* is

that

Dasein

as Being-in-the-world is his own

light whereby he sees where he is go

i ng ,

where he has been, and sees what

he

does

see as he goes.

To

say

that

it (Dasein) is

i l l u -

mined means that as Being-in-the-

world

it is cleared in itself, not

through any other entity, but in

such

a way

that

it

is

itself the

clearing. . . . By its very nature,

Dasein brings its

'there'

along

with

it.

If it lacks its 'there', it is not

factically

the entity

which

is es

sentially

Dasein; indeed, it is not

this entity at all. Dasein

is its

disclosedness.^^

The above has been quoted at

length in order to bring out the f u l l

significance of the following

passage

which

is from the same section of H e i -

degger to

which

Merleau-Ponty is re

ferring.

The ecstatical unity of temporality

—

that

is, the unity of the 'outside-

of-itself'

in the raptures of the fu

ture, of what has been, and of the

Present — is the condition for the

possibility that

there

can be an

entity

which

exists as its there. ^«

It is almost as though Heidegger

had anticipated Merleau-Ponty's

view

of time and history and sought to re

fute it beforehand. The 'there', the

situation in

which

one finds oneself,

has meaning only through temporality

and consequently cannot interpret tem

porality but must be interpreted by

temporality. One vows himself to

c e l i -

bate

chastity, for example. Later, one

falls

in love and marries. Did one vow?

D i d

one live his vow? If so, then how

can it be possible

that

he marry? Is

it to be assumed

that

in spite of one's

vow, that

is,

one's

plan and design for

one's own time and history, a circum

stance, an event arises which contradicts

and

negates that

plan or resolve in

spite of

that

plan or resolve?

W i t h

such

a vow or resolve, if indeed it was

an authentic vow or resolve, what pos

sible

meaning could the occasion of

f a l l i n g

in love and marrying have? Or

again,

does

the

giving

make one char-

MERLEAU PONTY ND HEIDEGGER

261



itable or does one give because one is

charitable? Does the tel ling of lies

make one a l i a r or does one lie because

one is a liar? Of course, a distinction

between dispositions or tendencies and

actual character

states

is applicable

here.

However, the significance of such

dispositions or tendencies is

that

they

*go' before relevant situations not mere

l y in the

sense that

because one is dis

posed to be charitable or to lie one

is

l i k e l y to be charitable or to lie i f

the situation arises; but

these

dis

positions go before in the

sense that

situations to be charitable or to lie

arise only

because

one is so disposed.

To one who is neither charitable nor

tight-fisted, a beggar is a meaningless

enti ty and such a one cannot be aroused

to the actual character state of being

charitable or tight-fisted. To one who

has not yet decided to be either truth

f u l or deceitful, speech as communica

tion

is precluded and such a one is left

to conducting such idle conversation as

bores,

embarrasses,

and even infuriates

anyone for whom conversation is more

than just

t ime - f i l l .

But

how does this

refute

Merleau-

Ponty?

Co u l d

not the above be as

we l l

given

as an interpretation of his theory

since he too maintains

there

is no out

side without an inside; that

one's

re

sponse is as much a matter of

one's

own

integral physical, organic, psychic state

as it is a matter of the stimuli or ex

ternal situation

? ^

The difference lies in the primacy

of

the 'inside' or of the 'outside'.

M e r

leau-Ponty

seems

at times to give the

primacy to

one's

integral or homeo-

static state and at other times to the

'world'. However, because Merleau-

Ponty precludes the possibili ty of a rad

i c a l , individual,

absolute choice, a

p r i

mordial

choice,

one's world, one's

fe-

benswelt cannot be interpreted as the

projection of

one's

being or conscious¬

PHILOSOPHY T O D Y

ness

except insofar as

one's

conscious

ness

is the interiorization of

leben¬

swelt which is now one^s lebensweit

In

other words, because Merleau-Ponty

precludes the possibility of a primordial

choice, a traumatizing choice so to

speak,

the structures, contents, direc

tions of consciousness are at root de

rived

from the 'outside' and

one's

re

sponsibility

for

one's

own existence is

at

best

a secondary, derived, hypotheti

cal responsibility.

Heidegger, because he does main

tain not only the possibility but the ac

tuality of a primordial choice, main

tains the primacy of consciousness.

Thus, consciousness is self-determining

and there is a lebensweit only because

there is such a consciousness, not vice-

vei^a.

