bushashia - notions of islam and the west in the us-libyan relationship

8/12/2019 Bushashia - Notions of Islam and the West in the US-Libyan Relationship

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The Fletcher School al Nakhlah Tufts University160 Packard Avenue Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA Tel: +1.617.627.3700

The Fletcher School Online Journal on Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Spring 2009

NotionsofIslamandtheWestintheUSLibyanRelationship:

AnHistoricalPerspective

FarahBushashia

INTRODUCTION

OhmyGod, they foundme, I dont knowhow,buttheyfoundme,franticallysputtersDr.Emmett Doc Brown, the eccentric inventor ofthetimemachinecarinRobertZemeckis highly successful1985 film Back to the Future,[Its] the Libyans!1AsAlanSilvestris background musiccrescendos,thecameracutstoaVolkswagenbusslowlyandsinisterly weaving down a

well

manicured,

deserted

backroad toward the emptyTwin Pines Mall parking lotwhere at 1:15AM theDoctorand his youngprotgMartytinker with the plutoniumpowered time machine.Suddenly the hatcoveredheadofanunnamed,swarthy,machinegunwielding Libyanemerges from the roof of thecareening bus asunintelligible, crazed Arabic words vaguelyincludingAllahpassbetweenhimandthe

driver, presumably verifying that the white

haired man in the lab coat and yellow rubbergloves is indeed the sameDocBrownwho tooktheir plutonium and provided them with anatomicbombconsistingoflittlemorethanpinball

machine parts! After an inordinatenumberofshots,DocBrown is takenfordeadandMartyhopsintothetimemachine car under hot pursuit fromthe Libyans who cannot manage toeliminate the unarmed witness astheyscreechinglycirclearoundtheJCPenney department store, cursingboth thedamnSovietgunand thedamnGerman car.2 Finally,Martyachieves the critical speed for timetraveland in thebright flashof lightthe Libyans lose control of theVolkswagen and dramatically crashinto a Fox Photo booth promisingonehourphotographdevelopmenttosuburbanCalifornianfamilies.

How did Libyans come tooccupy the position of archetypal

terrorist in this1985 film typecastingthem as unreasonable, unskilled and unable todefeat ordinary American citizens against abackdropofcontrastingsuburbanorderandcalmunfazedby foreignobjectsandpeople?Howdidan otherwise obscure Third World countrypreviously ruledby a pliant monarch come toconstituteamajorenemyof thepowerfulUnited

How did an otherwiseobscure Third Worldcountry previously

ruled by a pliantmonarch come toconstitute a major

enemy of the powerfulUnited States for over

twenty years,notwithstanding the

paradoxical portrayalof its terrorists as both

incompetent andthreats to national

security?

FarahBushashia,FletcherMALD2009,isasecondyear student concentrating on SouthwestAsia and

Islamic Civilization, and the United States, with a

particular interest inNorthAfricaandLibya.She is

alsoCoEditorinChiefofalNakhlah.


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Statesforovertwentyyears,notwithstandingtheparadoxical portrayal of its terrorists as bothincompetent and threats to national security?What factors were behind the US casting ofLibyan Leader Muammar alQadhafi in thefollowingsuccessiveroles:ingnuejuniormilitaryofficer turned head of state; ideologicallydriven

pariah bent on shaking up the internationalsystem by any means possible includingterrorism;dangerous andunstable MadDogofthe Middle East3 requiring armed response;globallyshunned despot seeking nuclear andchemical weapons willynilly as his countryseconomy and infrastructure, not to mentioncitizenry, crumbled; and, most recently, elderstatesman having seen the light andwanting toplay nicely in the international arenawith onlyoccasional recourse to diatribe and unsavory

allies? If Libyans were to make a cameo in amovie now, would it be as WesterndressedLibyan intelligence agents tipping off theWhiteHouse Situation Room in perfect English on asleekcellphoneastoOsamaBinLadens whereabouts in thespirit of thwarting commonenemyAlQaeda in theGlobalWaronTerror?

As the abovemetamorphosis in USLibyan

relations

suggests,

the

idea

of

an

overarching Islam versus theWest civilizational divide or acultural bias as the primarydriver of relations with Libyawould be difficult tosubstantiate. Steppingbackandconsidering Libya as an ArabandIslamiccountry,andtakinga panorama of US relations with other Islamiccountries, clearly religious affiliation andcivilizational identity do not hinder political

alliances.Forexample,theUnitedStateshasbeena staunch ally of the archconservative,antidemocratic guardiansof Islam, theKingdomof Saudi Arabia, since its inception, and enjoysmostly stable relations with the Jordanian andEgyptian client states as well. Until the 1979revolution, Iran numbered as a close ally of theUnitedStates. SaddamHusseinof Iraq rode the

roller coaster of overlapping and thendivergentinterests until finally he was forcibly removedfrompowerin2003.PervezMusharaffofPakistanconstituted another example of support, albeitfickle,foranIslamicheadofstate.

Yet despite the chiefly interestdrivenrelations with Islamic polities, a cultural bias

exists, selectivelymanifestduring timesof strife,more latent during times of cooperation, andvarying across countries. Media and publicopinion reveal such abias, as do films. But, towhatextentarebiasedviewsprimordial,heldbythe majority of Americans based on inherentperceptions of Islamic civilization, orinstrumental, stirred upby foreign policy elitesand fanned via the media to justify certainpolicies?Andas for the latelyeminentnotionofcivilizational divide, is this something pundits

proffer as an oversimplified heuristic tounderstandworldaffairsataparticular timeandplace, or does it evoke a fundamental, everpresent viewpoint only now taking the front

burner as international relationsprimarilytakeplaceinthemajorityMusliminhabited Third Worldgiven the denouement of theColdWar?Underwhatcircumstanceshasamajorworld religion, Islam, leaptto the forefront of international

political

problems,

and

what

accounts for the vastly differingtreatment of its leaders andfollowersovertime?

This paper seeks to explorecultural bias in the context ofchangingpoliticalrelationsbetweenthe United States and the Islamicstate of Libya. Periodization of the

relationship will be undertaken to illuminateamplification or downplaying of culturaldifferences in light of particular political

circumstances, as well as to address the abovequestionsofanessentializedcivilizationaldivide.Although Libya as such did not existbefore itsindependence in1951, thepaperwill lookat theinitialLibyanAmerican encounter as it occurredunder a different balance of power and priorconception of Islam. Themonarchy under KingIdris will also be covered as an era of near

Stepping back andconsidering Libya asan Arab and Islamic

country , and taking apanorama of US

relations wit h otherIslamic countries,clearly religious

affiliation andcivilizational identity do

not hinder politicalalliances.


