burrell sociological paradigms pp1-37

PART I: IN SEARCH OF A FRAMEWORK

1. Assumptions about theNature of Social ScienceCentral to our thesis is the idea that 'all theories of organisation arebased upon a philosophy of science and a theory of society' . In thischapter we wish to address ourselves to the first aspect of thisthesis and to examine some of the philosophical assumptionswhich underwrite different approaches to social science. We shall 'argue that it is convenient to conceptualise social science in terms t· /'

of four sets of assumptions related to ontology, epistemology,human nature and methodology.

All social scientists approach their subject via explicit or implicitassumptions about the nature of the social world and the way inwhich it may be investigated. First, there are assumptions of an I:ontological nature - assumptions which concern the very essence Iof the phenomena under investigation. Social scientists, for 1 'example, are faced with a basic ontological question: whether the j'reality' to be investigated is external to the individual - imposing,itself on individual consciousness from without - or the product ofiindividual consciousness; whether 'reality' is of an 'objective'!nature, or the product ofindividual cognition; whether 'reality' is aigiven 'out there' in the world, or the product of one's mind. /

Associated with this ontological issue, is a second set of'assumptions of an epistemological nature. These are assumptions Iabout the grounds of knowledge - about how one might begin tOrunderstand the world and communicate this as knowledge to \fellow human beings. These assumptions entail ideas, for example, .about what forms of knowledge can be obtained, and how one cansort out what is to be regarded as 'true' from what is to be regardedas 'false'. Indeed, this dichotomy of 'true' and 'false' itself pre-supposes a certain epistemological stance. It is predicated upon aview of the nature of knowledge itself: whether, for example, it ispossible to identify and communicate the nature of knowledge as,being hard, real and capable of being transmitted in tangible form~.or whether' knowledge' is of a softer, more subjective, spiritual oreven transcendental kind, based on experience and insight of a

2 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis

unique and essentially personal nature. The epistemologicalassumptions in these instances determine extreme positions on theissue of whether knowledge is something which can be acquired onthe one hand, or is something which has to be personally exper-.ienced on the other.,.Associated with the ontological and epistemological issues, but

tonceptually separate from them, is a third set of assumptionsconcerning human nature and, in particular, the relationshipbetween human beings and their environment, All social science,clearly, must be predicated upon this type of assumption, sincehuman life is essentially the subject and object of enquiry. Thus,we can identify perspectives in social science which entail a viewof human beings responding in a mechanistic or even deterministicfashion to the situations encountered in their external world. Thisview tends to be one in which human beings and their experiencesare regarded as products of the environment; one in which humansare conditioned by their external circumstances. This extremeperspective can be contrasted with one which attributes to humanbeings a much more creative role: with a perspective where 'freewill' occupies the centre of the stage; where man is regarded as thecreator of his environment, the controller as opposed to the con-trolled, the master rather than the marionette. In these twoextreme views of the relationship between human beings and theirenvironment we are identifying a great philosophical debatebetween the advocates of determinism on the one hand and'lciuntarism on the other. Whilst there are social theories whichadhere to each of these extremes, as we shall see, the assumptionsof many social scientists are pitched somewhere in the rangebetween.

The three sets of assumptions outlined above have direct\ implications of a methodological nature. Each one has important. consequences for the way in which one attempts to investigate andobtain 'knowledge' about the social world. Different ontologies,epistemologies and models of human nature are likely to incline

j social scientists towards different methodologies. The possiblei range of choice is indeed so large that what is regarded as science

\ by the traditional 'natural scientist' covers but a small range ofoptions. It is possible, for example, to identify methodologiesemployed in social science research which treat the social worldlike the natural world, as being hard, real and external to theindividual, and others which view it as being of a much softer,personal and more subjective quality.

If one subscribes to a view of the former kind, which treats the

Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 3

Isocial world as ifit were ahard, external, objective reality, then theIscientific endeavour is likely to focus upon an analysis of relation-ships and regularities between the various elements which it com-prises. The concern, therefore, is with the identification and defini-

, tion of these elements and with the discovery of ways in which..these relationships can be expressed. The methodological issues ofIimportance are thus the concepts themselves, their measurement!and the identification of underlying themes. This perspectiveAexpresses itself most forcefully in a search for universal laws!~Whichexplain and govern the reality which is being observed.

If one subscribes to the alternative view of social reality, whichstresses the importance of the subjective experience of individualsin the creation of the social world, then the search for understand-ing focuses upon different issues and approaches them in differentways. The principal concern is with an understanding of the way inwhich the individual creates, modifies and interprets the world inwhich he or she finds himself. The emphasis in extreme cases tendsto be placed upon the explanation and understanding of what isunique and particular to the individual rather than of what isgeneral and universal. This approach questions whether thereexists an external reality worthy of study. In methodological termsit is an approach which emphasises the relativistic nature of thesocial world to such an extent that it may be perceived as 'anti-scientific' by reference to the ground rules commonly applied inthe natural sciences.

The subjective-objective dimensionThe subjectivist The objectivistapproach to approach tosocial science social science

Nominalism I · ontology · I Realism

Anti-positivism I · epistemology · I Positivism

Voluntarism I · human nature · I Determinism

IdeographIc I· methodology ·1 Nomothetic

Figure 1.1 A scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature of social science


In this brief sketch of various ontological, epistemological,human and methodological standpoints which characteriseapproaches to social sciences, we have sought to illustrate twobroad and somewhat polarised perspectives. Figure 1.1 seeks todepict these in a more rigorous fashion in terms of what we shalldescribe as the subjective-objective dimension. It identifies thefour sets of assumptions relevant to our understanding of socialscience, characterising each by the descriptive labels under whichthey have been debated in the literature on social philosophy. Inthe following section of this chapter we will review each of the fourdebates in necessarily brief but more systematic terms.

The Strands of DebateNominalism-realism: the ontological debatel

These terms have been the subject of much discussion in theliterature and there are great areas of controversy surroundingthem. The nominalist position revolves around the assumptionthat the social world external to individual cognition is made up ofnothing more than names, concepts and labels which are used tostructure reality. The nominalist does not admit to there being any'real' structure to' the world which these concepts are used todescribe. The 'names' used are regarded as artificial creationswhose utility is based upon their convenience as tools for describ-ing, making sense of and negotiating the external world. Nominal-ism is often equated with conventionalism, and we will make nodistinction between them.2

Realism, on the other hand, postulates that the social worldexternal to individual cognition is a real world made up of hard,tangible and relatively immutable structures. Whether or not welabel and perceive these structures, the realists maintain, they stillexist as empirical entities. We may not even be aware of theexistence of certain crucial structures and therefore -have no'names' or concepts to articulate them. For the realist, the socialworld exists independently of an individual's appreciation of it.The individual is seen as being born into and living within a socialworld which has a reality of its own. It is not something which theindividual creates-it exists 'out there'; ontologically it is prior tothe existence and consciousness of any single human being. Forthe realist, the social world has an existence which is as hard andconcrete as the natural world.3


Anti-positivism-positivism: theepistemological debate4

It has been maintained that 'the word "positivist" like the word"bourgeois" has become more of a derogatory epithet than auseful descriptive concept'.S We intend to use it here in the lattersense, as a descriptive concept which can be used to characterise aparticular type of epistemology. Most of the descriptions ofpositivism in current usage refer to one or more of the ontological,epistemological and methodological dimensions of our scheme foranalysing assumptions with regard to social science. It is alsosometimes mistakenly equated with empiricism. Such conflationscloud basic issues and contribute to the use of the term in a