One is responsible fo r

one's

existence and not in any derived, sec

ondary, hypothetical sense but in a

p r i

mordial sense.

These differences are most pro

nounced in the last parallel passage.

In a summarizing

passage

in which

he briefly states his interpretation of

intentional being-in-the-world, Merleau-

Ponty borrows a term from Heidegger

and in a footnote gives the entire pas

sage from Heidegger containing the

term. Merleau-Ponty's words are:

The

world

is inseparable from the

subject, but from a subject which

is

nothing but a project of the

world, and the subject is insepara

ble from the

world,

but from a

world

which it projects itself. The

subject is a being-in-the-world and

the world remains 'subjective' since

its

texture

and articulations are in

dicated by the

subject's

movement

of transcendence. Hence we dis

covered, with the world as the

cradle of meanings, the direction

of

all directions, and ground of

a l l thinking, how to leave behind

the dilemma of realism and ideal

ism,

contingency and absolute rea

son, nonsense and

sense.̂ ^

262



The passage from

Heidegger is:

f the 'subject'

gets

conceived on

tologically as an existing Dasein

whose Being is grounded in tem

porality,

then one must say

that

the

world

is 'subjective'. But in

that

case, this 'subjective' world

as one

that

is temporally tran

scendent, is more 'objective' than

any possible

Object .^«

Merleau-Ponty

goes on to conclude:

The world as we have tried to

show it, as standing on the horizon

of our l i f e as the primordial unity

of all our experiences, and one goal

of all our projects, is no longer

the

visible

unfo lding of a consti

tuting Thought, not a chance con

glomeration of parts, nor, of course,

the working of a controlling

Thought on an indifferent matter,

but the native abode of all ra-

tionality

.3°

Heidegger goes on to conclude:

When Being-in-the-world is traced

back to the ecstatico-horizonal

unity of temporality, the existen-

tial-ontological

possibility

of this

basic

state

of Dasein is made in

telligible.

At the same time it be

comes

plain that

a concrete work

ing-out of the world-structure in

general and its possible variations

can be tackled only if the ontol

ogy

of possible entities within-the-

world is oriented securely enough

by clarifying

the idea of Being

i n general. If an interpretation of

this idea is to be possible, the

temporality of Dasein must be

exhibited

beforehand; here our

characterization of Being-in-the-

world w i l l be of service.^^

Quite simply, perhaps oversimply,

the differences are those to be expected

when

comparing a French empiricist

and a German idealist. For the former,

just as to

sense

or to perceive means

to

sense

or perceive something, so too,

to be conscious means to be conscious

of something outside*. Thus, conscious-

ss

is tied to and structured by the

something

which

gives meaning to it

The object of consciousness is not con

sciousness itself because one is not an

object

that

can be perceived. Rather,

the subject is one who makes his reality

and finds

himself only

in the act of

loving

(something), hating (some

thing),

w i l l i n g (something). In short,

it is through my relation to things that

know myself. *^

Fo r

Heidegger, Dasein is

that

Be

ing f or whom Being is an issue.^ Thus,

the understanding and interpretation of

Being depends on the meaning, the

seriousness for Dasein of the issue of

Being which is disclosed only through

Dasein's own self-understanding.

Through

such self-understanding Da

sein

is aware

that

his own

radical,

absolute

possibility

is death. Thus, ac

cording

to Heidegger, to be does not

primarily mean to be something for

prior

to being something there is first

the insight, understanding, interpreta

tion

of

Nothing.

The question, Why

are

there essents

rather than nothing?

is meaningless only to those who under

stand nothing as 'no thing', or as a p r i -

vation

or negation and not as a true,

positive possibility

as

true

and as pos

itive

as 'some thing'. The question,

Why are there

essents

rather than

nothing? goes to the root of Dasein's

existence for it discloses

that

for

Dasein,

the being for whom Being is an

issue and the being who by his own

choice is not yet not (to use a bit

of jargon wholly in the spirit although

not the letter of Heidegger), there are

essents simply

because Dasein cares.

