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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the War Cabinet. May 1940.

S E C R E T . Copy No .

W.M. (40) 132nd Conclusions.

T O B E K E P T U N D E R L O C K A N D K E Y .

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

W A R C A B I N E T 132 (40 ) .

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, May 21, 1940, at 11-30 A.M.

P r e s e n t : The R i g h t Hon . W I N S T O N S. C H U R C H I L L , M.P . , P r i m e Minis ter (in the Chair).

The R i g h t Hon . N E V I L L E CHAMBERLAIN, The R i g h t Hon. C. R. A T T L E E , M . P . , M.P . , Lord P r e s i d e n t of the Council . L o r d P r i v y Seal.

The R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T H A L I F A X , The R i g h t Hon. A. GREENWOOD, M.P . , Secre tary of S t a t e for Fore ign Min i s te r wi thou t Por t fo l io . Affairs.

The following were also p r e s e n t : The R i g h t H o n . A . V . A L E X A N D E R , The R i g h t Hon . A N T H O N Y E D E N , M.P . ,

M.P . , F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y . Secre tary of S t a t e for W a r . The R i g h t H o n . Si r A R C H I B A L D The R i g h t Hon . Si r J O H N A N D E R S O N ,

SINCLAIR, Bt. , M.P . , Secre tary of M.P . , Secre tary of S t a t e for t he S t a t e for A i r . Home D e p a r t m e n t a n d Min i s te r of

Home Securi ty . The R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T CALDECOTE, The R i g h t Hon. A . D U F F COOPER, M.P . ,

Secre tary of S t a t e for Dominion Minis te r of In format ion . Affairs.

The R i g h t H o n . L O R D H A N K E Y , The R i g h t Hon . L O R D BEAVERBROOK, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancas t e r Min i s te r for A i r c r a f t P r o d u c t i o n (Items 7 and 11). (Item 13).

The Hon . S i r A L E X A N D E R CADOGAN, A i r Chief Mar sha l Si r C Y R I L L . N . P e r m a n e n t Under -Sec re ta ry of S t a t e N E W A L L , Chief of the A i r Staff. for Fore ign Affairs.

A d m i r a l of the Fleet S i r D U D L E Y General S i r W. E D M U N D I R O N S I D E , P O U N D , F i r s t Sea L o r d a n d Chief of Nava l Staff.

ChiefStaff.

of the I m p e r i a l Gene ra l

Secretariat.

Si r E D W A R D B R I D G E S . Major -Genera l H . L. I S M A Y . Mr . W . D . W I L K I N S O N . Lieutenant-Colonel V . D Y K E S , R . E . Mr . E . P . DONALDSON. Mr . G. N. F L E M M I N G .

f213201 B

W A R C A B I N E T 132 (40 ) .

CONTENTS. Minute

No. Subject. Page 1 The W e s t e r n F r o n t and A i r Opera t ions 201

Progress of operations on the Western Front. Air operations over France and Belgium. Air attacks on enemy ships.

2 The Nava l S i tua t ion . . . 203

3 N o r w a y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 Operations at Narvik.

4 The Ne the r l ands 204 Accommodation for the Netherland Government.

5 I t a l y 204 Possible attack on Yugoslavia.

I t a l y 204 Possible intentions.

I t a l y 205 Possible plan for blocking the Suez Canal.

U .S .S .R 205 Suggested despatch of a special envoy to Moscow.

9 S p a i n . . . 205 Proposal for economic assistance.

10 Nethe r l and E a s t Ind ies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 Japanese policy.

11 Demoli t ions in Nor the rn French por t s a n d in Belg ium .... 206 Calais and Boulogne. Ghent and Bruges.

12 Invas ion of G r e a t B r i t a i n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 Possibility of seaborne and airborne attack.

1 3 A i r c r a f t P roduc t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 14 T h e Ne the r l ands and Belgium 209

Reception of war refugees.

The Western Front and Air Operations. Progress of the operations on the Western Front. (Previous Eef erence: W.M. (40) 131st Conclusions, Minute 1.)

1. The Prime Minister sa id t h a t the Chief of the I m p e r i a l Genera l Staff, who h a d j u s t r e tu rned from Flanders , would give the W a r Cabine t his app rec i a t i on of the presen t s ta te of affairs on the W e s t e r n F ron t . Genera l I rons ide h a d h a d a n a r r o w escape the previous n i g h t when h is hotel at Ca la i s h a d received a d i rect h i t from a G e r m a n bomb.