~. derogatory sense.I ~:--We use 'positivist' here to characterise epistemologies whichI () seek to explain and predict what happens in the social world by'. searching for regularities and causal relationships between its con-~ stituent elements. Positivist epistemology is in essence based uponI e traditional approaches which dominate the natural sciences.i Positivists may differ in terms of detailed approach. Some wouldI claim, for example, that hypothesised regularities can be verified~ by an adequate experimental research programme. Others wouldI _maintain that hypotheses can only be falsified and never demon-~Istrated to be 'true'.6 However, both 'verificationists' and 'fal-'t.•~ sificationists' would accept that the growth of knowledge is essen-; . tially a cumulative process in which new insights are added to the~ f existing stock of knowledge and false hypotheses eliminated.! ij The epistemology of anti-positivism may take various forms butt ,is firmly set against the utility of a search for laws or underlying\.•..••'.\'j,. regularities in the world of social affairs. For the anti-positivist, the! \ social world is essentially relativistic and can only be understood\' from the point of view of the individuals who are directly involvedi." . n the activities which are to be. studied. Anti-positivists reject the)'.. standpoint of the 'observer', which characterises positivist It,

epistemology, as a valid vantage point for understanding humanactivities. They maintainth~~~derstantl'- by

~

CCUPYing the frame of reference of t1:le-pan1Clj)lrntfn-'aetten. Onefi~Qgs.taDd from the inside rather than the outside. From

'" this point of view social science is seen as being essentially a\ subjective rather than an objective enterprise. Anti-positivists

end to reject the notion that science can generate objectiveRnowledge of any kind.?


Voluntarism-determinism: the 'human nature'debateThis debate revolves around the issue of what model of man isireflected in any given social-scientific theory. At one extreme we'jcan identify a determinist view which regards man and hisactivities as being completely determined by the situation orI'environment' in which he is located. At another extreme we can

!identify the voluntarist view that man is completely autonomousland free-willed. Insofar as social science theories are concerned tounderstand human activities, they must incline implicitly orexplicitly to one or other of these points of view, or adopt anintermediate standpoint which allows for the influence of bothsituational and voluntary factors in accounting for the activities ofhuman beings. Such assumptions are essential elements in social-scientific theories, since they define in broad terms the nature ofthe relationships between man and the society in which he Iives.8

Ideographic-nomothetic theory: the method-ological debateThe ideographic approach to social science is based on the viewthat one can only understand the social world by obtaining first-

\hand knowledge of the subject under investigation. It thus placesconsiderable stress upon getting close to one's subject andexploring its detailed background and life history. The ideographicapproach emphasises the analysis of the subjective accountswhich one generates by 'getting inside' situations and involvingoneself in the everyday flow of life - the detailed analysis of theinsights generated by such encounters with one's subject and theinsights revealed in impressionistic accounts found in diaries,biographies and journalistic records. The ideographic method

)stresses the importance of letting one's subject unfold its natureand characteristics during the process of investigation.9

The nomothetic approach to social science lays emphasis on theimportance of basing research upon systematic protocol andtechnique. It is epitomised in the approach and methods employedin the natural sciences, which focus upon the process of testinghypotheses in accordance with the canons of scientific rigour. It ispreoccupied with the construction of scientific tests and the use of


quantitative techniques for the analysis of data. Surveys,questionnaires, personality tests and standardised researchinstruments of all kinds are prominent among the tools whichcomprise nomothetic methodology. 10

Analysing Assumptions about the Nature ofSocial ScienceThese four sets of assumptions with regard to the nature of socialscience provide an extremely powerful tool for the analysis ofsocial theory. In much of the literature there is a tendency toconflate the issues which are involved. We wish to argue here thatconsiderable advantages accrue from treating these four strands ofsocial-scientific debate as analytically distinct. While in practicethere is often a strong relationship between the positions adoptedon each of the four strands, assumptions about each can in factvary quite considerably. It is worth examining this point in moredetail.

I The extreme positions on each of the four strands are reflected inlithe two major intellectual traditions which have dominated social

~ ,(science over the last two hundred years. The first of these is\, ![SUallY described as 'sociological positivism'. In essence this

reflects the attempt to apply models and methods derived from the

(

natural sciences to the study of human affairs. It treats the socialworld as if it were the natural world, adopting a 'realist' approachto ontology. This is backed up by a 'positivist' epistemology,relatively 'deterministic' views of human nature and the use of

<nomothetic' methodologies. The second intellectual tradition,/that of 'German idealism', stands in complete opposition to this. In

\I essence it is based upon the premise that the ultimate reaUty of the

(

universe lies in 'spirit' or 'idea' rather than in the data of sense: perception. It is essentially 'nominalist' in its approach to social, reality. In contrast to the natural sciences, it stresses the, essentially subjective nature of human affairs, denying the utility\ and relevance of the models and methods of natural science to\studies in this realm. It is 'anti-positivist' in epistemology,'voluntarist' with regard to human nature and it favours ideo-

(graphic methods as a fOlj,RdatioQfor social analysis. SociologicalI,positivism and German i~~rU>thus define the objective and\subjective extremesolOUr model.I Many sociologists and organisation theorists have been broughtup within the tradition of sociological positivism, without

8 Soci%Rica/ ParadiRms and OrRanisationa/ Ana/ysis

exposure to the basic tenets of German idealism. Social science forthem is seen as consonant with the configuration of assumptionswhich characterise the objective extreme of our model. However,over the last seventy years or so there has been an increasinginteraction between these two traditions, particularly at a socio-philosophical level. As a result intermediate points of view haveemerged, each with its own distinctive configuration ofassumptions about the nature of social science. They have allspawned theories, ideas and approaches characteristic of theirintermediate position. As we shall argue in later chapters,developments in phenomenology, ethnomethodology and theaction frame of reference are to be understood in these terms.These perspectives, whilst offering their own special brand ofinsight, have also often been used as launching pads for attacks onsociological positivism and have generated a considerable amountof debate between rival schools of thought. The nature of thisdebate can only be fully understood by grasping and appreciatingthe different assumptions which underwrite the competing pointsof view.

It is our contention that the analytical scheme offered hereenables one to do precisely this. It is offered not as a mereclassificatory device, but as an important tool for negotiatingsocial theory. It draws attention to key assumptions. It allows oneto focus on precise issues which differentiate socio-scientificapproaches. It draws attention to the degree of congruencybetween the four sets of assumptions about social science whichcharacterise any given theorist's point of view. We offer it here asthe first principal dimension of our theQretical scheme foranalysing theory in general and organisational theory in particular.For the sake of convenience we shall normally refer to it as the'subjective-objective' dimension, two descriptive labels whichperhaps capture the points of commonality between the fouranalytical strands.

Notes and References1. For a further discussion of the nominalism-realism debate,

see Kolakowski (1972), pp. 15-16.2. Kolakowski (1972), pp. 158-9. In its most extreme form

nominalism does not recognise the existence of any worldoutside the realm of individual consciousness. This is thesolipsist position, which we discuss in more detail in Chapter6.


3. For a comprehensive review of 'realism', see Keat and Urry(1975), pp. 27-45. They make much of the distinctionbetween 'positivism' and 'realism' but, as they admit, theseterms are used in a somewhat unconventional way.

4. For a further discussion of the positivism-anti-positivismdebate, see, for example, Giddens (1974) and Walsh (1972).

5. Giddens (1974), p. 1.6. See, for example, Popper (1963).7. For a good illustration of an anti-positivist view of science,

see Douglas (1970b), pp. 3-44.8. The human nature debate in its widest sense involves many

other issues which we have not referred to here. The precisemodel of man to be employed in any analytical scheme,however, is underwritten by assumptions which reflect thevoluntarism-determinism issue in one way or another. Wehave !solated this element of the debate here as a way oftreating at its most basic level a necessary assumption of allsocial-scientific theories which purport to account for humanactivities. Detailed propositions with regard to the preciseexplanation of human activities elaborate in one way oranother this basic theme.

