california studies in classical antiquity -'the battle of sardis in 395 b.c.' by j. k. anderson,...

7/27/2019 California Studies in Classical Antiquity -'the Battle of Sardis in 395 B.C.' by J. K. Anderson, 1974

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The Battle of Sardis in 395 B.C.Author(s): J. K. AndersonSource: California Studies in Classical Antiquity, Vol. 7 (1974), pp. 27-53Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25010662 .

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J. K. ANDERSON

The Battle of Sardis in 395 B.C.The publication of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia affordedscholars an opportunity of comparing Xenophon's account of events onwhich he should have been reliably informed, either as an active

participant or as a close friend of some of the principal actors, directlywith another contemporary or almost-contemporary account of thesame events. That theOxyrhynchus historian should provide information hitherto unknown about Boeotian politics and their bearing uponthe outbreak of the Corinthian War, or upon the operations of thePersian fleet under Conon, merely served to emphasize what was alreadyobvious-that Xenophon's information was incomplete and one-sided.But there is now early fourth-century authority for the variant tradition-hitherto only represented by Diodorus Siculus 1-of the manner inwhich Xenophon's friend and patron Agesilaus won his greatest victory.This throws doubt on Xenophon's story of the affair,2 which is totallydifferent. Yet here is amatter on which Xenophon ought to have beenwell-informed. If he really knew nothing about it, or, having onceknown, forgot, or deliberately chose to deceive his reader, is he to betrusted on anything at all? He has not, of course, lacked defenders, butthe strongest of these,W. Kaupert,3 has been overlooked both by E.

1Diod. Sic. 14.80.1. Cf. Hell. Oxy. 11 (6). Paus. 3.9.6 may also reflect thistradition. Plut. Ages. 10-15 and Nep. Ages. 3.4-6 are dependent on Xenophon; as arePolyaenus Strat. 2.1.9 and Frontin. Str. 1.8.12.2Xen. Hell. 3.4.20ff.

3W. Kaupert, "Sardis 395v. Chr.," inJ. Kromayer, Antike Schlachtfelder(Berlin 1924-1931) IV 261-289 (hereaftercited asKaupert, Schlachtfelder),nd inJ.Kromayer

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28 J. K. AndersonDelebecque,4 the most distinguished among recent Xenophonticscholars, and by I.A. F. Bruce,5 whose work on theHellenicaOxyrhynchiawill deservedly be widely followed. If I reopen the question, it is forfear of the case going by default, rather than because I have importantnew evidence to offer.

The ancient sources agree that when the campaign of395 B.C.opened, the Spartan King Agesilaus was at Ephesus, his mainbase. The Persian army, under Tissaphernes, had been heavily reinforced, and, according toXenophon, was preparing to defend the lineof the Meander river, some two days' march to the south-east ofEphesus, in the expectation that Agesilaus would invade Caria. ToXenophon6 the strategic importance of Caria consisted in the fact thatthe satrap's own home lay there, and therewould also be the tacticaladvantage, for the Greeks, of fighting in a country that was unsuitedto cavalry. Tissaphernes planned to use his superior cavalry in theMeander plain, before theGreeks reached themountains to the south.His infantry was held south of the river. It was probably numericallysuperior to that ofAgesilaus, but inferior in quality, though it includedat least several hundred Greek mercenary hoplites.7Modern critics 8have agreed thatTissaphernes was guidedby sound strategic reasoning. By conquering Caria, Agesilaus wouldhave deprived the Persian fleet of a base for the invasion of theAegean.Whether he could in fact have achieved this conquest without the siegeengines that enabled Alexander the Great to reduce Miletus andHalicarnassus may be doubted; at all events, he chose not to attempt it.and G. Veith, Schlachten-Atlas ur antikenKriegsgeschichte, ierte Lieferung, GriechischeAbteilung I Blatt 4, Kartchen 8-9 (hereafterKaupert, Schlachten-Atlas).4E. Delebecque, Essai sur la viedeXenophon(Paris 1957) 141acceptswithoutfurther discussion theviews ofCh. Dugas, "La Campagne d'Agsilas en AsiaMineure (395),"BCH 34 (1910) 58-95.5 I. A. F. Bruce, An HistoricalCommentaryn theHellenicaOxyrhynchia Cambridge 1967). Bruce's arguments have weighed heavily with H. R. Breitenbach, RE suppl. 12(1970) s.v. "Hellenika Oxyrhynchia," cols. 393-395. But Breitenbach, in summing up, leavesthe question open, while allowing thatXenophon's access to first-hand information inclinesthe balance in his favor.6Xen. Hell. 3.4.11-15; cf. Ages. 1.15.7Xen. Hell. 3.2.15 mentions Greeks in the service of both Pharnabazus and

Tissaphernes in 397 B.C.Polyaenus Strat. 7.16.1 mentions the picked Greek bodyguard ofTissaphernes in connection with hismurder.8 Including G. Busolt, "Der neue Historiker und Xenophon," Hermes43(1908)260; E.Meyer, Theopompsellenika (Halle 1909) 12;Kaupert, Schlachtfelder62 ;N.G. L.Hammond, A History of Greeceto322 B.C. (Oxford 1959) 454-455.



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I"J',,,,,,, .... \MT SIPYLUS ''","-^'- e

SaSdisTo Smyrna' ""4'BEL KAHVE S.l.ll' rardis"-?1rrurNvmnhn1ir ?I~J~'," > 'l.*.- ",Nymphoeaur oo\" , '/?

,'to",MTOLYMPUS t. in' 4"Ws' IA. , ' .- I I u*S U . .

j-.

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Eph!esus ., ";^ L ; -

, ..... .,, MIpaepa,.11e,,."" ~

Metropolis Cjf y , / . d.ih ,, , , -t ., .lk....

Agesilaus's prepare s at Ephesus in the early spring of 395 ad this lry presented him frm fllwing up his initial seEphesus , .....\-' -? .r,, ,' I

Xenophon's narrative of the campaign of 396 B.C.,Agesilaus's preparations at Ephesus in the early spring of 395, and thecampaign of 395 B.C. up to the battle of Sardis, is continuous.9 In 396

Agesilaus deceived the Persians by ordering the cities along his route toCaria to lay in supplies, and then invading Phrygia. But the inadequacyof his cavalry prevented him from following up his initial success.

9Xen. Hell. 3.4.11-24.



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30 J. K. AndersonAccordingly, when the campaigning season was over, he set aboutraising a force of mercenary cavalry by encouraging rich men whowished to avoid personal service to provide as substitutes fully equippedand mounted troopers.

Many years laterXenophon was to tell theAthenians that,"I myself know that the Spartan cavalry began to flourish, when theyreinforced itwith mercenary troopers." 10He must have been thinkingof Agesilaus's victories in 395 and 394 B.C., including, in the latter year,the victory at Narthacium in Thessaly, where the king rejoiced indefeating "the men who most prided themselves in horsemanship"with the cavalry that he had formed himself.11 By 371 B.C., at Leuctra,the Spartan cavalry, no longer mercenary but formed of untrained"inferior" citizens, had relapsed into inefficiency.12

Xenophon's emphatic "I myself know" (otSa 3' eycoyE)certainly implies eyewitness knowledge of at least some of the mercenaries' successes. His own testimony as well as that of DiogenesLaertius13-resting in part at least on independent sources-leaves nodoubt that he accompanied Agesilaus on his march fromAsia throughNorthern and Central Greece in 394 B.C. But his participation in thecampaign of 395 B.C. isnot directly attested by any ancient author.Of one thing we can be certain; he was no longer incommand of the "Cyreans," the remnant of the "Ten Thousand"whom he had brought to Thibron at Pergamum in 399 B.C., and whosecommand he had probably retained under Thibron and Dercylidas,14and perhaps even under Agesilaus in 396 B.C.Up to the early spring of395 B.C.Agesilaus had been assisted by the staff of thirty Spartiates whohad come out with him and Lysander the year before, though Lysanderhad been compelled by repeated snubs to remove himself before theactive campaign opened. Now, " the thirtywho had come with Lysandersailed away home, and as successors to them there arrived thoseaccompanying Herippidas. Of these, he appointed Xenocles andanother to command the cavalry, Scythes to command the newlyenfranchised hoplites [the ex-helots who made up theLaconian divisionof the infantry], Herippidas to command the Cyreans, andMygdon to

10Xen. Hipparch.9.4.11Xen. Hell. 4.3.9; Ages. 2.5.12Xen. Hell. 6.4.10-11.13Xen. An. 5.3.6; D.L. 2.52.14He is supposed to be the anonymous "commander of the Cyreans" ofXen. Hell. 3.2.7.



