caesar 39 - warsaw pact military strategy: a compromise in soviet strategic thinking

8/2/2019 Caesar 39 - Warsaw Pact Military Strategy: A Compromise in Soviet Strategic Thinking

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WARSAW PACT MILITARY STRATEGY:

A COMPROMISE I N SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING

Thi s work ing paper o f t h e D D / I R esea rch S t a f fexp l o re s t he deve l opm en t of Warsaw P a c t m i l i t a r ys t r a t e g y . The t h e s i s of t h i s s t u dy is t h a t t h e i n t e r n a lS o v i e t d e b a t e on t h e n a t u r e of a - w a r i n Europe has hada s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on t h e deve lopment of t h e m i s s i on sa nd f o r c e s t r u c t u r e of t h e E a s t Eu ro pe an armies.

The au tho r has ben ef i t e d much f rom d i s cu ss ion oft h e t h e s i s w it h col leagues i n ORR and O C I . The authoralone, however, is r e s po n s ib l e f o r t h e p a p e r 's conclu-sions, which are c o n t r o v e r s i a l .

The DDI/RS would welcome comment onadd re s sed t o Leonard Parkinson, who wrote i t ,

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WARSAW PACT MILITARY STRATEGY:

A COBIPROMISE I N S OV IE T STRATEGIC THINKIN G

SUMMARY AND. CONCL US I ONS . .. ............................... i .:

THE DEVELOPMENT OF '. PACT STRATEGY

I.. ,The D e f e n s i v e Mission ............................. 1

11 . The O f f e n s i v e Mission .............................. 8

The 1961 Be r l i n C r i s i s , ,C o m p r o m i s e . ............... 8

The P o s t - C u b a C r i s i s D e b a t e ...................... 16

Pact Po l i c y U n d e r The N e w Sov i e t Leadership . . . . . 22



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Summary and Conclusions

Ten years ago a Warsaw Pact doctrine was, i n anym ean ing fu l m i l i t a ry s en se , nonex i s t en t . The r equ i r e -m en ts f o r w a r fa re i n t h e E uropean t h ea t e r and t h i nk i ngon t he conduc t of a war in Europe were a t t h a t t i m e

b a s e d e s s e n t i a l l y on So vi et re so ur ce s. Today WarsawP ac t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e c a l l s f o r a h i g h l y i n t e g r a t e dand coord ina ted se r i e s of Soviet -East European of fe ns iv eand def ens ve ope ra t i on s . The o f f en s ve ope ra t i onsencompass a well-defined combined a r m s . miss ion on t h ep a r t of t h e Ea st Europeans, who ac t both a s f i l l e r s f o rS ov i e t un i t s and a s na t i on al components assigne d inva-s i o n ta s k s under So vi et f r o n t command. The def ens iveop er at ion s encompass a h i gh l y- i n t e g r a t e d e a r l y w ar nin gand a i r defense network "and a w e l l - c o o r d i n a t e d l o g i s t i csuppor t sys t em.

p a r a l l e l e d t h e development of NATO m i ss i ons and fo rces t r u c t u r e s . The i n i t i a l and al m os t exc l u s i ve a s s i gn -ment of a d e f e n s i v e m is s i on t o t h e non-Soviet pactf o r c e s r em ain ed t h e b a s i s of p a c t p o l i c y for t h e f i r s th a l f of t h e a l l i a n c e ' s h i s t o r y . The b z l a t e d i n c l us i o nof s u b s t a n t i a l n on -S ov ie t f o r c e s i n MOSCBW~S Europeani nvas i on p l ans w a s somewhat co inc iden t wi th cer t a inWest ern m i l i t a r y m oves du r i ng t h e 1961 B e r l i n c r i s i s .However, these are s i g n s t h a t co mp etin g i n t e r e s t s w i t h int h e S ov i e t U ni on - -r a the r t han t he Wes te rn " t h rea t "exc l u s i ve l y - -w ere r e spons i b l e f o r t h e a s si gnm en t of ano f f e n s i v e m i s s i on t o t h e East European forces .

The com pet ing i n t e r e s t s were r e f l e c t e d i n t h edeba t e w i t h i n t h e Soviet Union over t h e r o l e of landf o r c e s i n a European w a r . T h i s deba te has had import-ant i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e m is s io n s a nd force s t r u c t u r eof t h e E a s t European a r m i e s . The modern i s t school oft houg ht , advanced by Khrushchev a f t e r t h e ous t e r ofZhukov i n 1957, ca l l e d for t h e s a t u r a t i o n of nuc l ea rs t r i k e s on Western Europe and l e f t l i t t l e room f o r

The development of Warsaw Pa ct p o li c y has no t



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of a l l i e d o f f e n s i v e f o r c e s u nd er t i g h t S o vi e t c o n t r o l .And i n t h e f a l l of 1961, t h e f i r s t announced pac t m ee ti ngexc l u s i ve l y devo t ed t o m i l i t a r y matters was held (8-9September Defense Minis ters Meet ing in Warsaw), t h e f i r s tj o i n t p ac t e x e r c i s e s commenced (announced by Moscow on25 Septe mber ), and modern So vi et combined arms equipments e n t t o t h e E a s t European armies i n c r ea s e d i n q u a n t i t ya nd q u a l i t y . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e mass army was at r a d i t i o n a l i s t theme o v e r a l l c o n t r o l o ve r t h e m i l l i o n -p l u s E a s t European forces appears t o have been one a s p e c tof t h e S o vi e t m i l i t a r y ' s p a r t of t h e b a rg a in i n t h e 1 9 6 1

t o preven t a l a r g e r s c a l e Sovie t mobi l i za -, . t i o n t han t h a t which t ook p la ce . Another aspec t of t h e

m i l i t a r y ' s p a r t of t h e dea l w a s , of cou r se , t h e accep t -

ance of t h e view t h a t a l and w a r i n Europe would be foughtu n d e r nu cle ar co nd i t i on s. And i n order t o conduct . t h el and ope ra t i on unde r a nu cle ar exchange--which conceiv-a b l y could b lock t h e r o ad and r a i l re i nf o r ce m e nt e f f o r tfrom t h e So vie t Union--all ied f o rc e s may have acqui r edan incre ased va lue to t h e marshals as planned replace-ments f o r weakened Sov ie t u n i t s . A t h i r d a s p e c t ; t h et a rg e t i n g of ' s t r eng t hened E as t E uropean un i t s aga i n s tt h e West might draw some NATO f i r e away from S o v i e t u n i t s .

en t h us i a s t i s ove r t he compromise s r em ai ned s i l e n t on t h em i l i t a r y r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e a l l i e d fo rces , and a rguedt h a t t h e requ i rement s f o r w ar fa re s h o u l d come e s s e n t i a l l y

f r o m So vi et re so ur ce s. Khrushchev himself may havee n t e r t a i n e d doubt ove r t h e l o n g - r a n g e p o l i t i c a l w i s d o mof equipp ing t h e a l l i e d f o r c e s w i t h modern offensiveweaponry and over t h e l ong - range e f f ec t t h e 1961 panaceawould have on h i s m i l i t a r y views In fac t , Khrushchev ' se a r l i e r s c h o o l of t ho ug h t was reemphasized i n Sovie tmedia i n 1962.

N eve r t he l e s s , t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s were l e s s t h a n

K hrushshevq gene ra l s t r a t e g i c v iew s f aced asecond se tback fo l lowing t h e f a i l u r e of t h e Cuban m i s -s i l e venture . The d e b a t e on t h e r ~ l e f l and forces i nEurope was renewed, b u t t h i s t i m e b o t h s c h o o l s of t houghtt u r n e d t o t h e 1961 compromise i n suppo r t of v a r i o u sa s p e c t s of t h e i r a rg um en ts The t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s p o i n te d

t o t h e new o f fens i ve r o l e of t h e non -S ov ie t fo rc e s i nSUppQPt of t h e i r combined arms school of tho ugh t . Themodernis t s appeared t o sugges t t h a t S ov i e t fo rces couldbe c u t d u e t o t h e i nc r ea se d c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e E a s t

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European fo rc es . Thus i n December 1963 and a ga in i nFebruary 1964, a l l i e d armed f o r c e s were f o r t h e f i r s tt i m e d i r e c t l y b ro ug ht i n t o t h e c o n t e x t of a S o v i e t t r o o pand budget c u t formula by Khrushchev.

I t a p pe a re d t h a t t h e m o d e r ni s ts were ( t em pora r i l ya t l e a s t ) prepared t o t o l e r a t e a n i nc o ns i s t e n t m i l i t a r ys t r a t e g y p ro vid ed t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l amounts of men andequipment could be d e r i v e d from nsn-Sovie t resources .However, one pos t -Cuba c r i s i s development--the worseningof i n c i d e n t s a l on g t h e Sino-Soviet border--served t oobscure somewhat t h e d i f f e rences be t w een t h e t w o s c h o o l sof t hough t . The s t r e ng t h en i n g of t h e S ov i e t bo rde r w i t ht h e CPR r e l a t e d t o p a ct s t r a t e g y i n t h e s e n se t h a t t h e

improvement i n t h e E a s t European na t io na l f o r ce s wouldp ro vid e t h e S o vi e ts wi th t h e s t r a t e g i c f l e x i b i l i t y t oredep l oy , i f neces sa ry , some of t h e i r f o r c e s s t a t i o n e di n E a s t Europe t o the Far E a s t ( t o m e e t a l a r g e s c a l eChinese border in c id en t ) w i t h o u t j e o p a r d i z i n g S o v i e ts e c u r i t y on t h e i r W e s t e r n f r o n t i e r .