9. For an excellent discussion of the nature of the ideographicapproach to social science, see Blumer (1969), ch. I.

10. It is important to emphasise here that both nomothetic andideographic methodologies can be employed in a deductiveand inductive sense. Whilst the inductiv~deductive debatein science is a subject of considerable interest andimportance, we do not see it as being central to the fourdimensions suggested here as a means of distinguishingbetween the nature of social science theories. That notwith-standing, it remains an important methodological issue, ofrelevance to both sociology and organisational analysis,within the context of the assumptions explored here.

2. Assumptions about the Natureof Society

All approaches to the study of society are located in a frame ofreference of one kind or another. Different theories tend to reflectdifferent perspectives, issues and problems worthy of study, andare generally based upon a whole set of assumptions which reflecta particular view of the nature of the subject under investigation.The last twenty years or so have witnessed a number of attemptson the part of sociologists to delineate the differences whichseparate various schools of thought and the meta-sociologicalassumptions which they reflect.

The Order-Conflict DebateDahrendorf (1959) and Lockwood (1956), for example, havesought to distinguish between those approaches to sociologywhich concentrated upon explaining the nature of social order andequilibrium on the one hand, and those which were more con-cerned with problems of change, conflict and coercion in socialstructures on the other. This distinction has received a great deal ofattention and has come to be known as the 'order-conflictdebate'. The 'order theorists' have greatly outnumbered the 'con-flict theorists', and as Dawe has observed, 'the thesis that socio-logy is centrally concerned with the problem of social order hasbecome one of the discipline's few orthodoxies. It is common as abasic premise to many accounts of sociological theory whichotherwise differ considerably in purpose and perspective' (Dawe,1970, p. 207).1

Many sociologists now regard this debate as dead or as havingbee.n a somewhat spurious non-debate in the first place (Cohen,1968; Silverman, 1970; van den Berghe, 1969). Influenced by thework of writers such as Coser (1956), who pointed to the functionalaspects of social conflict, sociologists have been able to incorpor-ate conflict as a variable within the bounds of theories which are

Assumptions about the Nature of Society 11

primarily geared towards an explanation of social order. Theapproach advocated by Cohen, for example, clearly illustratesthis. He takes his point of departure from the work of Dahrendorfand elaborates some of the central ideas in the order-conflictdebate to present two models of society, which are characterisedin terms of competing sets of assumptions which attribute to socialsystems the characteristics of commitment, cohesion, solidarity,consensus, reciprocity, co-operation, integration, stability andpersistence on the one hand, and the characteristics of coercion,division, hostility, dissensus, conflict, malintegration and changeon the other (Cohen, 1968, pp. 166-7).

Cohen's central criticism is that Dahrendorfis mistaken in treat-ing the order and conflict models as being entirely separate. He ineffect suggests that it is possible for theories to involve elements ofboth models and that one need not necessarily incline to one or theother. From this point of view, the order and conflict views ofsociety are but two sides of the same coin; they are not mutuallyexclusive and thus do not need to be reconciled. The force of thissort of argument has been very powerful in diverting attentionaway from the order-conflict debate. In the wake of the so-calledcounter-culture movement of the late 1960s and the failure of the1968 revolution in France, orthodox sociologists have becomemuch more interested in and concerned with the problems of the'individual' as opposed to those of the 'structure' of society ingeneral. The influence of 'subjectivist' movements such as(:phenomenology, ethnomethodology and action theory, which well ~referred to in passing in the previous chapter, have tended to\become much more attractive and more worthy of attention. As aresult, interest in continuing the conflict-order debate has sub-sided under the iQfluence of issues relating to the philosophy andmethods of social science.

Our contention here is that if one reviews the intellectual sourceand foundations of the order-conflict debate, one is forced toconclude that it has met a premature death. Dahrendorf andLockwood sought to revitalise the work of Marx through theirwritings and to restore it to a central place in sociological theory.For the most part Marx had been largely ignored by leadingsociologists, the influence of theorists such as Durkheim, Weberand Pareto having been paramount. Interestingly enough, theselatter three sociologists are all very much concerned with theproblem of social order; it is Marx who is preoccupied with the role,of conflict as the driving force behind social change. Stated in thisJway, th-erefore, the order-conflict debate is underwritten by a


difference between the perspectives and concerns ofleading socialtheorists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Modernsociology has done little more than articulate and develop the basicthemes initiated by these pioneers of social analysis. To state thatthe order-conflict debate is 'dead' or a 'non-debate' 'is thus tounderplay, if not ignore, substantial differences between the workof Marx and, for example, Durkheim, Weber and Pareto. Anyonefamiliar with the work of these theorists and aware of the deepdivision which exists between Marxism and sociology is forced toadmit that there are fundamental differences, which are far frombeing reconciled. 2 In this chapter therefore, we wish to re-evaluatethe order-conflict issue with a view to identifying a key dimen-sion for analysing the assumptions about the nature of societyreflected in different social theories. In order to do so, let us returnto the work of Dahrendorf, who seeks to set out the opposingissues in the following terms:

The integration theory of society, as displayed by the work of Parsonsand other structural-functionalists, is founded on a number of assump-tions of the following type:(I) Every society is a relatively persistent, stable structure of ele-

ments.(2) Every society is a well integrated structure of elements.(3) Every element in a society has a function, i.e., renders a con-

tribution to its maintenance as a system.(4) Every functioning social structure is based on a consensus of

values among its members ...... .What I have called the coercion theory of society can also bereduced to a small number of basic tenets, although here again theseassumptions oversimplify and overstate the case:(I) Every society is at every point subject to processes of change;

social change is ubiquitous.(2) Every society displays at every point dissensus and conflict;

social conflict is ubiquitous.(3) Every element in a society renders a contribution to its disin-

tegration and change.(4) Every society is based on the coercion of some of its members by

others. (Dahrendorf, 1959, pp. 160-2)

The opposing adjectives which Dahrendorf's schema suggests fordistinguishing approaches to the study of society can be conve-niently brought together in the form of a table, as follows:


Table 2.1

Two theories of society: 'order' and 'conflict'

The 'order' or 'integrationist'view of society emphasises:

StabilityIntegration

Functional co-ordinationConsensus

The 'conflict' or 'coercion'view of society emphasises:

ChangeConflict

DisintegrationCoercion

As Dahrendorfadmits, this conceptualisation is something of anoversimplification, and whilst providing a very useful tool forcoming to grips with the differences between the two standpoints,it is open to the possibility of misinterpretation, in that the differentadjectives mean different things to different people. Nowhere isthis more evident than in the way in which the notion of conflicthas been treated in the sociological literature. Since Coser'sdemonstration of the functions of social conflict, for example, therole of conflict as an integrating mechanism has received a greatdeal of attention. In effect, the whole notion of 'conflict' has oftenbeen incorporated within the notion of integration. Dahr~ndorf'sintegration/ conflict dimension has been conveniently telescopedso that it is brought within the bounds of sociology's traditionalconcern for the explanation of order. The fallacy of this positionbecomes clear if one considers certain extreme forms of conflict,such as class conflict, revolution and war, which can only beincorporated in the integrationist model by the wildest stretch ofone's imagination. Examples such as these suggest that it is mis-leading to equate this type of macrostructural conflict with thefunctional conflict identified by Coser. There is an importantquestion of degree involved here, which emphasises the dangers ofthe dichotomisation of integration and conflict; realistically thedistinction between the two is much more of a continuum than themajority of writers have recognised.

Another strand of the Dahrendorf scheme which can beregarded as somewhat problematic lies in the distinction betweenconsensus and coercion. At first sight the distinction appearsobvious and clear-cut, focusing upon shared values on the onehand and the imposition of some sort of force on the other. Oncloser inspection there is a certain ambiguity. Where do the sharedvalues come from? Are they acquired autonomously or imposedon some members of society by others? This question identifies the


possibility that consensus may be the product of the use of someform of coercive force. For example, as C. Wright Mills haspointed out, 'What Parsons and other grand theorists calI "valueorientations" and "normative structure" has mainly to do withmaster symbols of legitimation' (1959, p. 46).