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clientelisminrelations,quiteunlikethefollowingdecadesofQadhafisrule,whichwillbetreatedinthe restof thepaper. So, themain focuswillbewhenandunderwhatcircumstancesdorelationsebbandflowwithLibyaandhowdothesefluxesrelatetoculturalbias.

US-LIBYAN RELATIONS PRIOR TO QADHAFIS1969 COUP

Abalance of power favoring Tripoli and amoreworldly impression of Islam comprise thechiefdifferences of earlynineteenth centuryUSLibyanrelations.Atthispointintime,theUnitedStateslackedtheresourcestooutfitanavystrongenoughtowithstandtheBarbaryPiratesprimarilyassociated with Morocco, Algiers, Tunis andTripoli, and Congress could not afford to paycontinually the tribute demanded. Prior to

resortingtoarmedconflict,ThomasJeffersonandJohnJayhadgonetoLondontonegotiatewiththeTripolitanian Ambassador whooffered that, [i]twaswritten intheirKoranthatallnationswhichhad not acknowledged theProphet were sinners, whom itwas the right and duty of thefaithful to plunder and enslave;and that every mussulman thatwasslaininthiswarfarewassure

to

go

to

paradiseand

that

the

Devil aided his countrymen inthese expeditions, for they werealmost always successful.4 Thus, Tripoliwas aforce tobe reckonedwith: indeed theUSvictoryin the first Barbary War was proudlymemorialized in the famousMarineCorpHymnopeningwith, from the halls ofMontezuma tothe shores ofTripoli.5Despite theTripolitanianAmbassadors Islamicallyconstrued justificationfor exercise of worldly power, the US policydriver was avoiding the tribute and did notexcessively dwell on theMuslim nature of theadversary,and inaddition itwascontemporarilycommonplacetospeakofGodandtheDevil.

It is interesting to note that these IslamicBarbary States had a connotation of places ofmundanepleasureandlackedanyfundamentalistor ascetic imagery of today. The Barbary Coastbecameaworddescribing,apartofacitythatis

notorious for gambling dens and brothels andsaloons and riotous nightlife6 (later applied toraucousSanFranciscoduring the1848CaliforniaGoldRush).One could imaginepuritanicalNewEnglanders expressing indignation at thebawdylifestyles of the pirates and the North Africanregencies with their harems and comfort in

milkingadvantagesconferredbyworldlypower.What this suggests rather than a civilizationaldivide is common crosscivilizational perceptionconditionedby power realities. In otherwords,the decadence associated with a laterphasecivilizationisgenerallyrejectedonmoralgroundsby an earlierphase civilization. For example,shortlyafterQadhaficametopowerinwhatsomeconsider the first fundamentalist Islamicrevolution in the region, thenightclubsandbarsassociated with Western presence were closed

and, as an asidebut indicative of the extent towhich Western influence wasactively routed, in 1970, twentyfiveyoungmenwerearrested forcopyingtheBeatlesintheirqueerappearance as part of aninitiative to combat effeminateyouth.7 Yet instead of seeingQadhafis program as arising inresponse to feared Westernencroachment, a Deputy CIA

Director

precluded

the

possibility

of a worldview stemming frombeyondonesprimarycivilization,

and informedWashington that thesepurificationmeasuresoccurred,presumablyoutofdeferenceto Islamic fundamentalism, 8 therebyessentializing something that was actually verymuchaproductofthetimes.

Lastlywithregardtothisnineteenthcenturyskirmish,somehaveciteditastheopeningroundof a long relationship of discord. However,although Tripoli possessed cultural continuitywith presentday Libya, itwas not themodernnationstateof today.Moreover,after the secondBarbary War ended in 1816, a 165year era ofpeaceensueduntilthe1981GulfofSidraincidentinwhichtheUnitedStatesshotdowntwoLibyanfighter planes over a territorial conflict in theMediterranean.Relationsdulled to thepoint thattheUSEmbassyinTripoliwasclosedin1882due

It is interesting to notethat these Islamic

Barbary States had aconnotation of placesof mundane pleasure

and lacked anyfundamentalist orascetic imagery of

today.


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toinactivity,asitsmaindutiesconsistedofraisingtheAmerican flagon IndependenceDay andonthe anniversary of the Battle of New Orleans.9Therefore, the recent ideaofongoing, intractableconflict likely serves as an explanation formorecontemporary clashes. For example, whenQadhafis son recently wrote that, Libyan

schoolchildrenlearnthatourfirstencountercamein 1800, when American warships entered ourharbors to bombard Tripoli and Derna,10 hedescribedmoretheQadhafiannarrativeofLibyannationalhistory.Infact,intheaftermathoftheUSattacks on Libya in 1986, Libya came out withpostage stamps entitled AmericanAggression,oneofwhichcontainedarepresentationoftheUSPhiladelphia ship sunk off the coast of Libya in1803!11 In addition, the title of a prominentAmericanhistoriansbook,LibyaandAmerica:Two

Centuriesof

Strife,12 speaks more to post9/11

narratives than to history. Thus, historyhighlighting conflict gains traction in times oftroubleandfadesawayduringmorestabletimes.

In sum, lookingat theearlyencounteraddsvaluetotheanalysisbysuggestingthatnotionsofIslam and the West, far from being static, aremuchinformedbypowerrealities,andthatIslamitself hasbeen cast differently fromwithin andwithoutover theyearsdue to circumstance.ThenextUSLibyansituationstobeexaminedwillbe

World War II and the postindependencemonarchyofKingIdris.PriortoWorldWarII,theUnited States hadbeen remote from theMiddleEast, while European powers further colonizedthe declining Ottoman Empire. General pointsrelevant to the following analysis are that thecolonialexperienceledtodefensivedefinitionsofIslambyitsovertakenadherents,thatatthe timeofWorldWar II theUnited Stateswas seenbyMiddleEasternersasanonEuropeanpowerwithdissimilar designs on the region, and that theUnitedStateshadrelatively littleknowledgeandexperience with the Middle East beforeembarking on its postWorldWarII leadershiprolethere.