T h e P r i m e Min i s t e r sa id t h a t the s i tua t ion was more favourable t h a n ce r t a in of the more obvious symptoms would indicate . The most dangerous of these symptoms w a s t h a t a German a rmoured column, which h a d been repor ted in s t r eng th at Amiens , h a d now entered Abbeville, a n d held t h a t town. Anothe r a rmoured column h a d been seen pas s ing Frevent . I t was probably m a k i n g for Boulogne. Two ba t t a l ions of G u a r d s were being sent to Boulogne in destroyers in o rde r to hold t h a t town aga ins t the German column.

O u r forces s t i l l enjoyed an overwhelming super ior i ty of numbers in th i s t h e a t r e of opera t ions . W e must now be ready to fight h a r d u n d e r open w a r f a r e condi t ions.

T h e Germans h a d probably left very small forces, if any, behind to hold the towns t h r o u g h which they h a d passed. Cambra i was believed to be prac t ica l ly empty of Germans . W e had held A r r a s , a l though G e r m a n a rmoured fighting vehicles were repor ted on all the roads round the town. T w o B r i t i s h divisions were now ope ra t ing in th i s t hea t r e to the south and west of A r r a s ; i t was hoped t h a t a t h i r d divis ion would jo in them t h a t day.

The Chief of the I m p e r i a l Genera l Staff h a d found Genera l Bil lot te , who was in command of the F rench left, in a s ta te of indecision, b u t h a d ga lvanised h im in to g iv ing orders for a counter­a t t ack sou thwards from the Doua i -Va lenc iennes area, in which he had some e igh t F r e n c h divisions at h i s disposal. There seemed no reason why the counte r -a t tack should not resul t in r e t ak ing Cambra i . Genera l W e y g a n d was v i s i t ing F lande r s t h a t day a n d would see both L o r d Gor t a n d Genera l Bi l lot te .

The Secretary of State for War r ead an exchange of te legrams w i t h L o r d Gor t .

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in the course of a. s ta tement r e p o r t i n g the resul ts of h is vis i t to F landers , b rought o u t the fol lowing po in t s :—

(i) Indecis ion had re igned in t he F rench H i g h Command i n the n o r t h un t i l the a r r i v a l of General Weygand and himself. Genera l Bi l lo t te was express ing the gloomiest forebodings, bu t was doing noth ing . H e had failed to c a r r y ou t h is dut ies of co-ordinat ion for the last e igh t days, a n d appea red to have no plans . H e (General I rons ide) h a d complained on the telephone to Genera l W e y g a n d , who had spoken sharp ly to General Bil lot te .

(ii) H e believed t h a t there was no th ing wrong wi th the French t roops themselves in F landers . The Br i t i sh E x p e d i ­t i ona ry Force were in very good hear t , a n d ready for t he fight. They h a d seen prac t ica l ly no fighting so far a n d the i r t o t a l casual t ies in the field were only of the order of 500. On one occasion our men h a d deal t very effectively w i t h a low-flying a t t ack by German a i r c r a f t ; they h a d brought down n ine of the enemy w i t h the i r Bren guns , a n d the low-flying a t t ack had thereupon ceased.

On the whole, our own H i g h Command were s t a n d i n g u p well to the s i tua t ion , a l though one or t w o changes h a d been made among the corps and divis ional commanders .

(iii) One of our p r i nc ipa l difficulties was the s ta te of our lines of communicat ion.of communicat ion.

These were crossed by French I n any event, all the roads on

lines both

[21320] ' B 2

l ines were filled w i t h h u n d r e d s of thousands of refugees from Belg ium and the no r the rn F rench towns. The crowds on the roads included some s t r agg le r s from the D u t c h Army . T h e wors t f ea tu re w a s the confusion in the towns th rough which these roads passed,

(iv) The first t h ing to be done, in order to get a g r i p on the s i tua t ion south and west of A r r a s , w a s to clear the towns of refugees, to block ent rances to the towns and to hold them w i t h our troops. Once we h a d occupied in th i s way such nodal po in t s as Doullens, Frevent , St. Pol , A l b e r t a n d Bapaume, we should have gone a long way t o w a r d s se t t l ing the problem of the G e r m a n a rmoured columns which h a d t aken us in the rear . Some of the towns he h a d ment ioned were not, s t r ic t ly speaking, in the B .E .F . sector, but th i s w a s no t ime for s t and ing on ceremony.