A normative structure here - what Dahrendorf would view asconsensus - is treated as a system legitimising the powerstructure. From Mills's point of view, it reflects the fact ofdomination. In other words, shared values may be regarded not somuch as an index of the degree of integration which characterises asociety as one which reflects the success of the forces ofdomination in a society prone to disintegration. From one point ofview, extant shared ideas, values and norms are something to bepreserved; from another, they represent a mode of dominationfrom which man needs to be released. The consensus/ coerciondimension can thus be seen as focusing upon the issue of socialcontrol. Consensus - however it may arise - is identified inDahrendorf's scheme as something independent of coercion. Thiswe believe to be a mistaken view since, as suggested above, itignores the possibility of a form of coercion which arises throughthe control of value systems.

In distinguishing between stability and change as respectivefeatures ofthe order and conflict models Dahrendorfis again opento misinterpretation, even though he explicitly states that he doesnot intend to imply that the theory of order assumes that societiesare static. His concern is to show how functional theories areessentially concerned with those processes which serve tomaintain the patterns of the system as a whole. In other words,functional theories are regarded as static in the sense that they areconcerned with explaining the status quo. In this respect conflicttheories are clearly of a different nature; they are committed to,and seek to explain, the process and nature of deep-seatedstructural change in society as opposed to change of a moresuperficial and ephemeral kind. The fact that all functional theoriesrecognise change, and that change is an obvious empirical realityin everyday life, has led Dahrendorf's categorisation in relation tostability and change to lose its potential radical force and influ-ence. It can be argued that different labels are required to identifyDahrendorf's two paramount concerns: first, that the order view ofsociety is primarily status quo orientated; second, that it dealswith change of a fundamentally different nature from that withwhich conflict theorists are concerned.3

Dahrendorf's notions of junctional co-ordination and disin-


tegration can be seen as constituting one of the most powerfulstrands of thought which distinguish the order and conflict per-spectives. Here again, however, there is room for misinterpreta-tion. The concept of integration in Dahrendorf's work derives fromthe functionalists' concern with the contribution which constituentelements of a system make to the whole. In many respects this is anoversimplification. Merton (1948) introduced the idea of manifestand latent functions, some of which may be dysfunctional for theintegration of society.4 Again, Gouldner (1959), writing shortlyafter the publication of the German edition of Dahrendorf's work,suggests that various parts of a system may have a high degree ofautonomy and may contribute very little by way of integration tothe system as a whole. The term 'functional co-ordination' is thussomething of an oversimplification and, given the existence of thepoints of view expressed above within the functionalist campitself, it is not surprising thatthe concept of 'disintegration' shouldbe seen as relevant and capable of being used from a functionalstandpoint. 'Disintegration' can be very easily viewed as an inte-grationist concept and, as with other aspects of Dahrendorf'sscheme, this dimension has often been telescoped and broughtwithin the bounds of the theories of order. For this reason it maywell have been clearer if the position of conflict theory on thisdimension had been presented in more radical and distinctiveterms. There is much in Marxian theory, for example, which refersto the notion of 'contradiction' and the basic incompatibility be-tween different elements of social structure. Contradiction impliesheterogeneity, imbalance and essentially antagonistic anddivergent social forces. It thus stands at the opposite pole to theconcept of 'functional co-ordination', which must presuppose abasic compatibility between the elements of any given system. Toargue that the concept of contradiction can be embraced withinfunctional analysis requires either an act of faith or at least aconsiderable leap of imagination.

Dahrendorf's work has clearly served a very useful purpose inidentifying a number of important strands of thought distinguishingtheorists of order from theorists of conflict. However, as will beapparent from the above discussion, in many respects the dis-tinctions which have been drawn between the two meta-theories donot go far enough. In particular, the insights of some twenty yearsof debate suggest that the characterisation of the conflictperspective has not been sufficiently radical to avoid confusion

. with the 'integrationist' perspective. This has allowed theorists oforder to meet the challenge which Dahrendorf's scheme presents

16 Sociological Paradigms and Organisarional Analysis

to their frame of reference within the context of their order-orientated mode of thought. In order to illustrate this point, let us .return to the work of Cohen (1968) referred to earlier.

In advocating his viewpoint Cohen appears to be misinterpretingthe distinction between the two models. His interpretation ofconcepts telescopes the different variables into a form in whichthey can be seen as consistent with each other. In effect his wholeanalysis reflects an attempt to incorporate the conflict modelwithin the bounds of the contemporary theory of order. He thusloses the radical essence of the conflict perspective and is able toconclude that the two models are not mutually exclusive and donot need to be reconciled. He argues that the two models are notgenuine alternatives and in effect suggests that each is no morethan the reciprocal of the other. He is therefore able to leaveDahrendorf's analysis with the central concern of his book - theproblem of order - largely intact. The incorporation of conflictinto the bounds of the model of order de-emphasise~ itsimportance. 5

In line with the analysis which we presented earlier, we arguethat the attempt to reduce the two models to a common base ignoresthe fundamental differences which exist between them. A conflicttheory based on deep-seated structural conflict and concernedwith radical transformations of society is not consistent with afunctionalist perspective. The differences between them,therefore, are important and worthy of distinction in any attemptto analyse social theory. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possibleto see that many of the misinterpretations which have arisen havedone so because the models in Dahrendorf's analysis were notsufficiently differentiated. We wish to propose, therefore, thatcertain modifications be made in order to articulate the differencesin a more explicit and radical form. Since much of the confusionhas arisen because of the ambiguity of the descriptions associatedwith the two models we wish to suggest the use of a somewhatdifferent terminology.

'Regulation' and 'Radical Change'Our analysis has shown that the order-conflict distinction is inmany senses the most problematic. We suggest, therefore, that itshould be replaced as a central theme by the notions of 'regulation'and 'radical change'.


We introduce the term 'sociology of regulation' to refer to thewritings of theorists who are primarily concerned to provideexplanations of society in terms which emphasise its underlyingunity and cohesiveness. It is a sociology which is essentially con ...cerned with the need for regulation in human affairs; the basicquestions which it asks tend to focus upon the need to understandwhy society is maintained as an entity. It attempts to explain whysociety tends to hold together rather than fall apart. It is interestedin understanding the social forces which prevent the Hobbesianvision of 'war of all against all' becoming a reality. The work ofDurkheim with its emphasis upon the nature of social cohesion andsolidarity, for example, provides a clear and comprehensiveillustration of a concern for the sociology of regulation.

The 'sociology ofradieal change' stands in stark contrast to the'sociology of regulation', in that its basic concern is to findexplanations for the radical change, deep-seated structural con-flict, modes of domination and structural contradiction which itstheorists see as characterising modern society. It is a sociologywhich is essentially concerned with man's emancipation from thestructures which limit and stunt his potential for development. Thebasic questions which it asks focus upon the deprivation of man,both material and psychic. It is often visionary and Utopian, in thatit looks towards potentiality as much as actuality; it is concernedwith what is possible rather than with what is; with alternativesrather than with acceptance of the status quo. In these respects it isas widely separate and distant from the sociology of regulation asthe sociology of Marx is separated and distant from the sociologyof Durkheim.

The distinction between these two sociologies can perhaps bebest illustrated in schematic form; extreme points of view arecounter-posed in order to highlight the essential differencesbetween them. Table 2.2 summarises the situation.

We offer this regulation-radical change distinction as thesecond principal dimension of our scheme for analysing socialtheories. Along with the subjective-objective dimensiondeveloped in the previous chapter, we present it as a powerfulmeans for identifying and analysing the assumptions which under-lie social theories in general.