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The Battle of Sardis 31command the soldiers from the allied cities."15 What Xenophon'sduties may have been after a reorganization whose purpose was perhapsto ensure that all themajor commands were inSpartiate hands, or evenwhether he had any duties, cannot be certainly determined. It isnotablethat the cavalry was the only part of the army forwhich two commanderswere appointed; that Xenophon suppresses the second commander'sname, as he apparently suppresses his own name at an earlier period,when he still commanded theCyreans;16 and that the reorganization ofa cavalry division was one part of the art of war inwhich a Spartiatemight well have benefited from Xenophon's technical advice. ButXenophon says that the anonymous " another," aswell asXenocles, wasone of the thirty Spartiates (rov'oWv SevoKXa iev Kal XAAovraTXev EtmTros iTrrEasC),nd we are not entitled to suppose that he did this only todisguise himself more completely.Two commanders may have been appointed because thecavalry was normally posted in two bodies, one on each wing, when anarmy was drawn up for battle. Xenophon may simply have forgottenthe secondman's name; he was certainly writing many years later. It isnot likely that Xenophon disliked the "other" and so refused toimmortalize his name. It would have been more in his manner tocensure him directly.At all events, Xenophon's experience and skillwould stillhave been useful, and it is not likely that he was dropped completelyfrom the Spartan service. If he had been, there seems to be no goodreasonwhy he should ever have been re-employed; yet the extraordinaryhonors and rewards, including the estate at Scillus, which he laterreceived from the Spartans,17 are unlikely to have been granted merelybecause he was a personal friend of theKing's, and still less likely tohave been given to him as a man of letters. Admittedly Lysander hadshown himself aware of the propaganda value of poetry 18but, "exceptfor the epigram that someone or other wrote forCynisca, and that whichSimonides wrote for Pausanias upon the tripod offered at Delphi, nopoet has left any memorial to the kings of Lacedaemon."19 Prosehistory like Xenophon's was likely to have less popular impact, andbesides there isno certainty thatXenophon had yet begun tomake his

15Xen. Hell. 3.4.20.16Supra n. 14.17D.L. 2.52.18Plut. Lys. 18.7.19Paus. 3.8.2.



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32 J. K. Andersonmark as an author when he returned to Europe in 394 B.C.20We maybe almost certain that the Spartans were rewarding him as a soldierwho had served themwell up to that time, and it isvery likely that hisservice continued until the end of the Corinthian War.21

It is still possible that he remained at Ephesus in 395 B.C.instead of accompanying the field army. Agesilaus must have left agarrison to protect his base. Dercylidas's invasion of Caria in 397 B.C.had been checked when he had to turn back to protect Ephesus,22 andAgesilaus no doubt took precautions against a similar frustration. Norcan we rule out the possibility thatXenophon was detained by sicknessor accident. But Agesilaus would certainly have seen that the officersat his base were informed as far as possible about his own movementsand those of the enemy, and in any caseXenophon himself was certainlywith theKing next year, and most likely during the operations againstPharnabazus in the latter part of 395 B.C.23We should not thereforeassume thatXenophon's account is faulty "due to his lack of first-handknowledge and the uncertain memory of his informants"24 unless it canbe shown to be erroneous in itself.That he disagrees with other authors,about whose opportunities to learn the factswe know nothing, isnot initself a sufficient reason to reject him.

Xenophon has indeed been detected in supposed error fromthemoment that his story followsAgesilaus out of Ephesus.25He says26that Agesilaus informed his new officers that he was going to lead thearmy directly "by the shortest route against the best part of the country"(7jnv avVTOlJTaW&rr-v 'T Ta KpTtcrTa r-sC Xwpas-not necessarily the"strongest" part in amilitary sense). Tissaphernes supposed that thistime he reallywould invade Caria. "But Agesilaus did not lie, but, as hehad announced, made an inroad directly into the district of Sardis. For

20Delebecque (supra n. 4) 29-75 argues that the first two books of theHellenica were written in 402 B.C., but D.L. 2.57 is inadequate to support his claim thatXenophon was Thucydides's collaborator and literary executor. See furtherW. P. Henry,GreekHistoricalWriting (Chicago 1967), especially pp. 54-88.21Delebecque (supran. 4) 169-185.22Xen. Hell. 3.2.12-14.23Xen. Hell. 4.1.29-41 (the account of the meeting between Pharnabazusand Agesilaus) is alrhost certainly an eyewitness report.24 Bruce (supra n. 5) 153. This criticism might with more justice be directedagainst parts of Xenophon's history of the Peloponnesian War, such as his account of theBattle of Notium (Xen. Hell. 1.5.10-15).25Dugas (supran. 4) 62-65.26Xen. Hell. 3.4.20-22.



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The Battle of Sardis 33three days he marched through country clear of enemies, and obtained

many provisions for his army, but on the fourth day the enemy cavalryarrived. And [their commander] 27 told the officer in command of thebaggage to cross the Pactolus and encamp, but they themselves saw thecamp-followers of the Greeks scattered in foraging, and killed many ofthem."

The simple "for three days he marched" certainly contrasts with the care with which halting-places and parasangs arenumbered in the early part of the Anabasis. But Xenophon's apparentlystraightforward story is questioned not only for itswant of detail butbecause those details that he does give-that Agesilaus marched by theshortest route; that hemarched for three days; that the battle tookplaceon the banks of the Pactolus-are thought to prove that Xenophonimagined the Greek army marching along a route that was in factclosed to it.

A commander, or traveller, intending to go from Ephesusto Sardis would in fact have several choices open to him (seemap):1. He could proceed east-north-eastwards up the valleyof the Cayster, at whose mouth Ephesus lies, having on his left the long

ridge ofMt. Tmolus. Tmolus is low at itswestern end, but rises progressively towards the east. Several passes lead northward over it to thewide vale of the Hermus,28 of which one in particular needs to beconsidered here. This lies rather more than fortymiles in a straight linefrom Ephesus, above the modern Odemis. On this route must havestood theHypaepa of Strabo,

" a citywhere one goes down from Tmolustowards the Caystrian plain." 29This route was followed by the Ionianrebels when they marched up from the coast to capture and burnSardis in 498 B.C.,30and itwas perhaps to prevent a repetition of suchattacks that the "watch place" was built on the summit of the pass,which Strabo describes as crowned with "an exedra f white marble, the270 rjyE/uvis supplied fromXen. Ages. 1.30.28Kaupert, Schlachtfelder76-278 notes the pass north of modern Baindyr

(Bayindir),which leads to theHermus valley about twentymiles below Sardis.A practicableroute also appears to exist a little further to the east on the line Blbiiller-Karakoy-Urganli;this has not been brought into the discussion by any modern scholar, and in fact thesesecondary routes seem never to have been of commercial or military importance.29 Strab. 13.627. Besides Strabo's testimony, the use of this road in Romantimes is proved by milestones from the lower Cayster valley: B. Haussoulier, "NouveauMilliaire au Nom deManius Aquillius," Rev. Phil. 23 (1899) 293-299, especially 298-299.30Hdt. 5.100-101.