There is a

lebensvoeltj

one has one's

own world because one has taken up the

issue of Being and has understood and

projected it so as to conduct one's l i f e

according

to

that

understanding and in

terpretation.**

MERLEAU PONTY ND HEIDEGGER

263



Merleau-Ponty s thesis may be

summarized

thus: G i v e n that man is

a

knower,

that

he is conscious, then

it

must be that his integral

physical,

organic, psychic condition is a thrust,

drive,

impetus, intention,

c a l l

it what

you w i l l

open to knowing and con

sciousness such that existence is exist

ence in and of the world in the manner

determined by the thrust or intention

and by the structures of the world in

which one finds oneself. Consequently,

consciousness as explicit awareness is

but an abstraction, in the Hegelian,

phenomenological

sense, of that total

consciousness

which

is being-in-the-

world; explicit awareness is but one

mode of being-in-the-world. One can

be in this mode of explicit awareness

only because one is already conscious.

Consciousness

unfolds according to

its own structures and directions and

it is this unfolding, which in the proc

ess discloses its origins and directions,

which is time. Time, because i t is a

mode of consciousness, serves as a mod

e l

of consciousness for in its unfolding

or ekstases it discloses the unfolding

or

ekstases of consciousness. The di

mensions of time are but the dimen

sions of consciousness: the future is

consciousness projection of its direc

tion or possibility; the past is the o r i -

gins

of consciousness; the present is

the now no longer a

possibility

about

to be an origin.

Heidegger s thesis

seems

to be

that

given a man s existence as fini te and

contingent, then it must be that his

radical, pr imordial being is to be fin ite

and contingent. That is to say, man s

existence must be as truly non-exist

ence as it is existence; man possesses

an act of non-esse as truly as he does

an act of

esse,

if s wh language may

be used. AU else that Dasein is, is

a mode or modification of this radical

esse-non-esse, this not yet not. One

P ILOSOP Y T O D Y •

can

have

l i v ed

many years a ll the while

subject to yesterday s failings and mis

takes, decisions and promises; today s

demands and exigencies; tomorrow s

agenda and yet, not have a there ,

not have a

past,

a future, a present.

However, if Dasein does understand, if

Dasein is authentically, the visible rou

tine and manner of

l i f e

may not change

a

jot. But, there is a difference. The

responsibility fo r one s l i f e the au

thority of its structure and content,

routine and pattern; of its rules, laws,

customs, values hangs not on a social

or

cultural peg but upon one s own

resoluteness or choice. Does one marry

until death . . because that is how

the State or Church defines and struc

tures marriage or because one chooses

to so marry? Does one take a vow of

religious l i f e because the

Church

says

such

vows constitute religious

l i f e

or

does one chose such a

state

and there

fore give structure to it in just that

way? If in these

cases

and all l i ke

cases the former is the case, then cer

tainly

as institutions change, as con

ditions, circumstances, t imes change,

so also do the commitments, resolutions,

choices

one has made. If the latter

is the case, then what relevance does

anything

except one s own death have

to the continuance of Dasein s reso

lutions, commitments, choices, that is,

existence?

Here at the practical

level

the ma

jor

difference between Merleau-Ponty s

and Heidegger s conception of time is

most apparent. For Heidegger, be

cause time and all that is in time

is

that

possibility

of existence which

Dasein himself has taken up, struc

tured, defined, so-called situational

ethics, relativistic ethics, subjective

ethics are as abusive and ignorant of

Dasein s

authentic condition as is any

a priori system of ethics based on so-

called

eternal

truths

and values. For

RA



Merleau-Ponty, because time is the

necessary unfolding of Conciousness or

Being-in-the-world

conceivable as sub

ject and object, inside and outside only

i n an abstract way, conditions, circum

stances, times are relevant to

one's

resolve or choice. Thus as conditions,

circumstances, times change, so also

does one's

resolve. The consciousness

to

which

ordinary language refers when

it

speaks of

'self

or

is but a mode

of

a greater, inclusive Consciousness

comprising

both

'self

and the

world

to

which 'self

feels

itself

directed.

Self

is

subject to this Consciousness. The

responsibility, authority of

self

is con

ditional,

hypothetical. In summarizing

Merleau-Ponty one is tempted to say

that

for Merleau-Ponty

there

is no such

thing as a choice, only a more or less

adequate serving of the needs of the

times and upon

these needs,

require

ments, dictates of the times, all else

depends.