ered by t h e compromise continue to be i n e v id e nc e . Ont h e on e hand, t h e r o l e of l a n d f o r c e s in a n u c l e a r w a rremains a c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e i n t h e USSR, and thus p l a c e si n doubt t h e long-range mission s and fo rc e s t r u c t u r e oft h e non-Soviet armies , a n d t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s s t a t i o n e din East Europe as w e l l . And on t h e other hand , c e r t a i n

i n d i c a t i o n s of a n e l e v a t e d s t a t u s f o r t h e p a c t h a veemerged and the E a s t European mi l i t a ry modern iza t ionprogram has cont inued . In e f f e c t , t h e a ss ig nm en t o f ano f f e n s i v e m i ss i on t o t h e E a s t European forces , whichi n i t i a l l y seemed t o bea r t h e t r a p p i n g s of a temporarypanacea, ha s appa r en t l y g i ven ray t o a pact moderniza-t i o n e f f o k t of a more permanent nature . Recent ly t h em odern i za t i on t r end h a s been accompanied by signs of agrowing Eas t European v oice i n pa ct policy-making--here-t o f o r e a n almost exclusive S ov i e t p re rog a t i ve . S houldt h e new Sov ie t l e ad er sh ip f a i l to br ing forward a eompre-h e n si v e m i l i t z r y p o l i c y , t o d a y' s well-armed E a s t Europeann a t i o n s may w e l l hEve t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to shape p a c ts t r a t egy i n ' . $he fu t u re -and t h u s c o nv e rt t h e p a c t i n t o

a c o n v e n t i o n a l m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e

Under t h e new Kremlin leadership, problems engend-

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TBE DEVELOPMENT O F PACT STRATEGY

The growth of1 t w o s e p a r a t e m i s si o n s a p p ea r s i n t h edevelopment of p a c t m i l i t a r y p o l i c y The e a r l i e r , defen-s i v e a s p e c t s of c u r r e n t p a c t s t r a t e g y a p p ea r as a d i r e c toutgrowth of t h e n a t i o na l i n t e r e s t s of t h e i n d i v i d u a lW a r s a w P a c t n a t i o n s : The l a t t e r , o f f e n s i v e aspec t s ofc u r r e n t p a c t s t r a t e g y , h o w e v e r , owe more t o compet ingi n t e r e s t s w i t h i n t h e S o v i e t Union t h a n t o i n t r a - p a c tdevelopments . W e f i r s t o u t l i n e t h e d evelopm ent of t h ed e f e n s i v e mission.

I . The Defens ive Miss ion

When e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1955, t h e W a r s a w P a c t w a s l i t t l emore t h a n a propaganda countermeasure t o t h e i n c l u s i o nof West Germany i n t h e W es te rn a l l i a n c e . Sov i e t m i l i t a r yt h i n k i n g a s r e f l e c t e d by a v a i l a b l e s t a t e m e n t s and f o r c e s -in-be ing gave l i t t l e , i f a n y , c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e o f f e n -s i v e u t i l i z a t i o n o f MOSCOW'S p o o r l y - e q u i p p e d a l l i e d fo rcesi n an in va s i on of Western Europe . (While each a l l y r e p o r t -e d l y r e c e iv e d a m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g m i s s i o n i n 1 95 5 l e d bya ' s e n i o r S o v i e t g e n e r a l , a p p a r e n t l y l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n was

g i v e n t o co or di na t i ng SQVie t-EaSt European of fe ns iv e exer-c i s e s . An e a r l y 1961 a r t i c l e i n t h e. S o v i e t P $ t o p secre tMi l i t a r y Though t j o u r na l , w hich w e d i s c u s s l a t e r , i n d i c a t e dt h a t v i r t u a l l y no e f f o r t s had b een g i v en by Moscow t o t h eu t i l i z a t i o n of Warsaw P a c t a l l i e s i n j o i n t o f f e n si v e op er a-t i o n s . ) T h e t a c t i c a l command machinery of t h e p a c t w a scumbersom e, pa q t i c u l a r l y i n l i g h t of the demands of modernwarfare , an d b et r ay e d t h e p r e v a i l i n g S o v i e t view t h a t

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t h e a l l i e d f o r c e s would have l i t t l e m i l i t a r y s i g n i f i c a n c ev i s - a - v i s t h e West. *

Whi le the East European of fens ive rode appea r s t oh av e b ee n i n i t i a l l y n e g le c t e d , s i g h t i n g s i n t h e m id -1 950 'sof what was t he n modern Sov ie t def ens ive equipment i n th e, a l l i ed fo rc e s ( such a s advanced radar and a l l -wea therMIG-1'7 i n t e rcep t o r s** ) sugges t t h a t Moscow had n o t com-p l e t e l y i g n o r e d a m ean i ng fu l m i l i t a ry role fo r non-Sovie tt r o o p s i n t h e W a r s a w a l l i a n c e . I n f a c t , a Sovie t -Eas tEuropean e a r l y warning and a i r d e f en s e c a p a b i l i t y a p p ea rst o have beep c a l l e d f o r by Moscow e a r l y i n t h e p a c t ' s

d u a l de fens i ve m i s s i ons were compat ib l e w i t h t h e n a t i o n a li n t e r e s t s of t h e E a s t E uropean na t i ons (de fense o f t h e i rown t e r r i t o r y ) , v i t a l t o S o v ie t n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s ( e a r l ywarning of a bomber a t t ac k from Western Europe and nor th-e r n Afr ica ) , and i n s t rum en t a l i n p rov i d i ng a meaningfulv e h i c l e t o f u r t h e r the image of common g o a l s i n t he newlyf o u n d e d a l l i a n c e .

' h i s t o r y (and i n c e r t a i n c o u n t ri e s , p r i o r t o 1955). The

*The p a c t ' s armed o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e J o i n t Command, aso r i g i n a l l y d r a f t e d i n the 1955 t r e a t y c o ns i st e d of * a com-mander-in-chief (who has been a S o v i e t o f f i c e r s i n c e t h ei n c e p t i o n of t h e p a c t ) a i d e d by t h e d e f en s e m i n i s t e r s oro t h e r commanders of t h e i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s t a t e s who ac tas dep u t i e s . The "pact depu t i e s " w e r e t o r e t a i n f u l l com-p e t e n c e f o r a l l t h e n a t i o n a l t r o o p s t h a t were as s i gnedt o t h e J o i n t Command. Sometime i n l a t e 1961, or e a r l y1962, a s t r e a m l i n e d " w a r t i m e " pact command organizat ionappears to have been s e t up. Nore on t h i s l a t e r .

able i n t h e Soviet Union, s a t e l l i t e n a t i o n a l fo r c e sr e c e i v e d t h e Soviet improvements in t h e s a m e time p e r i o d .As w e p o i n t out l a t e r , t h i s w a s not t h e case w i t h modernSovie t o f fens ive weaponry .

**In t h e main, when a i r defense t echnology became a v a i l -

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The d u a l miss ions a l s o r e p r e s e n t e d a c lear r e q u i r e -ment no t o n ly under t h e vi e ws o f t he p r o f e s s ion a l So v i e tm i l i t a r y bu t a l s o unde r K hr ushc he v 's de velop ing c onc e p t sof a war i n Eur ope. K hrus hc hev ' s s t r a t e g i c c onc e p t s re-garding a European war (and t h u s $he r o l e of t h e p a c t )began t o emerge i n t he months fo l lo wing h i s s u c c e s s f u lshowdown with Marshal Zhukov i n l a t e 1957. Elements i nKhrushchevOs image of a f u t u r e war (which, as w e d i s c u s sl a t e r , were more c l e a r l y g e n e r a l i z e d i n h i s January 1960

Supreme Soviet speech) s e re p r e s e n t i n h i s 24 May 1958speech a t a Moscow meeting of t h e P o l i t i c a l C o ns ul ta ti v eCommittee of t h e p a c t , t h e f i r s t s u c h me et in g f o ll o w in gZhukov's ous t e r , In unus ua l l y g r a ph i c t e rm f o r t h e t i m e ,Khrushchev d e s c r i b e d t he de va s t a t i ng c ons e que nc e s of t h eu s e of nu cl ear weapons--not conv ent io nal force s-- in a

f u t u r e w a r :

Wars between s t a t e s have a lways broughtg r a ve d i s a s t e r s upon t h e peoples . B u ta f u t u r e war, if t h e a g g r e s s o r s succeedi n u n l ea s h in g i t , t h r e a t e n s t o becomet h e most d e v a s t a t i n g war i n t h e h i s t o r yof mankind, because t h e r e is no gua r a n t e et h a t it w i l l not become a nuc l e a r w a rw i t h a l l i t s c a t a s t r oph i c c ons e que nc e s .M i l l i o n s of people would pe r i sh , g re a tc i t i e s and i n d u s t r i a l c e n t e r s would be

razed from t h e f a c e of t h e e a r t h , uniquec u l t u r a l r e l i c s c r e a t e d by mankind

th r ough t h e ages would be i r r e v o c a b l yd e st r o ye d i n t h e c o n f l a g r a t i o n of sucha war and vas t t e r r i t o r i e s poisoned w i t hr a d i o - a c t i v e f a l l o u t .

And t h a t Khrushchev con sid ered t h a t nu cle ar weapons w o u l dbe employed i n t h e i n i t i a l s t a g e s of t h e w a r w a s madei m p l i c i t i n h i s c r i t i c i s m of a l l e g e d Western p o l i c y . Ins c o r i ng w hat he c i t e d as o f f i c i a l NATO s t r a t e gy - - " in caseof a "Russ ian aggress ion ' t h e NATO armed fo rces w e r er e a dy t o u s e atomic weapons f i r s t " - -Khrushchev publ ic lys t a t e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e t h a t NATO p o l i c y m i gh t o b l i g et h e W a r s a w Pac t m e m b e r s t o c o n s i d e r t h e q u e s t i o n ofs t a t i o n i n g r o c k e t w eapons i n East Germany, Poland and

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Czechoslovakia . (P ri va te ly , Khrushchev had made a s i m i l a rs ta tement , b u t w i t h o u t m en ti on in g s p e c i f i c c o u n t r i e s , t oa U.S. newsman a f e w days a f t e r Z hukov' s o u s t e r . ) Thes t r a t e g i c im p l ic a t io n of K h r u s h c b v ' s r e f e r e n c e t o t h eneed fo r countermeasures t o "NATO po l i cy" appea r s t o haveb e e n t h a t t h e i n i t i a l s t a ge of a f u t u r e war w o u l d most,l i k e l y i n v ol ve t h e exchange of n u c l e a r s t r i k e s . K h r u -shchev d i d no t go on (as h e > - d i d n 1960) t o s t a t e f l a t l yt h a t c o n v e n t i o n a l fo rces unde r nuc l ea r cond i t i ons had l o s tt h e i r former impor tance. B ut he d i d t a k e t h e occas i ona t t h e May 1 95 8 me et in g t o r e i t e r a t e t he J anua ry 1958S o v i e t t r o o p c u t and redeployment announcements* andth'e other Warsaw Pact t roop c u t s as an example of t h eb l o c ' s "peacefu l i n ten t ions" - -no t as an example of m e e t -i n g m i l i t a r y r e a l i t i e s , as h e w o u l d l s p e l l o u t i n 1960.