(v) The nex t s tep would be to deal w i t h t he G e r m a n a rmoured columns themselves. Very quick act ion would be necessary; otherwise the Germans would receive con­siderable re inforcements by p a r a c h u t e a n d by t roop­ca r ry ing a i rc ra f t . A Br i t i sh force, consis t ing of both a rmoured fighting vehicles a n d i n f a n t r y would have to be collected a t once. The A r m o u r e d Division, which was on the way to the scene of opera t ions , m i g h t form the nucleus of such a force. Genera l Evans , i ts Commander , h a d landed a t H a v r e w i t h his staff, bu t t he first un i t s of the Division had h a d to be d iver ted to Cherbourg , owing to the recent a i r a t t ack on H a v r e .

(vi) The G e r m a n a rmoured columns probably consisted of medium tanks and motorised i n f an t ry . One of them h a d been observed pass ing a given po in t in about 25 minutes , a n d was es t imated to comprise some 5,000 or 6,000 troops.

(vii) The re were a cer ta in number of t roops in towns on the . . l ines of communicat ion, such as Abbeville, bu t

considerable forces were needed to hold u p a rmoured columns. Nevertheless, an t i - t ank guns were being sent out of the line to these forces in o rder t h a t they migh t es tabl ish blocks a t the ma in road junct ions ,

(viii) I n the confused fighting t h a t would be going on i t was very probable t h a t Genera l Georges would not have up - to -da te in format ion of t he enemy's movements. T h e normal l iaison channels th rough H e a d q u a r t e r s , B r i t i s h A i r Forces in F rance migh t not suffice to call u p a i r suppor t quickly aga ins t profitable t a rge t s for bombing by our a i r forces in the A m i e n s - A r r a s area .

The Prime Minister expressed the g r a t i t u d e of the W a r Cabine t to the Chief of the I m p e r i a l Genera l Staff for dea l ing so prompt ly and vigorously wi th the s i tua t ion in F rance . H e suggested t h a t the Chief of the Imper i a l Genera l Staff a n d the Chief of the A i r Staff should concert together a r r a n g e m e n t s for ensur ing t h a t p r o m p t and adequa te a i r suppor t could be provided to the opera t ions of our forces in the A m i e n s - A r r a s area .

Air operations The Chief of the Air Staff r epor ted t h a t a force of Blenheims over France and h a d car r ied out a t t acks on columns of a rmoured vehicles in t he Belgium. a rea A r r a s - C a m b r a i on the morn ing of the 20th May. Vi l lages

packed wi th t roops h a d been bombed and several burs ts h a d been observed on columns of t roops on the roads.

I n the af ternoon 23 a i rcraf t , heavily escorted by fighters, h a d a t tacked enemy columns in the a r ea A r r a s - B a p a u m e . One H u r r i c a n e h a d been lost, bu t one enemy a i r c r a f t h a d been shot down, and possibly another as well. Var ious successful a t t acks h a d been made aga ins t t r a n s p o r t and troops.

91 bombers had been o p e r a t i n g last n igh t . Enemy concentra­t ions in the C a m b r a i - L e C a t e a u - H i r s o n - V e r v i n s - S t . Quen t in a r ea h a d been a t t acked . T h e following places h a d been repor ted as full of t roops : Valenciennes, Fore t de Mormal , Vis , Fore t de Nouvion. No movement h a d been seen west a n d nor th of Aub igny . A pe t ro l convoy seemed to have been h i t near Nouvion, since h i g h flames a n d many explosions had been seen. A t r a i n h a d been h i t n e a r H i r s o n .

18 Blenheims h a d a t t acked columns in the area A u d e n a r d e ­G r a m m o n t - H a l . One column a mile and a half long h a d been a t t acked .

No repor t s h a d been received from the A i r Component or the Advanced A i r S t r i k i n g Force owing to t he i n t e r rup t ions of communica t ions wi th F rance .

E a r l y on the m o r n i n g of the 21st, an enemy column on t h e Amiens-Abbevi l l e road h a d been a t tacked. A squadron of fighters was o p e r a t i n g from K e n t over the Lens area .

Air attacks on A H u d s o n had bombed an enemy pa t ro l vessel 100 miles west enemy ships. of the H o r n s Reef a n d obta ined a direct hi t , leaving the sh ip in

a s ink ing condition. A force of 8 enemy motor torpedo boats 46 miles n o r t h of the Hook h a d also been a t tacked . A la ter reconnaissance had repor ted only 7 boats visible, a n d i t seemed likely t h a t one had been sunk by our a i rc ra f t . More a i r c r a f t h a d gone to t r y a n d make a fu r the r a t t ack on th is force. One of our a i r c r a f t w a s missing.