We seem to have come a long way

i n

our discussion of time — such a

long way

that

time is now a remote,

obscure theme. However, the journey

has been a necessary and therefore a

planned one. The consideration of time

has brought us to a consideration of

resoluteness and authority, i.e., con

science,

because

for both Merleau-Ponty

and Heidegger time, in one way or

another, is the projection of conscience,

of one's

resoluteness, and

one's

authori

tative, responsible choice. Consequent

l y

moral and ethical considerations

were touched upon. Thus, although the

above considerations would not appear

to the average man as a discussion

of time, the above is precisely that.

To

conclude by way of a summary,

let us note that because Heidegger in

tends

to do metaphysics phenomenologi

cally (whether or not this is legitimate

is

another question) he is contrained

to

view

time as a metaphysical

p r i n c i -

ple.

Because he intends to do psychol

ogy

phenomenologically (whether this

is

the only legitimate use is another

question) Merleau-Ponty concludes to

a less startling and revolutionary

view

of

time.

Whereas in Heidegger the analysis

of

time takes us

deeper

and

deeper

into

the conscious subject

until

we are deal

ing

only

with

the subject in

itself

and

no longer as in the

world,

in Merleau-

Ponty the analysis of time holds us

at the point of contact or union of

Being-in-the-world.

Fo r Merleau-Ponty

there

is no consciousness conscious of

itself

save as a consciousness

which

knows itself in and through the world.

It is by communicating

with

the

world

that we communicate beyond all doubt

with

ourselves

. 35

Consciousness and

experience are identical

with

one an

other and hence, consciousness is con

sciousness of the present. Through this

consciousness of the present we become

aware of time in the manner described

above because we hold time in its

entirety, and we are

present

to our

selves because we are present to the

world. **

C l a r i f y i n g

his description of time

Merleau-Ponty

seems

to move in a di

rection

similar

to Heidegger's. In point

ing out that unless the subject is iden

tified

with

temporality, self-positing be

comes a contradiction since a transcen

dental ego is necessarily invoked,

M e r -

leau-Ponty

seems

to be placing tem

porality at the very center of the being

of

the conscious subject. However, he

goes on to say that subjectivity is not

motionless identity

with

itself: as

with

time, it is of its essence, in order to be

genuine subjectivity, to open

itself

to

an Other and to go forth from itself. *^

Aside

from the fact that the

statement

is

in the linguistic analytic

sense t r i v i a l

since subjectivity implies

objectivity,

an

Other thrown up to

that

for

which

the

MERLEAU PONTY ND HEIDEGGER • • •

265



other is an object, the essential open

ness

to an Other and the going forth

force the conclusion

that

Temporality

cannot be anything other than a re

lationship founded upon the openness

and going forth to a

world.

Just

as

consciousness is non-existent without

a

world

so too temporality is non-exist

ent without the

world.

But as was said

above, the 'world' to which Merleau-

Ponty is referring is not a pure leben¬

swelt, purely a phenomenological one;

rather it is a

world

which becomes one's

world.

In Heidegger's terms, the

world

for

Merleau-Ponty is the world of the

'they-self, a

world socially,

culturally

imposed. Thus, it is no more proper

to say temporality belongs to one mem

ber of the relationship than to say it

belongs to the other member. We

must avoid conceiving as real and dis

tinct entities either the

indivisible

pow

ers, or its distinct manifestations; con

sciousness is neither, it is both; i t is

the very action of time-creation . .

The given of consciousness is being-

in-the-world,

which is to say, tempor-

ality-in-the-world.

To go beyond

that

given,

to see consciousness and percep

tion

'from the other side' so to speak,

to analyse consciousness and in some

way

see the ontological

structure

of it

is , for Merleau-Ponty, not possible. The

extreme l i m i t of description is con

sciousness itself.*^

Temporality for Merleau-Ponty is

a dimension of subjectivity which

through analysis

enables

us to see sub

jectivity.

However, the analysis of time

which gives access to subjectivity does

not provide an opportunity for reiterat

ing statements about

a subject open

to a

world

or a

world

which is object

for

a subject. Rather, the analysis dis

closes subject and object as two

b-

str ct moments of a unique structure

which

is presence.** Thus, Merieau-

Ponty's

statements

such as We

re

temporality, notwithstanding, tempor

ality is but a consequence of Being-in-

the-world.*^ The deepest one may

plunge is not into the metaphysical

principles

of Being-in-the-world but

only into the thickness of the pre-ob-

jective present, in which we f i n d our

bodily being, our social being, and the

pre-existence of the

world. *^

In

short, a comparison of Heideg

ger and Merleau-Ponty concludes to

this. For Heidegger, temporality is the

metaphysical, ontological ground of our

intentional being-in-the-world. That

this is Heidegger's doctrine is undenia

bly

confirmed by his

statement

of in

tent: That the intentionality of 'con

sciousness' is grounded in the ecstatical

unity of Dasein (i.e., temporality) and

how this is the case, w i l l be shown in

the following

Div is ion. **

The fact

that

the division referred to has never ap

peared proves nothing. One can only

speculate as to why it has never ap

peared.