Given the complementary relationshipbetween Hollywood and the US governmentduring World War II, a synopsis of 1942HollywoodBmovieAYankinLibyarevealsmuchabout theway Libya figured into theAmerican

outlook on the world at the time: earnestAmericancorrespondentMikearrives inLibyaand stumbles upon a Nazi German scheme toassist tribal leaders in a coup against theBritishoccupiers; Mike purloins one of the gunsimported by Nazis to add to the incavestockroomof thecoconspiringSheikh(who, ina

typical premodern rivalry, is the son of theBritishfriendly Sheikh) and leaves it off at theapartment of an attractive female BritishintelligenceofficernamedNancy,whoalsoservesas the unrequited love interest of the BritishfriendlySheikhwhosparesherfromdeathwhenthegun is found inherapartment;Mike tries towarn the British Consul who brushes him offsince theBritishhaveacoupof theirown in theworks; and, finally, Mike wins Nancy and theNazi coup is thwarted,but not without seeing

some belly dancing and meeting an AmericanundercoveragentfromBrooklynposingasarazorsalesman to the bearded Muslims of Libya!13SalienttonotearethestereotypesofArabculture,the sense thathistoryisactingupon ratherthan at thebehestofLibya,and the imageofAmericansas

bumbling

onto

an internationalstage full ofdanger andintrigue by themoreduplicitous andlessprincipledEuropeans.

Further on the notion of culturalbias andfollowingupon theprevious citationof anotheroftheveryfewfilmstoaddressLibya,theworkof

JackShaheen regarding stereotypingofArabs inAmerican films lends veracity to the idea of anAmericanculturalbiastowardArabs.Inhisstudyof virtually every Hollywood film madeportraying Arabs, Shaheen finds Arabsdehumanized and villianized in ninetyfivepercent of the films, a caricature remainingessentially unchanged through the myriad

In his study of virtuallyevery Hollywood f ilm

made portraying Arabs,Shaheen finds Arabs

dehumanized andvillianized in ninety-fivepercent of the films, acaricature remaining

essentially unchangedthrough the myriad

international events ofthe twentieth century.


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internationaleventsofthetwentiethcentury.14Ofwhat do these stereotypes consist? Pause andvisualize the reelArab.Whatdo you see?Blackbeard, headdress, dark sunglasses. In thebackground a limousine, harem maidens, oilwells, camels. Or perhaps he isbrandishing anautomatic weapon, crazy hate in his eyes and

Allahonhislips.15Thelatterdescriptionappliesparticularlywell toBack to theFuture!Whyhavethesestereotypesendured?AccordingtoShaheen,the post1948 violence and upheaval in theMiddle East captured on television newsreinforced stereotypes and serve[d] as both asourceandexcuse for filmmakers.16Inaddition,Shaheennotesthelackofcivilsocietyresponse,interms of uncritical movie reviews, scarcelymobilized ArabAmericans, and weak tononexistent ArabAmerican participation in the

movieindustry.Shaheensargumentbuttresses thenotionof

an ingrained American cultural bias againstArabs, although it isworth considering towhatextent the views of the few in Hollywoodinfluence themanyAmericans.Yet regardlessofwhether thebias is initiallyheldbymanyor fewAmericans, the bias is not rejected in publicdiscourse by those Americans digesting thestereotypes. So another question tobe exploredlaterwillbewhyAmericansaresopredisposedto

accepting these caricatures. As a final relatedpoint, despite Department of Defensecollaboration with Hollywood at times, theHollywoodelite issufficientlyremoved from theforeign policy elite to obviate the idea of anentirely instrumental cultural bias hammereddown from above to suit policy exigencies,thoughthebiasmaycertainlybereinforcedfromtime to time.Furthermore, theexerciseofspeechfreedomsby many Americans especially mediamemberswouldmakesuchascenariodifficulttoachieve except during wartime or conditionswhere conception of the national interest areclosely and uniformly sharedbyjournalists andpolicy makers. One caveat to this would begovernmentplanted disinformation, which willbeaddressedinthenextsection.

Returning to theprojectof setting the scenefortheentranceofQadhafi,letusreviewrelevantpostwar details. The Libyan trusteeship was

createdpursuanttothe1945PotsdamConferenceto check StalinsNorth African ambitions, withGreatBritainandAmerica servingas trustees.A1950memo to Secretary of StateDeanAchesonnoted that [o]ur prestige is probably higher inLibyathaninanyotherpartoftheareabecauseofU.S. support of Libyan independence.17

Americanbackingofindependencewastemperedhowever by a realpolitik policy goal ofmaintaining military base rights consideredessentialinlightoftheColdWar.Thetrusteeshipsoongaveway to theKingdomofLibya, ledbyKingIdriswho,reminiscentofthegoodsheikhofA Yank in Libya, had supported theAllies inWorldWarII.UnlikeQadhafi,IdrissawworkingwithWesternpowers as thebestway to restoreMuslimpoliticalposition.

TheUSLibyan relationship during this era

mainlyconsistedofmuchneededeconomicaidinexchange forbase rights. Interestingly, SecretaryAcheson lamented howmajor assistance theUSprovided toLibya,includingdecisive grainshipmentsduring aseveredrought, went

unnoticed

by

the US press.Indeed muchof the USLibyanrelationshipofthisperiodlackedmediaattention,possibly due to the axiom ofbad news sellingmore than good news, or to Libyas obscurity.Moving on from aid tobase rights, a chief USdiplomat inTripoli attempted to essentialize theLibyan governments position in 1954 as,tantamount to blackmail and showing little

change from [the]barbarypirate tradition,18yetthiswas not entirely accurate as thebasewas afait accompli and the aid was more a wellmeaningpalliative than ablackmailpayment. Insum,priorto1969,LibyafiguredasakeyUSallyin theMiddle East,mitigating challenges posedby the Cold War, Nasserism, and antiIsraelisentiment,aswellaspresentingtheprospectofa

Indeed much of the US-Libyan relationship o f

this period lackedmedia attention,

possibly due to theaxiom of bad news

selling more than goodnews, or to Libyas

obscurity.


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steady supply of oil given the exploration anddevelopmentbyAmericanoilcompanies.