Six a i r c r a f t h a d ca r r i ed out mine- laying opera t ions . The oil t anks a t Ro t t e r dam, which had been left undes t royed

a n d were believed to conta in 11,000 tons of av ia t ion sp i r i t , h a d been successfully a t t acked d u r i n g the n igh t . L a r g e fires a n d explosions were seen.

The W a r C a b i n e t ­(i) Took note of the above s ta tements .

(ii) I n v i t e d the Chief of the I mpe r i a l Genera l Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff to ensure t h a t adequa te a r r a n g e ­ments were made for quickly answer ing calls for a i r suppor t in the a rea of the Br i t i sh E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force.

The Naval 2. The First Sea Lord r epor ted t h a t the cables between the Situation. E a s t Coast a n d Borkum and Norderney h a d all been cut . (Previous The blockships for t he Be lg ian p o r t s were a t 30 minu t e s ' notice. Bef erence: The Swedish sh ip Erik Frisell (5,066 tons) h a d been sunk by W M (40) 131st g u n f i r e by a U-boat 35 miles south-west of St. K i l d a on the morn ing

o f t n e 1 9 t i lConclusions, May. Minute 1 ) ' F r e n c h destroyer a n d two oilers had been sunk off D u n k e r q u e

in the r a i d d u r i n g the previous n igh t . There h a d been several a i r a t t acks on sh ipp ing in the Downs a n d the Channel , bu t l i t t le damage h a d resul ted.

De ta i l s were given of the a i r r a i d on H a v r e the previous n i g h t a n d of the damage caused.

The W a r Cab ine t took note of the above s ta tement .

Norway. Operations at Narvik. (Previous Eef erence: W.M. (40) 131st Conclusions, Minute 4.)

3. The Chief of Naval Staff sa id t h a t a petrol ca r r ie r a t N a r v i k h a d been bombed and destroyed by fire.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs r e fe r red to the pol i t ica l aspects of a fa i lure to t ake Narv ik . Te legrams h a d been sent to H i s Majes ty ' s represen ta t ives in Norway and Sweden to the effect t h a t the re was no need for them to discuss any fu r the r the

(PreviousReference:W.M. (40) 129thConclusions,Minute 3.)

The Netherlands. Accommodation for the Netherland Government. (Previous Reference: W.M. (39) 81st Conclusions, Minute 7.)

Italy. Possible attack on Yugoslavia. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 126th Conclusions, Minute 8.)

Italy. Possible intentions. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 131st Conclusions, Minutes 6 and 7.)

p roposa l for a cessation of host i l i t ies in N o r t h e r n Norway. I f a t t ime i t was found necessary, for m i l i t a ry reasons, to w i t h d r a w

from Norvik, th i s proposal might , a f te r all, prove valuable. H e therefore d id not propose to close the door on th is p roposa l u n t i l i t

a n v

e n how the s i tua t ion developed. w a s s e

The W a r Cabinet agreed w i t h the act ion proposed by the Fore ign Secretary.

4. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sa id t h a t the N e t h e r l a n d Fore ign Min i s te r h a d called on h im t h a t morn ing and h a d asked whether H i s Ma jes ty ' s Government would approve the es tabl ishment of the Ne the r l and Government in London, where they h a d obta ined suitable office accommodation. The Fore ign Secre tary h a d expressed his agreement w i t h th i s proposal , subject to the approva l of the W a r Cabinet .

The W a r C a b i n e t -Inv i t ed the Fore ign Secretary to confirm the provis ional approva l which he h a d given to the Ne the r l and Govern­ment to establ ish themselves in London .

5. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs d rew a t t en t ion to t e l eg ram No. 231 D I P P , da ted the 20 th May,' f rom H i s M a j e s t y ' s Ambassador in P a r i s , r epo r t i ng t h a t the F rench Government considered inoppor tune the declara t ion which we h a d suggested should be made in the event of an I t a l i a n a t t a ck on Yugoslavia . I t d id not seem possible to pursue the m a t t e r fu r the r a t the presen t moment otherwise t h a n by ask ing the T u r k i s h Government for the i r views.

The W a r Cabinet took note of th i s s ta tement .

6. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sa id t h a t S i r Pe rcy Lora ine was to see Count Ciano t h a t day, but t h a t he h a d no fu r ther informat ion as to the in tent ions of the I t a l i a n Govern­ment . W e had, however, now heard t h a t the I t a l i a n s were anxious to proceed w i t h the proposed discussions on con t raband policy.

The Prime Minister reminded the W a r Cabinet t h a t he h a d been propos ing to make a s ta tement t h a t af ternoon in the House of Commons on our policy in r ega rd to I t a ly . I n the l ight of the s i tua t ion as i t h a d developed, a n d in p a r t i c u l a r the Duce ' s reply to his personal message, he much doubted whe the r a s ta tement on the l ines proposed would serve any useful purpose , whi le i t m igh t well involve us in an unprofitable exchange.

The re was genera l agreement w i t h t h i s view.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sa id t ha t there w a s some reason to believe t h a t the I t a l i a n Ambassador in P a r i s h a d been told t h a t such a s ta tement was to be made . H e thought , however, t h a t we should have no difficulty in answer ing any quest ion as to why we had changed our-minds on the ma t t e r .

Italy. 7. The Chief of Naval Staff re fer red to the r epo r t t ha t an Possible plan for I t a l i a n a i r c r a f t ca r r i e r of 5,000 tons was short ly leav ing Tobruk, blocking the would pass t h r o u g h the Suez Cana l on the 25th M a y a n d would Suez Canal. reach M a s s a w a on the 27th May. I t was not a t all clear w h a t (Previous purpose th i s movement would serve, and i t w a s necessary to Eef erence: consider the possibi l i ty t h a t the a i r c r a f t ca r r i e r would be a very W.M. (40) 129th convenient sh ip w i t h which to block the Canal . A r m e d g u a r d s were Conclusions, placed on merchan t ships pass ing th rough the Cana l to prevent any Minute 5.) such action, b u t not on men-of-war.

I n the course of discussion, i t w a s suggested t h a t we m i g h t make enqui r ies of t he I t a l i a n Government , p u t t i n g to them blunt ly t h a t we h a d received th i s r epo r t of the i r in ten t ions . Also, t h a t a r r a n g e m e n t s should be made to enable the Cana l to be t empora r i ly blocked a t shor t notice if we w a n t e d to p l ay for t ime in r e g a r d to the passage of th i s a i r c ra f t - ca r r i e r .

The W a r C a b i n e t ­(i) Inv i t ed the Chief of Nava l Staff to endeavour to obta in

fu r the r detai ls , t h rough the Nava l A t t a c h e in Rome, in r e g a r d to the movements of th i s vessel,

(ii) I nv i t ed the F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y to ins t ruc t the Senior Nava l Officer in the Cana l Zone to get in to touch w i t h the local officials of the Suez Cana l Company, w i t h a view to a r r a n g i n g for a t empora ry blockage of the Canal , if i t should be required ,

(iii) I nv i t ed the Secre tary of S t a t e for Fore ign Affairs to exp la in the posi t ion to H i s Ma jes ty ' s Ambassador a t Rome, a n d to ascer ta in if he favoured a d i rect app roach to the I t a l i a n Government on th is mat te r .

U.S.S.R. 8. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said, w i th the S u ^ e s t e d des- Min i s t e r for Economic W a r f a r e , he h a d now seen S i r Stafford patch of a Cr ipps , and t h a t the l a t t e r h a d agreed to u n d e r t a k e the suggested special Envoy to Mission to Moscow on behalf of H i s Majes ty ' s Government . Moscow. H e h a d also seen M. Maisky, and h a d told him, in answer to

a(Previous question, tha t , while the Mission was in tended to be p r i m a r i l y Reference: concerned w i t h t r a d e mat te r s , S i r Stafford C r i p p s would have full W.M. (40) 129th l iber ty to discuss any other m a t t e r which m i g h t ar ise . Conclusions, M. Maisky h a d expressed himself as much pleased wi th the Minute 7.) ' suggestion, a n d h a d said t h a t he expected to receive a reply from

his Government in two or three days ' t ime. T h e W a r Cabine t took note of t h i s s ta tement .

Spain. 9. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, reminded the (Previous W a r Cabine t of the a r rangement s contemplated for p rov id ing References: Spa in , t h r o u g h P o r t u g a l , w i th economic ass is tance which it w a s W.M. (40) 131st hoped would help to prevent unsa t i s fac tory developments in Spa in . Conclusions, These a r r a n g e m e n t s h a d now been agreed wi th t h e D e p a r t m e n t s Minute 5, concerned. ' and 123rd Mr . Eccles of t he Min i s t r y of Economic W a r f a r e was r e t u r n i n g Conclusions, to P o r t u g a l on the following day, where he would see D r . Sa laza r Minute 12.). w i t h a view to p u t t i n g ma t t e r s in t r a in . Proposal for Cabine t took note of th i s s ta tement . T h e W a r

economic assistance.