For

Merleau-Ponty temporality is

a consequence of intentional being-in-

the-world.

Heidegger

presents

us with what

might be a true understanding of what

is

most truly the fact of our existence

the fact of

constant,

incessant, de

bilitating, demoralizing change; and

how to cope with and even overcome

this fact. If Merleau-Ponty's interpre

tation of time is correct, then our only

choice is resolving ourselves to the fact

of

change which, in being a change

that is

antecedent

to self-conscious

ness,

is anonymous change; and to the

gradual inevitable demoralization and

depersonalization which anonymous

change entails.

PHILOSOPHY

T O D Y •

66



R E F E R E N E S

1. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans

lated by John

Macquarrie

and Edward Rob

inson (New

York

and Evanston: Harper &

Row, Publishers, 1962) H. 331 (All references

to this work are given according to the pag

ination of the German editions preserved in

the Macquarrie-Robinson translation and cor

responding to the pagination given by

Mer

leau-Ponty in his references to Heidegger.

The

work will be referred to hereafter as

B T .

Not all of Merleau-Ponty's references

to Heidegger wijl be considered since

some

are either not germane or

ls

little different

in significance from references considered.

2. BT, H. 335.

3. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of

Perception,

translated by

Colin

Smith

(Lon

don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962) p. 410

(This work will be referred to hereafter as

P P .

4.

B T ,

H. 324.

5. BT, H. 422; PP, p. 412.

6. PP. p. 412.

7. PP. p. 412.

8. BT, H. 425

9. There is more truth in mythical personifi

cations of time than in the notion of time

considered, in the scientific maimer, as a

variable of motion in

itself,

or, in the Kantian

manner, as a form ideally separable from its

matter. PP, p. 422. See pages 421-422 of PP.

10. Here I am anticipating the argument made

immediately below this number in the

text.

11. BT, H. 350; PP, p. 420.

12. BT, H. 336.

13. Understanding is grounded

primarily

in the

future (whether in anticipation or in await

ing). States-of-mind temporalize themselves

primary

in having been (whether in repeti

tion or in having forgotten). Falling has its

temporal roots primarily in the Present

(whether in making-present or in the moment

of vision). All the same, understanding is

in every case a Present which *is in the proc

ess of having been.' All the same, one's

state-

of-mind

temporalizes itself as a future which

is 'making present*. And all the same, the

Present *leaps away' from a future that is

in the process of having been, or

ls

it is

held on to by such a future. BT, H. 350.

14. BT, H. 350.

15. BT, H. 373.

16. Authentic Being-towards-death

—

that

is to

say, the finitude of temporality — is the

hidden basis of Dasein 's historicality. BT,

H . 386 (Author's emphasis).

17. PP, p. 421.

17a.

(Page

9) Only

because primordial

time is

finite

can the derived time temporalize itself

as infinite. BT, H. 331 (Author's emphasis).

18. I am no more aware of being the true sub

ject

of my

sensations

than of my

birth

or

my death. Neither my

birth

nor my death

can appear to me as experiences of my own,

since, if I thought of them thus, I should

be assuming myself to be pre-existent to, or

outliving,

myself in order to be able to ex

perience them, and I should therefore not

be genuinely thinking of my birth or my

death. PP, p. 215.

19. Of Chapter Two, Division Two, entitled

Dasein's Attestation of an Authentic Poten-

tiality-for-Being,

and Resoluteness Heideg

ger

says:

These observations and those which

follow after

were

communicated as th s s on

the occasion of a public lecture on the con

cept of time . . . Footnote to H. 268, on

page

495 of Macquarrie-Robinson translation.

20. PP, pp. 432-433.

21. If indeed I made myself into a worker or

a bourgeois by an absolute initiative, and if

in

general terms nothing ever courted our

freedom, history would display no structures,

no

event

would be

seen

to take shape in it,

and anything might emerge from anything

else.