The r o l e t h a t n on -S ov ie t f o r c e s c o u ld p l a y i n t h epa ct under th e new Sov iet image of a w a r i n Europe mayhave been sug ges ted i n Khrushchev 's sober r e f e re n c e t ot h e c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e U.S. s t r a t e g i c bomber fo r ce andt h e t h r e a t of n e a rb y U . S . bases. In t h i s con t ex t Khru-shchev in h i s May 1958 speech boas ted t h a t " t h e S o v i e tUnion and t h e other W a r s a w t r e a t y count r i es can have andd o have eve ry t h i ng neces sa ry to keep themselves o u t of

* T A M announced i n January 1958 t h a t t h e Soviet Army,Navy and A i r Force would be c u t by 300,000 men; 41,000men would be withdrawn from E a s t Germany and 1'7,000 f r o mHungary. The withdrawa l o f S o v i e t t r o o p s f r o m Rumaniawas announced a t t h e meet in g, and p a c t commander Konevannounced t h e r e s o l v e o f E a s t EUrQpean na t i on s t o r e duc econven t iona l fo rc es by 119 ,000 men. (In 1960 Moscowr e p o r te d t h a t o v e r one q u a r t e r m i l l i o n a l l i e d armedf o r c e s p e r s o n n e l c u t s had been made si n c e 1955 .) An 11

Map 19 65 TASS repcast o f an i n t e rv i e w w i t h p a c t s t a f fch ie f Ba tov claimed t h a t t h e pac t co un t r i e s "between1955 and 1958 r e d u c e d u n i l a t e r a l l y t h e nu me ri ca l s t r e n g t hof t h e i r armed f o r c e s by 2 , 4 ~ , 0 0 0men"--a f ig u r e abouts i x t i m e s grea te r t h a n t h e one gi ve n by Moscow i n 1958.

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a s t r a t e g i c a l l y d i sa d va nt ag eo us p o s i t i o n , ' The f a c t t h a tt h e p a c t was i n s u c h a p o s i t i o n a n d t h a t E a s t Europeanf o r c e s were openly inc luded i n S o vi e t s t r a t e g i c t hi n k in gon t h e Western bomber t h r e a t s u g g e st s t h a t a c t i v e a l l i e dp a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a more h i gh l y e f f e c t i v e a i r de fensesys tem was regarded as an exigency under Khrushchev 'sview of a war i n E u rope .

t a k e n t o e q u i p t h e E a s t European armies w i t h more advanceda i r defense hardware such as s u r f a c e - to - a i r miss i l es(SAMs) and m i s s le -equ ipped a11we a th e r j e t i n t e r c e p t o r s

-' (YIG-19s), b u t a v a i l a b l e e vi de nc e p o i n t s t o t h e l a t t e r

We do not know pr ec i s e l y when th e d ec i s io n was=9 58 o r t h e f i r s t h a l f of 1 95 9.

as r e p o r t e d tha t some t i m e p r i o ri u m of t h e Sov ie t Cent ra l Committee " i n co ns u l t a t i onw i t h p o l i t i c a l l e a de r s o f t h e Warsaw Pact ' ' d e c id e d t oe q u i p t h e E a s t European forces w i t h s u r f a c e - t o - a ir m i s -s i l e s . * The l a s t p a ct p o l i t i c a l c o n s u l t a t i v e c o n f e r e n c e

p""I.P r i o r t o 1960 w a s t h e Mky 1958 Moscow meet in g, b u t t h e-stated t h a t t h e D a c t ' s " o o l i t i c d . l e a d -'ers" p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e dec i s i on db r i ng "uhpub l i c i zedv i s i t s t o M O S C O W . ~ ~ 1 h a s r e p o r t e d t h a t Eas tE uropean o f f i ce r s were brough t t o t e USSR fo r g round t oa i r m i s s i l e t r a i n i n g i n e a r ly 1959, and l a t e r i n . t h e y ea rwere s e n t back--a long wi th S A M s , MIG-19s and S ov ie t

r e po r te d t h a t p r i o r t o 1 960 a l l i e dc ted i n t a c t i c a l ground-to-ground

miss i l es . T h i s c l e a r l y s u g ge s ts t h a t more t h a n a n a n t i -a i r d ef en se r o l e f o r t h e E a s t Europeans was being con-s i d e r e d b y MQSCOW. However, t h e f i r s t o b s e r v a t i o n of

such an "of fens ive" weapon a c t ua l l y i n E a s t European forcesd i d n o t take plac e u n t i l mic i-1962-- i. e. , a f t e r Khrushchev 's1 96 1 c o n ce s si o ns t o h i s t r a d i t i o n a l i s t m inded m a rs h al s(more on t h i s l a t e r ) . i nformed u st h a t S o v i e t i n s t r u c t i o1959 w a s l i m i t e d t o a c u r s o r y i n t r o d u c t i o n of g e n e r a lp r i n c i p l e s a n d o n l y s e l e c t S o v i e t o f f i c e r s were given

i n s t r u c t i o n i n f i r i n g such m i s s i l e s .

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i n s t ru c t o r s- - t o t r a i n n a t i o n a l f o r c es . (The f i r s t SAMs i t e manned by a l l i e d t r o o p s w a s obse rved i n June 1960.). . ~.

I

By l a t e 1959, Khrushchev had developea n i s e a r i i

views on t h e na tu r e and conduc t of a f u t u r e w a r i n Europe ,and he p laced h i s p a r t i c u l a r image of t h e c o n f l i c t before

t h e Supreme S o v i e t on 1 4 J a nua r y 1960. H e h e ld t h a t t h echarac te r of a f u t u r e w a r be tween the grea t powers w o u l dbe r oc ke t - nuc l e a r , and t h a t t h e d e c i s i v e r e s u l t s wouldt a k e p la c e i n t h e f i r s t m i nu t es o f t h e c o n f l i c t . T here -

f o r e , t h e o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e b r an c he s of t h e armedf o r c e s i nv ol ve d i n t h e i n i t i a l exchange were t h e c r i t i c a lf o r c e s , a n d t h a t t h e s u r f a c e nav y, t h e t a c t i c a l a i r f o r c eand t h e gr ound f o r c e s "had l o s t t h e i r previous impor tance"and could be c u t by on e- th ird . Khrushchev d i d n o t l i s tenemy armed forces as a t a r g e t i n t h e i n i t i a l p hase of

t h e war; presumably he f e l t t h a t s u c h forces wouldbe con-sumed a long w i th t h e rest of c o n t i ne n t a l Europe. As for

pac t s t r a t e g y , E hr us hc he vP s c o n s i de r a t io n s r e l a t i n g t oa European w a r v i r t u a l l y r u l e d o u t t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n ofn on -S ov iet f o r c e s i n an y s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e b u t t h a t of a i rd e f e n s e .

The ope ra t iona l imp1i c a t o n s of Khrushchev ' s

s t r a t e g i c p ro no un ce me nt s were s p e l l e d o u t i n t h e f i r s ti s s u e of Mil i t a r y Though t ( c l a s s i f i e d t o p secre t by t h eSo vi e t s ) which appea red in e a r l y 1960. The s c e n a r i o a sp r e s e n t e d i n t h e c l a s s i f i e d p u b l i c a t i o n p o r t r ay e d t h ev i r t u a l l i q u i d a t io n of Eupope i n which a l i m i t e d numberof Sov ie t c onve n t i ona l f o r c e s - - o the r Warsaw P a c t f o r c e swere ignored--were called upon for secon dary mop-up t as k s .T h e s a t u r a t i o n of n u c l e a r s t r i k e s (as c a l l e d f o r i n K h r u -s hc he v' s s t r a t eg y ) l e f t l i t t l e room f o r a c onve n t iona ll a n d b a t t l e i n Europe, and t h u s no n e c e s s i t y t o c o o r d i n a t ec onve n t iona l of f e n s v e opera t i o n s w i t h Moscow s E a s t Europ-e a n a l l i e s .

In p u b l i c t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y e n d o r s ed Khru-

s h ch e v 's s t r a t e g i c v ie ws . T l t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s "

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( i nc lu d ing ge ne r a l s t a f f c h i e f Soko lovsky a nd, p r oba b ly ,p a c t commander Konev, who were r e p l a c e d i n 1960) v i g o r o u s l yc o u n t e r at t a c k e d t h e o p e r a t i o n a l i m p l i c at i o n s o f K h r u -s hc he v ' s s t r a t e gy . The p r in c i pa l a rgum en t was t h a t a l andb a t r l e would be fought i n Europe in w h i c h mass S o v i e tarmies w o u l d be ne c e s s a r y . A f e w t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s a rgu edt h a t n o t o n l y t h e n o n - st r a t e g ic S o v i e t f o r c e s b u t t h ea l l i e d forces would be ca l l ed upon. And i n th e So vie t

debate, t h e u t , i l i z a t o n of p a c t a l l i e d f o r c e s

c e p t i o n o f a war i n Europe . Genera l Kurochkin , i n roundlyc r i t i c i z i n g t h e o p er a t i o n al i m p l i c at i o ns o f t h e 3odern-i s t s ' s t r a t e g i c v ie ws of c o n d uc t in g a w a r , wrote I

L F Jo a c e d i n t h e f i r s t r e b u t t a l of t h e modernis t con-

\

\I

i n t h e d e t e r m i n at i o n of t h e degree ofr e a c t i o n it is n e c e s sa r y t o considert h a t nuc l e a r - m i s s i l e weapons m u s t beu s e d i n a dec is ive and purpose fu l way,b u t o n l y w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s of expedi -ence . . The fo r sa ki ng of t h i s r e q u i r e -ment can lea d t o a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e i na war unleashed by aggr ess ors w i l li n v o l v e s u c h large human and mater i a ll o s s e s on b o t h s i d e s t h a t the con-sequences may be c a t a s t r o p h i c f o r man-k i n d .