The notions of 'regulation' and 'radical change' have thus farbeen presented in a very rough and extreme form. The two modelsillustrated in Table 2.2 should be regarded as ideal-typicalformulations. The seven elements which we have identified lenetthemselves to a much more rigorous and systematic treatment in


which their overall form and nature is spelt out in detail. We delaythis task until later chapters. Here, we wish to address ourselves tothe broad relationships which exist between the sociologies ofregulation and radical change. We maintain that they presentfundamentally different views and interpretations of the nature ofsociety. They reflect fundamentally different frames of reference.They present themselves, therefore, as alternative models for theanalysis of social processes.

To present the models in this way is to invite criticism along thelines of that levelled at Dahrendorf's work. For example, it couldbe suggested that the two models are the reciprocals of each other- no more than two sides of the same coin - and that relationships

Table 2.2

The regulation-radical change dimension

The soci%l?Y of REGULATION The soci%l?Y of RADICAL CHANGEis concerned with: is concerned with:

(a) The status quo(b) Social order(c) Consensus*(d) Social integration and

cohesion(e) Solidarity(f) Need satisfactiont(g) Actuality

(a) Radical change(b) Structural conflict(c) Modes of domination(d) Contradiction

(e) Emancipation(f) Deprivation(g) Potentiality

Notes* By 'consensus' we mean voluntary and 'spontaneous' agree-ment of opinion.t The term 'need satisfaction' is used to refer to the focus uponsatisfaction of individual or system 'needs'. The sociology ofregulation tends to presume that various social characteristics canbe explained in relation to these needs. It presumes that it ispossible to identify and satisfy human needs within the context ofexisting social systems, and that society reflects these needs. Theconcept of 'deprivation', on the other hand, is rooted in the notionthat the social 'system' prevents human fulfilment; indeed that'deprivation' is created as the result of the status quo. The social'system' is not seen as satisfying needs but as eroding thepossibilities for human fulfilment. It is rooted in the notion thatsociety has resulted in deprivation rather than in gain.


between the sub-elements of each model need not be congruent,that is, an analysis may pay attention to elements of both.

The answer to both criticisms follows our defence ofDahrendorf's work. To conflate the two models and treat them asvariations on a single theme is to ignore or at least to underplay thefundamental differences which exist between them. Whilst it maybe possible to use each model in a diluted form and thus obtain twoanalyses of the middle ground which approximate each other, theymust remain essentially separate, since they are based upon oppos-ing assumptions. Thus, as we have illustrated, to discuss the'functions' of social conflict is to commit oneself to the sociologyof regulation as opposed to that ofradical change. However closeone's position might be to the middle ground, it would seem thatone must always be committed to one side more than another. Thefundamental distinctions between the sociologies of regulation andradical change will become clear from our analysis of theirintellectual development and constituent schools of thought inlater chapters. We conceptualise these two broad sociologicalperspectives in the form of a polarised dimension, recognising thatwhile variations within the context of each are possible, theperspectives are necessarily separate and distinct from each other.

Notes and References1.

2.

3.

Among the numerous theorists primarily concerned with theproblem of order, Dawe cites Parsons (1949), Nisbet (1967),Bramson (1961), Cohen (1968), and Aron (1968).For a discussion of the Marxism versus social sciencedebate, see Shaw (1975). The division between Marxisttheorists and orthodox sociologists is now so deep that theyeither ignore each other completely, or indulge in anexchange of abuse and accusation regarding the politicalconservatism or subversiveness commonly associated withtheir respective points of view. Debate about the intellectualstrengths and weaknesses of their opposing standpoints isconspicuous by its absence.Later in this chapter we suggest that the descriptions of'concern with the status quo' and 'concern for radicalchange' provide more accurate views of the issues involvedhere.


4. Dahrendorr acknowledges Merton's distinction betweenlatent and manifest functions but does not pursue the con-sequence of 'dysfunctions' for the concept of integration(DahrendoIT, 1959, pp. 173-9).

5. Other 'order' theorists who have addressed themselves toDahrendorf's model tend to follow a similar path in theattempt to embrace conflict theory within' their perspective.See, for example, van den Berghe (1%9).

3. Two Dimensions:Four Paradigms

In the previous two chapters we have focused upon some of thekey assumptions which characterise different approaches to socialtheory. We have argued that it is possible to analyse theseapproaches in terms of two key dimensions of analysis, each o~which subsumes a series of related themes. It has been suggestedthat assumptions about the nature of science can be thought of interms of what we call the subjective-objective dimension, andassumptions about the nature of society in terms of a regulation-radical change dimension. In this chapter we wish to discuss the.....•.relationships between the two dimensions and to develop a coher-ent scheme for the analysis of social theory.

We have already noted how sociological debate since the late1960shas tended to ignore the distinctions between the two dimen-sions - in particular, how there has been a tendency to focus uponissues concerned with the subjective-objective dimension and toignore those concerned with the regulation-radical changedimension. Interestingly enough, this focus of attention hascharacterised sociological thought associated with both regulationand radical change. The subjective-objective debate has beenconducted independently within both sociological camps.

Within the sociology of regulation it has assumed the form of a'Jdebate between interpretive sociology and functionalism. In the)'wake of Berger and Luckmann' s treatise on the sociology of know- Iledge (1%6), Garfinkel's work on ethnomethodology (1967) and a !general resurgence of interest in phenomenology, the questionable Istatus of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the \functionalist perspective have become increasingly exposed. The \debate has often led to a polarisation between the two schools oft !thought. '

Similarly, within the context of the sociology of radical changethere has been a division between theorists subscribing to 'subjec-tive' and 'objective' views of society. The debate in many respectstakes its lead from the publication in France in 1%6 and Britain in


1969 of Louis Althusser's work For Marx. This presented thenotion of an 'epistemological break' in Marx's work and emphas-ised the polarisation of Marxist theorists into two camps: thoseemphasising the 'subjective' aspects of Marxism (Lukacs and theFrankfurt School, for example) and those advocating more 'objec-tive' approaches, such as that associated with Althusserian struc-turalism.

Within the context of the sociologies both of regulation andradical change, therefore, the middle to late 1960s witnessed adistinct switch in the focus of attention. The debate between thesetwo sociologies which had characterised the early 1960s disap-peared and was replaced by an introverted dialogue within thecontext of each of the separate schools of thought. Instead of'speaking' to each other they turned inwards and addressed theirremarks to themselves. The concern to sort out their position withregard to what we call the subjective-objective dimension, acomplicated process in view of all the interrelated strands, led to aneglect of the regulation-radical change dimension.

As a consequence of these developments, recent debate hasoften been confused. Sociological thought has tended to be charac-terised by a narrow sectarianism, from which an overall perspec-tive and grasp of basic issues are conspicuously absent. The time isripe for consideration of the way ahead, and we submit that the twokey dimensions of analysis which we have identified define criticalparameters within which this can take place. We present them as

THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGEr---- ------ - -- ---- ---.,I II II II 'Radical 'Radical I: humanist' structuralist':I II I

SUBJECTIVE I OBJECTIVEI II II II 'Interpretive' 'Functionalist' II II II II I~ J

THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION

Figure 3.1 Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory

Two Dimensions: Four ParadiRms 23

two independent dimensions which resurrect the sociologicalissues of the early 1960s and place them alongside those ofthe late1960s and early 1970s. Taken together, they define four distinctsociological paradigms which can be utilised for the analysis of awide range of social theories. The relationship between theseparadigms, which we label 'radical humanist' , 'radical structural-ist', 'interpretive' and 'functionalist', is illustrated in Figure 3.1.,

It will be clear from the diagram that each of the paradigmsshares a common set of features with its neighbours on the hori-zontal and vertical axes in terms of one ofthe two dimensions but isdifferentiated on the other dimension. For this reason they shouldbe viewed as contiguous but separate - contiguous because of theshared characteristics, but separate because the differentiation is,as we shall demonstrate later, of sufficient importance to warranttreatment of the paradigms as four distinct entities. The four para-digms define fundamentally different perspectives for the analysisof social phenomena. They approach this endeavour from con-trasting standpoints and generate quite different concepts andanalytical tools. /