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34 J. K. Andersonwork of the Persians." 31From the summit, this route follows the courseof the Pactolus down to Sardis. The city stood at the point where thePactolus emerges from the hills into thewide, flat plain of the Hermusand there is an expanse of level ground perhaps threemiles wide betweenSardis and theHermus river.

2. A second possibility would be togo north fromEphesus,more or less along the line of themodern main road and railway fromSelsuk to Izmir, to the head of the Gulf of Izmir. From thispoint Sardislies about fiftymiles to the east. The route turns eastwards over the lowsaddle of Bel Kahve, which links the last northwestern outlier of theTmolus range (Tahtali Dag: ancient Olympus) to themass ofMountSipylus. Beyond Bel Kahve, below the southeastern skirts of Sipylus,lies a pleasant country, whose amenities are attested by a huntinglodge of the Emperors of Nicaea (Nymphaeum; modern Kemal Pasa).From here the Hermus valley is easily reached at a point about twentymiles below Sardis.

This route avoids all major obstacles, but is certainly notthe most direct and could not have been covered in the time whichXenophon allows for themarch.3. To avoid the detour by theGulf of Izmir, the travellercan diverge from this second route a few miles north of Ephesus, andtake themost westerly and lowest of the passes across themain Tmolusrange. This isKarabel-the Black Pass-which also leads to the countryaround Nymphaeum and to the lowerHermus valley. Through thispassruns, at the present day, an unsurfaced road, adequate probably for thesturdier types of motor vehicle, but intended rather for foot-travellersand animals. It did not appear to bemuch used in the summer of 1951when I rode by it to visit the famous Hittite reliefs near the head of thepass; but the existence of these reliefs proves the importance of Karabelin the Bronze Age, and since Herodotus knew about them (thoughwrongly ascribing them to Sesostris of Egypt) it is evident that thiswaywas still travelled in the fifth century B.C.32

31 Strab. 13.625. Professor Greenewalt informs me that members of theAmerican archaeological expedition in Sardis have searchedwithout success for the remainsof the exedra. But he cites A. H. Sayce, "Notes from Journeys in the Troad and Lydia," JHS 1(1880) 88, for the interesting possibility that this or another monument, "inscribed withPersian cuneiform characters,"may have survived "in a desolate part of Mount Tmolus"until the latterpart of the nineteenth century, ifnot until the present.32Hdt. 2.106. The principal relief has been often illustrated; e.g. Ekrem

Akurgal, The Art of theHittites (NewYork 1962) PI.XXII. ProfessorGreenewalt drawsmy



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The Battle of Sardis 35Diodorus Siculus indicates that Agesilaus followed thisroute (aswas clearly established by Ch. Dugas in 1910) and he seems tobe in agreement with the Oxyrhynchus historian, though the latter'stext is too fragmentary to be read continuously.33 Diodorus says thatAgesilaus:

Led his army out into the plain of theCaysterand the country about Sipylus and ravaged the possessionsof the natives. Tissaphernes collected ten thousand cavalryand fifty thousand infantry, followed close on theLacedaemonians, and destroyed thosewho were detached from theformation in foraging. But Agesilaus formed his soldiers inhollow square and clung to the foothills of Sipylus, waitingfor an opportune moment to fall on the enemy. Aftertraversing the country as far as Sardis he ravaged thegardens and the paradise of Tissaphernes, which waselaborately adorned with plantations and other amenitiesfor luxury and the enjoyment of delights in peacetime.After thishe countermarched until hewas midway betweenSardis and Thybarna....In this account, Agesilaus must be supposed to havemarched by Karabel, the only pass that leads from the Cayster Valleyto "the country about Sipylus" (i.e.Nymphaeum), rather than directlyto theHermus valley.The long detour by the Gulf of Izmir and Bel Kahve isclearly not in question.Critics on both sides 34have pointed out that the ravaging

attention to recent discoveries; Hans G. Guterbock, "Das dritteMonument am Karabel,"Ist.Mitt. 17 (1967) 63-71, and to the discussion byKurt Bittel, "Die Reliefs am Karabel beiNif (Kemal Papa)," AfO 13 (1941) 181-193, of Herodotus's statement that the reliefs stoodone on the road from the Ephesian territory to Phocaea and one on that from Sardis toSmyrna. Bittel remarks (p. 188) thatKarabel provides the easiestpassage over themountainslying to the north of theCayster valley, and notes the likelihood of the suggestion that thecontinuation of the Persian Royal Road may have run through the pass.33Dugas (supra n. 4) 62-64; Diod. Sic. 14.80.1. Hell. Oxy. 11 (6) 2-3appears tomention " theCaystrian plain" and toagreewith Diodorus inmaking Tissaphernesattack the Greeks on their march. The better-preserved narrative of the actual battle (Hell.Oxy. 11 [6] 4) is clearly amajor source forDiod. Sic. 14.80.2-3, though apparently indirectlythroughEphorus.34Dugas (supra n. 4) 61. G. de Sanctis, "Nuovi studi sulle 'Elleniche' di



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36 J. K. Andersonof the paradise and gardens around Sardis would have been more easilycarried out after the Persian army had been defeated than when theGreek army was being compelled to remain in close formation in theface of a largerPersian force.Agesilaus could not have reached Sardis by"clinging to the foothills of Sipylus," though he could have "clung to"the northern edge of Tmolus on his way up the Hermus valley. Thehollow squarewas not really a suitable formation formountain warfare,35and Xenophon at least had found, during the retreat of the TenThousand, that it was dangerous for an army in hollow square toattempt to pass a defile when an enemy was following close behind it.36Agesilaus could not have led his army through Karabel except incolumn. Nor could Tissaphernes have followed except in the sameformation-and, if he had done so, it is hard to imagine what more"opportune moment to fall on the enemy" Agesilaus could have foundthanwhen the head of the Persian column was emerging from the passand its tail was somewhere in the Cayster valley.How much of Diodorus's story is based on the HellenicaOxyrhynchia s uncertain. The Oxyrhynchus historian is not necessarilyresponsible for the difficulties and errors noted above; not enough is leftof his text to let us pronounce. It isclear that he differed fromXenophonand agreed with Diodorus inmaking the Persian army follow theGreekfor some time before the battle,37 but he did not necessarily bring itthrough the same passes immediately behind Agesilaus. Indeed,Diodorus might well mean that the armies first encountered in theneighbourhood of Mount Sipylus, after crossing the Tmolus rangeseparately.But, whatever faultsDiodorus committed, and whether the

Oxyrhynchus historian shared them or not, Xenophon's error in sayingthatAgesilaus marched on Sardis "by the shortest route" appeared toDugas farmore serious.38His argument may be summarized as follows:

1. The march of the Ionians in 498 B.C. proves that theCayster valley-Hypaepa-Pactolus valley route was the normal oneOxyrhynchos," Atti Tor. 66 (1930-1931) 178-179 rightly emphasizes that the order of eventsinXenophon is"piu logico".35Busolt (supran. 8) 262.36Xen. Anab. 3.4.19-20.