In one case i t may be ne c e s s a r yt o c o nd uct o p e r a t i o n s f o r t h e comple ted e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e means of r e t a l i a t i o n ,and in a no the r - - t o de s t r oy t h e s t r a t e g i cnuclear weapons b a s e s . I t is c l ea r t h a ti n a s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n of t h i s t yp ei t may be p o s s i b l e t o f i n d a p l ac e f o rt h e u t i l i z a t i o n of t h e o t h e r b r a n c h e sof t h e armed f o r c e s of t h e Sovie t Union,and of t h e f o r c e s of o t h e r c o u n t r i e sof t he S o c i a l i s t camp. (emphas i s sup-

~1 e d )

Kuroc-kin d i d n ot e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e t h e "place" t o be found

o r t h e "branch" t o be employed by t h e a l l i e d f o r c e s . He

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11. The Offens ive Miss ion

The 1961 Be r l i n Crisis Compromise : When Khrushchevd e c i d e d in l a t e 1960 or e a r l y 1961 t8 t r y t o i n t im id a t et h e West into making concess ions on Berlin and Germany,

he w a s soon faced by a c o a l i t i o n of h i s l ea d i ng o f f i c e r swho counte red t h a t r e l i a n c e on rocket-nuclear weaponsa lone would j e o p a rd i z e S o v i et s e c u r i t y . The Soviet m a r -s h a l s (and p a r t i cu la r l y Mal inovsky and Grechko*) appea led ,

*Malinovsky 's c r i t i c i s m w a s made i m p l i c i t i n h i s 22ndPa r t y C ongre ss s pe ec h i n which he ca l l ed f o r m u l t i - m i l l i o nman army whi le f a i l i n g t o draw a U.S.-USSR m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t hcomparison.s u p e r i o r i t y t hr ou gh ou t t h e y e a r . ) 1Khrushchev had emphasized S o v ie t m i l i t a r y

Is s a t r s xa c e io n w i tn l u l ru snen v's i n t e n t i o n to reduce t h e

s i z e of t h e army, and he f e l t so s t r o n g l y a bo ut t h i s t h a th e t h r e a t e n e d to r e t i r e , whatever t h e consequences, s t a t -i n g t h a t i t w a s r i d i c u l o u s t o depend on n u c l e a r - m i s s i l eweapons alone.

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..

a r g u i n g t h a t t h e S o v i e t c o n ve n ti o n al f o r c e s were n o ta k

an adequa te l e ve l o f combat p reparednes s fo r a showdowno v e r B e r l i n a n d t h a t t h e 1960 t roo p and budge t p roposa ls h o u l d be suspended . And i n ea r l y < 1961 he t r ad i t i on -

debate b eg an t o a p p ea r i na r is is progressed--and

a l i s t s v ie ws i n t h eopen Sovie t imed ia..

as t h e U.S. v i g o r o u s l y reacted by s h a r p l y i n c r e a s i n g t h em i l i t a r y budge t f o r s t r a t e g i c and conventional weaponry,ex t end i ng tours of d u t y , i n c r e a s i n g d r a f t q u o t a s andm o b i l i z i n g a subs t an t i a l num ber of r e s e r v i s t s - - t h e S o v i e tm a rs h al s a dvanced t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r s t r a t e g i c vie ws i nc a l l i n g f o r m as si ve S o v i e t c on v en ti on a l f o r c e s t o f i g h ta l a n d war i n Europe. In sh or t , Khrushchev 's 1960s t r a t e g i c c o n si d er a t i o ns were on t h e b r i n k of be i ng ove r -

tu rned by t h e p r o f e s si o n a l m i l i t a r y .

s e a r c h i n g f o r a method t o s a l va ge t h e p r i n c i p a l a t t r i b -utes of h i s s t r a t e g i c c on s id e ra t i on s and t h u s m i t i g a t et h e e f f o r t s of h i s m i l i t a r y pro fe s s i o na l s . One suchtemporary panacea was presen ted by a Major General A .Klyukanov 1

Khrushchev a t t h e same t i m e seems t o have been

I a l yueanov ' s a i s cus s i on m aae iz c l e a r m a z It h er e had been i t t l e s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t io n given by t h eS o v ie t m i l i t a r y t o t h e u s e of a l l i e d f o r c es i n j o i n to p e r a t o n s H e wrote t h a t "unfor tuna te ly" Sovie t -Eas tE uropean m i l i t a ry coo rd i na t i on " is n o t sha red even w i t ha l i m i t e d number of g e n e r a l s and s e n i o r o f f i c e r s o f t h eS o v i e t t r o o p s d e p l o y e d i n t h e b or de r m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t swho, i n case of war, m u s t p e r s o n a l l y d i r e c t combat opera-t i o n s of t h e i r t r o o p s i n c o o r d in a t i o n w i t h t h e t r o o p son o r from t h e t e r r i t o r y of t h e c o u n t r i e s of t h e S o c i a l i s tcamp. 1

In r e t r o s p e c t , a proposal somewhat 1 k e Klyukanov ' s

seems t o u n d e r l i e m u c h of t h e de ci s i on t o commence t h e

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f i r s t j o i n t m i l i t a r y exercises i n t h e f a l l of 1961.*And t h e c on c ep t of j o i n t t r a i n i n g a p p ea rs t o have pro-vided Xhrushchev with a t empora ry counte rporposa l i n ane f f o r t to :hold down t h e n u m e r i c a l s t r e n g t h of t h e S o v i e tc o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s , or a t l e a s t t o prevent a l a r g e rS o v i e t m o b i l i z a t i o n on t h e scale envisaged by Malinovskyi n his O c tober 1961 p l e a f o r "mass, m u l t i m i l l i o n - s t r o n garmed forces" f o r t h e c on du ct of a f u t u r e w a r . I nc r e a s e dr e l i a n c e on non-Sovie t forces w o u l d n o t o n l y ease t h e

* I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t o no te t h a t a Major General A .Klyukanov w a s i d e n t i f i e d i n 1961 as a m e m b e r of t h eThi r d Shock Army, G r o u p of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG)--an area i nc lude d i n t h e f i r s t j o i n t ac t exercisesc a r r i e d out in t h e f a l l of t h a t yea r .



I I

s t r a i n s of suspending t h e 1960 Sov i e t t r oop c u t p r o p o s a l ,b u t would a l s o p a s s o n t o E a s t Eur opea n m i l i t a r y bud ge t sp a r t o f t h e c o s t of modern combined a ~ m s quipment.*

That Khrushchev w a s l e s s t h a n e n t h u s i a s t i c aboutr e v er s i n g h i s e a r l i e r t roop and budge t c u t p o l i c i e s wasmade pa in f u l l y e v ide n t i n h i s 8 J u l y 1961 s pe e c h t o m i l i -t a r y g r a du a t e s i n wh ic h he a nnounce d t h e s us pe ns ion of

t h e J a nua r y 1960 t r oo p c u t proposa l and t h e i nc r e a s e da p p r o p r i a t i o n s f o r d e f e n se . H e emphat i c a l l g e xp l a ine dt h a t t h e measures were " te m por ar y ," t h a t t he y were re-s pons ive i n na tu r e , and t h a t t he y w ou ld be promptlyr e s c inde d upon r e c e ip t of e v ide nc e t h a t t h e U . S . wasw i l l i n g t o r e l a x t e ns i on s . I n t h e same speech, Khru-

shchev a l so ment ioned th e a l l i e d c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h es t r e n g t h of t h e p a c t : " I t is admi t t ed i n t h e West t h a tt h e s t r e n g t h of the Sovie t Union and t h e o t he r s o c i a l i s ts t a t e s is n o t i n f e r i o r t o t h e f o r c e s of t h e Westernpowers. '* While Khrushchev ' s br i e f r e f e re nc e f a l l s s h o r tof i n d i c a t i n g a p o l i c y of t a p p i n g a l l i e d resources t oease S o v i e t m o b i l i z a t i o n s t r a i n s , it does i n d i c a t e t h a tKhru shch ev i n J u l y 1 96 1 r e ga r de d t h e m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t hof " o the r s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s " as a m e a n ing f u l f a c to r i nt h e E a s t - W e s t ba lance of f o r c e s . L e s s t h a n f o u r monthse a r l i e r , t h e 29 March communique of t h e pa ct P o l i t i c a lCo ns ul ta t iv e Commit tee (meet ing i n Moscow) s t a t e d t h a t" t h e n a t i o ns p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e Warsaw 'Prea ty, dur ingt h e course of a thorough exchange of op in ion , c oo r d ina t e d

m e a s u r e s which t he y c on s ide r n e c e s s a r y t o im ple men t i nt h e i n t e r e s t of f u t u r e s t r en g t h e n in g t h e i r d e f e n s i v ec a p a b i l i t i e s . " And l e s s t h a n f o u r month s a f t e r h i s J u l y" r e v e r s a l , " K hr ushchev i n h i s 27 October speech a t t h e22nd Par ty Congress claimed t h a t " the Sovie t Union and

I*Sov ie t combined-arm equipment s e n t t o t h e a l l i e d

armies i nc re as ed n o t o n l y i n q u a n t i t y b ut a l s o i n q u a l i t yf o l l ow ing t h e 1961 B e r l i n cr i s i s . For a good d i scuss ionof t he m ode r n i z a t i on of t h e a l l i e d a r m i e s , see '1

I

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i n t h e 1961 compromise. A t any r a t e , i n 1 96 2 i n d i c a t i o n sof g r e a t e r So v ie t c o n t r o l of a l l i e d o f fe n s i ve f o r c e sb eg an t o e me rg e. I n c o n t r a s t t o G e n e ra l Kl yu ka no v' se a r l y 1 96 1 s u g g e s ti o n ( c i t e d e a r l i e r ) f o r g r e a t e r c oo rd i-n a t i o n w i th a l l i e d tr o o p s. a n a r t i c l e i n t h e t h i r d i s s u eof Mil i t a ry Though t in i 9 62 f l a t l y s t a t e d t h a t a l l i e darmies of t h e pac t s h o ul d be d i r e c t l y s u b o r d i n a t e t oS o v i e t c o n t r o l o f o p e r a t i o n s . The S o v i e t a u t h o r , a

.Colonel V . Zemskov, s t a t e d t h a t :

a t t h e s t a r t of a w a r i t is n e c e s s a r y t oe l i m i n a t e ' d u a l c o n t r o l of a l l i e d armies(by t h e f r o n t commander and t h e m i l i t a r yl e a d e r s h i p o f t h e a l l i e d c o u n t r i e s ) . T h e

armies s h o u l d r e c e i v e c om bat t a s k s o n l yf r o m t h e front commander.