GermanefromtheforegoingaretheinherenttensionsofaUSpolicysimultaneouslyadvocatingselfdeterminationwhile carving out a sphere ofmilitary control to counter an external, nonLibyan threat, and that Islam is not intrinsically

antiWestern as shownby religious leader Idriscooperativestancewhichdifferedquiteabitfromthe eighteenth century Libyan Ambassadorscomment that Islam enjoined enslaving nonbelievers.Alsoworthnoting is thecomplete lackof issue with King Idris being an explicitlyMuslim leader rulingundera legitimacy conferred byreligious status, suggestingthat Islamic credentials perse pose no problem,

especially when coupledwith satisfaction ofgeostrategic goals.Ultimately, the difficulty ofupholding proWesternpolicies in a panArabenvironment, anachronisticforeignmilitarybases,shiftsin socioeconomic conditionsduetonewfoundoilwealth,allegationsofcorruptionandincompetenceinthe

government,

and

incomplete

ambit

of

the

Eastern

Libyanbased Sanusi religious order, led tovulnerabilityandprecipitatedthe1969coup.

US-LIBYAN RELATIONS FROM QADHAFIS1969 COUP TO THE PRESENT

Ifgraphedonanxaxisof timeandayaxisranging fromnormal toworseningrelations,USLibyan affairs between 1969 and 2008 wouldresembleanasymmetricalEverest startingoutatlowelevation,steadilyclimbinguntilabout1980,steeply ascendinguntil the sharppeakof armed

attack in 1986, descending only minimallythrough the 1990s, plummeting down anescarpment toward normalcy in 2003, and thenslowly approaching ground level thereafter. Sixphases roughly correspond to the gradationchanges: the orientation period following thecoup,gradual souring, fullonantagonism,backburner hostility, rehabilitated quasially, and

uncertainnonenemy.Thissectionwillnotlookatevery rock in the mountain. Instead,disproportionate emphasiswillbeplaced on theearlierphasesoftherelationshipduetocontinuityinLibyan rule, enduring themes of conflict, andLibyanisolationafter1986aswellaswithdrawalofUSAmbassadorialrepresentationbetween1972

and2008.Finally,sinceQadhafihasbeenkingofthehilltheentireperiod,factorsaffectingculturalbias and notions of civilizational dividewillbemorecleargivenonelessvariabletoconsider.

RidingonNasserscoattails,Qadhaficametopower in 1969 also to promote freedom, unity,

and socialism, and stated that,[t]he true cause of therevolution lay in thebackwardArab life which reduced theArabtoanalmostcompletelack

of affiliationwith the twentiethcentury. It isby turning to thethree slogans that the Arabworld rediscovers [its] dignityand [its] place in history.19Significant to note are theperception of decline and thelackofimmediatelyantagonistictone toward the West. Policyorientation for the new regime

centeredonpositiveneutralityandnonalignment

in

the

Cold

War,

armed

support

for

the

Palestinian cause, and sustenance forwhatweredeemed freedom and liberation movementsworldwide. Qadhafipresented apeoples Islamas opposed to an establishment Islam,undertaking measures to nationalize ulemaproperty,encouragingthemassestorebelagainstulema authority and take over themosques, andlevyingastateorganizedreligious taxtosupportjihad in Palestine.At a 1970 IslamicConference,Qadhafi stated that,wemustcorrectly interpretIslam and the Quran Islam is a continuous

revolution[i]t is themotherofall ideologies.20These last Islamrelateddetailsare listedbecausetheyshowthemalleabilityofIslamandchallengeany notion of a nativist return to an immutableIslam opposed to theWest, although there is afine line between cultural authenticity andxenophobia. Despite these audacious claims totransform Libya, Qadhafi was ajuniormilitary

Qadhafi presented a peoplesIslam as opposed to an

establishment Islam,undertaking measures to

nationalize ulemaproperty,encouraging the masses to

rebel against ulemaauthorityand take over the mosques,

and levying a state-organizedreligious tax to support jihad

in Palestine.


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officer of humble origin under the age of thirtywithminimalexposuretointernationalaffairs,sofrom the outset pragmatism and polish werewanting.

The inexperience of the junta complicatedmatters forNixon administration policymakersunsureofhowtoreceivethenewregime.Forthe

United States, chief concerns raisedby the coupcenteredonthedispositionofWheelusAirForcebase and the Britishbases, protection of nearlyUSD 5 million American investments in theLibyan oil industry, continued access to highquality Libyan oil for European allies, anymilitantstancetowardIsrael,andgeneralArabistagitations including the overthrow of friendlyconservative regimes like Saudi Arabia. A 1970Department of Statememorandum suggestivelynoted that the Libyan government may have

renamedWheelusUkba ibnNafiaafter the7thcenturyArabconquerorofNorthAfrica(whoalsoexpelled theChristians from there).21It isworthnotingwith regard to civilizational casting thattheairforcebaseisnownamedafterayounggirlwho lived nearby and died from an Americanmilitary accident. Qadhafi was not initiallydescribed as an Islamic threat, nor were hisIslamizingmeasuresontheradarscreen,perhapsbecause the context in which the Islamizingmeasures were made did not threaten vital

interests,

as

for

example

the

1979

Iranian

Revolutionwould.Themainmenaceposedbythenew Libyan governmentwaswhether itwouldcreepleftwardtowardtheUSSR,whichwasdealtwith in a less panicky manner given NationalSecurity Advisor Henry Kissingers policy ofdtente. In thepress,coverage largelyaddressedthe fate of King Idris,AmericanJewish groupsoutcryagainstantiIsraelstatementsandpossiblearmsdealswiththeFrench,andtheevacuationofthePeaceCorps;thisnewswasafarcryfromthesensationalstoriestocome.

Althoughpublicly thenewgovernmentwasrecognized,measures to influence ifnotalter theregimewerediscussed. Ina recentlydeclassifiedPaper on PossibleAlternative Pressures on theLibyan Regime addressed to Kissinger, fouroptions were considered: enlist NATO allies topressure the Libyan government to honor itscommitment tomilitarybase leases (considered

impractical because European allies had morevital economic relations with Libya); economicpressures curtailing oil involvement (consideredunfeasiblebecauseUSoil companieswould losemoneyandLibyahadplentyofmarketforitsoil);military display of force using the Sixth Fleet(unworkable because armed forces could not

commit further than a show); and a fourthblackedoutoptionlikelydetailing acovertcountercoup, as theoption islaterreferred to

as somekind ofpoliticalpressure.22The pointto makehere withregard totheoverallanalysis isthatbecausetheUS lackedsufficient leverage to change thebehaviorof theregime using the first three pressure points, the

levers

of

covert

political

pressure

and

discrediting

the regimeviamediaandpublicannouncementsbecame key tools; in otherwords, the nature ofpower in the relationship dictatedboth relianceon covert measures and the use of media toinfluence domestic and international publicopinionofLibyaaswellas the regimesviewofitself.So,gapsinknowledgeabouthappeningsinLibya, instrumental use ofmedia, and activatedculturalbias,allagainstabackdropoftumultuousevents,accountformuchofthevolume,variance,and venom in the media over the years, as

admittedly does the person ofQadhafi himself.For this orientation period, however, thememorandumauthorsrecommendedawaitandseepolicy.