37 Enough of the beginning of Hell. Oxy. 11 (6) 3 is preserved to make thiscertain. 38Dugas (supran. 4) 64.



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The Battle of Sardis 37between Ephesus and Sardis.39Xenophon will have himself travelled bythis route in 401 B.C.when he went to join Cyrus the Younger.40 Hetherefore knew that itwas a three days' journey (not that he himself saysthat he took three days, but thatHerodotus,41 who gives the distance asfive hundred and forty stades, calls it a three days' journey). So (supposedly) Xenophon said that Agesilaus "marched for three days."2. But in fact this routewas unsafe forAgesilaus in 395 B.C.,even ifXenophon is right in saying that Tissaphernes had been trickedinto holding his army in theMeander valley. (The omission of this trickby Diodorus and theOxyrhynchus historian isnot, asDugas would haveit, a circumstance of small importance; it enabled Agesilaus to passTmolus unopposed, and he might never have passed it in the face ofopposition.) A long two days' march up the Cayster valley toHypaepawould have taken Agesilaus across the front of the Persians, who musthave had Ephesus under observation. Their cavalry patrols could havecome close to the city, and theymight also have arranged to spread thealarm by means of beacons42 when the Greeks came out. Even if themain body of cavalry was further south, it could easily have reached theCayster valley in time to harass the Greeks. IfAgesilaus had used thisroute, he certainly would not have marched for three days withoutseeing an enemy; indeed, Tissaphernes, ifhe was alerted promptly andreacted with speed, could very possibly have brought up his whole armybefore the Greeks reached Hypaepa. His infantry was "south of the

Meander"-probably not strung out along the river bank, but concentrated, so as to march to whatever point Agesilaus chose for the attempted crossing. The Persian cavalry would report which way theGreeks were coming, and delay theirmarch until the infantry reached

39Kaupert, Schlachtfelder80, agrees thatAgesilaus would not have riskedtaking this route, but rejects the arguments advanced by Dugas (supran. 4) 64-65 to provethat Xenophon says he did take it.40Xen. Anab. 3.1.8 says that Xenophon joined Cyrus at Sardis; Anab.6.1.23 that he went up fromEphesus. His route is not described, but it is reasonable to assumethat he followed awell-established highway.41Hdt. 5.54 G. Cousin, Kyros leJeune enAsieMineure (Paris 1905) 86 pointsout that inXen. Anab. 2.2.6 themarch toCunaxa is reckoned fromEphesus, not fromSardis,and the "ninety-three stages" there noted seem to include the journey from Ephesus toSardis. The passage is however probably not authentic, but (like others of the same sort)inserted intoXenophon's textby a commentatorwho did his job badly. As Cousin points out,

we have to allow nine stages totalling eighteen parasangs between Ephesus and Sardis tomakethe numbers agreewith the daily totals for themarch.42Xen. Anab. 7.8.15 speaks of the Persians using fire-signals to spread thealarm when the Greeks attacked Asidates in 399 B.c.



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38 J. K. Andersonits position. A likely point for themain Persian concentration would beopposite Tralles (modern Aydin), which had been one of Cyrus'sfortresses in 401 B.C.43and no doubt, like Sardis, had passed into thehands of Tissaphernes. This gave Tissaphernes a strong bridgehead onthe north bank of theMeander, only some thirtymiles fromHypaepa,whereas Agesilaus had fortymiles tomarch in the face of the Persiancavalry. The ridge of Messogis, between the Meander and Caystervalleys, is not a formidable obstacle like Tmolus; and, though Tissaphernes would have had to bring his infantry across theMeander toreachTralles, he would have been unopposed. Even if he could not havereached Hypaepa first with his whole army, it does seem extremelyimprobable that the Greeks would have been allowed to march forthree days completely unmolested by this route.

Dugas44 adds that amarch by theKarabel-Sipylus routewas best suited toAgesilaus's purpose of spreading alarm as widely aspossible and gathering booty. I am not sure that "la riche region duSipyle" (i.e., the country about Nymphaeum), pleasant though it is,would have afforded larger centres of population or more portablewealth than theCayster valley. But this isof small importance comparedwith the earlier argument. IfAgesilaus wished to avoid the Persians, atleast in the first stages of hismarch, until he had crossedMount Tmolus,he must have chosen theKarabel route.

But is it in fact certain that Xenophon says he did notfollow it? The arguments intended to prove that the Hypaepa routewas the "normal" one in antiquity are not decisive. Very possibly theIonians surprised Sardis in 498 B.C. because they approached by the"back door." The apparent preference of travellers in the late nineteenth century for theHypaepa route45 seems in part to be governedby the modern settlement-pattern of the Cayster valley. Dugas doesnot commit himself to an actual measurement of the Karabel and

43Xen. Anab. 1.4.8.44Dugas (supran. 4) 65.45ProfessorGreenewalt points out that this has already been suggested byK. Bittel (supran. 32) 188 n. 16and by G. M. A. Hanfmann, inhis review of Carl Roebuck,lonianTrade andColonization,Gnomon 2 (1960) 700.Among moderns favouring theHypaeparoute,Dugas (supran. 4) 62 n. 6 notes, besidesHaussoulier (supran. 29) and Cousin (supran. 41) 85, G. A. Radet, La Lydie (Paris 1893) 31, 102.None of these scholars isconcerned withthemarch ofAgesilaus.



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The Battle of Sardis 39Hypaepa routes, but there is in fact very little between them as regardsdistance. Kaupert46 offers the following table of distances:

Ephesus-Sardis as crow flies 85 km.Ephesus-Karabel-Sardis 103 km.Ephesus-Bayindir-Sardis 99 km. (but by amountaintrack)Ephesus-Odemisch (i.e.Hypaepa)-Sardis 105km.

These figures, though carefullymeasured, cannot of course be acceptedwithout reservation, as the precise course of the ancient roads is notestablished. De Sanctis47 accepts the view that "la strada piu diretta"is theEphesus-Hypaepa-Sardis route,which he estimates as 90-100 km.He allows 120-130 km. forEphesus-Karabel-Sardis, but seems todetourunnecessarily far to the west before Karabel, in order to take in theGreek town of Metropolis, 120 stades from Ephesus on the road toSmyrna,48 and too far to the north, to "le pendici del Sipylo," aftercrossing Karabel. My own map measurements agree approximatelywith those of Kaupert, and give a distance of rather over 60 miles foreither theKarabel or theHypaepa route. Either would be an easy threedays' journey for amounted traveller (like, presumably, Xenophon in401 B.C.), and a hard, but by no means exceptional, three days' marchfor infantry.49As a matter of fact, Xenophon's narrative suggests thatthe Greek army had covered a considerable part of its fourth day'smarch too-"On the fourth day the enemy cavalry arrived"-butcertainly not at peep of day. Persian cavalry were afraid of night operations and preferred to encamp at a distance from the enemy for fear of

46Kaupert, Schlachtfelder78.47De Sanctis (supran. 34) 179.48 Strab. 14.632.49 Cousin (supra n. 41) 85 took a total of 16 hrs. 45 mins., travelling time

(spread, presumably, over more than one day) by the Hypaepa route in 1898. He wastravelling light, for thosedays (p. 223): "Notre arm&en'est pas bien considerable: avec moiun interprete, et un homme pour soigner les chevaux; comme baggages, un bissac qui penddes deux cotes de la selle; comme armes, mon revolver, qui, d'ailleurs, me fut vole en cours dela route."Xenophon probably travelled fromEphesus toSardis in somewhat similar circumstances,not, as Cousin suggests, at the head of a small party of troops (cf.Xen. Anab. 3.1.4 forhis unofficial status). F. Riihl, "Randglossen zu derHellenika von Oxyrhynchus," RhM 68(1913) 184, allows thatXenophon's story implies a march of three and a half days, but

wrongly maintains that itwould be impossible to reach Sardis in this time except by theHypaepa route.