The Nature and Uses of the Four ParadigmsBefore going on to discuss the substantive nature of each of theparadigms, it will be as well to pay some attention to the way inwhich we intend the notion of 'paradigm' to be used.l We regardlour four paradigms as being defined by very basic meta-theoreticalassumptions which underwrite the frame of reference, mode of}theorising and modus operandi of the social theorists who operate/;

. within them. It is a term which is intended to emphasise theYl., com~onality of p,erspective which binds the work of asr0UJ' ofr lIJeonsls log:-lnenD ~uc!Ja way tnat Mey can be usefuHy regardedas approa~hmg SOCIaltheory within the bounds of the same

l{Qbkt\\a\.\~•This ueYmitionuoes not imply comp\ete unity of thought. It

• allows for the fact that within the context of any given paradigm, there will be much debate between theorists who adopt differ~nt""standpoints, The paradigm does, however, have an underlymg: 'unity in terms of its basic and often 'taken for granted' as sump-I tions, which separate a group of theorists in a very fundamental

\ way from theorists located in other paradigms. ~he '~nity' of theparadigm thus derives from reference to alternatIve vIews of real·

24 Sociolo!?ical Paradi!?ms and Or!?anisational Analysis

ity which lie outside its boundaries and which may not necessarilyeven be recognised as existing.

In identifying four paradigms in social theory we are in essencesuggesting that it is meaningful to examine work in the subject areain terms of four sets of basic assumptions. Each set identifies aquite separate social-scientific reality. To be located in a particularparadigm is to view the world in a particular way. The four para-digms thus define four views of the social world based upon differ-

('- lent ~a-theoret~ssumptions with regard to the nature ofscience aIi<t"or-s-ociety.

It is our contention that all social theorists can be located withinthe context of these four paradigms according to the meta-theoretical assumptions reflected in their work. The four para-digms taken together provide a map for negotiating the subjectarea, which offers a convenient means of identifying the basicsimilarities and differences between the work of various theoristsand, in particular, the underlying frame of reference which theyadopt. It also provides a convenient way of locating one's ownpersonal frame of reference with regard to social theory, and thus ameans of understanding why certain theories and perspectivesmay have more personal appeal than others. Like any other.map, it'1-provides a tool for establishing where you are, where you have!been and where it is possible to go in the future. It provides a tool:for mapping intellectualjourneys in social theory - one's own and'those of the theorists who have contributed to the subject area.

In this work we intend to make much use of the map-like qual-ities of the four paradigms. Each defines a range of intellectualterritory. Given the overall meta-theoretical assumptions whichdistinguish one paradigm from another, there is room for muchvariation within them. Within the context of the 'functionalist'paradigm, for example, certain theorists adopt more extreme posi-tions in terms of one or both of the two dimensions than others.Such differences often account for the internal debate which goeson between theorists engaged in the activities of 'normal science'within the context of the same paradigm. 2 The remaining chaptersof this work examine each of the four paradigms in some detail andattempt to locate their principal theorists in these terms.

Our research suggests that whilst the activity within the contextof each paradigm is often considerable, inter-paradigmatic'journeys' are much rarer. This is in keeping with Kuhn's (1970)notion of 'revolutionary science'. For a theorist to switch para-digms calls for a change in meta-theoretical assumptions, some-thing which, although manifestly possible, is not often achieved in

Two Dimensions: Four Paradigms 25

practice. As Keat and Urry put it, 'For individual scientists, thechange of allegiance from one paradigm to another is often a"conversion experience", akin to Gestalt-switches or changes ofreligious faith' (1975, p. 55). When a theorist does shift his positionin this way, it stands out very clearly as a major break with hisintellectual tradition and is heralded as being so in the literature, inthat the theorist is usually welcomed by those whom he has joinedand often disowned by his former 'paradigm colleagues' . Thus wewitness what is known as the 'epistemological break' between thework of the young Marx and the mature Marx - what we wouldidentify as a shift from the radical humanist paradigm to the radicalstructuralist paradigm. At the level of organisational analysis, at'·....!'distinct paradigm shift can be detected in the work of Silverman - •a shift from the functionalist paradigm to the interpretive paradigm. We will analyse such intellectual journeys in more detail i .."later chapters. ./

Before we progress to a review of the four paradigms, one pointis worthy of further emphasis. This relates to the fact that the fourparadigms are mutually exclusive. They offer alternative views ofsocial reality, and to understand the nature of all four is to under-stand four different views of society. They offer different ways ofseeing. A synthesis is not possible, since in their pure forms theyare contradictory, being based on at least one set of opposingmeta-theoretical assumptions. They are alternatives, in the sensethat one can operate in different paradigms sequentially over time,but mutually exclusive, in the sense that one cannot operate inmore than one paradigm at any given point in time, since in accept-ing the assumptions of one, we defy the assumptions of all theothers.

We offer the four paradigms for consideration in these terms, inthe hope that knowledge of the competing points of view will atleast make us aware of the boundaries within which we approachour subject.

The Functionalist ParadigmThis paradigm has provided the dominant framework for the con) \duct of academic sociology and the study of organisations. Itrepresents a perspective which is firmly rooted in the sociology of \regulation and approaches its subject matter from an objectivist \point of view. Functionalist theorists have been at the forefront of :


the order-conflict debate, and the concepts which we have usedto categorise the sociology of regulation apply in varying degreesto all schools of thought within the paradigm. It is characterised bya concern for providing explanations of the status quo, socialorder, consensus, social integration, solidarity, need satisfactionand actuality. It approaches these general sociological concernsfrom a standpoint which tends to be realist, positivist, determinist

. and nomothetic.? The functionalist paradigm generates regulative sociology in its

most fully developed form. In its overall approach it seeks toprovide essentially rational explanations of social affairs. It is aperspective which is highly pragmatic in orientation, concerned tounderstand society in a way which generates knowledge which canbe put to use. It is often problem-orientated in approach, con-cerned to provide practical solutions to pr~ctical problems. It isusually firmly committed to a philosophy ofsocial engineering as abasis of social change and emphasises the importance of under-standing order, equilibrium and stability in society and the way inwhich these can be maintained. It is concerned with the effective'regulation' and control of social affairs.

As will be apparent from our discussion in Chapter 1 theapproach to social science characteristic of the functionalist para-digm is rooted in the tradition of sociological positivism. Thisreflects the attempt, par excellence, to apply the models andmethods of the natural sciences to the study of human affairs.Originating in France in the early decades of the nineteenthcentury, its major influence upon the paradigm has been throughthe work of social theorists such as Auguste Comte, HerbertSpencer, Emile Durkheim and Vilfredo Pareto. The functionalistapproach to social science tends to assume that the social world iscomposed of relatively concrete empirical artefacts and relation-ships which can be identified, studied and measured throughapproaches derived from the natural sciences. The use of mechan-ical and biological analogies as a means of modelling and under-standing the social world is particularly favoured in manyfunctionalist theories. By way of illustration consider, for exam-ple, the work of Durkheim. Central to his position was the idea that'social facts' exist outside of men's consciousness and restrainmen in their everyday activities. The aim was to understand therelationships between these 'objective' social facts and to articu-late the sociology which explained the types of 'solidarity' provid-ing the 'social cement' which holds society together. The stabilityand ordered nature of the natural world was viewed as characteris-


ing the world of human affairs. For Durkheim, the task oflsociology was to understand the nature of this regulated order. I'

Since the early decades of the twentieth century, however, thefunctionalist paradigm has been increasingly influenced by ele-ments from the German idealist tradition of social thought. As willbe recalled from our discussion in Chapter I, this approach reflectsassumptions about the nature of social science which stand inopposition to those of sociological positivism. As a result of thework of such theorists as Max Weber, George Simmel and GeorgeHerbert Mead, elements of this idealist approach have been util-ised within the context of social theories which have attempted tobridge the gulf between the two traditions. In so doing they haveforged theoretical perspectives characteristic ofthe least objectiv-ist region of the paradigm, at its junction with the interpretiveparadigm. Such theories have rejected the use of mechanical andbiological analogies for studying the social world and haveintroduced ideas which place emphasis upon the importance ofunderstanding society from the point of view of the actors who areactually engaged in the performance of social activities.