And t h e command of a f r o n t , a c c o r d i n g t o s u b s e q u e n t s o u r c e sis a S o v i e t o p e r a t i o n . A t about t h e same t i m e Zemskov'sa r t i c l e appeared i n c l a s s i f i e d c i r c u l a t io n (May o r June1962) , t h e f or m ul a o f S o v i e t d i r e c t i o n o f a l l i e d o f f e n -s i v e f o r c e s a p pe ar ed i n t h e Sovie t volume, M i l i t a r yS t r a t e g y .S t r a t e g y (which were w r i t t e n by a group of 15 S o v i ao f f i c e r s u n d e r t h e d i r e c t i o n of Marshal Sokolovsky) in-c l u d e d a passage under t h e s u bs e c ti o n e n t i t l e d " p os s ib l ea g e n c i e s of command of t h e Sovie t Un ion ' s armed f o r c e si n inodern c o n d i t i o n s " c a l l i n g for d i r e c t S o v i e t c o n t r o lof a l l i e d t r o o p s :

Both t h e 1962 and t h e 1963 editi- i l i tary

O p e r a t i o n a l u n i t s i n c l u d i n g armied f o r c e sof d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l i s t c ou n tr ie s c an be

created t o c on du ct j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s i nm i l i t a r y t h e a t e r s . The command of t h e s eu n i t s c a n be a s s ig n ed t o t h e Supreme HighCommand of t h e S o v i e t A r m e d Forces, w i t hr e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e supreme high com-mands of t h e a l l i e d c o u n t r i e s .

The " w a r t i m e " command of t h e p a c t forces a s p r e s e n t e d i nt h e Zemskov and Soko lovs ky form ul a i s , of course, i ns h a r p c o n t r a s t t o t h e "peacetime" c h a i n of command a so f f i c i a l l y p ro cl aim ed i n t h e 1955 W a r s a w T r e a t y and i n

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s u bs eq u en t o f f i c i a l s t a te m e n ts on p a c t o r g a n i z a t i o n .Soviet Supreme High Command w o u l d c o n t r o l n o t o n l y t h es t r a t e g i c d i r e c t i o n of t h e w a r , b u t c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a lw a r t i m e comba t ope ra t ions ( such as reass ignment of t a c t i c a lmiss ion s ) and , pre sumably th e peacet ime joint m i l i t a r ye x e r c i s e s . 1

The

Another aspect of t h e S o v i et m i l i t a r y P s p a r t oft h e b a r g a i n i n t h e 1961 compromise w a s , of c our s e , t a c i tacceptance of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i s t v iew of t he ne e d f o rm a s s armies i n Europe under nuc lear co nd i t io ns . And th emoderniza t ion of a l l i e d o f f e n s i v e f o r c e s r e l a t e s t o t h et r a d i t i o n a l i s t view i n t h e s e n se t h a t s t re n gt h en e d pac tf o r c e s c o u l d be r e ga rde d by t h e S ov i e t m a r s hal s as v i t a l

t o t h e success o f t h e S o v i e t i n v a s i o n - - p a r t i cu l a r l y ifW es ter n s t r i k e s b lo ck ed t h e road and r a i l re inforcemente f f o r t f r o m t h e Sov ie t Union. In s h o r t , s a t e l l i t e f o r c e swould be o f g r e a t e r v a l u e as planned rep lacements forweakened Sovi e t un i t s i f t h e former were equipped w i t hmodern combined arms equipment. T h a t t h e S o v i e t s wereconcerned wit h t h e problem of i s o l a t i o n b etw een t h e f r o n tand t h e rear by m e a n s of e ne m y nuc l e a r s t r i ke s w a s madeclear i n an a r t i c l e by Major General P. S t e p s h i n i n t h es e c r e t v e r s i o n o f M i l it ar y Thought , i s s u e s i x (December1961) :

I t is s u f f i c i e n t t o n ot e t h a t t h e prob-able enemy can take spec ia l m e a s u r e s a t

t h e beginning ofa

w a r t o u p s et t h e move-ment of r e s e r v e s f o r w a rd , f r om t h e d e p t hof t h e c o u n t ry by s e t t i n g up s o - c a ll e d" n u c l e a r o b s t r u c t i o n bar r i e r s" a long t h en a t u r a l l i n e s i n t e r s e c t in g t h e bas ic1 n e s of communica t ions . Simultaneously,a l a rg e number of n u cl e ar s t r i k e s c an be

d e l i v e r e d a g a i n s t t r o o p s , r o a d j u n c t i o n s ,s t a t i o n s , t u n n e l s p o r t s and w ha rv es .

However, t h e use of non-Sovie t t roops t o remedy t h e prob-able re inforcement problem w a s not ment ioned b y S t e p s h i no r by any o the r Mi l i t a ry Thought- u th o r .



I I

The q u e s t i o n of E a s t Eu ro pean m i l i t a r y r e l i a b i l i t yha s probably concerned th e marshal (and th e Kremlinl eaders as w e l l ) f rom th e t i m e t h e d e c i si o n was f i n a l l yt a k e n t o t a r g e t non-Sovie t fo rc es against .NATO up t o t h ep r e s e n t t i m e . The marshals, however, c o u l d have rega rdedt h e r e l i a b i l i t y i s sue in a somewhat d i f f e r e n t l i g h to win g t o t h e r e a l i t i e s of nucle ar war in Europe . Thatis , th e modernized pac t fo rce s posses s a s t a n d i n g v a l u eto Moscow b y t h e f a c t t h a t non -Sov ie t a dva ncing f o r c e scould draw some NATO f i r e f ro m a dv an ci ng S o v i e t u n i t s .T h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e advancing non-Soviet fo rc es wasp r o ba b ly a n o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n a f f e c t i n g MOSCOW'S viewof E a s t European m i l i t a r y r e l i a b i l i t y - - e . g . , would t h eCzech f o r c e s f i g h t more v ig o ro u sl y t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a lenemy ( G e r m a n s ) t ha n o the r enemy g r oup ings? Th i s r a t i on a l emay, i n p a r t , u n d e r l i e t h e Soko lovs ky a u tho r ' s e xp l a na t i ont h a t S o v i e t c o n t r o l of o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e E uro pea n t h e a t e r sdoes no t mean t h a t a l l E a s t Eur ope a n na t i ona l f o r c e s w i l . 1act as " f i l l e r s " f o r S o vi et u n i t s . Both e d i t i o n s ofM i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y p o i n t o u t t h a t

i n some m i l i t a r y t h e a t e r s , o p e r a t i o n a lu n i t s of t h e a l l i e d c o u n t r i e s w i l l beunder t h e i r own supreme high command.I n s u c h cases , t he se u n i t s c an be com-manded according t o j o i n t c o n c e p t s a n dp l a n s of o p e r a t i o n s , a n d by close

c o o r d i n a t i o n of t r o o p o p e r a t i o n s t h r o u g hr e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t hese c o u n t r i e s .

The " ope r a t i ona l un i t s of t h e a l l i e d c o u n t r i e s . . . un de rt h e i r own supreme h i g h command"--rather than t h e E a s tE uro pea n u n i t s s p e c i f i c a l l y a s si g n ed t o t h e Warsaw P a c tJ o i n t Command--generally are a s s igne d home defense ands u p p l y m is s ions by t he Ea s t Eur ope a n na t i ona l de f e ns em i n i s t r i e s . C e r t a i n t e r r a i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , however,may i n some cases s e r v e t o obscure t h e d i f f e r e n c esbetween the two t y p e s of a l l i e d f o r c e s . P o l i t i c a l con-s i d e r a t i o n s may a l s o p l a y a p a r t in t h e a l l o c a t i o n ofsemi-independent combat t a s k s . A t any r a t e t h e a s s ign -ments of some inde pend ent mi ss io ns t o t h e a l l i e d commandsseems t o r e f l e c t t h e same r a t i o n a l e t a k en i n t h e e a r l i e rp e r i o d of t h e p a c t f o r a i r d ef en se r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .

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3EfsL7I



.

Tha t i s , S o v i e t p l a n n e r s a p p ea r t o ha ve c a p i t a l i z e d onc e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l E a s t E u r o p e a n n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s Gina d d i t i on t o c e r t a i n t e r r a i n c o n s id e ra t io n s ) t o m a x i m i z et h e i r s e p a r a t e mi s si o n s i n t h e a t t a c k , w h i l e r e t a i n i n g

While avoiding a d e s c r i p t i o n of "who w i l l attack whom,"t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a pp ro ach was o b l i q u el y r e f e r r e d t oi n a Nedelya a r t i c l e by Colonel Genera l S . Shtemenko( i s s u e six, 31 Janua ry-6 Februa ry 1965) a f t e r a d i scus -s i o n of "combat tasks":

t h e S o v ie t claim t o o v e r - a l l d i r e c t i o n of t h e o p e r at i o n . , (

I t m u s t be n ot ed t h a t S o v i e t m i l i t a r yd o c t r i n e is of a t r u l y i n t e r n a t i o n a lna ture and is i n k e ep in g w i t h t h e bas i c

i n t e r e s t sof

a l l s o c i a l i s t c o un t r i e si n c l u d i n g t h o s e u n i t e d b y t h e WarsawP a c t . It bears i n mind t h e n e c e s s i t yt o p re se rv e i n each socia l !bt c o u n t r yt h e r e s p e c t i v e c o u n t r y ' s n a t i on a J. p e c u l i a r i t i e s i n m i l i t a r y d ev elo pm en t,a f a c t which s t r e n g t h e n s t h e m i l i t a r ya l l i a n c e of t h e s o c i a l i s t s t a t e s .