PP, p. 449.

22.

Which

means that we confer upon history

its significance, but not without its putting

that significance forward

itself.

. . We are

not asserting that history from end to end

has only one meaning, any more than has

an

individual life. We mean simply that in

any case freedom modifies it only by taking

up the meaning which history

was offering

at the moment in question, and by a kind

of

unobtrusive assimilation PP, p. 450.

23. PP, p. 426.

24. Section 28, H. 131ff of BT.

25. BT, H. 133 (Author's emphasis).

26. BT, H. 350.

27. This is an oversimplified statement of the

argument of

he Structure of Behaviour

and

l ss obviously so of the argument of

he

Phenomenology

of

Perception.

28. PP, p. 430.

29. BT, H. 366.

30. PP, p. 430.

31. BT, H. 366.

32. PP, p. 383.

33. BT, H. 12.

MERLEAU PONTY

ND

HEIDEGGER

• • •

267



34. Dasein is an entity which does not just occur

among other

entities.

Rather it is ontically

distinguished by the fact that, in its very

Being, that Being is an

issue

for it. But in

that case, this is a constitutive state of Da

sein's Being, and this implies that Dasein, in

its Being, has a relationship towards that

Being

— a relationship which itself is one of

Being.

And this means further that there is

some

way in which Dasein understands itself

in its Being, and that to some degree it

does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this

entity that with and through its Being, this

Being

is disclosed to it.

Understanding of

Being is itself a definite characteristic of

Dasein's Beifig.

Dasein is ontically distin

guished in that it is ontological. BT, H. 12

(Author's

emphasis).

35. PP, p. 424.

36. PP, p. 424.

37. PP, p. 426.

38. PP, pp. 424-425.

39. When we try to go deeper into subjectivity,

calling all things into question and sus

pending all our beliefs, the only form in

which a glimpse is vouchsafed to us of that

nonhuman ground . . . is as the horizon of

our particular commitments, and as the po

tentiality of something in the most general

sense, which is as the world's phantom.

P P p. 407.

By analysing this paragraph and com

paring with it Heideggerian notions alluded

to, one could

give

a quite nice comparison

and listing of the differences

between Mer

leau-Ponty and Heidegger. Heidegger, by

raising

the question of Being, the emptiest,

broadest,

vaguest

of concepts, is questioning

all things and suspending all beliefs.

Con

sequently, it is to be expected that such a

questioning and suspension would disclose a

non-human world, a world in which we are

not at home, a world in which our

exist

ence is revealed as uncanny . The horizon

of all our commitments is not a world in

any s ns of that term; the horizon is a

self who is only too

mudi

a stranger in

any world.

40. PP, p. 430.

41. PP, p. 432.

42. PP. p. 433.

43. BT,

footnote

to H. 363 on

page

498 of

Macquarrie-Robinson

translation (Author's

emphasis).

Socml Heorf College Belmont Notth Corolino

28012

P H I L O S O P H Y T O D A Y

SUMMER 1973

Paul Ricoeur

From Existentialism to the Philosophy of

Language —

Paul

Ricoeur

Creativity in Language

— Paul Ricoeur

The Task of Hermeneutics

— Paul Ricoeur

The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation

—

Paul

Ricoeur

The Tasks of the Political Educator —

Paul

Ricoeur

Ethics

and

Culture —

Paul

Ricoeur

A Critique

of B F

Skinner^s Beyond Free

do m and Dignity

— Paul Ricoeur

A Bibliography on Paul Ricoeur

Francois

H .

Lapointe

WINTER

1973

Maurice Merleau-Ponty — Robert F. Lechner

The Formation of Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy

— Robert M. Friedman

Merleau-Ponty

and the

Spirit

of

Painting

—

James Gordon Place

Selected Bibliography on Art and Aesthetics in

Merleau-Ponty

— Francois H. Lapointe

Merleau-Ponty and the Husserlian Reductions

— Raymond J. Dcvcttere

For-itself and In-itself m Sartre and Merleau-

Ponty

— John M . Mordand

The Self

in

WUliam Tomes — John J. Shea

Mead, Phenomenalism

and

Phenomenology

—

Paul Tibbetts

A Whiteheadian Theory of the Agent Self

— John Bennett

• P H I L O S O P H Y T O D A Y

•

268

camele 1975, time in merleau-ponty and heidegger

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