Netherland East Indies. Japanese policy. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 127th Conclusions, Minute 6.)

Demolitions in Northern French Ports and in Belgium. Calais and Boulogne.

Ghent and Bruges. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 118th Conclusions, Minute 4.)

Invasion of Great Britain. Possibility of seaborne and airborne attack. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 116th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

10. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs d r e w a t ten t ion to te legram No. 795 from H i s Majes ty ' s Ambassador , Tokyo, r epo r t i ng as follows :—

A member of the Embassy Staff had been told in J a p a n e s e official q u a r t e r s t h a t the quest ion of the Ne the r l and Eas t Ind i e s could now be r e g a r d e d as settled, and t ha t , unless some other P o w e r intervened, t he J a p a n e s e fleet would not move south.

T h e W a r Cabine t took note of this s ta tement .

11 . The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster sa id t h a t d u r i n g the las t few days p lans had been worked Out a n d p r e p a r a ­t ions made for ca r ry ing out demolit ions in N o r t h e r n F r e n c h por ts . I n view of the menacing s i tua t ion wi th r e g a r d to Ca la i s and Boulogne, Nava l demoli t ion pa r t i e s h a d been organised a n d would be ready to sai l d u r i n g t h e course of the afternoon.

The Prime Minister t h o u g h t t h a t there was no immedia te r isk of t h e Germans occupying the F rench por ts in s t reng th .

The Secretary of State for War said t h a t two ba t ta l ions were being sent to Boulogne to deal wi th any German advanced forces which migh t manage to reach the por t .

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster sa id t h a t he h a d no informat ion as to whe ther demolit ions a t Ghent a n d Bruges had been or would be ca r r i ed out . These demoli t ions h a d been a responsibi l i ty of the F rench author i t ies , but the F rench t roops h a d been w i t h d r a w n from n o r t h e r n Belgium.

The Prime Minister suggested t h a t the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancas t e r should get in to touch w i t h A d m i r a l Keyes a n d invi te him to do every th ing possible to ensure t ha t the demoli t ions were effected.

The W a r Cabinet agreed : — (1) T h a t the demoli t ion pa r t i e s should proceed to Cala is a n d

Boulogne fo r thwi th . (2) T h a t the officer in command of the pa r t i e s should have

a u t h o r i t y to destroy any stores of petrol in these two por ts , if th i s course was necessary to deny them to the Germans .

(3) T h a t save as in (2), no demolit ions should be effected w i t h o u t ins t ruc t ions from the A d m i r a l t y .

12. T h e W a r Cabinet h a d before them a R e p o r t by the Chiefs of Staff Commit tee ,^ in collaborat ion wi th the M i n i s t r y of Home Securi ty, on Seaborne and Airborne a t t ack on the U n i t e d Kingdom ( W . P . (40) 153).

The Prime Minister suggested t h a t the W a r Cabine t should give the R e p o r t the i r genera l approval . H e did no t feel, however, t h a t every aspect of the problem h a d been covered and he though t t h a t fu r the r considerat ion should be given to the m a t t e r in t he following week in the l igh t of an apprec ia t ion which was being p repa red by officers of the three Services of t he possibil i t ies o f a t t ack looked a t from the enemy's po in t of view.

1

(Previous Eef erence: W.M. (40) 127th Conclusions, Minute 16.)

(Previous Eef erence: W.M. (40) Con­clusions 119 A, Minute 4.)

Supply of fire-arms.

1 d £

I n discussion, the following poin ts were ra ised :—

Fortifications. (1) The Lord Privy Seal re fer red to the absence of fortifications

ins ide th is country. I t m i g h t be desirable to establish s t rong poin ts a t a number of places to form centres of resis tance aga in s t t roops l anded from the air , u n t i l

. mobile t roops could be concentra ted to destroy them. The Secretary of State for War under took to follow

u p th is suggestion.