Therelationshipsoonbegantosour.DespitestrainsregardingdeliveryofF5planesandArabpolitics, analystswithinUSDepartment of Statenoted that, Qadaffi and his supporters are

[G]aps in knowledgeabout happenings in

Libya, instrumental use ofmedia, and activated

cultural bias, all against abackdrop of tumultuous

events, account for muchof the volume, variance,and venom in the media

over the years, asadmittedly does theperson of Qadhafi

himself.


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prepared tomake one last effort to preserve abasically U.S./Western Europe orientation ofLibyan society and its oilbased economy.23TensionsovertheUSrelationshipwithIsraelandwhetherforcewasnecessarytoresolvetheArabIsraeli conflict constituted themajorwedges, asillustrated by the following conversations

between Qadhafi, Major Jallud and USAmbassadorPalmer:

[Qadhafi]askedwhat is reason for thisspecialUS relationshipwith Israelhecould see no historical, geographical,religious or other rationalbasis for it.Thus, he must conclude, USG[USGovernment] doesnt likeArabs: WhydoesUShateArabs?heasked.Hesaidthathe learned inCairoand elsewhere

that other Arab leaders agree that thesole problem they have with USG isAmericancommitmenttoIsrael.24

Relevanttothegeneralquestionofwhenandhownotions of civilizational divide arise,Islamophobiawas cited one year later as a lastditchexplanationforUSpolicy:

QadhafiaskedwhydoesUSGadhereto its commitment to Israel [since]

U.S.

interests

in

Arab

world

far

outweigh its interests in Israel. Hesaid he could not understandWashingtons special tie to TelAviv:couldtherebeaJewishChristianpactdirected against Islam?...After firmlyrejecting any suggestion ofIslamophobia, I[Ambassador Palmer]saidUSGiscommitted toajustpeaceintheME[MiddleEast](Jalludatthisjuncture remarked to Qadhafi that IearlierhadtoldhimthatMEproblem,

like Viet Nam and Korea, could beresolved peacefully throughnegotiations; Qadhafi smiledagreement with Jalluds grimace ofincredulityatthisidea.)25

Theseconversationsarequotedatlengthbecausethey underline that the regimedid not start out

antiWestern and the Islamophobia explanationwas neither the first choice nor satisfactory,important to thecivilizationaldivide strand,andthat fundamental disagreement over the ArabIsraeliconflictmorethananyotherinterestsdrovetensions well into the future, including theexplosiveterrorismissue.

Though this paper does not seek to delveinto the thorny topicof terrorism,comparing the1978and2008Libyanviewsofterrorismsuggeststhat a common definition remains elusive, butthatgreatermomentum to tackle terrorismasaninternationalproblemexists. Ingeneral, thechiefdifferencescenteron:whetheroneviewsviolencedifferentlyonwholesaleandretaillevels;whatthe contours, if any, ofjust use of forcewouldconstitute;howfarchainsofcausalitystretch;andhow interrelated are events. At the first Arab

AmericanPeopletoPeopleDialogueConference,which took place in Tripoli in 1978, Qadhaficommentedthat:

Foreign bases, nuclear weapons,starvation, economic warfare, navalfleets,hijackingofplanes,theholdingofhostages for ransom, and thekillingofinnocentpeopleareallactsofterrorism.Ifweareseriousincombatingterrorism,we have toput all thesedeeds on one

list

and

find

the

necessary

solution

for

them.[W]hen aPalestinianhijacks aplane toexpresshisdespair, theU.S. shakes theworldby saying that this is terrorismandanendshouldbeputtoit. WeareinagreementwiththeU.S.,anendmustbeputtoterrorism,butweshouldseeksolutions to the underlying problemswhich have led to this kind ofterrorism.26

Andanotherquote,againgivenatlengthbecauseit cuts to the quick of current issues, speaks towhat Noam Chomsky would term NationalSecurityStates,policiesofshorttermpragmatismcontravening principles, and the cultural biasagainstArabs:


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History has recorded the insult to theAmericansby theirmobilization of alltheir resources in the service of evil,reaction, backwardness, dictatorship,fascismandoppression.Itseems thatinviewofAmericans,humanrightsareapplied only to some people. Oh,

people of America I cannot addressyou as friends because we were notfriends, andwe are not yet friends Isay: Oh American guests, after thisreview and all these explanations youshouldbe able to understandwhetheror not we have aggressive intentions.You can also understand whether weare backward, or whether we haveideas.27

As concerns the present, although Qadhafipromptly condemned 9/11 and indeed was thefirst to report Bin Laden to Interpol in 1998, hestillpresentsadifferentrationale:whileterrorism

constitutesa horriblescourge itis ajustifiableact forthose who

commit

it[which] is

itsdanger;

and BinLaden isproblematic because

of the heresy of his ideas such as theCaliphate.28 Rapprochement analysis portrayingQadhafi as having seen the light or become

rehabilitated imply that he came around toWestern morality, but a more valid approachwouldbetoidentifyaconvergenceinIslamicandWestern morality and work toward a moreuniversalview.