The Post-Cuba Crisis Debate : Khrushchev * s m i l i t a r yviews s u f f e r e d a second ma.ior setback f o l l ow ing h i s f a i l -u r e t o q p i d l y redress t h e - s t r a t e g i c e q u a t io n by i n s t a l -l i n g medium-and-long-range m i s s i l e s i n C u b a . And, as i n

t h e daysof

t h e 1 9 61 B e r l i n c r i s i s , t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r yr e a c t i o n r e f l e c t e d a s t r o n g b i a s i n f av oP of c onve n t iona lf o r c e s . B u t t h e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g el em en t i n t h e reneweds t r a t e g i c debate w a s t h a t now both s c h o o l s of t hough ttur ned t o th e "compromise" i n d i r e c t s u p p o r t of v a r i o u sa s p e c t s of t h e i r a r g u m e n t s .

For example, Khrushchev in h i s F eb ru a ry e l e c t i o nspeech renewed h i s e a r l i e r l i n e on Sov ie t a nd a l l i e dc o n t r i b u t i o n s t o p a ct m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y . A t t h es m e t i m e he lamented t h e burdensome cost of keepingS o v ie t m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s from f a l l i n g be hi nd t h o s eof t h e West and r e i t e r a t e d h i s e a r l i e r views on t h e n a t u r eof n u c l e a r w a r . I t a p p e a r e d p a r t i c u l a r l y c u r i o u s t h a tKhrushchev would r e f e r t o Soviet and a l l i e d m i l i t a r y

I

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SEML7



s u pe r i o r i t y , t he n c ompla in a bou t t h e va s t amout of re-sources a l l o c a t e d t o th e So vie t armed fo rc es , and the nconc lude wi th t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t a n u c l e a r war wouldb e d e c i s i v e l y s e t t l e d b e f o r e l a r g e a r m i e s could performany s i g n i f i c a n t m i s si o n . An e x p l a n a t i o n may be t h a t a tt h i s t i m e K hr us hc he v ' s a t t e n t i on was d i r e c t e d toward (1)b loc k ing t h e e f f o r t s o f t h o s e who were a t te m p ti n g t oc onve r t h i s t e m por ar y 1961 c onc e s s ions t o convent iona ls t r a t e g y i n t o a f u l l r e v e r s a l , a n d (2) renewing h i s 1960e f f o r t t o reduce t h e n u me ri ca l s t r e n g t h o f t h e armedf o r c e s a n d c u t t h e m i l i t a r y b u d g e t .

I n e a r l y s p r in g 1963 K hrushchev t u r ne d h i s e m pha si son a l l i e d c a p a b i l i t i e s i n a n o t h e r e f f o r t Lo head of f a

ren ewed c amp aign f ro m t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s i n t h e S o v i e thigh command,* B u t t h i s t i m e h i s e f f o r t s were n o t c a r r i e do u t i n a cr i s i s atmosphere. Thus, wh ile Khrushchev pur-s u e d h i s 1 96 3 p o l i c y of d e t e n t e w i t h t h e West ( l i m i t e dt e s t ban t r e a t y , ban on o r b i t i ng nuc l e a r we apons, e t c . ) ,E a s t E uro pean m i l i t a r y e f f o r t s were r e c e iv i ng e mphas is i nthe Sov i e t p r opa ga nda media . The d e t e n t e p o l i c y reached

a h i g h w i t h the s i g n i n g of t h e l i m i t e d t e s t b a n t r e a t yin August, and t h e campaign t o d i r e c t a t t en t i o n t o a l l i e d

e f f o r t s h i t an a l l - t ime h i g h i n t h e unprecedented amountof bloc propaganda t h a t was devoted t o a j o i n t p a ct e x er - 'c ise--"Operation Qum te%" --in September 1963. And f i n a l l yi n December 1963 Khrushchev re tu rn ed t o h i s m i l i t a ry bud-ge t and manpower reduc t io n propo sa l , t h i s t i m e armed w i t h

improved E a s t European fo rc es i n one hand and a d e t e n t ep o l i c y i n t h e o t h e r . I n h i s l a t e 1963 approach, Khrushchev' s

*We have found no e x p l i c i t s ta te m en t by Khrushchev ora n y o t h e r S o v i e t l eader t h a t S o v i e t f o r c e s c o ul d be c u tdue t o t h e i n c r e a s e d c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e East Europeanfo rces . Such an assessment , w h i l e probably sound, wouldbe f a r f r om p r ude n t f o r Moscow*s l i n e t o t h e E a s t Europ-e a n s i n t h e s e n s e t h a t s u c h an ope n a s s e r t i on c ou ld un-ne c e s s a r i l y hamper t h e m i l i t a r y i n t e g r a t i o n e f f o r t andc o n t r ib u t e t o t h e po l i t i c a l a nd e c onom ic d r i f t fromMoscow.

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view of t h e East-West b a la n c e of s t r e n g t h r e p e a t e d l y i n-c lu de d r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n of t h e a l l i e da rm ie s ; i n c o n t r a s t , Warsaw P a c t f o r c e s were not mentionedi n KhrushchevOs 1960 tro op and budget c u t f o r m u l a .

1 4 Janua ry 1960 KhrushchevSupreme Soviet Speech.

The Council of M i n i s t e r spu t s be fo re you f o r cons i de ra -t i o n and con f i rm a t i on t h eproposa l t o r e d u c e o u rarmed fo rc e s by ano the r 1 . 2

mi l l io n men. If s u c h aproposa l is accepted by t h eSupreme Soviet, our armyand navy w i l l have a comple-ment of 2,4 23, 000 men. Thusthe complement of our armedf o r c e s w i l l be below t h e l e v e lproposed by the Unit ed S t a t es ,B r i t a i n , and F rance du r i ngt h e d i s c u s s i o n of t h e d i s a r -mament problem i n 19 56.These proposa l s env i sagedf o r t h e S ov i e t U nion and t h eUnited S t a t e s armed f o r c e s

a t a l e v e lof

2 .5 mi l l ion meneach.

We agreed t o t h i s proposal andhave on our p a r t advanced itmany t i m e s , proceeding, ofcou r se , f rom t h e premise t h a tt h i s w o u l d be only th e f i r s ts t e p in t h e f i e l d o f armedf o r c e s r e d u c t i o n. W e mentionedt hese f i g u r e s i n p a r t i c u l a ri n t h e proposa l s of t h e S o v i e tGovernment t o t h e GeneralAssembly i n t h e autumn of

195 6. More t h a n t h r e e y e a r s

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15 December 1963 KhrushchevCPSU C en tr a1 C o m m i t t e eplenum speech.

When t h e q u e s t i o n w a sra i sed of reduc ing t h enumber of armed f o r c e sand armaments of t h eSoviet Union and i t s a l l i e s

of t h e Warsaw P a c t ont h e one s i d e and thenumber of t h e armed forcesand armaments of t h e l a r g eWestern s t a t e s and t h e i rNATO a l l i e s on t h e o t h e r ,it was i n v a r i a b l y p o i n t e do u t t o u s t h a t t he Weste rnpowers cannot ag ree t oa n y e s s e n t i a l r e d u c t i o nof t h e i r armed f o r c e sand armaments , p r mar ilybecause t h e Soviet Unionand i t s a l l i e s posse s s

a l a rge preponderancep r ec i se l y i n t h e numberof armed fo rces and con-vent ional armaments .

A t t h e same t i m e , i t w a ss t a t e d t h a t i n v i ew oft h i s t he Weste rn s t a t e sm u s t pre se rve and accumula t enuc l ea r a rms i n o rde r t oba l ance t he m ight o f t h e i rarmed f o r c e s w i th t h emight of the armed f o r c e sof t h e Warsaw Pact coun-

t r i e s . T h i s w a s s a i d a t



1 I

h a v e p a s s e d s i n c e then, but

agreement has no t ye t beenach ieved o n t h i s . A p r o p o s a li s now be in g made t o r educet h e armed forces t o a lowerl e v e l , a n d w e a re d oi ng t h i so u r s e l v e s , w i t h o u t d e l a y s ,wi thou t an unnecessa ry wasteof t i m e and energy, wi thoutt h e n er vo us s t r a i n c o nn e ct edw i t h end less a rgument s witho u r p a r t n e r s on t h e q u e s t i o nof disarmament.

t h e t i m e when the Sovie tUnion was proposing--andw e a l s o p ro po se t h i s now--t o a gr ee t h a t t h e s t r e n g t h .of i t s armed f o r c e s be

e q u a l t o t h e s t r e n g t hof t h e armed fo rc es of

t he Uni t ed S t a t e s .

E a s t European armed f o r c e s were aga in brought up by Khru-shchev in t h e c o n t e x t of h i s 14 February 1964 CPSU Cen-t r a l Committee plenum rema rks abouts t h e "measures w e aret a k i n g t o reduce defen se expend i tu res" and t h e numer icals t r e n g t h of t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s :

I s h o u l d l i k e t o s a y a few words abo utt h e m e a s u r e s w e are t a k i n g t o reduced e f en s e e x p e n d i t u r e s The i m p e r i a l i s ti d e o l o g i s t s s h o u t a l o t a bo ut t h e S o v i e tU ni on 's b e i n g a l l e g e d l y f o r c e d t o reducearmaments and armed f o rc e s becau se ofdifff i c u l t i e s i n economic development.Attempts are a l s o b e i ng made t o advance

a t h e o r y about t h e S o v i e t U ni on 's b e i n gu na b le t o d e v e l op i t s economy ands t r e n g t h e n i t s d e f e n s e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,because i t is unab le t o compete wi thc a p i t a l i s m s u c c e s s f u l l y . A l l t h e s eare , n a t u r a l l y , f a b r i c a t i o n s . Theyshow t h a t t h e opponents of soc ia l i smare v e r y worried by th e tempestuous de-velopment of th e So vi e t Union and t h es o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s and by t h e f a c t%hat s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s h av e nowcreated armed f o r c e s e q ua l- -a s h a sbeen a d m i t t e d by t h e leaders of t h eimper i a l i s t powers - - to t h e f o r c e s of

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t h e c a p i t a l i s t w o rl d. And w e b e l i e v e

t h a t o u r armed f o r c e s are more power-f ul. (emphas i s suppl ied)

One conspicuous con t r a s t wi th ghrushchev 's 1960e f f o r t f o l lo w ed i n t h e wake o f h i s l a t e s t budgetary pro-po sa ls . Whereas i n 1960 abundant propaganda sup po r t hadb ee n g i v e n t o t h e manpower and budget c u t pr opos a l ,KhrushchevDsDecember 1963 and February 1964 pro po sa lsw e r e g ive n m in im al a t t e n t i o n i n t h e S o v i e t media. (Thel e a d i n g S o v i e t m a rs h a ls r em ai ne d s i l e n t on t h e manpowerr e d u c t i o n s u g g e s t i o n . )

s i l e n t on t h e c hanges i n a nd r e p o r t e d l i m i t e d t r oop w i th -drawals f rom the GSFG i n t h e s u m m e r of 1964.