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40 J. K. Andersonsurprise.50The fact that they at once made arrangements for pitchingtheir camp also suggests that the day was well advanced, though notnecessarily that evening was approaching. The army of Cyrus theYounger on itsmarch approached its camping grounds "about thehour when themarket-place fills" 51 (i.e., latemorning) having presumably moved off at first light, so as to complete the day's march beforenoon and rest during the heat of the day. This isan excellent routine forhot climates, and the Persians probably followed it in 395 B.c. also.Wecannot be so sure about Agesilaus; in 394 B.c. the raid of his army,temporarily commanded by Gylis the polemarch, into Locris, wasprotracted until after sunset,with unfortunate results.52But thisdoes notmean that they had not started early, and at least it is clear that theGreeks were not just breaking camp when the Persians came on them in395 B.c. The foragerswere dispersed, and no doubt themain army wasalready on the move and had covered a part at least of the fourth day'smarch. It would seem, then, that Agesilaus could have reached theneighbourhood of Sardis by either theKarabel or theHypaepa routewithin the time given by Xenophon, and that in distance there is notmuch to choose between them.

But, quite apart from the distance, there is a second reason,pointed out by Kaupert, for regarding Karabel as the "shortest" route.It crosses a verymuch lower pass. Kaupert 53gives the height ofKarabelas ca. 450 m. (about 1500 feet) above sea level; the pass above Hypaepaas 1065m. (about 3500 feet), and the lesser tracks inbetween ("Baindyr "and "Odemisch") as 841 and 954 m., respectively. This is an excellentreason for preferring Karabel. It may be objected that Xenophon'smention of the Pactolus proves that he did imagine Agesilaus comingdown the Pactolus valley toward Sardis, not up the Hermus valley,which he does not mention. But Xenophon's story suggests an openplain, through which the Persian cavalry could hunt the scatteredGreek foragers. The pitching of the Persian camp on the far side of theriver indicates that there was level ground here too. This does not suitthe Pactolus valley above Sardis, a glen hemmed in by rugged mountains.54 In fact we are to picture the Persians encountering theGreeks

50Xen. Anab. 3.4.35; cf. Cyr. 3.3.26-27.51Xen. Anab. 1.8.1.52Xen. Hell. 4.3.22-23.53Kaupert, Schlachtfelder76 (cf. tables on p. 278).54 Ihave never traversed theupper valley of thePactolusmyself, only lookedat it from below, and, I must confess, without this problem in mind. I am indebted to



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The Battle of Sardis 41below Sardis, in the level plain, through which the Pactolus takes thelast part of its course before joining the Hermus. But (since the Greekshad clearly not justmarched straight through Sardis, as theywould havehad to have done to reach the plain from the upper Pactolus valley andthe pass above Hypaepa) theGreek army must have been approachingfrom below; that is, up the vale of theHermus, which theymust havereached by crossing Karabel. The Hermus isnot mentioned, either byXenophon, or by Diodorus, or, as far as his text can be reconstructed,by the Oxyrhynchus historian,55 because the expanse of level plainbetween river and mountain was wide enough for the armies tomarchand manoeuvre without taking the river into account.We may conclude that Agesilaus did march throughKarabel, that this isXenophon's "shortest" and "direct" route, ascontrasted to the detour by Izmir and Bel Kahve, and that the extradetails given by Diodorus (and in all probability by theOxyrhynchushistorian) are not proofs of superior knowledge but mistakes anddistortions.56

Agesilaus, then, was marching up the Hermus valley and,during his fourth day's march, was approaching the lower course of thePactolus, below Sardis, when the Persian cavalry appeared. They werebetween the Greeks and the Pactolus, since "their commander told theofficer in command of the baggage to cross the Pactolus and encamp."Here it isnecessary to examine briefly the view thatXenophon actuallyProfessorCrawfordGreenewalt, who knows the countrymuch better than Ido, forconfirmingmy general impression.Riihl (supran. 49) 183 shows that the supposition that both armies hadfollowed the Pactolus route leads to impossible contradictions, but deduces from this thatXenophon's story is falsified,not thatXenophon implies thatAgesilaus marched byKarabel.But it is inconsistent toargue thatXenophon imaginedAgesilaus marching down the Pactolusvalley because he himself knew this route, and at the same time to claim that his story is afiction because it isunsuited to the topography.55Stephanus ofByzantium s.v. 'Eppovre8lovcites Ephorus in his eighteenthbook (JacobyFGH Fr. 72) for "the plain ofHermus" as "a place near Cyme." The mentionof "Cyme" (Ephorus's own home) makes it unlikely that the quotation came from anaccount ofAgesilaus's march toSardis, asDugas (supran. 4) 67 n. 2 suggests.Some incident,not to be certainly identified, "vor herbst 395" (Jacoby, n. ad loc.)but probably later thanthe battle of Sardis, seems to be referred to. Paus. 3.9.6. says that the battle was fought ev'EpjLovre8& and that both the Persian cavalry and infantry, thegreatest army since thedaysof Xerxes and Darius, were routed.56Busolt (supran. 8) 264 concluded, even beforeKaupert's analysis of thetopography, that the extra details of the variant tradition were inventions. Even Dugas(supran. 4) 61 allows that one iscompelled "supposer une transpositionde faits" and placeafter the battle incidents that Diodorus puts before. Then (pp. 63-64) "le texte de Diodore,ainsi compris, devient parfaitement clair."



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42 J. K. Andersonwrote "He [Agesilaus] told the officer in command of the baggage tocross the Pactolus and encamp."57 It is true that the "commander" ofthe Persian cavalry isnot found in the text of theHellenica as we have it,and has to be supplied from the parallel passage in the Agesilaus,58butthe sentence runs awkwardly ifwe are to keep jumping fromGreeks toPersians and back again-" For three days he marched through countryclear of enemies ... but on the fourth day the enemy cavalry arrived.And he told the officer in command of the baggage to cross the Pactolusand encamp, but they themselves saw the camp-followers of theGreeks... ."More important, Xenophon's narrative of the subsequentbattle shows that theGreeks drove the Persians into the Pactolus, andthen crossed to capture the Persian camp.59 Therefore the enemy musthave been between the Greeks and the river, and the Greek baggagecould not have passed the river in advance.This also shows (as Kaupert demonstrated)60 that thePersian cavalry were not following Agesilaus by the same route. Theyhad reached a point ahead of his army, without, apparently, overtakingit; theymust therefore have travelled by a different road-presumablyTralles-Hypaepa-Sardis. The object of Tissaphernes was to reachSardis before Agesilaus, not just to follow him up, and if he did in facthold his army opposite Tralles he was guarding against a sudden raid onSardis as well as against the expected invasion of Caria. Kaupertestimates that the distance from Tralles to Sardis is 75 km. in a straightline, or probably 110-115 km. as the Persians marched, a little furtherthan Agesilaus had to go over a higher pass, and starting a little later.The Persian infantrywould not arrive before Agesilaus, but the cavalrywould be in time to hold the Greeks in check below the city, andTissaphernes himself could reach the garrison and hearten it to face thecrisis.61 All the same, there was cause for alarm, and haste, whenAgesilaus did not march south ashad been expected. Itmay bewondered,in view of the knowledge that theOxyrhynchus historian shows of the

57Among modern scholars (I believe) only F. Cornelius, "Die Schlacht beiSardis," Klio 26 (1933) 29-31, has argued for thisview, which is rightly dismissed by Bruce(supran. 5) 155.58Supra n. 27.59Xen. Hell. 3.4.24.60Kaupert, Schlachtfelder81-283; cf. Schlachten-Atlasfig. 8.61Dugas (supran. 4) 70 very properly askshow Tissaphernes, ifhe had been

with his troops in Caria, could have been in Sardis at the time of the battle, as Xen. Hell.3.4.25 says he was. The Hypaepa route is the answer, and there is no need to doubt Xenophon,as does Ruhl (supran. 49) 177-178.