Movingback to the 1970s and on to a lessemotive,convoluted issue,oilcomprisedanotherkeycontributortospoilingrelations.In1970Libya

becamethefirstMiddleEasternorNorthAfricancountry tonegotiatearaise inoilprices,29and in1973, theyearof the firstoilembargo,Libyanoilwas the second largest sourceofUSoil imports.Media coverage of oil shocks illustrated greatlyamplified culturalbias in light of a conflictualsituation and nonsystemic views of the global

economy. For example, a histrionic 1973 TIMEarticle entitled The Arab World: Oil, Power,Violence highlights the foregoing as well asnotions of civilizational divide in citing theCrusades:

SuddenlytheArabs,100millionstrong,backwardandneglectedandabusedforcenturies, have begun to realize theproportionsofthestrategicweapontheyhold in their hands. They have long

complainedofthemoneythatIsraelhasreceived from the U.S. and WesternEurope.Nowtheyarereceivinganothersortofbonanzaahundredtimesover.Their oil wealth is in the process ofchanging theirhistory,bringing themapower they have not known since thetime of the Crusadesa power thatcouldbeusedforpeacefuldevelopmentorforviolenceandrevenge.30

And

the

following

extracts

speak

to

how

Libya

becameatopenemyoftheUS,totheevolutionofQadhafis image, and to how Arab nationalismtakesonanessentialcharacterasseenby theuseofthewordinstinctstodescribeitsmotivation:

TherecentthrusttowardArabcontrolofMiddle Eastern oilbegan in 1970, andthemanwhostarteditallwasthenew,young(then28)andhotheadedrulerofLibya, Colonel MuammarGaddafi[who was] [s]purred by the

instincts of Arab nationalism andpride[and is] handsome, devout,ardent,evenfanatical.31

Qadhafi had earlier complained to AmbassadorPalmer about media coverage, though he tooessentializesAmericanmotivationforoutcryoveroil:

Rapprochement analysisportraying Qadhafi as

having seen the light orbecome rehabilitatedimply that he came

around to Westernmorality, but a more validapproach would be to

identify a convergence inIslamic and Western

morality and work towarda more universal view.


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10

unwarranted attacks and criticisms ofLARG [Libyan Arab RepublicGovernment] and LARG personalities,includingQadhafihimself,appearinUSmedia.He cited recentTIMEmagazinearticle,severalreportsinNewYorkTimes

We seek our rights re oil, Qadhaficommented, We arenot irresponsible. and article inNational Review. TheseindicateAmericanwritersmotivatedbyhatredandblindnessvisvisLARG.32

In sum, the way cultural bias appears in themedia is conditioned by thedegree of conflict in politicalrelations, and citation ofcivilizational divide correlates

with intractability of politicalconflict.Now let us return to the

questionofwhyAmericansarepredisposed to accepting theculturalbiasandintimationsofcivilizational divide towardArabs in general and Libyansinparticular.Asearliermentioned,factorssuchasturmoilintheMiddleEastandweakcivilsocietypresence of ArabAmericans contribute.

Obviously,

the

bias

is

not

monolithically

held,

as

a

LibyangovernmentofficialnotedtoanAmericandiplomat in 1970: there are individual privateAmericans who understand and appreciate theArabposition[yettheyare]completelywithoutinfluence in American society.33 For Europe,histories of the Crusades and perceptions ofMuhammad as spreading religionvia the swordheldmore sway than for theUS,whichdidnotdirectly share an acrimonious history withMuslims. In terms of policy, the US supportedselfdetermination in the Middle East until

previouslydiscussedpostWorldWarII strategicconsiderationsmadethisunfeasible.ThusIslamicleaders threatened the stability of theinternational system rather than essentiallyprovedtroublesome,notwithstandingtheculturalbias. Qadhafi, with his spreading of revolutionandthirdworldpopulismusingIslamicsymbols,caused American diplomats toworry about his

proclamationof an Islamic state,hispromotionof Islam as the religion of the black man inAfrica, and his spreading of Islamic radicalismand terrorism worldwide; in fact, QadhafisIslamic campaign influenced US officialperceptionsof Islamic revivalism longbefore theIranianRevolution.34So,rivalpoliticalpressures

under the banner of Islam provoked: thecombination of powerful acts associated withIslam, rather than Islam in itself or any historywithIslam,coloredperceptions.

Moreover,while political conditions inclineAmericans to accept this bias, the AmericaneducationaltreatmentofIslamgreatlyexacerbates

matters, as in the 1970s itwas quite possible for acitizenof theUnitedStatestogrow up, graduate from a

majoruniversity, and pursuea career without knowinganything about Islam or theMuslim world.35 After the1970s, more internationaleducation appeared inAmerican schools, but,

significantly,[m]ulticulturalists argued that the curriculumshould include Islam and otherworld religions,notbecauseworld history does notmake sense

without

them,

but

because

Muslims

and

others

nowformsignificantgroupswithintheAmericanpopulation.36 (And it isworth noting that eventhe imperfect project of multiculturalism facedoppositioninthe1980sfromthosewhowishedapurely Western educational experience.)Following from this Americancentric rationale,Islam has notbeen taught in relation to worldhistorybut ratherwith respect to theAmericanpolitical experiencewith Islam, namely throughtheArabIsraeliconflictand Islamic leaders suchasKhomeini,Qadhafi,andAssad.Notonlydoes

this affect how Islam is received, but alsoperpetuatesaviciouscyclewhereinbiasedmediacoverage of Arabs andMuslims is used in theclassroom,and then studentsabsorb theseviewsandpropagate them later. In addition, textbooksportrayed Islam in light of the Arab nomadicsocietyand the lifeof theProphetofIslamwhiledeliberately downplaying the Abrahamic legacy

Islam has not been taught inrelation to world history but

rather with respect to the

American po li ticalexperience with Islam,

namely through the Arab-Israeli conflict and Islamicleaders such as Khomeini,

Qadhafi, and Assad


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11

in Islam thereby disconnecting Islam from theJudeoChristian tradition;37 thusIslam isseenasan entity apart fromWestern civilization,whichhinders student construction of thecomprehensive, dynamic worldview needed tounderstandbetterinternationalpolitics.

To pick up the policy thread,by the time

PresidentReagan tookoffice in1981, theUSandLibya had terminated diplomatic relations. Theprevious Carter administration had emphasizeddealing with developing countries themselvesrather than exclusively through the Cold Warprism,andincreasedscrutinyoverissuessuchashuman rights and the environment.Consequently, emphasis shifted from Libyasdealings with the USSR to Libya as a statesponsorofterrorandderailerofthepeaceprocessthrough its support of Palestinian rejectionist

factions.Libyanterroristactivitieshadbeennotedfrom1969on,butCongressandtheExecutivehadstruggled in both the Nixon and FordadministrationsoverwhethertodesignateLibyaaterrorist state. Then as lately occurredwith therapprochement, the Executive leaned moretoward interestbasedpoliticswhereasCongress,as representative of the people, was moreresponsive to public sentiment and interestgroups. Therefore, given culturalbias, collectivememory of contemporary events like oil shocks

and

terrorism,

and

paucity

of

knowledge

of

Libya

apart from thedemonizedQadhafi, the inertiaofthepoliticalrelationshiprestsatconflict.