. The t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s i n 1 9 6 3 and 1 9 64 made i t c l ea r

And open Sovie t sources remained

t h a t t h e y d i d not accep t Khrushchev*s new ra t i on a l e f o rt h e t r oo p c u t , and they argued w i t h e q u a l v i g o r t h a tu nd er t h e o b t a i n i n g c o n d i t i o n s ( i . e . , " w i l d men" i n t h eU.S., f a s c i s t s a n d r e v a n c h i s t s in t h e FRG, e t c . ) , " theSo vi e t Union and t h e people s of t h e commonwealth ofs o c i a l i s t n a t io n s are compelled t o s t r e n g t h e n in everyway t h e de fe ns e po t e n t i a l of t h e s o c i a l i s t camp, and t osee t o i t t h a t t h e i r armed fo rces are a lways k e p t i n com-

b a t r e a d i n e s s c a p a b l e of d e a l in g r e t a l i a t o r y blows t oany aggressor" (Marshal Botmis t rov , 20 February 1964TASS inlterview on A r m e d For c e s D ay). S im i l a r l y , pa c tcommandqr Grechk o i n h i s 8 July 1964 Kremlin sp eechargued t h a t " it is ne c e s s a r y t o s t r e n g t h e n e ve n f u r t h e r

the de f e ns ive pow e r of t h e S o v i e t s t a t e and t o see t o '

it t h a t , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e armies o f t h e o t h e r s o c i a l i s tc o u n t r i e s , o u r armed forces are ready a t any moment t od e a l a c r u s h i n g r e p u l s e t o t h e im pe r A a l i s t a gg r e s s o r s I 1

While appa rgn$ly re je c t i n g Khrushchev' s eva lua -t i o n o f t h e a l l i e d c o n t r ib u t i o n , c e r t a i n l e a d i ng marshalsn e v e r t h e l e s s r e g a r d e d t h e s t r e n g t h e n e d a l l i ed a rmies asa p o i n t in f a v o r of the combined a s m s school of t hough t .Pact commander Grechko m a d e i t c l e a r t h a t f u t u r e w a r p l a n sfor t h e European t h e a t e r would be d r a f t e d w i t h s c e n a r i o so u t l i n i n g n u c l e a r an d c o n v e n t i o n al p a c t o p e r a t i o n s :'

-20-A



The g r e a t im por ta nce of t h e j o i n t e xe r -

c i s e s l i e s a l s o i n t h a t t h e y h av e beenc onduc ti ve t o t h e f u r t h e r g r o w t h of com-ba t might of o u r J o i n t A r m e d For c e s ,h i g h e r s t a n d a r d s of m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g ,be t te r c o o r d i n a t i o n of t a s k f o r c e s , ands t a f f s , e l ab o ra t io n of common views onnuc lear and conve nt ion al war far e methods.(Grechko interview w i t h a N ovos t i P r e s sAgency correspondent, 27 Februa ry 1964Novosti Supplement)

S o v i e t t h i n k i n g on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n ve n ti on al w a ri n t he European t hea te r had r e c e i v e d s u r p r i s i n g l y l i t t l ea t t e n t i o n in op en and c l a s s i f i e d m i l i t a r y discourse ,a lt ho ug h a t f i r s t g l an ce t h i s would seem t o be a l o g i c a largument f o r t h e S ov ie t t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s t o emphasize.I n t h e c l a s s i f i e d 1960-62 deba t e , t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i s t sgave no i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s i n E uropecould be c a r r i e d o u t by conve nt ion a l fo rc es a lone . AndGrechko's b r i e f remark (above) reg ard in g pa c t conven t ionalexercises d i d n ot r e f l e c t t h e s c e n ar i o s of v i r t u a l l y e ve ryp a c t t h e a t e r exercise--the theater fo r ce maneuvers havebeen a lmos t exc lus ive ly nuc lea r -or i en ted . The nuc l e a ro r i e n t a t o n of t h e exe rc i se s , however , has ca l l ed f o rr e s t r a i n e d n u c l e a r t a r g e t i n g - - r a t h e r t h a n 8 West Europeanho loc a us t as c a l l e d f o r in Khrushchev's sc ho ol of thought--a nd f o r a f o r c e s t r u c t u r e of high speed, maneuverablecombined arms equipment to se i ze i m po r ta nt t a r g e t s . I n

s h o r t , p a c t p l a n n i n g h a s been based on both nuc lea r andc o n v e n t io n a l o p e r a t i o n s , r a t h e r t h a n on one or t h e o t h e r ,and t h u s combined opera t ions a re g ive n t h e g r e a t e s t a t -t e n t ion.

*The few S o v i e t m i l i t a r y writers t h a t h a v e expressedp r e f e r e n c e f o r a t l e a s t a non-nuc lea r s ta ge i n a Europeanwar have s topped shor t of e x p l i c i t l y a s se r t in g t h a t s u c h.a war could remain non-ncclear .

-21-



.

h a s i d e n t i f i e d hi ms e lf w i t h a 1 9 6 5 m i l i t a r y b u d g e t c u tof 500 m i l l i o n r u b l e s ,* and Br ez hn ev h a s i d e n t i f i e d him-s e l f w i t h a f i v e - y e a r 71 b i l l i o n r u b l e a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o -gram which might inv olv e d i r e c t comp et i t ion between th ep r o d u c t i o n o f a g r i c u l t u r a l equipment (such as t r a c t o r s )and conven t i ona l m i l i t a r y weaponry ( such as t a n k s ) . (HOW-ev er , Brezhnev 's speech did n o t c o n t a i n a word on defense . )The manpower i s s u e h a s been i n d i r e c t l y n ot ed ; t h e s e r v i c et e r m f o r l ow er e c h e l o n m i l i t a r y p e r s o nn e l w i t h h i g h e re d u c a t i o n has been sh arp ly r educed , and decreased m i l t a r ymanpower l e v e l s planned under Khrushchev have been c la imedby one Sov ie t mar sha l . **

But w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f a f e w piece-meal movesi n t o t h e r e s o u rc e a l l o c a t i o n i s s u e , t h e new leader sh ip

h a s n ot c l e a r l y addre s sed i t s e l f t o q u e s t io n s of m i l i t a r ys t r a t e g y w hich d i r e c t l y r e l a t e t o t h e European t h e a t e r .N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e n u c l e a r c r u s h v e r s u s t h e combined armso p e r a t i o n i n Eu ro pe are s t i l l t r ea t ed as a c o n t r o v e r s i a li s s u e by Sov ie t m i l i t a r y spokesmen a While Khrushchev'sviews on t h e European n u c l e a r war have not y e t beenchampioned by t h e n e w p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p , t h e t r a d i -t i o n a l i s t v ie ws ha ve b een f r e q u e n t l y r e s t a t ed by t h e m i l i -t a r y l eader sh ip , who have genera l ly s u b s t i t u t e d the theme

of " m a s s , m u l t - m i l l ion armies" w i t h a p p e a l s for h i g hspeed, maneuverable combined a r m s equipment capable off i g h t i n g a l a n d war i n Eu ro pe u n de r n u c l e a r c o n d i t i o n s .The mass armies theme has not been dropped, however , anda t l e a s t o ne l e a d i n g m i l i t a r y sp ok es ma n h a s r e c e n t l y

-*Unlike Khrushehev's December 1963 and Febru ary 1964

manpower and budge t c u t f o r m u l a s , Kosygin d i d no t men t iont h e E a s t European fo rces in t h e c o n t e x t o f h i s r e d u c e dd e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e p r o p o s a l s on 9 and 11 December 1964a t t h e Supreme Soviet .

**Marshal Sokolovsky a t a press confe rence on F e b r u a r y17, 1965 gave 2.423 m i l l i o n as the n u me ri ca l s t r e n g t h of

t h e S o v i et A r m e d F o r c e s . (TASS and MQSCOW r a d i o , 17February 1965.) In a c u r i o u s " r e b u t t a l , M ars ha l R o t m i s t ro v

t o l d a U . S . a t tache at a 4 J u n e F i n n i s h Army Day celebra-t i o n t h a t SokolovskyQs f i g u r e was too l o w and shou ld no tbe a c c e p t e d .

k-23-

I I



a s s e r t e d t h a t s u pe r i o r i t y i n manpower is a c o n s i d e r a t i o nf o r a ny k ind of war. Malinovskg s t a t e d a t a 14 May 1965speech a t a Moscow meeting celebrating t h e 10th annive r -s a r y of t h e p a c t t h a t : " I r r e s p ec t i v e of whether war isto be waged with the use of nuclear weapons or withoutthem, w e are convinced t h a t t h e s u pe r i o r i t y i n manpowerand- mater ia l w i l l be on o u r s i d e . "

The s o lu t i on o f t h e l ong- st a nd ing de ba te on t h en a t u r e of a f u tu r e Eur opea n war w i l l have important impli -c a t i o n s f o r t h e f u tu r e m i s s ions and f o r c e s t r u c t u r e oft h e E a s t European a r m i e s , and t h e S o v i e t forces s t a t i o n e di n E a s t Europe a I f , for e xa mple p t h e Sov i e t l e a d e r s h i pr a i s e s i t s assessment of t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of the modernized

a l l i e d f o r c e s a nd /o r a dop t s a Khrushchevian view of n u c l e a rw a r i n Europe, t h e n a s s t a n t a l redeployment of S o v i e tforces from E a s t Europe

i t may be s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e newly appointed commanderof t h e S o v i e t t r o o p s i n E a s t Germany, General Koshevoy,expresse d c e r t a i n IChrushchevian views a t a t i m e when th e"mass armies" theme was most loudly proc la imed by t h eSo vi et hi gh command. Gen eral Koshevoy wrote i n t h e