Since the 1940s there has been also an infusion of certain Marxistinfluences characteristic of the sociology of radical change. Thesehave been incorporated within the paradigm in an attempt to'radicalise' functionalist theory and rebuff the general charge that

THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGEr---------- ----------1I II II I: Marxist II theory II II I

SUBJECTIVE' I OBJECTIVEI II I

I German ~ III Iidealism

L ~~_ jTHE SOCIOLOGY OFREGULATION Sociological

positivism

Figure 3.2 Intellectual influences upon the functionalist paradigm


f functionalism is essentially conservative and unable to provideexplanations for social change. These attempts underwrite the

-oebate examined in the previous chapter as to whether a theory of'conflict' can be incorporated within the bounds of a theory of'order' to provide adequate explanations of social affairs.

Put very crudely, therefore, the formation of the functionalistparadigm can be understood in terms of the interaction of threesets of intellectual forces, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Of these,sociological positivism has been the most influential. The compet-ing traditions have been sucked in and used within the context ofthe functionalist problematic, which emphasises the essentiallyobjectivist nature of the social world and a concern for explana-tions which emphasise 'regulation' in social affairs. These cross-currents of thought have given rise to a number of distinctiveschools of thought within the paradigm, which is characterised bya wide range of theory and internal debate. By way of overview,again somewhat crudely, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the fourparadigms in terms of the constituent schools of sociological andorganisational theory which we shall be exploring later on. As willbe apparent, most organisation theorists, industrial sociologists,psychologists and industrial relations theorists approach their sub·ject from within the bounds of the functionalist paradigm.

The Interpretive Paradigm/'";Theorists located within the context of the interpretive paradigmIadopt an approach consonant with the tenets of what we havei described as the sociology of~{)n, though its subjectivist! approach to the arnrr-ySiSOflfie social world makes its links with

~

iS sociology often implicit rather than explicit. The interpretiv'eparadigm is informed by a concern to understand the world as it is,to understand the fundamental nature of the social world at the

Ilevel of subjective experience. It seeks explanation within theI,realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity, within theframe of reference ofthe participant as opposed to the observer of

~ction., In its approach to social science it tends to be nominalist, anti-

positivist, voluntarist and ideographic. It sees the social world asan emergent social process which is created by the individualsconcerned. Social reality, insofar as it is recognised to have anyexistence outside the consciousness of any single individual, isregarded as being little more than a network of assumptions and

THE SOCIOLOGYOF RADICAL CHANGE

Phenomeno-logical

sociology

SUBJECTIVE

SoI

p

sI

sm

Phenomenology Hermeneutics Integrativetheory

Interactionlsmand social

action theory

Socialsystemtheory

Russiansocialtheory

Objectivism

Figure 3.3 The four sociological paradigms

SUBJECTIVE

THE SOCIOLOGYOF REGULATION

Theoriesof

bu reaucraticdvsfunctions

Socialsvstemtheorv

Objectivism

Figure 3.4 The main schools of organisational analysis


intersubjectively shared meanings. The ontological status of thesocial world is viewed as extremely questionable and problematicas far as theorists located within the interpretive paradigm areconcerned. Everyday life is accorded the status of a miraculousachievement. Interpretive philosophers and sociologists seek tounderstand the very basis and source of social reality. They oftendelve into the depths of human consciousness and subjectivity intheir quest for the fundamental meanings which underlie sociallife.

Given this view of social reality, it is hardly surprising that the\commitment of the interpretive sociologists to the sociology ofregulation is implicit rather than explicit. Their ontologica~/assumptions rule out a direct interest in the issues involved in theorder-conflict debate as such. However, their standpoint isunderwritten by the assumption that the world of human affairs iscohesive, ordered and integrated. The problems of conflict,domination, contradiction, potentiality and change play no part intheir theoretical framework. They are much more orientatedtowards obtaining an understanding of the subjectively created

~

Ocial world 'as it is' in terms of an ongoing process.Interpretive sociology is concerned with understanding the

essence of the everyday world. In terms of our analytical schema itis underwritten by an involvement with issues relating to the:nature of the status quo. social order. consensus, social integra-tion and cohesion, solidarity and actuality. 3

\ The interpretive paradigm is the direct product of the Germanidealist tradition of social thought. Its foundations were laid in thework of Kant and reflect a social philosophy which emphasises theessentially spiritual nature of the social world. The idealist tradi-tion was paramount in Germanic thought from the mid-eighteenthcentury onwards and was closely linked with the romantic move-ment in literature and the arts. Outside this realm, however, it wasoflimited interest, until revived in the late 1890s and early years ofthis century under the influence of the so-called neo-idealistmovement. Theorists such as Dilthey, Weber, Husserl and Schutzhave made a major contribution towards establishing it as aframework for social analysis, though with varying degrees ofcommitment to its underlying problematic.

Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the manner in which the paradigmhas been explored as far as our present interest in social theory andthe study of organisations is concerned. Whilst there have been asmall number of attempts to study organisational concepts andsituations from this point of view. the paradigm has not generated


much organisation theory as such. As will become clear from ouranalysis, there are good reasons for this. The premises of theinterpretive paradigm question whether organisations exist in any-thing but a conceptual sense. Its significance for the study oforganisations, therefore, is of the most fundamental kind. Itchallenges the validity of the ontological assumptions whichunderwrite functionalist approaches to sociology in general andthe study of organisations in particular.

The Radical Humanist ParadigmThe radical humanist paradigm is defined by its concern to developa sociology of radical change from a subjectivist standpoint. Itsapproach to social science has much in common with that of theinterpretive paradigm, in that it views the social world from aperspective which tends to be nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntar-ist and ideographic. However, its frame of reference is committedto a view of society which emphasises the importance of over-throwing or transcending the limitations of existing socialarrangements.

One of the most basic notions underlying the whole of thisparadigm is that the consciousness of man is dominated by theideological superstructures with which he interacts, and that thesedrive a cognitive wedge between himself and his true conscious-ness. This wedge is the wedge of 'alienation' or 'false conscious-ness', which inhibits or prevents true human fulfilment. The majorconcern for theorists approaching the human predicament in theseterms is with release from the constraints which existing socialarrangements place upon human development. It is a brand ofsocial theorising designed to provide a critique of the status quo. It .tends to view society as anti-human and it is concerned to articu-late ways in which human beings can transcend the spiritual bonds.and fetters which tie them into existing social patterns and thusrealise their full potential.I In terms of the elements with which we have sought to concep-itualise the sociology of radical change, the radical humanist placesImost emphasis upon radical change, modes of domination, eman-.cipation, deprivation and potentiality. The concepts of structuralconflict and contradiction do not figure prominently within thisperspective, since they arc characteristic of more objectivist viewsof the social world, such as those presented within the context of

.the radical structuralist paradigm.


In keeping with its subjectivist approach to social science, theradicalhumanist perspective places central emphasis upon humanconsciousness. Its intellectual foundations can be traced to thesame source as that of the interpretive paradigm. It derives fromtheGerman idealist tradition, particularly as expressed in the workof Kant and Heg~ (though as reinterpreted in the writings of theyoungMarx). It is through Marx that the idealist tradition was firstutilised as a basis for a radical social philosophy, and many radicalhumanists have derived their inspiration from this source. Inessence Marx inverted the frame of reference reflected in Hegelianidealism and thus forged the basis for radical humanism. Theparadigm has also been much influenced by an infusion of thephenomenological perspective deriving from Husser!.