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The Battle of Sardis 43operations of the Persian fleet,62 whether the variant tradition ofAgesilaus's movements does not reflect the hurried reports that came into the Persian headquarters-"They are coming out! They are in theCayster valley! They have turned north! They have reached MountSipylus! They aremarching on Sardis! No, they are turning back"all with exaggerated reports of devastation and of the efforts made bythe local defense forces to follow the Greek army and contain itsprogress. The situation immediately before the battle as describedby Xenophon was thus quite different from that represented in theother tradition. Xenophon shows Agesilaus approaching Sardis up theHermus valley after an unopposed march; Tissaphernes forestalling himby a forcedmarch with his cavalry along a different route, but with hisinfantry not yet at the scene of the action. The other version puts thewhole Persian army (including infantry) in contact with the Greeksduring the approach march, makes the Persians follow the Greeksinstead of appearing in front of them, and makes Agesilaus-stillfollowed by the Persians-turn back after reaching the suburbs of Sardis.From these irreconcilable differences follow totally different accounts ofthe battle itself:

1. According to Xenophon,63 when Agesilaus saw thePersian horsemen cutting down his scattered foragers,He ordered his cavalry to go to their relief. The Persians,on their part, when they saw the relief force, rallied anddrew themselves up in opposition, with their cavalrymanyranks deep.64 Thereupon Agesilaus, perceiving that theenemy's infantrywere not yet present in support, but thathe himself lacked no part of his preparations, thought it anexcellent opportunity to join battle if he could. So he62De Sanctis (supran. 34) 184ff. also suggests that P's informationmay bederived throughConon's camp.63Xen. Hell. 3.4.22-25.64The deep formation of the barbarians, as opposed to the Greek cavalry,who were drawn up " likea phalanx, fourdeep," isgiven byXenophon (Hell.3.4.13) as one ofthe causes of the Greek reverse in 396 B.C. In Hipparch.2.1-6 he advises drawing up the

Athenian cavalry ten deep, with the commanders of each section of ten forming the front rank.Asclepiodotus 7.5, with lessexperience, orwith professionals rather than amateurs inmind,advises that cavalry should be drawn up in fewer ranks than infantry, because horses takeup more room than men.



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44 J. K. Andersonsacrificed, and led his phalanx directly at the horsemenwho had been drawn up, and from his hoplites ordered theten youngest age-groups to run together with them, andtold the peltasts to lead on at the double. And he gave theorder to the cavalry too to charge, saying that he himselfand all the army were following them. The Persiansreceived the cavalry. But when every danger was uponthem at once, they gave way, and some of them fell in theriver immediately, but the others fled. But the Greeksfollowed them up and took their camp as well. And thepeltasts, as was to be expected, turned to plunder. ButAgesilaus encamped his army in a ring round everything,friend and foe alike. Much spoil was taken, which raisedmore than seventy talents, and in particular itwas on thisoccasion that the camels were captured, which Agesilausbrought away to Greece.When this battle took place, Tissapherneshappened to be in Sardis.2. Diodorus,65 after saying that Agesilaus turned backfrom the outskirts of Sardis to a point "midway between Sardis and

Thybarna," continues:He dispatched Xenocles the Spartiate with fourteenhundred soldiers by night to a wooded place, in order toambush the barbarians. But he himself marched at breakof day with this army, and when he had passed the ambush,and the barbarians, attacking without order, were clingingto the rearguard, with unexpected suddenness he turnedround upon the Persians. There was a hard battle, andwhen the signal was raised to themen who were lying inambush, the latter raised the paean and threw themselvesupon the enemy. But when the Persians saw themselvescaught between two fires, they were terrified and immediately took to flight. Agesilaus's men pursued them forsome distance, killed more than six thousand, rounded upa great crowd of prisoners, and plundered their camp,which was full of much wealth. From this battle Tis65Diod. Sic. 14.8.2-5.



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The Battle of Sardis 45saphernes withdrew to Sardis, astonished at the daring ofthe Lacedaemonians....3. The HellenicaOxyrhynchia an be read continuously fromthe laying of the ambush:66By night... [he sent?] [somany] hoplites and [somanyhundred] light infantry and placed Xenocles the Spartiatein command of them. He [gave orders?] thatwhen theywere marching by them ... to draw up for battle . . . androusing his army at break of day he led it [back?] to theadvance.67 But the barbarians followed him up, as theywere accustomed to do, and some of them attacked theGreeks, some rode round them, and some followed without order along the plain. But Xenocles, when he understood it to be time to fall on the enemy, roused thePeloponnesians from the ambush and pushed them on atthe double. As for the barbarians, as each of them saw theGreeks running upon them, they fled through all theplain. And Agesilaus, when he saw them panic-stricken,sent from his army the light-armed soldiers and cavalry topursue them. And these, together with themen who hadrisen from the ambush, fell on the barbarians. Theyfollowed the enemy up for no great length of time, as theywere unable to overtake them since most of them werecavalry and light infantry. But they struck down about sixhundred of them, and after desisting from the pursuitmarched to the very camp of the barbarians. There theyfound the guard inno state for action, and quickly took thecamp and captured from the enemy many supplies, largenumbers ofmen andmuch equipment andmoney, including some belonging toTissaphernes himself.Such was the battle. And the barbarians,astounded at the Greeks, withdrew with Tissaphernes toSardis.

66Hell. Oxy. 11 (6) 4.67 1 understand this to mean that he reversed the previous day's retrogrademovement and again advanced on Sardis.



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46 J. K. AndersonIt is clear that Diodorus is not simply copying or sum

marizing, however carelessly, the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia,whose version,for convenience, may be referred to as "P ". Points of difference include:1. The manner of setting the ambush. Diodorus makes

Agesilaus sendXenocles on, and on the next day continue hismarch inthe same direction. P apparently makes Agesilaus double back towardsSardis, leaving Xenocles behind, though the text is not sufficientlycertain to establish this.

2. Diodorus makes Agesilaus himself launch the firstattackon the barbarians. P says that Agesilaus waited until Xenocles hadsprung the trap.3. Diodorus makes Xenocles act on a signal fromAgesilaus.P leaves him to act on his own initiative.

4. Diodorus says that there was a hard battle. P says thatthe barbarians fled at once.5. Diodorus says that six thousand barbarians were killed.P puts the number at six hundred.Some of these differences might be supposed to representthe stories of different eyewitnesses.68 A soldier with Xenocles mighthave acted on the latter's order without knowing that Agesilaus haddirected it by signal. He might have seen the enemy in full flight and

given credit to themoral effect of the ambush, without knowing that themain army had in fact attacked first and had a hard fight of it. Butin the "hard battle" (yevopdevrse KapTepaS,icaXlS) e may recognize afavorite invention of Ephorus,69 through whom the tradition of Pseems to have been transmitted toDiodorus, in "improved" form. Theimprovements will also include the tenfoldmultiplication of the Persiancasualties, to a figuremore worthy of the occasion. It seems best, then,to discount Diodorus as a possible independent source, and restrictfurther discussion to a comparison between Xenophon and P.The suggestion that Agesilaus won two separate and

68 "The history of a battle is not unlike the history of a ball.... No individual can recollect the exact order inwhich, or the exact moment at which [particularincidents] occurred,which makes all the difference as to theirvalue or importance."Wellington, DespatchesXII 590 (8Aug. 1815), quoted by Lady Longford, Wellington,Pillar of State(London 1972) 11.69SoDugas (supran. 4) 67; Busolt (supran. 8) 267;De Sanctis (supran. 34)178, and others, including Bruce (supran. 5) 151.