, t h i r d t o p s ec r e t 1 9 61 i s s u e of Mi l i ta ry Thought ( sen t t ot h e p r e s s on 10 Ju ly 1961-- i .e . , two days a f t e r Khrushchevannounced, with l i t t l e e n thus ia s m, t h e s us pe ns ion of h i s1960 troop anti budget cut pr opos a l ) t h a t "due t o t h eh i g h e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e nu c l e a r -m i s s i l e weapon, a f r o n tcan now f u l f i l l i t s t a s k s in a n o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n w i t ha g r e a t l y reduced number of f o r c e s and c o nv e n ti o an l f i r emeans." A g r e a t l y reduced number of S o v i e t f o r c e s w a s

~~~Vmrrrtars*ou A i 1 b U A J

-24-

+=



I I

announced by Marshal Soko lovsky w it hi n a few weeks of

Eoshevoy's GSFG appointment. And i n h i s 17 Februaryannouncement, Sokolovsky-- immed iately af t e r re i t e s a t n gt h e s t a n d a r d S o v i e t t h r e a t o f u n d i s cl o s e d c o un t er m ea su re st o p o s s i b l e NATO n u c l e a r s h a r i n g p r o p o s al s - -a s s er t e d t h a t"w e s h a l l gladly wi thdraw o u r troops from t h e t e r r i t o r yof Hungary, Poland, and t h e GDR i f t h e Western powersannounce t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o f o l l o w our example. "*it may be s i gn i f i c a n t t h a t t h e common Sov ie t f o r m u la t i onof countermeasures to NATO n u c l e a r p l a n s h a s , on at l e a s tone pu b l i c oc c a sion , no t be en couched i n p u r p o se f u l lyvagae language. Pa ct commander Grechko a t a 1 4 MayKreml in recept ion t h i s yea r made t h e unprecedented publ icmention of " t h e j o i n t n uc le ar ** f o r c e of t h e Warsaw Pac t . "While s u ch a f o r c e ( i f i t a c t u a l l y e x i s t s ) would m o s t

l i k e l y be t i g h t l y c o n t ro l l e d by t h e S o v i et s , t h e f a c t t h a tj o i n t n u c l e ar e f f o r t s h av e b een g i v e n a somewhat mores p e c i f i c form, p l u s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Janua ry 1965 pac tmeet ing was a l l e g e d l y c a l l e d t o d i s c u s s measures a g a i n s tt he f o r m a t ion o f a NATO m u l t i l a t e r a l n u c l e a r f o r c e , mays u g g e s t t h a t a n e v e n grea te r Soviet nuclear commitmentt o d ef en d Ea s t E u r o p e r e p r e s e n t s a n e f f o r t t o l a y t h efounda t ion (or i n t h i s c a s e , a s t r e ng the ne d " nuc l e a rs h i e l d " ) f o r f u t u r e Sov ie t troop w i t h d r a w a l s . OP a s

Fina l , l y ,

*In h i s unusual 4 June " r e b u t t a l " of Sokolovsky's 17

February manpower f i g u re , Rstnnis&rov re po r t ed ly added t h a tEurope w a s a h o s t ag e t o S o v i e t l a n d f o r c e s and t h u s i tw a s f o o l i s h t o t h i n k t h a t t h e Sovie t ground forces i nEurope w o u l d be reduced. Rotmis trov, i n a vein somewhatsimilar t o t h a t of Malinovsky's 14 May remark ( c i t e d

e a r l i e r ) , commented t h a t t h e Sovie t Union was a c o n t i n e n t a lpower w it h t h e c a p a b i l i t y of t ak ing Europe i n 60-90 days ,w i t h or without nuclear weapons .

**The word "nuclear" appeared in both the TASS Eng l i s hand Russ ian accounts of G r e c hkovs r e ma r ks ; c u r i ous l y ,t he R us s i a n word f o r "armed"--ra thes th an "nuclear" --a ppe ar ed i n Red S t a r ' s ve r s ion of G Y X X ~ ~ Q ' semark.--

-25-



Genera l Koshevoy reasoned i n 1961, th e S ovi e t rocke t -n u cl ea r e f f o r t w i l l m i t i g a t e t h e ne ed f o r t h e l a r g eS o v i e t , c o n v e n t io n a l f o r c e At any r a t e , w e have noc o n c r e t e e v i d e n c e of Sovi e t t r oo p redeployment f rom E a s tEurope s i n c e Khrushchev' s ous t e r .

Meanwhile, the s a t e l l i t e moderniza t ion programha s ra p i d l y advanced . The e a r l i e r l*temporaryl l asp ectof t h e p a c t o f f e n s i v e mo d er n iz at io n e f f o r t h a s a p p a r e n t l yg i v e n way t o a r e e qu ipm e n t po l i c y be a r ing t he m a r ks ofa more ne a r ly "Qermanent" na tu re . And ge ne ra l ly unl i ket h e pre-1961 p o li cy , now i n m o s t instances when modernS o v i e t t a c t i c a l weaponry becomes a va i l ab le i n t h e S o v i e tU nion , pa c t na t i o na l forces r e c e ive t he Sov i e t im pr ove -m en ts i n t h e same t i m e p e r i o d . I n a d d i t i o n t o t he c on -t i n u i n g m o de rn i za ti on p o l i c y , c e r t a i n i n d i c a t i o n s of ane l ev a te d s t a t u s f o r t h e p ac t have emerged. For example,Marshal Grechko a t t h e 1 96 5 p a c t c o n s u l t a t i v e m e e ti n gw a s i d e n t i f i e d by TASS (19 January) as t h e "SupremeCommander of t h e J o i n t Warsaw Pa c t A r m e d Forces' ' ; a tt h e l a s t p a c t c o n s u l t a t i v e me et in g ( J u l y 1963) h e w a si d e n t i f i e d o n l y as "commander i n chief .'' I n a d d i t i o nto h i s W a r s a w Pact Job , Grechko h a s a ppa r e n t l y be e ngiven command of t h e So vi e t Ground Fo rces . The E a s tEur opea n p r e s s s i n c e t h e coup h a s on oc c a s ion refer red

t o t h e " J o i n t Supreme Command" of t h e p ac t; ea r l i e rr e f e r e n c e s ref erred t o t h e " J o i n t Command

W hile g en er .a l c o n t i n u i t y i n p a c t m i l i t a r y d e ve lo p -

ments h as b een r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e p o s t c ou p p e r i o d , s e v e r a ls i g n s of wha%may be a growing East European voice inp a ct policy-mak ing have marked t h e a f f a i r s of t h e p a c t .To l i s t a few unprecedented developments , t h e Janua rymee t ing was not used by Moscow as a f o r um f o r t h e pre-s e n t a t i o n of S o v i e t p o l i c y , i t was not even ca l l ed byMoscow ( K os yg in ope n ly s t a t e d tha$ t h e meeting w a s h e l da t Ulbrichtgs i n s i s t e n c e ) , and t h e 20 January p a c t com-

'munique d i d not l i s t t h e d e l e g a t i o n s a t t e n d i n g t h e meet-i n g ( t h u s for t h e f i r s t time l e a v i n g o p e n t h e q u e s t i o nof who a c t u a l l y s ig n ed t h e document) . And s i n c e t h ef a l l of Khrushchev s igns of Rumania 's app a ren t ly de c l i n-i n g i n t e r e s t i n pact membership have been a i r ed w i t hsome frequency.

-26-



W ith t h e p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n of Rumania, a n a t i o nl e f t p l a i n l y o u ts i de t h e p a c t ' s I ' f i r s t s t r a t e g i c e ch elo n"(a t e r m r e c e n t l y c oin ed by Czech and GDR m i l i t a r y spokes -

;men t h a t seems t o f o l lo w t h e 1 9 6 3 ' 'Quartet" c o n c e p t ) , t h e* ' s l a c k e n i n g of p o l i t i c a l t i e s w i t hi n t h e p ac t i n t h e p a s t

f e w years h a s had s u r p r i s i n g l y l i t t l e e f f e c t on p o l i c yr e l a t i n g t o p u r e ly m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s . And s t r a t e g i c p la n-n i ng on t h e European war, a s w e po i n t ed ou t e a r l i e r , h a sremained an a l m os t exc l u s i ve S ov i e t p re roga t i ve t h rough -o u t t h e t e n y e a r s of t h e p a c t ' s e x i s t e n c e , e v en t ho ug ht h e non-Soviet fo r c e s have grown from weak, poosly-equipped-and-organized home defense units t o highly-t ra ined, moder-n i ze d and s t r e am l i n ed m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . Today, t h i s .preroga t ive- -perhaps the l a s t po l i c y domain t o be dominatedby th e S ov ie ts i n East Europe--may be moving from t h ec l o s e d c o n t r o l o f t h e S o v i e t p l a n n e r s t o t h e more opent a b l e s of W a r s a w P a c t c o u n c i l s . I n short , what may be

MOSCOW'S l o o s en i n g g r i p i n m i l i t a r y p l a nn i ng m ig ht b e asomewhat b e l at e d r e f l e c t i o n of Moscow's e a r l i e r diminut ionof p o l i t i c a l and economic dominance i n E a s t Europe. How-

e v e r , w e c a n no t j ud ge t h e e x t e n t o f t h e r u mb li ng s of E a s tEuropean i n f lue nce on p a c t mil i t a ry po l i cy-making . I tseems r e a s o n a b l e t o a s s u m e ' t h a t shou l d t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i cl a c k of d i re c t i o n from t h e new Krem li n l e ad e r s h i p d ra go n, and p a r t i c u l a r l y s h ou ld t h e new l e a d e r s h i p f a i l t obr i ng fo rw ard a comprehens4.ve m i l i t a r y s t ra t e g y , t h e w e l l -armed E a s t European na t i on s may w e l l have an oppo r t un i t yt o shape- pa c t s t rat egy--and th us t o c o nv e rt t h e p ac t i n t o

a c o nv e nt io n al m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e .

caesar 39 - warsaw pact military strategy: a compromise in soviet strategic thinking

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