As we shall illustrate in our detailed discussion of this paradigm,apart from the early work of Marx, interest remained dormant untilthe 1920s, when Lukacs and.Gramsci revived interest in subjectiv-ist interpretations of Marxist theory. This interest was taken on bymembers of the so-called Frankfurt School, which has generated agreat deal of debate, particularly through the writings of Habermasand Marcuse. The existentialist philosophy of Sartre also belongsto this paradigm, as do the writings of a group of social theorists aswidely diverse as lIIich, Castaneda and Laing. All in their variousways share a common concern for the release of consciousnessand experience from domination by various aspects of the ideolog-ical superstructure of the social world within which men live outtheir lives. They seek to change the social world through a changein modes of cognition and consciousness.

Figures 3.3 and 3.4 again provide a somewhat rough and readysummary ofthe manner in which this paradigm has been exploredinterms of social theory and the study of organisations. As we shallargue in Chapter 9, the writers who have something to say onorganisations from this perspective have laid the basis of a nascentanti-organisation theory. The radical humanist paradigm inessence is based upon an inversion of the assumptions whichdefine the functionalist paradigm. It should be no surprise, there-fore, that anti-organisation theory inverts the problematic whichdefines functionalist organisation theory on almost every count.

The Radical Structuralist ParadigmTheorists located within this paradigm advocate a sociology ofradical change from an objectivist standpoint. Whilst sharing an


approach to science which has many similarities with that offunc-~ionalist theory, it is directed at fundamentally different ends.

/Radical structuralism is committed to radical change, emancipa-tion, and potentiality, in an analysis which emphasises structural

l conflict, modes of domination, contradiction and deprivation. It\ approaches these general concerns from a standpoint which tends

to be realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic.Whereas the radical humanists forge their perspective by focus-

ing upon 'consciousness' as the basis for a radical critique of!society, the radical structuralists concentrate upon structural reia-\tionships within a realist social world. They emphasise the fact thatiradical change is built into the very nature and structure of con-[temporary society, and they seek to provide explanations of thejbasic interrelationships within the context of total social forma-tions. There is a wide range of debate within the paradigm, anddifferent theorists stress the role of different social forces as ameans of explaining social change. Whilst some focus directlyupon the deep-seated internal contradictions, others focus uponthe structure and analysis of power relationships. Common to alltheorists is the view that contemporary society is characterised byfundamental conflicts which generate radical change throughpolitical and economic crises. It is through such conflict andchange that the emancipation of men from the social structures inwhich they live is seen as coming about.

This paradigm owes its major intellectual debt to the work of themature Marx, after the so-called 'epistemological break' in hiswork. It is the paradigm to which Marx turned after a decade ofactive political involvement and as a result of his increasing inter-est in Darwinian theories of evolution and in political economy.Marx's basic ideas have been subject to a wide range of interpret a-tions in the hands of theorists who have sought to follow his lead.Among these Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and Bukharin have beenparticularly influential. Among the leading exponents of the radi-cal structuralist position outside the realm of Russian socialtheory, the names of Althusser, Poulantzas, Colletti and variousMarxist sociologists of the New Left come to mind. Whilst theinfluence of Marx upon the radical structuralist paradigm isundoubtedly dominant, it is also possible to identify a strongWeberian influence. As we shall argue in later chapters, in recentyears a group of social theorists have sought to explore the inter-face between the thought of Marx and Weber and have generated adistinctive perspective which we describe as 'conflict theory'. It isto this radical structuralist perspective that the work of Dahren-


dorf belongs, along with that of other theorists such as Rex andMiliband.

Figures 3.3 and 3.4 again provide a general overview of theschools of thought located within the paradigm, which we shall beexamining in some detail in Chapters 10 and 11. In British andAmerican sociology the radical structuralist view has receivedrelatively little attention outside the realm of conflict theory. Thisparadigm, located as it is within a realist view of the social world,has many significant implications for the study of organisations,but they have only been developed in the barest forms. In Chapter11we review the work which has been done and the embryonicradical orRanisation theory which it reflects.

Exploring Social TheorySo much, then, for our overview of the four paradigms. Sub-sequent chapters seek to place flesh upon the bones of this analyti-cal scheme and attempt to demonstrate its power as a tool forexploring social theory. 4 Hopefully, our discussion will do justiceto the essentially complex nature of the paradigms and the networkof assumptions which they reflect, and will establish the relation-ships and links between the various perspectives dominating socialanalysis at the present time. Whilst the focus in Chapters 5,7, 9 and11is upon organisational analysis, the general principles and ideasdiscussed in the work as a whole clearly have relevance for theexploration of a wide variety of other social science disciplines.The scope for applying the analytical scheme to other fields ofstudy is enormous but unfortunately lies beyond the scope of ourpresent enquiry. However, readers interested in applying thescheme in this way should find little difficulty in proceeding fromthe sociological analyses presented in Chapters 4,6,8, and 10to ananalysis of the literature in their own sphere of specialised interest.

Notes and References1. For a full discussion of the role of paradigms in scientific

development, see Kuhn (1970). In his analysis, paradigms aredefined as 'universally recognised scientific achievementsthat for a time provide model problems and solutions to a


community of practitioners' (p. viii). Paradigms are regardedas governing the progress of what is called 'normal science',in which 'the scientist's work is devoted to the articulationand wider application of the accepted paradigm, which is notitself questioned or criticised. Scientific problems areregarded as puzzles, as problems which are known to have asolution within the framework of assumptions implicitly orexplicitly embodied in the paradigm. If a puzzle is not solved,the fault lies in the scientist, and not in the paradigm' (Keatand Urry 1975, p. 55). 'Normal science' contrasts with rela-tively brief periods of 'revolutionary science' , in which 'thescientist is confronted by increasingly perplexing anomalies,which call into question the paradigm itself. Scientific revolu-tion occurs when a new paradigm emerges, and becomesaccepted by the scientific community' (ibid., p. 55).

We are using the term 'paradigm' in a broader sense thanthat intended by Kuhn. Within the context of the presentwork we are arguing that social theory can be convenientlyunderstood in terms of the co-existence of four distinct andrival paradigms defined by very basic meta-theoreticalassumptions in relation to the nature of science and society.'Paradigms', 'problematics', 'alternative realities', 'framesof reference', 'forms of life' and 'universe of discourse' areall related conceptualisations although of course they are notsynonymous.

2. Some inter-paradigm debate is also possible. Giddens main-tains 'that all paradigms ... are mediated by others' and thatwithin 'normal science' scientists are aware of other para-digms. He posits that: 'The process of learning a para-digm ... is also the process of learning what that paradigm isnot' (1976, pp. 142-4).

Interestingly, he confines his discussion to the mediationof one paradigm by another one. We believe that a model offour conflicting paradigms within sociology is more accurateand that academics' knowledge of 'scientists' within theother three paradigms is likely to be very sketchy in somecases. Relations between paradigms are perhaps betterdescribed in terms of 'disinterested hostility' rather than'debate' .

3. The notion of need satisfaction derives from the use of abiological analogy of an organism and plays no part ininterpretive sociology.

4. The sociological concerns of recent years have resulted in a


number of works which have aimed to chart a path throughthe social science literature by reducing the variables ofsociological analysis to a number of key dimensions. Thoseof Dahrendorf (1959), Wallace (1%9), Gouldner (1970),Friedrichs (1970), Dawe (1970), Robertson (1974), Keat andUrry (1975), Strasser (1976) and Benton (1977) all readilycome to mind. In a sense our work adds to this literature. Hadspace permitted, we would have liked to demonstrate theprecise way in which the schemes proposed by these variousauthors all fall, in a partial way, within the bounds of thescheme developed here.

burrell sociological paradigms pp1-37

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