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The Battle of Sardis 47distinct victories over Tissaphernes, in both of which he captured theenemy's camp, and that through some curious accident Xenophon knewof one battle only, and P only of the other, may be set aside.70 Somemodern scholars have sought to reconcileXenophon with P; forDugas 71" ladifference entre P etXenophon estmoins grande qu'entre Xenophonet Diodore." He lists as points of resemblance:

1. The battlefield was some way from the camp.2. The Greeks attacked first.3. Only the light troops of the Persian army took part

(though in P these include light infantry as well as cavalry).4. Both P and Xenophon make Xenocles (whom Xenophon presumably thought of as commanding the cavalry) lead theGreek attack.

5. The battle resulted in the capture and pillage of thePersian camp.This special pleading is unconvincing in view of the

differences which Dugas goes on to list:1. P saysTissaphernes was present at thebattle; Xenophonthat he was in Sardis.2. P says Agesilaus ambushed the Persians; Xenophondoes not.3. P and Xenophon differ completely about the order inwhich theGreeks engaged.4. P describes the battle as a mere skirmish; Xenophon"le prdsente comme une veritable battaille rangee" (Surely this mis

represents both? Sixty thousand men are not overthrown in a "mereskirmish" and Xenophon does not represent the fighting as at allcomparable to, for instance, the battles of Cunaxa or Coronea. Besides

70Busolt (supran. 8) 258-259 spares thispossibility a glance. Compare alsoBruce (supran. 5) Appendix I.71Dugas (supra n. 4) 68-73. Professor W. K. Pritchett has kindly drawn myattention to a recent attempt to produce a "relative consensus" between the sources;D.Nellen, "Die Schlacht bei Sardes," AncientSociety3 (1972) 45-54. Nellen assumes (p. 48) thatthere was only one battle, and thatXenophon accompanied Agesilaus but was not in hisconfidence.Wherever he disagreeswith P he is inventing in order toglorifyAgesilaus. "Dieserdie Quellen harmonisierenden Analyse" leads (p. 52), to the conclusion reached by Dugas,that thedivergences between Xenophon and P are, taken as awhole, lesssignificant than thecorrespondences.



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48 J. K. Andersonhe writes of the affair at Sardis as an encounter action; he does notsuggest that the armies were carefully drawn up for battle.)5. P and Xenophon differ as to the place of the battle (butboth must place it in theHermus plain below Sardis).6. P speaks of the Persians scattering in flight throughoutthe plain; Xenophon makes the Greeks pursue them into and across thePactolus.

In view of these differences, I believe compromise to beimpossible. "Es gibt nur ein Entweder-Oder! Wer hat Recht ?" 72

The following objections have been made toXenophon'sstory,73 and theymay be answered as follows:1.When Xenophon says Tissaphernes was in Sardis hecontradicts his earlier statement that he was holding his infantry southof the Meander. (This difficulty has already been explained by the

supposition that Tissaphernes had accompanied his army on its forcedmarch northward by theHypaepa route.)2. If the ambush had not taken place, P would not haveinvented it. (This is begging the question; if one story or another is

invented, why must the invention be Xenophon's? And one cannotdismiss the ambush, as Dugas tries to do, as an unimportant circumstance thatmight well have slippedXenophon's memory. If therewas anambush, itwas, as Pmakes it, the decisive factor in theGreek victory.)3. Xenophon knew that, when the army had been reorganized at Ephesus, Xenocles had been given command of thecavalry. When, therefore, he heard that Xenocles had distinguishedhimself in the battle, he gave the leading part to the cavalry-thoughwithout naming Xenocles himself, and without finding out what he hadreally done. (This is ingenious; but it is surely equally possible that thecavalry did play the part thatXenophon said they did; thatXenocleswas awarded the prize for valour, in a "laconic" despatch that did not

72Busolt (supra n. 8) 260. This is an uncompromising attitude rightlypraised byKaupert, Schlachtfelder66. There is of course a temptation to use the existence oftwo different ancient stories as a license to make up one's own version, which is in effect thecourse followed byW. Judeich, "Theopomps Hellenica," RhM 66 (1911) 94-139. JudeichattacksXenophon on points of detail, and expresses a preference for P but does not followhim. His complicated reconstruction of the battle iswell criticised by Kaupert, Schlachtfelder272. 73Dugas (supran. 4) 70-73; cf.Kaupert, Schlachtfelder69.



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The Battle of Sardis 49enumerate his services; and that P therefore made up a part for him.)4. Xenophon wrote to please Agesilaus and thereforewould not allow that the battle had been a mere skirmish. (But it isP,not Xenophon, who magnifies theGreek victory; P brings Tissapherneshimself into the field; P reports the overthrow of thewhole Persian army,not of the cavalry alone. This argument tellsvery heavily inXenophon'sfavour.) 74 5. Topographical disagreements as to the place of battleand the direction of the Persian flight arise from the question of theroute followed by Agesilaus, which has been already discussed.

6. An argument notmentioned byDugas is thatXenophoncontradicts himself, or violates the rules of common sense, by bringingthe Persian baggage-train to the field of battle ahead of the infantry.This isusually answered by referring to the order ofmarch of the idealPersian army of the Cyropaedia.75 ere Cyrus is described asmarchingin all haste, with his cavalry forming the advance guard, preceded byscouts. The baggage follows, where the country is level, inmany trainsofwaggons and pack animals, with the infantry phalanx coming behindtohelp stragglers.But one does not know how far this theoretical pictureagreedwith actual Persian practice; Cyrus theYounger's army does notseem to have conformed with it, and in any case Xenophon expresslysays that this order ofmarch in theCyropaedia as for level country only.In the hills, the baggage formed a single column with the fightingtroops closed up on each side of it, each unit as far as possible stayingclose to its own baggage. IfTissaphernes did in fact follow rules similarto those of the Cyropaedia,most of his baggage-train will have been stillin the hills, with the infantry towhom it belonged, when the cavalryreached the open plain below Sardis.

But the cavalry's ownmarch will have been delayed by thepassage of the hills to a pace which pack-animals (including the famouscamels) could follow. And the luxurious Persian horsemen, who "hadmore coverlets on their horses than on their beds, because they cared

more for being softly seated than for horsemanship,"76 no doubt74As is well pointed out by De Sanctis (supra n. 34) 185-186, as well asBusolt (supran. 8) 261. It is surprising that their arguments are not noted by Nellen (supra

n. 71) 49, 53. 75Busolt, "Zur Glaubwerdigkeit Theopomps," Hermes 45 (1910) 227,answeringMeyer (supran. 8) 6, 13. For the "Persian" order of march seeXen. Cyr.6.3.2-3.76Xen. Cyr.8.8.19.



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50 J. K. Andersoninsisted on taking a considerable amount of personal baggage with them.This perhaps included tents, carpets, and silver cups, like those that theTen Thousand captured from Tiribazus,77 and may at all events besupposed to have been farmore worth plundering than the baggage ofthe infantry. The fact that the camp was small enough forAgesilaus tothrow a cordon around itwith the rest of his army when his peltaststurned toplunder also inclines one to suppose that it did not include thebaggage-train of the whole Persian army.Itmay be asked why the Persians, if they had just passedSardis on their way down the Pactolus valley, did not leave theirbaggage in safety in the city. The answer must be that they had everyintention of taking the field against theGreeks, as soon as their infantrycame up, and had no doubt of the ability of their cavalry to check theGreek advance in themeantime.