Arming of Police. (2) I n reply to a question, the Secretary of State for Home

Affairs and Minister of Home Security sa id t h a t the Commissioner of Met ropo l i t an Police, af ter full discussion wi th his Chief Super in tenden t s , was opposed to the a r m i n g of the Police. Only a small p ropor t ion of the Pol ice had been t r a i n e d in t h e use of fire-arms, and in the Commiss ioner^ view, p rov ided t h a t there was no shor tage of personnel who could be armed, the Police should be kep t for civil police work, of which there would be plenty, while the available a rms were issued to other­personnel.

(3) The Prime Minister w a s re luc tan t to accept the view t h a t the police should not be a rmed. I n many instances, foreign police forces car r ied a r m s ; a n d he though t t h a t the m a t t e r should be fur ther examined before any final decision was reached.

Supply of fire-arms. (4) The Secretary of State for War sa id tha t , a t the moment,

there were not sufficient rifles a n d pistols to a rm all the men who h a d volunteered. I t was suggested t h a t the quest ion of ob ta in ing fu r the r suppl ies of pistols and shotguns, by w i t h d r a w a l from p r i v a t e persons, should be considered.

Supreme authority in event of invasion. (5) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs asked whether

i t was qui te clear tha t , in the event of seaborne or a i r ­borne invasion, supreme a u t h o r i t y devolved on the mi l i t a ry au thor i t i es .

The Secretary of State for Home Affairs and Minister of Home Security sa id t h a t Regional Com­missioners were in the closest touch w i t h the Mi l i t a ry au thor i t i e s a n d i t was qui te clear tha t , in the event of invasion, the Mi l i t a ry au tho r i t i e s took command.

Defence of aerodromes and aircraft factories. (6) The Ijord President of the Council t hough t t h a t first

p r io r i t y should be given to the defence of aerodromes a n d a i r c r a f t factories, more especially the two vi ta l factories p roduc ing engines for our fighters.

The W a r C a b i n e t ­

(i) Gave general approva l to the repor t of the Chiefs of Staff ( W . P . (40) 153), and in p a r t i c u l a r gave covering approva l to the se t t ing u p of a Home Defence Execut ive,

(ii) Took note t h a t the problem of Defence aga ins t seaborne and a i rborne a t t ack was being made the subject of fu r ther intensive study, a n d t h a t "it would a g a i n be brought before Minis te rs in about a week 's t ime.

[21320] ' c

(iii) Asked t h a t ce r ta in aspec ts of the problem should be fu r the r examined as below :—

(a) The Secretary of S ta t e for W a r was asked to investi­ga te w h a t a r r a n g e m e n t s were being made for the es tabl ishment of s t rong po in t s in the a r e a s where a i rborne invasion was most likely to be a t tempted .

(ft) The Secretary of S t a t e for Home Affairs a n d the Min i s te r of H o m e Secur i ty was asked to consider fur ther , in consul ta t ion w i t h the Secre tary of S ta t e for W a r , whe ther the police should be a rmed.

(c) The Secretary of S t a t e for Home Affairs w a s asked to inves t iga te the possibi l i ty of supp lement ing the stocks of small a r m s avai lable to the au thor i t i e s by collecting sho tguns a n d pistols from pr iva te persons.

Aircraft 13. The Lord Privy Seal r epor ted to the W a r Cabine t t ha t Production. agreement h a d been reached on two out of the three po in t s which (Previous were remi t ted to h im for a r b i t r a t i o n a t the meet ing held on Reference: Sa tu rday , the 18th May. On the t h i r d poin t , r e l a t i ng to the supply W.M. (40) 127th of a i r c r a f t to Canada , the W a r Cabine t h a d before them Memoranda Conclusions by the Min i s t e r for A i r c r a f t P r o d u c t i o n a n d by the Secre tary of Minute 14.)' S ta te for A i r ( W . P . (40) 160 a n d 161).

The proposal was to wi thho ld the despa tch to C a n a d a of Anson and Ba t t l e a i r c r a f t to be used for the t r a i n i n g of pi lots , observers and a i r gunners . I t was a quest ion of weighing the advan t age of an immedia te add i t i on to our a i r s t r e n g t h in med ium bombers, aga ins t the prospect ive provision of p i lo ts as a long- te rm policy. There was no evidence t h a t o ther a i r c r a f t were avai lable to t ake the place of the machines proposed to be wi thhe ld . The a t t i t u d e of the Dominion Governments was likely to be unfavourab le to a cessation, a n d i t was i m p o r t a n t to m a i n t a i n a cont inuous supply of t r a ined flying personnel. I n these c i rcumstances , he h a d reached the con­clusion t h a t the comparat ively small a d d i t i o n to our a i r s t r eng th represented by the a i r c r a f t being despa tched to C a n a d a w a s insufficient to jus t i fy a t present the w i t h h o l d i n g of the delivery of these machines.