Adding to this inertia, the Reaganadministration sought to mold public opiniontoward Libya via a disinformation campaignportraying,Qaddafithelunatic,LibyatheSovietproxy,Qaddafi themajor sourceof internationalterrorism,andrepressiveLibya,allofwhichwerealso reflected increasingly in official statementsfrom the U.S. government.38 Thus, PresidentReaganwas able to conduct the firstprimetime

American military operation, to the tune of aseventysix percent approval rating.39 An articleappearing in TIME shortly thereafter explainingthe attacks entitled, Gaddafi: Obsessed by aRuthless, Messianic Vision, connected histerrorismwithIslam:

hismessianicvision, like the turbans inwhich he wraps himself, does notcamouflage his vicious methods andruthless fanaticism. He hasbecomethe modernday incarnation of thesociety of Assassins, which flourishedfrom the 11th to 13th century in the

Middle East...[he] regards himself notonlyasthe lastgreathopeofPanIslambutasthescourgeoftheWest,whichhefervently believes has humiliated theArab world for centuries. It is ahumiliationheintendstoavenge.40

However, exercising the speech freedomspreviously cited as counterbalancing entirelyinstrumentalbias,Americanjournalistspublishedquestioning articles, such as Bob Woodwards

Gadhafi Secret Target of Secret US DeceptionPlan appearing in the Washington Post.41 Inaddition,QadhafihadovertheyearstargetedtheAmericanpeople withopenlettersinnewspapersandinterviews,but asmentioned

before

regardingpolish andpragmatism,these hadlittle effect.After 1986,Libyawithdrewfrom activeantagonism into backburner hostility, whichsimmered through the 1990s, in connectionwith

Lockerbie, designation as a rogue state, andpursuitofweaponsofmassdestruction.

Tobrieflyconcludethissectionandreturntothe focusonhowculturalbiasrelates topoliticalcircumstances,itisinterestingtonotetheshiftincoverage of Qadhafis Islam in the press. Forexample, when Secretary of State CondoleezzaRicevisitedLibyainSeptember2008,thehighest

To some extent, Qadhafihas reprised his earliest

role as a devoutMuslim. . . On the other

hand much haschanged, such as

shifting from support forPLO rejectionist factionsto advocating a one-

state solution, sanctionsand failed socialism, and

revolutionaryrealpolitik motivatingrenunciation of WMDs.


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12

rankingUSofficialtodosoin50years,thefocuschanged to a more benign, exotic Islam: theAssociatedPresswrotethatRicemadecommentsfollowing a traditional Muslim dinner theeveningmealthatbreaksthedaysfastduringtheholy month of Ramadan;42 and according toReuters, Gadhafi,wearing a white robe and a

greenbroochintheshapeofAfrica,didnotshakehandswithRicebutputhis righthandoverhisheart.By Muslim tradition, men should avoidcontactwithfemalesduringthefastingtime.43Tosomeextent,Qadhafihasreprisedhisearliestroleas a devout Muslim, still grating in terms ofmeeting with Russian leaders, pursuingauthenticity to the point of pitching a BedouintentontheChampslyses,speakingoutagainstAmericanoilactivities,andgenerallyattemptingto remold the international system.On theother

handmuch has changed, such as shifting fromsupport for PLO rejectionist factions toadvocating a onestate solution, sanctions andfailed socialism,andrevolutionary realpolitik44motivating renunciation ofWMDs. This sectionhas attempted to highlight the variable ofchanging perceptions in the metamorphosis ofQadhafi.Insum,itwouldseemthatculturalbiastakes a derogatory turn in times of politicalconflict and reverts to a more benign Otherapproachintimesofcooperation.

CONCLUSION

In September 2006, the English NationalOpera together with Asian Dub FoundationreleasedGadaffi:ALivingMyth,aspokenandrapopera set to raga, punk, dub and electronicaplayed by the English National Orchestra andNorth African musicians. A review entitledMuammarMia,HereWeGo atLast offers anoverall flavor: Colonel Gaddafi swearsvengeanceagainst theWest in a fieryaria set inthebombedoutruinsofTripoli.ColonelGaddafi

sparswithRonaldReaganinasearingduetattheUNGeneralAssembly.ColonelGaddafi sings apowerballadaboutwomenslibwhilehisfemalebodyguards fan out around him Busby Berkleyfishnets and feather boas.45 The operasconceptualizer,SteveChandraSavale,alsoknownasChandrasonic,soughttomovebeyond,allthis

clash of civilizations rubbish and put acompletely different spin on thewhole thing.46Onthewhole,theoperareceivedlukewarmifnotstinginglydreadfulreviews,quitepossiblyduetothecontroversialsubjects,butperhapsalsoowingtolyricssuchas,Onlyinthedesertistheretrueunionbetweenmeandmyself,47andThepowerin the sand is the power in the land.48Nevertheless, the opera represented a seriousattempt, in the words of Scottishborn Muslimplaywright Shah Khan, to present a complex

character and situation and move beyondsimplisticgoodversusevilideasas[m]usicbyitsverynatureharmonisesopposingthemes49

Although the above opera represents theBritishvisionofQadhafi,andnotthehypotheticalnextAmericanmovieofQadhafimentionedintheintroduction,itisrevealinginthatitreachedforamore absurdist than clashofcivilizationsnarrative toexplainQadhafi.What thissuggests,and indeed what the glance at USLibyanrelations over the past two hundred years

highlights,

is

that

the

notion

of

civilization

divide

constitutes yet another attempt, albeitoversimplified, to understand dynamic,interrelatedhistory.

The views and opinions expressed in articles are

strictly the authors own, and do not necessarily

represent those of al Nakhlah, its Advisory andEditorialBoards, or theProgramfor SouthwestAsia

and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher

School.


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Spring 2009


13

WORKS CITED

1BobGaleandRobertZemeckis,BacktotheFuture,releasedintheUnitedStatesonJuly3,1985,and

distributedbyUniversalPictures. (TheIndependenceDayreleaselikelystokedpatrioticantipathyagainsttheLibyans. Interestingly,RonaldReaganquotedfromthefilminhis1986

State

of

the

Union

Address.)