Xenophon's story, then, presents no impossibilities.Arguments-again not insuperable-can be brought on the other side.IfAgesilaus was being followed by thewhole Persian force, how couldhe turn back without bringing on an immediate collision between thearmies? Objections have also been raised to the story of the ambush.Could Agesilaus have successfully concealed fourteen hundred men?The small-scale ambushes carried out by the rearguard of the TenThousand 78are not really comparable, and when Hannibal laid largescale ambushes against the Romans he was helped by theweather, andby the dominance of the Carthaginian cavalry. Would the Persiancavalry not have discovered Xenocles and his men ?79And would thissmall detachment not have been in grave danger? This objection mightbe answered by again drawing attention to the reluctance of thePersians to engage in night operations. But, if the story of the ambush isto be accepted, is not the version of Diodorus preferable after all?Would not the sudden realization that theywere caught between twofires,when theywere already attacked by Agesilaus and were no doubtcounting on their hit-and-run tactics to secure their safety, have affectedthe Persiansmore than themere appearance in their rear of a comparatively small force? But this objection is not decisive either; an un

77Xen. An. 4.4.21.78Xen. An. 4.1.22; 4.7.22.79De Sanctis (supran. 34) 181. See also Busolt (supran. 8) 264, makingperhaps toomuch of the difficulties.We need not necessarily imagine the ambushers drawnup ina column, 550 meters long.Meyer (supran. 8) 15points to the importanceof ambushesin ancient warfare as an argument in favour of P.



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The Battle of Sardis 51disciplined and over-confident army might have become panic strickenwhen surprised.In the end, then, the question resolves itself into one ofcredibility of witnesses. Scholars who write Xenophon off as a notoriousfalsifier of history80 have never produced an adequate, or indeed any,motive for his supposed falsifications in this case. As has been seenalready, he makes much less of Agesilaus's victory than do P andDiodorus; why should he deliberately belittle his benefactor and friend ?Nor, as has also been seen, is there much merit in the suggestion thatXenophon, the friend ofAgesilaus and colleague of his principal officers,had no access to reliable information about the battle. As De Sanctisjustly observes, merely to state this hypothesis plainly is to refute it.81On the other hand, the assumption that P heard nothingabout the battle except its result does not contradict anything thatweknow about his career (for, after all, we know nothing), and reasons forhis writing a plausible but fictitious82 battle-piece can at least besuggested. A Greek army, composed largely of heavy infantry, could beexpected to beat off cavalry, and perhaps remain masters of the field;but they had, in ordinary circumstances, little hope of doing muchdamage to their mobile enemy.83 Readers who turned to history booksforpractical examples would want to know how the thingmight be done,and a historian who did not know the circumstances of a battle but feltthat he could himself devise suitable tactics might feel free to writewhat he believed tobe appropriate to the occasion, just as hemight havedone when reporting a speech.84Accordingly he described themarch inhollow square along the edge of the hills as the proper way for a Greekarmy tomarch when attacked by Persian cavalry. He then invented theambush, and adorned it, with circumstantial detail-including thename of Xenocles.85 It was later further improved by Ephorus (whose

80 "Ein bewusster Geschichtsfalscher": Riihl (supra n. 49) 173.81De Sanctis (supran. 34) 182-183.82Busolt (supra n. 8) 266 appositely quotes Polybius 3.33.17 on rolscLtoinrTorws EUVSOpLeVOISC V arvypaeCowv.

83Cf.Xen. An. 3.3.6ffon theexperiences of theTen Thousand on the firstdayafter their crossing of the Zab.84This is not intended to imply thatThucydides himself extends the licensethat he claims in reporting speeches (Thuc. 1.22.1) to his battles.85De Sanctis (supra n. 34) 185 supposes the ambush to have been inventedto explain the "unprecedented" victory of Greek infantryover Persian cavalry.But precedents were not in fact wanting-at Plataea, perhaps at Marathon (see for a new view of thiscontroversial question, Evelyn B. Harrison, "The South Frieze of theNike Temple and the



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52 J. K. Andersonversion is transmitted by Diodorus), perhaps because he found weaknesses in P's account.

Ifwe accept Xenophon's story as factual, the reasonswhythe Persians were defeated with heavy loss are apparent. They were, inthe firstplace, surprised by the increased efficiency of theGreek cavalry,which compelled them to come together and made a stand instead ofcontinuing to cut off theGreek foragerswith impunity. In the secondplace, they miscalculated the speed with which the Greek infantrywould come up in support. Lastly, and perhaps most fatal, they leftthemselves without room to take evasive action when thewhole Greekarmy was upon them. The Pactolus proved an obstacle to their ownretreat, not a defensive barrier protecting their camp.In all these respects, the victory ofAgesilaus resembles thevictory which Xenophon won when he drove Mithradates into awatercourse by the unexpected onslaught of his improvised cavalry, supportedby the hoplites and peltasts of the rearguard of the Ten Thousand.86 Butthis is not a reason for rejectingXenophon's story of the battle of Sardis.We may rather suggest that he recognized, on the field of battle, that thePersians had presented Agesilaus with an even greater opportunity thanthat by which he himself had profited, and advised the prompt andvigorous actions that led to victory.Sardis did not fall toAgesilaus in consequence of the battle.The Persian infantrymust have arrived in good time to forestall anypossible assault on the city; but, after the defeat of their cavalry, theycould hardly have contemplated offensive operations against theGreeks. Xenophon proceeds to the fall and death of Tissaphernes andthe dealings between Agesilaus and the new satrap Tithraustes. But, infact, theremust have been an interval of some weeks, for the news toreachKing Artaxerxes and for theKing todecide thatTissaphernes hadfailed and must be removed. We are not to suppose that during thistimeAgesilaus made no attempt whatever to follow up his success.We

may therefore believe at least the substance of the story, given at someMarathon Painting in the Painted Stoa,"AJA 76 (1972) 353-378) and certainly in the actionsof the Ten Thousand. Cornelius (supra n. 57) 31 also sees the ambush as an invention whichexplained how Greek infantrycould closewith Persian cavalry, and suggests that Pmight haveconfused in his notes an account of the Battle of Sardis with a story of the action on the

Mysian Olympus (Hell.Oxy. 16 [11] 2)86Xen. An. 3.4.1-5. I have already pointed out this resemblance in J. K.Anderson, Military TheoryandPracticein theAge ofXenophon(Berkeleyand Los Angeles 1970)117-118.



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The Battle of Sardis 53length by P and summarized by Diodorus,87 thatAgesilaus marched toCelaenae on the headwaters of theMeander, but after failing to obtaingood omens for the passage of the river fell back to the coast.Xenophonomits this march, not because it never happened, or because it didhappen but he never heard about it, but because itproved fruitless, and,from the viewpoint from which he wrote theHellenica, years later, unimportant. Armies who marched through their enemies' territorywithout securing any fortresses or effecting any permanent occupation werelike sailorswho sailed on and on, leaving a wake behind them that wasno more their own than the waters that lay ahead.88

University of CaliforniaBerkeley

87Hell. Oxy. 12 (7): Diod. Sic. 14.80.5.88Xen. Cyr.6.1.16.

california studies in classical antiquity -'the battle of sardis in 395 b.c.' by j. k. anderson,...

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