The following were the m a i n po in t s m a d e in the discussion : — (1) The Minister for Aircraft Production s ta ted t h a t he h a d t h a t

morn ing received a n u n d e r t a k i n g from Messrs. B r y a n Al len t h a t they could p roduce 100 Lycoming engines a mon th which were sui table for fitting to Ba t t l e s and Anson a i rc ra f t . H e suggested, therefore , t h a t the Rolls-Mer l in and Cheetah engines now fitted to these a i r f r ames should be taken out a n d fitted in to a i r f r ames now in reserve, bu t for which no engines were immediate ly available.

The Secretary of State for Air suggested t h a t th i s was a new proposal which he would gladly discuss w i t h the Minis te r .

(2) The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs po in ted out t h a t the A i r T r a i n i n g Scheme h a d been agreed w i t h the Dominion Governments of A u s t r a l i a , New Zea land and Canada . E lemen ta ry t r a i n i n g was ca r r i ed out in A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand, a n d more advanced t r a i n i n g in Canada . I f there w a s to be any g a p in the supply of a i r c ra f t for t r a i n i n g , we m i g h t have to ask the Dominion Governments to accept a modification of the agreed scheme.

(3) The Secretary of State for Air po in ted out t h a t there were a l ready 700 a i r c r a f t of the types in quest ion in store, for wh ich equ ipmen t would have to be found before the Ansons a n d Bat t les , due for despatch to Canada , could be r e a d a p t e d for opera t iona l use. I t was suggested t h a t the provision, for the Bat t les a n d Ansons due for despa tch to Canada , of the i tems of equipment which were in shor t supply, was likely to in ter fere w i t h the provision of equ ipment for more modern types.

(4) The Prime Minister sa id tha t Ba t t l e a i r c ra f t were being used on the f ront to-day, and t h a t they were likely to be increas ingly useful in the course of the next two months, if the enemy were to establish bases closer to the U n i t e d Kingdom, a n d were to obtain a foothold on the French coast. The types of a i r c ra f t now in quest ion were not those of the first efficiency, but if we ran short of the bet ter types it would be unwise to depr ive ourselves of the second-best in the l i fe-and-death s t ruggle which we m i g h t have to face in the next few weeks. Although, the number of machines involved was inconsiderable, he t hough t t h a t i t would be dangerous to send away from the coun t ry even a small number of a i rc ra f t , if they could be used for opera t iona l purposes in the near fu ture . The supply of pi lots , though of immense value, was remote in comparison wi th the needs of the moment, when the enemy appea red to be s t ak ing everyth ing on reach ing a quick decision. H e was therefore inclined to suspend the despatch of these a i r c r a f t u n t i l af ter the immedia te crisis, and felt confident t h a t the Dominions would u n d e r s t a n d the posit ion.

The W a r Cab ine t— Inv i t ed the Secre tary of Sta te for A i r to re-examine the posi t ion in consul ta t ion wi th the Min i s t e r of A i r c r a f t P roduc t ion , w i t h p a r t i c u l a r reference, t o — (a) the proposal t h a t Ba t t l e a n d Anson a i r f rames only

should be sent over, and Lycoming engines fitted in C a n a d a ;

(b) the quest ion whe ther opera t ional equipment could be made avai lable for the a i r c r a f t in question, w i thou t i n t e r f e r ing w i t h the supply of equ ipment to more modern types.

The M i n i s t e r s were invi ted to inform the Secretary of S ta te for Dominion Affairs of the conclusions reached.

The Netherlands 14. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sa id t h a t he and Belgium. h a d received an u r g e n t message from M. Corbin in r e g a r d to the Eeeeption of ass is tance which we h a d u n d e r t a k e n to give the French in dea l ing war refugees. w i t h the refugee problem. The French Government were anxious (Previous t h a t we should des igna te one person wi th whom they could establish Reference: contact a n d who would be responsible for co-ordina t ing the dut ies W.M. (40) 131st Q f a l l D e p a r t m e n t s in th i s ma t t e r . The Fore ign Secretary proposed Conclusions, t h a t the Chancel lor of the Duchy of Lancas t e r should u n d e r t a k e Minute 12.)' these dut ies .

T h e W a r Cabine t agreed to this proposal .

Richmond Terrace, S. W. 1, May 21 , 1940.