2Ibid.,carchasescene.3CoinedbyPresidentRonaldReaganin1986astensionsescalatedbeforetheUSmilitaryattackonLibya.4Jefferson,AmericanMinisterinFrance,TheAtlanticMonthly30(180)(October1872):405424.5TheMarinesHymn,HeritageSectionoftheU.S.MarinesOfficialWebsite,(accessedOctober18,2008).

6BarbaryCoast,Dictionary.com.WorldNet3.0.PrincetonUniversity.

(accessedNovember28,2008).7DanielDishon,ed.,MiddleEastRecord,19691970,VolumeFive(Jerusalem:IsraelUniversitiesPress,1977),

976.8

ShortTermProspectsforLibya,NationalIntelligenceEstimateNumber36.569,December30,1969,fromForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates,NixonFordAdministrations,VolumeE5,Part2,Chapter3,Libya(accessedOctober9,2008).

9RonaldBruceSt.John,LibyaandtheUnitedStates:TwoCenturiesofStrife(Philadelphia: Universityof

PennsylvaniaPress,2002),28.10

SaifAleslamalQadhafi,LibyanAmericanRelations,MiddleEastPolicyX(1)(Spring2003):36.11

PeterM.Rexford,LibyasPropagandaPostage,TheWashingtonPost,February27,1987,N62.12

RonaldBruceSt.John.13

AYankinLibya(1942),InternetMovieDatabase,(accessedOctober18,2008).

14

JackG.Shaheen.ReelBadArabs:HowHollywoodVilifiesaPeople(NewYork:OliveBranchPress,2001).15JackG.Shaheen,ReelBadArabs:HowHollywoodVilifiesaPeople,inAlsamSyed,sp.ed.,Islam:

EnduringMythsandChangingRealties,TheAnnalsofTheAmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocialScience,(ThousandOaks,CA:SagePublications,2003),172.

16Ibid.,190.

17RonaldBruceSt.John,61.

18Ibid.,69.

19MahmoudG.ElWarfally,ImageryandIdeologyinU.S.PolicyTowardLibya,19691982(Pittsburgh,PA:

UniversityofPittsburghPress,1988),44.20

DanielDishon,ed.,MiddleEastRecord,19691970,VolumeFive(Jerusalem:IsraelUniversitiesPress,1977),976.

21MemorandumforMr.HenryA.Kissinger;Subject:WheelusAirForceBaseClosure,June12,1970,

DepartmentofState,fromForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates,NixonFordAdministrations,VolumeE5,Part2,Chapter3,Libya(accessedOctober9,2008).

22MemorandumforDr.Kissinger,WashingtonSpecialActionGroup,November24,1969,from

previouslycitedvolumeofForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates.23

MemorandumforDirectorofCurrentIntelligence,February23,1971,DepartmentofState,frompreviouslycitedvolumeofForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates.


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al Nakhlah


14

24TelegramfromAmericanEmbassyTripolitoUSSecretaryofState,February24,1971,from


TelegramfromAmericanEmbassyTripolitoUSSecretaryofState,October30,1972,frompreviouslycitedvolumeofForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates.

26

ElWarfally,

72.

27AMessagetotheAmericanPeople,ArabAmericanPeopletoPeopleDialogueConference,October

912,1978,Tripoli,Libya.(accessedNovember3,2008).28

TheLeadersAnalysisofCurrentCrisisofTerrorisminTheWorld,AlGathafiSpeaks2008(accessedDecember1,2008).

29AsHenryKissingernotedinhisbookYearsofUpheaval:Untilthenthedominantroleamongtheoil

producingcountrieswasplayedbyessentiallyconservativegovernmentswhoseinterestinincreasingtheiroilrevenueswasbalancedbytheirdependenceontheindustrialdemocraciesforprotectionagainstexternal(andperhapseveninternal)threats. ColonelQadhafiwasfreeofsuchinhibitions. Anavowedradical,hesetouttoextirpateWesterninfluence.Hedidnotcareifintheprocessheweakenedtheglobaleconomy. (TakenfromElWarfally,52.)

30

The

Arab

World:

Oil,

Power,

Violence,

TIME,

April

2,

1973,

(accessedNovember30,2008).

31Ibid.

32TelegramfromAmericanEmbassyTripolitoUSSecretaryofState,February24,1971,from


DepartmentofStateTelegram,SignalsonUSLibyanRelations,April13,1970,frompreviouslycitedvolumeofForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates.

34FawazA.Gerges,IslamandMuslimsintheMindofAmerica,inAlsamSyed,sp.ed.,Islam:Enduring

MythsandChangingRealties,76.35

SusanL.DouglassandRossE.Dunn,InterpretingIslaminAmericanSchools,inAlsamSyed,sp.ed.,

Islam:

Enduring

Myths

and

Changing

Realties,

52.

36Ibid.,55.

37Ibid.,52.

38RonaldBruceSt.John,125.

39NicholasLaham,TheAmericanBombingofLibya:AStudyoftheForceofMiscalculationinReaganForeign

Policy(Jefferson,NCandLondon:McFarland&Company,Inc.,2008),157.40

KarimH.Karim,IslamicPeril:MediaandGlobalViolence(Montreal:BlackRoseBooks,2000),79.41

JosephT.Stanik,ElDoradoCanyon:ReagansUndeclaredWarwithQaddafi(Annapolis,Maryland:NavalInstitutePress,2003),224.

42MatthewLee,RiceMeetsGadhafionHistoricVisittoLibya,ABCNews,(accessedDecember1,2008).

43Reuters,USLibyatiesofftoagoodstart,France24.com,(accessedDecember1,2008).

44MalfridBrautHegghammer,LibyasNuclearTurnaround:PerspectivesfromTripoli,TheMiddleEast

Journal62(1)(Winter2008).45

NeilFisher,MuammarMia,HereWeGoatLast,TimesOnline,August25,2006,(accessedDecember1,2008).


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15

46Ibid.

47Ibid.

48CharlieTaylor,Gaddafi:ALivingMyth,OnlineReviewLondon

(accessedDecember1,2008).49

PeterCulshaw,ButWhatIsIt?Telegraph,September4,2006,(accessedDecember1,2008).

bushashia - notions of islam and the west in the us-libyan relationship

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